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ISBN 978-960-7905-44-4

Κέντρον Ἑλληνικῆς καὶ Ρωμαϊκῆς Ἀρχαιότητος
τοῦ Ἐθνικοῦ Ἰδρύματος Ἑρευνῶν
Βασιλέως Κωνσταντίνου 48 - 116 35 Ἀθήνα - τηλ.: 210 72 73 673

Ἐκτύπωση: Γραφικὲς Τέχνες «Γ. Ἀργυρόπουλος ΕΠΕ»
Κ. Παλαμᾶ 13, Καματερό - Ἀθήνα
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BETWEEN CITY AND KING

Prosopographical Studies on the Intermediaries
Between the Cities of the Greek Mainland and the Aegean
and the Royal Courts in the Hellenistic Period (322-190 BC)

ΚΕΝΤΡΟΝ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΡΩΜΑΪΚΗΣ ΑΡΧΑΙΟΤΗΤΟΣ
ΕΘΝΙΚΟΝ ΙΔΡΥΜΑ ΕΡΕΥΝΩΝ

RESEARCH CENTRE FOR GREEK AND ROMAN ANTIQUITY
NATIONAL HELLENIC RESEARCH FOUNDATION

ΜΕΛΕΤΗΜΑΤΑ

59

DIFFUSION DE BOCCARD - 11, RUE DE MEDICIS, 75006 PARIS

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ATHENS 2008

PREFACE

This book is a revised version of my PhD thesis, submitted to the Department of History of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens in 2003 (in Greek).¹ In writing this book I have tried to take into consideration books and articles which were published in the meantime, mostly until late 2007; other than that, I have made several changes to the content, but few changes to the structure of the original thesis. I have to admit that I originally entertained the idea of including a number of more theoretical approaches to the material studied in my thesis. I soon realized, however, that such an endeavour would have made an already μέγα βιβλίον resembling a μέγα κακόν even more; accordingly, I had to limit myself to the original scope of the thesis, namely the study of the career of intermediaries and the exploration of their structural role in the relationship between city and king in the Early Hellenistic period. I hope I shall have the opportunity to return to the subject through different approaches in the future.

The list of people to whom I am grateful for helping me in various ways over all these years is quite long; to my failure to ever have properly expressed my gratitude to them, I shall now add the sin of forgetting many of them. Beginning with my years in the University, I would like to thank all the members of the examination committee for their valuable comments and encouragement, as well as the librarians and the administrative personnel of the University for facilitating my studies in various ways. Research for my thesis and for this book would have been impossible without the wonderful libraries of the École Française d'Athènes and the American School of Classical Studies at Athens; my warmest thanks go to their past and present directors and to their helpful personnel. Prof. Angelos Chaniotis was a gracious host at the University of Heidelberg during my six-month stay there in 2000, which was funded by the Greek State Scholarships Foundation. Moving to my years in KERA, I would like to take this opportunity to thank Niki Eisangelea, Soula Soulioti, Kostas Tremountanis and Sophia Saroglidou, for respectively providing secretarial, administrative, technical and librarian support, without which any scholarly activity at this –or any other– Institute would have been impossible. I would also like to thank Dimitra Stathaki, Athena Iakovidou

¹ Μεταξύ βασιλέως και πόλεως. Μελέτες σε προσωπογραφική βάση για τους ανθρώπινους συνδέσμους ανάμεσα στις πόλεις του ελλαδικού χώρου και τα ελληνιστικά βασίλεια (322-190 π.Χ.).

and Irene Kalogridou, for help with the indexes, bibliographical research and other chores pertaining to the final production of this book, and Myrina Kalaitzi, who bravely undertook the task of attempting to improve my English in an impossibly short period of time.

My deepest gratitude goes to my two teachers –who not only taught me much, but also provided me with a live example of rigorous scholarship. To the director of the Institute, Prof. Miltiades B. Hatzopoulos, I owe gratitude for a number of reasons; to limit myself to what is relevant to this study, he graciously offered me the time I needed in order to complete my thesis, he was always more than willing to answer my many questions, and consented to include this book in the Μελετήματα series, bravely disregarding the danger of a missed deadline. To my University teacher, Prof. Kostas Buraselis, I owe my pursuits in ancient history in general. Without his insistence that I become an historian, his patient but uncompromising persistence in correcting my many mistakes, and his warm personal interest in seeing my labour finally coming to fruition, even long after the completion of my thesis, this book would not have been possible to write.

Finally, I think it would be wiser to spare my wife Eftychia and my son Yannis from words that would only be a thoroughly inadequate recompense for the long hours I spent in front of the computer screen instead of spending them with my loved ones.

Athens, June 2008

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE	7-8
INTRODUCTION	19-34

I. PROSOPOGRAPHICAL CATALOGUE

A. ATHENS

FROM THE DEFEAT AT KRANNON TO THE 'LIBERATION' BY POLIORKETES (322-307)

A1. Archedikos son of Naukritos of Lamptraï	37-39
A2. Demades son of Demeas of Paiania	40-49
A3. Phokion son of Phokos (of Potamos?)	49-57
A4. Demetrios son of Phanostratos of Phaleron	58-65
A5. *Xenokrates son of Agathenor of Chalkedon	65-67
A6. Kallimedon son of Kallikrates of Kollytos	67-68
A7. Demeas son of Demades of Paiania	68
A8. Konon son of Timotheos of Anaphlystos	68
A9. Klearchos son of Nausikles of Aigilia	68-69
A10. Hegemon	69
A11. *Solon of Plataia	69
A12. Deinarchos (of Corinth or Athens)	69-70
A13. Hagnonides son of Nikoxenos of Pergase	70-72
A14. Archestratos	72
A15. Ktesias son of Chionides	72-73
A16. Polyeyktos son of Sostratos of Sphettos	73-74
A17. Thymochares son of Phaidros of Sphettos	74-76
A18. Thrasykles son of Nausikrates of Thria	76-78

THE FIRST PERIOD OF POLIORKETES' RULE (307 - 301)

A19. Stratokles son of Euthydemos of Diomeia	78-106
A20-30. The dedicants of IG II ² 3424	106-107
A31. Xenokles son of Xeinis of Sphettos	107-109
A32. Kleainetos	109
A33. Chionides of Thria	109
A34. Kalaidēs son of Lytides of Xypete	109-110
A35. Philostratos son of Philostratos of Kephisia	110-112
A36. Archedemos son of Euphron of Rhamnous — A37. Apollonios	112-113

TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE AND DEFEAT (301-262)

A38. Philippides son of Philomelos of Paiania	113-115
A39. Poseidippos son of Bakchios of Kothokidai	115-116
A40. Philippides son of Philokles of Kephale	116-125
A41. Lachares	125-129
A42. Dromokleides of Sphettos	129-131

A43. Gorgos son of Phrynichos (?)	131-132
A44. Olympiodoros	133-139
A45. *Theophrastos of Eresos	139-140
A46. Phaidros son of Thymochares of Sphettos	140-145
A47. Kallias son of Thymochares of Sphettos	145-150
A48. *Krates (son of Askondas of Thebes ?)	150-152
A49. Demochares son of Laches of Leukonoion	153-159
A50. Epicharmos son of Kallistratides of Kolonos	159
A51. [Memnon son of Memnon ?] of Aphidnai	159-160
A52. Nikeratos son of Phileas of Kephale	160
A53. Komeas son of Chaireas of Lamptraï	160-161
A54. Eucharos son of Euarchos of Konthyle	162
A55-56. Glaukon and Chremonides sons of Eteokles of Aithale	162-170
A57. Aristo[---]	170-172
UNDER MACEDONIAN RULE (262-229)	
A58. Thrason son of Thrason of Anakaia	172-173
A59. Demetrios son of Phanostratos of Phaleron	173-175
A60. Lyandros son of Apollodoros of Anaphlystos	175
A61. Apollodoros son of Apollodoros of Otryne	175-176
A62. Herakleitos son of Asklepiades of Athmonon	177-179
A63. [---] of Leukonoion	179-181
A64. Lykomedes son of Diochares of Konthyle	181
A65. Chairedemos son of Epicharinos of Kolonos	182
A66. [---] son of [---]machos of Xypete	182-183
A67. Ameinokles son of Tachyllos of Kydathenaioi	183
A68. Elpinikos son of Mnesippos of Rhamnous	183-185
A69. Apollonios of Thria — A70. Dikaiarchos son of Apollonios of Thria	185-186
FROM INDEPENDENCE TO ROME (229-192)	
A71-72. Eurykleides and Mikion sons of Mikion of Kephisia	187-194
A73. Ktesias of Thorikos — A74. Chaireas son of Archeneos of Pallene	194
A75. *Prytanis son of Astykleides of Karystos	195-198
A76. Thoukritos son of Alkimachos of Myrrhinous	198-199
A77. Theophrastos	199-200
A78. Demainetos son of Hermokles of Athmonon	200
A79. Asklepiades son of Zenon (of Phyle?)	201
A80. Kephisodoros son of Aristodemos of Xypete	201-203
A81. Demokles	204
A82. Timokles (?) son of Menekrates (of Kikynna?)	204-206
A83. Apollodoros	206-208

B. THE PELOPONNESE

ARGOS

B1. An ancestor of Aristomachos (I)	209-212
B2. Aristetas — B3. Aristippos (I) (son of Aristomachos or Archandros)	212-215
B4. Aristomachos (I) son of Aristippos (I)	215-219
B5. Aristippos (II) son of Aristomachos (I)	219-220
B6. Aristomachos (II) son of Aristomachos (I)	220-224

B7. Orthagoras son of Pythilas of Kleodaidai	224-226
TROIZEN	
B8. Theognetos son of Theoxenos — B9. [---] son of Asklepiades	226-229
SIKYON	
B10. Alexion	229-230
B11. Timokleidas	230-231
B12. The ancestors of Aratos	231-232
B13. Aratos son of Kleinias	233-251
B14. Aratos son of Aratos	251-253
B15-16. Dionysodoros and Deinokrates sons of Deinokrates.....	253-256
SPARTA	
B17. Areus I	256-259
B18. Hippomedon son of Agesilaos	259-260
B19. Kleomenes III	260-262
B20-25. Adeimantos, Polyphontas, Sthenelaos, Alkamenes, Thyestes, Bionidas — B26. Omias — B27. Gyridas — B28. Cheilon	263-269
MESSENA – MESSENE	
B29. Nikodemos (son of Nikarchides?)	269-270
B30. Gorgos (son of Eukletos?)	271-274
MESSENA – KYPARISSIA	
B31. Chariteles	274-275
ARKADIA – MEGALOPOLIS	
B32. Damis	275-276
B33-34. Nikophanes and Kerkidas	276-279
ARKADIA (UNKNOWN CITY)	
B35. [---] son of Philton (?).....	279-280
ELIS	
B36. Thrasyboulos	280-281
B37. Aristotimos son of Damaretos	281-283
B38. Amphidamos	283-284
B39. Kallistratos	284-285
ACHAIA AND THE ACHAIA Koinon	
B40. Timoxenos	285-286
B41. Eperatos of Pharai	286-287
B42. Anaxilaos son of Aristeus of Dyme	287-288
B43. Kykliadas son of Damaretos of Pharai	288-292
B44. Memnon son of Peisias of Pellene	292-293
C. MAINLAND GREECE	
MEGARIS – MEGARA	
C1-6. Phokinos son of Eualkes, Aristotimos son of Menekrates, Damoteles son of Dameas, Theodoros son of Pancharos, Prothymos son of Zeuxis, Timon son of Agathon	295-302
BOIOTIA	
OROPOS	
C7. Amphidemos son of Amphimedes	303-304

C8. Aristomenes son of Meilichos	304-307
C9. Dionysodoros son of Soter	307-308
C10. Neandros son of Neandrides	308-310
C11. Philonautes (?)	310-311
C12. [--- ---]os	311
TANAGRA	
C13. Meilion son of Aphroditos	311
ORCHOMENOS	
C14. Eudikos son of Thion	311
THESPIAI	
C15. P(e)isis son of Charias	312-315
C16. Damaretos — C17. Philainetos— C18. Euphronios	315-319
THEBES	
C19. Krates son of Askondas	319
C20. Askondas — C21. Neon son of Askondas — C22. Brachylles son of Neon	319-323
UNKNOWN CITY	
C23. Damokles (?) son of Nearchos	323
PHOKIS	
ELATEIA	
C24. Xanthippos son of Ampharetos	323-326
ABAI	
C25. Ameinias — C26. Pancharidas — C27. Sotimos — C28. Archedamos — C29. Euanor — C30. Archias — C31. Nikoboulos	326-327
DORIS	
KYTENION	
C32. Lamprias son of Pankles — C33. Ainetos son of Polytas — C34. Phegeus son of Sotion	328-332
AITOLIA	
C35. Sosippos	332-333
C36. Lamios	333
C37-38. Thoas and Dikaiarchos sons of Alexandros of Trichonion	334-338
C39. Nikandros son of Bittos of Trichonion.....	339-341
AKARNANIA	
C40. Aristophantos	341-342
C41. Androkles — C42. Echedamos son of Mnasilochos of Leukas	342-344
C43. Mnasilochos son of Echedamos of Leukas	345-346
C44. Alexandros son of Antiochos	347
THESSALY (196-190)	
MAGNESIA - DEMETRIAS	
C45. Eurylochos	347-348
EPIRUS (232-190)	
C46. Charops son of Machatas, Thesprotian Opatos	349-353

D. THE ISLANDS OF THE AEGEAN

RHODES	
D1. Kallikles son of Teison of Lindos — D2. Anaxipolis (son of Timaratos of Lindos?).....	355-356
D3. Menedemos.....	357-358

D4. Timasitheos son of Dionysios — D5. Epikrates son of Timasistratos	358-359
D6. Nikomachos	359-361
D7. Leonidas son of Archenax of Lindos	361
KOS	
D8. Nikomedes son of Aristandros	361-365
D9. Ka[---]	365-368
D10. Aristolochos son of Zmendron — D11. Makareus son of Aratos	368-370
D12. Phainis — D13. Philophron — D14. Archepolis	370-371
D15. Kaphisophon son of Philippos	371-372
D16. [---]es son of Xa[nthippos?]	373
D17. Diomedon son of Diodotos	373-376
D18. Philinos — D19. Pasiias son of Aristagoras	376-380
D20. Stasilas son of Lykophron	380
KALYMNA	
D21. Nikostratos son of Nikophantos	381
D22. Lyson son of Kai[---]	381-382
SAMOS	
THE AGE OF ANTIGONOS AND DEMETRIOS (CA. 320 - CA. 295)	
D23. Naniskos son of Epigenes	382
D24. [. . .]os son of Ion	383-384
D25. Epikouros son of Zoilos	384-385
D26. Ouliades son of Semokles	385
D27. Theodektes (?) son of Hyblesios	386
D28. [---] son of Hegesion	386
D29. Melouchos son of Myon	386
D30. Molpos son of Pythagoras — D31. Amphidokos son of Skython	387-389
D32. Aspasiios son of Theupropos	389-390
THE AGE OF LYSIMACHOS (295 OR SOON AFTERWARDS - 281)	
D33. Kaios — D34. Douris son of Kaios	391-392
THE AGE OF THE PTOLEMIES (CA. 280 - 221)	
D35. Kallikrates son of Boiskos	393-396
D36. Amphilochochos son of Lokros	396-397
D37. Boulagoras son of Alexes	397-400
D38. Thyon	400-401
BETWEEN THE PTOLEMIES, RHODES AND RHOME (CA. 221 - 197)	
D39. Thales, adopted son of Euelthon and natural son of Herakleides	401-402
D40. Timotheos son of Demainetos	402
CHIOS	
D41. Nikostratos son of Demetrios	402-403
LESBOS – ERESOS	
D42. Damon son of Polyarchos	403-406
D43. Aglanor son of Periandros	406
D44-48. Hermos son of Damonikos – Bakchios son of Hermodikos – Euphanes son of Damarchos – Glaukon son of Menon – Eurylochos son of Bakchios	407-408
NESOS	
D49. Thersippos	408-413

SAMOTHRAKE	
D50. Hegesistratos	413-415
D51. Polychares son of Leochares — D52. Epinikos	415
AMORGOS – MINOA	
D53. Iasidemus son of Mnesis	415-419
D54. [---o]n	419
NAXOS	
D55. [Kalli]as	419-420
IOS	
D56. Archagathos	420
D57. [---] son of [---]damas — D58. [---] son of Alkimedon (?)	421-423
PAROS	
D59. Kydias son of Amiantos — D60. Archephylos son of Leontios	423-424
TENOS	
D61. Kallistagoras son of Isandros (?) — D62. Pantainos son of Sphodrias	424-425
ANDROS	
D63. Kleokritos	425-426
KIMOLOS	
D64. Teles[---]	426
KYTHNOS	
D65. Glaukon (son of Simos?)	427
KEOS	
KARTHAIA	
D66. Aristopeithes (son of Erasikles?)	427-428
D67. Sosinikos son of Isonikos	428-429
KARTHAIA (?)	
D68. Kriton son of Adeimantos — D69-70. Adeimantos and Menippos sons of Kriton — D71. Archelas — D72. Theotelides — D73. Arcestratos	429-432
IOULIS	
D74-78. M[. . .]s — Timostratos — Phrasikydes — Somenes — Kallidamos	433-434
DELOS	
D79. Aristolochos son of Nikodromos	434-438
D80. Tharsynon son of Choirylos	438-439
D81. Achaios son of Phanodikos	439
D82. Mnesalkos son of Telesarchides	439-440
D83. [Kynthiades (?)] son of Teleson	440-442
D84. Synonymos son of Theaios	442-443
D85. Amphikleides son of Amphikleides	443
LEAGUE OF THE ISLANDERS (unknown city)	
D86. Echestratos	443
EUBOIA	
CHALKIS	
D87. Kleoptolemos	444-445
D88. Euboulidas — D89. Philon	445

ERETRIA	
D90. Elpinikos son of Stilbos	446-448
D91. Antiphilos son of Hipparchos of Ptechai	448-449
D92. Archelaos son of Rhe[ximachos of Oinoe]	449-450
D93. Timippos	450-451
D94. Damasias son of Phanokles of Aphareus	451-452
D95. Menedemos son of Kleisthenes	452-456
KARYSTOS	
D96. Aristonikos son of Aristomedes	457-458
CRETE	
ITANOS	
D97. Aigon	459-461
LYTTOS	
D98. Amnatos	461-462
GORTYN	
D99. [---] son of Aristonymos — D100. Paithemidas — D101. [Damasilas?] son of Eurybotas	462-464
APOLLONIA	
D102. [---] son of Tharsyphas	464-465
POLYRRHENIA	
D103. [---] son of Menon	465

II. CONCLUDING REMARKS

1. INTERMEDIARIES AND ROYAL ADMINISTRATION	
1.1. Ancestry, social standing and political experience of the intermediaries.....	469-470
1.2. Initiating the relationship with the court	470-473
1.3. Prior contacts with the court	473-474
1.4. A durable relationship: intermediaries and the courts	474-475
1.5. An unstable relationships: the incomplete subjugation of civic elites to royal power ...	475-477
1.6. Benefits for the intemediaries	477-481
1.7. The use of citizen intermediaries by the royal administration	482-483
1.8. Between city and king: “the human hinges of Hellenism”	483-486
2. INTERMEDIARIES AND THE <i>POLIS</i>	
2.1. Honouring royal officials: the lasting bond of euergetism, seen from the city’s point of view	486-490
2.2. Honouring royal officials: local variations in the general picture	490-493
2.3. Εὐφραεῖς πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολήν: choosing the proper channels of communication with the royal court	493-496
2.4. Local variations regarding the number of interlocutors with the royal authorities	496-499
2.5. Cities and intermediaries: a tale of conflicting interests	499-501
3. INTERMEDIARIES AND HELLENISTIC SOCIETY	501-505

APPENDICES

1. The context of the honours accorded to Asandros by the Athenians in February 313 (Osborne 1981: D42)	507-509
2. The <i>agonothesai</i> of Glaukon son of Eteokles (<i>IG II² 3079</i>), and the Panathenaia of 286/5 (?) (<i>SEG 28 [1978] 60</i> , ll. 64-66)	510-513

3. The Athenian generalships of the countryside, and the forts of Attica from 255 to 229 ..	513-521
4. Sacrifices performed by the Athenians for kings Antigonos Gonatas, Demetrios II (?) and in honour of the <i>Soteres</i> (Antigonos I and Demetrios Poliorketes), 262-229	521-523
5. Aratos' trip to Egypt and his choice of allegiance between the courts of Pella and Alexandria in the period 250-245	523-532
6. The date of the nesiarch Apollodoros	532-534
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND ABBREVIATIONS	535-566
INDEXES	567-611

INTRODUCTION

There is obviously no need to emphasize the commonplace that the relationship between cities and Hellenistic kingdoms is one of the core problems of the period.¹ In the south Balkans and on both coasts of the Aegean, the world of the *poleis* (in which, for the purposes of this study, I also include the *koina* of the southern Greek mainland),² formed the main kind of state formation with which the Hellenistic kingdoms³ were confronted –if not on the level of political, military and financial power, then certainly on the level of institutional stability and ideology. The confrontation became even more complex because of the failure of Hellenistic kingdoms to create a thorough, unitary and unifying set of institutions and ideology. This should not be taken to mean that the kings did not possess political and ideological mechanisms to enforce their power. On the contrary, they had a wide

¹ Among a myriad of formulations, allow me to single out the views of one of the leading experts on the period in the latter half of the twentieth century, namely Édouard Will (1988: 329-35, especially 335).

² On the typology of Greek state formations, see Hatzopoulos 1996: I 487-96, with earlier bibliography; for the reasons for which I excluded the confederate states of northern Greece from this study, see p. 32-33, below. I do not underestimate the huge differences between a *polis* and a *koinon*, or those between an autonomous *polis* and a member state of a *koinon*. Nevertheless, as far as the main focus of this study is concerned, that is, the personal strategies of civic leaders and other civic intermediaries between the royal administration and other state formations, as well as the personal aspects of formal and informal diplomacy, differences are negligible.

³ In the Hellenistic kingdoms I also include Macedonia, despite its singularity of combining an old and established institutional and ideological structure with the new needs of the Hellenistic world. The power relationship between the Seleukid or the Ptolemaic throne and the political entities in their realm generally remained ‘external’, in the sense that the main pole of power –the king and the royal administration– and his subjects remained structurally distinct entities, even if the latter were usually seen as belonging to the king’s πράγματα. On the contrary, the kings of the Macedonians found themselves in a peculiar position: on the one hand, they belonged to, represented and led a distinct community (the Macedonians), while on the other they attempted to create personal ‘Hellenistic’ relations of power with other statal entities –not as kings of the Macedonians, but simply as kings. Obviously, it is only the latter kind of relations which will interest us here. This means that I shall not be dealing with the relationship of the Macedonian kings with Macedonian cities, nor with cities which were direct possessions of the Macedonian throne, as Thessaly was until 196. It should also be obvious that some of the observations which follow on the institutional inadequacy of the Hellenistic kingdoms do not apply to Macedonia, but they do apply to the Macedonian throne in its relationship with the rest of the Greek world.

array of pre-existing structures at their disposal (Macedonian kingdom, Achaemenid kingdom, Pharaonic Egypt, other traditional Greek forms of personal leadership), on which they drew and which they re-interpreted, integrating into a functional aggregate a number of means of enforcing power to subjects, subjugated states and allies, and to Greeks and non-Greeks alike.¹ Nevertheless, although the monarchs' charisma – a quality in perpetual need of confirmation – may partly explain the alliance with, or subjugation to royal power of individuals, groups and communities, it did not form a link between these individuals, groups and communities sufficiently strong to form a unitary and cohesive structure, to which people – at least in the area under discussion – could feel they belonged,² a structure which would enable political and social assimilation and which the Greek *polis* undoubtedly continued to display.³

¹ The bibliography on Hellenistic monarchy is extensive: Gehrke 1991: 46-67 and 165-81 (= [2000]: 77-86 and 236-40) offers a useful survey of earlier views; among more recent general accounts, see Shipley 2000: 59-73, Virgilio 2003 and Ma 2003b. On the views of contemporary political philosophy regarding the king and his role – as known from the few and fragmentarily preserved relevant philosophical treatises of the period –, see the overview of Schofield 1999: 742-44, with earlier bibliography, and Virgilio 2003: 47-65. It is now unanimously – and justifiably – understood that it is impossible to speak of the Hellenistic monarchy in general (see, for example, Mooren 1983: 209), and that the kings were greatly influenced by pre-existing power structures in their realm, but also by a number of other sources, especially on the level of the symbolic display of royal power (among more recent works, see especially Bilde *et al.* [eds.] 1996). If there is one common feature of all Hellenistic monarchies it is probably the charismatic nature of the king's power (see the still useful Weberian analysis of Gehrke 1982). Most defining characteristics of Hellenistic monarchy revolve around the nucleus of charismatic leadership: to name but a few, the authority obtained through successful military leadership, the means and the authority to donate (money, land, military power) and to grant ('freedom', 'autonomy', constitution, laws, judicial decisions), patronage of the arts, of civilization and religion, a privileged relationship with the divine.

² In other words, the Hellenistic kingdoms lacked strong and cohesive 'horizontal' bonds (I follow the terminology of Dihle 1993: 288-89 and Davies 2002).

³ I am well aware that this 'negative' assessment of Hellenistic monarchy runs contrary to the more 'positive' portrayal which invests a growing number of recent works. This 'positive' portrayal is heavily influenced by growing evidence on the Seleukid state and, especially, by the interpretation of Seleukid power structures in the light of their Achaemenid past (Sherwin-White / Kuhrt 1993 still being the point of reference). Despite several problematic points (see, already, the series of articles dedicated to Sherwin-White / Kuhrt 1993 in *Topoi* 4.2 [1994]), such an interpretation puts justified emphasis on the fact that the respect for a great variety of local power structures was an intrinsic feature of imperial tradition in that area, and did not necessarily diminish the authority of central government (see, for example, Sherwin-White / Kuhrt 1993: 40-42, 119-20, or Ma 2003b: 186: "The diversity of roles played by the kings only reinforces the unitary ideology: it shows the existence of the boundary-crossing kings, whose multiplicity in interaction expresses identity of purpose and authority"). What this sort of assessment of Hellenistic monarchy occasionally does not take into account, however, is that in the world of Greek *poleis* political *participatory* activity was probably more defining a feature of local community and

For many decades, the examination of the relationship between cities and kingdoms –or, to be more precise, between cities and royal administrations– focused on a misleading dilemma: was it a legal relation or a relation of power? In other words, was there a set of legally binding rules which framed the relationship, or did it depend exclusively on the balance of raw force? Scholarly discussion on the subject moved along a line with two extreme positions. At the one extreme, whose clearest representative was Alfred Heuß in 1937,¹ lies the view which considers the relationship between a city and a king as –always– an external, interstate relationship. The king could interfere in the city’s domestic affairs, he could play a decisive role in decision-making and in everyday life, the city could be in essence fully subjugated to the royal *fiat*, but all outward appearances of the distinctiveness and formal autonomy of the city remained largely unscathed. Even when there existed established instruments for the enforcement of royal power (*epistatai*, garrisons etc.), they always were, so to speak, adjacent to the city’s institutions, and did not replace them nor were they superimposed on them. According to the other extreme view, formulated immediately and explicitly as an answer to Heuß’s theory,² Wolfgang Orth probably being its most outspoken representative,³ the forms and the rhetoric of the relationship between cities and royal courts were consistently proven to be an elaborate theatrical performance, always hiding very specific relations of power behind the curtains, relations in which, almost invariably, the king was the strong pole, dictating his will upon the cities. Any autonomy or formal political function the city may have had was only by royal dispensation and remained under the king’s close supervision. Many scholars sided with one or the other extreme, fully or with reservations, observing the many exceptions to the rule; others preferred a more agnostic position, and suggested that only through the study of the relationship of particular cities with particular kings in particular periods could viable conclusions be drawn.⁴ Perhaps

its identity politics than in the Achaemenid state or in Pharaonic Egypt. The result was that, as far as the Greek cities were concerned, the preservation of local power structures without these structures being integrated into a wider framework was an inherent danger for royal authority (Ma himself admits that his fascinating sketch of Hellenistic monarchy describes “the *ideal* workings of royal ideology” [2003b: 192; my emphasis]).

¹ Heuß 1963.

² See already Bikerman 1939.

³ Orth 1977.

⁴ This is not the place to review the extensive bibliography on the subject. Among more recent works, see the useful survey of Gehrke 1991: 176-79 ([2000]: 252-55) (whose conclusion is that we should avoid generalizations), the brief account of Shipley 2000: 59-86, the overview of Davies 2002: 5-12, who attempts to look at the issue from a wider angle, and the important typology of the subjugation of cities to royal power offered by Ma 1999: 150-74. On the importance of a variety of factors determining the degree of actual independence a city could achieve, see the

the most useful recent contribution to the debate remains the study of John Ma,¹ who insisted on the importance not only of the objective realities of euergetism – a phenomenon already studied within the framework of the relationship between city and king –² and the enforcement of royal power in general, but also of their rhetoric –viewed in the light of performative speech act theory. Despite the obvious supremacy of the royal side, this rhetoric shows how negotiable the relationship between the two sides was (in the sense that public discourse pertaining to the relationship mattered and had repercussions on how royal authority was enforced on the *poleis*), and, on the other hand, how fully aware both sides were of the negotiable nature of the relationship and how energetically they sought to take advantage of that fluidity.

The relationship between city and king can be studied on three distinct, albeit interdependent, levels. On the first level, that of the objective correlation of power, there is no question that the kings (or at least powerful kings) had at their disposal more financial resources, greater military force, and, accordingly, more political power,³ not only in comparison with almost all individual cities, but also in comparison with many of the federal *koina*.⁴ To be precise, military preponderance was an intrinsic feature of Hellenistic kingship: a king is powerful *because* he is a king, and he is a king *because* he is –and to the degree that he is– a successful military leader. This comparative advantage in no way means that the world of the cities ceased to be useful on a practical level. Quite the contrary: we should not underestimate the military usefulness of the alliance of cities –especially in troubled times for the kingship or when a king first rose to the throne–⁵ nor the

acute observations of Gauthier 1993: 212-16. On the need for specific studies dealing with the relationship from the cities' viewpoint, cf. Ma 2003c: 253-54.

¹ Ma 1999: 150-214.

² See, for example, Gauthier 1985: 39-53; Bringmann 1993 and 2000; Billows 1995: 71-78; Habicht 1997.

³ Cf. the slightly exaggerated remarks of Davies 1984: 291: "Only *qua* monarch could one be a major power in contemporary Greek military conditions. Even the federal states were paper tigers, while the single *polis* as a power unit able to hold its own with the other eastern Mediterranean powers was dead".

⁴ It is certainly not accidental that the *koina* were reorganized and expanded precisely in this period. The reinforcement of the *koina* was not only expressed through geographical expansion and military strength, but perhaps also through a distinct ideology of expansion and enforcement of their power, posing as the complete opposite of arbitrary royal power and intervention. Koehn 2007 traces some elements of this ideology, based on the notions of federalism, mutual consent and promotion of common interests, which was propagated by the strongest of the *puissances moyennes* of the period, namely Rhodes and the confederate states of the Aitolians and the Achaians.

⁵ The classic example is the contribution of Smyrna to the attempt of Seleukos II to maintain control over Asia Minor during the Third Syrian War (*I. Smyrna* 573 [SVA III 492], ll. 1-5, 89-91).

financial importance which the inclusion of the cities in the king's realm had,¹ or the importance which the world of the cities had as an indispensable source of manpower for all ranks of the military² and of the royal administration.³

The second level is the ideological facet of the relationship. Here the balance of power is in a sense reversed. The aforementioned deficiencies of Hellenistic kingdoms, in terms of an institutional framework which would help consolidate the –always conditional– royal realm as a unitary sociopolitical entity, meant that the world of the *poleis* to a large extent maintained its prestige as the generator of civilization –both in the original and in the broader sense of the word; in other words, it remained the main point of political reference, at least in the area under discussion, that is, in the Southern Balkans and the Aegean. This prestige of the cities did not allow royal preponderance to be summarily translated into a relationship of explicit dependence. The acknowledgement of the cities' prestige by the kings took on many forms: repeated declarations of freedom and autonomy for the cities, especially in the Early Hellenistic period,⁴ foundation and refoundation of alliances and quasi-federate entities under royal patronage,⁵ foundation,

¹ For extraction as an essential part of the royal state's operation, see the comments of Ma 2003b: 183–84. The financial benefits of the kings were not only related to direct and indirect taxation (on which, see the examples gathered by Ma 1999: 154–55), but also to more informal means of extraction, such as the honorific crowns awarded to kings: originally an expression of gratitude for particular benefactions but gradually 'institutionalized', taken for granted and expected by the kings on several occasions even from formally fully independent cities, honorific crowns became a form of fixed indirect taxation.

² See, in general, Launey [1987]; for the Ptolemaic army in particular, see also Bagnall 1984, with the remarks of Buraselis 1993: 258–59.

³ For Greek citizens in the royal administration scholarly discussion in effect begins with Habicht's fundamental article on royal courts (Habicht 1958). For a recent attempt to minimize the numbers of Greeks among the high-ranking military and administrative personnel of the Seleucid kingdom, see Carsana 1997, with the justified, albeit occasionally too harsh, criticism of Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 223–34 and 1998b (cf. Istasse 2006 and the more balanced view of Mehl 2003). For the Ptolemaic kingdom, see Mooren 1975, with Buraselis 1993: 257–58. The attraction that the royal court and administration exercised on the skilled and aspiring citizens of the Greek world is a phenomenon often described by or reflected in our sources. Three passages are most illuminating: Theopompos (*FGrHist* 115 F 224) speaks of the court of Philip II as the refuge of the vilest of men –both Greeks and barbarians; Theokritos (*Id.* 14.58–65) praises Ptolemy II as the best employer a free man may find; Chrysippos (*SVF* III 691) claims that one of the possible courses of action for the wise man –in fact, the first on the list, with his involvement in local political life coming only at second place– is to become a king or a royal officer.

⁴ These declarations (by Polyperchon in 319, by Antigonos in 315, by virtually all the Successors in 311) were neither sincere nor realistic, something that both sides fully realized. Nevertheless, they would not have been repeated so often if both sides did not realize and accept their powerful symbolic importance.

⁵ League of the Islanders (315), refoundations of the Corinthian League (302 [?] and 224), refoundation of the *koinon* of the Kretaieis (ca. 217).

refoundation or renaming of cities,¹ a multitude of benefactions to the cities,² active pursuit by the kings of their honouring by the cities and of the publicity of these honours.³ Judging by the results, the inevitable conclusion is that the world of the *poleis* must have been perceived by the kings as an indispensable provider of their royal power's legitimacy.

Consequently, the third level, that of the actual institutional, political and diplomatic contacts between the two sides, acquires a whole new interest. Unfortunately, an overall treatment of the institutions governing the relationship between city and king, that is, of the Hellenistic theory of international relations and its corresponding diplomatic practice, comes up against two major difficulties. The first is the inherent instabilities and tensions of the structures pertaining to the relationship. The royal administrative machine was faced with two contradicting needs: on the one hand, it was obliged to respect outward appearances of civic autonomy, and on the other hand led a policy aiming at the closest possible subjugation of the city to the royal πράγματα, that is, at the subversion of civic autonomy in any meaningful sense of the term.⁴ This inherent contradiction partly explains the multiformity of the relationship; in other words, it explains our inability to formulate a full, all-inclusive typology of the relations between city and king.⁵ These relations were by definition under negotiation, hence any treatment of the subject from an institutional point of view, such as the one Heuß attempted, is misleading and ineffective.

The second difficulty, more relevant to the purposes and the structure of this study, is partly a result of the first. Since the essence of the bilateral relationship cannot be studied solely through the study of institutions, the role of the particular individuals involved at any given time in the relationship, as well as the

¹ See mainly Cohen 1995. The foundations of new cities even in the eastern Seleukid realm, regardless of the possible motives (see the sober treatment of the subject by Cohen 1995: 63-71), as well as the conscious aspirations of non-Greek or even non-Hellenized communities to obtain *polis* status (cf. Couvenhes / Heller 2006: 27-34), are indicative of how self-evidently important the phenomenon of the *polis* was considered by all interested parties in the Hellenistic period.

² All relevant data is gathered by Bringmann / von Steuben 1995.

³ Cf. Ma 1999: 194-201, 211-14.

⁴ Cf. Magie 1950: 829 (who is condensing and rephrasing the classic formulation of the problem by Jones 1940: 95): "... the difficulty of determining more accurately the nature of the relationship between the kings and the cities arose from a conflict between two points of view, namely, the tendency of the kings to regard their dominions as a 'complex of territories' containing 'privileged communities' and the desire of the cities to appear as 'sovereign states in alliance' with the rulers". Cf. also Will 1988: 335: "... la dialectique *basileia/polis* reste un des problèmes cruciaux de l'histoire hellénistique, un problème que l'époque n'a pas résolu en des termes juridiques satisfaisants pour les deux parties. Je parlais de 'double échec' –mais il n'en est qu'un, en somme: ce qu'eût pu être le vrai 'État hellénistique', où la nouveauté monarchique eût harmonieusement intégré l'archaïsme civique, n'a pas vu le jour. La solution devait être romaine".

⁵ See, for example, the successive exceptions to Ma's typology (Ma 1999: 163-66).

historical context become almost as important as the institutions. In other words, in an interstatal relationship governed by an undefined –and indefinable– institutional framework the role of personal strategies, interpersonal relationships and personal networks of communication weighed in almost as much as the institutional role of the individuals involved on both sides. The importance of interpersonal bonds between the agents of the relationship was further enhanced by the fact that the representation of the cities and the representation of royal administration were both organized on a purely personal basis.¹ As is well known, Greek *poleis* lacked a specialized diplomatic corps; all diplomatic contacts were carried out by *ad hoc* elected citizens;² moreover, there were no formally organized political factions that could support one king or another.³ The same is true for the royal administration. The highest-ranking royal officials, the king’s φίλοι, were primarily characterized as such owing to their personal bond with the monarch, rather than according to any concrete court hierarchy, and the differentiation of their functions was rudimentary.⁴ For the cities the result was that

¹ This was also reflected in ancient perceptions of morality in interstate relations: from a moral point of view, the ‘behaviour’ of one state towards another was not considered fundamentally different than the domestic sociopolitical behaviour of an individual (see Low 2007: 129-74, and especially 174, where she points out that “actors in interstate relations could be either individuals, or groups of individuals, or the *polis*”, without distinction; cf. Mitchell 1997: 51-55).

² Mosley 1973: 43-47; Giovannini 2007: 92-97. In most cities there did not even exist specific laws on the criteria a diplomatic representative should meet in order to be elected for the mission, nor on the procedure of their selection (Mosley 1973: 46).

³ This means that whenever I speak of a ‘faction’ in this study I only do it for reasons of convenience; the reader should be warned that I merely imply a number of citizens favouring a particular policy (domestic or related to a foreign power) at a particular time, not a political ‘party’ in the modern sense.

⁴ I use the term in its broadest possible sense, that is, I include all the occupants of the higher positions of royal administrations, whether our sources call them *expressis verbis* φίλοι or not. The long discussion on the semantic width of the technical term φίλος (see Mooren 1977: 38-50; Herman 1981; Weber 1993: 22-32; Buraselis 1994: 24; Savalli-Lestrade 1998: x-xiv and 251-81; Mooren 1998: 123; Meißner 2000; Kralli 2000b) has not resulted in definite conclusions (see, for example, the awkward solution of Savalli Lestrade 1998: x-xiv as to whom her prosopography should include). In my opinion, this impasse reflects precisely the fact that the term did not acquire a specific denotation until very late in the period (cf. Buraselis 1994: 21-23 and Mooren 1998: 123: “wholly neutral term”). Before the end of the third century, almost in the end of the period covered by this study, no Hellenistic court had a solidified court hierarchy and corresponding titulature, with specific titles attached to specific functions (Le Bohec 1985: 118-19 [Macedonia]; Mooren 1977: 17 [Ptolemies]; Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 265-74 [Seleukids]; Virgilio 2003: 137-39 does not sufficiently clarify that the “gerarchia di gradi e titoli aulici” which he describes are a later phenomenon). This has two results. Firstly, the presence of the term φίλος allows no inferences as to the person’s exact position other than that he certainly was relatively high in the ranks of the administration and that he had a personal bond with the king. Secondly, the lack of that title does not necessarily mean that such a relationship did not exist. The term

the circumstances under which they came into contact with a royal φίλος mattered less than the very fact of the latter's personal relationship with the monarch.¹ For both sides, the individuals involved in the relationship and their networks of personal contacts could prove as important as any offices they may have held.² For the city in particular, who the city's ambassador was, what his political agenda prescribed and what his personal ambitions were often mattered more than the fact that he was an ambassador or than the guidelines drawn up by the city which sent him on his mission.

The role of individuals in the royal administration has long been fully acknowledged by modern scholarship. During the last few decades, there have appeared many general studies on the courts of Hellenistic kings,³ and full prosopographies of the administrative personnel for practically all kings of the period,⁴ while the army personnel of the Hellenistic kingdom had already been studied earlier.⁵ Paradoxically, the other side of the coin has been left almost completely untreated.⁶ This means that, although the individuals involved in the

φίλος τοῦ βασιλέως, at least for the Early Hellenistic period, denotes precisely what the term says: that the person in question has a personal relationship with the king, and therefore belongs to the royal staff and may perform any number of administrative duties. I should add that I also use in a non-technical sense the term "courtier", whose corresponding ancient term (αὐλικός) had negative connotations (cf. Meißner 2000: 9-10).

¹ Cf. Buraselis 1994: 24.

² Cf. Mitchell 1997: 55-72.

³ Modern treatment of the subject begins with Habicht 1958. The study of Herman 1981 is useful for the material it gathers, but its central argument, namely that the term φίλος had negative connotations in the world of the cities until 280, should be rejected (see Landucci Gattinoni 1992: 66; Buraselis 1994: 24 and n. 13; Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 251-81, especially 275). Buraselis 1994 compares the *philo*i of Hellenistic rulers with the *amici* of Roman emperors with interesting results. The diplomatic function of the *philo*i and other royal officials is treated by Olshausen 1973 and Mooren 1979. Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 251-81 and 289-94 proceeds to a very useful study of court titles and the phenomenon of the royal *philo*i in general.

⁴ The monumental prosopography by Berve 1926, although focusing on Alexander's age, also includes many of the protagonists of the age of the Successors, as do the more recent studies of Alexander's army officers by Heckel 1992. The Macedonian kingdom from Gonatas onwards is covered by Le Bohec 1985, who, however, has too strict criteria regarding who should be included in the king's *philo*i (see p. 246 n. 5, below); see also O'Neil 2003. The officers of Antigonos the One-Eyed and Demetrios Poliorketes are catalogued by Billows 1990: Appendix 3. On the reign of Lysimachos, see Lund 1992: 178-83; Landucci Gattinoni 1992: 245-59; Franco 1993: 183-205. On all major Asian kingdoms, see Savalli-Lestrade 1998 (on the Attalid kingdom in particular, see also Allen 1983: 133-35 and Savalli-Lestrade 1996). Finally, on the Ptolemaic court, see mainly Mooren's studies (1975 and 1977).

⁵ See mainly Berve 1926; Bengtson 1952-1964; Launey [1987].

⁶ Davies 2002: 11 acutely highlights the importance of the individuals moving along the line connecting the cities and the royal administration, but inaccurately writes that they have been the object of many studies (in his n. 11 he cites prosopographical studies covering exclusively

relationship between city and king on the royal side have been fully studied, the individuals involved on the civic side have not. This is not an unimportant omission. The civic side –the weaker side– is as important for discerning the forms and the essence of the relationship as the royal side is. In fact, it may be even more important for the study of the role of individuals acting as agents in the relationship. The representatives of the kings always shared two features: they always strove to serve the objectives of the side they represented and they invariably strove to enhance their status on the side they represented, that is, at the royal court. As we shall very often have the chance to observe, neither feature is self-evident for the individuals involved on behalf of the city.

Accordingly, the focus of this study will be the role of intermediaries between city and king, acting on behalf of their city of origin. The greatest part of the book consists of the prosopographical catalogue,¹ covering all citizens (and very few metics, fully incorporated into civic life; they are marked with an asterisk) who played an explicitly attested, or surmised with sufficient certainty, role as intermediaries between their city of origin and one or more royal courts, whether they were active within the city or at the royal court. By role as intermediaries I mean any specific activity linking in any way the city with the royal court, whether the activity was of institutional nature (for example, participating in an embassy or a *theoria*, proposing a law, a decree, or an alliance)² or not (for example, supporting

the royal administration). The old but still useful study of Mosley 1973 deals exclusively with the diplomatic envoys of cities in the Classical period. It is mostly the same period, and particularly the technical features of embassies (gestures, rhetorics, grasp of languages, reception etc.), which is dealt with by Piccirilli 2002 (cf. Piccirilli 2001).

¹ The geographical order of the catalogue roughly corresponds to the order followed in *Inscriptiones Graecae* (for the Aegean islands, the order is: east Aegean in a south-north direction, Cyclades in a south-north and east-west direction, Euboea and Crete). The order of the entries within each geographical section is chronological, the first attestation of the individual under discussion as an intermediary serving as the chronological point of reference. The entry title is followed by the citation of the main sources on the individual under discussion, or by the citation of only those sources which attest to his role as an intermediary, with a bibliographical citation for the rest of the sources. In epigraphic sources I mostly cite the edition I used (other principal editions are cited within brackets).

² Obviously, the proposers of laws or decrees were not always the actual instigators of the policies that the law or the decree served. Formal reasons (such as limitations as to the officials who were allowed to propose a decree) or political considerations (such as the choice of a statesman not to associate his name with a specific proposal) often resulted in another citizen proposing the law or the decree (see Gauthier 2005, with earlier bibliography). Even so, the inclusion in my catalogue of proposers of laws and decrees pertaining to the city's relationship with a king was necessary for many reasons. To begin with, even when we know that the actual instigator of the proposal was not the proposer himself, we must assume that the proposer belonged to the same political group as the instigator, and thus qualifies for inclusion in the

an alliance with a king in civic politics, entering into unofficial diplomatic contacts with a royal court, promoting the city's interests at the royal court, being responsible for dedications to the king or his officers, otherwise facilitating or helping publicize royal euergetism and royal propaganda). I do not include citizens belonging to the royal administration or army if there is no evidence to suggest that their position was used (by themselves, by their city of origin or by the royal court) to facilitate the relationship of their home city with the royal court.¹ Neither do I include city officials who may have been at a given time *ex officio* involved in an action such as those described above, if their involvement was anyway expected or required of their position, while no personal role of theirs beyond the boundaries of their office is attested, surmised or expected under

catalogue. Furthermore, proposing a decree, even one drafted by another statesman, was anything but an insignificant procedural move; it was an important political act, a fundamental testimony to a person's active participation in politics (cf. Hansen 1989: 158-59, on the ancient criteria for describing an Athenian as an orator or as a general, that is, a statesman, and Byrne 2004: 313, on the political significance of proposing decrees). Finally, in the overwhelming majority of cases we simply do not know if the instigator of the proposal was someone different than the actual proposer; accordingly, excluding proposers of decrees would deprive us of the greatest part of the evidence.

¹ Naturally, in the vast majority of royal officials, it is difficult for us to either affirm or dismiss the possibility that they acted as intermediaries on behalf of their city of origin: a long commentary would have been required to explain why a number of individuals were not included in my catalogue. Moreover, this particular group of (possible) intermediaries poses a methodological problem: what constitutes evidence that a citizen employed by a king served as intermediary between his city of origin and the royal court? I preferred an exclusive rather than an inclusive threshold. Some examples may illustrate my point: Apollonios (**A37**), an Athenian (most likely) phrourarch of Rhamnous in the last years of the fourth century, is included because he was honoured by the Rhamnousians for his zeal towards the king, the general and the Athenian people. The reason he was included was not that he was an Athenian taking his orders from Poliorketes, with Attica as his jurisdiction, but that he was *honoured* for his activities. Dikaiarchos (**A70**), officer of the Macedonian army and phrourarch of Panakton and Eretria, is included not as an Athenian in the service of Gonatas, but as an Athenian whose position in the Macedonian army the Rhamnousians sought to exploit in order to achieve concrete results. A more inclusive threshold would have come up against two problems, one practical and one of essence. The practical problem would have been that in order for us to be able to affirm or deny their role as intermediaries all royal officials with a documented origin would have to be examined in detail. The essential problem is that for most of the royal officials who came from a Greek city we have no *a priori* reason to assume that they maintained their ties with their city of origin. Next to men like Kallias (**A47**), who maintained an interest in the political life of their home city, there must have been hundreds of men in the service of a king who had turned their back on their civic past; cf. *BullEpigr* 1980, 434, where Jeanne and Louis Robert aptly point out that it is usually impossible to draw any conclusions from the origins of a royal official as to the city's relationship with the king whom he served.

normal circumstances.¹ In other words, I do not include military or administrative officials of a city which happened to be in an alliance with a king at a particular time, if there is no evidence that this alliance somehow influenced their political stance, that is, once again, if there is no evidence to suggest a personal strategy parallel to or even beyond what their office required and what the expressed will of the body politic dictated.² I fully realize that these choices are to a large extent subjective and arbitrary. My objective was not to deal with citizens who circumstantially appeared to align their activities with royal policies, for reasons which may have been independent of their will, or with citizens who were simply technically obliged to act as agents of the relationship between city and king. A catalogue, for example, of Athenians in public office during the domination of the city by Antigonos Gonatas, or a catalogue of Boiotians serving in the Ptolemaic administration would have proven of no assistance in the study of the intermediaries' role. A general who led his city's army alongside the royal army may very well have been simply obeying the orders of the city, and, under normal circumstances, is not expected to have personally influenced the relationship between the city and the king; on the other hand, an ambassador to a king is *expected* to have played a personal role, and a proposer of a decree in honour of a

¹ For example, in a decree in honour of a king or a royal official, I include the proposer but not the president of the assembly or councillors mentioned in the procedure. As far as the decrees for foreign judges are concerned, I only included judges going to a city at the explicit orders of a royal officer (**D74-78**), and citizens proposing honours for royal judges (**D53**) or for judges whose appointment was due to direct royal intervention (**D64**) and not, for example, citizens honouring judges who merely tried a case in accordance with royal edicts.

² Two examples may again help illustrate my point. 1) I did not include Philopoimen, despite the alliance of the Achaians with Philip V during the general's first period of activity until the end of the third century. It is true that Errington 1969: 27-48 draws a portrait of Philopoimen that would necessitate his inclusion here: according to Errington, from the battle of Sellasia to the end of the third century, Philopoimen was practically Philip's agent; the king sent him to Crete on a mission serving the Macedonian interests, forced his election to the *koinon's* leadership in 210, and then attempted to assassinate the Achaian statesman when the latter acquired more power than the king had anticipated. This portrait, however, is in my opinion totally unsubstantiated. All sources confirm that Philopoimen declined to enter the service of Doson after Sellasia, despite an invitation by the king, that his mission in Crete was of private nature (which means that, even if he offered his services to the Gortynians, Philip's allies, this would not constitute evidence for his relationship with the Macedonian court *as a representative of the Achaian state*), and, finally, that Errington's scenario regarding the elections of 210 is hardly plausible (cf. p. 288 n. 7, below). 2) I did not include persons like Kleochares son of Kleodorides, elected demarch of Rhamnous immediately after the end of the Chremonidean War (*I. Rhamn.* 6). Although his election at that particular juncture makes his pro-Macedonian disposition –or, at least, his acceptance by the Macedonian overlord– very plausible, the decree in his honour implies nothing of the sort. My goal was not to compile a catalogue of all *possible* supporters of the kings; rather, it was to compile a catalogue of all individuals attested as having played an *active part* in the relationship between the two sides.

royal officer by *definition* influenced the relationship between the two sides. I shall, accordingly, only deal with intermediaries in the more meaningful sense of individuals performing specific actions with political consequences and, often, of personal nature.¹

The prosopographical orientation of the study also means that only a small number of attestations of the relations between particular cities and particular kings are treated, as I only include individuals whose name, patronym, and/or demotic or ethnic have been even partially preserved. My main concern will be the detailed examination of particular individuals, of their career and of the impact which their role as intermediaries between city and king had on their career. The foreign policy of a given city, the history of the institutions and of the particular historical circumstances shaping the relationship of a given city with a given king are only discussed to the degree that they shed light on the career of the intermediary under discussion –or when, which is annoyingly often, there are no other sources nor plausible prosopographical identifications for the intermediary under discussion.² In other words, the present study is not a study of institutions and *grande histoire*, but a study of the individuals who played a role in the actual operation of the institutions, and a study of the structural consequences of that role.

¹ After some ambivalence, I removed from the catalogue the ambassadors who led two clearly ‘hostile’ embassies –namely, the Spartan embassy led by Derkyllidas or Mandrokleidas to Pyrrhos in 272 (Plut., *Pyrrh.* 26.24 and *Mor.* 219F; Stobaios 7.60), and the Pheraian embassy led by Pausanias to Antiochos III in 191 (Livy 36.9.5-7)–, as well as the ambassadors who led two Epirote embassies to Philip V in 205 (Livy 29.12) and 198 (Livy 32.10.2; cf. Diod. Sic. 28.11; App., *Mac.* 5) in the context of the Epirotes’ effort to bring the First and Second Macedonian Wars respectively to an end. Although, technically, all four cases should have been included, it is clear that, in essence, they in no way constituted mediation to the royal court. The two hostile embassies were procedural diplomatic *démarches*, protests to a king about to invade the country, while the Epirote embassies were part of a desperate effort to end a war which would have unwillingly implicated Epirus, an eventuality that the Epirotes had been striving to avoid for decades. It should be noted, however, that an apparently ‘hostile’ embassy may not always have been as hostile as it seems; had not so many details of Spartan history in 220-218 been preserved, we would have surmised that Omias (**B26**) was an anti-Macedonian and that the embassy he led was hostile, which does not seem to have been the case, as we shall see in the relevant entry.

² Admittedly, the lack of a fairly reliable chronological skeleton for the third century has forced me to examine several problems pertaining to the *histoire événementielle* in much more detail than I originally anticipated or wished for. When possible, I attempted to relegate treatment of these issues to the footnotes or the appendices. Regarding the highly complex issue of choosing between the ‘high’ and the ‘low’ chronology for the period 322-312, I follow the brilliant eclectic solution of Boiy 2006 and 2007 (where one can find the extensive relevant bibliography and a thorough discussion of the available primary sources): I follow the ‘low’ chronology for 322-320, the ‘high’ chronology for 320-313, and revert to the ‘low’ chronology for 312-311 (for the period 319-317 in particular, see in more detail Paschidis 2008).

Considerations of volume but also of essence have led to other limitations to my study, as well. The period covered extends from the end of the Lamian War in 322 to the (military) end of the Antiochic War in 190. The defeat of the anti-Macedonian alliance by the forces of Antipatros signalled, in my opinion, the true beginning of the Hellenistic period. Firstly, it showed that the domination of the Macedonians was not merely the result of the military and political genius of two men, namely Philip and Alexander, but of a wider historical dynamic with which the world of the *poleis* was forced to deal by developing mechanisms of manoeuvring. Secondly, the end of the Lamian War made it clear that the ruthless antagonism between aspiring successors of Alexander would involve not only the Macedonian kingdom and Alexander's possessions, but the entire Greek world. Thirdly, the radical constitutional change imposed on Athens by Antipatros in collaboration with leading Athenians also made it absolutely clear that the new rulers would respect the letter of civic autonomy only to the degree that the cities would respect the spirit of royal overlordship. Royal intervention in the domestic affairs of the cities would no longer be part of the circumstantial pursuits of the invincible conqueror of the Persian empire; it would be an everyday reality with which the cities would have to learn how to cope.

The lower time limit is set by a turning point which –for the purposes of the present study, at least– had even more important consequences. With the failure of Antiochos III and his Aitolian allies to unite the Greeks against the Romans, and with the king's subsequent defeat, the chapter of the consolidation of Roman domination in the East, which had opened with the First Macedonian War in 215, was in effect concluded; what inescapably followed was a mere formality. Rome had now become the inevitable key player and all attempts to resistance, wider revolts or even dangerous wars (such as the Third Macedonian or the Mithridatic Wars) that followed, were (or ended up as) attempts to question the Roman world order rather than actual attempts to repel the Romans from the Greek East. The new reality of definite Roman domination had two major consequences for the Greek world. The first was that in the eyes of the new overlord the *polis* lacked the legitimizing usefulness and the political weight that it possessed in the eyes of the Hellenistic kings. The Romans also used the rhetoric of civic autonomy, to which they added the new notion of philhellenism; but their preponderance in the correlation of power was even more evident than that of the kings. On all levels, from military prowess to ideological importance, the *poleis* mattered much less than in the Hellenistic past. The second and even more important consequence was that Rome's final prevalence signified the loss of an important political weapon for the *poleis*, namely the exploitation of the antagonism between actual and aspiring overlords. From the moment when the multipolar Hellenistic world became a unipolar system, with Rome as the true centre of power, the *polis*'

choices were drastically reduced.¹ Moreover, the existence of a single centre of power and its distance –both in the literal sense of the word and in the sense of Rome’s differences in relation to the world of the *poleis*, on the levels of resources, power structure and ideology– created substantially different circumstances for the mediation between the cities and Rome, as well as for the role of the individuals involved in this mediation.

A last set of limitations is of geographical and constitutional nature. As far as the royal side of the relationship is concerned, only the Successors (until 306) and the major kingdoms of Macedonia, namely the Ptolemies, the Seleukids and the Attalids, are dealt with.² Older ethnic kingdoms or smaller Hellenistic kingdoms have not been included, although the details of mediation are often similar,³ mainly because the novel characteristics of Hellenistic kingship –namely the king’s relatively enhanced power and his involvement in areas which may not have belonged to his realm– were defining parameters of the relationship between city and king in the period under study.⁴ As far as the world of the cities is concerned, I had to limit myself to southern mainland Greece⁵ and the Aegean

¹ Polyb. 21.17.12 is a passage indicative of how significant a turning point the battle of Magnesia was for the relationship of the cities with Rome: immediately after the battle, a great number of embassies swarmed to Rome, on behalf of Eumenes II, Antiochos III, Rhodes, Smyrna, “and almost all of the nations and polities this side of the Taurus mountains” (καὶ σχεδὸν τῶν ἐπὶ τᾷδε τοῦ Ταύρου πάντων τῶν κατοικούντων ἔθνῶν καὶ πολιτευμάτων). This is an eloquent symbolic expression of the transformation of the Eastern Mediterranean into a unipolar world.

² The Attalid kingdom posed a specific chronological problem. The overwhelming majority of testimonies of Eumenes II’s relations with various cities cannot be precisely dated. Since almost all such relations are more likely to date after the end of the Antiochic War, when Eumenes became one of the chief allies of Rome in the east and, accordingly, the most powerful ruler in Asia Minor, I have included none of these cases.

³ See, for example, the relationship of Athens with the Spartokids of Bosphoros or with Audoleon of the Paionians in the 280’s (IG II² 653 and 654-655 respectively), a relationship which displays many features characteristic of a city’s relationship with more powerful rulers: exploitation of ancestral ties (Spartokos) or of a pre-existing good relationship (Audoleon), use of the services of courtiers mediating to the king on behalf of the city and honoured by the city for their services (IG II² 655), involvement of the same statesman in successive contacts with a particular royal court (both decrees pertaining to the Paionian kingdom were proposed by Simonides).

⁴ Indicative of the different nature of the relationship of cities with lesser kingdoms are the letters by which king Ziailas of Bithynia and (perhaps) the king of Bosphoros accepted the *asylia* of the sanctuary of Apollon at Kos (Rigsby 1996: n^{os} 11-12). In contrast to the haughty and procedural tone of other kings (cf. Rigsby 1996: 114), the detailed and adorned language of these two kings gives the palpable impression that they considered it an honour to be visited by the cultured (n^o 12, ll. 8-10) Koan *theoroi*, who thus indirectly recognized the kings’ Greek cultural identity (see n^o 11, ll. 11-17 and n^o 12, ll. 27-29).

⁵ The only exception was Delphi. Within the chronological scope of this study, proposers or other individuals responsible for the ratification of decrees of the city of Delphi were not recorded (cf. Rhodes 1997: 135). Judging from later examples (see *ibid.*), the archon and the

islands, for a number of practical reasons, but also for reasons of essence. To begin with, I did not include ethnic states with a monarchical form of central government, such as Epirus until 235, or, obviously, Macedonia. Since foreign policy belonged to the jurisdiction of the central government, in such states the king was in reality the only person handling matters of foreign policy; the role of other individuals who were lower in the political hierarchy was always subordinate and never autonomous.¹ I also left out the direct external possessions of the kings, such as Thessaly until 196, or some direct Ptolemaic possessions in the Aegean, such as Thera or Methymna. The exclusion of the cities of Asia,² on the other hand, is due, I must admit, mostly to practical reasons. The rich epigraphic harvest from the cities of Asia,³ in conjunction with the lack, in most cases, of evidence allowing a deeper understanding of domestic political life or a clear glimpse of an individual's career, would overburden the prosopographical catalogue with a great number of entries requiring a detailed examination of many chronological and historical problems, mostly unrelated to the core of my investigation, without, in most cases, leading to meaningful conclusions regarding the role of the particular intermediaries. Nevertheless, there is also a more essential reason for that exclusion. When examining the relationship of Asian cities with the kings, we always need to make a distinction between old cities and

basileus probably played a part in the procedure; it would have been a manifest exaggeration to include all recorded councillors, especially for a city which, despite the international political importance of its sanctuary, did not display any significant domestic political life. As far as the amphictionic decrees are concerned, and regardless of the nature of the decree (Lefèvre 1998: 189-90), the proposer seems always to have been an hieromnemon or a *pylagoras* (*ibid.*, 205-214), who is never recorded. Again, it would have been an exaggeration to include all the hieromnemones for the very few decrees of the Aitolian period which would be of some interest to the reasoning of this study (CID IV 40; 85; 97-100). In any case, the amphictionic decrees of the Aitolian period always reflected the orientation of Aitolian diplomacy, regardless of the actual composition of the amphictionic council.

¹ On the contrary, and again after some ambivalence, I finally included Spartan kings, precisely because at Sparta there were other established decision-making institutions, with foreign policy under their partial jurisdiction. This means that the personal strategies of Spartan kings were not necessarily identical to the expressed foreign policy orientation of the body politic. Characteristically, the relationship between the two Spartan kings finally included in this catalogue (Areus I [B17] and Kleomenes III [B19]) and Hellenistic kings turned out to be completely comparable to that between other civic leaders in this catalogue and the kings.

² Cyprus has not been included either, but it is a particular case anyway: during most of the period under study, Cyprus was a direct Ptolemaic possession, while the relations of the Cypriot civic elite with the Ptolemies took on a form which presents limited interest for the purposes of this study (cf. p. 498, below).

³ The number of inscriptions from Asia is constantly increasing over these last decades: see the overview of Ma 2000.

new foundations,¹ as well as between subject, subjugated and (formally at least) autonomous cities. Political structures and mentalities, and the mechanisms of linkage between the city and the royal administration were different –often substantially different– for each particular type of city.² Both distinctions, as necessary as they may be, are highly problematic. The distinction between old and new cities is made difficult by the royal practice of renaming old cities. The distinction between subject, subjugated and autonomous cities has been for several decades an unattainable research *desideratum*.³ Finally, and most importantly, the inclusion of Asian cities would have led to a heterogeneous material, in sharp contrast with the unity of the material from the cities and the *koina* of ‘old Greece’, and would thus vitiate the unity of the analysis.

In the short last part of the book, I attempt to recapitulate the common motifs of the intermediaries’ role and to assess how these motifs may help us re-evaluate the structural relationship between city and king, and Hellenistic society in general.

¹ For the importance of this distinction, see Will 1988: 329-30 and Giovannini 1993: 269; on some common features of the new foundations, see also Savalli-Lestrade 2005.

² These problems are posed to a much lesser degree for the islands of the northeastern Aegean, which have been accordingly included, although, according to ancient geographical perceptions, they belonged to Asia.

³ See Ma 1999: 150-74, who is fully aware of the many exceptions, as well as of the traps into which our inadequate sources can lead us.

I. PROSOPOGRAPHICAL CATALOGUE

ATHENS

From the defeat at Krannon to the ‘liberation’ by Poliorketes (322-307)

A1. Archedikos son of Naukritos of Lamptrai

— SEG 42 (1992) 91; Polyb. 12.13.7; other sources, testimonia and fragments: *LGPN* II, s.v. Ἀρχέδικος n° 3; *PCG* II 533-36

SEG 42 (1992) 91 is a decree ratifying unspecified measures, “so that as many of the king’s friends and Antipatros’ friends as possible, having been honoured by the Athenian people, bestow benefactions upon the city of the Athenians...”. It has been variously dated from 338/7 to 322. Stephen Tracy, based on the fact that only one king is mentioned in the decree, dated it to the aftermath of the battle of Chaironeia, when king Philip, Alexander and Antipatros were honoured with the Athenian citizenship.¹ Badian, Gauthier and Habicht immediately rejected this dating and opted for a date during the Asian expedition.² Badian correctly pointed out that the title βασιλεύς was not used by Greek cities for the Macedonian king before Alexander, let alone without the king’s name.³ Gauthier suggested that in the decree’s phrasing we should discern the right of Antipatros, acting as a regent during the Asian campaign, to be surrounded by *philoï*, like the king himself. Finally, A. B. Bosworth (1993)⁴ pointed out a) that the mention of a ruler as a king, without his name, would be a first for Athens and hardly appropriate for a democratic regime; b) that to make the regent appear practically equal to Alexander would

¹ Tracy 1993; on the honours for Philip, Alexander and Antipatros, see Osborne 1983: 69-70, T68-70.

² Badian 1994: 389-93; Gauthier, *BullEpigr* 1994, 289; Habicht 1993: 255 n. 12.

³ Tracy apparently accepted this argument (Tracy 1995: 98: “For a better assessment of the date, see...”; it should be noted that, in the first part of his book [1995: 8 n. 5] he still dates the decree after Chaironeia). I know of only two, both doubtful, exceptions to Badian’s rule: Daux 1949: 258-60 n° 4 (but see Robert, *BullEpigr* 1950, 126) and *Agora* 16.72. The crucial piece of evidence is *IG* 1³ 89 where the title of the Macedonian king is omitted on fifteen occasions (ll. 9, 15, 16, 25, 26, 35, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 55, 56, 57, 60; in all of them, except ll. 26 and 35, the royal title cannot be restored). This epigraphic habit of the Greek cities does not, of course, mean that the Macedonian kings were not so called within Macedonia (for the long and unproductive debate between Hammond and Badian on this issue, see Hatzopoulos, *BullEpigr* 1989, 428 and 471-472; 1990, 447; 1991, 376 and 417; 1993, 356; 1994, 378 and 436).

⁴ Followed by Poddighe 2002: 32. Lambert 2007: 109 n° 105 gives the date as “c. 324-322/1”, which means that he rejects Tracy’s initial dating but does not make a choice between the other two options.

be inappropriate for Macedonian etiquette, risky for Antipatros and dangerous for the Athenians. Correspondingly, Bosworth proposed a date immediately after the battle of Krannon, during the negotiations of Athens with Antipatros, when the accession of Alexander IV to the throne had either not taken place or had not as yet been made known to the Athenians.

Although objections can be raised to Bosworth's arguments,¹ I agree with his dating. The most characteristic trait of the text is its idiosyncratic structure: the mention of the proposer is not followed by the motivation clause, as one would expect in an honorific decree, nor by a reference to a *probouleuma* or a recommendation by some official, but by a final clause functioning more or less as a title:² ὅπως ἂν ὡς πλεῖστοι τῶν τοῦ βασιλέως φίλων καὶ Ἀντιπάτρου, τετιμημένοι ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τῶν Ἀθηναίων, εὐεργετῶσιν τὴν πόλιν τῶν Ἀθηναίων. Honorific decrees thus constructed seem to be quite rare.³ The substitution of the *reasoning* behind the resolution for the *purpose* it serves is, I believe, indicative of exigent circumstances in the city. Since these circumstances demanded the goodwill of all possible contacts of the Athenians in the Macedonian court and Antipatros in particular, they most probably belong in either 338 or 322; and if the aftermath of Chaironeia is excluded –for reasons which Badian has convincingly demonstrated–, then they must belong to the aftermath of Krannon. Unfortunately, we do not know the exact measures which were proposed. Most probably one or more Macedonians were granted the Athenian citizenship.⁴

¹ Against his first argument one could argue that it would not be inappropriate to call Alexander (not only king of Macedonia but heir of Darius III, the Great King, and hence the king *par excellence* in that period) 'the king' without further qualifications. Moreover, the term φίλος did not become a technical term until later in the Hellenistic period and could be used for Macedonians other than the king; see *I. Adramytteion* 34, l. A7-8 and p. 409 n. 1, below. On the other hand, it is true that the term is not attested in inscriptions before Alexander's death (for its occasional use in literary sources instead of ἑταῖρος during the reign of Alexander, see Berve 1926: 30 n. 2-3 and Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 254-57).

² The phrase is syntactically similar to a hortatory intention formula (see Henry 1996 and the index in Woodhead 1997), a subset of the disclosure formula (on which see Hedrick 1999: 408-425). Nonetheless, neither its place in the decree nor its rhetorical purpose support its characterization as such: the hortatory intention formula belongs to the end of a decree, and its purpose was to attract future benefactors; our phrase lies at the very beginning of the actual decree and its audience seems to have been the Athenians themselves. It is more of a justification of the (unknown) measures that are proposed in the decree than a wish for the outcome of the resolution.

³ For Hellenistic examples not belonging to honorific decrees, see *IG II²* 380; 463; 659. I know of only two Hellenistic honorific decrees thus constructed: *IG II²* 713 and *SEG* 16 (1959) 58. Interestingly, the latter has exactly the same subject as our decree: honours *en masse* for officers of a Macedonian ruler (see further **A19** [IV], below).

⁴ It seems tempting to suppose that the phrase ὡς ἂν πλεῖστοι of the final clause points to *en bloc* naturalization; *en bloc* naturalizations in Athens, however, were only granted to all citizens (or groups of citizens) of an allied city (Osborne 1983: 202-204).

The proposer of the decree is probably Ἀρχέδικος Ναυκρίτου Λαμπρεύς, the well-known *anagrapheus* of 320/19, as Tracy proposes in his edition of the decree and as Leonardos had already proposed in 1915.¹ Habicht convincingly identified this Archedikos with Archedikos the oligarchic comedy-writer and political enemy of Demochares.² For present purposes, this identification is highly significant: Archedikos the politician proposes honours for certain *philoï* of Antipatros; Archedikos the comedy writer *is* one of Antipatros' *philoï*.³ Although the term has different meanings in each case –the honourands are *philoï* in the semi-technical sense of 'officials', Archedikos is *philos* in the political sense of a 'supporter'–, the fact that the same word is used is an eloquent indication of the close connection between the two groups (pro-Macedonian Athenian oligarchs / Macedonian officials). This close connection often amounts to osmosis: Archedikos belongs simultaneously to several groups (Athenian citizens, Athenian oligarchs, pro-Macedonian statesmen, 'friends' of Antipatros) and mediates the bond between them. His personal strategy can only be the resultant of his simultaneous belonging to these different groups.

Naturally, flattering Macedonian officials may have seemed as the only available policy in 322, and Archedikos' express goal was to secure present and future benefactions for his city. As we shall see later in more detail,⁴ however, we should not take the rhetoric of the necessity for collaboration with the Macedonians at face value, for this rhetoric often served to mask the actual coincidence of interests between pro-Macedonian oligarchs and the Macedonian court.

¹ Tracy 1993; Leonardos 1915: 202.

² Habicht 1993. Archedikos as *anagrapheus*: *IG II²* 380-383a (for 382, cf. the *Addenda* of the *IG*); *SEG* 21 (1965) 305 (*IG II²* 383b) and 309 (*IG II²* 384); Stroud 1971: 174-78 n° 25; *Agora* 16.100. Archedikos as a comedy writer: *PCG* II 533-36. Archedikos and his father –the mention of the rare name Ἀρχέδικος alongside a Ναύκριτος make the identification very plausible– are witnesses of the prosecution in the curse tablet *IG III* 3, 67a. Archedikos may have proposed another decree in 318/7 (*Agora* 16.104 [*SEG* 21 (1965) 318]), an honorific decree for Hermo[---] of Herakleia who helped the Athenians before, during and after the sea battle of Abydos, in the beginning of the Lamian War), which would mean that he remained active even after the democratic restoration of 318. Nonetheless, the restoration of his name ([Ἀρχέδικος] | [Ν]αυκρίτου [Λαμπρεύς]) is not safe and is rendered even unsafer by anomalies in the *stoichedon* arrangement and by engraving mistakes.

³ Polyb. 12.13.7.

⁴ See especially the case of Phokion (**A3**, below).

A2. Demades son of Demeas of Paiania

— PAA 306085; De Falco 1954

Demades is a classic example of an Athenian statesman who has had so much bad press by the ancient literary tradition¹ that the understanding of his actions, motives and aspirations is severely encumbered.

Demades was a self-educated orator with no eminent ancestry.² He appeared in politics immediately after the battle of Chaironeia, when he negotiated with Philip II, achieving rather favourable peace terms.³ The resulting excellent relationship he maintained with Philip, Alexander and Macedonian officials earned him all sorts of charges and libels from anti-Macedonian politicians –charges which are now practically impossible to verify.⁴ His personal contacts with the Macedonian court proved useful for Demades in 335, when he managed to convince Alexander to exonerate the anti-Macedonian leaders the surrender of whom the king had initially demanded. For this achievement Demades earned the highest honours by the Athenian *demos*.⁵ Having proposed divine honours for Alexander in 324,⁶ Demades was charged and convicted for bribery in the Harpalos affair, and lost his civic rights in 323, after repeated γράφαὶ παρανόμων by his opponents.⁷

¹ Brun 2000: 17-40 has a useful survey of the way Demades has been treated by ancient authors and modern scholars alike. Williams 1989 and Brun 2000 are among the very few scholars who firmly resist this hostile tradition; in my opinion, however, both occasionally carry their justified criticism of the *communis opinio* too far, so that their Demades is at times transformed from a corrupt traitor into a well-meaning selfless patriot. Replacing one moralistic construct with its opposite is hardly necessary.

² Nevertheless, the depiction of Demades as an illiterate demagogue who owed his wealth to bribery is grossly exaggerated (see Brun 2000: 41-48). Even before Chaironeia, Demades appears to have enjoyed high financial standing, probably through commerce.

³ For the relevant primary sources, see SVA III 402.

⁴ See, for example, Demades, frs. 55, [71], [76-78], [80-82], [88-89], [100], [102] De Falco. The only charge that Demades himself apparently confessed to, in one of the genuine fragments, was his bribery by Philip (fr. 55). Bribery may indeed have been a source of Demades' wealth (Davies 1971: 100; see, however, n. 2, above), but bribery was far from uncommon in that period and can hardly mean that Demades did not serve Athenian interests (Brun 2000: 151-70).

⁵ Alexander and Athens in 335: Diod. Sic. 17.15; Arr., *Anab.* 1.10.3; Plut., *Alex.* 13.1-2, *Dem.* 23.6 and *Phoc.* 17. Plutarch, following the tradition favourable to Phokion, attributes the achievement to the general, but this is clearly wrong (Brun 2000: 73-78). Honours for Demades: Din. 1.101.

⁶ Demades' policy between 335 and 324: Brun 2000: 85-95, with earlier bibliography. Divine honours for Alexander: for the relevant primary sources, see Demades, frs. 11-15 De Falco; Oikonomides 1956: 126; Kotsidu 2000: n° 6; Brun 2000: 98; cf. Buraselis 2004: 168-71; for analysis, Habicht 1970: 28-36 remains essential; see also Brun 2000: 97-107.

⁷ Three, according to Diod. Sic. 18.18.2; seven, according to Plut., *Phoc.* 26.3; two, according to the *Suda*, s.v. Δημάδης.

I. *The embassy of 322*

Demades reentered the scene in the summer of 322 when the Athenians hastened to restore his civic rights after the battle of Krannon.¹ He immediately arranged for an embassy to Antipatros.² A perusing of the sources would result in the following summary narrative: The embassy evolved in two phases. Initially, the ambassadors assured that Antipatros would not invade Attica; nonetheless, the regent demanded unconditional surrender. The ambassadors returned to Athens with Antipatros' request and then went back to Antipatros' camp at Thebes. In the second phase of the negotiations, Macedonian terms became more specific: Athens was to surrender the leaders of the anti-Macedonian faction, pay indemnities, and accept the installation of a censitary regime as well as of a Macedonian garrison at Mounychia. The philosopher Xenokrates of Chalkedon (see **A5**, below) protested, Phokion asked for the garrison not to be installed, but the Athenians were in no position to negotiate and the terms were accepted without changes.³ A more careful analysis of the sources, however, raises several questions, which will be dealt with in this and the following entries.

Demades was certainly present in the first phase of the embassy.⁴ Neither Plutarch nor Diodoros, however, mentions him in the second phase. His presence in the –crucial– second phase can only be surmised from two vague and thus unreliable references of Pausanias and Nepos.⁵ The lack of information on Demades'

¹ Diod. Sic. 18.18.2; Plut. *Phoc.* 26.3.

² The most detailed sources on the embassy of 322 are Plut. *Phoc.* 26–27 and Diod. Sic. 18.18.1–6. See also: Nepos, *Phoc.* 2.2; Diog. Laert. 4.9; [Demetr.], *Eloc.* 289 (= fr. 183 Wehrli = fr. 12 Stork *et al.* [Fortenbaugh / Schütrumpf 2000]); Demetr., fr. 131A–C Stork *et al.*; Paus. 7.10.4; Philod., *Ind. Acad.* VII 22–VIII 17; *Suda*, s.v. Δημάδης and Ἀντίπατρος. New readings in *Vat. Gr.* 73 by Martin 2005 allow the assumption that Dexippos, *FGrHist* 100 F 33 belongs to an *antilogia* during the first stage of the embassy (cf. n. 4, below). For a discussion of the embassy, see mainly Cloché 1923/4: 164–73; Gehrke 1976: 87–91; Williams 1982: 44–47; Tritle 1988: 129–31; Brun 2000: 113–18; Poddighe 2002: 33–37.

³ Perhaps the only thing the ambassadors did manage to extract was a vague promise that the garrison would be temporary: see Diod. Sic. 18.48.1.

⁴ Diod. Sic. 18.18.2; Plutarch does not mention him. If Dexippos, *FGrHist* 100 F 33 refers to the first stage of the embassy (see n. 2, above), the overconfident speaker in F 33 (i), who asks for a relegation of any decision to “the kings” (πρεσβευομένοις παρὰ τοὺς βασιλεῖς) may well be Demades, and the speaker in F 33 (k) who accuses the previous speaker of “audacity” (ἐν τῷ σφετέρῳ θάρσει) and threatens to wage war in order to secure his own country's safety (ἐρχ[ό]μ[ε]θα ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν τὴν οἰκίαν ἀσφάλειαν βεβαιώσοντες) is probably Antipatros. In that case, this is definitely the first stage of the negotiations, before the threat of imminent Macedonian invasion had been removed.

⁵ Paus. 7.10.4: Δημάδης δὲ καὶ ὅσον προδοτῶν Ἀθήνησιν ἄλλο ἢν ἀναπεῖθουσιν Ἀντίπατρον μηδὲν ἐς Ἑλληνας φρονῆσαι φιλάνθρωπον, ἐκφοβήσαντες δὲ Ἀθηναίων τὸν δῆμον ἕς τε Ἀθήνας καὶ πόλεων τῶν ἄλλων τὰς πολλὰς ἐγένοντο αἴτιοι Μακεδόνων ἐσαχθῆναι φρουράς. Nepos, *Phoc.* 2.2: [Phokion] *cum Demade de urbe tradenda Antipatro consenserat*. Both sources draw on the

role in the final negotiations is surprising. Why has the –practically unanimously negative– tradition on Demades preserved no famous speeches, no anecdotes, no specific charges against Demades during this negotiation? For Plutarch, for example, who judged Demades very harshly,¹ this would be a golden opportunity to exonerate his hero Phokion from all responsibility for the outcome of the embassy and blame the harsh measures imposed on Athens on Demades.²

The measures imposed by Antipatros, and the lack of real opposition to them by the ambassadors point to the same conclusion. Setting the census required for civic rights at 2,000 drachmas deprived Demades of a substantial part of his political audience. Even if we were to leave the sincerity of his democratic convictions out of consideration, we should not fail to take account of the fact that Demades, a *homo novus* in politics, lacked the family and political ties of other political leaders.³ Rhetorical skill and mastery of the art of persuasion in front of large audiences in the assembly were his main political assets and the source of his political power; it would, therefore, be surprising if he did not fervently oppose the measures imposed by Antipatros. Moreover, we shall later see that Demades immediately strove to oppose the other main measure imposed in 322, namely the presence of the Macedonian garrison.

In other words, Demades, if present at all,⁴ seems not to have played a major part in the second phase of the negotiations of 322.⁵ He probably did not try to

democratic and anti-Macedonian Athenian tradition, which is hostile both towards Demades and Phokion (Bearzot 1985: 53-54; Tritle 1988: 4-7 and 213-14 n. 12; Brun 2000: 172-73) and they clearly do not provide enlightening factual details.

¹ Plut., *Phoc.* 30.5-10 and *Dem.* 4.

² It has long been observed that depicting Demades as a corrupt and villainous traitor principally served Plutarch in depicting Phokion in a gentler light, as a righteous patriot (Bearzot 1985: 17-18; Williams 1989: 30; Brun 2000: 27-28). Of course, Plutarch blames neither Phokion nor Antipatros for the *φιλανθρώπους... διαλύσεις* (*Phoc.* 27.6; cf. Diod. Sic. 18.18.4 and 6). But the sad picture of the Macedonian forces entering Athens on the day the Eleusinian Mysteries began (*Phoc.* 28.2) makes it clear that he followed authors who did not find the measures imposed to Athens attractive. Besides, throughout the long narrative of the capture and conviction of Phokion, Plutarch never defends Phokion's policy; he merely shifts the focus to his legendary integrity.

³ Cf. Davies 1971: 99-100, 559-600.

⁴ As far as I have been able to confirm, all scholars who have dealt with these events unanimously suppose that Demades was present throughout the negotiations: see Cloché 1923/4: 166 n. 1, with earlier bibliography; Gehrke 1976: 88 and n. 9; Bearzot 1985: 181; Tritle 1988: 129-31; Williams 1989: 25 ("All we know of Demades' personal role in these negotiations is that he was present").

⁵ Brun 2000: 113-18 does not make the necessary distinction between the two phases of the embassy and considers Demades as the embassy's indisputable leader. From a procedural point of view, Demades' 'disappearance' should not come as a surprise. In important embassies on crucial occasions, all major political currents of the city were usually represented (Adcock / Mosley 1975: 155). In embassies to a royal court this proportionality could be used both by a king and by a

openly oppose the terms of the final settlement during the embassy –such a stance would have probably been futile and would have destroyed his good relations with the Macedonians– but certainly did not advocate them either, for they were detrimental to his political future. If we are to find Athenians who favoured the measures, we need to look elsewhere.

II. *The death penalty for anti-Macedonian leaders*

Demades' first political action after the peace treaty with Antipatros was to propose a decree by which Demosthenes, Hypereides, Aristonikos and Himeraios, that is, the leaders of the anti-Macedonian faction, who had already fled the city, were condemned to death.¹ In fact, Demades and the Athenians had no other choice. That the leaders of the anti-Macedonian faction be condemned to death was one of Antipatros' demands; the decree was, however, to have no real consequences, since the persons it aimed at had already fled. This conviction to death *in absentia* was favourable to Demades from more than one aspect, as he succeeded in appearing loyal to Antipatros, while also securing the permanent absence of his political enemies from the city, in a way which did not offend his countrymen and their civic pride.²

III. *The embassy about Samos*

One of the issues which the peace treaty with Antipatros left unresolved was the future of the Athenian cleruchy at Samos. In accordance with the conditions laid down by Alexander's *diagramma* of 324 regarding the return of political exiles, the Athenians were eventually forced to abandon their cleruchy and return the island to the exiled Samians. The Samian question had been one of the primary causes of the Lamian War³ and remained a fundamental problem of the Athenian foreign policy even after the war.⁴ Antipatros apparently did not wish to assume responsibility for the final decision and relegated the matter to the kings, that is, to Perdikkas; accordingly, the Athenians sent an embassy to the Guardian of the

political group. An illuminating example is the embassy of Phokaia to Seleukos (later Seleukos IV), son of Antiochos III, in 190, which sought to avoid an invasion of Seleukid forces (Polyb. 21.6). Three of the ambassadors were favouring the Seleukids, while two were favouring the Romans; Seleukos, who refused to see the two pro-Roman ambassadors, was apparently informed by the other ambassadors of civil unrest in Phokaia, and subsequently attacked the city.

¹ Plut., *Dem.* 28.2; [Plut.], *Mor.* 846F; Arr., *FGrHist* 156 F 9.13; Nepos, *Phoc.* 2.2-3. All three sources concur that the decree postdated the self-exile of the anti-Macedonian leaders, which had taken place immediately before the negotiations with Antipatros ([Plut.], *Mor.* 846E) and in any case before Pyanopsion (~October) 322, when Demosthenes died (Plut., *Dem.* 28.2).

² Cf. Williams 1989: 25.

³ Diod. Sic. 18.8.2; cf. Poddighe 2007, with earlier bibliography.

⁴ See Brun 2000: 102-107.

kings,¹ probably during the winter of 322/1.² Perdikkas ruled unfavourably to the Athenians and restored the island to the exiled Samians.³

There is a detailed source on this embassy which names Demades as the key ambassador. It is a rhetorical exercise of the second century,⁴ which recreates the supposed dialogue between Demades and Deinarchos in Antipatros' court in 219 (for the context, see the following section). Although the dialogue is fictional, its unknown author uses "ottime fonti" and many of the factual details he refers to are corroborated by other sources.⁵ L. 229 mentions an "embassy about Samos" to Perdikkas, in which Demades participated.⁶ This must be the embassy of late 322. Demades' mission may have been unsuccessful, but, nonetheless, the demanding journey to –perhaps– Kilikia,⁷ remains a striking example of the energy he could display when it came to protecting his city's interests. As we shall see presently, he probably set out to meet someone with whom he had already been in contact.

IV. *The fatal embassy of 319 and Demades' covert diplomacy (322?-319)*

The main source of Athenian displeasure after 322 was the presence of the Macedonian garrison at Mounychia. Despite constant pressure, Phokion, the real leader of the post-322 regime, refused to ask for its withdrawal (cf. the following entry). The Athenians, consequently, turned to Demades, "who they thought conducted himself in a manner beneficial for the city in issues regarding the Macedonians".⁸ Demades gladly undertook this embassy as well and set out for Macedonia in the beginning of the Attic year 319/8, taking his son Demeas with

¹ Diod. Sic. 18.18.6: *περὶ δὲ τῆς Σάμου τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἐπὶ τοὺς βασιλεῖς ἐποιήσαντο*. On Antipatros' concession of jurisdiction to Perdikkas, cf. Rathmann 2005: 20 n. 53.

² Diodoros records Perdikkas' decision after Antipatros' settlement of Athenian and Greek affairs and the marriage of his daughter Phila to Krateros, therefore the decision cannot have come before the winter of 322/1; cf. Gehrke 1976: 106 n. 110, with earlier bibliography.

³ Diod. Sic. 18.18.9; cf. Diog. Laert. 10.1.

⁴ [Demades], fr. 91 De Falco.

⁵ De Falco 1954: 68. Brun 2000: 32 considers this source useless. I believe one should distinguish between two types of factual details used in such rhetorical exercises: those which are used for the specific rhetorical purposes of the author and form the pseudo-historical context of the exercise, and those which are taken for granted by the author in the course of his argumentation. The former, unless corroborated by other sources, may be discarded as unhistorical; the latter, however, were intended to enhance the exercise's credibility, and thus may very well have been common knowledge; consequently they should not be considered *a priori* suspect.

⁶ [Demades], fr. 91 De Falco, l. 229; cf. ll. 199-200 and 213-14, where reference is made to the loss of Samos after Perdikkas' decision.

⁷ On the whereabouts of Perdikkas in the winter of 322/1, see Anson 2004: 81-82 n. 16.

⁸ Diod. Sic. 18.48.1. Antipatros was initially friendly to Demades (Diod. Sic. 18.48.2; Plut., *Phoc.* 30.4).

him.¹ But Kassandros, filling in for his dying father,² had discovered a letter of Demades to Perdikkas,³ in which Demades asked the chiliarch to come to Europe and rid the Greeks “of a putrid old stamen”, that is, Antipatros.⁴ After being publicly accused by Deinarchos (A12, below), who was at the time at Antipatros’ court, Demades and his son were put to death by Kassandros (or Antipatros).⁵

As regards our discussion, the main interest of this embassy lies in Demades’ letter. The letter’s existence, perhaps even its authenticity, should not be questioned. All sources recounting the incident mention it, including its characteristic phrase, and the original source was most probably Hieronymos of Kardia, Diodoros’ key source and one of Plutarch’s key sources on the events of that period.⁶ Hieronymos had served as Eumenes’ officer, and Eumenes was an important member of Perdikkas’ council;⁷ Hieronymos was therefore perfectly placed to know of the content of such a letter and we know that he often relied on official documents as a primary source for his work.⁸ In fact, one could surmise that Hieronymos not only provided later authors with an account of the incident, but was actually

¹ [Demades], fr. 91 De Falco; Diod. Sic. 18.48.1-4; Plut., *Dem.* 31.4-6 and *Phoc.* 30.8-10; Arr., *FGrHist* 156 F 9.14-15; *Suda*, s.v. Δημάδης, Diod. Sic. 18.44.1 dates the embassy in the beginning of the archonship of Apollodoros (319/8); although Diodoros’ eighteenth book is notorious for its chronological discrepancies, including his failure to mention the archons of 321/20 and 320/19 (see Goukowsky 1978: xxxi-xxxvii; Bosworth 1992: 73-74), *IG II²* 383b confirms that Demades was still alive in the seventh or tenth prytany of 320/19 (cf. Woodhead 1997: 149-50). Diodoros’ dating is therefore unanimously accepted (see, for example, Gehrke 1976: 105 n. 104; Brun 2000: 125 and n. 40; Landucci Gattinoni 2003: 17 and 27-28; Anson 2004: 134-35).

² Or Antipatros himself, according to Diodoros (Diod. Sic. 18.48.2-4), whose version is generally taken to be less plausible (*contra* Bearzot 1985: 200-205; Landucci Gattinoni 2003: 27-30).

³ Plut., *Phoc.* 30.9 names Antigonos as the recipient of the letter. This is clearly a mistake: all other sources speak of Perdikkas, including Plutarch himself in *Dem.* 31.5. The mistake is probably due to the fact that in 319 Perdikkas was already dead (so Ferguson 1911: 28), and not to a deliberate implication of Antigonos by a later hostile source (so Bearzot 1985: 203).

⁴ Demades, fr. 58 De Falco (Diod. Sic. 18.48.2; Plut., *Dem.* 31.5 and *Phoc.* 30.9; Arr., *FGrHist* 156 F 9.14).

⁵ The execution of Demades and his son was perhaps masked as a death penalty imposed by other Athenians present, including Deinarchos (Gehrke 1976: 107 n. 112). Killing an ambassador was a heinous act (cf. Kienast 1973: 544; Giovannini 2007: 95) that required some sort of justification and institutional cover-up.

⁶ For Diodoros, see Goukowsky 1978: ix-xxiv; Hornblower 1981: 32-39 and Landucci Gattinoni 1997: 194-203 and 2003: 15-17, who correctly points out that Diodoros also depends on a source less friendly to the Antigonids and less interested in Asia, perhaps Douris of Samos, although I would put less emphasis on the importance of this second principal source. For Plutarch, see Gehrke 1976: 232-36; the fact that Plutarch’s main source on Athenian events during that period is probably Demetrios of Phaleron (Tritle 1992: 4291-94) does not invalidate my argument.

⁷ Plut., *Eum.* 3.12.

⁸ Rosen 1967; Goukowsky 1978: xxiii; Hornblower 1981: 131-37.

Kassandros' real-life informer on Demades' secret dealings with Perdikkas.¹ In any case, the brutality of Kassandros' reaction leads to the conclusion that contacts between Demades and Perdikkas must have existed, whether the content of the letter was genuine or later forged by Kassandros or Demades' Athenian rivals.²

A second question arising from the letter of Demades is the date and context of the initial contact between Demades and Perdikkas. Although the anonymous author of the "papyrus of Demades" ([Demades], fr. 91 De Falco) implies that the letter postdated Demades' embassy about Samos in 322, it seems likely that their initial contact predated the end of the Lamian War.³

¹ Rosen 1967: 63 supposes that Hieronymos found the letter in Antigonos Gonatas' archive at Pella; Hornblower 1981: 131-37 (cf. Habicht [2006]: 62) supposes that Hieronymos took hold of Perdikkas' archive after the convention at Triparadeisos. The second suggestion seems more plausible, considering Hieronymos' interest in archival material, but neither theory explains how the letter reached Antipatros' court. Diod. Sic. 18.48.2-3 says that Antipatros learnt about the letter immediately after Perdikkas' death. This does not seem plausible: why would Antipatros, having been informed of Demades' actions, remain inactive for a whole year? An interesting solution would be to suppose that Antipatros was informed of the letter in 319 by Hieronymos himself. In the summer of 319, Eumenes, under siege at Nora by the forces of the coalition against Perdikkas, sent Hieronymos to Antipatros in order to convince at least one of Perdikkas' opponents to remain neutral (Diod. Sic. 18.42.1; for the exact date, see Goukowsky 1978: xxxv and Bosworth 1992: 59). Hieronymos 1) arrived at Pella only months or even weeks before Demades, 2) was in a position to know of Demades' letter, 3) was generally unfavourable to the democratic factions in Greek cities (Goukowsky 1978: xxi-xxii; Hornblower 1981: 171-79) and, mainly, 4) was on a mission to win the sympathy of Antipatros and Kassandros. Under these circumstances, exposing old contacts between a city in Antipatros' jurisdiction and Antipatros' enemy would have been a perfect diplomatic gift.

² The authenticity of the letter, or at least the fact that such a letter existed, is accepted by most scholars (see, for example, Schubert 1914: 253; Cloché 1923/4: 185 n. 1; Beloch 1925: 86; Rosen 1967: 63; Errington 1970: 62; Goukowsky 1978: 152-53; Bearzot 1985: 203-204; Brun 2000: 125-26).

³ The author speaks of three letters of Demades ([Demades], fr. 91.190 ff.). In ll. 195-202 Deinarchos wonders why Demades tried to contact Perdikkas, since the Macedonian had driven the Athenians out of Samos; accordingly, Ferguson 1911: 28 n. 3 and Beloch 1925: 86 agree that the letters postdate the Samos embassy. Nonetheless, in the alleged second letter (ll. 227-254), Demades attempts to convince Perdikkas not to marry Nikaia, the daughter of Antipatros, and we know that Nikaia arrived at Perdikkas' camp in the summer of 322 (Diod. Sic. 18.23.1-3; Arr., *FGrHist* 156 F 9.21), thus *before* Demades' embassy. Moreover, Demades' phraseology makes better sense if read within the context of the Lamian War: Perdikkas is asked to intervene "immediately" (Diod. Sic. 18.48.2: *κατὰ τάχος*) in order to "save the Greeks" (Plut., *Dem.* 31.5). Finally, dating the initial contact between Demades and Perdikkas before 322 would better explain Demades' ambivalent reaction after the death of Alexander (see p. 48 n. 1, below). Schubert 1914: 253 (followed by Errington 1970: 62 and Rathmann 2005: 72 n. 224) also dates their initial contact before the end of the Lamian War, but for completely different reasons, arising from his reconstruction of Perdikkas' policy.

In any case, Demades clearly sought to take advantage of the rivalry between the Successors. This is not an example of trading one overlord for another (an aspect of Hellenistic politics, which we shall often come across in what follows); Demades and his allies played the card of offering support to one Macedonian contender in order to loosen the control imposed on Athens by another. The choice of Perdikkas has a twofold explanation. Perdikkas, especially after 322, was the main enemy of Antipatros, who was an immediate source of concern for the Athenians; moreover, Perdikkas was at the time the only Successor who clearly aspired to gain control over the whole of Alexander's realm.¹ For Athens, a leader whose sphere of influence would cover all of Alexander's territorial possessions must have appeared less threatening than the leader of Macedonia proper, for whom southern Greece was by definition a 'backyard' of vital importance.

The thorough knowledge of international politics and, particularly, of the correlation of power between leading protagonists that Athenian politicians exhibited should not go unnoticed. This knowledge proved to be an indispensable tool of diplomacy for Hellenistic cities, a tool which allowed their leaders some –often admirable– manoeuvring. Intermediaries between city and king, especially ambassadors, who had direct access to the kings' court, were particularly well-informed about issues of international politics, and that knowledge made them extremely useful to their cities.²

V. *General estimate*

The depiction of Demades by Pausanias is rather straightforward: he was a traitor to his city;³ this is more or less the opinion of the majority of ancient writers. It is, nonetheless, hardly reconcilable with the portrayal of Demades, as this would emerge from an unbiased examination of the career of this self-taught orator from Paiania. Approaching the Macedonian *Machthaber* and satisfying their demands were moves advantageous to him personally, politically useful, often a product of dire need as well, but never an end in themselves. Such moves bore Demades money and, judging by the fact that they were repeatedly deemed useful by his countrymen (in 338, in 324, in 322, in 319) increased his political capital. They were also inescapable –as he himself acknowledged;⁴ Demades firmly

¹ Heckel 1992: 143-63; Anson 2004: 91-92.

² For ambassadors as 'spies', see, for example, Kienast 1973: 515-16.

³ Paus. 7.10.4.

⁴ See, for example, fr. 5, where Demades replies to Lykourgos who accuses him of not looking at the laws when proposing a pro-Macedonian decree: "No, I did not see them; for they were overshadowed by Macedonian arms" (οὐκ ἐνέβλεπον· ἐπεσκότει γὰρ αὐτοὺς τὰ Μακεδόνων ὄπλα). A sense of realism appears to have been the cornerstone of his political thought (fr. 134: "it is not fair that a charge based on words be considered stronger than a defence based on reality", οὐ δίκαιόν ἐστι τὴν ἐκ τῶν λόγων κατηγορίαν ἰσχυροτέραν ἡγεῖσθαι τῆς ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀπολογίας).

believed (as many Athenian politicians of all factions did) that Athens did not have the necessary resources to oppose the Macedonians.¹ They were not, however, the main focus of his policy, but merely its means; he consistently employed such means in order to enhance his city's position (as was the case with the peace treaty of 338, or the attempt to retain Samos in Athenian hands), even in opposition to Macedonian wishes (as was the case with the cancellation of the extradition of anti-Macedonian leaders in 335, or the official and unofficial attempts to remove the Macedonian garrison).²

The other major difficulty with the *communis opinio* on Demades is his unanimous depiction as one of the leaders of the post-322 regime. Literary and epigraphic sources leave no doubt that he was politically active during that regime; as we have already seen, he undertook at least two major diplomatic initiatives, the second of which proved fatal for him and his son. This hardly means, however, that he shared power with Phokion. The old general was, as we shall see

¹ See frs. 6-7, 11-14, 49. It is interesting that Demades' policy during the Lamian War is difficult to infer –most tellingly, modern scholarship sees him either as a dedicated pacifist (so Poddighe 2002: 24-25) or as one of the instigators of the war (so Brun 2000: 107-112). The *florilegia* of his sayings offer an inconsistent picture. On the one hand, he appears to have been circumspect regarding the news of Alexander's death (fr. 53), while, on the other hand, he reportedly claimed that Macedonia without Alexander was like a blinded Cyclops (fr. 15; both fragments are apparently genuine). Perhaps we are not dealing with inconsistency but with a time lag: Demades may have been cautious at first until the events had been verified and then followed the prevailing anti-Macedonian current –like Demosthenes did– or, at least, did not oppose it. In any case, had he been one of the instigators of the Lamian War, his involvement in the embassy of 322 would remain inexplicable.

² Epigraphical sources do not alter this picture of Demades' activities, at least after 322 (for lists of decrees proposed by Demades, see Oikonomides 1956; Hansen 1989: 40; Dreyer 1999: 185 n. 293; Brun 2000: 177-78; his post-322 decrees are conveniently gathered by Poddighe 2002: 141-69 n^{os} 2 and 9-11). Five decrees proposed by Demades are known from this period, the subject of three of which is possible to define: unspecified honours for the otherwise unknown Nikostratos of Philippi (?), who may have been involved in the repatriation of the cleruchs from Samos (*Agora* 16.100; cf. Tracy 1995: 19), reorganization of the *agora* of the Piraeus (*IG II²* 380 [*Syll³* 313]), honours for someone who brought corn to the city (*IG II²* 400). We do not know the content of *IG II²* 372 (on which see Tracy 1995: 152, who confutes the joining of another fragment, accepted in *Agora* 16.95, and Lambert 2007: 126 n^o 150 and n. 129) and 383b. *IG II²* 398a (Bielman 1994: n^o 9), an honorific decree for someone who helped releasing Athenian captives of the Lamian War, is also attributed to Demades by some scholars (Habicht 1989c: 1-2 [=1994: 9-10]; Veligianni-Terzi 1997: 102 n^o 167; Bielman 1994: 42; Brun 2000: 122), because it is similarly phrased as one of his older decrees (*IG II²* 399 [*JSE* 2; Bielman 1994: n^o 6]; on this decree, see Lambert 2006: 140-43); in my opinion, however, the attribution should not be considered certain. In all cases in which the content is identifiable, we are dealing with issues crucial for the city; even the honouring of the citizen of Philippi a) is not necessarily related to the Macedonian court and b) is a reward for real services. The contrast with Stratokles, another famous pro-Macedonian statesman, and the honours for royal *philoï*, which he proposed in 303-302 (see **A19** [IV], below), is particularly eloquent.

in detail in the following entry, the undisputed leader of the regime. No major action, including the military preparation against an invader, could be taken without his consent. Demades' role was secondary; he emerged into the foreground in only two contexts: a) in the popular assembly, that is, in a context probably perceived as inoffensive to the regime,¹ and b) when Phokion had to appease the restless Athenians by allowing Demades to do what the people thought he knew best: use his connections to obtain favourable results from the Macedonian overlords.

A3. Phokion son of Phokos (of Potamos?)

— Φωκίων Φώκου (Ποτάμιος²): for the period 322-319, see mainly Plut., *Phoc.* 26-38; Diod. Sic. 18.18.1-6; 18.64-67; Nepos, *Phoc.* 2-4; cf. Plut., *Agis* 2.4 and *Mor.* 142B; for the rest of the sources, see PA/APF 15076; for discussion, see Gehrke 1976; Bearzot 1985; Tritle 1988

Phokion's personality and policy are depicted by the ancient sources as vividly as those of Demades. He is mostly seen as the χρηστός³ Athenian leader *par excellence*. There is no doubt that he was also the city's most prominent military leader of the fourth century; elected forty-five times as general, he took part in most of Athens' military encounters from 376 to 322. Nevertheless, at least since the eve of the battle of Chaironeia⁴ he appears opposed to the anti-Macedonian faction of Athenian politicians. Thenceforth, and almost until the end of the Lamian War,⁵ the same motif is repeatedly attested: Phokion tries to avoid an entanglement with Macedonia by all means, but then reluctantly participates in military and diplomatic operations.⁶

I. The embassy of 322 to Antipatros

We already saw the main events regarding the embassy of 322 in the preceding entry. As far as Phokion is concerned, we need to stress the following: The tradition friendly to the general portrays his presence in the negotiations as desired by the Athenians and wholly beneficial to the city. According to Plutarch, the Athenians insisted that Phokion be one of the ambassadors because he was the only statesman they trusted, and the general was almost forced to participate, but, nonetheless, not before he reprimanded his countrymen once more for their

¹ For the council and the assembly in the regime of 322-318, see Oliver 2003.

² For Phokion's demotic, see *Agora* 15.42, l. 206, with Tritle 1988: 37-38.

³ See, for example, Plut., *Phoc.* 10.4; Diog. Laert. 6.76.

⁴ Plut., *Phoc.* 16.1.

⁵ His last military action was the defence of the Attic coastline, just before the end of the war (Plut., *Phoc.* 25).

⁶ For Phokion's policy between 339 and 322, see in detail Gehrke 1976: 52-87; Bearzot 1985: 115-27 and 144-69; Tritle 1988: 97-123.

folly.¹ He managed to cancel the planned Macedonian invasion to Attica, as a personal favour granted to him by Antipatros, despite Krateros' opposition.² Later, when Antipatros announced the measures that were to be imposed on Athens, Phokion is said to have protested against the presence of the Macedonian garrison at Mounychia, only to receive Antipatros' denial;³ nevertheless, Diodoros and Plutarch claim that the measures were benevolent and fair beyond all hope.⁴

But this is one side of the coin. The decree ordering to send plenipotentiary ambassadors to Antipatros was proposed by Demades,⁵ and the Athenians' haste to restore the latter's civil rights shows that it was through him that they thought they stood a better chance against Antipatros' demands, not through Phokion. If this is true, the fact that, as we have already seen, Phokion and his circle were dominant in the second phase of negotiations shows that this predominance was due mostly to backstage manoeuvring rather than to popular demand.

Our interest, however, should focus on Phokion's view of the measures. In this respect it is characteristic that, even for Plutarch, Phokion's reaction against the presence of the garrison came only after the (reported) outburst of Xenokrates against it;⁶ it may very well have been a premeditated reaction for appearances' sake. Antipatros' reply points to the same conclusion. Plutarch (*Phoc.* 27.7-9)⁷ knows of two traditions: according to the first, Antipatros asked Phokion if he could guarantee the adherence to the peace terms without the presence of the Macedonian garrison; the general remained silent and then Kallimedon (see **A6**, below) violently insisted on the necessity of Macedonian presence in Athens; according to the second tradition, Antipatros replied as follows: "we would gladly grant you all favours save the ones which will lead both to your undoing and ours" (ἡμεῖς πάντα σοι χαρίζεσθαι βουλόμεθα πλὴν τῶν καὶ σὲ ἀπολούντων καὶ ἡμᾶς). Obviously, the first tradition goes back to the apologetics of the oligarchy of 322-318 –the Macedonian garrison was an evil necessary to curb the troublesome⁸ nature of the Athenian *demos*– while the second tradition goes back to the democratic reactions both against the measures and against Phokion personally.⁹ The events that followed (see sections II and III, below) vindicate the second tradition. In fact, the

¹ Plut., *Phoc.* 26.4.

² Plut., *Phoc.* 26.5-7.

³ Plut., *Phoc.* 27.7-9.

⁴ Diod. Sic. 18.18.4; Plut., *Phoc.* 27.6.

⁵ Diod. Sic. 18.18.1-2.

⁶ On Xenokrates' role, see the following entry.

⁷ It is interesting that Diodoros reports no reaction to Antipatros' measures.

⁸ Cf. Plut., *Phoc.* 27.8: μηθὲν πολυπραγμονήσειν.

⁹ This negative tradition, reflected principally in Nepos but also in some of Plutarch's anecdotal material, probably goes back to Demochares and his circle (Bearzot 1985: 53-54 and Tritle 1988: 4-7 and 213-14, with bibliography).

imposition of a censitary regime, its interpretation as a return to the ancestral regime,¹ the emphasis on the stability which ensued and on the preservation of individual properties,² all conform so well to the goals and the rhetoric of Athenian oligarchs³ that many scholars have convincingly argued that these measures were due to Phokion and Demetrios of Phaleron⁴ at least as much as to Antipatros.⁵ The measures which were eventually imposed actually served the interests of both sides: on the one hand, Antipatros imposed a regime under close Macedonian supervision and ensured that the loyalty of its leaders would be reinforced by Macedonian arms and by the personal ties between these leaders and the Macedonian court; on the other hand, oligarchic leaders and intellectuals were given the chance to lead the implementation of an old political programme with guaranteed security.

¹ Diod. Sic. 18.18.5; cf. Plut., *Phoc.* 27.5.

² Diod. Sic. 18.18.4; cf. Paus. 7.10.4.

³ A word of caution is perhaps needed here: the fact that the regimes of Phokion and Demetrios of Phaleron may diverge at some points from the theories found in ancient political thinkers more or less opposed to Classical Athenian democracy (cf. the remarks of Poddighe 2002: 110-15, 139-40 on the differences between the regime of 322-318 and Aristotelian political theory) does not disprove the adherence of these regimes to the antidemocratic tradition: as Williams 1997: 329 aptly remarks regarding Demetrios of Phaleron's regime, we should be looking for a common outlook on democracy between these regimes and oligarchic political theory, not for factual details of the latter's implementation.

⁴ Ferguson 1911: 19-20; Cloché 1923/4: 164-73; Bearzot 1985: 178-83; Poddighe 2002: 36-37. Gehrke 1976: 87-91 (with further bibliography) argues in detail that Phokion's stance was (to say the least) submissive and that the measures conformed perfectly to oligarchic aims, but insists that Phokion achieved the best result possible for Athens. Dreyer 1999: 157-61 goes one step further, claiming that the measures "sind... alleine aus seinem (*scil.* Antipatros') Interesse der Machtsicherung in Athen zu verstehen" (159). Nevertheless, the most fervent supporter of Phokion is Lawrence Tritle, who follows the pro-Phokionic ancient tradition *verbatim*. Firstly, he refuses to consider the regime of 322 as an oligarchy, claiming that ancient sources which do call it exactly that (see p. 53 n. 2, below) are a "democratic and ideological hyperbole" (1988: 133). As for the embassy of 322 (1988: 129-31), he takes Phokion's opposition to the measures for granted, and claims that the ambassadors had no part in the decisions but only presented the measures to the assembly. Finally, he shifts the blame to Demades, claiming that: "By a decree proposed by Demades, the Peace of Antipatros was approved by the Athenian *demos*" (p. 131). Nonetheless, the sources he cites in support of this statement are on the decree by which the anti-Macedonian leaders were sentenced to death *in absentia*; none of these sources (Plut., *Dem.* 28.2; [Plut.], *Mor.* 846F; Arr., *FGrHist* 156 F 9.13; Nepos, *Phoc.* 2.2-3) allows the assumption that this was part of a wider decision to accept Antipatros' measures (the same mistake is made by Green 2003: 5).

⁵ As plenipotentiary ambassadors, Phokion and his associates had plenty of leeway for personal, unauthorized initiative (although not absolute freedom; see Mosley 1973: 30-38 and Skoczyla-Pownall 1995: 145).

II. *Phokion, Menyllos and Nikanor*

Menyllos, the first phrourarch of Mounychia, was a personal friend of Phokion, perhaps already before his arrival at Athens.¹ Their friendly relationship must have been so obvious that the pro-Phokionic tradition had to resort to yet more anecdotes portraying the general's impeccable morality: Phokion proudly denied gifts from Menyllos, even those meant for his son Phokos.² Once again, however, it is not the general's relationship with the Macedonians that the tradition denies, but only the charge of receiving money as a βασιλεῦσι φίλος.³

Meanwhile, tension in Athens aggravated. Many who had lost their civic rights because of the censitary regime were settled in Thrace by Antipatros; many others were exiled on his demand. According to Plutarch, Phokion merely asked that they would not be sent outside Greece.⁴ For those who stayed in the city, with or without political rights,⁵ the presence of the Macedonian garrison was so painful that Plutarch cannot resist the temptation to record the supernatural signs of political mourning.⁶

The prime objective for the Athenians who remained in Athens and were politically active⁷ was the removal of the garrison. Phokion, however, steadfastly refused to take any diplomatic initiative, "either because he did not expect to convince [*scil.* Antipatros] or because he saw that the people behaved more prudently and engaged in politics in a disciplined manner on account of fear".⁸ Accordingly, the Athenians turned to Demades, who embarked on the fatal mission

¹ Plut., *Phoc.* 28.1. Phokion had plenty of opportunities to forge personal ties with Macedonian notables, since he had personal contacts with the court at least since Chaironeia (338: Plut., *Phoc.* 17.6 and Nepos, *Phoc.* 1.3; 335/4: Plut., *Phoc.* 17.6); on the personal relationship of the general with several Macedonians, cf. Orsi 2001: 149-51.

² Plut., *Phoc.* 30.1-2. We need to bear in mind that it was again through a relative –his son-in-law Charikles– that Phokion had been implicated in the Harpalos affair (Plut., *Phoc.* 21.5-22.4)

³ Plut., *Phoc.* 30.5.

⁴ Plut., *Phoc.* 28.7 and 29.4. Mass resettlement, especially of troublesome groups, was part of a traditional Macedonian royal policy (see Griffith 1979: 348-82 and Baynham 2003). Bearzot 1985: 191 doubts the reality of Phokion's objection.

⁵ Plutarch's version (*Phoc.* 28.7), according to which not all disenfranchised Athenians left the city, is certainly more plausible than that of Diodoros (18.18.4-5), according to which all disenfranchised citizens were relocated (cf. Poddighe 2002: 66-69).

⁶ Plut., *Phoc.* 28.2-6.

⁷ The number of citizens dropped to 9,000, according to Diod. Sic. 18.18.5. From this number we should definitely subtract an unknown number of exiles, banished either on Antipatros' demand or by their own initiative. For the long bibliography on the numbers of those who lost their civic rights according to Plutarch (12,000) and Diodoros (22,000), and on the ensuing implications for the estimate of the Athenian population in the late fourth century, see Poddighe 2002: 59-73, the bibliography cited by Hansen 2004: 627 and Oliver 2007: 76-87.

⁸ Plut., *Phoc.* 30.8: εἴτε μὴ προσδοκῶν πείσειν εἴτε μᾶλλον ὀρῶν σωφρονοῦντα τὸν δῆμον καὶ πολιτεύομενον εὐτάκτως διὰ τὸν φόβον.

of 319, discussed in the preceding entry. With the lower strata deprived of their civic rights and large numbers of anti-Macedonian democrats away from the city, the fact that the majority of Athenians insisted on the removal of the garrison means that a significant portion of oligarchs and their supporters must have also been opposed to the Macedonian presence. This, in turn, means that Phokion's power depended more and more on Macedonian arms and less and less on popular approval, as the later turn of events makes abundantly clear. Pro-Phokion apologetics repeat for 319 the argument of 322: the Macedonians are necessary if order is to be imposed on the unruly Athenian crowds.¹ What remains unsaid is that the garrison was also necessary for maintaining Phokion, the uncontested leader of the regime,² in power.

Antipatros' death in the summer/autumn of 319 and the struggle for power between the Guardian of the kingship Polyperchon and Antipatros' son Kassandros had an immediate effect on Athens. Kassandros hastened to replace Menyllos with his nephew Nikanor. The replacement was carried out before the news about Antipatros' death reached Athens; as a result, the Athenians accused Phokion of withholding knowledge of a fact which could allow them to take advantage of Macedonian rivalry.³ Phokion hastened to forge friendly ties with the new commander and even convinced him to make donations and expenditures, including an *agonothesia*, so as to appease the ever troublesome Athenians.⁴

¹ In fact, Plutarch (*Phoc.* 32.1-3) goes as far as saying that Polyperchon's *diagramma* was a devious ploy of the Macedonian general to undermine Phokion's power through the return of the demagogues, so as to have his hands untied to carry out his plans for the city.

² See Diod. Sic. 18.65.6: Φωκίων, ὁ ἐπ' Ἀντιπάτρου τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὴν ἐσχηκώς, or Plut., *Phoc.* 29.5: ἐπιμελόμενος τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν. These statements, corroborated by all available sources on the regime of 322-319 belie the general tendency of modern scholarship to consider Phokion and Demades as joint leaders of the regime, sharing the same policy towards the Macedonians or even the same domestic policy (for example, Orsi 2001: 137-39; Lehmann 1997: 13, 25, 26, 29, 58-61; Green 2003). Even more problematic is Brun's analysis (2000: 120-23), according to which Demades was the actual leader of the regime, which was mostly democratic. Firstly, despite Demades' political activity in this period it is clear that actual leadership lay with the old general, and that Demades' influence was, at best, waning (see the preceding entry, especially section V). Secondly, I fail to see how a regime called *expressis verbis* an oligarchy by literary and epigraphical sources which do not conform to the pro-Phokion tradition (Diod. Sic. 18.18.4 and 65.6; Osborne 1981: D38 (IG II² 448, l. 61); cf. Lehmann 1997: 13), a regime, moreover, supervised by Antipatros' men such as Kallimedon (**A6**, below) and Deinarchos (**A12**, below), can be termed democratic, merely because some democratic forms were maintained.

³ Plut., *Phoc.* 31.1-2. It would probably be impossible to carry out the replacement so quickly and secretly, without Phokion's and Menyllos' complicity. On Nikanor, see Bosworth 1994.

⁴ Plut., *Phoc.* 31.2-3. *Agonothesia* in this context must be taken to mean funding for the games, since the office of the *agonothetes* had not been created as yet (cf. **A31**, below). Even so, Nikanor is the first non-metic foreigner known to have assumed the expenses of an Athenian festival (Mikalson 1998: 58-59).

Polyperchon's *diagramma* (autumn 319) on the freedom of the cities and the return of the exiles¹ resuscitated the hopes of Athenian democrats.² Nikanor prepared for the inevitable conflict with Polyperchon, stalling the Athenians (who were openly demanding the removal of the garrison) and secretly increasing his forces at Mounychia. The Athenians realized that he was planning to take over the Piraeus, managed to send an embassy to Polyperchon³ and protested to Phokion who did everything within his power to facilitate Nikanor; even Plutarch has to note: "it would seem that he had a very strong confidence in Nikanor's intentions".⁴ The Athenians took to arms and Phokion had to save Nikanor from the hands of the general of the countryside Derkyllos. Despite a specific decree ordering Phokion to have the Athenians armed and prepared to counter Nikanor's attack, the general "neglected" to do so (ἡμέλησεν); the result was that Nikanor took over the Piraeus during the winter of 319/8. Nepos⁵ adds that Phokion also "neglected" to ensure Athens' food supplies, a point of vital importance to a city awaiting an enemy invasion.

Diodoros, Plutarch and Nepos offer diverging accounts of the events that followed. According to Plutarch, Phokion was then (finally!) alarmed (ἐθορυβεῖτο) and meant to lead Athenians to battle;⁶ Nepos says the exact opposite,⁷ namely that the Athenians wanted to attack Nikanor and that Phokion, once again, deterred them; Diodoros says that the Athenians sent to Nikanor "ambassadors from among the noteworthy men who were friends with Nikanor",⁸ namely Phokion, Konon son of Timotheos, and Klearchos son of Nausikles, with a request for the grant of autonomy, in accordance with Polyperchon's *diagramma*. The most likely course of events is that through the embassy Phokion tried to stall for time, perhaps promising to lead his countrymen to battle if negotiations failed.⁹ The supposed negotiations with Nikanor which followed and the relegation of the

¹ Diod. Sic. 18.56. For the Athenians, the *diagramma* had the additional importance of restoring Samos to them.

² For what follows, see Diod. Sic. 18.64-65; Plut., *Phoc.* 32; Nepos, *Phoc.* 2.4-5.

³ Diod. Sic. 18.64.3.

⁴ Plut., *Phoc.* 32.9: ἔοικεν ἰσχυρά τις αὐτῷ περὶ τοῦ Νικάνορος ἐγγενέσθαι πίστις.

⁵ Nepos, *Phoc.* 2.4.

⁶ Plut., *Phoc.* 33.1.

⁷ Nepos, *Phoc.* 2.5.

⁸ Diod. Sic. 18.64.5: πρέσβεις τῶν ἐπιφανῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ φιλίαν ἔχόντων πρὸς Νικάνορα.

⁹ Williams 1982: 149-50; Bearzot 1985: 208-213. This scenario follows the sequence of events reported by the three relevant sources in contrast with the account given by Gehrke 1976: 112, who places the capture of the Piraeus after Phokion's embassy, considering it unlikely that the Athenians would entrust such an embassy to Phokion after the capture of their port. His reasoning, however, does not take into account the correlation of political power at the time: Phokion's faction may well have still had the majority.

decision to Kassandros¹ were most probably the version offered to the indignant Athenians by Phokion and Nikanor; it is no accident that the embassy to Kassandros, which should have followed such a decision, was never carried out, although there was plenty of time until the spring of 318 and the invasion of Alexandros son of Polyperchon. During that time, Nikanor, despite the additional pressure put on him by Olympias, who ordered him by letter to restore the Piraeus to the Athenians, continued to stall.² It is noteworthy that Nikanor maintained his position without any military pressure by the Athenians even after the democrats came to power in 318 and up until the surrender to Kassandros in 317 and his assassination by Kassandros' order during the same summer.³

III. *Phokion, Alexandros and Polyperchon*

In the spring of 318, Alexandros, the son of Polyperchon, invaded Attica, accompanied by many of the Athenian exiles.⁴ The reactions of the oligarchic leaders in the face of imminent danger⁵ varied. Demetrios of Phaleron and others⁶ stayed loyal to Kassandros and Nikanor and were vindicated by the course of events. Phokion and his circle, on the other hand, hastened to approach the third consecutive Macedonian with (potential) power over the city, and tried to convince Alexandros to keep Mounychia for himself instead of handing it over to the Athenians, at least until Kassandros was defeated.⁷ From the negotiations between Alexandros and Nikanor it had already been made obvious that Polyperchon's side had no intention of restoring the Piraeus to Athenian hands.⁸ In other words, Phokion's turnaround was justified; he correctly assumed that his power could just as well be guaranteed by Polyperchon's forces; which of the Macedonian factions would play that role was merely a technicality.

¹ Diod. Sic. 18.64.5.

² Diod. Sic. 18.65.1-2.

³ Bosworth 1994: 62-63, with relevant sources and detailed discussion.

⁴ Plut., *Phoc.* 33.1.

⁵ Cf. Diod. Sic. 18.65.4: φοβούμενοι τὰς τῶν νόμων τιμωρίας.

⁶ Usually Demetrios of Phaleron, Kallimedon (**A6**, below) and Charikles are named (cf. Ferguson 1911: 33; Gehrke 1976: 117; Williams 1982: 154 n. 398); nevertheless, it was only Demetrios who stayed by the side of Nikanor (Ath. 12.542e; cf. p. 59 n. 2 and p. 67 n. 3, below) and not the other two, who simply left town (Plut., *Phoc.* 33.4; cf. 35.5, where they are sentenced *in absentia*).

⁷ Diod. Sic. 18.65.4. The contact with Alexandros was unofficial, not in the context of a formal embassy.

⁸ Diod. Sic. 18.65.3 and 5; Plut., *Phoc.* 33.1 and 43.3. This was later confirmed by Polyperchon himself, who replied to the Athenian democratic ambassadors (for the context, see in the text below) that, in direct opposition to his own *diagramma*, he would continue to directly control the Piraeus διὰ τὸ πολλὰ δύνασθαι χρησιμεύειν τὸν λιμένα πρὸς τὰς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις χρείας (Diod. Sic. 18.66.2).

But the turn of events was unfavourable for Phokion. An “all-blended assembly” (ἐκκλησία παμμειγής), in which repatriated exiles, former citizens, who had been deprived of their civic rights and, according to Plutarch, even foreigners took part,¹ deposed Phokion, abolished Antipatros’ regime, elected new archons “among the extreme democrats”² and condemned oligarchic leaders to death or exile and confiscation of their property. Phokion was naturally among those charged with treason by Hagnonides, Epikouros and Demophilos;³ accordingly, he fled the city, took shelter with Alexandros and received ‘letters of recommendation’ for himself and his associates addressed to Polyperchon. Accompanied by Hegemon (A10, below), Solon the Plataian (A11, below) and Deinarchos the Corinthian (?) (A12, below), Phokion moved on to Phokis where Polyperchon was camped.⁴ Meanwhile, Hagnonides was sent on an embassy to Polyperchon, to ask the surrender of Phokion and the restoration of the Piraeus to the Athenians, according to the *diagramma*. The official embassy and the group of fugitives arrived at Polyperchon’s camp simultaneously.⁵ The hearing granted by Polyperchon to both groups⁶ in the presence of the irascible Philip III formed the scene of rhetorical confrontations between the Athenians, to the obvious amusement of the Macedonian nobles; it is one of the most tragicomic moments in Early Hellenistic Athenian history. Polyperchon was favourable to the official embassy from the start and he arrested, tortured and executed Deinarchos. Phokion and Hegemon may have tried to blackmail Polyperchon hinting at their arrangement with Alexandros.⁷ This assumption can explain why the Macedonian general interrupted Phokion repeatedly, and why Polyperchon, when called upon by Hegemon as a witness to his good intentions for the Athenian *demos*, accused Hegemon of being a slanderer, an accusation that almost led to an on the spot execution of the latter by the furious Philip III. Finally, Polyperchon delivered Phokion and his associates to the Athenians with an armed escort, judging them guilty of treason but leaving their sentence to the judgement of the “free and autonomous” Athenians.⁸ The question of sovereignty over the Piraeus was probably left unresolved.⁹

¹ Plut., *Phoc.* 33.2; cf. Diod. Sic. 18.65.6 and Nepos, *Phoc.* 3.2.

² Diod. Sic. 18.65.6: ἐκ δὲ τῶν δημοτικωτάτων τὰ ἀρχεῖα καταστήσας.

³ On the last two, see Plut., *Phoc.* 38.2.

⁴ Diod. Sic. 18.66.1; Plut., *Phoc.* 33.4-5.

⁵ Diod. Sic. 18.66.2; Plut., *Phoc.* 33.6-7. The fugitives were delayed at Elateia because Deinarchos fell sick. The delay cannot have been long, *pace* Errington 1977: 492, who, trying to accommodate events to his chronological reconstruction, speaks of a delay of several months, while Plutarch clearly speaks of several days (*Phoc.* 33.6: συχνὰς ἡμέρας). Cf. Williams 1984: 304 and Bosworth 1992: 69.

⁶ Diod. Sic. 18.66.2-3; Plut., *Phoc.* 33.8-12; Nepos, *Phoc.* 3.3-4.

⁷ So Ferguson 1911: 34 n. 1; Bearzot 1985: 226.

⁸ Plut., *Phoc.* 34.4.

⁹ See A13, below.

The fate of Phokion and of all oligarch leaders who had not fled the city was predetermined.¹ They were led bound back to the city, where they were accused of being the instigators of “the enslavement of the country and the abolition of democracy and laws”.² Unable to defend themselves amidst the clamour of the riotous crowd, they were sent to prison where they were forced to drink the conium.

IV. Power under the aegis of the ‘opponent’ (322-318)

Phokion’s career after 322 is of particular interest because it highlights a turning point in Athenian politics. In the age of Lykourgos, there definitely existed politicians for whom a confrontation with Macedonia was not a priority to say the least, as well as politicians who had close personal ties with the court of Pella, a court that must have been viewed as a potential –or, occasionally, actual– refuge in case of political failure. Nevertheless, it would be probably incorrect to speak of pro-Macedonian statesmen in the strict sense of the term, apart from very few exceptions. The devastating defeat in the Lamian War offered Athenian oligarchic politicians and intellectuals a significant advantage: the Macedonians’ preference for tightly controlled leaderships –often supervised by Macedonian garrisons– gave them outside support against the “troublemakers” of the democratic faction and the unforeseeable demands of the mindless “mob”. The Macedonian need for control met the pursuit of oligarchy by some of the Athenians.³

Up to then, Phokion had been a general who could boast a long service to his country and a politician who had the cleverness not to allow his contacts with the Macedonians put a smear on his reputation of integrity. Nevertheless, he immediately grabbed the chance in 322 to hold “supreme authority during Antipatros’ rule”,⁴ and did not hesitate to stick with whoever could provide him with Macedonian armed protection (Menyllos, Nikanor, Alexandros). His obsession to curb the anti-Macedonian predisposition of the Athenian πλῆθος might have stemmed from his sincere belief that this was a dangerous course; but this was of no interest to the Athenians then and it should be of no interest to us now. The bottom line was that his actions only benefited himself, his associates and his Macedonian patrons, deprived his city from several chances to get rid of the Macedonian garrison and directly contributed to the capture of a part of the city by the Macedonians. The deadly rage of the Athenian crowd was well-founded.

¹ For the trial and execution of Phokion, see Diod. Sic. 18.66.4-67.6; Plut., *Phoc.* 34.1-37.4; Nepos, *Phoc.* 4; cf. the thorough analysis of Bearzot 1985: 227-41.

² Diod. Sic. 18.66.5: τῆς τε δουλείας τῆ πατρίδι καὶ τῆς καταλύσεως τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῶν νόμων.

³ On Phokion’s regime, see the careful analysis of Bearzot 1985: 191-200; Dreyer 1999: 157 n. 182 cites abundant bibliography on the subject; see also Poddighe 2002.

⁴ Diod. Sic. 18.65.6: ὁ ἐπ’ Ἀντιπάτρου τὴν τῶν ὄλων ἀρχὴν ἐσχηκώς; cf. Plut., *Phoc.* 29.5: ἐπιμελόμενος τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν.

A4. Demetrios son of Phanostratos of Phaleron

— Fortenbaugh / Schütrumpf 2000; *LGPN* II s.v. Δημήτριος n° 448

The philosopher and political leader Demetrios of Phaleron is another political figure of Early Hellenistic Athens who has been the subject of long discussions.¹ His involvement in the Harpalos affair in 324, under unknown circumstances, is the first reference to Demetrios' political activity to have been preserved in our sources.² In what follows, I shall focus exclusively on his relations with the Macedonians.

I. *The embassy of 322*

We have already seen the details of the embassy of 322 in the two preceding entries. The only source documenting Demetrios' presence in that embassy is the peripatetic treatise *Περὶ ἐρμηνείας* (originally attributed to Demetrios himself), where an embassy to Krateros, in which the philosopher took part, is mentioned.³ In all likelihood this is the first phase of negotiations, when Antipatros and Krateros demanded the unconditional surrender of Athens.⁴ Demetrios' role does not appear to have been important; nevertheless, there should be no doubt that the final settlement suited his political and philosophical agenda perfectly. Demetrios was personally connected with two of the leaders of the oligarchic faction, namely Phokion⁵ and Konon son of Timotheos;⁶ moreover, the ancient tradition of comparing the regime of 322-319 with Solon's constitution may be attributed to him;⁷ characteristically, a similar comparison was later put forward for his own regime of 317-307.⁸

II. *From the death penalty (318) to the leadership of the city (317)*

The next mention of Demetrios is in connection to the events of 318. When Alexandros son of Polyperchon laid siege to the city, Demetrios, Kallimedon and Charikles (Phokion's son-in-law) did not follow Phokion and his circle, who tried to come to terms with the Macedonian general. Kallimedon and Charikles fled the

¹ Gehrke 1978 remains fundamental on the political career of Demetrios. For later bibliography, see Williams 1987: 93-98; Tracy 1995: 36 n. 1; Habicht [2006]: 71-84; Dreyer 1999: 162 n. 206 and 180-84; Fortenbaugh / Schütrumpf 2000.

² Diog. Laert. 5.75.

³ [Demetr.], *Eloc.* 289. The third-person reference to Demetrios in this passage is one of the main reasons why the attribution of the work to Demetrios has been rejected: see Chiron 1993: xiii-xxxix.

⁴ Krateros is not mentioned by any of the sources on the second phase of the negotiations.

⁵ Demetr., fr. 133.

⁶ Diog. Laert. 5.76.

⁷ Diod. Sic. 18.18.5; cf. Gehrke 1978: 195-96 for Demetrios as the person chiefly responsible for Phokion's posthumous rehabilitation.

⁸ Cf. Gehrke 1978: 187; see also Strab. 9.398.

city,¹ while Demetrios remained loyal to Nikanor and Kassandros and took refuge at Mounychia.² Later in the same year, he was convicted to death by the democrats who took control of the city.³ Demetrios obviously remained at Mounychia during the summer of 318, when Nikanor led Kassandros' forces to the Propontis⁴ and the Piraeus was controlled by Kassandros himself.⁵ His personal contact with Kassandros⁶ proved extremely useful a year later.

The recovery of Athens by Kassandros in 317 was the product of compromise and of intense political debate. The Athenians, frustrated by their inability to rid themselves of the Macedonian garrison with the help of Polyperchon or Olympias, were obliged to begin negotiations with Kassandros. One of the “noteworthy citizens” (τῶν ἐπαινουμένων πολιτῶν) “dared” (ἀπετόλμησε) to propose an alliance with Kassandros; after a passionate debate it was decided to send an embassy to the Macedonian and “arrange matters as well as possible” (καὶ τίθεσθαι τὰ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὡς ἂν ᾗ δυνατόν). After a series of meetings an alliance was agreed upon: the terms of Kassandros consisted in the preservation of the Macedonian garrison at Mounychia for the remainder of the war and the imposition of a censitary regime with a census of 1,000 drachmas. Most importantly, the Athenians agreed (in late winter or early spring 317)⁷ “to appoint an Athenian as overseer of the city, whomever Kassandros would designate; Demetrios of Phaleron was chosen”

¹ Plut., *Phoc.* 33.4.

² This is indirectly deduced by a passage of Karystios, *FHG* IV 358 (*apud* Ath. 12.542e), where Demetrios is said to have taken refuge by Nikanor after the death of his brother Himeraios in 322. Since a) this would not make sense for 322, when Phokion's regime still stood unchallenged, and b) Nikanor took charge of Mounychia only in the end of 319, almost all scholars correctly assume that the incident dates to 318 (see, for example, Ferguson 1911: 33; Gehrke 1976: 117; Williams 1982: 154 n. 398); the reservations of Bearzot 1985: 219 n. 129 are, in my opinion, unjustifiable.

³ Plut., *Phoc.* 35.5.

⁴ Diod. Sic. 18.72.3-8.

⁵ Kassandros sailed to the Piraeus from Asia (Diod. Sic. 18.68.1) and returned there after laying siege to Salamis (18.69.2).

⁶ For the “friendship” between Demetrios and Kassandros, cf. Ath. 12.542f.

⁷ The *terminus post quem* is the date of the last decree enacted by the short-lived democratic regime of 318-317; this is either Osborne 1981: D38 (*IG* II² 448), dated 318/7, Pryt. IV 35, on the last day of Maimakterion, or Osborne 1981: D39 (*IG* II² 350), ll. 36 ff., dated 318/7, Pryt. VII 18, if indeed there is some connection between this decree and the hopes of Athenian democrats for help from Olympias against Kassandros, as has been assumed (Schweigert 1939: 32-34; Poddighe 2002: 196; see also **D39**, below); if we follow the sequence of events recorded by Diodoros, then the *terminus ante quem* is the spring of 317, since the previous European event mentioned by Diodoros is the return of Nikanor from the Propontis, presumably as soon as the weather allowed a safe voyage, that is, in the early spring of 317 (on the events of 318/7, see Paschidis 2008).

(καταστῆσαι δ' ἐπιμελητὴν τῆς πόλεως ἕνα ἄνδρα Ἀθηναῖον ὃν ἄν δόξη Κασσάνδρω· καὶ ἡρέθη Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεύς).¹

The heated debates before this appointment, the vote to send an embassy with the express proviso that the ambassadors should ensure the best possible terms, and the repeated meetings with Kassandros testify to the degree of Athenian distrust of Kassandros and to the degree of difficulty the supporters of Kassandros must have faced in convincing the body politic. It was by then obvious, however, that Polyperchon was losing ground all over Europe, and the Athenians, sooner or later, would have to come to terms with the occupier of their port, despite the fact that no actual military operation of Kassandros against the Athenians is recorded. The main argument of the oligarchs was probably that an alliance with Kassandros would (in the future) reunite the *asty* with the Piraeus; this reunification figures prominently in the honorific decree for Demetrios by the deme of Aixone.² Nevertheless, the opposition to the overthrow of the democratic regime should not be underestimated. This is an important point for our discussion. The Athenians' hope to regain the Piraeus may account for their allying with Kassandros, a move which can thus be understood as complying with the expectations of *all* Athenians. The imposition of a censitary regime, on the other hand, even of a regime less rigid than that of 322,³ was certainly not part of the designs of the democratic faction which held the majority, nor is it likely to have been a non-negotiable demand of Kassandros who, unlike Antipatros in 322, had not inflicted a crushing defeat on Athens. In other words, the regime change of 317 was probably as much due to some Athenians as to the Macedonians. The difference between the events of 322 and those of 317 is that, now, it was probably not the (unknown) ambassadors but the Athenian oligarchs under Kassandros' protection who took advantage of the situation. Thus, Demetrios, who –let us not forget– had been under sentence of death, was either appointed by Kassandros or elected by the *demos* (depending on the point of view and the rhetorical needs...)⁴ as an

¹ Diod. Sic. 18.74.1-3.

² IG II² 1201 (Syll³ 318), ll. 5-10: καὶ πολέμ[ου | γενομένου]ν ἐν τῇ χώρῃ καὶ χωρισθέντ[ων τ]οῦ Πειραιῶς] καὶ τοῦ ἄστεως διὰ τὸν [πόλεμ]ον, πρεσβεύσ[α]ς διέλυσε Ἀθηναίους] καὶ πάλιν ἐπανήγα]-γεν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ εἰρήνην κ[α]τεργάσατο Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τεῖ χώ[ρ]αι]. Diodoros (18.74.3: ὥστε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔχειν πόλιν τε καὶ χώραν καὶ προσόδους καὶ ναῦς καὶ ἄλλα πάντα) also reproduces this *topos*, which must emanate from the rhetoric of Demetrios himself.

³ Gehrke 1978: 178-81 insists that the census of 1,000 drachmas was low and that the Athenians who lost their civic rights were actually few. The argument is valid (cf. Poddighe 2002: 109-140, especially 137-40 for the *timema* of 322), but partly misleading, as it overlooks the *ideological* importance which the absence of a census in Classical Athenian democracy had (cf. the emphasis put on unrestricted participation in the body politic, some decades later: SEG 28 [1978] 60, ll. 82-83: τεῖ δημοκρατία τεῖ ἐξ ἀπάντων Ἀθηναίων).

⁴ In the decree of Aixone there is no mention of Kassandros: Demetrios is portrayed as an elected official (IG II² 1201 [Syll³ 318], ll. 11-12).

ἐπιμελητής.¹ In a way, the reunification of the city with the Piraeus, the ultimate goal of the democrats, took place only in the sense that the oligarchic fugitives of the Piraeus took over the city.

III. Athens during Demetrios' ten-year rule (317-307) and the connection with the Macedonians

The prevailing picture of Athens under the rule of Demetrios of Phaleron (317-307) is that of a city which withdraws into itself, with its undisputed leader caring mostly for the implementation of his domestic political programme,² of a city in which a façade of constitutional legitimacy is maintained, albeit under close supervision,³ of a city, finally, where peace rules owing to Macedonian arms.⁴ This is a valid depiction; some adjustments are required, however, as far as foreign policy is concerned. The absence of Athens from the stage of international affairs was far from complete; moreover, one can detect the traces of a foreign policy which did not blindly follow Macedonian orders, at least not after 313.

The Athenian fleet is mentioned as present at four fronts (Samos, Lemnos, Kythnos, Oreos) during the Third Diadochi War (315-311).⁵ Demetrios himself is explicitly mentioned only in relation to the unsuccessful expedition of Lemnos (fall 314), when he followed Kassandros' order to send an Athenian squadron to the island.⁶ The equally unsuccessful expedition to Samos was a much more serious affair, given the great importance of the island to Athens in the previous decade. Moreover, although Kassandros must have given his consent for the expedition, and although, had the Athenians been successful, their victory would have definitely been detrimental to Antigonos, and therefore beneficial to Kassandros, it is far from certain that the expedition was decided primarily by Kassandros. The Samos expedition may well have been an Athenian attempt to take advantage of the circumstances, in order to implement their old design of recovering possession of the island.⁷

¹ The title recorded by Diodoros (18.74.3 and 20.45.2) was probably his official title (see Tracy 1995: 43-46 and Dreyer 1999: 161 n. 205, with earlier bibliography).

² The legislation of Demetrios, its possible relation to fourth-century philosophy and its conservative and aristocratic nature need not concern us here; see mainly Gehrke 1978; Lehmann 1997: 62-85; Williams 1997; Mikalson 1998: 46-74; Gagarin 2000; Haake 2007: 67-73; on the *nomophylakes*, see also O'Sullivan 2001 and Poddighe 2002: 45-52.

³ See especially Tracy 1995: 36-51.

⁴ See, for example, Habicht 1995: 64: "...ihm das Feld der äußeren Politik verschlossen war".

⁵ Samos (315 or early in 314?): *IG XII 6*, 51-52; Kythnos (315/4): *IG II² 682 (Syll³ 409)*, ll. 9-13; Lemnos (autumn 314): *Diod. Sic.* 19.68.2-4; Oreos (first half of 313): *Diod. Sic.* 19.75.7-8; *IG II² 682 (Syll³ 409)*, ll. 13-18. For the details, see **A17**, **A18** and Appendix 1, below.

⁶ *Diod. Sic.* 19.68.2.

⁷ This assumption is reinforced if Asandros' military assistance (Osborne 1981: D42 [*IG II² 450, Syll³ 320*]) is indeed relevant to this expedition; see Appendix 1, below.

The Athenian fleet was defeated twice during these expeditions; the Lemnos expedition, in particular, proved a disaster.¹ Even worse, the Athenians lost Delos to Antigonos, probably in 314.² The alliance with Kassandros was proving increasingly detrimental to Athens. Perhaps this can explain the Athenians' unwillingness to aid Kassandros in 313 at Oreos (see **A17**, below), and their negotiations with Antigonos in the summer of the same year. Polemaios, Antigonos' general, captured Oropos, made an alliance with Eretria and Karystos and then invaded Attica. The Athenians, who had already "secretly sent word to Antigonos, asking him to liberate the city" (λάθρα διεπέμποντο πρὸς Ἀντίγονον ἀξιοῦντες ἐλευθερώσαι τὴν πόλιν), "took courage and forced Demetrios to make a truce and send an embassy to Antigonos in order to conclude an alliance" (θαρρήσαντες ἠνάγκασαν τὸν Δημήτριον ἀνοχὰς ποιήσασθαι καὶ πρεσβείας ἀποστέλλειν πρὸς Ἀντίγονον περὶ συμμαχίας). Obviously, the secret contact between Antigonos and "the Athenians" was the work of the Athenian opposition.³ Apart from the defeats Athens suffered as an ally of Kassandros, Antigonos' rhetoric in the declaration of Tyre⁴ and thereafter about the freedom of the Greek *poleis* must have been an important incentive for Athenian democrats. Demetrios, faced with a growing displeasure over the alliance with Kassandros, had to succumb to the demand for an embassy. Some sort of truce was definitely concluded: Polemaios did not invade Attica, and Athens took part in no military operations against Antigonos until 307. Nonetheless, the embassy's stated aim was not merely protection against imminent danger (Polemaios' invasion) but also the conclusion of an alliance. Apparently, no such effort was made; we hear nothing of an alliance with Antigonos until 307. Demetrios probably had no intention of actually switching alliances and the embassy is best seen as a smokescreen to deter the opposition from taking more immediate action while, at the same time, keeping the city off a war in which no Athenian wanted a part anyway.

This slight distancing of Demetrios from Kassandros is also reflected in the events of 307. According to Plutarch,⁵ when Demetrios Poliorketes sailed into the Piraeus in June 307, Demetrios of Phaleron and his generals did not immediately react, because they thought the fleet was Ptolemy's and they made preparations for a friendly welcome. Ptolemy had signed a peace treaty with Kassandros a year before,⁶ so, technically, he was not an enemy of Athens. But his welcome *as an ally* by the Athenians is not justified by the peace treaty between Kassandros and himself. Can this mean that Athens, which had already distanced itself from

¹ The Athenians lost twenty ships; cf. **A18** and Appendix 1, below.

² For the date of the foundation of the League of the Islanders, see Buraselis 1982: 60-75.

³ Diod. Sic. 19.78.4; cf. Habicht [2006]: 82.

⁴ Diod. Sic. 19.61.

⁵ Plut., *Demetr.* 8.5.

⁶ Diod. Sic. 20.37.2.

Kassandros, was also in friendly contact with Ptolemy, perhaps from 308 on, when the latter made advances in the Peloponnese?¹

As we saw in the case of Demades, the policy of not putting all of one's eggs in the same basket had been a trend in the foreign policy of Hellenistic *poleis* already since the aftermath of Alexander's death. It is, nevertheless, surprising to find that the same foreign-policy tactic was adopted by a man who owed his rise to power to the Macedonian administration.²

IV. The 'embassy' of 307

Demetrios' careful policy is also evident in the events surrounding the capture of Athens by Poliorketes in 307.³ According to Diodoros, Demetrios initially took refuge by Dionysios, the phourarch of Mounychia, who resisted the forces of Poliorketes as long as possible; but when the Piraeus was eventually captured, Demetrios of Phaleron did not follow Dionysios in his flight, but fled to the *asty*; the following day, "sent by the people, along with others, as ambassador to Demetrios, he held a parley both about the autonomy and about his own safety, and secured a safe passage for himself; giving up the affairs of Athens, he fled to Thebes and later on to Ptolemy in Egypt".⁴ Apparently, the two issues were raised by different ambassadors; the autonomy was discussed by representatives of the opposition to Demetrios' regime, who were already in control of the city,⁵ while the participation of Demetrios and his associates in the embassy had the sole purpose of securing their own personal safety. This was accomplished with Poliorketes' help: the ambassadors returned to Athens escorted by a military detachment led by Aristodemos of Miletos, obviously in order to avoid an outburst of violence against the philosopher and his men.⁶ Demetrios had learnt Phokion's lesson well; he knew that attempting to stay in power when the city changed Macedonian overlords would prove fatal.

¹ Even after failing to ally himself with most *poleis* in the Peloponnese, and after the peace treaty with Kassandros, Ptolemy maintained garrisons at Sikyon and Corinth (Diod. Sic. 20.37.2), that is, in the immediate surroundings of Attica.

² Can these signs of independent foreign policy lie at the origin of the negative judgement of Demetrios by Douris (*FGHist* 76 F 10), a historian of anti-democratic and pro-Antipatrid tendencies? The alternative hypothesis put forward by Landucci Gattinoni 1997: 82-83 and 2003: 115, of a moral failure of Demetrios' policy in Douris' view, does not seem plausible.

³ Diod. Sic. 20.45; Plut., *Demetr.* 8.4-10.1.

⁴ Diod. Sic. 20.45.4: πεμφθείς μεθ' ἑτέρων πρεσβευτῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου πρὸς Δημήτριον καὶ περὶ τῆς αὐτονομίας διαλεχθείς καὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἀσφαλείας ἔτυχε παραπομπῆς καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀπογινώσκων ἔφυγεν εἰς τὰς Θήβας, ὕστερον δὲ πρὸς Πτολεμαῖον εἰς Αἴγυπτον.

⁵ Compare Plut., *Demetr.* 9.1 (the Athenians celebrate Poliorketes' victory) with 10.1 (the Athenians had contacts with Poliorketes already before the blockade).

⁶ Plut., *Demetr.* 9.2-3. Even Demetrios' passage to Thebes was facilitated by the Antigonid army.

V. In Egypt

Demetrios probably arrived in Alexandria after the death of Kassandros in 297.¹ Even as a powerful courtier of Ptolemy,² the philosopher did not forget Athens. According to Plutarch, he lived in such luxury that he regularly sent gifts to Athenians,³ either to the city as a whole or to his political friends. These donations testify to Demetrios's effort to keep the channels of communication with Athens open. In the same way that a relationship with a king could provide Hellenistic civic leaders with a safe haven away from the vicissitudes of civic strife, maintaining ties with their homeland could provide them with a refuge from the dangers that the struggle for influence at court could bear. In fact, Demetrios found himself in need of such a haven: having participated in a plot against the succession of Philadelphos to the throne, he was imprisoned by the new king, and eventually died in prison.⁴

¹ Cicero (*Fin.* 5.19.53) is the only source claiming that Demetrios went to Alexandria immediately after his escape to Thebes. Diogenes Laertios (5.78) writes, and Plutarch (*Mor.* 69C-D) seems to imply, that he left Thebes only after Kassandros' death in 297 (the fact that Demetrios' name is included in a well-known curse tablet dated to 304, together with the names of Kassandros, Pleistarchos and Eupolemos [cf. Habicht 1985: 80] is irrelevant to this issue). The latter version of events is more plausible: Demetrios would probably have waited for the situation in Athens to clear up, exactly like he had done in 318 (cf. Will 1979: 73). This assumption is reinforced by Knoepfler's demonstration that Thebes entered the Boiotian *koinon* only in 287 and that, for decades after its refoundation in 316 or 315 (for the exact date, see Landucci Gattinoni 2003: 19-21, with earlier bibliography), the city was primarily a heavily guarded military outpost (see Knoepfler 2001b). This means that Demetrios of Phaleron headed not only to a city friendly to Kassandros, but to the king's main military stronghold in mainland Greece.

² Plut., *Mor.* 601F: πρώτος ὦν τῶν Πτολεμαίου φίλων. For Demetrios' career in Alexandria, his purported influence on the legislative work of Ptolemy I and his role in the foundation of the Mouseion, see Fraser 1972: 114-15 and 314-15, Tracy 1995: 49-51 and the bibliography cited by Williams 1987: 91 n. 17.

³ Plut., *Mor.* 601F. Some scholars date these gifts to the period after 287 (see Quaß 1993: 102 n. 110, with earlier bibliography). This is unlikely: why would Demetrios –who, in the eyes of the Athenian public opinion, was a tyrant imposed by a Macedonian overlord– believe he could gain influence in a period in which the rhetoric of democratic patriotism prevailed? I believe that Demetrios' gifts are better explained if placed in the period after 301. If Demetrios indeed sought to regain influence in Athens, this is the period when he had a double advantage: he was an old political friend of Kassandros, supporters of whom had regained influence after the battle at Ipsos (cf. **A38**, below), but also a courtier of Ptolemy, a powerful member of the winning coalition at Ipsos. Under both capacities, Demetrios was well placed to take advantage of the negative disposition towards Poliorketes (cf. **A19** [III], below) which prevailed in Athens at the time.

⁴ Diog. Laert. 5.78. Demetrios tried to bring the children of Ptolemy I and Antipatros' daughter Eurydike to the throne; his machinations are perhaps a demonstration of his continuing ties with the family of Antipatros.

VI. *An overview*

Demetrios of Phaleron is a peculiar case of a political leader: originally a philosopher, then an appointed ruler of his city, and finally an intellectual and a *philos* at a royal court, with an unfailing interest in political life in his homeland, Demetrios is a prime example of Hellenistic mobility. His leadership also offers an illustration of an inconsistency which was inherent in Hellenistic politics: even civic leaders who rose to power –and maintained it– with the help of royal arms, in blatant disrespect of popular will, could, nevertheless, have a foreign policy agenda not wholly conformant to royal wishes.

A5. *Xenokrates son of Agathenor of Chalkedon

– Plut., *Phoc.* 27.1-6 and 29.6; Philod., *Ind. Acad.* VII 22-VIII 1; Diog. Laert. 4.9; perhaps Demetr., fr. 131A-C Stork *et al.* [Fortenbaugh / Schütrumpf 2000]; for other sources and fragments, see Isnardi Parente 1982

Xenokrates of Chalkedon, director of the Academy from 339/8 to his death in 314/3, had been a resident of Athens already for half a century¹ when he became one of the first non-Athenian ambassadors of the city² in the crucial embassy of 322 to Antipatros.³ Despite his supposedly reclusive life in the Academy, the philosopher was not a stranger to Macedonian kings and generals: according to a disputed tradition, he had taken part (perhaps unofficially) in an embassy to Philip II,⁴ according to another tradition, he received a donation by Alexander (part of which he returned);⁵ finally, he is later reported to be in contact with, and ask favours from Polyperchon.⁶

¹ See Diog. Laert. 4.6, with Whitehead 1981: 224-25 and Sonnabend 1996: 98 n. 255.

² Kienast 1973: 527.

³ For a detailed account of the embassy, see **A2-A3**, above.

⁴ Diog. Laert. 4.8-9. For doubts about the historicity of the incident, see Whitehead 1981: 234-35, Isnardi-Parente 1981: 151-52 and Sonnabend 1996: 100-104. Sonnabend argues convincingly in favour of the accuracy of the tradition, and less convincingly on dating the incident to 338. Either way, the integrity of Xenokrates, as it is portrayed by this incident, reminds us of one of the conflicting traditions on his role in 322 (see in the text, below). This could mean that, even if we do not accept the historicity of the earlier embassy, we should probably not doubt the existence of previous contacts between Xenokrates and the Macedonian court, since it must have been the existence of such contacts which led to the defence of the philosopher's image.

⁵ Diog. Laert. 4.8; 5.10; *Suda*, s.v. Ξενοκράτης; Cic., *Tusc.* 5.91; Val. Max. 4, fr. 3. Among the titles of works attributed to Xenokrates there are some that attest to his ties with the Macedonian court: *Πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον περὶ βασιλείας*, *Πρὸς Ἀρύβαν*, *Πρὸς Ἡφαιστίωνα* (Diog. Laert. 4.14). Xenokrates' disposition towards the Macedonian throne may have been parallel to that of Aristotle: friendly and patronizing at first, hostile after the Asian campaign (cf. Isnardi Parente 1981: 155-58).

⁶ Plut., *Mor.* 533C; Isnardi Parente 1981: 155 argues unconvincingly that this relationship can be interpreted as evidence that Xenokrates sided with Athenian democrats, who favoured Polyperchon over Kassandros; in my view, it merely shows a personal relationship with a powerful Macedonian.

At least three sources mention Xenokrates in the context of the embassy of 322. According to Plutarch (*Phoc.* 27.1-6), Antipatros was from the start hostile to Xenokrates,¹ who is said to have been the only ambassador openly opposing the proposed peace terms, which the others “wholeheartedly accepted as benevolent” (27.6: ἡγάπησαν ὡς φιλανθρώπους τὰς διαλύσεις). The same picture is drawn in the *Index Academicorum* (VII 22 - VIII 1) of Philodemos: Xenokrates argues against the measures as being unworthy of free men, and faces Antipatros’ hostility. A later incident belongs to the same tradition: the philosopher denied the award of Athenian citizenship, proposed by Demades or Phokion, not wishing to “take part in a constitution against the imposition of which he argued in an embassy”.² Diogenes Laertios (4.9), on the other hand, reflects a different tradition: the embassy is about the liberation of the captives of the Lamian War (an issue not mentioned by any other source), Xenokrates replies to an invitation to dinner with Antipatros with a reference to Homer, thereby winning Antipatros’ esteem, and is finally successful in his embassy.³

Once again it is difficult to choose between the conflicting traditions. It is obvious that the former emanated from the Academy and aimed to make a hero of its free-thinking director, while the latter probably emanated from his Peripatetic philosophical opponents.⁴ Most scholars believe that Diogenes is not a trustworthy source and that the academic tradition is in better accordance with the anti-Macedonian, or, rather, anti-tyrannical stance of Xenokrates.⁵ Nonetheless, this supposedly anti-Macedonian attitude is only documented by the very academic tradition whose historicity we are trying to detect; on the contrary, his former good relationship with the Macedonians (see above) and Phokion⁶ is well documented. An agnostic conclusion is perhaps unavoidable: we cannot exclude the possibility that it was not only the other ambassadors of 322 who were favourable

¹ The fact that Antipatros refused even to accept Xenokrates’ presence in the reception for the ambassadors does not mean that he was not a regular member of the embassy, since the other relevant sources explicitly testify to his regular membership (Whitehead 1981: 240).

² Plut., *Phoc.* 29.6: φήσας οὐκ ἂν μετασχεῖν ταύτης τῆς πολιτείας περὶ ἧς ἐπρέσβευεν ἵνα μὴ γένηται. The wording of Philodemos (*Ind. Acad.* VIII 2-11) is almost exactly the same. Cf. Whitehead 1981: 235-38.

³ A vaguely hostile reference to Xenokrates in the work of Demetrios of Phaleron may be connected to the same incident (Demetr., fr. 131A-C Stork *et al.* [Fortenbaugh / Schütrumpf 2000] = frs. 158-159 Wehrli + Philod., *Rhet.*, fr. 12 [Sudhaus 2.173], with the comments of Isnardi Parente 1981: 137-38 and Dorandi 1997 and 2000: 384-86).

⁴ See Isnardi Parente 1981: 130-31; Williams 1982: 47 n. 134; Bearzot 1985: 177-78; Sonnabend 1996: 114-24; Poddighe 2002: 35; Haake 2007: 25-28.

⁵ See, for example, Isnardi Parente 1981: 152-62; Whitehead 1981: 239; Dorandi 1991: 44-45; Dillon 2003: 91-94 (who seems to ignore the testimony of Diogenes and considers Xenokrates a democrat). The main exception is Sonnabend 1996: 100-126, whose arguments I follow here.

⁶ Plut., *Phoc.* 4.2 and 29.6.

to the measures imposed by Antipatros, but even the (supposedly?) brave and freedom-loving philosopher.

A6. Kallimedon son of Kallikrates of Kollytos

— PA/APF 8032; PAA 558185; LGPN II, s.v. Καλλιμέδων n° 7

Kallimedon, also known as Karabos –‘the Crab’–, came from a family who had old ties with Macedonia. The first clear political reference to him comes in connection to the Harpalos affair, when he was charged by Demosthenes with conspiracy with exiles in Megara who were waiting to return to Athens by force of Alexander’s exiles decree; he may have been politically active already during the reign of Philip II. Firmly pro-Macedonian and “full of arrogance and hatred towards the people” according to Plutarch, he self-exiled along with Pytheas at the outbreak of the Lamian War and took shelter by Antipatros, in whose service he undertook diplomatic missions during the war.¹ He certainly remained by Antipatros’ side until the autumn of 322, since, when the Athenian embassy arrived at Thebes, he was present not as a representative of the Athenians but as a consultant of Antipatros, whom he urged to uphold his decision to install a Macedonian garrison at the Piraeus.² He apparently returned to Athens after the censitary regime was established, since he is again reported to have fled the city in the spring of 318.³ Later on, he was condemned to death *in absentia*.⁴ He may have settled in Macedonia, on an estate he had been offered in Beroia in an unknown circumstance.⁵ Whether he returned to Athens in 317 remains equally unknown; his son Agyrrhios was politically active in the 280’s, although at the opposite end of the political spectrum.⁶

The only period of Kallimedon’s life which is of interest for the purposes of this study is his return to Athens and his role in the regime of 322-318. Obviously, as a *philos* of Antipatros, Kallimedon had a leading role in the regime, an assumption confirmed by his death sentence in 318. In this respect, his insistence on the

¹ Family: Davies 1971: 279. Harpalos affair: Din. 1.94; cf. Worthington 1992: 264-65. Reign of Philip II: Ath. 14.614e. His character: Plut., *Phoc.* 27.9: ἄνδρα θρασὺν καὶ μισόδημον. Envoy of Antipatros: Plut., *Dem.* 27.2.

² Plut., *Phoc.* 27.9.

³ Plut., *Phoc.* 33.4: ἀπῆλθον (*scil.* Kallimedon and Charikles, Phokion’s son-in-law) ἐκ τῆς πόλεως; there is no reason to assume that they merely left the *asty* and took refuge by Nikanor in the Piraeus like Demetrios of Phaleron (as do Ferguson 1911: 33; Gehrke 1976: 117; Williams 1982: 154 n. 398). They most probably left Attica.

⁴ Plut., *Phoc.* 35.5.

⁵ [Aeschin.], *Epist.* 12.8. Tataki 1999: 1119-20 has advanced the attractive hypothesis that Kallimedon, politarch of Beroia in 122/1, could be a descendant of the Athenian Kallimedon or a member of a local family affiliated to him (cf. Paschidis 2006: 257).

⁶ Agyrrhios proposed two honorific decrees (*IG II²* 653 and *Agora* 16.181, dated to 288 and 281 respectively) that, for different reasons, illustrate the pro-independence and fervently anti-Macedonian attitude prevailing in Athens at the time.

need for a Macedonian garrison in 322 seems only natural; Kallimedon is an extreme example of politicians for whom foreign military presence was a guarantee of political power.

A7. Demeas son of Demades of Paiania

— *LGPN II, s.v. Δημέας* n° 47; *PA/APF 3322*; *PAA 306870*

Almost nothing is known about Demeas son of Demades, apart from his participation in the embassy of 319 to Antipatros, which proved fatal for father and son (see **A2** [IV], above). Apparently, Demeas was politically active already before Alexander's death,¹ but neither literary nor epigraphical sources shed any light on his political activity. In any case, it is safe to assume that the embassy in which his career –and his life– ended epitomizes a phenomenon which we shall often come across in various entries: personal contacts with a royal court were often bequeathed to the descendants of a statesman.

A8. Konon son of Timotheos of Anaphlystos

— *Diod. Sic. 18.64.5*; for other sources, see *LGPN II, s.v. Κόνων* n° 22; *PA/APF 8708*; *PAA 581755*

Konon, son and grandson of illustrious Athenian generals and offspring of a prominent fourth-century family, was a member of the embassy of 319/8 to Nikanor, led by Phokion (see **A3** [II], above); it is, thus, safe to assume that he belonged to the oligarchs then in charge. This embassy is his last recorded activity,² and he probably belongs to the leaders of Phokion's regime who were exiled or executed in 318 (see **A3** [III], above).

A9. Klearchos son of Nausikles of Aigilia

— *Diod. Sic. 18.64.5*; *PA/APF 8480*; *PAA 574915*; *LGPN II, s.v. Κλέαρχος* n° 12

Klearchos is the third member of the embassy of 319/8 to Nikanor known to us (for the details, see **A3** [II], above), and, thus, one more eminent Athenian known

¹ Hypereides (frs. 87-90, 92-93) has written two speeches against him, while the *Suda* (s.v. Δημάδης) calls him an orator; see Woodhead 1997: p. 145 with bibliography.

² Habicht [2006]: 68 follows the identification of Konon (patronym and ethnic wholly restored) whose crown, awarded at the Panathenaia, is recorded in the accounts of the Treasurers of Athena for the year 317/6 (*IG II² 1479A*, ll. 18-20), with Konon son of Timotheos (the identification was proposed by Schmitthenner and accepted by the editors of the *IG*). Since honours for Konon were declared during the Great Panathenaia of August 318, this identification would lead us to assume a rather unorthodox sequence of events. Konon would be honoured in 319/8, that is, during Phokion's regime, and then not only would he not be sentenced to exile or death as the other leading oligarchs were, in the spring of 318, but his honours would be declared during the Panathenaia of 318, immediately after the democratic takeover. This is hardly possible in the case of "one of the prominent men who were friends with Nikanor" (*Diod. Sic. 18.64.5*) and, accordingly, this identification should be abandoned; besides, the name Konon was far too common in Athens.

to have been a friend of Nikanor and an associate of Phokion. His family was rich, and his father Nausikles was a known public figure who had often switched allegiances; after 340 he appears as a follower of Demosthenes and Hypereides.¹ Apparently, his son did not share his political ideas. His participation in this embassy is the last recorded event of his life.

A10. Hegemon

— Plut., *Phoc.* 33.6; [Aeschin.], *Epist.* 12.8; other sources: *LGPN* II, s.v. 'Ηγήμων n° 4

Among Phokion's friends who accompanied the general to his escape to Polyperchon in the spring of 318 and to his execution in May of the same year (see **A3** [III], above), Hegemon is the best known. Demosthenes calls him an associate of Aischines and Demades.² In ca. 331 he was charged for unknown reasons in an *eisangelia* and was subsequently acquitted in a suspicious manner;³ he was also rumoured to have received a donation of land in Macedonia, like Kallimedon.⁴ He proposed two laws and at least one decree dealing with issues of financial management, the exact content of which is not certain.⁵ The decree was enacted in the summer of 321, another proof that Hegemon was active during Phokion's rule. His summary description by Harpokration (s.v. 'Ηγήμων) may very well be accurate: εἷς δὲ ἦν τῶν μακεδονιζόντων καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ δωροδοκίᾳ διαβεβλημένων.

A11. *Solon of Plataiai

— Plut., *Phoc.* 33.6

He was one more of Phokion's associates, who accompanied the general to Polyperchon's camp in the spring of 318 (see **A3** [III], above). His name is not mentioned among those who were executed some weeks later. Solon, obviously a metic, is otherwise unknown.

A12. Deinarchos (of Corinth or Athens)

— *Suda*, s.v. Δείναρχος; [Dem.], *Epist.* 6; Arr., *FGrHist* 156 F 9.15; Plut., *Dem.* 31.6; [Demades], fr. 91 (De Falco); Plut., *Phoc.* 33.5 and 8

Deinarchos the statesman, who also accompanied Phokion to Polyperchon in the spring of 318 (see **A3** [III], above), is confounded by later sources with the homonymous orator. *Suda*'s entry on the orator relates that Deinarchos was appointed

¹ See Davies 1971: 396-98.

² Dem. 18.285.

³ According to [Dem.] 25.47, Aristogeiton the prosecutor was bribed.

⁴ [Aeschin.], *Epist.* 12.8.

⁵ Aeschin. 3.25 (law on the *theorika*, before 330; for its possible content, see Rhodes 1972: 235); *IG* II² 1628, l. 300 (law on the equipment of war ships, before 326); *IG* II² 375 (decree of unknown content, summer 321); *IG* II² 1469, l. 122 (reference to a decree which may relate to the previous one; cf. Habicht 1982: 198).

ἐπιμελητῆς τῆς Πελοποννήσου by Antipatros and died as a result of Polyperchon's calumny. This is clearly not the orator, who stayed in Athens until 307 and died after 292/1,¹ therefore the reference must be to the statesman, whose presence in Corinth in the service of Antipatros is attested by a letter of the Demosthenic *corpus*.² Deinarchos the statesman was the chief accuser of Demades in Antipatros' court in the summer of 319; the sources on this embassy report him to have been a Corinthian,³ but given the general confusion between the two Deinarchoi, one cannot be certain: this may be a mistake due to Deinarchos' assignment to Corinth.

The only certainty we can extract from this general confusion is that Deinarchos the politician held a prominent position on Antipatros' staff and belonged to the leading group of Athenian oligarchs during Phokion's regime. If he was not an Athenian himself, then his presence in Athens is difficult to explain; the similar case of Kallimedon (A6, above), who also belonged simultaneously to the fervently pro-Macedonian Athenian faction and to the staff of Antipatros, allows the assumption that Deinarchos' role was also to take care of Macedonian interests in Athens, whether this was due to personal choice (if he was an Athenian) or to his appointment by Antipatros.

Equally vague is his role during the takeover by the forces of Polyperchon. What is surprising is his treatment by Polyperchon: as soon as Deinarchos arrived at Polyperchon's camp in Phokis, he was arrested, tortured and executed.⁴ The fact that he was not handed over to the Athenians would make sense if he was not an Athenian, like Phokion and Hegemon, or a metic, like Solon; again, the obvious irregularity of the whole procedure does not allow certainty.

A13. Hagnonides son of Nikoxenos of Pergase

— Plut., *Phoc.* 33.4-12; Nepos, *Phoc.* 3.4; other sources: *LGPN* II, s.v. Ἀγνωνίδης n° 6; *PAA* 107455

A well-known orator of democratic convictions, a friend of Demosthenes and accused alongside with him in the Harpalos affair,⁵ Hagnonides was banished by the regime of 322⁶ and returned with Alexandros' army in 318. As soon as the

¹ [Plut.], *Mor.* 850D; Dion Hal., *Din.* 9; cf. Worthington 1992: 3-10. It is interesting, however, that the orator may have been in good terms with the Macedonians as well: he was a pupil of Theophrastos and Demetrios of Phaleron and was involved in politics during the latter's rule, as in 307 he was charged as one of the instigators of the overthrow of democracy ([Plut.], *Mor.* 850C-D; Dion Hal., *Din.* 2). Even if some of the details about his ties with Macedonia are due to confusion with the other Deinarchos (so Worthington 1992: 6 n. 11), the hostility of the democrats towards him after 307 cannot be accidental.

² [Dem.], *Epist.* 6.

³ Arr., *FGrHist* 156 F 9.15; Plut., *Dem.* 31.6; [Demades], fr. 91.

⁴ Plut., *Phoc.* 33.8.

⁵ Hyp. 5.40; *Din.*, fr. 26; Dion Hal., *Din.* 10; he was apparently acquitted (Worthington 1992: 56).

⁶ Plut., *Phoc.* 29.4. Hagnonides was one of the exiles who were allowed to remain in mainland Greece; originally at least, he took refuge in the Peloponnese.

democrats took over, Hagnonides, Epikouros and Demophilos son of Demophilos¹ charged Phokion and the oligarchic leaders with treason and led the embassy to Polyperchon.² Some months later, Hagnonides proposed the posthumous confirmation of the naturalization and the other honours which had been awarded to Euphron of Sikyon.³ Phokion's followers got their revenge in 317: Phokion's accusers were among the very few politicians who were condemned to death after the rise of Demetrios of Phaleron to power; Hagnonides was the only one who had not already fled the city and was executed immediately.⁴

Some comments on the outcome of Hagnonides' embassy to Polyperchon are required (for the factual details, see **A3** [III], above). The embassy had two goals: the removal of the garrison at Mounychia and the handing over of Phokion and his associates to the Athenians. As for the first, the new democratic leadership knew well that their main leverage over Polyperchon was the latter's declared policy of autonomy of the Greek cities and this was undoubtedly where they founded their argumentation; this is made obvious by Diodoros' wording (18.66.2): *πρεσβείαν... παρακαλοῦσαν δὲ τὴν Μουνυχίαν αὐτοῖς δοῦναι μετὰ τῆς αὐτονομίας*. Nevertheless, Polyperchon probably left the issue unresolved.⁵ In other words, the embassy's first goal was not attained. The surrender of the oligarchic leaders, the second goal of the embassy, was achieved, but even this success had severe negative repercussions. Polyperchon handed over the fugitives to the Athenians, but accompanied this action with his own judgement that the accused were guilty as charged.⁶ Moreover, the whole procedure of granting hearing to the representatives of both sides⁷ makes it clear that Polyperchon and Philip III were actually *judging* the treason charge; had they not found the 'defendants' guilty they would not have handed them over to the Athenians for a formal trial. In other words, in this case, the 'court of first instance' for a purely domestic affair of a "free and autonomous" *polis* became the court of the Macedonian king, with the consent, if

¹ Plut., *Phoc.* 38.2.

² Plut., *Phoc.* 33.4-12.

³ Osborne D38 (*IG II² 448*), l. 36 ff.

⁴ Plut., *Phoc.* 38.2.

⁵ Plutarch does not mention any decision on the matter of the garrison; Diodoros (18.66.2) reports that the general felt obliged to stick by his own *diagramma*, although he wanted to keep the Piraeus in Macedonian hands, but again does not mention any decision. Perhaps the surrender of the captive oligarchs was accompanied by a vague reference to the city's freedom and autonomy (cf. the letter of Polyperchon, read to the Athenian assembly [Plut., *Phoc.* 34.4]: *ἐκείνοις (scil. the Athenians) δίδοναι τὴν κρίσιν ἐλευθέροις τε δὴ καὶ αὐτονόμοις οὔσι*). This would be a specious excuse for Polyperchon: the very terms of the *diagramma* would be reaffirmed, while no obligations for the removal of the garrison were assumed; in any case, the garrison was not at the time – and never came to be – in Polyperchon's control.

⁶ Plut., *Phoc.* 34.4.

⁷ Plut., *Phoc.* 33.8-12.

not at the request, of both the ‘prosecution’ and the ‘defendants’. This was clearly no official arbitration or a ξενικὸν δικαστήριον, official procedures not uncommon in Greek law;¹ it was, in essence, an indirect acknowledgement on the part of the Athenians that the ‘freedom and autonomy’ of the *polis* was under Macedonian protection, that is, under Macedonian control. This is another *leitmotiv* we shall encounter in dealing with the role of intermediaries between city and king: even the statesmen who turned to a king with the best of patriotic and pro-autonomy intentions could bring about a tightening of royal control over the city.

A14. Archestratos

— Plut., *Phoc.* 33.6

Archestratos was the proposer of the decree to send to Polyperchon the embassy which was led by Hagnonides (see the preceding entry and **A3** [III], above). His role was insignificant: Plutarch (*Phoc.* 33.6) makes it clear that the chief instigator of the embassy was its leader, Hagnonides. The wide diffusion of the name Archestratos in Athens renders any identification unsafe; nonetheless, it is tempting to identify him with Archestratos son of Euthykrates of Amphitrope (PA/APF 2419; PAA 211400), a rich collaborator of Hypereides.²

A15. Ktesias son of Chionides

— Κτησίας Χιωνίδου [. . . ? . . .]ος; Osborne 1981: D35 (*IG* II² 387; *Syll*³ 315)

Proposer of the decree by which Sonikos and Eu[kles?] received the Athenian citizenship at Polyperchon’s request in the tenth prytany of 319/8.³ Both the proposer of the decree⁴ and the recipients of the honours are otherwise unknown, although it is safe to assume that the latter were officers of Polyperchon, perhaps

¹ Firstly, the extraordinary circumstances did not allow for the observance of the normal procedure involving foreign judges or arbitrators (official request by the *polis*, appointment of a judge, etc.); secondly, the hearing was not conducted by an appointed judge, but by the king himself; thirdly, this was probably too early a stage in the development of the institution of foreign judges (at least in mainland Greece) to allow the assumption that this was the institution which Polyperchon and the Athenians had in mind (see Robert, *OMS* V 152 and Gauthier 1972: 345-46, although there are examples from the fourth century [Crowther 1999: 256]); finally, had Polyperchon thought he could judge the case in an officially recognized capacity, he would not have hastened to acknowledge the competence of Athenian courts in the affair.

² On the possible political profile of Archestratos son of Euthykrates, see *IG* II² 1628.451-2 with Davies 1971: 70.

³ Osborne 1981: D35 (*IG* II² 387; *Syll*³ 315).

⁴ Ktesias is unrelated to Chionides of Thria, who proposed the decree in honour of Nikomedes of Kos (*IG* II² 1492B, l. 101; Osborne 1981: D51 (*I. di Cos* ED 71[abce] I A; see **A33**, below), since the former’s demotic has eleven letters, that is, three more letters than Θριάσιος has. Another (?) Ktesias proposed a decree of a deme or a tribe in the end of the fourth century (*IG* II² 598; cf. Henry 1977: 61).

the subordinates of Kleitos who had led the Macedonian contingent which brought Phokion and his associates back to Athens some months earlier.¹

The importance of the decree as regards our discussion cannot be overstated. This is the first Athenian public document related to a case of a naturalization in which it is formally recognized that the award of citizenship was the result of a request – a binding request, if we are to be realistic – of a foreign ruler. As we shall later see (A19 [IV], below), it was certainly not the last.

A16. Polyeuktos son of Sostratos of Sphettos

– Osborne 1981: D39 (IG II² 350; CIGIME I 1, 513); for other sources, see LGPN II, s.v. Πολύευκτος n° 49; PA/APF 11950; PAA 778285

The last preserved decree of the democratic regime of 318–317² grants Athenian citizenship to the otherwise unknown [.¹⁰ Ἀ]γῆνος of Epidamnos and [.⁸]ελόχου of Apollonia.³ The motivation clause is so fragmentarily preserved that the reason for which the two men were honoured remains elusive. Mention is made to Athenian vessels (ll. 16–17) and to an official of Apollonia (ll. 15–16);⁴ the whole affair apparently took place “last year” (ll. 13–14: π[έρυσιν]). The dating of the affair in 319/8 and the honourands’ provenance from Western Greece have led to the assumption that the whole affair may be related to the intervention of Olympias (still in Epirus in 319/8), on behalf of the Athenians, and her letter to Nikanor (early in 318), asking him to hand over the Piraeus to Athens.⁵ It is a plausible albeit precarious assumption.

The proposer of the decree was Polyeuktos son of Sostratos of Sphettos, a known orator and statesman of the fourth century;⁶ the decree is his last known act. He was an eminent democrat, a friend and associate of Demosthenes, a firm

¹ Plut., *Phoc.* 34.2; the surrender took place around May (Phokion was forced to drink the conium on Mounychion 19 [Plut., *Phoc.* 37.1]). The decree is a safe *terminus ante quem* for the democratic takeover and therefore invalidates Errington’s chronology, according to which the takeover should be dated in the autumn of 317; see Errington 1977 and the detailed refutation of his theory by Osborne 1982: 98 n. 377; Williams 1984; Bosworth 1992: 67–70.

² Cf. Osborne 1982: 111.

³ Osborne 1981: D39 (IG II² 350; *I. Apollonia* I 1, 513; Poddighe 2002: 195–96 n° 2), Pryt. VII (ca. March) 317.

⁴ The official need not necessarily be one of the honourands (Cabanès, *I. Apollonia* I 1, p. 152); Alkimachos son of Alkimachos of Apollonia, to whom citizenship had been awarded in 333/2, to be subsequently reaffirmed in 318 (Osborne 1981: D37 [IG II² 391]; for the date of the reaffirmation, see Osborne 1982: 102), may have been the official in question. In the latter decree the only recorded benefaction of Alkimachos is his financial contribution “to the salvation of the city” in 318 (l. 5–6), but only the end of the motivation clause has been preserved.

⁵ Diod. Sic. 18.65.1–2; cf. 18.74.1; for the assumption that the decree is related to this affair, see already Schweigert 1939: 32–34 and Poddighe 2002: 196.

⁶ See M. H. Hansen 1989: 57–58.

opponent of Phokion,¹ and one of the politicians whose exile Alexander had demanded in 335.² He was charged in the Harpalos affair in 324,³ but was apparently acquitted, since he later actively took part in the diplomatic preparations for the Lamian War.⁴ If the assumption made above about the content of the decree which Polyeuktos proposed in 317 is correct, it is interesting for our purposes that the last political act of a staunch anti-Macedonian may have been related to a request for help from a Macedonian queen.

A17. Thymochares son of Phaidros of Sphettos

—IG II² 682, ll. 3-18 (Syll³ 409; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 15)

Thymochares, the offspring of a rich Athenian family,⁵ followed the example of his father Phaidros, who had been elected thrice as a general. His military activity is only known from the long decree in honour of his son Phaidros (IG II² 682; see **A46**, below).⁶ His first assignment involved a mission to Cyprus and the adjacent coast of Asia Minor, and was a complete success (ll. 4-9). Its date and context are not easy to ascertain, but one of the most plausible guesses dates the incident to 321/0, which would effect that Thymochares already enjoyed political power and recognition already during the regime of Phokion.⁷

As already said, the Athenian fleet appears at four fronts during the Third Diadochi War: Samos in 315 or early in 314, Lemnos in autumn 314 (on these two fronts, see the following entry), Kythnos in 315/4 and Oreos in the first half of 313.⁸ Thymochares led the Athenian fleet in the latter two cases. He was not involved with the Lemnos campaign, in which the Athenian squadron was led by Aristoteles. He may also have been involved in the Samos campaign; the fact that

¹ See Dem. 9.72; Plut., *Phoc.* 5.5, 9.9, *Mor.* 803E, *Dem.* 10; [Plut.], *Mor.* 841E-F.

² Arr., *Anab.* 1.10.4 (cf. Plut., *Dem.* 23, *Suda*, s.v. Ἀντίπατρος 2).

³ Din. 1.100.

⁴ [Plut.], *Mor.* 846C-D; cf. Plut., *Dem.* 27.3.

⁵ On the past of the family, see Davies 1971: 534-26.

⁶ Thymochares son of Kallias, a dedicant at the shrine of Apollo on Delos before 277 (IG XI 2, 164 B 1-2), is probably not our Thymochares, as is assumed by the editors of *LGPN* II, s.v. Θυμοχάρης n° 10, but his grandson (cf. Habicht 1979: 46 n. 5; Marek 1984: 253 and p. 145 n. 1, below).

⁷ IG II² 682, ll. 4-9. For the various hypotheses advanced regarding the context of the incident, see Dittenberger *apud* Syll³ 409; Ferguson 1911: 21; Berve 1926: n° 17; Davies 1971: 526; Hauben 1974; Descat 1998b: 188-90; Bayliss 2006. The latter (despite Gauthier's [*BullEpigr* 2006, 182] reservations) makes a strong case for restoring the name of Antigonos in the rasura of l. 6, dissociating the "war in Cyprus" in l. 8 from the events that are recorded afterwards, and for connecting this campaign with the events in Cyprus before and after the conference of Triparadeisos. Hauben's identification of Thymochares' victory with a victory recorded on a panathenaic amphora of 321/20 or 318/7 (cf. Bayliss 2006: 115 n. 35, with earlier bibliography) also points to a date in 321/0.

⁸ Samos: IG XII 6, 51-52; Kythnos: IG II² 682 (Syll³ 409), ll. 9-13; Lemnos: Diod. Sic. 19.68.2-4; Oreos: Diod. Sic. 19.75.7-8; IG II² 682 (Syll³ 409), ll. 13-18.

this is not mentioned in the decree in his son's honour can be easily explained by the fact that the Athenians were defeated.

The Kythnos incident was probably a minor affair; the main purpose of the campaign seems to have been to fight pirates and to ensure safe navigation.¹ The following campaign is more interesting. In the first half of 313, Kassandros besieged Oreos in Euboeia. Telesphoros and Medeios, Antigonos' officers, rushed to offer help to the city; by the time help from Athens arrived, Kassandros' fleet had been practically destroyed; as a result, Kassandros barely managed to escape, after inflicting some damage to the enemy fleet.² The same incident is described in the Phaidros decree: when Thymochares, στρατηγός ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν τῶν τῆς πόλεως, arrived at Oreos, he managed "to secure for Athens –alone among the allies (of Kassandros)– exemption from service in works pertaining to the siege".³ The connection with the incident reported by Diodoros is obvious and generally accepted. An important difficulty remains, however. According to Diodoros, help ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν arrived only *after* the siege, and the Athenian vessels took part in the naval battle through which Kassandros escaped from the Antigonid encirclement. Moreover, the Antigonid fleet was vastly superior to that of Kassandros and it is, therefore, highly unlikely that the siege by Kassandros was continued.⁴ This necessarily effects that Thymochares' force was not identical to the squadron which came to Kassandros' rescue, but only took part in the first part of the siege. In other words, the Athenians and other allies were forced to man Kassandros' fleet and to join in on the laborious preparations for the siege; this explains the reluctance of the Athenians and the success of Thymochares' intervention to

¹ Robert, *OMS* VI 185-86. We cannot rule out, however, a connection between the Kythnos and the Samos campaigns (cf. Habicht [2006]: 422 n. 74).

² Diod. Sic. 19.75.7-8.

³ *IG* II² 682, ll. 16-18: ὥστε τῶν συμμάχων μόνους Ἀθηναίους ἀλειουργήτους | εἶναι τῶν ἔργων τῶν πρὸς τὴν πολιορκίαν. This is one of the oldest attestations of the term ἀλειουργήτος / ἀλειουργησία (cf. Dem. 18.91).

⁴ Kassandros' fleet comprised thirty vessels, while the combined fleets of Thymochares (20 vessels) and Medeios (100 vessels), were four times as large (Diod. Sic. 19.75.7-8). Even after the destruction of four Antigonid vessels and even if we assume that only part of Medeios' huge squadron went to Oreos, and that the Athenian squadron was large, Kassandros simply did not have enough naval power to carry on the siege. Billows 1990: 122-23 tries to remove this difficulty by assuming that Medeios was called back to Asia and, as a result, the combined forces of Kassandros and Thymochares were able to defeat Telesphoros' squadron. This cannot have been the case for two reasons. Firstly, it would be an incomprehensible move for Medeios to have departed as soon as he had arrived at Oreos and, thus, to have given up on a very realistic chance to capture Kassandros himself. Secondly, Diodoros makes it clear that Kassandros did not defeat his opponents but merely managed to break away, precisely because his opponents, relying on their superiority in numbers, thought victory was assured, and were, thus, caught off guard by the combined attack of Kassandros and the Athenians (Diod. Sic. 19.75.7: ἐπέπλευσαν οἱ περὶ Κάσσανδρον καταφρονοῦσι τοῖς πολεμίοις).

Kassandros, who granted them exemption. It was only later, in the second part of the confrontation, that a second Athenian squadron (not necessarily led by Thymochares) came to Kassandros' rescue.

If this reconstruction of the event is accurate, the incident illustrates both the degree of Athenian subjugation to Kassandros in the age of Demetrios of Phaleron as well as its limits. The Athenians were obliged to participate in Kassandros' campaigns; when the campaign involved areas of Athenian interest (such as Samos or Lemnos), participation was willing or even sought after; when no such interest existed, Athenian participation was negotiable. Let us not forget that it was only a few months later that Demetrios of Phaleron was forced by the opposition to negotiate with Antigonos.¹

A18. Thrasykles son of Nausikrates of Thria

— Osborne 1981: D42 (*IG II²* 450; *Syll³* 320); cf. *Agora* 16.97 (*SEG* 21 [1965] 303); *IG II²* 546

Asandros son of Agathon (of Beroia?)² was granted the highest honours³ in Athens (citizenship, *sitesis* in the *prytaneion*, *proedria*, and the right to have a bronze statue erected in the *agora*) on the proposal of Thrasykles son of Nausikrates, in ca. February 313.⁴ The decree has long been adduced as evidence in the debate on the chronology of the 310's. The main question for present purposes is if –and how– the reasons to honour Asandros are related to the Athenian campaign in Lemnos (winter 314), Asandros' adventures in Karia in 314 and 313 (according to the 'high' chronology which I follow here)⁵ and the Athenian campaign against Samos, which is generally placed between 315 and 311. As I explain in detail in Appendix 1, the likeliest solution is to accept that Asandros visited Athens just before the Samos campaign, which should be placed in 315 or early in 314. Asandros, an ally of Kassandros since 315 and Antigonos' adversary, took part in the Samos campaign, providing ships and military contingents (ll. 18-22 of our decree).

¹ Diod. Sic. 19.78.4; see **A4** [III], above.

² Tataki 1998: 76 n° 16 has the sources and bibliography on Asandros and discusses his possible descent from Beroia; to the sources there cited, add *SEG* 47 (1997) 1563, with Wörrle 2003 and 2003b.

³ Gauthier 1985: 77-89. Asandros was in fact the first non-Athenian honoured with *sitesis* in the *prytaneion* (Osborne 1982: 115).

⁴ Osborne 1981: D42 (*IG II²* 450; *Syll³* 320), *Pryt.* VI 26 of 314/3, an intercalary year. According to Palagia 1998: 19-20, a fragmentary relief in the Acropolis Museum (MA 3006) may have been the upper part of the stele on which the decree was inscribed.

⁵ See Errington 1977; Bosworth 1992; Wheatley 1998; Boiy 2006 and 2007 with the extensive earlier bibliography on the 'high' and the 'low' chronology of this period. For proponents of the 'low' chronology, the honours for Asandros are unrelated to Asian affairs (Errington 1977: 498 n. 63). Billows 1990: 116-17 with n. 43, for instance, is obliged to assume that the military help Asandros provided was against pirates. As we shall see shortly, this is unlikely; Asandros' help involved large-scale military assistance.

In what concerns us here, we must note O'Sullivan's assumption¹ that Asandros took refuge in Athens after the loss of his satrapy in early 313, and that this was when the appendix to the decree was made. By the appendix, Asandros was also awarded *sitesis* in the *prytaneion*, an honour which until then had never been granted to someone who was not expected to reside in the city.² This is an interesting assumption which could also serve to demonstrate the importance of civic honours for honourands who, at the time of the honouring, had no vital interests in the city: the city which had received a benefaction could prove a useful temporary refuge. It is for technical reasons, however, that O'Sullivan's assumption is not very plausible.³

The case of Thrasykles, the proposer of the decree, presents significant similarities to that of Archedikos son of Naukritos (**A1**, above). Thrasykles was also an *anagrapheus* –in fact he was the successor to Archedikos in 321/20–⁴ and also proposed honours for a Macedonian. The difference between them lies in the fact that Thrasykles proposed the decree long after his term of office had been over. His office under Antipatros and Phokion and the decree he proposed under Kassandros and Demetrios of Phaleron are the only two testimonies for Thrasykles' political activity.⁵ He apparently belonged to the inner circle of the oligarchs in charge since 322; the fact that he remained active under Demetrios of Phaleron seems to imply that, like Demetrios, he remained loyal to Nikanor and Kassandros during the turmoil of 318. Our almost complete lack of knowledge about political

¹ O'Sullivan 1997: 114–16.

² On the *sitesis* in the *prytaneion*, apart from O'Sullivan, see also Gow 1963: 89–90; Osborne 1981b and 1982: 215.

³ There is no reason to consider the second part of the decree as an appendix added later; the normal explanation in such cases is that the amendment is contemporary with the voting of the decree, and that its aim was to accommodate Asandros' request for a bronze statue: see Osborne 1982: 115; Gauthier, *BullEpigr* 1998, 164; Lambert 2000: 489.

⁴ *Agora* 16.97 (SEG 21 [1965] 303); *IG II²* 546 with SEG 21 (1965) 304 for the date. I should take the chance to note that the restoration ἐν [τῶι Ἑλληνικῶι πολέμῳι] in ll. 14–15 of *IG II²* 546 (accepted also by Tracy 1995: 90 n. 15) is rightly rejected by Ashton 1984: 153 n. 6, who points out that the inscription is too fragmentary to allow such restorations and that in documents dating to 322–318 direct reference to the Lamian War is never made (cf. Poddighe 2002: 11 n. 3); one could add that the term Ἑλληνικὸς πόλεμος (on which see again Ashton 1984), was used with pride only by democratic regimes in Athens and thus seems unlikely for a decree dating to 321/20.

⁵ We also know the name of his son: Kallidemos (*IG II²* 6257). The identification of Thrasykles with the homonymous Athenian mentioned in the curse tablet *IG III* 3, p. ii–iii, fr. a, is due to Wünsch's assumption that Thrasykles and Nausias mentioned in the same tablet should be considered as demesmen of Thria; given the frequency of the names in Athens, this is an unwarranted assumption. The identification is repeated in *LGPN II*, s.v. Θρασυκλῆς n° 37 and Ναυσίας n° 11 (with wrong citations), as well as in *RE*, s.v. Thrasykles n° 2).

life under Demetrios' rule¹ affords no assumptions as to Thrasykles' possible role in his regime.

The first period of Poliorketes' rule (307 - 301)

A19. Stratokles son of Euthydemos of Diomeia

— LGPN II n° 22

Stratokles was the undisputed leader of the restored democracy of 307. His family, the richest and most significant family of the small deme of Diomeia, first appears in our record in the mid-fourth century. His family's wealth was significant but it does not seem to have been accompanied by political activity. Stratokles was the first (and last) member of the family known to have been involved in politics.² He first appeared as an accuser in the Harpalos affair; he may have been active during the Lamian War, but is completely absent from sources on the events of 322-307 – a clear indication of his anti-oligarchic tendencies.³

I. Divine honours for Antigonos and Demetrios and a periodization of Stratokles' career

After the expulsion of Kassandros' garrison, the razing of the fort at Mounychia and the restoration of the Piraeus and the constitution, the time had come for the Athenians to honour Poliorketes, in the very first days of 307/6.⁴ By a decree proposed by Stratokles, Antigonos and Demetrios were granted unprecedented

¹ The decree under discussion is one of the very few –two to five– decrees under Demetrios of Phaleron (Tracy 1995: 36 n. 2; for political life under his regime, see *ibid.* 36-51). This epigraphic 'silence' is best highlighted by what followed: there are at least fifteen decrees dating to 307/6, the first year after the regime change (see p. 81 n. 1, below).

² For Stratokles' family, see Davies 1971: 494-95. The family's traces disappear after Stratokles. It is almost certain that Stratokles is to be identified neither with the orator Stratokles mentioned in Dem. 37.48 nor with the homonymous general of Chaironeia (Aeschin. 3.143; Polyainos 4.2.2); see Davies 1971: 495.

³ Harpalos affair: Din. 1.1, 20, 21. Lamian War: Plut., *Demetr.* 11.4-5.

⁴ Poliorketes' siege and conquering of the city: Diod. Sic. 20.45.1-46.1; Plut., *Demetr.* 8.1-10.2. The precise dating is secure (see Jacoby, *FGrHist* IIIb *Suppl.* I, 342 and II 248). The siege began on Thargelion 26, shortly before the end of 308/7 (Plut., *Demetr.* 8.5; cf. *FGrHist* 239B 20); Philochoros, *FGrHist* 328 F 66 explicitly dates the liberation of Megara to the first days of 307/6; the final assault upon Mounychia which followed lasted only two days (Diod. Sic. 20.45.7). This dating is confirmed by the Attic calendar of 307/6: although the changes to the administrative calendar rendered necessary by the addition of the two tribes were finalized only during the fifth prytany (Woodhead 1997: 168 with earlier bibliography), they were envisaged from the very beginning of 307/6 (see Pritchett / Meritt 1940: 1-21; Meritt 1961: 178 n. 19): it is certainly no accident that the council's secretary, attested from the first days of the year (*Agora* 16.107), was Lysias son of Nothippos from Diomeia –the deme of Stratokles– a deme assigned to the new tribe named Demetrias (now tribe II); this must have been a measure designed to flatter Poliorketes (cf. Tracy 1995: 37 n. 6).

honours: golden statues of theirs standing in a chariot erected in the *agora* next to the statues of the tyrannicides, two crowns of 200 talents each, an altar to honour them as Saviours, formation of two new Attic tribes and building of two sacred triremes bearing their names, yearly contests with a procession and sacrifices in their honour, and having their figures woven on the Panathenaic *peplos*.¹

This unprecedented accumulation of honours has been sufficiently analysed in its religious and political dimensions.² The only remark worth to be repeated here is that these honours were not granted without good cause. The expulsion of the garrison and the overthrow of the unpopular regime of Demetrios of Phaleron³ were in earnest viewed as the highest possible benefaction, calling for the highest possible honours. Poliorketes was not dealt with as a semi-divine benefactor on account of his strength, but on account of his very specific actions in favour of the city. In other words, Antigonos and his son were treated by the Athenians within the established ideological framework of benefaction. This is made evident by what followed. Immediately after the voting of the honours, the Athenians sent an embassy to Antigonos, on the pretext of proclaiming the honours,⁴ but in reality in order to ask for further benefactions, namely for supplies of grain and shipbuilding timber, which apparently Poliorketes had already promised to them.⁵ Indeed, Antigonos offered 150,000 medimni of wheat and sufficient timber for the building of 100 triremes; he also restored the island of Imbros to the Athenians.⁶

¹ Main sources: Diod. Sic. 20.46.2; Plut., *Demetr.* 10.3-11.1; 12.1; 13.1-3 (a highly problematic source on the honours, as I hope to show elsewhere in detail); Philochoros, *FGrHist* 328 F 48, 165, 166; Polemon, fr. 8 (*apud* Harp., s.v. ἔνι καὶ νέα); for the rest of the literary and epigraphical sources, see Kotsidu 2000: n° 9 L and 9 E respectively.

² See the fundamental analysis offered by Habicht 1970: 44-48; see also Mikalson 1998: 78-85; for ruler cult in general, see Buraselis 2004: 158-86, with extensive bibliography.

³ Plut., *Demetr.* 10.2.

⁴ For embassies to announce honours to or congratulate kings, the Roman state or emperors, cf. Kienast 1973: 512-13; Canali de Rossi 1997: 745-47 (thematic index); Ziethen 1994: 115-31.

⁵ Diod. Sic. 20.46.4; Plut., *Demetr.* 10.1.

⁶ Diod. Sic. 20.46.4. It is more probable that Lemnos was restored to Athens in 305, rather than in 307; see section II, below. It is usually assumed (Ferguson 1911: 112; Pritchett 1937: 333 n. 12; Billows 1990: 151; Dreyer 1999: 63) that the thirty Athenian triremes which took part in the naval battle of Salamis in the summer of 306 (Diod. Sic. 20.50.3) were built with the timber sent by Antigonos. This is not a necessary conclusion. As we have already seen, Athens was in a position to deploy its fleet on various occasions between 315-313 and, despite the loss of twenty vessels during the Lemnos campaign (Diod. Sic. 19.68.2-4), I see no reason why its naval power should have diminished between 313 and 306 so much that the city should have become unable to deploy thirty ships. The participation of an Athenian squadron in the battle of Salamis is also mentioned in *IG II²* 479-480 (with the restorations of Wilhelm 1942b). For a second donation of timber by Antigonos, see in the text, below.

Until 292, the first decree proposed by Stratokles after the ‘liberation’ of the city was followed by at least another twenty-six to twenty-eight decrees. This number makes Stratokles the most prolific Athenian statesman of all times.¹

The distribution of the decrees in time is unequal:

Period	certain	probable	Total (max.)
a) 307/6-306/5	11 ²	1 ³	12
b) 304, second half	2 ⁴	1 ⁵	3
c) 303-302	6 ⁶	1 ⁷	7
d) 306-302 (no precise date possible)	2 ⁸		2
e) 302/1	2 ⁹		2
f) 292	1 ¹⁰		1
g) undatable	2 ¹¹		2
	Total		29

¹ Cf. Tracy 2000: 228. It is interesting to note that Stratokles, with a total of twenty-seven to twenty-nine decrees, and Demades, with at least twenty-three (Brun 2000: 33), that is, the two statesmen most productive in the assembly, are the ones most labelled by the literary tradition.

² 307/6: **(1)** honours for Antigonos and Demetrios (p. 79 n. 1, above); **(2)** *IG* II² 456, with *SEG* 21 (1965) 328 for the date; **(3)** *IG* II² 457 + [Plut.], *Mor.* 852A-E; **(4)** *IG* II² 461, with *SEG* 21 (1965) 332 for the date; **(5)** *SEG* 3 (1927) 86; **(6)** *IG* II² 455 with *SEG* 21 (1965) 327 for the date; **(7)** *IG* II² 460, with *SEG* 21 (1965) 331 for the date; **(8)** *SEG* 31 (1981) 80 (*IG* II² 561), which, as we shall see, probably belongs to the first half of 306.

306/5: **(9)** *IG* II² 469 (*Syll*³ 328; the date is not explicitly recorded but, as we shall see, is not in doubt); **(10)** *IG* II² 471; **(11)** *IG* II² 474 + Dow 1933: 412-13.

³ **(12)** *IG* II² 470 (for Stratokles as the more probable proposer, see Wilhelm 1939: 349).

⁴ **(13)** Plut., *Demetr.* 24.9; **(14)** *ibid.* 26.3-4.

⁵ Although Stratokles’ name is not explicitly associated with the new religious honours voted for Poliorketes in 304, we should probably assign them to him: **(15)** Plut., *Demetr.* 10.5 and *Mor.* 338A; Clem. Al., *Protr.* 4.54.6 (altar for Demetrios Kataibates); Plut., *Demetr.* 23.5-24.1; Philippides, fr. 25 (*PCG* VII; *apud* Plut., *Demetr.* 26.5) (association with Athena). For the date, see section III, below.

⁶ **(16)** Osborne 1981: D45 (*IG* II² 486); **(17)** *SEG* 16 (1959) 58; **(18)** *SEG* 36 (1986) 164; **(19)** *IG* II² 492 (Bielman 1994: n° 13); **(20)** Osborne 1981: D60 (*IG* II² 495; *ISE* 6); **(21)** Osborne 1981: D61 (*IG* II² 496 + 507 + *Add.*; *Syll*³ 347).

⁷ **(22)** *IG* II² 739 + Pritchett 1972: 170; for the date, see section III, below.

⁸ **(23)** *IG* II² 559 + 568 = *Add.*, p. 662; **(24)** *IG* II² 560. Both are related to the present study. The latter honours two royal *philo*i, one of them named Διονύσιος (Habicht 1996b tentatively identifies him with Dionysios of Sinope who mediated between Kos and queen Phila in the same period [*I. di Cos* ED 20; cf. **D9**, below], but the name is too common). The former is a decree in honour of Philippos (?) (the name has been wholly restored) son of Menelaos, an officer of Antigonos and Demetrios. If his name was indeed Philippos, and despite the extremely common name and patronym, he may have been one of Alexander’s veterans (Arr., *Anab.* 1.14.3; 3.11.10; 3.25.4). His identification with Philippos, a *somatophylax* of Alexander IV (*SEG* 31 [1981] 80 [*IG* II² 561]) is unlikely; see p. 84 n. 3, below.

⁹ **(25)** *Hesperia* 1 (1932) 46 n° 4; **(26)** *IG* II² 640.

¹⁰ **(27)** *SEG* 45 (1995) 101 (*IG* II² 649 + Dinsmoor 1931: 7-8; Kotsidu 2000: n° 12).

¹¹ **(28)** Osborne 1981: D102 (*IG* II² 971), ll. 16-21 (after 304?); **(29)** *Agora* 16.110.

A necessary first conclusion is that Stratokles' predominance was closely connected to, and in fact depended on, Poliorketes' sway over Athens. It is significant to note that this predominance was made evident from the very beginning of Poliorketes' rule: from the seventeen (fifteen certain and two possible) decrees of 307/6, six were proposed by Stratokles, while we know of only three or four decrees which were certainly not his, each of them assigned to a different proposer.¹ It should also be noted that Stratokles' almost exclusive stage of action was the assembly: although he served once as a member of the council,² as far as we can confirm he did not take part in any embassy and never held any office. Stratokles was a full-time orator in the assembly of the people.³

But these conclusions are insufficient. Within the main group of Stratokles' decrees, one can discern two subperiods (307-305 and 303-302). The epigraphic 'silence' of Stratokles from spring 305 to summer 303 is definitely due to chance and to the war with Kassandros;⁴ as the two decrees of 304 known to us from literary sources show, Stratokles remained very much in power in 305-303. There is, however a marked difference in the content and in the underlying politics between the decrees of 307-305 on the one hand and those of 303-302 on the other, as we shall have the chance to see in greater detail later. This differentiation is best explained on the basis of the severe reaction to Poliorketes' rule by a number of Athenian democrats in early 303, a fact which has thus far attracted little attention by scholars.

II. 307-305: *the optimistic democracy and the donations of 305 (money, timber and Lemnos)*

After the extravagant honours for Antigonos and Demetrios, Stratokles' activities seem to have been initially centered on foreign policy. In the winter of 307 he proposed a decree in honour of ambassadors of Kolophon,⁵ in early 305 he probably proposed honours for another ambassador of Kolophon, a city praised for the help it provided to the Athenians when Kassandros first besieged Athens

¹ For the decrees of 307/6, see Woodhead 1997: 169 and Tracy 1995: 40 n. 21, 2000: 230 and 2003: 145-46. The decrees not proposed by Stratokles are *IG II² 358*, with *SEG 21 (1965) 326* and *26 (1976) 87* for the date; *Agora 16.107*; *IG II² 464* and *463* (not certainly dated to 307/6).

² For only one of Stratokles' decrees is there a *probouleuma* (*IG II² 455*); cf. Rhodes 1972: 70; Byrne 2004: 322 n. 28.

³ Cf. Tracy 2000: Stratokles and Demochares took particular care in the way their name would be inscribed, that is, in the way their image would be displayed through public documents. For a similar interest shown by other politicians of the regime of 307, see also Hedrick 2000, along with the interesting observations of Gauthier, *BullEpigr* 2001, 176.

⁴ Out of the fifteen decrees dated to 305/4 and 304/3, two are assigned to Stratokles (summer 303), four to other proposers (*IG II² 703*; *Hesperia* 5 [1936] 201; *IG II² 482* and *483*), while the name of the proposer has not been preserved for the rest.

⁵ *IG II² 456*, with *SEG 21 (1965) 328* for the date.

in 306;¹ in the summer of 306 he proposed honours for another city, probably for the same reasons;² finally, a little earlier, he had proposed honours for three citizens of Priene, among other things, for well receiving Athenian ambassadors sent to Priene.³ This close bond between Athens and a number of Ionian cities of the Aegean and of the coast of Asia Minor, attested to for the same period by other sources as well, is related to the incorporation of Athens in the Aegean realm of Antigonos and Demetrios.⁴ This does not, however, mean that the Athenians blindly complied to Poliorketes' orders; maintaining close ties with the Aegean was a natural tendency for Athens, aiming at ensuring food supply.⁵ The fact that the contacts of Athens with cities of the Aegean were facilitated by the incorporation of both parties in Antigonos' sphere of influence was a secondary aspect of this long-standing Athenian tendency.

Another well-known decree of Stratokles, dating to the same period, is the decree of late 307, awarding posthumous honours to Lykourgos.⁶ Stratokles' foreign policy was related to the city's present and future; in this case the democratic regime was settling its accounts with the past, while setting a standard for the future. The motivation clause puts considerable emphasis on the respect Lykourgos had shown for the laws, on his honourable management of resources, on the grants he had awarded to the citizens, and on the financial and military safeguards he had provided for the city's freedom and autonomy. It is of particular interest that the same statesman who, some months earlier, had proposed semi-divine honours for Antigonos and Demetrios –an act which, according to an ancient and modern *topos*, marked the end of Athenian dignity–, now published a manifesto of autonomy and proudly referred to Lykourgos' actions

¹ IG II² 470, with Wilhelm 1939: 349 for the assignment of the decree to Stratokles.

² IG II² 455, with SEG 21 (1965) 327 for the date. The content can be determined by the beginning of the motivation clause: ἐπειδὴ ὁ δῆμος (ll. 7-8). This *demos* must be a foreign one (cf. IG II² 703; 796; SEG 3 [1921] 94). The mention of a war (ll. 9-10: [κ]ατὰ πόλεμ[ov]) probably means that, in this case too, we are dealing with a city which somehow helped Athens during her first siege by Kassandros.

³ SEG 3 (1927) 86. It has been suggested (Reger 1992: 368) that a decree (IG II² 660) of the second half of the fourth century (see Lambert 2007: 110 n° 110) honouring the people of Tenos, Tenians living in Athens and Tenian envoys or leaders also belongs to 306. Moreover, a mutilated decree (*Hesperia* 40 [1971] 187-89 n° 34) of the last quarter of the fourth century (see Lambert 2007b: 69 n° 11) also deals with diplomatic relations with Tenos. If both belong to the same period, they are manifestations of the same foreign policy.

⁴ Habicht [2006]: 87 and 424 n. 7.

⁵ The Four-Year War was undoubtedly a time of shortage in Athens' food supply (Tracy 1995: 34).

⁶ IG II² 457 + [Plut.], *Mor.* 852A-E, dated 307/6, *Pryt.* VI. Osborne's theory that IG II² 513 is another copy of the same decree (Osborne 1981c: 172-74) was first challenged by Prauscello 1999: 57-71 (with the extensive relevant bibliography) and then confuted by Tracy 2003: 70-72.

against Alexander, which were meant to keep the city free and autonomous.¹ This apparent contradiction is particularly eloquent for the mentality of Stratokles and his associates during these first years of Demetrios' rule. The immeasurable praise to the Macedonian overlord was apparently not accompanied by lack of will for internal autonomy and for an independent foreign policy.

Even the honours proposed by Stratokles for *philo*i of Poliorketes in these first two years were very different from those he would propose in 304-302. Three such decrees are known down to 305. By the first decree² two or three –the names Philippos and Iolaos are preserved– former *somatophylakes* of a king Alexander, at the time officers of Antigonos and Demetrios, were honoured.³ The decree is usually dated to 307-301, but the fact that Antigonos and Demetrios do not carry the royal title (ll. 10-11) almost certainly dates it before the summer of 306, but not long before, since Demetrios is explicitly said to have been in Asia when the decree was enacted.⁴ The fragmentary state of the decree has given rise to long discussions, restorations and overconfident identifications.⁵ There are two interconnected questions. The first is whether in this case the term *σωματοφύλαξ* has the narrow sense of “royal bodyguard, member of the royal privy council”, or the broader sense of “member of the first class of hypaspists”, that is, of the royal *agema*.⁶ If the term is used in its narrow sense, then “king Alexander” should be identified with Alexander IV;⁷ if it is used in its broader sense, he should be identified with Alexander III.⁸ Although no conclusive argument against the latter

¹ IG II² 457, ll. 9-21; [Plut.], *Mor.* 852D. Kralli's attempt (2000: 149-50) to downplay the importance of the anti-Macedonian tone of the decree and to insist on its 'managerial' aspect is somewhat misleading. The managerial aspect of Lykourgos' government is clearly portrayed as a means to an end, as a secondary facet of his overall objective of freedom, autonomy and glory for Athens.

² SEG 31 (1981) 80 (IG II² 561).

³ Heckel 1986: 290 supposes that the honourands were three, which would effect that under Philip III and Alexander IV *somatophylakes* continued to amount to seven (four for Philip and three for Alexander). This inscription however is not relevant to his theory: the honourands are not honoured as Bodyguards of the King (in which case all of them would have to be mentioned), but for their role in Antigonos' court.

⁴ SEG 31 (1981) 80, ll. 10-11; cf. Billows 1990: 395.

⁵ For the sake of completeness I should also mention the fanciful 'reconstruction' of this text by Oikonomides 1987 (cf. SEG 36 [1986] 161), which would effect that the honourands were, in fact, the murderers of Alexander III, and were honoured by Hypereides.

⁶ For the term *somatophylax*, see Bosworth 1980: 323; Heckel 1986 and 1992: 237; Hatzopoulos 2001: 57-59. The third sense that the term could have, that of Royal Page, is certainly to be excluded in the case of this decree. In the Ptolemaic administration the term was initially used in its narrow sense (Mooren 1975: 75-77) and eventually became a court honorific title (Fraser 1972: I 102; II 182-84; Mooren 1977: 33-36; Piejko 1981).

⁷ In favour of this option: Habicht 1973: 374; Burstein 1977; Heckel 1980; 1981; 1986: 290; 1988: 42-43; 1992: 284-85.

⁸ In favour of this option: Billows 1990: 394-95 n° 57 and 421-23 n° 93.

option exists,¹ the former is more likely.² The second question is related to the identity of Philippos. Given the extreme banality of the name, I would suggest that all the identifications that have been hitherto proposed are highly insecure;³ moreover, they offer nothing to our analysis. From the wording of the decree itself it becomes clear that their former status as *somatophylakes* had nothing to do with the honours which the two men received in Athens: they are being honoured for their “present”⁴ position by Antigonos and Demetrios, with whom they “fight for freedom and democracy” ([συναγωνί]ζοντ[αι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας καὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας]).⁵ The exact occasion for the honours is not known; nonetheless, the next two decrees, to which we shall shortly turn, show that royal officials were still honoured only for specific benefactions towards the Athenians. Since the honourands are by Antigonos’ side, and therefore played no part in the liberation of 307, they probably played some role in the Athenian embassy which followed (as we saw above). Stratokles, no doubt the instigator of the embassy, was well-placed to propose honours for those who intervened in Athens’ favour.

By the second honorific decree for Antigonid officers,⁶ a certain [. . .]ότιμος was honoured. Two actions of [. . .]otimos are described in the motivation clause of the decree. The first was only indirectly related to Athens (ll. 2-8): he was a phourarch stationed at the Euripos, subordinate to Polemaios (nephew of

¹ Heckel’s argument that the term is not epigraphically attested in its broader sense is misleading, since, to the best of my knowledge, it is not attested in its narrow sense either. The term is later attested in the Attalid administration (*IG IV 1* [OGIS 329]; cf. Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 381-82) and, fairly frequently, in the Ptolemaic administration as well (see p. 83 n. 6, above), albeit in a different sense that cannot help us determine its use in the Attic decree.

² The main argument of Billows, that the sixteen-year-old Alexander IV had no need of a privy council is weak: as Habicht points out, *somatophylakes*, honorary bodyguards soon to become advisers, must have been part of the βασιλικὴ ἀγωγή which our sources testify that Alexander IV had received (Diod. Sic. 19.52.4).

³ Apart from the bibliography already cited in the eight preceding notes, see also Robert, *BullEpigr* 1982, 156, who thinks that Philippos is certainly to be identified with [Philippos] son of Menelaos mentioned in *IG II² 559 + 568 = Add. p. 662*, because the first letter of the *somatophylax*’s patronym was read as M by Heckel 1981. Billows, however, based on personal autopsy, read it as a B, a reading that Heckel seems to accept in his later publications.

⁴ *SEG 31* (1981) 80 (*IG II² 561*), l. 10: νῦν (the restoration is obligatory because of the preceding phrase ἔν τε τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ).

⁵ As Heckel 1981 pointed out, this restoration is assured by the similar phrasing of *IG II² 561*. On the contrary, I do not agree with his restoration –without any comments– [συνηγωνί]ζοντ[ο], instead of the obvious (because of the preceding νῦν) [συναγωνί]ζοντ[αι]. The past tense of the verb was perhaps preferred by Heckel because the present tense is one letter too long for the *stoichedon* arrangement; but this is a minor problem compared to the syntactical inconsistency ensuing from νῦν... συναγωνίζοντο.

⁶ *IG II² 469* (*Syll³ 328*).

Antigonos and his general “of Greece” after 313);¹ after Polemaios’ defection to Kassandros in 310 and then to Ptolemy² and his execution by Ptolemy in the summer of 309,³ [. . .]otimos is said to have contributed to the liberation of Chalkis according to the wish of Antigonos and Demetrios.⁴ This would effect that the honourand rejoined the Antigonid camp and probably followed Poliorketes in his Greek campaign in 307. The part of the text setting out the real reason for honouring [. . .]otimos has not been preserved, but its temporal context is specified as “now that Kassandros has attacked the *demos* of the Athenians in order to enslave the city” (ll. 8-10: καὶ νῦν ἐπιστρατεύσαν[ος ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμ]ον τὸν Ἀθηναίων Κασσάνδρ[ου ἐπὶ δουλείαι τ]ῆς πόλεως). Undoubtedly,⁵ the honourand was in charge of a contingent sent to help Athens during Kassandros’ first attack on the city in the second half of 306, an event which set the stage for the Four-Year War between Athens and Kassandros.⁶ Therefore, it would be somewhat misleading to speak merely of honours for an Antigonid officer: [. . .]otimos was not honoured for belonging to the Antigonid staff, but for helping the city repel an intruding army. His case is no different that that of the Kolophonian ambassador, to which we have already referred, who was honoured for the same reasons as [. . .]otimos, by a decree again proposed by Stratokles.⁷

¹ Diod. Sic. 19.77.2 (Polemaios is sent to Europe); 19.87.3 (ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πραγμάτων).

² Diod. Sic. 20.19.2.

³ Diod. Sic. 20.27.3; for Polemaios’ career, see Billows 1990: 426-30 n° 100.

⁴ On this event, probably followed by the incorporation of Chalkis and Eretria in the Boiotian *koinon* in 308-304, see Picard 1979: 259-61.

⁵ Cf. Billows 1990: 443 n° 125.

⁶ The reference to the attack as occurring “presently” securely dates the decree to 306/5. Secure sources on this first attack: Paus. 1.26.3; *IG* II² 467, 470, 1954, the decree under discussion and an unpublished inscription from Rhamnous (Petraikos 1999: I 32-33; cf. p. 89 n. 2, below); cf. Hauben 1974b and Habicht [2006]: 425-26 n. 22. I believe that we should add *IG* II² 505 (two metics were honoured for risking their lives in order to repair the south walls in 306/5, which effects that Kassandros had reached the city walls by 306), and perhaps Osborne 1981: D44 (*IG* II² 553), for the date of which see p. 95 n. 3, below. The first dated mention of the invasion is *IG* II² 470, Pryt. VII 27 = Gamelion 30), which means that the attack had been countered by February 305 (cf. Beloch 1925: 158, n. 3). Only a few days earlier (306/5, Pryt. VII 14), five individuals, who may come from Euboia, were honoured (*Agora* 16.113). If the restoration of their ethnic is correct (on the basis of *IG* II² 491), their activities were probably connected with that of [. . .]otimos. This, in turn, would date the decree for [. . .]otimos roughly to the same period (late winter 306/5) and would mean that, as soon as the defence of the city proved successful, the Athenians rushed to honour all those who had come to their help. The repair of the Piraeus walls and the provision of arms on the initiative of Demochares (*IG* II² 463 [Meier 1959: n° 11] + *Agora* 16.109; *IG* II² 468; [Plut.], *Mor.* 851D-E) do not help determine the chronology of the events, as no precise date has been preserved (Woodhead 1997: 173 argues for a date in 307/6) and as they could belong to either before or after the beginning of the attack.

⁷ *IG* II² 470; see the preceding note.

By the third decree in honour of royal officers, issued in late spring 305 (Pryt. X 29), Stratokles proposed honours for relatives of a certain Lykiskos, “being by the side of kings Antigonos and Demetrios and struggling in the Athenian people’s favour by words and by deeds...” ([διατρ]ίβοντες παρὰ το[ῖ]ς βασιλεῦσι]ν Ἀντιγόνωι [καὶ Δημητρίωι] καὶ συναγ[ωνιζόμενοι ὑπὲρ] τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων λέγο]ντες καὶ πράττοντες...¹ Once again, the specific reasons for the honours are not known; nevertheless, there is some evidence to help us recover them. Firstly, the preserved part of the motivation clause leads to the conclusion that the honourands were not in Athens at the time (nor had they been there in the recent past),² but at Antigonos’ court, probably in Syria.³ This probably means that the honourands offered some assistance to Athenian ambassadors to Antigonos.⁴ It so happens that we know of an Athenian embassy, whose ambassadors returned to Athens just eight days before the honours for Lykiskos’ relatives were enacted: according to the accounts of the treasurers of Athena, on Pryt. X 21 of 306/5, 140 silver talents “by Antigonos” (πα[ρ’ Ἀντι]γ[όνου]) were handed over

¹ IG II² 471. It has been suggested that the Lykiskos of the decree under discussion should be identified with the L[yk]i[sko]s honoured in a poorly preserved decree, which has been heavily restored by Woodward 1956: 6-8 n° 9 (SEG 16 [1959] 60) and dated by him to 306/5 as well. Nonetheless, Stroud 1971: 174-78 n° 25 identified a fragment explicitly dated to 320/19 as the beginning of the decree for L[yk]i[sko]s (Tracy 1995: 78 agrees with Stroud’s joining; Bielman 1994: 34-35 n° 10 appears to be unaware of it; finally, Billows 1990: 397-98 n° 62, while acknowledging the new date for L[yk]i[sko]s, continues to believe that he should be identified with our Lykiskos). In my opinion, however, this identification is not plausible, even if the honourand of 320/19 was, indeed, named L[yk]i[sko]s. Firstly, the only reason to believe that the L[yk]i[sko]s of 320/19 was in any way related to the Macedonians is Woodward’s bold restoration [διατρ]ίβω]ν π[α]ρὰ τοῖς βασιλεῦσι]ν. Secondly, even if we accept this restoration, an honourand of 320/19 related to a Macedonian could only have belonged to the Antipatrid camp; this, in turn, would render a third assumption necessary, namely that Lykiskos or his descendants switched sides and eventually joined the Antigonid camp. In all, the identification of the Lykiskos of IG II² 471 with the Lykiskos (?) of Stroud 1971: 174-78 n° 25 is based on three non-verifiable assumptions and should, thus, be resisted.

² In that case they would be referred to as *πρότερον διατρίβοντες παρὰ τοῖς βασιλεῦσι* (for a parallel from Stratokles’ decrees, see IG II² 560).

³ Antigonos’ Egyptian campaign was under way by late October 306 (Diod. Sic. 20.73.3) and it was probably not long after that that Antigonos returned to Syria (Diod. Sic. 20.76.5-6).

⁴ Billows 1990: 398, misled by the participle *συναγωνιζόμενοι*, thinks that Lykiskos’ relatives fought with the Athenians against Kassandros. Nonetheless, the verb *συναγωνίζομαι* is invariably used metaphorically in Attic decrees; it belongs to the vocabulary of benefaction rather than to that of war (see, for example, Osborne 1981: D47 [IG II² 558] with the remarks of Hedrick 1999: 420-21; Osborne 1981: D68 [IG II² 646]; IG II² 655; 743; *Agora* 16.172; SEG 28 [1960] 60; characteristically, all the aforementioned examples are related to royal officials). The verb is attested in another decree of Stratokles (SEG 36 [1986] 164), again in a metaphorical sense, as we shall see.

by Xenokles son of Xeinis of Sphettos, Kleainetos, and Chionides of Thria.¹ The connection with the embassy implied in the decree for Lykiskos' relatives is, I believe, fairly plausible.²

A decree proposed by one of the ambassadors of 305, Chionides of Thria, is most probably connected with the same embassy.³ It honours Nikomedes son of Aristandros of Kos (see **D8**, below) with a golden crown and the Athenian citizenship. Nikomedes was an important Antigonid official, who had twenty-six to twenty-nine honorific decrees, voted for him by various cities, engraved on two stelai in his hometown. The reasons for the Athenian honours are not known – only the conventional mention of his goodwill to and usefulness for the city and his help (?) to those who “joined arms for the democracy” (τῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς δη[οκρατίας συστρ]ατευομένων) have been preserved in the decree – but the fact that all other decrees in his honour refer to embassies and diplomatic contacts makes it clear that Nikomedes was a diplomatic adviser and allows the assumption that he was honoured for his help in the embassy of 305.⁴

¹ *IG II² 1492 (Syll³ 334) B*, ll. 97-101. The date (l. 98) is given as δεκάτης πρυτανείας ἐνάτει φθίνοντος (*scil.* Μουνυχιῶνος, the month corresponding to the tenth prytany). On the basis of *IG II² 471* we can conclude that Mounychion had thirty days and that Mounychion 22 (ἐνάτει φθίνοντος) corresponds to Pryt. X 21 (for the calendar of 306/5, see Pritchett 1937: 111; Meritt 1961: 137-38; Woodhead 1997: 178). For the ambassadors, see **A31-33**, below. Although they are not explicitly said to be ambassadors, there should be no doubt that this was an official embassy: I fail to understand the contrary assumption of Schaefer (1967: 1507), who claims that there was no need for an official embassy, as Xenokles, like so many from the deme of Sphettos, was a pro-Macedonian and therefore suitable for an unofficial mission. Xenokles was hardly a pro-Macedonian (see the corresponding entry); even if he was, this would hardly exclude an official embassy: a sum given as a donation to a citizen would not be officially recorded as money παρ' Ἀντιγόνου in official records.

² It would be tempting to connect another highly problematic inscription, *SEG 34 (1984) 72 (IG II² 675 + 525 + Add.*, p. 662-63; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 10), with this embassy. This decree, mentioning donations and ambassadors (*IG II² 675c-d*, l. 3) was associated with our embassy by Pritchett 1937 who, accordingly, dated it to 306/5 (this date had been already tentatively suggested by A. C. Johnson 1915: 444 n. 2 and was later accepted by Meritt 1961: 138-39). Nevertheless, Tracy 1988: 307-308 (see already Tracy 1973: 191) established that the inscription was the work of a letter-cutter whose career began late in the first quarter of the third century and that the decree should be dated to 279/8, because of the demotic of the secretary.

³ Osborne 1981: D51 (*I. di Cos ED 71[abce] I A*, ll. 1-19). It was Habicht 1982: 198-99 who recognized the identity of the proposer.

⁴ Despite accepting that Nikomedes is clearly portrayed as a diplomat in the other decrees, Billows 1990: 411 assumes that he took part in Poliorketes' 307 campaign. In this assumption he is obviously misled by Herzog's initial restoration of ll. 4-6 (justifiably called “highly speculative” by Osborne 1981: 126-27). The text makes much more sense as restored in *I. di Cos*, where “the Athenians”, and not Nikomedes, is the subject of στρατεύομαι.

The decree inscribed immediately below this Attic decree at Kos has been more recently published;¹ it confirms the dating of the Attic decree to 305 and sheds more light on the embassy of Chionides, Xenokles and Kleainetos. It appears to have been an honorific decree issued by the Athenian cleruchs of Lemnos for Nikomedes and thus must have also expressed gratitude for the mediation of Nikomedes to Antigonos in favour of the Athenians. Since the honours for Nikomedes are expected to be announced during the next Panathenaia, no doubt those of 304, the decree of the cleruchs should be dated to 305/4. In the summer of 305, as again the accounts of the treasurers inform us,² Chionides sailed to Imbros and Lemnos and collected a large sum of money. This is the first secure attestation of the recovery of Lemnos by the Athenians.³ Many scholars have assumed (correcting Diodoros) that Lemnos was given back to the Athenians by Antigonos along with Imbros in 307. Nonetheless, the reconstruction of the sequence of events relating to the diplomatic activity during 305 proposed above would suggest that Lemnos was restored to Athens only in 305, after the second embassy to Antigonos.⁴

Finally, it is interesting to see how the money donated by Antigonos to Athens in 305 was spent: over forty talents were handed over by the treasurers to

¹ *I. di Cos* ED 71[abce] I A, ll. 20-31.

² *IG II²* 1492 (*Syll³* 334) B, ll. 124-134 (305/4, *Pryt.* I 14).

³ It is later confirmed by *ISE* 8 (*SEG* 3 [1927] 117), of 303/2. *SEG* 45 (1995) 92 (*IG II²* 550), which mentions the cities of Lemnos, Athenian ambassadors, fortifications on the island and a certain Antigonos, is irrelevant to the issue. Tracy 2003: 102 identified it as work of a cutter who worked from 281/0 to ca. 240, and therefore it cannot refer to the takeover of the island in 307, and Antigonos in l. 14 cannot be Antigonos the One-Eyed, as has sometimes been assumed (see, for example, Bielman 1994: n° 58 and Cargill 1995: 211-12, with earlier bibliography). Tracy (2003: 109-111) believes that the text dates to ca. 260 and that Antigonos is Antigonos Gonatas, an overall plausible suggestion. Nonetheless, even if, as Cargill points out, the (necessary) royal title may follow the name (see the similar construct in *SEG* 16 [1959] 58: οἱ ἀπὸ Δημητρίου τοῦ βασιλέως ἐξαποστελλόμενοι), this is not the usual syntax for a reference to a king. Two alternative solutions are possible: a) the text may date from the period before the end of the war, in which case the king mentioned would be Gonatas, being referred to –without his royal title– as an enemy, not as the overlord of Athens; b) the Antigonos mentioned in l. 14 may simply not be the king.

⁴ For the assumption that Lemnos was restored in 307, see Moretti, *ISE* I 16; Marasco 1984b: 42 n. 14; Billows 1990: 150; Habicht [2006]: 87 and 148; Cargill 1995: 51; Tracy 2003: 110; the only dissenting voice is Bugh 1988: 216, who claims that it would have been imprudent for Antigonos in 307 to relinquish control over such a prosperous and strategically positioned island. Nonetheless, a more compelling argument against the consensus would be that *Diod. Sic.* 20.46.4 includes only Imbros in the donations of 307; it would be a paradox if he reported an island of secondary importance and forgot the very important possession of Lemnos. For the importance of Lemnos for Athens' food supply, see Kallet-Marx / Stroud 1997: 186; for later developments in the cleruchy, see **A53**, below.

Polykleitos of Athens, Heraklei[*tos vel -des*] of Erythrai and the generals;¹ Billows reasonably assumes that the first two were Antigonid officers in charge of the city's defence during his absence.² Two months later, almost two and a half talents were spent on the transport of shipbuilding timber donated by the kings.³ This cannot be the aforementioned timber of 307,⁴ for the interval between the donation and the transport (fall 307 – late spring 305) would then be too long. There now seems to be a clear difference between the two donations: the one of 307 consisted in grain, timber and Imbros, that of 305 in money, timber and Lemnos.⁵

If the reconstruction proposed here is correct, then Antigonos made two important donations to Athens within less than two years. These donations can shed light on three interconnected developments in the relationship between Athens and the two kings in 307-305. Firstly, we need to stress once more that the unusually high honours for Antigonos and Demetrios were intricately connected with Athenians' aspirations for the greatest possible gains from them: money, materials and land. These aspirations, materialized through the actions of Stratokles (the instigator both of the honours and of the two embassies), intensified when Kassandros launched his first attack, soon after Poliorketes' departure in late fall 307. Secondly, we need to stress that Antigonos appears to have been bound to respond to Athenian requests by the conventional framework of *euergetism*⁶ and that Stratokles and the Athenians were perfectly aware of this 'obligation'. But this last remark in no way means that Antigonos was not promoting his own needs as well through his donations. Prospective master of the Aegean in 307, already king in 305, Antigonos had every interest to attach a traditional naval power to his camp as firmly as possible, and to secure its defence, especially against Kassandros, that is, his main rival in Europe.⁷ A city like Athens could offer

¹ *IG II² 1492 (Syll³ 334) B*, ll. 105-108; ten out of these forty talents were later returned (ll. 114-118).

² Billows 1990: 389 n° 48 and 430-31 n° 102. A third Antigonid officer with similar duties in the countryside was the well-known Adeimantos of Lampsakos, *κατασταθείς στρατηγός ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως Δημητρίου* for 306/5 and 305/4 (?), according to an unpublished decree of Rhamnous (Petraikos 1999: I. 32-33, 430).

³ *IG II² 1492 (Syll³ 334) B*, ll. 118-124; for l. 121, see Meiggs 1982: 494 n. 87.

⁴ Diod. Sic. 20.46.4; Plut., *Demetr.* 10.1. The two loads of timber are confounded, among others, by Habicht [2006]: 88 and Bringmann (Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: 29), who, in connection with the donation of 307, writes: "den Transport des Schiffsbauholzes mußten die Athener finanzieren", with a reference to *IG II² 1492* of 305; it is clear that the transport of the timber sent in 305 was partly financed by Antigonos' monetary donation.

⁵ The fact that the common denominator was timber is no accident: a stronger fleet was necessary to ensure the protection of the two island possessions.

⁶ Cf. Ma 1999: 185-87 and 203-205.

⁷ The parallel donation of 1,200 suits of armour to Athens by Poliorketes after the naval battle at Salamis (Plut., *Demetr.* 15.1-2), was both a strong ideological message and a very practical contribution to the city's defences (Smith 1962: 116 n. 13; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 11).

him military power (like the thirty ships stationed at Salamis), a strategic alliance (Athens was a crucial stronghold for central mainland Greece and south Aegean) and political status (semi-divine honours legitimized his assumption of the kingship).

III. *The chronology of 304-302, the reaction against Poliorketes (first half of 303?) and Stratokles' renewed predominance*

After concluding a truce with the Rhodians,¹ Poliorketes returned to Athens in the spring of 304, in order to relieve Athens from the offensive which Kassandros relaunched. The military situation in Attica was crucial. Kassandros had occupied the forts of Panakton, Phyle and Oropos to the north and had 'liberated' Salamis to the south; in other words, he had the city surrounded by land and sea. Moreover, he had certainly reached the city's walls and may have temporarily occupied even part of the *asty* itself.²

The imminent danger for the city and the subsequent gratitude for the help Poliorketes provided are reflected in the decrees of this period³ and in the new religious honours granted both to Poliorketes (altar of Demetrios Kataibates and association of his cult with that of Athena),⁴ and to his officers.⁵ Stratokles, "who greatly benefited from flattery (*scil.* towards Demetrios)",⁶ was most probably the instigator of these new honours, although he is not explicitly associated with them by any of our sources.

Closely related to these honours is another 'religious' decree proposed by Stratokles. In order to accommodate Poliorketes' wish to become an initiate of the Eleusinian mysteries, both illegally and ahead of time, Stratokles rearranged the Attic calendar, renaming Mounychion to Anthesterion –the latter being the month during which the Lesser Mysteries were celebrated–, and the following month, Thargelion, to Boedromion –during which the Greater Mysteries were

¹ Diod. Sic. 20.100.5-6; Plut., *Demetr.* 23.

² Panakton and Phyle: Plut., *Demetr.* 23.3; Oropos: *ISE* 8; cf. *SEG* 36 (1986) 165, ll. 19-22; Salamis: Polyainos 4.11.1 and Paus. 1.35.2; city walls: Paus. 1.15.1 and *SEG* 30 (1980) 325 with Habicht 1985: 78-80; *asty*: *IG* II² 479-480, with restorations by Wilhelm 1942b, which have not attracted much attention. A precise date or sequence for these events cannot be established. Kassandros' first attack had probably been repelled by late winter 306/5 (see p. 85 n. 6, above); the diplomatic activity of early 305 established above and the extreme paucity of decrees securely dated to 305/4 probably mean that Kassandros' second offensive may have begun in the summer of 305 or soon after.

³ See Habicht [2006]: 92-93.

⁴ Plut., *Demetr.* 10.5 and *Mor.* 338A; Clem. Al., *Protr.* 4.54.6 (altar); Plut., *Demetr.* 23.5-24.1; Philippides, *PCG* VII fr. 25 (Plut., *Demetr.* 26.5) (association with Athena). Cf. Habicht 1970: 48-50; Mikalson 1998: 86-88.

⁵ Habicht 1970: 55-58.

⁶ Plut., *Demetr.* 24.11: πολλά γὰρ... ὠφελεῖτο διὰ τὴν κολακείαν.

celebrated.¹ A recent epigraphical confirmation of Plutarch's testimony has created a number of chronological problems, which we shall have to discuss in some detail.

Until now the chronology of Poliorketes' stay in Athens between 304 and 302 seemed certain. He remained in the city for sometime after expelling Kassandros;² during the winter of 304/3 he prepared for his campaign in the Peloponnese, which must have started as soon as the weather allowed (late winter - early spring 303?). Diodoros, who gives a more detailed account of this campaign, also dates it to 303.³ These are the only European events he reports for 303; his next reference to Poliorketes and Europe comes seven chapters later, in the Attic year 302/1, that is, most probably in the Hieronymic / Julian year 302.⁴ This is when Diodoros places the affair of the Mysteries,⁵ Poliorketes' course by sea and land to Thessaly, skirmishes with the forces of Kassandros, a truce concluded between the two,⁶ and Poliorketes' passage to Asia in the fall of 302. Meanwhile, still in 302 according to the traditional dating,⁷ Poliorketes had refounded the League of Corinth. Diodoros and Plutarch concur that this predates the episode of the Mysteries.⁸ The refoundation of the League probably coincided with the Isthmia of 302; the scant evidence we have for this festival suggests that we should place it either in late spring (in which case it could in fact barely predate the Lesser Eleusinia of April-May), or in

¹ Plut., *Demetr.* 26; Diod. Sic. 20.110.1; cf. Philochoros, *FGrHist* 328 F 69-70. For Poliorketes' motives, see Landucci Gattinoni 1983.

² Plut., *Demetr.* 23.4-24.12.

³ Diod. Sic. 20.102-103. Poliorketes occupied Sikyon, settled the political situation there, oversaw the resettlement of the upper city, was honoured by the Sikyonians with sacrifices and festivals, then occupied Corinth, laid siege and occupied the Acrocorinth, conquered parts of Achaia, and, finally, Orchomenos in Arkadia. Other sources (Plut., *Demetr.* 25.1-2; Michel, *Recueil* 452; SVA III 446; cf. Billows 1990: 172) allow us to add Epidaurus, Troizen and Argos, where we find him in the summer, during the Heraia, to his conquests; perhaps also Elis (cf. Roebuck 1941: 61) and Messene (cf. **B29**, below).

⁴ Diod. Sic. 20.110-111. For the dating methods of Hieronymos, see Hornblower 1981: 101 and 109; for the ways Diodoros used them, see Wheatley 1998: 261-68; Anson 2004: 11-19 and Boiy 2007: 17 and 109, with earlier bibliography.

⁵ Diod. Sic. 20.110.1.

⁶ Diod. Sic. 20.111.2. The truce is also dated to 302 by the *Parian Chronicle* (*FGrHist* 239 B 26).

⁷ See SVA III 446 and Billows 1990: 172-73 with earlier bibliography.

⁸ Plut., *Demetr.* 25.4 places the refoundation of the League immediately before the episode of the Mysteries. Diodoros does not report the refoundation, but his phrasing in two passages following those recounting the Peloponnesian campaign (20.106.1: ὄρων τὴν δύναμιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀξιομένην and 20.107.1: Κάσανδρος... διαπολεμήσων Δημητρίῳ καὶ τοῖς Ἑλλήσι) seems to presuppose the existence of the League. Both passages are explicitly dated to 302.

early summer (in which case both Plutarch and Diodoros would be mistaken).¹ To sum up, the commonly accepted chronology stands as follows:

winter 304/3	Poliorketes is in Athens
campaign season 303	Peloponnesian campaign
winter 303/2	diplomatic preparations for the assembly at Corinth; Poliorketes is in Athens
spring 302	the assembly meets at Corinth and the League of Corinth is refounded
Mounychion 302	Stratokles 'corrects' the Attic year, Poliorketes returns to Athens and is initiated to the Mysteries

In 1986, A. Matthaïou published a decree of 304/3, dated to [. . .⁸. . .]ἰῶνος ὑστέρου;² the decree seemed to show that 304/3 was intercalary, contrary to all prior indications. Woodhead's explanation appears obligatory and has been generally accepted:³ the month is to be restored as [Ἀνθεστηρι]ἰῶνος ὑστέρου, and this is the very Anthesterion which Stratokles had rearranged in order to accommodate Poliorketes' wishes to become an initiate. This "second" Anthesterion is, in fact, Mounychion. After ca. April 303 the Attic year went as follows: "second" Anthesterion (in fact Mounychion) with the Lesser Mysteries, second Boedromion (in fact Thargelion) with the Greater Mysteries, Skirophorion. The sequence matches Plutarch's description perfectly.⁴ The problem –which neither Woodhead nor those who agreed with his reconstruction seem to have realized–⁵ is that dating the irregular Eleusinia to 303 necessitates a rearrangement of the whole

¹ For the date of the Isthmia, see Robert 1946: 27, n. 3; Ferguson 1948: 122-23, n. 33-34; Gomme / Andrewes / Dover 1981: 23-24. The latter show that the Isthmia of 412 and those of 390 were probably held in early summer, but we have no way of knowing whether things were the same a century later. For the assumption that the refoundation of the League coincided with the Isthmia, see Robert 1948: 27, n. 4; Schmitt, *SVA III* n° 446, p. 76; Billows 1990: 172-73. 303/2 is more likely to be an Isthmian year than 304/3: the festival was trieteric, and the Isthmia whose date can be established appear to have taken place on an even Julian year (412: Thuc. 8.10.1; 390: Xen., *Hell.* 4.5; 332: Curt. 4.5.11; 228: Polyb. 2.12.8 and the best-known Isthmia, those of 196); cf. Klee 1918: 53.

² *SEG* 36 (1986) 165; for the content of the decree, see in the text, below.

³ Cf. Tréheux, *BullEpigr* 1990, 397.

⁴ Woodhead 1989; cf. Woodhead 1997: 180.

⁵ Characteristically, Habicht 1990: 463 agrees with Woodhead but maintains the traditional date of 302 for the Eleusinia (1995: 87), while Woodhead 1997: 194 takes for granted that the League of Corinth was refounded in 302, without realizing that dating the irregular Eleusinia in 303 effects that the testimony of both Diodoros and Plutarch should be discarded. J. Morgan, in his unpublished contribution to the conference *Ἀττικαὶ Ἐπιγραφαί. Συμπόσιον εἰς μνήμην Adolf Wilhelm (1864-1950)* (Athens 2000, published in 2004) did exactly that: he dated the Peloponnesian campaign after the Mysteries of 303. Other recent treatments of questions pertaining to the first years of the refoundation of the League (such as Martin 1996, with a plausible reconstruction of *Agora* 16.122), ignore the issue completely.

chronology of 304-301: the episode of Poliorketes' irregular initiation to the Mysteries is now shown to belong to 303, and not to 302 as previously thought.

For the time being let us re-examine this decree. The honouree is Medon, an otherwise unknown officer of Poliorketes, son of a *proxenos* and benefactor of the Athenians. Medon "had earlier contributed to the salvation of the people and the freedom of the other Greeks"; the Athenians, however, honoured him mostly because "now, the King has sent him to proclaim to the *demos* his decisions on the places Kassandros and Pleistarchos have conquered...".¹ This leads us to a number of conclusions: 1) Poliorketes did not reside in Athens "now", that is, in April-May 303; apparently he was in the Peloponnese. 2) The "salvation of the other Greeks" is not only a reference to the Peloponnesian campaign, but yet another reflection of the Antigonid propaganda which ultimately led to the refoundation of the League of Corinth. 3) The restoration of Phyle, Panakton and, perhaps, Oropos to the Athenians² occurred only *after* the reorganization of the calendar by Stratokles, apparently only a few days before Poliorketes returned to Athens to attend the Lesser Eleusinia. This is important for the assessment of Stratokles' policy, to which we shall have to return.

Another chronological indication is useful for the present discussion. Woodhead showed that the decree by which the Athenians decided to hold a sacrifice during the prytany of the Akamantis as well as to hold annual sacrifices in Elaphebolion in order to express their gratitude for Poliorketes' victory over Kassandros and Pleistarchos and for the restoration of freedom and autonomy to the "Greek cities" can only be dated to 304/3, the only year for which the equivalence Akamantis – Elaphebolion can be valid.³ Once again, the conclusions ensuing from such a dating have not been drawn. For the decree does not only show that Poliorketes had already won major victories by spring 303,⁴ it also shows that, while the war was not yet officially over (ll. 11-13), the fundamental objectives of the campaign had already been achieved.⁵ Otherwise, it would have been imprudent for Athens to decide on annual sacrifices and it would have been a whimsical

¹ SEG 36 (1986) 165, ll. 16-18 ([συμπράττων] ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ δή[μου] | [σωτηρίας καὶ τῆ]ς τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλληνῶ[ν ἐ][λευθερίας]) and 18-22 ([ν]ῦν ἀπέσταλκεν αὐτ[όν] | [ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀπαγ]γελοῦντα τῶι δήμῳ[ι τ]ῆ[ἀ]ρέσκοντα ἑαυτῶι ὑπὲρ τῶν χωρί[ων] | [ἃ κατέλαβεν Κάσσα]νδρος καὶ Πλείστ[αρχος ---]).

² Billows 1990: 401-402 claims that Medon proclaimed "the capture of the Attic frontier forts from Kassandros and Pleistarchos", but τὰ ἀρέσκοντα ἑαυτῶι clearly means that what was proclaimed was Poliorketes' decisions, not merely the news of his success.

³ *Agora* 16.114 (SEG 30 [1980] 69) with Woodhead 1981: 363-65 and Habicht 1990: 465-66 for the restoration that shows that annual sacrifices and not contests were decided.

⁴ Woodhead 1981: 365-66; Billows 1990: 171, n. 18.

⁵ In the charter of the new League, obviously to be dated after the end of the campaign, it is repeatedly stated that the war is not over: SVA III n° 446, ll. 70-71, 77, 91. Technically, the war only ended with the truce with Kassandros in 302.

decision even for Poliorketes to break off an unfinished war in order to go to Athens and become an initiate of Demeter.

In other words, by March-April 303 the Peloponnesian campaign was effectively over. Poliorketes communicated his intent to become an initiate, Stratokles reconfigured the Attic year, Poliorketes then (in April-May) restored the forts of Attica to the Athenians, perhaps, as we shall see, in order to appease them, and came to the city in order to participate in the Lesser Eleusinia. This is the sequence of events precisely as recounted by Plutarch and Diodoros, except for the fact that that the two authors place the events one year later, that is, in 302. This, by itself, does not present us with insurmountable problems: assuming that the Peloponnesian campaign had been over by late spring 303 is perfectly legitimate.¹ The problem of the date of the refoundation of the League of Corinth, however, remains. According to the traditional chronology of the events, the irregular *mystes* was not just a king worshipped as a Saviour; he was also the *hegemon* of the Greeks. Dating the irregular Mysteries in 303 either presupposes that our only literary sources on the events report both their date and their sequence mistakenly, or entails the dating of the refoundation of the League to 303 as well. The latter is plausible, albeit the less likely assumption,² especially if we are to maintain the link between the refoundation and the Isthmia.³ Either way, the refoundation of the League (*pace* Plutarch and Diodoros) certainly postdates Poliorketes' initiation: even if we dated it to 303, there is simply no time for the preparations and for the arrival of the participants to have been concluded before June.

In conclusion, less certainty can be attained regarding the chronology of 304-302 than before. The Peloponnesian campaign should be dated slightly earlier than previously thought, and it had been more or less over by March-April 303.

¹ The campaign may have begun earlier than it is usually assumed, perhaps already during the winter of 304/3; this would explain the surprise captures of Sikyon, Corinth and Achaia (Diod. Sic. 20.102.2, 103.1 and 103.4 respectively).

² Diodoros neglected to report a number of events certainly dated to 303 and 302: for 303, the capture of Troizen, Epidauros, Argos, Elis (?) and Messene (?) (see p. 91 n. 3, above) and, most notably, the refoundation of the League of Corinth. This could mean that he has skipped the whole second part of the Peloponnesian campaign, immediately after which one could date the refoundation of the League. Diodoros' mention of the illegal initiation of Poliorketes to the Mysteries in 302, immediately before the latter's departure from Athens (20.110.1) may be due to his effort to wrap things up as far as Poliorketes was concerned with the mention of an impressive event, before proceeding to the account of the king's Thessalian campaign. But this is, admittedly, highly conjectural. *IG II² 492* (Bielman 1994: n° 13), a decree securely dated to 303/2 (its decisions were to be proclaimed at the Panathenaia of 302), which mentions the refoundation of the League, is of no help in the chronology of these events, since it can either reflect the announcement of the refoundation, or the diplomatic preparation for it.

³ See p. 92 n. 1, above.

The irregular initiation of Poliorketes occurred immediately afterwards in Mounychion and Thargelion 303. In anticipation of this, Stratokles had rearranged the Attic calendar; in exchange, Poliorketes restored the forts of Attica to the Athenians. The League of Corinth was refounded either immediately afterwards, in 303, or, as traditionally dated, in 302. The rest of Poliorketes' activities are impossible to date with precision. The new chronology may be tabulated as follows:

winter 304/3	Poliorketes is in Athens
late winter - spring 303	Peloponnesian campaign
Mounychion 303	Stratokles 'corrects' the Attic year, the Attic forts are restored to the Athenians, Poliorketes returns to Athens and is initiated to the Mysteries
late spring / summer 303 or spring 302	the assembly meets at Corinth and the League of Corinth is refounded

Let us now return to the main focus of our discussion, namely Stratokles. Despite the objections of the *dadouchos* of Eleusis and of the comedy-writer Philippides,¹ the rearrangement of the calendar had a very practical result for Athens. Just as he had done in 307, Stratokles again made the extravagant honours accorded to the king dependent on significant benefits that the Athenians expected from the king. There should be no doubt that Stratokles publicly claimed that the new lavish honours were perfectly justifiable in view of the anticipated restoration of Phyle, Panakton and Oropos, forts of great strategic importance to the city. This policy had reached its limits, however. There are a number of indications that the Athenians were displeased, to say the least; this displeasure was not only expressed in theory,² but also in concrete political actions, all of them datable to the first half of 303:

1) A law imposing constraints on the value of crowns awarded to honourands was passed before the summer of 303, most probably in the first half of 303.³ Given

¹ Plut., *Demetr.* 26.

² On this sort of opposition, see Habicht 1970: 213-21 and the excellent analysis of Mari 2003 on the *asebeia* of the Macedonians and their Athenian supporters.

³ Osborne 1982: 135; Henry 1983: 25-27 and 50 n. 35. The *terminus ante quem* is set by IG II² 488, in which the archons of 304/3 are honoured κατὰ τὸν νόμον; the decree belongs either to the last days of 304/3 (for the honouring of archons in the end of their year of office, see *Agora* 16.123 [302/1] and IG II² 685 [276/5]) or to the first days of 303/2. The fact that in IG II² 493, in the end of 303/2, the restoration κατὰ τὸν νόμον is one letter too long for the *stoichedon* disposition of the text is hardly a serious obstacle. Osborne 1982: 135 claims that the *terminus post quem* is the naturalization decree for Neaios (Osborne 1981: D44 [IG II² 553]), which he dates to 304/3, *Pryt.* VII (Osborne 1975: 153-55 and 1982: 117-20; for an untenable dating after Chaironeia or during the Lamian War, cf. Tracy 1995: 119). This is the last known decree by which a crown of a specific value and not "according to the law" was awarded. Osborne's main argument for dating it to 304/3 is that the war was apparently over (Il. 9-10: [ἐ]ἰς τὸν πόλεμον). But this phrase can very well apply

the quantity and the value of the crowns awarded to Antigonos, Demetrios and their officers after 307, this law is an indirect but indisputable indication of anti-Macedonian disposition.

2) Another measure of the first half of 303 which can be perceived as equally anti-Macedonian is the reinstatement of the *dokimasia* (control of the legitimacy) of naturalizations.¹

3) The clearest indication of anti-Macedonian feelings is provided by Plutarch (*Demetr.* 24.6-12). The young Kleainetos, son of Kleomedon and a lover of Poliorketes, presented a letter to the assembly by which the king asked for the cancellation of a fifty talents debt of his father's. The letter aroused great indignation, and the Athenians voted that no letter of Poliorketes was to be brought before the assembly again. Plutarch places the incident after Poliorketes' sojourn in Athens in 304 and before his initiation to the Mysteries in spring 303, therefore

to the temporary cease of hostilities in 306/5 (cf. *IG II² 470*: [νῦν... κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τὸ [ν γεγενημένον]). The main reason for the honours for Neaios is his help in military operations, among other places, in Eleusis. We know that Eleusis was involved in the Four-Year War (a fact that Osborne does not seem to take into account) by a passage of Pausanias (1.26.3), where it is reported that the general Olympiodoros "put the Eleusinians in array at a time when the Macedonians were attacking Eleusis" and defeated them. Since Poliorketes, whose forces played a decisive role in the outcome of the operations of 304, is not mentioned in the decree for Neaios, the incident probably dates to the first attack by Kassandros in 306 (cf. **A44**, below). In other words, the decree for Neaios should probably be dated to 306/5, Pryt. X. (which, as we know from *IG II² 473*, was the prytany of Oineis for that year). Nonetheless, I agree with Osborne that the crown legislation should be dated to the first half of 303, although for different reasons. The decree for Neaios (or maybe Osborne 1981: D43 [*IG II² 467 + Add. 661*], of the second half of 306/5) remains the *terminus post quem* for the legislation, which must have been voted sometime between the late spring of 305 and the summer of 303. Within that period, the time appropriate for anyone wishing to constrain the price of crowns to propose such legislation was after the winter of 304/3, when, with the war coming to an end, an avalanche of honours for the Macedonians should be expected. M. B. Walbank 1990: 445-46 n° 20 also dates the legislation to the spring of 303, on the assumption that Osborne 1981: D47 (*IG II² 558*), in which the crown is awarded κατὰ τὸν νόμον, is the continuation of *IG II² 484*, in 304/3, Pryt. VIII. This joining, however, is rejected by Tracy 2003: 151 n. 3 (for the sometimes insecure joinings of M. B. Walbank in general, cf. Tréheux, *BullEpigr* 1990, 392; Tracy 1995: 148-49).

¹ See Osborne 1982: 136. A safe *terminus ante quem* is Osborne 1981: D61, dated two days before the end of 303/2; a *terminus post quem* is provided by the naturalization of Oxythemis of Larisa (Osborne 1981: D47 [*IG II² 558*]), dated either to 304/3 or 303/2 (Osborne 1982: 125-26). Osborne's preference for the latter date is based on a complex argument regarding the role of the military treasurer in the financial administration of 303/2, an argument now disproved by the fact that the treasurer is attested for 304/3 (*Agora* 16.114; see already the reservations of Rhodes 1997: 44). In my opinion, the mention of captive cavalrymen in the appendix of the decree (ll. 31-36) tips the balance in favour of 304/3, closer to the end of the war than 303/2. Given that the crown for Oxythemis was awarded κατὰ τὸν νόμον, the decree should date to the first half of 303 (see the preceding note).

during his absence in the Peloponnese in the late winter or early spring of 304/3. This was a much more serious affair. The Athenians openly reacted against Macedonian intervention in Athenian internal affairs and tried to delimit the sphere within which the royal will was to be accepted. Poliorketes' rage when he returned to the city is well understood; in order to appease this rage as well as to get rid of his political opponents, Stratokles proposed a decree, by which the previous decree on Poliorketes' letters was annulled and its instigators were condemned to death or exile; furthermore, it was decided that any order by Poliorketes would in the future be accepted as holy and just. This last bit may well be Plutarch's own interpretation or exaggeration; nonetheless, the decrees of Stratokles in the summer of 303 (see section IV, below) make it clear that the royal will did acquire institutional weight in the assembly's decisions. Surely Demochares (A49, below), a leading politician of the regime of 307 and, by 303, the leader of radical anti-Macedonian democrats,¹ and probably the comic poet Philippides (A39, below), a fierce opponent of Stratokles, were among those (self-) exiled at that juncture. Philippides' best-known fragment –“this [*scil.* the honours for Poliorketes] is what ruins the state; not comedy”² is a testimony of the vehemence of the radicals against Stratokles and Poliorketes.

4) The stele inscribed with the naturalization decree for Neaios, an Antigonid officer (306/5, *Pryt. X?*),³ was later vandalized and Neaios' name was carefully excised in a clear case of *damnatio memoriae*. Obviously, the act of vandalism cannot be dated with precision, but we cannot rule out a date in the first half of 303, a period of strong anti-Macedonian sentiments.⁴

5) We find another indication of the opposition to Stratokles and Poliorketes in the summer of 303. In the end of 304/3 or the beginning of 303/2 Eucharos son of Euarchos, *anagrapheus* of the council,⁵ was honoured for ensuring that the laws of 304/3 were inscribed and for taking care that they were “exposed for those who want to see them, so that no one ignores the laws of the state” (ὅπως ἂν ἐκτεθῶσι... σκοπεῖν τῷ βουλομένῳ καὶ μηδὲ εἶς ἀγνοεῖν τοὺς τῆς πόλεως νόμους).⁶ This display of respect for the laws would not be so significant had democratic legitimacy not been so –almost menacingly– emphasized and had the phrase σκοπεῖν τῷ βουλομένῳ, attested mostly in the fifth century, not been used. This

¹ Plut., *Demetr.* 24.11; for the leading role of Demochares, see Tracy 2000.

² Philippides, *PCG* VII fr. 25 (Plut., *Demetr.* 12.7): ταῦτα καταλύει δῆμον, οὐ κωμῳδία.

³ Osborne 1981: D44 (*IG* II² 553); for the date, see p. 95 n. 3, above.

⁴ Osborne (1975: 153-55 and 1982: 118-19) considers it possible that the excision is simultaneous with another *damnatio memoriae* for an Antigonid officer, Herodoros, which is probably dated to 287. Nevertheless, Herodoros was honoured in 294, and memories of his actions were still fresh; this would hardly be the case of Neaios, honoured a quarter of a century before.

⁵ Rhodes 1972: 138 n. 7.

⁶ *IG* II² 487, ll. 6-10.

archaic formulation of the need for strict adherence to democratic form, viewed within the context of 303, attests to the Athenians' nostalgia for the illustrious past of the strong and independent Athenian democracy.¹

6) A detail pertaining to the organization of the Attic calendar similarly attests to the Athenians' insistence on democratic forms. In 307/6, the secretary of the council came from the new tribe Demetrias (tribe II), clearly in order to honour the liberator of the city. The secretary of 306/5 belonged to Aiantis (tribe XI) –an arbitrary choice, probably decided by lot–² and for the next two years the customary secretary cycle proceeded normally: tribe XII in 305/4 and tribe I (Antigonis) in 304/3. In 303/2, however, the secretary came from tribe III (Erechtheis); in other words, the cycle was maintained, but tribe II (Demetrias) was bypassed. Those who have commented on the anomaly have seen it as an insignificant detail, explained by Demetrias' recent position in the cycle in 307/6.³ But to start a new secretary cycle after the expulsion of Demetrios of Phaleron had an obvious symbolism: the 'new' democracy made a fresh start, both 'in the name of the king' (Demetrias, 307/6) and by means of the most democratic of measures, the lot (Aiantis, 306/5); the cycle was then supposed to carry on without further changes. This bureaucratic insistence on bypassing the tribe in honour of the –twice– Saviour of the city, less than a year after the reaffirmation of his semi-divine nature is, to say the least, peculiar, and is best explained as another sign of discontent with Poliorketes.

IV. 303-302: "for the king has sent word..."

This growing political turmoil in 303 sheds a new light on Stratokles' stance from the summer of 303 to the summer of 302. As we saw, in 307-304 Stratokles had used the honours for Poliorketes and his friends and officers as a means of securing various benefits for the city, as well as for himself, in his capacity as the key intermediary between the city and the Antigonid court. In the decrees

¹ For the phrase σκοπεῖν τῶι βουλομένῳ, see Hedrick 1999: 411-13. Similar phraseology had been used by Demochares in 307 (IG II² 463, l. 30).

² The secretary cycle had probably been abolished during the rule of Demetrios of Phaleron, since secretaries are mentioned neither in the two decrees securely dated to 317/6-308/7 (IG II² 450b and 453) nor in the two decrees which, according to Tracy 1995: 36 n. 2, may belong to this period (IG II² 592 and 727). Tracy's suggestion (1995: 37 n. 6) that the choice of Aiantis (tribe XI, formerly IX) for 306/5 may be explained by the fact that secretaries from (former) tribes III-VIII had served under Demetrios of Phaleron is hardly plausible: why should we assume that six secretaries served in the ten years of his rule? Given that the secretary of 318/7 came from Aegeis (then tribe II) (Osborne 1981: D38 [IG II² 448], ll. 37-38; Agora 16.104), if the cycle had been in operation during Demetrios of Phaleron, then for 306/5 (that is, after the special case of 307/6), we would expect a secretary either from Pandionis (former tribe III) or Erechtheis (now tribe III).

³ Osborne 1985: 283; Tracy 1995: 37 n. 6; Rhodes 1997: 44.

preserved from 303 to 302, the former goal seems moderated, if not abandoned: Stratokles seems to have been interested exclusively in honouring various representatives of royal power. The motivation clauses of these decrees are vague and repetitive, and almost never allow us to assume any specific benefaction on the part of the honourands, or any motive other than the satisfaction of royal will and the consolidation of Stratokles' role as its chief interpreter.

On the penultimate day of 304/3, Stratokles proposed the naturalization of three otherwise unknown royal *philoï*, Eupolis,¹ [Bian]or (?),² and Sotimos son of Dositheos of Kyrene.³ In 303/2 he proposed honours for Apollonides son of Charops of Kyzikos (?), who had already received the Athenian citizenship.⁴ On the penultimate day of 303/2, he proposed the naturalization of Alkaïos son of Heraïos of Ainos and of Solon son of Straton of Bargylia, also honoured (apparently in the same period) in Epidauros.⁵ A decree in honour of an unknown royal friend probably also belongs to 303-302.⁶

Only one of the above decrees mentions specific benefactions on the part of the honourand (*IG II² 492* [Bielman 1994: n° 13]), but even that does not alter the general picture. Apollonides son of Charops⁷ had offered military assistance to Athens during a siege, obviously during the Four-Year War (ll. 4-9),⁸ and had

¹ Osborne 1981: D45 (*IG II² 486*); cf. Billows 1990: 385-86 n° 40, with earlier bibliography.

² *SEG 16* (1959) 58. It is occasionally assumed that there were more than one honourands (hence various restorations, assuming two or three more names; see, for example, Habicht 1970: 57 n. 9, who recognizes Apollonides son of Charops), but Koumanoudes 1986: 14-17 argues convincingly that there was only one honourand (on Koumanoudes' less likely restorations, see p. 100 n. 4, below). Cf. Billows 1990: 377 n° 23.

³ *SEG 36* (1986) 164; cf. Billows 1990: 434 n° 10.

⁴ Bielman 1994: n° 13 (*IG II² 492*). The date is certain: the honours for Apollonides were to be proclaimed in the coming Panathenaia (ll. 28-29), undoubtedly those of 302 (Bielman 1994: 47 n. 57).

⁵ Osborne 1981: D60 (*IG II² 495*; *ISE 6*) and Osborne 1981: D61 (*IG II² 496 + 507 + Add.*; *Syll³ 347*) respectively. Despite the objections of M. B. Walbank 1989: 88-89, *Agora 16.117* (Osborne 1981: D62 + *SEG 39* [1989] 103), a decree with exactly the same formulation, probably voted on the same day, could be a copy of one of the other two, although it is likelier that it involved a different honourand. For the honours which Alkaïos received in Epidauros, see *IG IV² 1, 58*. The stone carrying this decree also carried a very similar decree, probably in honour of Solon. For the two honourands, cf. Billows 1990: 366 n° 7 and 433-34 n° 107.

⁶ *IG II² 739 + Pritchett 1972: 170*. For the verification of the join between the two fragments, see Herz / Wenner 1978 (cf. *SEG 38* [1988] 283).

⁷ Apollonides is known from two more sources. In 306 (Billows 1990: 370, with earlier bibliography) or 302 (according to the *communis opinio*) he was honoured by the Ephesians, along with Poliorketes himself (*Syll³ 352 [I. Ephesos 1448]*). Later, apparently after the defeat of Poliorketes in Asia, he joined the Seleukid court; Seleukos I sent him to Poliorketes to convince the latter to surrender (Plut., *Demetr.* 50.3).

⁸ Wilhelm 1942: 175-76 thinks this is Kassandros' first attack in 306, while Hauben 1974b: 10 thinks it is the second invasion of 304, because there was no siege during the first attack. *IG II²*

helped repatriate (or ransom) some Athenians (ll. 9-15).¹ The important thing to bear in mind, however, is that Apollonides had already been honoured for these services. Now (vūv, l. 17), he is honoured because, “sent by the kings to the Greek cities, he acts according to the interests of the kings, the Athenians and the rest of the Greeks” (ll. 20-23).² This is a clear reference to the League of Corinth, either to the diplomatic preparations before its refoundation or to the announcement of the refoundation. Either way, no additional benefaction to Athens is included in the rationale of his being honoured again; the new honours were justified merely on the basis of his important position in the kings’ administration.

The same picture is –more vividly– drawn from the rest of the decrees of 303-302. The motivation clauses are particularly eloquent: “in relation to what the king has sent word for to the council and the people, declaring Eupolis to be his friend and that he excels in the management of the kings’ affairs as well as those of the Athenian people...”;³ Bianor (?) is honoured “so that the envoys of king Demetrios to the city, who do what is advantageous to the people, be honoured...”;⁴ the motivation clause of the decree for Sotimos reads as follows: “in relation to what the king has sent word for to the council and the people, declaring that he

505, ll. 30-36, however, shows that Kassandros had reached the city gates in 306 as well, so both dates remain possible.

¹ Wilhelm 1942: 176-83, followed, among others, by Olshausen 1974: 89 n° 65 and 97 n° 74; Osborne 1983: T83; Billows 1990: 369-70 n° 12 (but cf. the reservations of Bielman 1994: 48), assumes that we are dealing with the repatriation of captives after the sea battle of the Hellespont during the Lamian War. The only certain allusions are to Athenians in exile (l. 11: [φε]ύγουσιν Ἀθηναίων), to something that happened in Kyzikos (ll. 12-13: ἐγ Κυζίκ[ω]) and to the repatriation of Athenians (ll. 13-14: ΤΟΝ ἀ[νασ]ωιζομέν[οις] σ[υ]ν[ε]λάμβ[α]νεν εἰς [τ]ὴν οἰκαδ[ε] σ[ω]τηρί[αν], according to Wilhelm’s restoration). Wilhelm’s theory is not plausible. Firstly, it is far from certain that we are dealing with a single event; furthermore, Wilhelm’s theory explains neither why the benefactions of 322 should be reported after those of 306 or 304, nor the reference to exiles; finally, ἀνασώζω may indeed refer to repatriation but not necessarily (see Bielman 1994: 252-53). Incidentally, ἀ[νασ]ωιζόμεν[ος] σ[υ]ν[ε]λάμβ[α]νεν (with Apollonides as the subject, and not the Athenians, as in Wilhelm’s restoration) is syntactically more plausible.

² ... [ἀποστελ]λόμε[ν]ος ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων πρὸς τὰς πόλεις τὰς Ἑλληνίδας π[ράτ]τει [τὰ] συν[φ]έροντα τοῖς τε [β]ασιλε[ῶ]σι καὶ τῶι δήμωι τῶι Ἀθηναίων [καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις π[ᾶ]σι Ἑλλη[σ]ι...

³ Osborne 1981: D45 (IG II² 486), ll. 11-15: [περὶ ὧν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐπέστειλεν τεῖ [βουλεῖ καὶ τῶι δήμωι ἀ]ποφαίνων φίλον εἶναι Εὐπολιν καὶ ὅτι ἄρ[ισ]τα τῶν βασιλέων ἐπιμέλεσθαι καὶ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων ---].

⁴ SEG 16 (1959) 58: ὅπως ἂν τιμῶνται οἱ ἀπὸ Δημητρίου του βασιλέως ἐξαποστελλόμενοι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν καὶ πράττοντες τὰ συμφέροντα τῶι δήμωι ---]. Up to this point I follow Schweigert’s *editio princeps*. Koumanoudes 1986: 14-17 draws attention to the fact that there is only one name in the header of the decree, and therefore it would be incorrect to restore more names in what follows; his own restoration, however, is also untenable: ὅπως ἂν Τ[ενεδίων] *vel sim.* οἱ ἀπὸ Δημητρίου τοῦ βασιλέως ἐξαποστελλόμενοι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, εὖνοι ὄντες εἰς τὰ συμφέροντα τῶι δήμωι τῶι Ἀθηναί[ω]ν, [τ]ιμη[θῶ]σιν ---].

[*scil.* Sotimos] is his friend, well-disposed to the king's affairs and the freedom of the Athenian people and that he, too, succours the fight for democracy, and since the council has deliberated in his favour and proposed to the assembly..."¹ Since this last motivation clause survives intact, it is fairly probable that the other two decrees, voted on the same day, mentioned no particular benefactions either. Eupolis was honoured *because* Poliorketes sent a letter to this purpose, *because* he was a friend of the kings and *because* he managed the affairs of the kings (and, secondarily, of the Athenians) well,² not because he did something useful for the city through his position. The explicit role of the royal letter in the honouring of Eupolis and Sotimos clearly reflects Stratokles' decree earlier in 303, according to which royal will had almost the force of an Athenian law (see in the preceding section). The same phrase ([περὶ ᾧ]ν ὁ βασιλ[εὺς ἐπέστειλεν]) is repeated in another decree of Stratokles,³ allowing us to date it to 303-302 as well, perhaps in the summer of 303, like the other two decrees.⁴ Bianor was apparently honoured because royal envoys should be honoured. The comparison with the closest Athenian parallel, the final clause of the decree honouring friends of Antipatros in 322 (see **A1**, above), is revealing: in 322, the goal of the honours is the assurance of future benefactions and the honours are a means to an end; in 303, the proposer's concern is confined to the honours: the means have become the end.

On the penultimate day of 303/2, the situation was similar. The content of the two or three naturalization decrees proposed by Stratokles on that day is identical: "because X, being by the side of king Demetrios does whatever he can, by words and by deeds, both for Athenians arriving to the king and, in general, for the Athenian people..."⁵ As Osborne aptly remarks, Stratokles "just inserted different names into the 'set text'"⁶. Under other circumstances, one might have asked

¹ SEG 36 (1986) 164: περὶ οὗ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐπέ[στειλεν] τεῖ βουλευῖ καὶ τῶι δήμωι ἀποφ[αίνων φ]ίλον εἶ-να>ι <α>ύτῶι καὶ εὖνον εἰς τὰ τῶν] βασιλέων πράγματα καὶ τὴν τ[οῦ δήμο]υ τοῦ Ἀθηναίων ἐλευθερίαν καὶ [συναγ]ωνιστὴν ὑπὲρ τῆς δημοκρατίας [καὶ ἡ β]ουλή προβεβούλευκε ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν δῆμον.

² If the restoration is correct, the syntax ἐπιμέλεσθαι... τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων is rather surprising, coming from an Athenian statesman. It may well be derived *verbatim* from the royal letter, an additional indication both of the rather dominating intentions of Poliorketes and of Stratokles' limited, procedural, role: he seems merely to have put the unaltered text of the royal letter to the vote.

³ IG II² 739 + Pritchett 1972: 170.

⁴ Pritchett 1972: 172 dates the decree after 304, when Poliorketes was more often referred to without his father, often just by his title and without his name. The decree may well be another naturalization decree: in fr. b, l. 15 one could restore [εἶναι αὐτὸν] Ἀθηναί[ον].

⁵ Osborne 1981: D60-62: ἐπειδὴ *nomen* διατρίβων παρὰ τῶι βασιλεῖ Δημητρίωι διατελεῖ πράττων ἀγαθὸν ὃ τι δύναται καὶ λόγωι καὶ ἔργωι περὶ τε τοὺς ἀφικνουμένους ἰδία Ἀθηναίων πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα καὶ κοινῆι περὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων....

⁶ Osborne 1982: 135.

in what kind of diplomatic activity the honourands had proved useful, but the repetition of the same phrase renders such a pursuit meaningless. The honouring of royal friends –with one of the highest honours awarded by the Athenian state– had already developed into a highly standardized procedure with its own bureaucratic phraseology. Even the interesting disclosure formula¹ at the end of the decree for Solon (“so that all those by the king’s side show their goodwill towards the people knowing that they will be honoured by the people in a manner worthy of that goodwill”)² gives the same impression: Solon was honoured for his goodwill towards Athens, not for particular benefactions.

The formulaic character of these decrees, however, should not be seen merely as the work of a bored bureaucrat, drafting standard texts for the assembly to ratify. On the contrary, it is of great significance and perspicuously attests to the growing public acceptance (at least by Stratokles’ faction) of the inclusion of Athens in the royal *pragmata*,³ that is, to the city’s increasingly tighter dependence on the royal administrative machine and legislative production. By proposing honours for royal officials who had not offered concrete services to the city, Stratokles undermined the very foundation of the euergetic transaction between a city and an individual, at least as this stood until the turning point of the second century (wisely observed by Gauthier 1985), namely the postulate that an honour was always a recompensation for concrete benefactions, already performed or immediately expected.

It is mainly this period that paints the career of Stratokles in negative colours. If my interpretation of his policy in 307-304 is correct and Stratokles was not then the spineless puppet, the flatterer who set out to destroy the state, as he is often described, one needs to find an explanation for his later policy. This explanation, I believe, lies in the reaction of his political opponents against him. If his opponents had prevailed in early 303 and had imposed a course considerably less subservient to the royal *fiat* for Athens, Stratokles would have been deprived of his main asset, that is, his position as the practically exclusive intermediary between his city and the king; this is precisely what happened after Poliorketes’ defeat at Ipsos. In terms of the domestic struggle for power, Stratokles had no

¹ For the disclosure formula of Attic decrees, see Hedrick 1999: 408-425 (especially 423-24 for this rare type).

² Osborne 1981: D61, ll. 32-36: ὅπως ἂν οἱ διατρίβοντες παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ ἅπαντες ἐνδεικνύωνται τὴν εὐνοίαν τῷ δήμῳ εἰδότες ὅτι τιμηθήσονται ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἀξίως τῆς εὐνοίας.

³ For the rhetoric of the inclusion (or not) of Greek cities in the βασιλικά πράγματα, see the acute observations of Ma 1999: 217-18 on *OGIS* 219. When I speak of inclusion I am not using legal terminology; I only refer to the –equally important as actual, formal inclusion in another state– acceptance by the Athenians of royal overlordship, in the same way that the Samians declared that their island was being restored εἰς τὰ τοῦ βασιλέως Πτολεμαίου πράγματα (*IG* XII 6, 12) in 198, although it probably never became a direct Ptolemaic possession (see p. 393 n. 3, below).

other choice: he resorted to an even closer attachment of Athens to Poliorketes' administration and banished his political opponents.¹

V. 302-301: *awaiting the outcome of the battle*

Poliorketes had certainly departed from Athens by the summer of 302.² 302/1 and early 301/0, until the battle of Ipsos, appears to have been a period of circumspect wait for Athens. Activity in the assembly remained intense: there are at least thirteen decrees preserved from 302/1³ and one from early 301/0.⁴ We get a glimpse into the content of nine of them.⁵ Athenians honoured citizens, metics and foreigners for the military or financial assistance they offered to Athens during the Four-Year War, and they also honoured *taxiarchoi*, but, apparently, refrained from dealing with the city's relationship with the Macedonian overlord: Poliorketes, his *philoï*, or Antigonos are never mentioned or even alluded to. As soon as Poliorketes withdrew from the city he suddenly disappeared from official discourse.

Judging by the fact that at least four decrees bear his signature, Stratokles apparently remained very much in charge. We do not know the content of the first decree (302/1, Pryt. II).⁶ By the second (302/1, Pryt. VII, that is, early 301), an unknown was honoured for contributing to the purchase (from Sicily?) of grain at a good price and perhaps for contributing to an *epidosis* for the provisioning with food;⁷ by the third (302/1, Pryt. XI, early summer 301), another unknown (a metic?) was honoured for participating in military operations during the Four-

¹ Dreyer 1999: 174-80 also claims that 304 was a significant turning point in the period 307-301, although he prefers to focus on the forms of the post-304 regime (royal dominance, presence of a foreign army in the *asty* etc.) rather than on the domestic political situation.

² The long march of Poliorketes to Macedonia and the Hellespont, where he spent the winter of 302/1 (Diod. Sic. 20.110.1-111.3; the *Parian Chronicle* [FGrHist 239 B 26] places the truce between Poliorketes and Kassandros in 302/1, as well), allows no other dating.

³ Woodhead 1997: 194-95, from whose catalogue one must delete IG II² 562, which belongs to the middle of the third century (Tracy 1988: 317 and **A66**, below).

⁴ IG II² 640.

⁵ Apart from the four decrees proposed by Stratokles (*Hesperia* 1 [1932] 46 n° 4; IG II² 499; 503; 640), on which see in the text, below, see also IG II² 500-502 and 504-505; *Agora* 16.123-125.

⁶ *Hesperia* 1 (1932) 46 n° 4.

⁷ IG II² 499; cf. Tracy 1995: 34; for ll. 16-17, see Reger 1993: 313 n. 45. Wilhelm's restoration in l. 20 ([καὶ νῦ]ν ἐν τῷ πολέμ[ωι]) is doubtful. All decrees of 302/1 settle accounts with the past and the next decree of Stratokles explicitly refers to the war as being over (IG II² 503: πρότερόν τε πολέμου γενομένου). Accepting the restoration would necessarily effect that the decree refers to difficulties in securing grain supplies, because of the forthcoming war in Asia; nonetheless, Asia and the Hellespont were not the only areas from which grain could arrive, as the reference to Sicily makes clear. Perhaps the restoration [πρότερο]ν ἐν τῷ πολέμ[ωι] (epigraphically possible if we discard the unnecessary ἀμφότεροι which, in Wilhelm's restoration, precedes the phrase in question) is preferable.

Year War;¹ from the last (301/0, Pryt. II, late summer 301), only the beginning of the motivation clause has been preserved, allowing the assumption that a whole city was honoured.² In other words, Stratokles seems to have shared the general circumspection of the Athenians; apparently he realized he had to wait for the outcome of the battle which was to judge the war between Antigonos and the rest of the Diadochi.

The battle was fatal for Antigonos and catastrophic for Poliorketes. The Athenians kept their distance immediately. They voted not to accept any king within their walls, discreetly sent Deidameia, Poliorketes' wife, away from the city, and sent word of their decision to the king, then on his way back from Ephesos; they found him in the Cyclades, where the king without a kingdom merely managed to ensure the return of the part of his fleet which was still in Attic harbours.³ A short period of strict neutrality started for Athens; during that period, ties with Kassandros and Lysimachos were rekindled and forged respectively.⁴

Stratokles' rule came to an abrupt end. He almost completely disappears from literary and epigraphical sources and if he did not make one last appearance in 292, we would be entitled to assume that the regime of 301 proceeded not only to his political deposition but also to his physical extinction.

VI. Stratokles' reappearance in 292

When Stratokles reappeared in 292, the political situation in Athens had had too many turns. After the moderate regime of 301, there came the civil strife between the generals (298/7), the tyrannid of Lachares (297[?]-295), the reconquest of the city by Poliorketes (in the spring of 295), and the oligarchic regime he imposed soon after (294/3-292/1), which, despite the reinstatement of some democratic forms, more or less continued to exist until the rebellion of 287.⁵ Stratokles' stance before 295 is unknown and it would be imprudent to make educated guesses. In 295, however, he must have thought that the reconquest by Poliorketes was a golden opportunity for him, and it is tempting to imagine him in 295 among the orators who competed for flattery to Poliorketes, when the king announced his rather lenient treatment of a city he had conquered for the second time.⁶ If he did try to regain power, he was unsuccessful. Apart from the decree

¹ IG II² 503. Two small fragments found in the Agora (Agora 16.126 [SEG 39 (1989) 107]) are reported by M. B. Walbank 1989: 91-92 n° 19 as possibly belonging to this decree; cf., however, Woodward 1997: 199-200 and p. 95 n. 3, *in fine*, above).

² IG II² 640; my assumption is based on the phrase ἐπειδὴ ὁ δῆμος, on which see p. 82 n. 2, above.

³ Plut., *Demetr.* 30.1-31.1.

⁴ See **A4** (V), above and **A38**; **A40**, below.

⁵ For all these events see below, especially **A41**, **A43**, **A44**.

⁶ Plut., *Demetr.* 34.6.

which Stratokles proposed in honour of the ninety-year old Philippides son of Philomelos –a fourth-century oligarch who reappeared after Ipsos–,¹ the erstwhile undisputed leader of the city falls back to silence. As we shall see, the leaders of this second period of Poliorketes’ rule over Athens were old democrats of 307-302, such as the respected general Olympiodoros, demagogues, such as Dromokleides of Sphettos, and oligarchs, such as Philippides and Phaidros son of Thymochares, who either reappeared in 301 or returned from exile in 292 at the request of Theophrastos.²

The career of Philippides, the honourand of Stratokles’ last decree, will be dealt with in the respective entry (A38, below). What is of particular interest regarding Stratokles himself is the tone of the decree’s language. The honourand and his ancestors are said to have displayed εὐνοία and φιλοτιμία towards the people, to have diligently participated in *epidoseis*, trierarchies, choregies and liturgies; Philippides is praised for his generalship (with no particular reference to possible events during his generalship), for fulfilling his religious duties, for leading “embassies good and advantageous to the people” (ll. 34-35), etc. It is remarkable that in fifty-six long lines, Stratokles managed to avoid making even the briefest reference to specific events during the honourand’s career,³ which coincided with a period of turmoil for Athens –a period marked by a number of regime changes, civil strifes and the city’s occupation by foreign powers. The need to avoid sensitive matters and the need for reconciliation between two former opponents is palpable. Had the decree for Philippides been enacted before Ipsos, it could be interpreted as a magnanimous gesture on the part of Stratokles, as a token of proper manners towards a respected adversary; seen against the background of 292, however, it is best explained as an effort of his to please a leader of the hybrid regime of 294, in a vain attempt to regain some political standing.

VII. Conclusion

In both ancient literary sources and modern secondary literature, Stratokles’ portrayal is unanimously negative.⁴ He is presented as the flatterer of Poliorketes *par excellence*, a straw-man of a foreign power, taking no interest in his city’s

¹ SEG 45 (1995) 101 (IG II² 649 + Dinsmoor 1931: 7-8; Kotsidu 2000: n^o 12).

² Philochoros, *FGrHist* 328 F 167; Dion. Hal., *Din.* 2-3; [Plut.], *Mor.* 850D.

³ Cf. Gauthier 1985: 90.

⁴ Among the literary sources, see especially Plut., *Demetr.* 11-12, 24.10-11, 26.5; *Mor.* 798A; Diod. Sic. 20.46; this portrayal has its obvious origins in his opponents in the period of 307-301, namely Demochares and Philippides. For the view of modern scholars, see, for example, Habicht 1995: 80: “... hat Stratokles sich rasch den Ruf einer servilen Kreatur der neuen Machthaber erworben...”, or Dinsmoor 1939: 14, who speaks of “degrading subservience”. I hesitate to cite Koumanoudes’ characterization (1986: 18), which is probably not very far from the libel against Stratokles in ancient comedy...

interests. Drawing such a portrait of Stratokles, is, I believe, generally just, save for one important *caveat*: it is valid for 303-302 but one-sided and unfair for 307-304. In 307-304 Stratokles led the fashion of awarding extraordinary, perhaps degrading for Athens, honours for the kings and their cortège, but at the same time strove to secure concrete and important compensative benefits for Athens; in 303-302, on the contrary, he strove only for the consolidation of his leadership against the growing and express opposition to his policy. During this second period, instead of opting for a more discreet manoeuvring against the suffocating hold of the city by Poliorketes, Stratokles considered it more expedient to consolidate his position as the exclusive intermediary between the city and the court even further, and transformed himself into a bureaucrat conveying royal decisions to the appropriate body for ratification. That option, however, also meant that Stratokles was left with no alternatives. Poliorketes' defeat at Ipsos inescapably marked the end of his career. Feelings for his policy were so negative that even his attempt to reenter the scene after the reconquest of the city by his former patron proved unsuccessful.

In comparison to Phokion, Stratokles represents a more advanced –more 'Hellenistic', one is tempted to say– stage in the political history of Greek *poleis*. His political predominance, just as Phokion's, was sustained by a foreign power, but with Stratokles democratic forms were not abated; on the contrary, his rule marks one of the most productive periods of the Athenian assembly. Reaction against his predominance did, of course, manifest itself, and it is no accident that after 302 and until 261 Athenian democrats kept trying to throw off the Macedonian yoke. Nonetheless, the very fact that a democratic regime proved perfectly compatible with the strictest adherence to royal power and demands must have made it evident to Hellenistic rulers that an imposed oligarchy was not a necessary condition for their rule over the Greek *poleis* to be established. It must have made it evident to them that, with the appropriate leader within the city and formal signs of respect for the *polis*' 'eccentricity' to wish to maintain if not the essence at least the forms of independence, their rule over the *polis* could be perfectly assured.

A20-30. The dedicants of IG II² 3424

— IG II² 3424 (ll. 12 ff. according to Wilhelm 1937)

According to the bold but, as usual, brilliant restorations of Adolf Wilhelm (1937), the dedicatory epigram IG II² 3424, preceded by a list of dedicants, is an epigram in honour of the "leaders of Greece and kings of Asia" Antigonos and Demetrios. If we accept these restorations, the (two?) crowns inscribed with their names and the epithet Soter (l. 20) make it clear that the date is soon after 306.¹

¹ Wilhelm 1937: 207, tentatively, and Müller 1973: 58, without reservations, date the epigram to 307, immediately after the 'liberation' of the city and the (supposed) proclamation of Antigonos and

Unfortunately, from the names of the dedicants (who were at least eleven and perhaps more than twenty)¹ only the demotic and, in some cases, part of the patronym is preserved: [--- ---]ίδης, [--- ---]χου Σουνιεύς, [--- ---]υ Κοθωκίδης, [--- ---]ος Αιξωνεύς, [--- ---]άτου ἐκ Κε(ραμέ)ων, [--- ---]χου Μελιτεύς, [--- ---]νος Ἀγρυλῆθεν, [--- ---]μνήστου Οἰναῖος, [--- ---]οκράτου ἐκ Κερα(μέ)ων, [--- ---]ο Ἀχαρνεύς, [--- ---]κλέους Παιονίδης. Obviously, no identifications are possible.²

The collective identity of the dedicants is of equal interest. Is it that we are dealing with unrelated private individuals, gathered together to honour the kings in parallel with the official honours accorded to them by the Athenian people (l. 17), or with members of some (religious or other) association? Their self-definition as “citizens” (l. 12: πολῖται) favours the former assumption. Besides, it is well-attested that in the first few years after 307, Athenian gratitude towards Demetrios was not only expressed through the honours awarded by the state or a deme,³ but also privately.⁴

A31. Xenokles son of Xeinis of Sphettos

— *IG II² 1492B*, ll. 100-101; for the rest of the sources, see *PA/APF 11234*; *LGPN II*, s.v. Ξενοκλῆς n° 84

Xenokles led the embassy of 305 to Antigonos, which, as we saw (A19 [II], above), was probably instigated by Stratokles and led to a donation of 140 silver talents and shipbuilding timber and, most probably, to the restoration of Lemnos to Athens. For the then *ca.* seventy-year-old friend and collaborator of Lykourgos, himself a wealthy Athenian and statesman of democratic conviction,⁵ this embassy,

Demetrios as kings by the Athenians (Plut., *Demetr.* 10.3). As I hope to demonstrate elsewhere in detail, the information of Plutarch is to be discarded; moreover, it is more appropriate to date the epigram in 306, when the official proclamation must have caused a flood of congratulatory decrees and dedications, as in the case of Byzantion (*IvO 45, 304, 305 [I. Byzantion 4-6]*).

¹ The upper part of the stone is missing. If we accept Wilhelm’s assumption that, to the left of the preserved crown, there was another crown for the other king, then it is highly probable that there was another column with names to the left of the preserved fragment.

² Only in the case of [--- ---]μνήστου Οἰναῖος is there some room for risking an assumption. There are eight names with that ending of the genitive in *LGPN II*, of which only one is attested in Oinoe (Θεόμνητος, in an epitaph of the third or second century [*IG II² 6975*]).

³ Cf. the honours for Poliorketes, his wife and Adeimantos of Lampsakos by the deme of Thria (Ath. 6.255c).

⁴ See, for example, Alexis, *PCG II fr. 116 apud Ath.* 6.254 and Antiphanes, *PCG II 81 apud Ath.* 10.423.

⁵ Lambert 2003: 104-105 seeks to cast a shadow over the generally accepted democratic tendencies of Xenokles by assuming that his reappearance (along with his brother Androkles?) in 307 and their financial support to the new regime (see in the text, below) may be due to their concern that their wealth would be viewed as suspect by the newly restored democracy. I see no reason, however, to assume that a democratic regime viewed wealth as suspect *per se*.

as was often the case in Classical and Hellenistic times,¹ was the culmination of a long career. Xenokles was politically active especially under Lykourgos.² He reappears in our records from the period of the brief democratic interlude of 318/7, in a religious capacity, allowing various benefactions.³ As expected, he disappears again from public record during the rule of Demetrios of Phaleron, but emerges as a leading figure in the records of the regime of 307: apart from his embassy in 305, he was the first (or one of the two first) *agonothetes* of the new regime in 307/6⁴ and became a target for comedy writers along with Stratokles and Chairephon, a famous *parasitos*.⁵ Judging from the allusion to them in the

¹ Cf. Kienast 1973: 509; Piccirilli 2001: 72-74.

² See Ampolo 1979 and Habicht 1988, with the sources and earlier bibliography.

³ He was then an *epimeletes* of the Mysteries; during his term he personally financed the erection of statues of Demeter and Kore and the building of a bridge which was crossed during the processions to Eleusis (I. *Eleusis* 95 [IG II² 1191]; *Anth. Pal.* 9.147; I. *Eleusis* 97-98 [IG II² 2841 and 2840]); this was in the archonship of Archippos, that is, either in 321/0 or in 318/7. Given Xenokles' political convictions, the latter date is likelier; the only argument put forward by Koehler (*ad IG II² 1191*) and Davies 1971: 415 in favour of 321/0 is that the turbulent 318/7 was inappropriate for such benefactions. On the contrary: the restoration of democracy was a perfect time for a rich democrat to sponsor such public works (cf. Ampolo 1979: 170 and Habicht 1988: 326 who leave both options open but also remark that Kohler's argument is untenable).

⁴ IG II² 3073, 3077 (cf. SEG 50 [2000] 194) and 749 + 828 with Habicht 1988. Lambert 2003, after an intricate analysis of the letter-spacing in the first of these inscriptions, tentatively restores the name of Androkles, Xenokles' brother, as *agonothetes*. For the interesting and probably misleading rhetoric of IG II² 3073, where the mention of the *agonothesia* is preceded by the proud remark "the people have financed" (ὁ δῆμος ἐχορήγει), see Parker 1996: 298 and Lambert 2003: 105 n. 19. The office of the *agonothetes* was created after 312/11, when the *choregoi* are mentioned for the last time (IG II² 2323a). It is unanimously accepted that the new office was a creation of Demetrios of Phaleron, perhaps in 309/8, when he was eponymous, in an effort either to relieve his rich political friends or to deprive them of a means of showing off or both (Gehrke 1978: 171-72; Quaß 1993: 275-85; Williams 1997: 335-38; Mikalson 1998: 54-58, with earlier bibliography). One must underline, however, that: 1) no literary source explicitly attributes the creation of the office of *agonothetes* to Demetrios of Phaleron; 2) the *agonothesia* of Xenokles (and Androkles?) is the first testimony of the office; 3) one of the arguments on which the attribution of its creation to Demetrios rests (cf. Gehrke 1978: 171 n. 115), namely that the *athlothetai*, responsible for procedural details of festivals and contests, are not attested after 320/19, is no longer valid (Nagy 1978; J. L. Shear 2001: 461). In other words, the attribution of the creation of the office to Demetrios of Phaleron only rests on the –perfectly plausible– assumption that the abolition of choregies required the existence of a state official who would supervise the procurement of the necessary funds. Nonetheless, the fact that the first attested *agonothetes* is the very rich Xenokles (and his brother?), with a past of costly benefactions, allows the assumption that the office was a creation of the democratic regime of 307, with which an office nominally funded by the state but in reality funded by a wealthy individual fits well (cf. Williams 1987: 98 n. 42; *contra*, again Williams 1997: 338 n. 35).

⁵ He became the target of the parody writer Matron (*apud Ath.* 4.134e); for a dating of this text immediately after 307, cf. Ampolo 1979: 175.

‘carrer decree’ for his homonymous grandson in the third quarter of the third century, Xenokles’ benefactions seem to have been remembered for a long time.¹ It would be tempting to attribute his disappearance from the sources after 305 to his having distanced himself from the excesses of Stratokles’ leading circle, as other leading democrats did, but the simplest and likeliest explanation is that he died shortly after the embassy of 305.

A32. Kleainetos

— Κλεαίνετος [--- ---]ῆθεν: *IG II² 1492B*, ll. 100-101

Another member of the embassy to Antigonos in 305 (see **A19** [II]), otherwise unknown.²

A33. Chionides of Thria

— Χιωνίδης [...^{ca.7}... ο]υ Θριάσιος: *IG II² 1492B*, l. 101; Osborne 1981: D51 (*I. di Cos* ED 71[abce] I A)

Chionides, otherwise unknown,³ was the third member of the embassy to Antigonos in 305, as well as the proposer of the honorific decree for the Koan Nikomedes, a high-ranking officer of Antigonos, who must have proved of assistance during the embassy (cf. **A19** [II], above).

A34. Kalaidēs son of Lytides of Xypete

— *SEG 36* (1986) 165

Stratokles was not the only Athenian who proposed honours for friends of Antigonos and Poliorketes. We have already seen the case of Chionides of Thria, who proposed honours for Nikomedes of Kos (see the preceding entry and **A19** [II]). Nikomedes, however, was Antigonos’ officer and had no connection with Poliorketes. Apart from Stratokles and the very peculiar case of Philostratos, discussed in the following entry, the only Athenian we know to have proposed honours for an officer of Poliorketes is Kalaidēs son of Lytides of Xypete, who proposed the aforementioned decree for Medon, son of [...⁹...].ras, in early spring 303.⁴

The honourand’s father⁵ had already been honoured as *proxenos* and benefactor of the people. Medon himself maintained his goodwill towards Athens while in the army of Antigonos and Demetrios,⁶ and contributed to the “salvation of the

¹ *IG II² 749 + 828* (cf. 791) with Tracy 1988: 317 and Habicht 1988.

² Due to his age, he can obviously not be identified with Kleainetos son of Kleomedon, lover of Poliorketes (Plut., *Demetr.* 24.6), on whom see above, **A19** (III).

³ He cannot be related to Ktesias son of Chionides (**A15**, above), proposer of a decree in 318/7 (Osborne 1981: D35 [*IG II² 387; Syll³ 315*]); cf. p. 72 n. 4, above).

⁴ *SEG 36* (1986) 165. For the date and the problems it causes, see **A19** (III), above.

⁵ To the possible restorations listed, *exempli gratia*, by Billows 1990: 402 ([Θεμισταγό]ρας, [Πλεισταγό]ρας), one could add [Κρατησαγό]ρας.

⁶ For ll. 14-16, see Gauthier, *BullEpigr* 1988, 430.

people and the freedom of the other Greeks”. The main reason for the honours, however, is that he announced to the Athenians Poliorketes’ decision to restore to them the forts of Attica which had been conquered by Kassandros.¹

Kalaides was a member of the council that year,² and his name is also attested in a contemporary dedication.³ A certain Kalaides son of Kalaides of Xypete who proposed two decrees in 251/0,⁴ should be his son, but nothing else is known of him or his family.

A35. Philostratos son of Philostratos of Kephisia

— *IG II² 498 (Syll³ 342)*

In the summer of 303,⁵ a few days before Stratokles proposed the naturalization of several Antigonid officials,⁶ Medeios, another Antigonid official, was honoured on the proposal of Philostratos son of Philostratos of Kephisia.⁷

In comparison with Stratokles’ decrees, Philostratos’ decree presents extraordinary particularities. The honourand is described as “earlier by the side of king Antigonos”, not “of king Demetrios” or “of the kings”, as is usually the case in this period. This, of course, could theoretically be merely an accurate description of the honourand’s career, as in the case of Nikomedes of Kos, the only other exception to this rule.⁸ But Nikomedes was honoured precisely for his mediation to Antigonos and appears to have had no connection with Poliorketes whatsoever; Medeios, on the other hand, was honoured precisely for his actions by the side of Poliorketes (ll. 15-19):

... καὶ συναποσταλεῖς ὅτε ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἀντίγονος ἐπέστειλεν τὸν ὄν ἀυτοῦ
Δημήτριον ἐλευθέρωσο[ν]τ[α] τ[ί]ν τε πόλιν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλ[λη]νας,
χρ]ήσιμος ἦν καὶ εὖνους [τῆ] τοῦ δήμου σ]ωτηρία[ι]...).

...dispatched, along with others, when king Antigonos sent his son
Demetrios with orders to free the city and the other Greeks, he proved
useful and well-disposed towards the salvation of the people...

¹ On the context, see **A19** (III), above.

² *Agora* 15.61, l. 1.

³ *IG II² 4610*. Cf. Matthaiou 1986: 20-21.

⁴ *IG II² 778* and 779; on the date of the archon Thersilochos, see Osborne 2000: 515. *LGPN II*, s.v. Καλαΐδης n° 1, curiously does not place Kalaides (I) in Xypete (cf. s.v. Λυτίδης n° 1); as a result, his relation with Kalaides (II) n° 4 does not become obvious.

⁵ *IG II² 498 (Syll³ 342)*; the date is extensively restored, based only on the two preserved letters of the secretary’s name; given, however, that we are certainly within the period 306-302, the restoration seems assured. For the preamble of the decree, cf. *SEG* 21 (1965) 338.

⁶ See **A19** (IV), above.

⁷ The homonymous father of the proposer is attested as a cleruch in Samos in 346/5 (*IG XII 6*, 261, l. 10).

⁸ Osborne 1981: D51, l. 2; on Nikomedes, see below, **D8**.

This is a striking passage, in more than one ways. To begin with, Poliorketes, the king *par excellence* in this period, often referred to only by his royal title, without a mention of his name,¹ here becomes “Demetrios, the king’s son”, whom his father sent on a mission with express orders. The royal title is conceded to Poliorketes only indirectly, by the plural βασιλεῦσι read earlier in the text (ll. 12-13). Moreover, Medeios is placed almost on the same level (συναποσταλείς), if not on a higher one,² with ‘Demetrios, the son’.³

Should one reach the conclusion that this is another expression of deprecation of Poliorketes and his stance towards Athens, like other such incidents which, as we saw, are equally dated to the first half of 303 (see **A19** [III], above)? That would certainly be mistaken; whatever the language and the subtext of the decree, let us not forget that Medeios was an officer of Poliorketes and, in fact, could have been no other than Medeios son of Oxythemis of Larisa. Medeios was an *hetairos* of Alexander III, an officer of Perdikkas initially and of Antigonos after 320, admiral of the Antigonid fleet in 313-304, officer of Poliorketes even after the battle of Ipsos,⁴ and an uncle of Oxythemis son of Hippostratos, who was a *philos* and one of the closest collaborators of Poliorketes and was awarded the Athenian citizenship in the first half of 303.⁵ Under no circumstance can a decree in honour of such a distinguished officer be perceived as indirectly anti-Macedonian.

There is a simpler, and much more interesting, explanation for the wording of the decree. As we saw, Stratokles was the main intermediary between Athens and the Antigonid court. Any Athenian politician not belonging to Stratokles’ circle and wishing to approach the Macedonians would find all formal channels of communication occupied by the privileged interlocutor of Poliorketes and his staff.

¹ Among other texts, see a decree by Stratokles a year earlier (Osborne 1981: D45 [IG II² 486]); cf. Pritchett 1972: 172.

² The verb ἐπιστέλλω used for Poliorketes, with its connotations of direct, written orders, is highly significant; in fact, it conveys a sense of inferiority clearer than the verb (συν)αποστέλλω used for Medeios. An informed observant might read between the lines of the decree: “King Antigonos sent an army with his son nominally in charge, but the other senior and more competent officers were actually in command”.

³ The comparison with Stratokles’ language in a similar case is telling: συνστρατευόμενος Ἀντιγόνω καὶ Δημητρίω τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν διετέλει εὐνους ὦν τῶι δήμωι τῶι Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἀπεσταλμένος μετὰ Δημητρίου εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα... (IG II² 559 + 568 = Add. 662); the honourand here is explicitly described as being under the command of Poliorketes.

⁴ On Medeios, see especially Habicht 1970b: 265-79; Helly 1973: I 84; Billows 1990: 400-401 n° 68, with sources, analysis and earlier bibliography. Bayliss 2002 plausibly assumes that one of the reasons for which Medeios was honoured was that Athenians fought under his command in the navy battle of Salamis (cf. Diod. Sic. 20.50.3).

⁵ On Oxythemis, see Osborne 1981: D47 (on the date of which, cf. p. 96 n. 1, above) and Habicht 1970: 55-58; Olshausen 1974: 100-103 n° 77; Osborne 1982: 124-26; Billows 1990: 414 n° 86; Bielmann 1994: 53-56, with the rest of the sources and earlier bibliography. There is yet another decree of 307-302 (perhaps 305/4) honouring a citizen of Larisa (Agora 16.134).

One can, therefore, not exclude the possibility that the honours which Philostratos proposed for a high-ranking officer of Antigonos, temporarily under Poliorketes' command, testify to the existence –or to an attempt to create– alternative channels of communication with the Antigonid court. If this assumption is correct, Philostratos extolled Medeios' rank by the side of Antigonos and –discreetly albeit clearly– downgraded Poliorketes, because he already had, or wished to forge, ties with other members of the Macedonian administration, with whom he could communicate without Stratokles' mediation. As we shall repeatedly observe, predominance in the channels of communication with the overlord's staff was a significant asset to an individual's political capital, and any aspiring politician labouriously sought to create and then maintain such channels open.

A36. Archedemos son of Euphron of Rhamnous — A37. Apollonios

— *I. Rhamn. 2*

By a recently published decree of the Athenian garrison at Rhamnous, the commander Apollonios, appointed by the general Asklepiades, was honoured for successfully fulfilling his duties, as well as for the *philotimia* he demonstrated towards the king, the general and the Athenian people (*I. Rhamn. 2*). The only information we have on the proposer of the decree, Archedemos son of Euphron, is that he belonged to an old illustrious family of Rhamnous.¹

B. Petrakos, the first editor of the decree, initially dated the inscription to the first half of the third century, but in his final publication pushed the date back to the “late fourth – early third century”.² If that is the case, the king can only be Poliorketes and the generalship of Asklepiades probably belongs to 303/2.³ Asklepiades could either have been an elected Athenian general or an appointed Macedonian officer: the issue must remain open until the publication of two inscriptions from Rhamnous dated to the Four-Year War comes out.⁴

¹ He is the grandson of Euphranor son of Euphron, whose family's funerary enclosure has been preserved (*I. Rhamn. 259-260*).

² *Prakt* 1991: 35 n° 10 and *I. Rhamn. 2* respectively; in the latter (p. 430) Petrakos dates the generalship of Asklepiades to the late fourth century. No photograph of the stone has been published.

³ Given the military operations near the forts of Attica during the Four-Year War, Asklepiades' generalship should probably be placed during the first rule of Poliorketes (307-301), rather than the second (295-287). Since the generals of the Attic countryside from 306/5 to 304/3 are already known (Petrakos 1999: I 32-33, 430), Asklepiades was general either in 303/2 or in 302/1; as Poliorketes had left the city by the summer of 302 at the latest, 303/2 is more likely.

⁴ The appointment of a high-ranking Macedonian officer, Adeimantos of Lampsakos, to the generalship of the Attic countryside for 306/5 and 305/4 (Petrakos 1999: I 32-33 and 430; cf. p. 89 n. 2, above) probably forms an exception (at least for this period), justified by the crucial circumstances of the war with Kassandros, rather than the rule. In 304/3 the general was the Athenian Kephisophon son of Antikles, for whom, according to the initial report by Petrakos (*ibid.*), no

The persons or states towards which the phrourarch's *philotimia* is directed is, as usual, significative: the king is mentioned first, then the general, and, finally, the *polis*. Whether it reflects the realities of the Macedonian presence at the fort,¹ or the rhetoric of the Athenians towards the twice Saviour of the city, this hierarchy is another indication of the king's position even in official documents of secondary importance (cf. **A19** [IV], above) and bears further testimony to the close intertwinement of Attic institutions and Macedonian administration.

Towards independence and defeat (301-262)

A38. Philippides son of Philomelos of Paiania

— *SEG* 45 (1995) 101; *IG* II² 641 (*Syll*³ 362); for the rest of the sources, see *PA/APF* 14361; *LGNP* II, s.v. Φιλίππιδης n° 16; cf. p. 114 n. 3, below.

As we have already seen (**A19** [VI], above), Philippides son of Philomelos of Paiania was honoured on Stratokles' proposal with a recapitulative 'career decree' in late spring 292.² As we have also seen, the very long text of the decree gives surprisingly few precise pieces of information for the career of the then ninety-year old³ statesman.

Already by the mid-fourth century, Philippides was a noted statesman. Offspring of a very rich family attested as early as the 430's,⁴ Philippides had often served as a trierarch or co-trierarch until 322,⁵ as well as a *choregos* prior to 317,⁶

appointment by Poliorketes is mentioned. If we accept that Asklepiades was a Macedonian officer, which I consider less likely, he is probably to be identified with Asklepiades of Byzantion, honoured in a roughly contemporary (307-303, probably 304/3) Athenian decree (*IG* II² 555; cf. Billows 1990: 375-76 n° 19). If he was an elected Athenian general, identification is impossible, given the commonness of the name in Attica (547 entries in *LGNP* II). Petrakos' initial dating of the decree (mid-third century) had led him to identify Asklepiades with Asklepiades of Phyle, a general honoured in 225/4.

¹ The parallels of Apollodoros son of Apollodoros (**A61**), an Athenian general appointed both by the Athenian people and by Antigonos Gonatas, and of Dikaiarchos son of Apollonios (**A70**), an Athenian military commander of the Macedonian army, but also a general of (and perhaps elected by) the Athenians (cf. Appendix 3, below) are telling: the ἀρετή and δικαιοσύνη of the former were directed towards king Antigonos, the *isoteleis* and the Athenian people, while the ἀρετή and εὐνοία of the latter were directed towards king Demetrios II, the Athenian people and the deme of Rhamnous.

² *SEG* 45 (1995) 101 (*IG* II² 649 + Dinsmoor 1931: 7-8; Kotsidu 2000: n° 12E).

³ Co-trierarch already in 359 (*IG* II² 1613, ll. 191-192), Philippides must have been born before 379 (Davies 1971: 549).

⁴ *Pl.*, *Prt.* 315a; on the family, see Davies 1971: 348-49.

⁵ *SEG* 45 (1995) 101, ll. 12-13; *IG* II² 1613, ll. 191-192; 1628, ll. 21, 30, 373-376 and 387-395; 1629, ll. 657-666, 892-895 and 906-910; 1631, l. 287; 1632, l. 263; cf. Davies 1971: 349-50.

⁶ *SEG* 45 (1995) 101, l. 13.

and, in general, he appears to have been one of the richest Athenians in the age of Lykourgos.¹ The only certain source allowing a glimpse of Philippides' political affiliation during that period is Demosthenes, who not only considered him a friend and possible supporter of Meidias (a known oligarch), but also explicitly presented him as being in confrontation with the πολλοὶ and δημοτικοί.² Despite older assertions to the contrary, Philippides should be identified with the Philippides accused by Hypereides in 336/5 of proposing honours for those who proposed honours for Macedonians after Chaironeia.³

Despite his oligarchic and pro-Macedonian convictions,⁴ Philippides held no known office nor does he appear to have been politically active either during the regimes of 322-318 and 317-307, or, expectedly, during the regime of 307-301. The decree informs us (ll. 23-32) that he was elected general of the navy in an unknown year, *archon basileus* in the year he was also honoured (293/2), and *agonothetes* after 306 (in fact, probably after 301).⁵ In other words, the more plausible assumption is that all of Philippides' tenures of office belong to the period 301-292, the only period after 336 during which we are certain that he was politically active.

The reason why an entry of the present catalogue is devoted to Philippides is that he “conducted successful and advantageous embassies for the people”.⁶ We

¹ Dem. 21.208, 212, 215; [Dem.] 58.33.

² Dem. 21.209.

³ Hyp. 2 (*Κατὰ Φιλίππιδου*). The main objection to this identification had been that our Philippides cannot belong to the pro-Spartan politicians of the first quarter of the fourth century, to whom Hyp. 2, fr. 15b refers (cf. Davies 1971: 550). In this passage, however, there is no explicit mention of Philippides; Hypereides merely compares pro-Macedonians of his time with pro-Spartans of the past, and considers the former an evolution of the latter (cf. Engels 1993: 146). I see no other reason to avoid the identification of the Philippides of our other sources –an eminent, rich oligarch, active in 348-322– and Hypereides' Philippides –an eminent pro-Macedonian oligarch, active in 338-336. The identification had also been proposed by Lewis 1955: 20 (who referred to a then forthcoming article, which I have not been able to find) and was accepted by Whitehead 2000: 28-29 (with earlier bibliography). If we accept this identification, then Philippides son of Philomelos is also the target of several anecdotes recorded by Athenaios (6.230c [Alexis, *PCG* II fr. 2]; 6.238c [Aristophon, *PCG* II fr. 10]; 11.502f-503a; 12.552d-f [Alexis, *PCG* II fr. 93, 148; Aristophon, *PCG* II fr. 10; Men., fr. 365 = Ὀργή, fr. 4]), all of which focus on his outer appearance.

⁴ Treves 1938: 2203 makes the untenable assumption that Philippides had switched sides to the democrats (already after Chaironeia), which would explain his honouring by Stratokles; see the objections by Davies 1971: 550 and the diametrically opposed interpretation of the decree proposed above (**A19** [VI]).

⁵ For the creation of the office, which is first attested for 307/6, see **A31**, above. The *terminus post quem* for Philippides' *agonothesia* must be the battle of Ipsos: it is difficult to imagine him serving as *agonothetes* during Stratokles' predominance.

⁶ SEG 45 (1995) 101, ll. 34-35: [πρ]εσβεί[ας] κ[α]λ[ἄ]ς καὶ συμφερούσ[ας τῶι] δήμω[ι πε]πρέ-σβευ[κεν].

have more details on at least one of these embassies. In early autumn 299, Philippides proposed honours for Poseidippos son of Bakchios of Kothokidai, who accompanied ambassadors to king Kassandros and proved useful to their mission.¹ Since the usefulness of Poseidippos is said to be attested to by the ambassadors, it is very likely that Philippides was one of them. The goal of the embassy is unknown.² The fact, however, that –for the first time in an Athenian document– the royal title of Kassandros is acknowledged,³ is a clear indicator of the turn in official Athenian policy. The regime after Ipsos, which has been anachronistically but aptly called “*moderato e centrista*”,⁴ implemented a policy of active neutrality, coming into contact with Kassandros, Lysimachos (see **A39**, above), and perhaps Ptolemy I (**A4** [V], above) at the same time, without, as we saw (**A19** [V]), cutting off all bridges of communication with Poliorketes. Just as Philippides son of Philokles was an obvious choice for approaching Lysimachos, Philippides son of Philomelos was a perfect candidate for approaching Kassandros. We have no information on the other embassies of Philippides, but we cannot exclude the assumption that he was involved in embassies to Kassandros more than once.

A39. Poseidippos son of Bakchios of Kothokidai

– IG II² 641 (Syll³ 362)

Poseidippos, otherwise unknown, accompanied the embassy of 299, probably led by Philippides son of Philomelos (see the preceding entry) to Kassandros. The most interesting part of the decree in his honour is the term used to describe his mission: οἱ πρέσβεις... ἀποφαίνουσι Ποσείδιππον συναποδημήσαντα μεθ’ ἑαυτῶν χρήσιμον εἶναι... (ll. 12-16). This wording makes it clear that Poseidippos was not an elected official member of the embassy.⁵ The most probable reason why

¹ IG II² 641 (Syll³ 362); on Poseidippos and his role, see the next entry. Tracy 2003: 38 observes that IG II² 818 is in fact the missing upper right part of IG II² 641 and not a separate inscription.

² Gullath 1982: 185 n. 3 assumes that Kassandros concluded a truce or a treaty with Athens before attacking central Greece. That some sort of understanding between the two sides was reached at is certain, but I do not believe that an official alliance was necessary for either side at this juncture. A more plausible assumption is that the embassy’s objective was to obtain a donation of grain, which was one of the benefits of the contemporary contacts with Lysimachos (cf. Habicht 1979: 19; 1995: 89-90; Osborne 1982: 148 n. 641).

³ Mentions of Kassandros without the royal title in 307-301: Osborne D43 (IG II² 467; Syll³ 327); IG II² 469 (Syll³ 328); IG II² 470; SEG 30 (1980) 325 and 36 (1986) 165.

⁴ Treves 1932: 188; cf. Ferguson 1911: “... to steer a middle course”.

⁵ Had Poseidippos been a regular ambassador, one would expect a phrase such as “the other ambassadors” (οἱ ἄλλοι πρέσβεις *vel sim.*) and not “the ambassadors” (οἱ πρέσβεις). Moreover, the verb συναποδημῶ is not part of the technical vocabulary of diplomatic practice (with a very doubtful exception: *IGBulg* 1² 13, l. 5). Its regular meaning is “to accompany one on *his* journey” and the συναποδημῆσας appears to hold an inferior position to the person he accompanies (see, for example, Diod. Sic. 17.49.3; Plut., *Brut.* 3.1), hence the meaning of συναπόδημος in the imperial

Poseidippos escorted the ambassadors without being an official member of the embassy was that the ambassadors expected that he would prove useful to the mission – an expectation which was eventually met, as the decree informs us. And the most probable reason why Poseidippos was expected to prove useful is that he had prior contacts with the court of Kassandros. If this assumption is correct, the interesting conclusion is that Athens did not rely only on ambassadors realistically expected to be well received in the court of the king, like Philippides, but also recruited private individuals¹ with the appropriate connections.

A40. Philippides son of Philokles of Kephale

— PCG VII 333-52 (testimonia and fragments)

The comedy-writer Philippides of Kephale was probably born in the mid-fourth century.² He made his first known political appearance during Poliorketes' first rule over Athens (307-301),³ when he appears to have been a prominent member of the democratic faction opposed to Stratokles and his subservient policy towards Poliorketes. Fragments of his work portray his vehement opposition to the extraordinary honours to Poliorketes, as well as his political and personal dislike for Stratokles.⁴

period, when the term acquired the technical sense of *comes*, “attendant of the emperor” (see Mason 1974: 88-89).

¹ The phrase ἀποδεικνύμενον τὴν εὐνοίαν ἣν εἶχε πρὸς τὸν δῆμον τῶν Ἀθηναίων (ll. 17-19) might allow, at first glance, the assumption that Poseidippos was not an Athenian by birth but a naturalized citizen, in which case one would be tempted to associate him with the well-known Poseidippos son of Kyniskos of Kassandreia, who lived in Athens (PCG VII 561-81). Nonetheless, similar phrases are used in Attic decrees for Athenians as well: Philippides himself, proposer of the decree for Poseidippos, was described as ἀεὶ φιλοτιμούμενος περὶ τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων (SEG 45 [1995] 101, ll. 8-9). There is therefore no reason to dispute Poseidippos' Athenian origins or to assume any connection with the Macedonian comedy-writer.

² The *Suda* places his *floruit* in the ρια' (111th) Olympiad (336-32), which would give us a birth date of ca. 375. This is obviously too high, which is why it is usually corrected to ρκα' (121st Olympiad, 296-92), which gives a birth date of ca. 334. Given that his first victory took place in the Dionysia of 312/11 (IG II² 2323a, l. 43; we do not know the date of another recorded victory [IG II² 2325, l. 164]), this, in turn, is somewhat low (cf. Davies 1971: 541). Moreover, Philippides must have been over sixty in 283, like all honourands receiving the highest honours in Athens (see p. 162 n. 4, below), which effects that he must have been born before 343. Bielman 1994: 77 n. 3 thinks the original reading of the *Suda* is correct, pointing out that Gell., NA 3.15.2 records that Philippides died very old, and that the date of the decree in his honour (283/2) is not incompatible with a date of birth ca. 365, for example. Nonetheless, such an assumption would imply: a) that his *floruit* came earlier than usual; b) that Philippides died immediately after his honouring, a plausible but unnecessary assumption; and c) that he won his first victory after the age of fifty, itself not very likely, even if possible.

³ His homonymous cousin was a member of the council in 305/4 (Agora 15.68, l. 62).

⁴ Philippides, PCG VII fr. 25 (Plut., *Demetr.* 12.9 and 26.5); 22 (Ath. 6.262a); 26 (Plut., *Mor.* 750E); 30 (Stob. 3.2.8); the passage recorded in Plut., *Demetr.* 11.3 is probably to be attributed to Philippides

The chief source on Philippides' life is the 'career decree' proposed by his fellow demesman Nikeratos son of Phileas in the autumn of 283.¹ The decree informs us that Philippides left Athens and sought refuge at the court of Lysimachos before the battle of Ipsos (cf. ll. 9-10, 16-17), probably in 303, when a short period of anti-Macedonian strife in Athens ended with the exile or self-exile of the opponents of Stratokles, including Demochares.² Determining the time of his return to Athens is more difficult. Some believe that he returned immediately after Ipsos,³ their sole argument being that the period of 300-298 seems most appropriate for the production of his plays against Stratokles and Poliorketes.⁴ Nothing, however, obliges us to assume that Philippides was in Athens in person during the *didaskalia* of his plays, let alone that he had permanently resettled in Athens. In fact, most scholars have rightly pointed out that nothing in the decree suggests that Philippides had resettled in Athens before 287, and accordingly place his return soon after that date.⁵ Franco, however, rightly points out that the mediation of Philippides between Athens and Lysimachos *after* 287 is described in the decree in terms which point to his continuing presence at court, and, accordingly, concludes that Philippides returned only in 284/3, when he was elected *agonothetes* and financed the established contests, as well as a new contest, held in honour of Demeter and Kore.⁶ Another difficulty (which has been pointed out without scholars drawing the necessary conclusions)⁷ is that, at the time he was honoured (autumn 283), Philippides was again at the court of Lysimachos.⁸ Are we to assume that he settled in Athens in 284, only to return to the court a year later? It is more plausible to assume that, after his self-exile in 303, Philippides never

as well (cf. *PCG* VII p. 352). For the place of Philippides in the history of political comedy, see Philipp 1973.

¹ *IG* II² 657 (Syll³ 374; T. L. Shear 1978: 94-95, T11; Bielman 1994: 74-80 n° 20; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 6; *PCG* VII 333-35, T3); on 'career decrees' in general, see Gauthier 1985: 77-92; cf. p. 162 n. 4, below.

² Plut., *Demetr.* 24.12; [Plut.], *Mor.* 851E; cf. above, **A19** (III). Fr. 25 of Philippides (τὰυτα καταλύει δῆμον, οὐ κωμωδία) may point to a legal charge against him. A date in 303 or 302 for his exile is unanimously assumed (see, for example, Ferguson 1911: 144; Tarn 1911: 95 n. 12; Habicht 1970: 215; T. L. Shear 1978: 49; Mastrocinque 1979b: 263; Lund 1992: 86). It must be stressed, however, that there is no direct evidence on an official exile; Philippides may well have left on his own will (cf. Sonnabend 1996: 311; Kralli 2000: 151).

³ See the bibliography cited by Bielman 1994: 78 n. 17.

⁴ Cf. Mastrocinque 1979b: 265-67 (with whose chronological scheme I disagree).

⁵ Among others: T. L. Shear 1978: 49 n. 84; Lund 1992: 101; Bielman 1994: 78; Sonnabend 1996: 311.

⁶ *IG* II² 657, ll. 31-36 and 39-48 with Franco 1990: 117 n. 124 (cf. Kralli 2000: 152).

⁷ T. L. Shear 1978: 29; Gauthier 1985: 83; Franco 1990: 128 n. 83; Bielman 1994: 78-79.

⁸ *IG* II² 657, ll. 29-30: "... and he remains useful to the Athenians who happen to arrive [at court]" (καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ περιτυγχάνουσιν Ἀθηναίων χρήσιμος ὧν διατελεῖ).

actually resettled in his hometown.¹ If this is correct, an important conclusion for the appraisal of his role as an intermediary can be drawn, namely that the poet was not an Athenian citizen who happened to offer his services to a king for a brief period of time, but a ‘full-time’ courtier of Lysimachos,² who just happened to maintain his interest in his hometown.

I. 299/8: *The donation of grain and a new interpretation for Lysimachos’ donation of a peplos for the Panathenaia*

The first intervention of Philippides on behalf of his hometown brought Athens 10,000 medimni of grain and a new spar and mast for Athena’s *peplos* for the coming Panathenaia of 298.³ The approach of Lysimachos, the donation and the honours for the king which followed, are part of the official foreign policy after Ipsos, when, as we saw (A38, above), Athens followed a path of careful distances from Poliorketes, active neutrality, and pursued contacts with all his opponents.⁴

¹ The obvious objection is that, as an *agonothetes*, Philippides had to reside in Athens, not only in order to supervise the games, but also in order to pass through an *euthyna* after his term of office (IG II² 657, ll. 47–48). To counter that objection, a short digression on the *agonothetai* is necessary. As we saw (A31, above), the office was probably created by Demetrios of Phaleron or, at the latest, in 307. Already from the start, only very rich citizens were elected (Xenokles [A31], Philippides son of Philomelos [A38], our Philippides, Phaidros son of Thymochares [A46]); they were obviously expected to spend a lot of their own money to secure the proper conduct of the contests, which is why the office is explicitly described as a liturgy and not an *arche* (IG II² 682, ll. 53–63), and why it was an honorary appointment, proudly passed from father to son (for the *agonothetai* of the third century, cf. J. L. Shear 2001: 472–78). The people actually taking care of the procedural details of the Panathenaia in the third century (J. L. Shear 2001: 461), or even the second (Nagy 1978), were still the *athlothetai*. In other words, the only real obligation of Philippides as an *agonothetes* may have been to provide large sums of money for (some?) contests and not to be present throughout the year, supervising the preparations. He was probably present at some of the contests of 284/3, and may have passed the *euthyna* after his term had ended, but there is no need to assume that he was a resident of Athens.

² For the high position of Philippides at Lysimachos’ court, see Plut., *Demetr.* 12.8–9 (*philos* and confidant of the king) and below; cf. Franco 1990: 118 and Landucci Gattinoni 1992: 259.

³ IG II² 657, ll. 11–16. It should be stressed that 299/8 is the year when the grain and the *peplos* were delivered to Athens. The necessary discussions which must have preceded Lysimachos’ decision, the latter’s final decision to proceed with the donation and the announcement of this decision probably belong to the previous year, 300/299. It is highly unlikely that the donation of cereals was made much earlier and that it was only distributed to the Athenians in 300/299, as Zink and Hünerwadel have assumed (cf. Bielman 1994: 77 n. 3).

⁴ Lysimachos was honoured with a golden crown (IG II² 1485A, ll. 28–29, with the comments of Burstein 1978 and Lund 1993: 66 for the date; cf., however, Lewis 1988: 303). The erection of the statue of Lysimachos in the *agora* (Paus. 1.9.4) probably belongs to the period after 285 (Franco 1990: 120 n. 39, with earlier bibliography).

The substantial donation of grain made 299/8 a year of sufficient food supplies, a fact that the new regime publicized effectively.¹

The donation of the spar and mast of Athena, that is, of the *peplos* and of the spar on which it was fixed for the procession of the Great Panathenaia every four years,² requires a more detailed examination. In 307, the Athenians had decided to have Antigonos and Demetrios portrayed on the *peplos*.³ Plutarch, explicitly quoting Philippides, has another story on that ‘Antigonid’ *peplos*: during the Panathenaia, the *peplos* was torn in half by a storm.⁴ It is accordingly unanimously assumed that the *peplos* donated by Lysimachos was meant to supplant the destroyed ‘Antigonid’ *peplos*.⁵

In my view, Plutarch’s anecdote is unhistorical. Firstly, it should be reminded that the decree for Philippides only speaks of a *donation*, not of a *replacement* of the *peplos*, as one would expect from a decree demonstrably favourable to Lysimachos and hostile to Poliorketes.⁶ Secondly, heed should be given to the narrative context of the anecdote. The destruction of the *peplos* is one of the divine omens which proved the sacrilegious nature of the honours voted for Poliorketes:⁷ conium gushed from the ground near the altars erected for Antigonos and Demetrios, a frost forced the Athenians to interrupt the procession of the Dionysia and blusted the vines, fig-trees and cereal crops. All these omens –including the destruction of the *peplos*– are drawn from Philippides’ comedy on Stratokles, the fragment of which (fr. 25) immediately follows.⁸ I see no reason why the story of the torn *peplos* should be invested with any greater historical value than the story of

¹ See Habicht 1979: 19. On the question of the frequency of the dedication of the *peplos* (annually or every four years) see mainly J. L. Shear 2001: 97–103 (annual *peplos*, attested from the late second century) and 173–86 (penteteric *peplos*), with the sources and earlier bibliography.

² On the Panathenaic ship, see T. L. Shear 1978: 39–44; J. L. Shear 2001: 97–103, 143–55, 173–86.

³ Diod. Sic. 20.46.2; Plut., *Demetr.* 10.4.

⁴ Plut., *Demetr.* 12.2. Plutarch places the event in 307, giving the impression that the Panathenaia in question are those of 306; had the *peplos* been destroyed in 306, however, it would have been replaced well before 298; it is therefore assumed (Mastrocinque 1979b: 262, with earlier bibliography) that the Panathenaia in question are those of 302, and that Plutarch, once more, got his dates wrong.

⁵ See for example, T. L. Shear 1978: 36 n. 89; Mastrocinque 1979b: 262; Franco 1990: 121; Quaß 1993: 101 n. 102; Mikalson 1998: 99; Tiverios 2000: 51; J. L. Shear 2001: 145 n. 104 and 580–81; Barringer 2003: 244.

⁶ Lysimachos is described as the sole victor at Ipsos over Demetrios and Antigonos (*IG II²* 657, ll. 16–18), who do not bear the royal title (l. 18 and 28).

⁷ Plut., *Demetr.* 10.3–7.

⁸ The fragment refers to the destruction of the *peplos* and the frost, not to the incident with the conium, but surely Plutarch had no other source: all omens are preceded by the overall introduction *ἐπεσήμηνε δὲ τοῖς πλείστοις τὸ θεῖον*. Plutarch perhaps used Philippides indirectly; his source may have been a historical work (Douris of Samos?) which included fragments of Philippides and their historical context (so Marasco 1981b: 63–64).

conium gushing from the earth. It should be added that further signs of divine displeasure were invented by the anti-Antigonid propaganda of the post-Ipsos period, as a reaction against the policy of Stratokles.¹ As already noted, the comedy of Philippides, which exploits this prevailing climate of superstition, must have been staged sometime between 300 and 298. Is it a coincidence that our only source on the destruction of the ‘Antigonid’ *peplos* is a theatrical play by the same person who convinced Lysimachos to donate a *peplos* to Athens? I believe that a different interpretation is needed.

There is no reason to assume that the *peplos* had been destroyed in 302. The ‘Antigonid’ *peplos*, a relic of the old regime, could no longer be used after Ipsos in the festival which, more than any other festival, reflected and proclaimed the Athenians’ self-image. Philippides decisively contributed to its replacement in two ways: on the one hand, he advised Lysimachos to donate a new *peplos*;² on the other hand, he simultaneously attacked Poliorketes and Stratokles’ faction through his theatrical work, thereby discrediting the old regime and its tangible testimonies, while at the same time facilitating the acceptance of the new *peplos*, free of the impiety interwoven with the old one. Lysimachos not only received Athens’ gratitude but, more importantly, managed an important symbolic blow against his main opponent’s promoted image. It is no accident that Ptolemy II followed his example in the Panathenaia of 278.³

II. *The prisoners of Ipsos and the ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ εἰργαμένοι*

The second benefaction of Philippides revolves around the fate of the Athenians who were in Poliorketes’ army in 301.⁴ He made sure the dead were

¹ Philochoros, *FGrHist* 328 F 67: a dog managed to climb the Acropolis against the rules and a comet appeared in the sky (cf. *Marmor Parium*, *FGrHist* 239 B 25 [303/2]); these signs, according to Philochoros, predicted the return of the exiles. The passage appears to be dated to 306/5, but this is not necessary (cf. Jacoby, *FGrHist* IIIb Suppl. I, 345). The date offered by the *Parian Chronicle* for the appearance of the comet (corroborated by Chinese evidence: see Ramsey 2006: 71) allows us, I believe, to establish the (fictional) date of Philochoros’ incident in 303/2 as well; otherwise, the mention of the return of the exiles of 303 would make no sense. The exiles, in that case, were prominent anti-Macedonians, such as Demochares and Philippides (who, of course, returned much later), and less prominent ones, perhaps such as the ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ εἰργαμένοι ὑπὸ Δημητρίου καὶ Ἀντιγόνου mentioned in the decree for Philippides (*IG* II² 657, l. 28; cf. section II, below); for a different view, see Mastrocinque 1979b: 262-63; Dreyer 1999: 144.

² The wording of the decree (*IG* II² 657, ll. 11-15: διαλεχθεὶς ἐκόμισεν τῶι δήμῳ... διελέχθη δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ κεραίας καὶ ἰστοῦ ὅπως ἂν δοθεῖ) does not allow the assumption that an Athenian petition had preceded the donation. The initiative probably belonged to Philippides and Lysimachos.

³ *SEG* 28 (1978) 60; for the date, see p. 149 n. 2, below.

⁴ This is not necessarily an official Athenian contingent (*pace* Franco 1990: 115; Lund 1993: 86; Bielman 1994: 79), although the existence of such a contingent is probable. Judging from the fact that Philippides sent the survivors “wherever each of them wanted” (*IG* II² 657, l. 25: οὗ

buried properly, that the prisoners (at least those in the hands of Lysimachos) were released, that those who so wished joined ranks with Lysimachos, that the rest of them –more than 300– went wherever they desired, “and he also begged for the release of the citizens who were left in Asia, incarcerated by Antigonos and Demetrios” (IG II² 657, ll. 16-29: παρειτήσατο δὲ καὶ ὅπως ἂν ἀφεθῶσιν καὶ ὅσοι τῶν πολιτῶν κατελήφθησαν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ εἰργμένοι ὑπὸ Δημητρίου καὶ Ἀντιγόνου). The first four actions require no further comment, other than they bare testimony to Philippides’ high place at court and considerable wealth.¹

The reference to “those incarcerated in Asia”, however, is not clear. Who are they, and in what did they differ from the other prisoners mentioned in the same phrase? It is usually assumed that they were Athenian hostages taken by Poliorketes, and/or anti-Macedonian politicians exiled to Asia.² Bielman³ aptly remarks that in the phrase εἰργμένοι ὑπὸ Δημητρίου καὶ Ἀντιγόνου the order in which the kings are mentioned is different from standard practice, including the order followed in the decree itself, just a few lines above; based on this anomaly she proceeds to construct an interesting albeit implausible theory: Antigonos is not Antigonos the One-Eyed but Antigonos Gonatas, the “prisoners in Asia” are Athenians who happened to be in the cities Lysimachos wrested from Poliorketes after Ipsos, and the mention of Gonatas, who had no connection to the post-Ipsos Asian campaign, is a testimony of Philippides’ hostility towards the Antigonids in general. Bielman’s theory is untenable for several reasons. Firstly, her argument that since the events date from the period after the battle of Ipsos Antigonos has to be Antigonos Gonatas is invalid, since there is no reason to suppose that the Athenians in question were imprisoned *after* Ipsos. Secondly, there is no reason why Lysimachos would have imprisoned Athenians who just happened to be in a city controlled by Poliorketes. Finally, the theory is disproven by the explicit mention of “Demetrios and Antigonos” as those responsible for the incarceration. We would, therefore, better abide by the traditional interpretation, explain the reversed order of the kings by the preeminent position of Poliorketes in Athenian matters, and assume that the εἰργμένοι are Athenians deposed by Stratokles and/or Poliorketes or perhaps taken hostage as an assurance of Athens’ continued good faith

ἕκαστοι ἠβούλοντο), which means that many of them decided not to return to Athens, most of the Athenians mentioned in the decree were probably mercenaries.

¹ On the financial burden of Philippides’ action, see Bielman 1994: 79. Franco 1990: 116, n. 16 points out that if Lysimachos had accepted the release of the prisoners without ransom, this should be reported in the decree, and concludes that Philippides ransomed the prisoners, but his argument can be turned against him: had Philippides spent additional money to ransom the prisoners, this should be recorded in the decree; let us not forget that this is a decree in honour of Philippides, not Lysimachos.

² See Franco 1990: 115 n. 14 and Bielman 1994: 79, with earlier bibliography.

³ Bielman 1994: 79-80.

towards the king. Their release and the return of some of them to Athens sheds new light on the political situation in post-Ipsos Athens;¹ it particularly sheds new light on Philippides' Athenian political agenda, the main objective of which was the restoration of democracy – a democracy which he fervently believed had been crippled in 307-301.

III. After 287: τὰ συμφέροντα τεῖ τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαῖ and the festivals of 284/3

If the interpretation of the “prisoners in Asia” proposed here is correct, there appears to have been a gap in the benefactions of Philippides between soon after 301 and 287. The gap is well explained; under the tyrannid of Lachares (297[?]-295), and the second rule of Poliorketes over Athens (295-287) neither Lysimachos nor Philippides had any reason to lavish any benefactions upon Athens nor did the Athenians in charge have any reason to ask for their help. It is therefore easy to understand why Philippides reappeared in Athenian affairs only after the revolt of 287 – the “liberation of the people” (κομισαμένου τοῦ δήμου τὴν ἐλευθερίαν) as the decree explicitly calls it. At that time he asked the king once more to send grain and money to Athens and, in general, did everything in his power “so that the people remain free and regain the Piraeus and the forts as soon as possible”.²

This activity is part of the intense diplomacy of 287-285, that is, until Poliorketes' final defeat by Seleukos in Asia, a period in which the main concern of Athenian statesmen was the military, diplomatic and financial protection of the city in view of a possible return of Poliorketes. Contacts with Lysimachos, Pyrrhos, Ptolemy, minor rulers such as Spartokos of Bosphoros or Audoleon of Paionia, even contenders for the Macedonian royal title, such as Antipatros Etesias, were actively pursued in that period.³ Contacts with Lysimachos, in particular,⁴ appear to have been dense. Two more officers of the king were honoured with the Athenian citizenship in the same period: Artemidoros of Perinthos⁵ and Bithys of Lysimacheia.⁶ We also know of at least two embassies to Lysimachos – led by one

¹ Cf. p. 120 n. 1, above.

² *IG II²* 657, ll. 31-36.

³ Pyrrhos (in 287): Plut., *Demetr.* 46.1-4 and *Pyrrh.* 12.6-8; Paus. 1.11.1; cf. Kotsidu 2000: n° 8, with bibliography; Ptolemy: *IG II²* 650 (*Syll³* 367; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 14); *IG II²* 682 (*Syll³* 409; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 15); *SEG* 28 (1978) 60 (Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 16); Osborne 1981: D77 (Kotsidu 2000: n° 48; *Agora* 16.173); [Plut.], *Mor.* 851E; cf. Habicht 1992: 69-71 and **A46-A50**, below; Spartokos: Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 34 (*IG II²* 653; *Syll³* 370); Audoleon: Osborne 1981: D76 (*IG II²* 654; *Syll³* 371; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 32 E1); Antipatros Etesias: [Plut.], *Mor.* 851E; for the date and context of that contact, see **A49**, below.

⁴ Cf. Franco 1990: 122-34.

⁵ *Agora* 16.172; cf. **A51**, below.

⁶ Osborne 1981: D87 (*IG II²* 808); the question whether the honourand should be identified with the general of Demetrios II in the 230's (Plut., *Arat.* 34.1) or with the *philos* of Lysimachos (Aristodemos, *FHG III* 310 *apud* Ath. 6.246a-c; Phylarchos, *FGrHist* 81 F 12 *apud* Ath. 14.614e-615a)

of the leaders of the post-287 regime, Demochares, nephew of Demosthenes–, which resulted in donations of 30 and 100 talents respectively;¹ these 130 talents should either be identified with the χρήματα of the Philippides decree (l. 34) or as part of them. Finally, the statue of Lysimachos which the grateful Athenians erected in the *agora* probably also belongs to the same period.²

Lysimachos' benefactions appear to have come to an end in 285 –and so did, correspondingly, the expression of Athenian gratitude. Habicht assumes that this is an indication of hostility between the two sides, triggered by the reluctance of Lysimachos to restore Lemnos to the Athenians, as well as by the significant increase of Lysimachos' power and the extinction of the danger which Poliorketes signified for Athens.³ These two factors obviously took a toll on the relationship between the two sides, but can hardly have led to open hostility. As Franco aptly remarks, the decree for Philippides repeatedly mentions the benefactions of Lysimachos;⁴ in the subtext of Hellenistic diplomatic language, this clearly means not only that Athens remained an ally of the king, but also that it expected future benefactions by him, including, as the decree explicitly states, help for the recovery of the Piraeus and the Attic forts.⁵

It is therefore in the context of this friendly, even if somewhat strained, relationship between Athens and Lysimachos that we should set the *agonothesia* of

is answered by SEG 38 (1988) 619 in favour of the latter option (cf., however, Gauthier, *BullEpigr* 1991, 176). On the latter Bithys, see mainly Ameling 1991: 113-15 and Franco 1990: 130-134, with earlier bibliography. It should be noted that the Athenian decree for Bithys should not be taken to imply that Lysimachos offered military assistance to Athens in 287, as Burstein 1980 had assumed, followed, among others, by Franco 1990: 130 and Lund 1992: 101. The phrase εἰς τάγμα καταχωρί[ζει] (l. 8; Kirchner's unnecessary restoration of the rest of the phrase as [εἰς τε ἡγεμονί]ας καθίστησιν probably gave rise to Burstein's theory) has an exact parallel in the decree for Philippides (*IG II²* 657, ll. 22-23: τοὺς βουλομέν[ους στρατ]εύεσθαι διώικησεν ὅπως ἂν καταχωρισθῶσιν [ἐν] ἡγεμονίαις). Bithys was not involved in any military operation in Athens any more than Philippides was (cf. Ameling 1991: 115); the only thing both Bithys and Philippides did was to incorporate Athenians who so wished in Lysimachos' army.

¹ [Plut.], *Mor.* 851E; cf. **A49**, below.

² Paus. 1.9.4. For the date, see Franco 1990: 120 n. 39, with earlier bibliography.

³ Habicht 1979: 79-80. Phylarchos, *FGHist* 81 F 29 (*apud* Ath. 6.255) records the hostility of the Athenians of Lemnos towards Lysimachos and informs us that Lemnos was only later restored to Athens by Seleukos I, immediately after the battle of Kouroupedion in 281; cf. Habicht 1970: 89-90 and Lund 1992: 203-204.

⁴ Franco 1990: 127-29. Dreyer 1999: 229 is also circumspect as regards Habicht's theory.

⁵ The recovery of the Piraeus (which probably only occurred in 229; for the long relevant debate, see Gauthier 1979; Habicht 1979: 95-107; Heinen 1981: 196-205; Reger 1992: 371-79; Woodhead 1997: 252; Taylor 1998; Dreyer 1999: 257-78; Oliver 2007: 55-60 and **A44**, below) was the key issue of Athenian politics, especially in the 280's: cf. Osborne 1981: D76 (*IG II²* 654; *Syll^P* 371; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 32 E1); *Agora* 16.176 (SEG 21 [1965] 176) and 181 (SEG 25 [1971] 89; *ISE* 14).

Philippides in 284/3. Naturally, these lavishly organized contests were a benefaction of Philippides as an individual, but Athenians were well aware that he was not only a wealthy citizen but also a prominent courtier of Lysimachos, whose donations were the chief source of Philippides' wealth.¹ If this is true for the pre-existing contests, it is even truer for the new contest held at Eleusis in honour of Demeter and Kore, which Philippides financed; this contest was instituted as "a reminder of the people's freedom",² but also in order to celebrate the recovery of Eleusis, for which Demochares was also honoured, and to which the donations of Lysimachos certainly contributed.³ Moreover, the lavish contests, old and new, come in significant contrast with the fiscal austerity of 286/5, on which Demochares prided himself, in typical Lykourgean language.⁴ It is true that two years later the danger of Poliorketes was extinct, but, nevertheless, these lavish festivities would not have been possible without the money of the citizen and courtier Philippides.

IV. An overview: Philippides between Athens and the court

If we were to draw a line connecting Athens and the court of Lysimachos, Philippides' position on that line would appear rather peculiar. In a sense, he was a courtier honoured for his mediation between the two sides. In another sense, however, Philippides was a citizen benefactor. This is an interpretation conspicuously promoted by both 'contracting parties'. If we focus on the, always significant, wording of the decree, the city appears to have honoured him because on every occasion Philippides proved his goodwill towards his hometown, helped his fellow citizens, promoted the city's salvation by words and deeds, "voluntarily accepted the people's nomination" of him as an *agonothetes*, successfully passed the *euthyna* "according to the laws", and "never did anything contrary to the rule of the people by words or deeds". The city honoured a worthy citizen, with terms befitting civic leaders,⁵ although the only official position Philippides ever held was that of an *agonothetes*, a costly liturgy rather than a real office.

But this point of view was also Philippides' point of view. The decree, as all decrees leading to the greatest honours in Athens, drew on a sort of official

¹ Philippides' family was probably well-off (cf. Davies 1971: 541), but certainly not as wealthy as the families of other *agonothetai* like Xenokles and Phaidros.

² IG II² 657, ll. 43-45: ὑπόμνημα τῆς τοῦ δήμου ἐλευθερίας.

³ [Plut.], *Mor.* 851E-F; cf. T. L. Shear 1978: 83-86; Habicht 1979: 25 n. 25; Gauthier 1979: 371-72; Franco 1990: 126.

⁴ [Plut.], *Mor.* 851E: συστείλαντι τὴν διοίκησιν πρώτῳ καὶ φεισαμένῳ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων...

⁵ Similar emphasis is put on democratic policy in the decrees for Lykourgos, Demochares ([Plut.], *Mor.* 851-852) and Kallias (SEG 28 [1978] 60).

curriculum vitae approved and submitted by the future honourand or his relatives.¹ This means that Philippides himself not only maintained an unfailing interest in Athenian affairs, manifested by the benefactions themselves, but was also interested in having his actions presented as those of a citizen benefactor.

At the same time, however, the wording of the decree points to a different direction: the decree makes it clear that even the benefactions of the king were largely attributable to Philippides –now the courtier and not the citizen. Moreover, Philippides strove for his actions to be advertised by the king himself: “... and to all these [*scil.* Philippides’ actions], the king has often testified to the Athenians sent on an embassy to him” (ll. 36-38; ... καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτων π[ά]ντων πολλάκις μεμαρτύρηκεν αὐτῶι ὁ βασιλεὺς πρὸς τοὺς π[ρ]εσβεύοντας Ἀθηναίων πρὸς ἑαυτόν). Philippides knew the importance of his position παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ, knew that the Athenians were well aware of this importance and impressed it upon them on every occasion. The story of his career as presented in the decree begins with his position at the court of Lysimachos, the victor of Ipsos over the hated Poliorketes, and throughout the text the Athenians are discreetly reminded of how influential the honourand was at the king’s court.

In conclusion, regardless of how much Philippides loved his country, he was exactly in the middle of the road leading from the city to the king and vice versa; a fact of which he was well aware of and which he duly emphasized. He was a citizen and a courtier; as a citizen, he exploited his countrymen’s gratitude to consolidate his position at court; as a courtier, he exploited the royal favour to enhance his esteem with which he was invested back home.

A41. Lachares

— Paus. 1.25.7-8; Plut., *Demetr.* 33.7-8; other sources: *FGrHist* 257a F 1-4 (*P.Oxy.* 2082); Plut., *Mor.* 379C and 1090C; Paus. 1.29.10 and 29.16; Polyainos 3.7.1-3; 4.7.5; 6.7.2; fr. 52.3; Demetrios, *PCG* V 11 *apud* Ath. 9.405f; *ISE* 23 (*IG* II² 774 + *Add.*) + *SEG* 39 (1989) 131, ll. 29-32 (?)

It is indicative of the deplorable state of our sources for the third century that we know so little about Lachares, who, according to all available sources, became a tyrant in Athens in the first decade of the century. To begin with, we know nothing about his background, including his patronym and his deme of origin. Secondly, there is no consensus on the duration of his tyrannid or its precise date. Various dates have been proposed: 300-295, 295-294 (with a civil strife from 298/7 and/or with Lachares in power already after 301), 297-294 and 297-295 (the dating which I follow here).²

¹ See *IG* II² 657, ll. 54-55 (... ὅταν ἐξέλθωσιν αἱ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου ἡμέραι τῆς αἰτίσεως), with Gauthier 1985: 83-88.

² Here I offer only a select bibliography, citing the main proponents of the various datings (for a more extensive bibliography, see especially Dreyer 1999: 17-76). **1**) 300-295: Ferguson 1929; Habicht 1995: 90 and n. 58 (cf. [2006] 99-101, modifying his earlier views); **2**) 295-294: Beloch

It is difficult to establish the sequence of events marking Lachares' career. It appears that Lachares, legally elected general ἐπὶ τῶν ξένων clashed with other generals led by Charias; supported by a great number of citizens he laid siege to the Acropolis, where Charias, the other generals and the troops loyal to them had taken refuge, convinced them to surrender and then instigated a decree to put them to death, despite the fact that they were supplicants to the temple of Athena. All this is said to have happened before Kassandros' death in May 297.¹ Then Lachares took power into his own hands,² only to face a popular rebellion soon afterwards (apparently before the summer of 296),³ a citizen force stationed

1927: 247-48; De Sanctis 1936; Habicht 1979: 1-21, among others, all supposing that the civil strife had begun by 298/7, while Dreyer 1999: 17-76 believes that Lachares was in legitimate power since 301; **3**) 297-294: Bearzot 1992: 74-86, with an interesting variation, according to which the undeniable constitutional change of 295 reflects a failed attempt of Lachares to reconcile with his opponents in the Piraeus; **4**) 297-295: Osborne 1982: 144-52; cf. Osborne 1985. In general, see the cautionary remarks of Heinen 1981: 177-84. With the exception of Dreyer and Bearzot, a general consensus has been reached on dating the end of his tyrannid to spring 295 (cf. Thonemann 2005: 71); I therefore wish to briefly comment on the date of its beginning. The main argument of those who believe civil strife in Athens began immediately after the battle of Ipsos (cf. Ferguson 1929: 14; Habicht [2006]: 99; Dreyer 1999: 38, 46, 54, 59) is that, according to the *Περιοχαί* of Menander's work (PCG VI 2, 140 n° 189, ll. 105-112), the scheduled production of Menander's *Imbrians*, a play written in 302/1, was cancelled because of the tyrannid of Lachares. Proponents of this theory, however, admit that this cannot be the Dionysia of 301, since Stratokles apparently remained in power until early autumn 301 (IG II² 640), and are led to suppose that the *terminus (paullo) ante quem* for the tyrannid is the spring of 300. Several objections can be raised to this assumption: (1) The rebellion of Lachares and Charias and their subsequent confrontation seems to be dated by *FGrHist* 257a F 1-4 (our only direct source on the events) only shortly before Kassandros' death, indisputably dated to May 297 (see Landucci Gattinoni 2003: 23). (2) The interval between the composition and the production of the *Imbrians* is clear in the *Περιοχαί*, especially with Gronewald's restoration, with the *asyndeton* between ἔγραψεν and ἐξέδωκεν (cf. Luppe 1993: 10); there is therefore no reason to suppose that the performance was cancelled in 301/0 and not later, especially if we consider how prolific a writer Menander was (cf. Habicht 1979: 16-20). (3) A number of sources indicate that the political situation in Athens was not aggravated before 298/7 (see the earlier view of Habicht 1979: 18-19 and Osborne 1982: 148 n. 641; *contra*: Dreyer 2000).

¹ *FGrHist* 257a F 1-3 (for two important corrections of the text, see Thonemann 2003). The executed generals were Charias, Peithias, Lysandros son of Kalliphon and Ameinias. Ameinias is known from an earlier honorific decree (Agora 16.129 [SEG 29 (1979) 92]), and Charias may be referred to in IG II² 1954 (see Bayliss 2003: 133-35); the other generals are apparently otherwise unknown.

² It is to this later stage that almost all sources on Lachares refer: see mainly Paus. 1.25.7-8, 29.10 and 29.16; Plut., *Demetr.* 33 and *Mor.* 379C; 1090C; Polyainos 4.7.5; Demetrios, PCG V 11 *apud* Ath. 9.405f).

³ *FGrHist* 257a F 4; cf. Osborne 1982: 148. Whether the coming of the tyrannid should be placed before or after Kassandros' death depends on the reliability of Pausanias 1.25.7, who claims that it was Kassandros who convinced Lachares to become a tyrant (cf. in the text, below);

at the Piraeus apparently played a leading part in the opposition against the tyrant.¹ Poliorketes realized that the civil strife was an excellent opportunity for him to reconquer Athens; he attempted a first unsuccessful siege, made a brief detour to the Peloponnese and then returned to Attica, for his final and successful attack (ca. March 295).² Lachares had already escaped;³ he sought refuge initially in Boiotia⁴ and then at the court of Lysimachos,⁵ where we lose trace of him after 292/1.⁶

Despite the fact that information on Lachares is sparse, we either know or can plausibly assume that he had contacts with two or three rulers. The first one – and the only one which is certain – was with Kassandros. Pausanias' description (1.25.7) is clear: "Kassandros, who displayed intense hatred towards the Athenians, as soon as Lachares rose to power, befriended him and convinced him to transform his rule into a tyrannid".⁷ Pausanias' account, however, is also problematic, since no other source attributes Lachares' action to Kassandros' instigation. Furthermore, it is clear that Pausanias follows sources hostile to Kassandros and, more or less, friendly to Poliorketes, "who was kindly disposed towards the Greeks":⁸ his account (1.25.8) of the 'liberation' of Athens from the tyrannid of Lachares, instigated by Kassandros, reproduces the account of the 'liberation' of the city from the 'tyrannid' of Demetrios of Phaleron (1.25.6), imposed by Kassandros. Moreover,

the anonymous chronicle (*FGrHist* 257a) conveys the opposite impression, namely that Lachares was acting within the bounds of the constitution until Kassandros died. If we accept Pausanias' version, the tyrannid's onset should be dated ca. early 297; if we accept the chronicle's version, it should be dated to 297/6. The fact that 296/5 seems to have been a year when constitutional forms were maintained (cf. Dreyer 1999: 31, with earlier bibliography) is irrelevant. Lachares' tyrannid (or 'tyrannid') was not the first during which some constitutional forms were maintained.

¹ *FGrHist* 257a F 4; Polyainos 4.7.5; *ISE* 23 (*IG* II² 774), l. 32 (Lachares' name should perhaps be restored in l. 29; cf. **B1**, below). It is possible that *Agora* 16.160, a decree of the deme of Piraeus, mentioning mass participation of demesmen in public works, is related to these events or their immediate aftermath. For the Πειραιϊκοὶ στρατιῶται of the papyrus (which is certainly the correct form of the term, despite the objections of Gabbert 1996: 62 n. 3), see mainly Bayliss 2003.

² Plut., *Demetr.* 33-34; on the exact date, see *IG* II² 644 with Osborne 1982: 149 and Woodhead 1997: 237.

³ Plut., *Demetr.* 33.8.

⁴ Paus. 1.25.8; Polyainos 3.7.1.

⁵ Polyainos 3.7.2-3.

⁶ Cf. Lund 1993: 103.

⁷ Paus. 1.25.7: Κάσσανδρος δέ –δεινὸν γάρ τι ὑπὲρ οἱ μῖσος ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους–, ὁ δὲ αὖθις λαχάρην προεστηκότα ἐς ἐκεῖνο τοῦ δήμου τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρα οἰκειωσάμενος τυραννίδα ἔπεισε βουλευῆσαι.

⁸ Paus. 1.25.6: φιλοτίμως πρὸς τὸ ἑλληνικὸν διακείμενον. According to Jacoby, *FGrHist* IIb Komm. 849, Pausanias follows Hieronymos of Kardia (for Hieronymos' positive but occasionally ambivalent treatment of Poliorketes, see Hornblower 1981: 227-32). Bearzot 1992: 49-101, *passim*, on the other hand, more convincingly argues that Pausanias was influenced by Athenian democratic writers, such as Demochares and Philochoros.

even Pausanias does not imply that Lachares was Kassandros' man prior to his lawful rise to power. Finally, the correlation of power in the post-Ipsos Athenian political scene does not necessitate the assumption that Lachares must have had Kassandros' favour from the outset of his career. As we saw, the post-Ipsos regime had cultivated rather friendly relations with Kassandros, and the men who were the instigators of this policy were prominent oligarchs like Philippides son of Philomelos. The fact that Lachares appears to have had popular support in his confrontation with the other generals probably means that he presented himself, at least initially, as a representative of the democrats; it is rather unlikely that the democrats were friendly towards Kassandros only nine years after Demetrios of Phaleron's rule.

In other words, Lachares probably rose to power without Kassandros' help; then he decided to deal with his opponents dynamically and to suspend the constitution. If his reported relationship with Kassandros is accepted, his choice of Kassandros as a patron of his illegitimate power was a perfectly reasonable one: at the time, Poliorketes was still trying to create alliances through dynastic marriages,¹ himself a king without a kingdom, cut off from developments in Athens.

We do not know what measures Lachares took to assure outside help in the face of popular unrest against him after Kassandros died (May 297). It is interesting that during the siege by Poliorketes in 295, a Ptolemaic squadron of 150 vessels appeared in the waters of Aigina to help the Athenians, but soon departed because of the vastly superior numbers of Poliorketes' fleet (300 vessels); this is when Lachares escaped from the city.² Could this mean that Lachares had turned to Ptolemy for help and left in despair when the Ptolemaic assistance proved inadequate? This is not a necessary conclusion. Both sides of the civil strife in Athens –Lachares and his mercenaries on the one hand, those who revolted against him and had managed to control the Piraeus³ on the other– were hostile to Poliorketes. Ptolemy's help may have been solicited by either side, or even by none: the king had every interest to prevent Poliorketes from conquering Athens. Besides, had Lachares turned to Ptolemy for help, he would have probably sought refuge in Alexandria and not at Lysimachos' court. Similarly, the fact that Lachares turned to Lysimachos does not indicate that he had prior contacts with his court.⁴ Lachares was now a fugitive,⁵ offering his military service to the highest bidder –or, perhaps, the only willing employer.

¹ Plut., *Demetr.* 31.5-32.8.

² Plut., *Demetr.* 33.7-8.

³ Polyainos 4.7.5.

⁴ Cf. Lund 1993: 92-93; Franco 1990: 122 n. 47.

⁵ Cf. Polyainos 3.7.1-2.

The approaches of Lachares to the kings –certainly Kassandros, perhaps Lysimachos and Ptolemy as well– are similar to a motif which is often encountered in the Peloponnese:¹ at junctures of intense political struggle within a city, ambitious civic leaders often turned to the kings in order to secure a powerful ally for themselves. Such temporary alliances did not involve a long-lasting corresponding (re-)orientation of foreign policy on the part of these leaders, let alone on the part of their *poleis*, nor should they be viewed as the result of the kings' wish to interfere in the affairs of that city. They bear testimony to a much simpler fact, namely to the desire of the aspirant civic leaders to ensure their position through a temporary association with the king who appeared most willing and available at the time.

A42. Dromokleides of Sphettos

– Plut., *Demetr.* 13 and 34.6; *Mor.* 798E

Our information on Dromokleides, a demagogue who followed Stratokles' paradigm after the reconquest of Athens by Poliorketes in 295,² is sparse. Dromokleides' first positively attested³ political act dates from 295, while we know of two decrees he proposed, in 295 and 291 or 290 respectively. Both are extreme examples of flattery to the king and consolidation of the proposer's position in the city, in contrast with the city's interests.

The siege which led to the reconquest of Athens by Poliorketes in the spring of 295 was a long and difficult one, despite the fact that the city had been experiencing a civil strife for two years; this reveals the degree of animosity towards Poliorketes, also attested in a decree according to which proposing peace or even negotiations with Poliorketes was punishable by death. Nevertheless, as Athenians were faced with starvation, as a result of the blockade imposed on Athens by land and sea, they were forced to surrender unconditionally.⁴

Contrary to all expectations, Poliorketes did not treat Athens harshly. By a (literally) theatrical gesture, he gathered the Athenians in the theatre, expressed no anger at their betrayal, offered 100,000 medimni of wheat and “established

¹ Cf. especially **B2-3**, below.

² The two men are compared by Plutarch (*Mor.* 798E), who considered them as examples of demagogues, who got rich through their activity in the assembly.

³ Osborne 1975: 153 n. 18 and 1982: 117 assumes that Dromokleides may have been the general who pleaded for the honours to Neaios in 304 or, rather, 305 (Osborne 1981: D44 [*IG* II² 553]; cf. p. 95 n. 3, above). Restoring Dromokleides' name in that decree is tempting, but Tracy 1995: 119 n. 1 correctly points out that there is no reason to assume that Dromokleides was politically active in 307-301, let alone as a general.

⁴ Plut., *Demetr.* 33-34; on the date, see *IG* II² 644 with Osborne 1982: 149 and Woodhead 1997: 237.

offices which were very dear to the people”.¹ According to Plutarch’s colourful account, Dromokleides, noticing that the gratitude of the multitude was even stronger than the praises of the demagogues who had spoken so far, went a step further and proposed a decree by which the Piraeus, including Mounychia, were offered² to Poliorketes. The king did not content himself with this offer, and established a garrison on the hill of the Mouseion.³

Poliorketes’ decisions on that occasion are a manifestation of a common feature of the way the kings treated the cities, especially in the third century: constitutional forms were maintained, the king presented himself as a benefactor rather than as an absolute ruler, while, at the same time, all measures necessary for the control of the *polis* by royal forces were taken without any respect for constitutional sensibilities. As far as Dromokleides is concerned, there should be no doubt that the decree he proposed was not a spontaneous display of Athenian gratitude, but a manifestation of royal power and an expression of royal wishes. We do not know whether his action was the result of prior understanding with the king,⁴ but, either way, Dromokleides knew perfectly well that he could cash in on this decree, politically or otherwise. His role was an unpopular but necessary one: he “proposed” measures that the king, for reasons of communication policy, could not present as his own decisions. The installation of a garrison at the heart of the civic centre, a measure that not even Dromokleides would dare propose, came as a normal appendix to Dromokleides’ decree.

Four or five years later, Dromokleides proposed another decree which served the interests of Poliorketes’ propaganda, this time with respect to his political and religious image. He proposed to ask Poliorketes for an oracle on the way Athenian dedications to Delphi should be reconsecrated; the city would do whatever the king vaticinated.⁵ The political aspect of the incident has been exemplarily explored by Habicht:⁶ the Athenians were concerned by the fact that the Aitolians, who were allied with the Boiotians, controlled Delphi, and expected Poliorketes to relieve them from danger coming from the north. But why should this legitimate concern have been expressed by this extreme form of flattery? Why this expression

¹ Plut., *Demetr.* 34.4-5: κατέστησεν ἀρχὰς αἱ μάλιστα τῷ δήμῳ προσφιλεῖς ἦσαν (προσφιλεῖς ἀρχαὶ refers here to the popular form of the constitution, not popular office holders; see Osborne 2006: 70-71). On the theatricality of the king’s announcement of the measures by the king, cf. Thonemann 2005, some of whose arguments are rightly rejected by Osborne 2006.

² In reality, this only meant that Poliorketes would maintain control of places he already held; cf. Habicht [2006]: 104.

³ Plut., *Demetr.* 34.6-7.

⁴ If that was the case, it would lend further support to Osborne’s assumption that Dromokleides belonged to the pro-Demetrian faction already in 307-301.

⁵ Plut., *Demetr.* 13.

⁶ Habicht 1979: 34-44, whose date (291-290) and analysis I follow here. Dreyer 1999: 128-35 offers an entirely different –but, in my opinion, unconvincing– reconstruction of events.

of hypocrisy and absurdity, as Plutarch calls it, which is also obvious in the famous *ithyphallos*, which was sung during the Eleusinia in the same period, and portrayed Poliorketes as a more tangible Dionysos?¹

This bidding of ever higher honours for the king may be seen as the natural outcome of the political needs of the king's supporters within the city. When the world of the *poleis* exhausted the traditional arsenal of honours in the context of euergetism, the citizens wishing to enhance their political position by new honours for the king had to resort to the closest conceptual group of honours and privileges, that of religion. In 307, Poliorketes was a Saviour, a *ktistes* benefactor; already in 304, an altar was erected in his honour and a devotional epithet was accorded to him (Καταιβάτης); the honours accorded to him in 295 more clearly belong to a religious framework: he was described as a tangible god on earth (*ithyphallos*), as an *anax* who vaticinated (Dromokleides' decree).

A43. Gorgos son of Phrynichos (?)

— Γόργος Φρυνί[χου] (?).]; Osborne 1981: D68 (*IG II² 646*; Kotsidu 2000: n° 9 E3)

Gorgos son of Phrynichos² proposed the honorific decree for Herodoros of Kyzikos or Lampsakos in 295/4, Pryt. IX.³ Both the proposer and the honourand are otherwise unknown; I shall therefore limit myself to a brief discussion of the historical context.

Herodoros was an Antigonid officer, originally attached to Antigonos (ll. 10-13) and then to Poliorketes (ll. 13-17). The main reason for the honours he received was that, according to the “ambassadors sent to king Demetrios on the matter of the peace” (ll. 17-19), he contributed to the conclusion of a peace and friendship treaty between Athens and Demetrios and to the city's relief from the war, “so that the people, regaining control of the *asty*, maintain the democratic constitution”, [κομισάμε]νος τὸ ἄστυ (*scil.* the people) δημοκρατ[ίαν διατελήι] ἔχων (ll. 19-25). Herodoros was awarded the highest honours for his services: a golden crown, the Athenian citizenship, permanent *sitesis* at the *prytaneion*, *proedria* in the games, and a bronze statue of his erected in the *agora*.

¹ Demochares, *FGrHist* 75 F 2; Douris, *FGrHist* 76 F 13; Ath. 6.253b-f; cf. Habicht 1970: 232-33 and 1995: 98-99; Mikalson 1998: 94-97; Dreyer 1999: 115, 133-34.

² Φρυνί[χου] is the most probable restoration of his patronym; other matching names, attested in Athens (Φρυνίσκου, Φρυνιχίδου, Φρυνίωνος), are rare.

³ Osborne 1981: D68 (*IG II² 646*; Kotsidu 2000: n° 9 E3). On the noteworthy relief which decorated the stele and depicted Athena crowning the honourand, as well as on the vandalization of the honourand's figure, see Osborne 1975: 155 and Lawton 1995: n° A 59, with earlier bibliography. According to Lawton 1992: 241, this is the only certain example of a stele inscribed with a public document bearing a separate relief above. Its dimensions (its total height reached 2.22m) and the conceptually outstanding relief underscored the importance of Herodoros' actions.

The ambassadors who testified to Herodoros' help were obviously the ambassadors who communicated the city's unconditional surrender to Poliorketes.¹ If the surrender took place in the spring of 295,² it seems odd that Herodoros was honoured a whole year later. The timespan may indeed be "a far from impossibly long wait in Athenian terms",³ but does need an explanation, which I believe is provided by the text of the decree itself. The negotiations between Poliorketes and Athens included several stages.⁴ The first step was the surrender of the city, the second was the termination of the war, the third was the recovery of the *asty*; only then was the constitutional democratic order considered to have come back to normal. As Ferguson had already understood,⁵ the recovery of the *asty* can only mean the removal of Poliorketes' *tactical* forces from the city. Although this move was primarily dictated by Poliorketes' strategic needs,⁶ it was also seen as a basic precondition for peace and for a semblance of a normal existence of the Athenian state. The 'democracy' for which the city (and the goddess Athena herself) were grateful to Herodoros included the reinstatement of democratic offices⁷ and the absence of billeting of Poliorketes' army –although garrisons at Mounychia and on Mouseion hill remained very much in place.⁸ The irony of the matter was that, only three months after the honours for Herodoros, Poliorketes imposed a regime which was subtly but unmistakably oligarchic (see the following entry). Herodoros was honoured for his help in the refoundation of a democracy which would prove stillborn.

¹ Plut., *Demetr.* 34.1.

² See the bibliography cited in the notes of the preceding entry.

³ Osborne 1982: 150; cf. Thonemann 2005: 77.

⁴ Could an undated episode which Plutarch recounts (*Demetr.* 42.2), according to which Athenian ambassadors waited for two years for an answer from Poliorketes, refer (with some exaggeration) to this period?

⁵ Ferguson 1929: 19-20.

⁶ Immediately after conquering Athens, Poliorketes returned to the Peloponnese, with plans to conquer Sparta (Plut., *Demetr.* 35.1).

⁷ Plut., *Demetr.* 34.5: ἀρχὰς αἱ μάλιστα τῷ δήμῳ προσφιλεῖς ἦσαν (cf. Osborne 1982: 151 and 2006: 70-71).

⁸ The terminology is parallel to the one used after the Chremonidean War: the 'liberation' of Athens in 256/5 or 255/4 (Eusebios, *Chron.* II 120 [Schoene]) consisted in the removal of the garrisons of the *asty* and the Mouseion hill (Paus. 3.6.6).

A44. Olympiodoros

— *LGPN* II, s.v. Ὀλυμπιόδωρος n° 17

For the two decades which followed 307, Olympiodoros was probably the most important Athenian general. We know practically nothing of his life outside the army until 294.¹

His military actions on behalf of his country² are known mainly from a chronologically and linguistically confused passage of Pausanias (1.26.1-3).³ His most important feats were four. The first (last in Pausanias' account) was the repulsing of an attack of Kassandros with the help of the Aitolians, the alliance of whom Olympiodoros secured in person by sailing to Aitolia (1.26.3); the incident probably belongs to 306 and should be connected with Kassandros' first offensive during the Four-Year War.⁴ Then a new Macedonian attack (καταδρομή) is mentioned, this time on Eleusis; Olympiodoros warded off the danger by leading the people of Eleusis to battle (1.26.3). Although this episode is usually dated in 305/4, during the second attack of Kassandros, there are good reasons to place it during his first attack in 306/5, as well.⁵

¹ Possible identifications with other known Olympiodoroi of that period are not secure. Davies 1971: 164-65 identifies him with Olympiodoros son of Diotimos of Euonymon (*IG* II² 1629, ll. 539-541 and 622-629), offspring of a rich family of democratic and anti-Macedonian tendencies. This identification is certainly plausible, although Davies' main argument, that not many prominent Olympiodoroi are known to have been active during that period, is weak. Another general Olympiodoros is mentioned in the case of Epikouros' attempt to free Mithres, ex-treasurer of Lysimachos, imprisoned at the Piraeus some time between 285 and 277 (*Epic., Epist.* 49; for the date, cf. Reger 1992: 373, with earlier bibliography and p. 134 n. 3, below), but his role is unclear.

² Olympiodoros' part in the war against Kassandros in Boiotia in 304 or 301-297 (*Paus.* 10.18.7, 34.2-3) need not concern us here; cf. Gullath 1982: 184-85; McInerney 1999: 241; **C24**, below.

³ There is only one highly probable epigraphic attestation of Olympiodoros' actions, namely a fragmentary list of names, followed by a mention of the general ἐπὶ τὰ ὄπλα Olympiodoros (*IG* II² 2429).

⁴ Hauben 1974b: 10, with earlier bibliography. Gabbert 1996: 60, in contrast to this unanimous dating, arbitrarily places the event in 305/4, arguing that Poliorketes was unable to help then because he was occupied with the siege of Rhodes. That Poliorketes did not repel Kassandros in 305/4 is certain, but the same is also true for 306, when he was occupied in Cyprus.

⁵ Habicht 1979: 107 n. 65 dated the event to 304 or earlier; in 1995: 83 he dated it to 304. Gabbert 1996: 61-62, having dated the event involving the Aitolians in 305/4, is forced to date this event to 302/1, again arbitrarily. Pausanias' account leaves the impression that this was a minor attack which the Athenians were able to repel with their own forces, without outside help. Since we know that the Athenians did not manage to repel Kassandros' second major attack in 304 before the forces of Poliorketes arrived, it is more likely that the Eleusinian incident was connected with Kassandros' first attack. Moreover, as we saw earlier (p. 95 n. 3, above), the incident may be referred to in the decree for Neaios, (*Osborne* 1981: D44 [*IG* II² 553]), which I believe should be dated to 306/5, *Pryt. X.* Bearzot 1992: 89 unconvincingly reiterates the older view that the episode belongs to the context of the Athenian revolt against Poliorketes in the early 280's.

The third feat of Olympiodoros, second in importance according to Pausanias (1.26.3) and the most highly debated in modern scholarship, is described with frustrating brevity: “this was his major feat, apart from what he did when he recovered the Piraeus and the Mounychia” (τόδε μὲν ἔστιν ἔργον μέγιστον, χωρὶς τούτων ὧν ἔπραξε Πειραιᾶ καὶ Μουνυχίαν ἀνασωσάμενος). The episode has been mainly discussed in the context of the controversy on the recovery of the Piraeus by the Athenians ca. 281.¹ Those who believe that the Macedonian garrison was then expelled, take it that Plutarch’s account refers to that event. For Habicht,² the main proponent of the opposite view, ἀνασώζω in this context can also be taken to mean ‘preserve’, ‘maintain’ in the city’s possession, and Olympiodoros’ action should thus be associated with the repulse of Kassandros referred to immediately afterwards. As far as the wider issue of the recovery of the Piraeus is concerned, I believe the evidence and the arguments in favour or against the recovery are inconclusive –in which case, Occam’s razor makes Habicht’s view that the Piraeus remained in Macedonian hands until 229 preferable.³ As far as

¹ See mainly Gauthier 1979; Habicht 1979: 95-107; Heinen 1981: 196-205; Bultrighini 1984; Reger 1992: 371-79; Woodhead 1997: 252; Taylor 1998; Dreyer 1999: 257-78; Oliver 2007: 55-60.

² Habicht 1979: 102-107 and 1995: 83.

³ Gauthier 1979 and Reger 1992: 373-79 convincingly confute the *positive* arguments which Habicht adduced in order to prove that the recovery *did not* take place in ca. 281. On the other hand, Gauthier, Reger and Dreyer offer no irrefutable argument which would demonstrate that the recovery *did* take place: (1) Even if Nikias *hysteros* was the archon of 282/1 (and not the one of 296/5, as Osborne 1985 argued and as the overwhelming majority of scholars now accepts [cf. Thonemann 2005: 67 and n. 8]), their argument that as soon as the Piraeus was reconquered there was a change of archons is untenable. A change of government would have entailed the denunciation of the previous archons, which was certainly not the case (see mainly Osborne 1982: 146 and Taylor 1998: 208-211). (2) The fact that the Athenians were preparing for an assault on the Piraeus shortly before 281 (*Agora* 16.176 and 181, ll. 29-31; *IG* II² 657, ll. 34-36; Osborne 1981: D76 [*IG* II² 654], l. 32) hardly means that they were also successful in their attempt; that no such preparations are known for the following period may just as well be due to a catastrophic defeat in front of the walls of the Piraeus, such as the one Polyainos 5.17 recounts, during which 420 Athenians were killed (this incident, usually dated to 287 [T. L. Shear 1978: 82-83; Habicht 1979: 98; Gauthier 1979: 356, 366] cannot be dated to 282/1, *pace* Osborne 1979: 194; see Oliver 2007: 58-59, who dates it shortly after 287). (3) Given the deplorable state of our sources for the mid-third century, the fact that there are no sources pointing to a food crisis in Attica between 280 and 265/4 is a particularly weak argument *e silentio*. The reason why Habicht’s view is preferable, despite the absence of conclusive evidence, is that, if we assume that the Athenians took over the Piraeus in 281, we would also need to assume another unattested takeover, this time by the Macedonians: since the handing over of the Piraeus was not part of the conditions imposed after the end of the Chremonidean War (see Paus. 3.6.6; Apollodoros, *FGrHist* 244 F 44), we would also need to assume that the Macedonians took over the Piraeus some time between 281 and the 260’s. Finally, the continuous changes in the Athenian archon list seem to offer new and positive evidence in favour of Habicht’s theory: if the archonship of Telokles, during which Epikouros wrote a letter to Mithres (*P. Herc.* 163 xxxvi 9-10; cf. Dorandi 1990b: 125 n° 18), who

Pausanias' text is concerned, however, Habicht's interpretation cannot be right. Ἐνασώζω in Pausanias always means "to regain";¹ therefore, there is no reason to connect Olympiodoros' action with the rescue of Eleusis in 306/5, mentioned immediately afterwards. If the "recovery" of the Piraeus does not belong either to the Four-Year War or to the –supposed– takeover of the Piraeus in 281, then it most probably belongs to the troubled period of Lachares' rule.² Olympiodoros may have fought against the tyrant soon before the surrender of the city to Poliorketes, when we know that the opponents of Lachares were based in the Piraeus.³ The report of the general's actions by Pausanias probably derives from decrees in honour of Olympiodoros, as the author himself implies;⁴ if this is the case, the discreet and vague description of his actions would make perfect sense if the decrees dated from after 295, not only because Olympiodoros' action facilitated the surrender of the city to a foreign power, but also because he was later to become a leader in the regime imposed by Poliorketes.

To be more specific, Olympiodoros became an eponymous archon for two consecutive years, 294/3 and 293/2.⁵ This stood in marked contrast to democratic forms and Olympiodoros was probably not elected by lot but was a –direct or indirect– royal appointee.⁶ It is also clear that during his term of office Olympiodoros exerted more power than was normal for this office: in later documents he is described as ὁ Ἀθηναίων προστατῆσας.⁷ Besides, these were not the only oligarchic features of the regime: during his term of office secretaries of the council were replaced by the *anagrapheis*,⁸ just like in the regime of 322-319; the judicial

was kept captive in the Macedonian garrison of the Piraeus, is to be dated to 280/79 (Osborne 2004: 77-78), then the Piraeus must have still been under Macedonian control after April 281, and the theory of an Athenian takeover of the fort should be abandoned.

¹ Bultrighini 1984; Dreyer 1999: 259-62.

² So, among others, De Sanctis 1936: 144-47 and Gabbert 1996: 61-62; Bayliss 2003: 140 finds it a plausible scenario, but provides an alternative one.

³ *FGrHist* 257a F 4; Polyainos 4.7.5; *ISE* 23 (*IG* II² 774), l. 32 (Lachares' name should probably be restored in l. 29; see **B1**, below) and, perhaps, *Agora* 16.160.

⁴ Paus. 1.26.3: Ὀλυμπιοδώρω δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἐν Ἀθήναις εἰσὶν ἔν τε ἀκροπόλει καὶ ἐν πρυτανείῳ τιμαί, τοῦτο δὲ ἐν Ἐλευσίῃ γραφή. This does not necessarily mean that the inscriptions themselves were Pausanias' source; his source may have been an Athenian writer with documentary interests, such as Philochoros (Bearzot 1992: 91; Kralli 2000: 137 n. 11 prefers Demochares).

⁵ Dion. Hal., *Din.* 9; Epic., *Epist.* fr. 105; *IG* II² 389 + *SEG* 21 (1965) 354; *SEG* 45 (1995) 101 (*IG* II² 649 + Dinsmoor 1931: 7-8); *Agora* 16.167. All three inscriptions date from his second year of office, 293/2. Osborne 1981: D70 (*IG* II² 378 + *SEG* 21 [1965] 353) was thought to belong to 294/3, but Osborne 2006: 70 n. 3 now dates it to 321/0.

⁶ Habicht 1979: 27 n. 38 and 1995: 97; Osborne 2006: 70.

⁷ Diog. Laert. 6.23.

⁸ For 293/2, see the sources mentioned in n. 5, above. *SEG* 21 (1965) 355 (*IG* II² 385a) was believed to date to 292/1, hence it was believed that the *anagrapheis* continued to replace the

scrutiny of naturalizations was apparently abandoned;¹ finally, after a request by Theophrastos to Poliorketes, prominent oligarchs returned to the city in 292.² The leaders of the regime of 287 unreservedly called the previous regime oligarchic.³

It is difficult to explain Olympiodoros' stance between 294 and 287. Although he may have collaborated with Poliorketes or his officers during the Four-Year War, he does not appear to have belonged to the group of politicians who sought the royal favour, as well as to cash in on that favour. At the very least, he was not a target of anti-Macedonian propaganda because of his (probable) connection with Antigonid power. Moreover, his whole career, including his actions in 287 (see below) does not lend support to the assumption that he was particularly sympathetic to oligarchic regimes. The fact that, as we shall see, his involvement with the regime of 294 did not stop the Athenians from entrusting him with military leadership against the Macedonians (see again below), must mean that he was not deemed an opponent by Athenian extreme democrats. Should there be any point in making assumptions which are largely unsupported by evidence, we may assume that Olympiodoros thought that the troubled times that had led to the Macedonian occupation of 294 (including, let us not forget, civil strife and a tyrannid) demanded a watchful leadership and a gradual return to democratic forms, so as the risk of a new tyrannid to be minimized; but then again, this may just as well have been his official excuse for not resisting Poliorketes' advances.

Having discussed this incident, the only which did any damage to Olympiodoros' posthumous fame, we may now return to Pausanias and his confused account (1.26.1). According to that account, the μέγιστον ἔργον of Olympiodoros was the removal of the Macedonian garrison from the Mouseion hill. It is the –almost–⁴

secretaries even after the end of Olympiodoros' office; Osborne 2006: 70 n. 3, however, now dates this decree to 319/8.

¹ Osborne 1982: 154.

² Dion. Hal., *Din.* 3 and 9 (the source is Philochoros; cf. *FGrHist* 328 F 167); [Plut.], *Mor.* 850D.

³ See the decrees for Demochares ([Plut.], *Mor.* 851F) and Kallias of Sphettos (*SEG* 28 [1978] 60). On the regime of 294, see the detailed presentation of Habicht 1979: 22–33. Dreyer's attempt (1999: 114–48, 164–67, 195) to confute the oligarchic character of the regime and to include it in the “restrained regimes” of 322–229/8 (p. 150), seems pedantic. It should be noted that, although the public discourse after 287 considered the whole period of 294–287 oligarchic to the point that the “ancestral constitution” was considered abolished (see Plut., *Demetr.*, 46.2: Ἀθηναῖοι δ' ἀπέσκησαν αὐτοῦ [scil. in 287]... ἄρχοντας αἰρεῖσθαι πάλιν ὥσπερ ἦν πάτριον ψηφισάμενοι...), there apparently was a gradual abatement of Macedonian control, at least as far as outward appearances were concerned: for example, the eponymous archon was again selected by lot after 292 and the secretary of the council was reinstated in 291.

⁴ Gabbert 1996: 64–66 dates the takeover of the Mouseion hill to 283/2 and considers the event part of the Athenian reaction to the news of Poliorketes' death. Her assumption has the advantage that it paints a less inconsistent image of Olympiodoros. The old general belonged, according to Gabbert, to the more moderate faction of the revolt of 287 “and may have done what

unanimous view of modern scholarship that this incident belongs to the revolt of 287, when we know that military encounters took place on the hill.¹ This revolt has been much discussed.² A brief overview of the events, based on Habicht's and Osborne's analysis, with one important correction made by Dreyer is necessary both for this and for following entries (**A46-48**).

In the spring of 287, as soon as Poliorketes lost the support of the Macedonians after the combined offensives of Pyrrhos and Lysimachos, the Athenians revolted and attacked the Macedonian garrisons. Their first success was to expel the Macedonians from the *asty*.³ Phaidros son of Thymochares, general ἐπὶ τὰ ὄπλα, led the moderate faction of the revolt, which did not necessarily wish a full-scale confrontation with Macedonian forces but only a policy of neutrality, like the one adopted after Ipsos; this faction apparently proposed a truce with Poliorketes. During the summer of 287, the more radical and bellicose faction prevailed, and Phaidros disappears from the scene. Simultaneously, Kallias, Phaidros' brother, albeit a sympathizer of the radicals, and a commander of Ptolemaic forces at Andros, hastened to Athens with a force of 1,000 men; his contingent took part in military operations in the civic centre and helped gather the crops from the countryside. Soon after, Athenians enjoyed their second success: a force including old men and ephebes stormed into the fort of the Mouseion hill under the leadership of Olympiodoros, with the crucial help of the subcommander of the garrison Strombichos, whom bribery had convinced to switch loyalties. Poliorketes,

he could to hinder it, along with Phaidros" (*ibid.* 66). The only chronological indication we have on the takeover of the hill, however, seems to confirm a date in 287 (see the following note).

¹ SEG 28 (1978) 60, ll. 12-15.

² The main sources, apart from the famous Kallias decree (SEG 28 [1978] 60), are: Plut., *Demetr.* 46.2-4 and *Pyrrh.* 12.6-8; Paus. 1.26.1-3 and 1.29.13; *IG II²* 682 (*Syll³* 409; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 15), ll. 30-52; *IG II²* 666-667; cf. T. L. Shear 1978: 87-97, who conveniently gathers these sources as well as some which probably belong to slightly later developments. The bibliography prior to the publication of the Kallias decree is cited by T. L. Shear 1978: 14 n. 23 and Dreyer 1996: 46 n. 9; later thorough discussions are mainly offered by: T. L. Shear 1978; Habicht 1979: 45-67; Osborne 1979 and 1980; Heinen 1981: 189-94; Gauthier 1982: 226-27; Habicht [2006]: 143-45; Gabbert 1996: 63-66; Dreyer 1996 and 1998: 200-223. T. L. Shear had originally dated the revolt to the spring / summer of 286. Habicht, Osborne and Dreyer have persuasively dated it to spring / summer 287. The only problems with this dating are: 1) the total lack of decrees from 287/6, when one would expect that many honorific decrees for Athenians and foreigners who helped the revolt would date; 2) the fact that Demochares only returned in 286/5 (cf. Heinen 1981: 191). The only solution is to assume, together with Dreyer 1996: 64-67, that the greater part of 287/6 was spent on the negotiations between Ptolemy, Poliorketes and Pyrrhos, an assumption which also fits the traditional dating of Poliorketes' departure for Asia in early 286 (see the bibliography cited by T. L. Shear 1978: 86 n. 235).

³ SEG 28 (1978) 60, ll. 13-14; these Macedonians were obviously the soldiers who remained loyal to Spintharos, the phrourarch, attempted to suppress the revolt, failed, and then retreated to the Mouseion hill (T. L. Shear 1978: 16).

as expected, hastened to Athens and laid a siege to the city, with the help of the garrison of Mounychia. Multilateral negotiations ensued, resulting in separate peace treaties between Poliorketes and Pyrrhos, as well as between Poliorketes and Ptolemy. In the negotiations between Poliorketes and Ptolemy, there were interventions by Kallias and Sostratos, another Ptolemaic official, sent to Athens for that purpose, as well as by the philosopher Krates, who had some role in reaching an agreement on a crucial point, namely having Ptolemy promise that Poliorketes' passage to Asia would not be hindered.

As far as Olympiodoros is concerned, there are two points which need to be clarified. The first is the precise dating of his action. Pausanias (1.26.1-2) is of no help, as he does not mention the siege of Poliorketes. The sequence of events as recounted in the summary of the revolt given here is based principally on the Kallias decree, which informs us that the honouand arrived in Athens after the revolt had erupted, but before the takeover of the Mouseion and the siege by Poliorketes.¹ The natural conclusion is that Olympiodoros' feat belongs to the second, more radical phase of the revolt. This would also explain the irregular succession of generals attested both by the decree for Phaidros –who is said to have been elected ἐπὶ τὰ ὄπλα πρῶτος ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου στρατηγός,² meaning that someone else was later elected to the same office– and by Pausanias.³ Apparently, late in 288/7, Phaidros was elected general for the following year, but was dismissed shortly afterwards by the radical faction which took control of the situation, to be replaced by the popular Olympiodoros.

A second point to be clarified is Olympiodoros' second turnabout. The former democrat hero had become Poliorketes' imposed leader only to later pose once more as the military leader of the anti-Macedonian radicals. Habicht convincingly argues that the turning point for Olympiodoros was the return of the oligarchs in 292.⁴ This was a development which conflicted with his political convictions, dispelled any vague hopes the old general might still have had that Poliorketes would allow Athens any real autonomy and, most importantly, was detrimental to his personal political interests.

In conclusion, the political relationship of Olympiodoros with Poliorketes seems to have been a minor incident in a primarily military career. The Macedonian king used a popular general as a smokescreen for an obvious constitutional change and

¹ SEG 28 (1978) 60, ll. 12-15: γενομένης ἐπαναστάσεως ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἐπὶ τοὺς κατέχοντας τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως στρατιώτας ἐγβαλόντος, τοῦ δὲ φρουρίου τοῦ ἐν τῷ Μουσεῖῳ ἔτι κατεχομένου; l. 27: ἐπειδὴ παραγενόμενος Δημήτριος καὶ περιστρατοπεδεύσας ἐπολιόρκει τὸ ἄστυ...

² IG II² 682, ll. 44-45.

³ Paus. 1.26.1: αὐτίκα τε ὡς εἶχον (scil. the Athenians) αἰροῦνται στρατηγὸν Ὀλυμπιόδωρον.

⁴ Habicht 1979: 43; Habicht's alternative explanation, that the turning point for Olympiodoros was the installation of the garrison on the Mouseion hill, is untenable, since Olympiodoros became eponymous *after* that development.

the strict control he imposed on the city, while the general accepted the leadership of a regime which did not seem to please him, in troubled times for his country. He soon reverted to his natural role, that of the general leading the Athenians to battle against the Macedonians.

A45. *Theophrastos of Eresos

— Theophrastos and Poliorketes: Philochoros, *FGrHist* 328 F 167; Dion. Hal., *Din.* 3 and 9; [Plut.], *Mor.* 850D; other sources: *RE Suppl.* VII, s.v. Theophrastos n° 3

Aristotle's successor to the leadership of the Peripatos seems to have also inherited his predecessor's excellent relationship with the Macedonians. He was a teacher and a friend of Demetrios of Phaleron,¹ and, as his pupil, enjoyed very good relations with Kassandros,² but also Ptolemy I.³ The philosopher had enemies on the democratic faction already before Demetrios' ten-year rule; one of the leaders of the democratic regime of 318, Hagnonides, had submitted a γραφή ἀσεβείας against him.⁴ His connection with Demetrios of Phaleron⁵ did not benefit his image after 307. One of the first measures of the new regime (proposed by Sophokles son of Amphikleides but in reality instigated by Demochares) was that no one could assume the leadership of a philosophical school without previous approval by the state. Theophrastos apparently failed to obtain such an approval and self-exiled; a year later, the decision was overturned, Sophokles was fined for proposing an illegal decree (despite Demochares' defence) and Theophrastos returned to Athens, which he never left again.⁶

This very indirect involvement of Theophrastos with politics would as such be insufficient to include him in the present catalogue; besides, the philosopher seems to disappear from the political foreground after 306.⁷ He reappears, however, in 292, four to six years before his death, with a purely political intervention. At his

¹ Diog. Laert. 5.39, 75.

² Diog. Laert. 5.37 and *Suda*, s.v. Θεόφραστος; for the treatise *On kingship* that Theophrastos dedicated to Kassandros, see Diog. Laert. 5.47, Ath. 4.144e and the discussion of Landucci Gattinoni 2003: 115-16 n. 139 and 138-39 and n. 245.

³ Diog. Laert. 5.37; apparently Theophrastos was responsible for sending Straton, his future successor to the leadership of the Peripatos, as a tutor to the future Ptolemy II (Diog. Laert. 5.58). In contrast to Ptolemy, Kassandros had met with Theophrastos in person (*ibid.*: Κάσανδρος γοῦν αὐτὸν ἀπεδέχετο καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ἔπεμψεν πρὸς αὐτόν).

⁴ Diog. Laert. 5.37; cf. Mari 2003: 86.

⁵ Cf. Tracy 1995: 48.

⁶ Diog. Laert. 5.38; Ath. 11.508f; 13.610f; Pollux 9.42. In a well-known fragment of Alexis (*PCG* II fr. 99), the law-makers and Poliorketes are praised for sending the philosophers "to hell", ἐς κόρακας. For the whole affair, see Marasco 1984b: 42-46; Habicht 1994b: 236-37; Lehmann 1997: 22-23; Haake 2007: 16-43.

⁷ This disappearance, however, may be due to the lack of sources for the Peripatos during that period, which is reflected in the very brief biographical note of Diogenes (5.36-41).

request, Poliorketes permitted the repatriation of several oligarchs who had been banished in 307.¹

We do not know when the philosopher and Poliorketes came into contact. Their acquaintance was probably made in the context of the social contacts any Hellenistic king was expected to maintain; philosophers, especially philosophers residing in Athens, the centre of philosophy, were by default privileged interlocutors of the kings.² At this particular juncture, the intermediary between Theophrastos and Poliorketes may have been Adeimantos of Lampsakos, one of the leading officers of Poliorketes in Europe in 307-301.³ Whatever the origin of the relationship, however, what mattered was that Theophrastos' particular request coincided with the royal interests. The situation in 294 was completely different than in 307: Poliorketes had abandoned his former guise of the protector of democratic autonomy; he was now a king of Macedonia, striving by any means to break the resistance of the radicals against his rule and ensure an unhindered control over the city.

A46. Phaidros son of Thymochares of Sphettos

— *IG II² 682* (Syll³ 409; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 15)

Phaidros belonged to a rich family of oligarchic tendencies, to which two important generals of the second half of the fourth century also belonged.⁴ His own career is known exclusively from the long 'career decree' in his honour, voted at his request⁵ after 265/4, most probably in 259/8 or the beginning of 258/7.⁶

¹ Dion. Hal., *Din.* 3 and 9 (the source is Philochoros; see *FGrHist* 328 F 167); [Plut.], *Mor.* 850D.

² Cf. Habicht 1994b: 240-44.

³ So Knoepfler 2001: 228-29, based on the very probable identification of Adeimantos of Lampsakos with Adeimantos (no ethnic), father of Androsthene, who was the executioner of Theophrastos' will (Diog. Laert. 5.57).

⁴ On Phaidros (I) son of Kallias and the family's past, see mainly Davies 1971: 534-26; on Thymochares, father of Phaidros (II), see **A17**, above.

⁵ *IG II² 682*, ll. 93-95: τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα πράττειν περὶ τῆς δωρεᾶς ἧς εἴτηκεν Φαῖδρος...

⁶ See Henry 1988; Osborne 1989: 228 n. 90; Henry 1992; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: 38; Osborne 2000: 514-15, 519-20, with earlier bibliography. In the latter, Osborne argues convincingly in favour of placing Euboulos (II), during whose archonship Phaidros' last dated activity is placed (*IG II² 682*, ll. 56-60), in 265/4 (cf. also Osborne 2004: 207-208 and 2006: 73). We know that the decree for Phaidros was enacted either in a year preceding a Panathenaic year or in the first days of a Panathenaic year, therefore the decree should be dated either in 263/2 (or early 262/1) or in 259/8 (or early 258/7). Osborne leaves both possibilities open (514-15), although he believes that 259/8 is less likely, on account of "such overtly unfavourable references to Antigonos" (511), and tends to assume (519-20 n. 42) that the stele bearing the decree, "unexpectedly modest in nature", was "a product perhaps of the war conditions prior to the fall of the city to Antigonos". Nonetheless, the real criterion by which to date the decree should ensue from the interpretation of Phaidros' role in 287. If he did try for a compromise between the Athenians and Poliorketes (see in the text, below), it is highly unlikely that he was honoured during the Chremonidean War,

The first public office Phaidros held was the generalship ἐπὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν. He held this generalship twice in 296/5 (ll. 21-24), which probably means that he was elected or appointed general both during Lachares' rule and after the surrender of the city to Poliorketes. His acceptance by both sides may mean that he belonged to Lachares' leading circle but switched camps when he realized the desperate state of affairs for the tyrant. For obvious reasons, his actions during his term of office in that troubled period are described in extremely vague terms: "he exercised all his duties well and contentiously" (IG II² 682, ll. 23-24: πάντων ὤμ προσήκεν ἐπεμελήθη καλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμως).¹

Phaidros enters into more detail when describing his second generalship, as general ἐπὶ τὰ ὄπλα in 288/7 and 287/6. The revolt (on which see **A44**, above) is described with the discreet temporal clause "in difficult times for the city" (περιστάντων τῇ πόλει καιρῶν δυσκόλων); Phaidros fought for "the common salvation" (ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς σωτηρίας), preserved the peace in the countryside, took the right decisions and oversaw the safe gathering of the crops into the city (ll. 30-36). This is obviously the first stage of the revolt, during the spring of 287. His stance in the even more troubled period of the summer of 287 is not so clear, because of four successive *rasurae* in ll. 37-38, 40-41, 42-44 and 47-52; the parts preserved inform us that Phaidros "left the city free and autonomous under the people's rule and the laws in force to the archons of the following year" (ll. 38-40: τὴν πόλιν ἐλευθέραν καὶ δημοκρατουμένην αὐτόνομον παρέδωκεν καὶ τοὺς νόμους κυρίου τοῖς μεθ' ἑαυτὸν), was then reelected ἐπὶ τὰ ὄπλα πρῶτος ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου στρατηγός, and acted according to the laws and the will of the state (ll. 44-47).

There is no doubt that the Macedonians and Poliorketes were referred to in the *rasurae*. Habicht and Osborne have convincingly refuted T. L. Shear's reconstruction of events, according to which the pro-Macedonian Phaidros tried to suppress a first unsuccessful revolt in 287 and was overturned by the revolt which Shear dated to 286. The actions of Phaidros in 288/7 are clearly related to the first stage of the revolt and Phaidros was on the side of the revolt, like his brother Kallias. Dreyer, however, convincingly pointed out two problems in Habicht's and Osborne's reconstruction of events. The fact that Phaidros was elected "first general" of 287/6 must mean that Phaidros was removed from power during that

and the decree should be thus dated to 259/8 (or early 258/7). Ameling (Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: p. 38) dates the decree in early 258/7, when the archonship of Thymochares, Phaidros' son, used to be dated; Thymochares, however, has not been left unaffected by the unending changes in the dating of Athenian archons, and his archonship is now dated to 257/6 (Osborne 2000: 515) –until further notice, that is.

¹ Dreyer 1999: 32-33 does not take into account the reasons for the vagueness of this description and uses the double generalship of Phaidros as evidence for his complicated reconstruction of Lachares' rule.

year and that someone else was elected in his stead,¹ not that he was “the first general” elected after the restoration of democracy, as Habicht and Osborne had assumed.² This is a clear indication that, at some point during that year, a faction opposed to Phaidros took control. Moreover, it is remarkable that in the 103 preserved lines of the decree for Phaidros no mention of Kallias is made, and that in the 109 lines of the decree for Kallias no mention of Phaidros is made.³ Given that both decrees were issued at the honourands’ request, and thus drew on an approved *curriculum vitae*, this silence becomes even more eloquent. If the two brothers were involved in the same revolt, sharing the same goals, the absence of any reference to the other of the two from the approved records of their career would be inexplicable.⁴ Finally, had Phaidros’ stance in the events of 287 been consistently anti-Macedonian, why is it that so extensive *rasurae* were made in his decree? Why would the fervently anti-Macedonian Athenians of ca. 200 object to the efforts of a statesman to remove Macedonian garrisons from the city?⁵

We must, therefore, accept Dreyer’s reconstruction of events: Phaidros initially led the revolt, but then, towards the end of 288/7, tried to curb the enthusiasm of the more radical elements of the revolted, proposed a peace treaty with Poliorketes,⁶ and was reelected general for the next year; but then the tide of events turned against him: the more radical side of the revolt took control, Kallias

¹ See the convincing remarks of T. L. Shear 1978: 66-67 and n. 194.

² Habicht 1979: 57; Osborne 1979: 188.

³ The fact that the decree for Phaidros was probably voted after the Chremonidean War does not explain the lack of reference to Kallias: judging from his way of describing his actions during Lachares’ rule, Phaidros was perfectly capable of confining himself to an allusive narration of events of which he did not wish to give a full account. Moreover, the decree for Kallias was enacted in 270/69, a few years before the outbreak of the Chremonidean War, in a period during which the open opposition to the Macedonians had become the official Athenian policy, as the decree itself reveals. If Phaidros was consistently anti-Macedonian, Kallias would have no justification not to refer to his brother’s role in the revolt of 287.

⁴ This is also pointed out by Gauthier 1982: 225-26, who agrees with Habicht’s reconstruction, according to which the two brothers worked together; Gauthier is accordingly forced to assume private reasons for the mutual lack of reference to the siblings, namely that Phaidros was responsible for the confiscation of Kallias’ property (SEG 28 [1978] 60, ll. 80-81). The text, however, clearly states that, whatever happened to Kallias’ property, happened “during the oligarchy” (l. 81: συνέβη ἐν τεῖ ὀλιγαρχίαι), which means that the reasons for the loss of Kallias’ fortune were political (cf. p. 146 n. 1, below).

⁵ This had been pointed out by T. L. Shear 1978: 11.

⁶ The suggested restoration συμβουλευσας τῶι δήμῳι συντελέσαι [[εἰρήνην πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα Δημήτριον, *vel sim.*] in the *rasura* of ll. 37-38 is the likeliest. Ameling (Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: 36) restores [[τὴν εἰρήνην τὴν πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα Δημήτριον]], which is closer to the number of missing letters, but far less likely, since it would imply that the peace treaty was actually concluded. Dreyer’s restoration [[εἰρήνην πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα Δημήτριον μίονον]] is equally unsatisfactory.

carried on his brother's work for the safe gathering of the crops in the countryside,¹ Olympiodoros was elected general in Phaidros' stead, the hill of the Mouseion was conquered by the Athenians, and Poliorketes reached Attica and laid a siege to the city. The peace treaty that Phaidros had proposed was later concluded, although not between Athens and Poliorketes, but between Poliorketes and Pyrrhos on the one hand and Poliorketes and Ptolemy (see the following entry) on the other.

Phaidros' other offices –mentioned in the decree before his involvement in the revolt of 287– are less securely dated. He was “many times” (πλεονάκις) general over the countryside and three times over mercenary soldiers (ll. 24-28); he also undertook an embassy to Ptolemy I which resulted in a royal donation of wheat and cash for the city (ll. 28-30). If all his offices are recorded in chronological order, this embassy should be dated between 296/5 and 288/7.² But during this period official relations between Athens and Poliorketes remained excellent, notwithstanding the growing popular discontent for the king; an embassy to Ptolemy aiming for help and protection seems unlikely. Accordingly, most scholars³ identify this embassy with the embassy to Ptolemy which Demochares proposed in 286/5.⁴ But this identification is equally problematic; it seems unlikely that Phaidros enjoyed the support of the leadership of 286/5, only a year after his dubious support for the revolt.⁵ It is, therefore, more probable that Phaidros' embassy was slightly later than 286/5 –in any case, earlier than Soter's death in 282.⁶ Close contacts between Athens and Alexandria are attested for this period.⁷ Zenon, a Ptolemaic officer, was honoured during the summer of 286 for his help in the safe import of wheat;⁸ then or slightly later, Zenon's brother

¹ For the necessity of the assumption that Kallias' actions in the countryside were not parallel but subsequent to those of Phaidros, see Dreyer 1996: 60.

² Osborne 1979: 188 (with caution), Henry 1992: 30 and Kralli 2000: 158 date the embassy just prior to the revolt.

³ For example, Ferguson 1911: 147; Beloch 1923: 276; Davies 1971: 526-27; Habicht 1979: 24 n. 23 and 60 n. 62; Marasco 1984b: 72 n. 39; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: 39. Habicht 1992: 69-70 (=1994: 142-43) avoids assumptions, while Dreyer 1999: 231 n. 163 considers it possible that the embassy dates before 294.

⁴ [Plut.], *Mor.* 850E. The safe import of wheat for which Zenon, a Ptolemaic official, was honoured (*IG II² 650*) is irrelevant to Demochares' embassy; see **A50**, below.

⁵ His *agonothesia* in 282/1 may show that Phaidros' status had not eclipsed, but 286/5 is probably too soon, and an *agonothesia* cannot be compared with an important diplomatic mission.

⁶ The fact that Phaidros' embassy is to Ptolemy I while Kallias' embassy in 282 (*SEG 28 [1978] 60*, ll. 43-55) came immediately after the rise of Ptolemy II to the throne, confutes Osborne's (1981: 156 n. 678) and Marasco's (1984b: 72 n. 39) circumspect suggestion that the two embassies are one and the same.

⁷ Cf. **A40** (III), above.

⁸ *IG II² 650*; cf. **A50**, below.

Philokles was naturalized;¹ most importantly, the Kallias decree informs us that there were more than one Athenian embassies to Alexandria, before Soter's death.²

Phaidros must have met two familiar faces in Alexandria; one was, of course, his brother Kallias, who had returned to Alexandria. Despite their political differences, the success of Phaidros' embassy was the desired outcome for both brothers; Athens could now afford to use both sides of the anti-Macedonian faction to achieve its goals. The other familiar face was Demetrios of Phaleron, with whom Phaidros' father had collaborated, and who may still have had the power to influence the court in Athens' favour.³

His *agonothesia* in 282/1 and overseeing of his son's *agonothesia* in 265/4 (?) (ll. 53–60) need not concern us here; they merely attest to his wealth, to his resurfacing in the public sphere and his wish to promote his son's political career.⁴

If Habicht's and Osborne's analysis of Phaidros' role in the events of 287 is correct, then we have a clear, unproblematic image of his career: he was an unwavering anti-Macedonian, leader of the revolt against Poliorketes, and ambassador to Ptolemy, where he also met his brother and collaborator. If, however, the sketch of his career drawn here is correct, then we have a very interesting example of a statesman who constantly tried to walk a tightrope: offspring of an oligarhic

¹ Agora 16.173 (Osborne 1981: D77; Kotsidu 2000: n° 48); cf. the statue in his honour (IG II² 3425).

² SEG 28 (1978) 60, ll. 39–43. If the embassy is dated after 288/7, one must explain the order of Phaidros' offices as given in the decree. The order goes as follows: generalship ἐπὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν (296/5), generalships over the countryside and over the mercenaries, embassy to Ptolemy, generalship ἐπὶ τὰ ὄπλα (288/7 and 287/6), *agonothesia* (282/1), overseeing his son's *agonothesia* (265/4), liturgies and *epidoseis*. It is clear that no strict chronological order was followed, as the general mention of liturgies and *epidoseis* shows. But why would the embassy be mentioned in the wrong place, inbetween the generalships? Perhaps Phaidros, who was the actual editor of the text, considered his generalships of 288/7 and 287/6 the apex of his career and placed them, accordingly, in the end of his –strictly speaking– political career (the *agonothesia*, the liturgies and the *epidoseis* follow as a distinct chapter), which is why he devoted thirteen lines to them (ll. 30–52). In other words, the order in which Phaidros' public offices and activities are presented in the decree is as follows: A) political offices: 1) various generalships; 2) embassy to Ptolemy; 3) the important generalships of 288/7 and 287/6; B) other activities: 4) *agonothesia*; 5) liturgies and *epidoseis*. If the decree was enacted in 259/8 (see p. 140 n. 6, above) and if the above analysis of Phaidros' role in the events of 287 is correct, the reason for laying such an emphasis on his generalships of 288/7 and 287/6 is obvious. In the age of Antigonos Gonatas' strict control over the city, Phaidros considered it prudent to emphasize his conciliatory political position, in “difficult times for the city” (l. 33).

³ On Demetrios in Alexandria, and on Thymochares, Phaidros' father, see above, A4 (V) and A17, respectively.

⁴ It is interesting that Thymochares became an eponymous archon only two years after the voting of the honours for his father. Should we consider this coincidental or take it as indication that, just like in the biennial archonship of Olympiodoros, after the Chremonidean War eponymous archons were designated rather than chosen by lot (cf. Osborne 2000: 511)?

family (his father's superior, Demetrios of Phaleron, would have preferred the term aristocratic), Phaidros collaborated with Lachares' regime, but also with the regime which followed the tyrant's overthrow; he led the revolt against Poliorketes, but then proposed a compromise; he suffered a political defeat, but soon resurfaced; he may have been branded as a pro-Antigonid politician by his political enemies, but led an embassy to Ptolemy; he held a public office during the Chremonidean War, but he was still on the front scene during the overlordship of Gonatas, assuring the vote of honours for himself and his son's political future and proudly declaring his efforts for a compromise between Athens and the king. This image is so inconsistent that, *prima facie*, appears implausible. I am very far from certain, however, that we should iron out the inconsistencies which are an intrinsic part of Hellenistic political *mos*.

A47. Kallias son of Thymochares of Sphettos

— SEG 28 (1978) 60 (Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 16); IG XI 4, 527

Before the discovery of the decree in his honour, Kallias was only known from an uninformative proxeny decree from Delos.¹ The long 'career' decree in his honour, published in 1978 by T. L. Shear,² is now our main source of information on Kallias. The decree was proposed by Eucharos son of Euarchos (**A54**, below), during the sixth prytany of 270/69.

¹ IG XI 4, 527. Although the demotic of Kallias is not attested in the Delian decree, Davies 1971: 527 had already suggested that Kallias was the brother of Phaidros. Marek 1984: 443-44 n. 490 identifies Kallias with another person by the same name, honoured with proxeny by Iasos (*I. Iasos* 46). This is a plausible suggestion and would furthermore fit Kallias' attested activity in Karia (see below); the name is very common, however, and the Karian decree, now lost, is of unknown date. T. L. Shear's assumption (1978: 45) that the unknown honourand with Ptolemaic affiliations of a decree of Halikarnassos (Frost 1971) is in fact Kallias, is equally uncertain. Apart from Kallias, Phaidros, their father Thymochares, and Phaidros' son Thymochares, we may identify several other probable members of the same family: 1) IG XI 2, 164 B, ll. 1-2 records for 277 the dedication of a silver cup to the shrine of Apollo on Delos by one Thymochares son of Kallias, who should probably be identified with our Kallias' son (Habicht 1979: 46 n. 5; Marek 1984: 253). 2) Thymochares of Sphettos, who appears to have contributed money to the famous *epidosis* under Diomedon, that is (Osborne 2000: 515; cf. Oliver 2002: 7; Habicht 2003: 55; Tracy 2003b: 59-60; Kralli 2003: 65; Osborne 2003: 69-70, 74; Oliver 2007: 200-204) in 248/7 (*Agora* 16.213 [IG II² 791; SEG 32 (1982) 118]) and is reported among the *hippeis* (*AM* 85 [1970] 216 n^{os} 232-233) must also be a member of the same family (cf. Habicht 1979: 47 and 1982: 33); he could be the son of either Phaidros or Kallias. 3) The same applies to the homonymous dedicant of the Asklepieion (Aleshire 1989: cat. V 73 [IG II² 1534 B, frs. a-k, l. 165]). In conclusion, this family was very active during the first half of the third century. Another interesting name is Thymochares son of Demochares from Leukonoion, *sofronistes* of the Leontis in 324/3 (Reinmuth 1971: n° 15, l. 4), obviously an uncle of the well-known Demochares (Davies 1971: 142 and pl. III). Could this be evidence of intermarriage between the two great political families from Leukonoion and Sphettos?

² T. L. Shear 1978; SEG 28 (1978) 60; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 16.

Kallias began and ended his career in the service of the Ptolemies. We do not know when he left Athens. The end of the motivation clause of the decree informs us that he remained loyal to the democracy and had no involvement in politics during the oligarchic regimes, to the point that he “preferred” to lose his fortune rather than act contrary to the democracy and the laws. The precise meaning of this is not clear, but it is certain that Kallias was not in Athens from 294 to 287.¹

Whatever the date and the reason for his self-exile, a point needs to be made. Kallias had –and exploited– both the assets and the opportunities which would guarantee his affiliation with the Ptolemaic administrative machine; in other words, he had an attractive resumé for the Ptolemies: he was an Athenian citizen, offspring of a rich and important family, while his father was an experienced general who had served under Demetrios of Phaleron, a prominent courtier of Ptolemy I.

When the revolt against Poliorketes broke out in the spring of 287,² Kallias was commanding the Ptolemaic forces in Andros (SEG 28 [1978] 60, ll. 19-20). With a picked force of 1,000 men he immediately set out to help his home city. It is not clear whether this was the result of a specific order by the king or of Kallias’ own interpretation of the king’s undoubted interest in creating difficulties for Poliorketes.³ Despite being favourable to the more radical faction of the revolt, in contrast to his brother Phaidros, he continued his brother’s work, assuring the safe gathering of the crops from the Attic countryside (ll. 23-27), and, when the siege by Poliorketes began, he took part in military operations, during which he was wounded (ll. 27-32).

¹ SEG 28 (1978) 60, ll. 78-83: Κ[.¹⁶⁻¹⁷.]Ν τεῖ πατρίδι Καλλίας οὐδεπόποθ’ ὑπομείνας [. . .]Ε[. . . κ]αταλελυμένου τοῦ δήμου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν ἐαυτοῦ | προέμενος δόσιν δοθῆναι ἐν τεῖ ὀλιγαρχίαι ὥστε μ[ηδὲν ὕ]πεναντίον πράξει μήτε τοῖς νόμοις μήτε τεῖ δημοκ[ρατί]αι τεῖ ἐξ ἀπάντων Ἀθηναίων. Cf. T. L. Shear 1978: 49; Habicht 1979: 31; Gauthier 1982: 221-26. Habicht assumes that his fortune was confiscated after 294, perhaps to accommodate for the needs of the oligarchs who returned in 292. Gauthier correctly points out that the assumption of a confiscation is not supported by the text and assumes that the loss of his fortune was the result of normal legal procedure, perhaps due to a private dispute between him and his brother Phaidros. In my opinion, however, the reference to the oligarchy makes it clear that, whatever the precise meaning of δόσιν δοθῆναι here, the reasons for the loss of his fortune were political. Dreyer 1999: 105-109 makes the implausible assumption that the oligarchy in question was the regime of Poliorketes and that Kallias willingly contributed money to the efforts of Lachares to overthrow it. If the δημοκρατία ἢ ἐξ ἀπάντων Ἀθηναίων is meant to be the opposite of the censitary regimes of Phokion and Lachares, as Lehmann 1997: 17-18 sensibly assumes, Kallias’ self-exile could be placed already in 322-307.

² For the sequence of events, see **A44** and **A46**, above.

³ The decree, *prima facie*, favours the latter alternative (ll. 22-23: ἀκόλουθα πράττων τεῖ τοῦ βασιλέως Πτολεμαίου πρὸς τὸν δῆμον εὐνοίαι); even if Kallias did follow a direct order, however, this would not be explicitly stated in the decree, whose aim was to exalt Kallias’ own actions. Habicht [2006]: 112 takes it for granted that Kallias was following orders.

In what followed and until Poliorketes' departure for Asia, Kallias' role was diplomatic. Although the siege of Athens did not involve the multilateral negotiations and the summit that Shear's theory assumed,¹ it is certain that it brought about the intervention of at least two kings. One was Pyrrhos, who had been summoned by the Athenians as soon as the siege had begun, but probably arrived after Poliorketes' departure from Athens.² The other was Ptolemy. Apart from Kallias, another high-ranking Ptolemaic officer reached the besieged city (autumn 287?):³ the well-known Sostratos son of Dexiphanes of Knidos.⁴ This is when Kallias momentarily cast off the cloak of the Ptolemaic official and acted as an Athenian citizen: when Sostratos asked the Athenians to send an embassy to him "with which he will agree all things relevant to the peace treaty with Demetrios, which will be signed on behalf of the city" (μεθ' ἧς συνθήσει τὰ περὶ τὴν εἰρήνην ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως πρὸς Δημήτριον), Kallias obeyed the wish of the generals and the council and led the embassy (ll. 34-39). The discreet wording cannot conceal the crucial fact that the two sides signing the treaty were Ptolemy and Poliorketes.⁵ The role of the Athenians was secondary, to say the least: Sostratos merely consulted them (he actually consulted an acting Ptolemaic official who just happened to be an Athenian citizen), but in the end the final details were settled and agreed upon by himself and Poliorketes.⁶

¹ T. L. Shear 1978: 74-78.

² Plut., *Demetr.* 46.1-4 and *Pyrrh.* 12.6-8. For the date of Pyrrhos' arrival and his separate peace treaty with Poliorketes, see Habicht 1979: 63; Hammond 1988: 233; Dreyer 1996: 64 and 1999: 220-21.

³ Dreyer 1996: 64, 67 and 1999: 219.

⁴ SEG 28 (1978) 60, ll. 32-39. For other sources on Sostratos, see *ProsPtol VI* 16555; for relevant secondary literature, see Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: 44 and Sonnabend 1996: 237-43. The latter's assumption that it is to these negotiations in 287 that an interlocution between Sostratos and an unspecified Antigonos (Sext. Emp., *Gram.* 1.276) belongs is attractive but uncertain.

⁵ Habicht 1979: 62 n. 65 and 1995: 103; Buraselis 1982: 97-98; Dreyer 1996: 64-67 and 1999: 219-22.

⁶ The translation offered by T. L. Shear 1978: 5 ("... with which he could conclude terms of peace with Demetrios on behalf of the city"), Burstein 1985: 75 ("... with which he would arrange terms of peace on behalf of the city with Demetrios") and Ameling (Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: 42: "... mit der er im Interesse der Stadt die Friedensbedingungen mit Demetrios vereinbaren wollte") are not completely accurate. Συντίθημι cannot here mean "to formally agree upon, to conclude a treaty" – a meaning which is only attested for the passive form of the verb (see the index of SVA III), but rather "to discuss", "to devise". These "discussions" were hardly binding for Sostratos. Had Athens been one of the signatory parties, the phrase ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως would have been meaningless and the object of συνθήσει would be τὴν εἰρήνην and not τὰ περὶ τὴν εἰρήνην. In that sense, Sonnabend 1996: 239-40, who claims that Kallias took part "an den Gesprächen mit Demetrios", is equally inaccurate, although I fully agree with the rest of his analysis, where he points out that Sostratos' aim was to convince the Athenians on the inevitability of the continued presence of Poliorketes' forces in the forts of Attica and the Piraeus.

Kallias remained in Athens until the negotiations with Poliorketes were concluded (ll. 39-40), probably in the spring of 286.¹ Poliorketes, with his rear in mainland Greece (Pyrrhos) and the Aegean (Ptolemy) theoretically covered, set out once more for the source of Antigonid power, Asia. The crisis for Athens was over, and Kallias could now return to his duties in the Ptolemaic administration; he was now summoned to Alexandria, where he is reported to have assisted all Athenian embassies until the death of Soter in early 282 (ll. 39-43), including the embassy which was proposed by Demochares in 286/5,² and the (slightly later?) embassy which was led by his brother Phaidros, as we saw in the preceding entry.³

Upon Soter's death, Kallias returned to Athens (ll. 44-45), where he resided for at least four years.⁴ During that period Kallias resumed the role of the main diplomatic representative of Athens at the Ptolemaic court, only this time not as a courtier who rendered services to emissaries from his home city, but as an ambassador and *theoros* himself. Upon Philadelphos' rise to the throne Kallias hastened to meet the new king in Cyprus, at the request of the Athenian generals; he secured 20,000 medimni of wheat and fifty talents for Athens (ll. 45-55). When the first Ptolemaieia (celebrated in 280 or 279/8)⁵ were announced, Kallias led the Athenian delegation, refusing to accept the fifty mnae the people had decided to give to the delegates (ll. 55-64); apparently, Kallias' career in the Ptolemaic administration had more than compensated for the loss of his personal fortune decades

¹ Dreyer 1996: 64 and 1999: 219.

² [Plut.], *Mor.* 850E.

³ *IG II²* 682, ll. 28-30.

⁴ Contrary to scholars who argue that Kallias never really settled in Athens (Gauthier 1982: 222-26; Marek 1984: 253; Gabbert 1996: 65 n. 9), I believe that the participle ἐπιδημῶν (l. 45) should leave no doubt that he did (cf. T. L. Shear 1978: 100; Habicht 1979: 61). Jones 2003 has recently claimed that ἐπιδημῶν and παρεπιδημῶν do not necessarily imply permanent residence; this may be so, but the fact that Kallias undertook *theoriai* as an Athenian, that is, travelled from Athens to Alexandria, seems to imply that he was a resident of Athens at the time, be it only temporarily. The reasons for Kallias' temporary distancing from the Ptolemaic court are unclear. He certainly did not fall out of favour with the new king; if that was the case, he would not have hastened to lead an embassy to him. The first succession in the Ptolemaic kingdom was a turbulent affair, during which another Athenian courtier, Demetrios of Phaleron was, as already said, imprisoned (Diog. Laert. 5.78); perhaps Kallias thought it would be wiser to distance himself from the court until things became clearer in Alexandria.

⁵ Based on a misunderstanding of the Kallias decree, Hazzard 2000: 53 (cf. 47-52, with earlier bibliography) dates the first Ptolemaieia in 282; the decree, however, does not presuppose that the announcement of the festival came immediately after Kallias' embassy of 282 (καί, in the phrase καὶ ὡς ὁ βασιλεὺς πρῶτον ἐπόει τὰ Πτολεμαῖα [l. 55] merely introduces the next item in the catalogue of Kallias' benefactions as it does repeatedly throughout the text; it does not establish a connection with the embassy, mentioned immediately before). For further criticism of Hazzard's drastically new dating scheme (first Ptolemaieia in 282, first isolympic Ptolemaieia in 262), see Chaniotis *ad SEG* 53 (2003) 907.

earlier. Kallias also secured a donation by Philadelphos for the *peplos*¹ of the Panathenaia of 278(?);² Philadelphos thus followed the example Lysimachos had set twenty years earlier.³

When the decree in his honour was enacted (270/69), Kallias was again in the service of the Ptolemies, serving as a military commander at Halikarnassos, while also continuing to serve as an intermediate between ambassadors and *theoroi* of Athens and the court, as well as to take good care of Athenians serving under his command in the Ptolemaic army (ll. 70-78).⁴

In more than one ways, Kallias represents the *Idealtyp* of the intermediary: when at court, he constantly strove to serve his country's interests as well; when in Athens, he and his countrymen hastened to exploit his connections with the court. The alternation of his two roles, that of the patriot courtier and that of the citizen with contacts at court, is so frequent, that one has to be very careful not to confuse them. Moreover, the pivotal mediative position of Kallias, whichever role he assumed, was also a powerful lever for the enhancement of his political capital in both arenas of power. His position in the Ptolemaic administration made him indispensable to the leadership of his city, wishing to maintain the closest ties possible with the Ptolemies. His Athenian origins and connections, on the other hand, made him instrumental for the implementation of Ptolemaic policy in Athens.

¹ For the meaning of the ὄπλα of the donation, see T. L. Shear 1978: 39-44.

² The dating of these Panathenaia depends on the restoration and meaning of ll. 64-66. T. L. Shear restored [τ]οῦ δήμ[ο]υ τότε [πρῶτο]ν τὰ Παναθήναια τεῖ Ἀρχηγέτι[δι] μέλλοντος πο[εῖν] ἄ[φ'] οἵ τ[ι] ἄστ[υ] ἐκεκόμιστο and thought that this passage was proof of his reconstruction of the events; since, in his view, the revolt broke out in 286, the first Panathenaia were those of 282; these were not celebrated, due to financial difficulties, hence the "first Panathenaia" of the decree were those of 278. Habicht agreed with Shear's restoration and, initially, agreed with the dating of the "first Panathenaia" to 278 (1979: 77 n. 1); later he dated them to 282 (1992: 70 n. 10; 1995: 133), supposing that the festival was cancelled in 286 and then held in 282, when Kallias' brother Phaidros was *agonothetes* (cf. J. L. Shear 2001: 586-95). Osborne 1980: 279 and Dreyer 1996: 50-56 and 1999: 204-211 restored [τρίτο]ν instead of [πρῶτο]ν, and assumed, accordingly, that the Panathenaia in question were those of 278. This restoration certainly does not seem normal (*pace* Dreyer 1999: 211 n. 66; see Gauthier, *BullEpigr* 1997, 207 and Stroud *ad SEG* 49 [1999] 113), but has the important advantage that it does not presuppose that Athens lost a rare opportunity to promote its self-image by cancelling (once, according to Habicht, or twice, according to Shear) the festival which represented this image *par excellence*. A possible attestation of the Panathenaia of 286 (*IG II²* 3079; see Appendix 2, below) would confirm Osborne's restoration: if the festival was not cancelled in 286, the Panathenaia of the Kallias decree, dated to 282 or afterwards, cannot be the "first" after the revolt.

³ *IG II²* 657, ll. 11-16; see above, **A40** [1].

⁴ For Philadelphos as the "good employer" *par excellence* of that period and the importance of his successful officers as poles of attraction for their countrymen to enlist into the Ptolemaic army, cf. Buraselis 1993: 258-59.

His actions in 287 served the interests of the king, notwithstanding the undisputed honesty of his personal motivation. Subsequent royal donations to Athens were a tool of Ptolemaic propaganda; the very presence of Kallias in Athens served as an advertisement of royal generosity. Kallias had the advantage of being able to exploit his, literally, central position to the benefit of Athens, the Ptolemies, and himself.

A48. *Krates (son of Askondas of Thebes?)

— Plut., *Demetr.* 46.3-4; for the rest of the sources, see Giannantoni II 705-57

The philosopher Krates took part in the diplomatic negotiations of 287/6 between Poliorketes and Sostratos (for the details, see the preceding entry). According to Plutarch's account (Plut., *Demetr.* 46.3-4), Poliorketes, enraged at the revolted Athenians, placed the city under siege. The people decided to send as emissary the philosopher, "a wise man of great repute" (ἄνδρὸς ἐνδόξου καὶ συνετοῦ);¹ Krates, pleading in favour of the Athenians and pointing out Poliorketes' own interests, managed to convince him to raise the siege and head for Asia, in order to conquer Lysimachos' territories in Karia and Lydia.

As we saw, the Kallias decree reveals that things were far more complicated. Negotiations took place primarily between Ptolemy (through Sostratos) and Poliorketes; the latter decided to lift the siege and turn to Asia only when he secured that he could campaign to Asia unhindered by Ptolemy's fleet. Accordingly, Krates' role must have been secondary. Perhaps the Athenians, not an official party of the negotiations, thought it would be wise to enhance their chances of survival by playing a 'good card' in Hellenistic diplomacy, a philosopher.²

But which philosopher? The question is rarely raised. As far as I have been able to confirm, it is invariably accepted, with very few exceptions (often stemming from a misinterpretation of the sources or the secondary literature),³ and usually without discussion, that the Krates in question is Krates son of Antigenes of Thria, student of Polemon and later (276/5) head of the Academy.⁴ When the need for evidence is felt, it is always pointed out, from Willamowitz⁵ onwards,⁶

¹ The manuscripts have ἐνδόξου καὶ δυνατοῦ, which is decidedly awkward, hence usually emended to ἐνδόξου καὶ συνετοῦ.

² On the diplomatic role of philosophers in the Hellenistic period, see mainly Sonnabend 1996: *passim*; cf. Korhonen 1997: 40-54.

³ Clerc 1893: 182-83 and Whitehead 1981: 241 take the identification of Krates proposed here as incontestable, which it is not. In his edition of the Plutarchean *Life of Demetrios* (*Vita Demetri Poliorketes*, 1957 [*non vidi*]; see Flacelière / Chambry 1977: note on Plut., *Demetr.* 46.3), Eugenio Manni suggested that the Krates in question is the epigrammatist and philosopher Krates of Mallos in Kilikia, which is certainly mistaken.

⁴ On the Krates of the Academy, see mainly Diog. Laert. 4.21-23 and Dorandi 1994.

⁵ Wilamowitz 1881: 208 with n. 33.

⁶ To cite a few: Ferguson 1911: 149; Beloch 1925: 233 n. 2; T. L. Shear 1978: 77 n. 212; F. W. Walbank 1988: 231; Goulet-Cazé 1994: 497; Sonnabend 1996: 315; Korhonen 1997: 45-47.

that Krates of the Academy wrote speeches which were delivered in assemblies and embassies.¹ Even if this could be adduced as evidence for this identification, one major problem remains: Polemon and Krates “were not friends of the people” (ἦστην οὐ φιλοδημώδεε).² If φιλοδημώδης should be understood in its literal meaning of “friend of the people” it is difficult to imagine a philosopher of such convictions intervening in favour of the most radical Athenian attempt for an independent and autonomous democracy. If it should be taken to mean simply “detached” or “snobby”, as Diogenes’ context seems to imply –Polemon and Krates are compared to the flute player Dionysodoros who boasted that no one listened to his melodies–, it is again difficult to envisage Krates, a man of the ‘ivory tower’, to suddenly enter public life in order to assume a delicate diplomatic mission, involving negotiations with a king who besieged his homeland. Apart from the vague and far from dependable reference to speeches related to embassies and written by Krates the Academic, nothing connects this Krates with Poliorketes,³ with any other king, or, for that matter, with any political, diplomatic or even public activity.

Another philosopher Krates is known only by the mention of his name by Diogenes Laertios (4.23), and is therefore impossible to identify with “Krates the philosopher” of the Plutarchean passage. There is, however, another candidate, who could very well be identified as Krates *the* philosopher: the Theban Cynic philosopher Krates son of Askondas. This Krates was most probably still alive in 287,⁴ after the destruction of his home city by Alexander resided mostly in Athens,⁵ where he was very popular,⁶ was considered the embodiment of philanthropy, offered his counsel to anyone, and mediated to solve any kind of dispute (fr. 18 G = 27-29 S). In other words, he was definitely the kind of man that Plutarch’s source

¹ Diog. Laert. 4.23.

² Diog. Laert. 4.22. This is also pointed out by T. L. Shear 1978: 77 n. 212, who does not consider it a real problem, and Sonnabend 1996: 314, who believes that the philosopher, secluded in the Academy, was convinced to overcome his isolation by the dire circumstances of his homeland.

³ Sonnabend’s assumption (1996: 314-15) that Krates the Academic must have known Poliorketes, as he was sent to him by the Athenians, is a circular argument.

⁴ Diog. Laert. 6.87 dates his *akme* to the 113rd Olympiad, which gives a birth date of ca. 368-365, while he also informs us (6.98) that Krates died at a very old age. All scholars date his death in the 280’s (see, for example, Dudley 1937: 43 [after 290]; Giannantoni III 504; Knoepfler 1991: 173 n. 10 [ca. 280]; Goulet-Gazé 1994: 496; T. Dorandi in: Algra *et al.* 1999: 800 [288-285]).

⁵ Plutarch’s anecdote (*Mor.* 69C-D = Krates, fr. 34 G = 53 S; in what follows, numbering of the fragments is given according to G[iannantoni] and S[kouteropoulos]) on the unexpectedly mild attitude of Krates towards Demetrios of Phaleron in Thebes, presupposes Krates’ presence in Thebes, at least for a short while. All other fragments, however, make it clear that Krates mostly resided in Athens.

⁶ Apuleius goes as far as saying that Krates was worshipped by the Athenians as *lar familiaris*, owing to his habit of entering houses uninvited, offering his counsel and teachings (*Apul., Flor.* 22 = Krates, fr. 18 G = 30 S).

could call “a wise man of great repute”.¹ Contrary to the later stereotype of unsociable or even misanthropic Cynic philosophers, Krates entertained very good relations not only with the general public, but also with a plethora of known personalities of his time. To limit myself to persons who had a direct or indirect connection with Macedonia and its court, he had met Alexander, who treated him with respect (fr. 31 G = 49-50 S),² Demetrios of Phaleron (despite their irreconcilable differences their relationship was characterized by mutual respect: frs. 33-34 G = 52-53 S), Menedemos, with the political choices of whom he had disagreed (Menedemos, fr. 11 G = Krates, frs. 54-55, 92 S), Zenon, of whom he was a teacher (frs. 37-39 G = 57-63 S), and Stilpon of Megara (fr. 38 G = 91 S), a philosopher who enjoyed Poliorketes’ favour (Diog. Laert. 2.115). To conclude, Krates the Cynic, contrary to Krates the Academic, could easily have been in contact with Poliorketes or his entourage,³ and was a philosopher very popular in Athens, with a proven prowess in achieving reconciliation: an ideal choice for an ambassador to Poliorketes at a difficult moment. That he was not an Athenian presents us with no problems: the other seven Hellenistic philosophers Athens used as intermediaries and official ambassadors were all foreigners.⁴

If the Krates who was sent to Poliorketes was the Cynic philosopher, another assumption is made possible. Immediately prior to the siege of Athens in 287, Poliorketes “restored to the Thebans their constitution”.⁵ As Knoepfler recently argued, it was only then that Thebes entered the Boiotian *koinon*.⁶ This was a reasonable move for Poliorketes, who was in desperate need for allies after the combined attack of Pyrrhos and Lysimachos. Nevertheless, one could tentatively suggest that Krates may have played a part, intervening not only in favour of his city of residence, but also in favour of his city of origin.

¹ The *Quellenforschung* on the Plutarchean *Life of Demetrios* is not entirely satisfactory; see, for example, Sweet 1951; Flacelière / Chambry 1977: 10-13; Marasco 1981b. Plutarch was well informed about the Cynic philosopher, and repeatedly mentions him throughout his work (*Mor.* 69C; 87A; 125F; 141E; 466E; 499D; 546A; 632E; 830C; 831E).

² A Krates who is mentioned by Philip II as a relative and friend of Harpalos (Plut., *Mor.* 179A = Krates, fr. 34 G = 51 S) is definitely not the Cynic philosopher (Tatakis 1998: 350 n° 97 correctly supposes he was of Macedonian origin).

³ Thrasyllus, an otherwise unknown Cynic philosopher, was an acquaintance of Antigonos Monophthalmos (Plut., *Mor.* 182E [cf. 531E-F]).

⁴ See Habicht [2006]: 126.

⁵ Plut., *Demetr.* 46.1: Θηβαίους ἀπέδωκεν τὴν πολιτείαν.

⁶ Knoepfler 2001b.

A49. Demochares son of Laches of Leukonoion

— PAA 321970; *FGrHist* 75

Demosthenes' nephew Demochares was deemed in antiquity “a man of valour at war and worse than no one in political oratory”.¹ He authored an important historiographical work and was one of the undoubted leaders of democratic Athens between 307 and 303, and from 286 to his death shortly before 271; nevertheless, information on his life and works is limited.

He was already politically active in 322, when he publicly opposed Antipatros' demand that the anti-Macedonian leaders be delivered to him,² and had already evoked the animosity of oligarchs like Archedikos and Demetrios of Phaleron.³ Demochares reappears on the political foreground after the ‘restoration’ of the democracy in 307, when he appears to have been one of the undoubted leaders of the regime along with Stratokles.⁴ He was responsible for the reconstruction of the walls of the Piraeus and the provision of arms in 307/6,⁵ the mastermind behind Sophokles' decree which resulted in the exile of Theophrastos and other philosophers,⁶ the proposer of a decree in the summer of 305, on the basis of which money gained from Chionides' mission to Lemnos and Imbros were used

¹ Demochares, *FGrHist* 75 T 1 ([Plut.], *Mor.* 847C): ἀνὴρ καὶ κατὰ πόλεμον ἀγαθὸς καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πολιτικούς λόγους οὐδενὸς χείρων.

² Demochares, *FGrHist* 75 T 1 ([Plut.], *Mor.* 847D). Two problematic pieces of evidence may be associated with this episode. Sen. (Y), *De ira* 3.23 records an Athenian embassy to a king Philip, father of a king Alexander, during which “Demochares the Audacious” (*Demochares (...) Parrhesiastes*) more or less told the king to go hang himself. Polybios also mentions Demochares' audacity, perhaps drawing on Demetrios of Phaleron, but the target of his *parrhesia* in Polybios is Antipatros (Polyb. 12.13.8 [*FGrHist* 75 F 4]). Seneca's anecdote has been occasionally associated both with the anecdote recorded by Polybios and with the –real– embassy of Demochares to an Antipatros ([Plut.], *Mor.* 851E; on this embassy, see below), and it has thus been assumed that the whole episode refers to Philip IV, son of Kassandros, and his brother Antipatros, to whom Demochares was supposed to have led an embassy (see Kirchner, *PA* 3716). This assumption, as we shall later see, is not supported by chronology. The audacity of Demochares in front of Antipatros needs have been nothing else than his boldness to publicly oppose Antipatros' demand in 322. Perhaps Seneca's source confused this with the Athenian embassy to Polyperchon and Philip III in the spring of 318 (Diod. Sic. 18.66.2-3; Plut., *Phoc.* 33.8-12; Nepos, *Phoc.* 3.3-4; see **A3** [III], above) –an embassy for which a number of amusing incidents were reported or invented– and then Seneca himself confused Philip III with Philip II (for a different assumption, see Marasco 1984b: 66). In any case, rejecting the historicity of Seneca's anecdote does not entail deeming Plutarch's testimony of some political action on the part of Demochares in 322 unreliable (so Jacoby, *FGrHist* IIC Komm. 114; Davies 1971: 142 and Marasco 1984b: 25-27), as Plutarch was very well informed on Demochares.

³ Polyb. 12.13 (Demochares, *FGrHist* 75 T 2; F 4).

⁴ Cf. Tracy 2000.

⁵ *IG* II² 463 (Meier 1959: n° 11) + *Agora* 16.109; *IG* II² 468; [Plut.], *Mor.* 851D-E; for the date, see Woodhead 1997: 173, with earlier bibliography.

⁶ Diog. Laert. 5.38; Ath. 11.508f; 13.610f; Poll. 9.42; cf. Alexis, *PCG* II fr. 99 and **A45**, above.

for military purposes,¹ and responsible for the alliance with the Boiotians, probably in 305/4.² Nevertheless, Demochares, who chose to lead the Athenian democrats who were displeased with Poliorketes, was banished by Stratokles in 303.³

As his son Laches explicitly records in the posthumous decree in his honour, Demochares returned to Athens only under Diokles, in 286/5, that is, not only after the Athenian revolt of 287 but also after Poliorketes' departure for Asia. There is no direct evidence as to his whereabouts during his seventeen-year exile. Ferguson's assumption⁴ that, like Philippides son of Philokles, Demochares had headed for Lysimachos' court has been generally accepted, either with a few or many reservations,⁵ and, as we shall see, remains plausible even if unprovable.

His first concern after his return was the tidying up of Athens' public finances, as the decree proudly records, distinctly reminding us of the rhetoric of Lykourgos' admirers ([Plut.], *Mor.* 851E). He then focused on diplomacy: he led two embassies to Lysimachos, which resulted in donations of a total of 130 talents and proposed an embassy to Ptolemy, which resulted in a donation of fifty talents, and to a certain Antipatros (to the question of the identity of whose we shall return), which brought the city twenty talents ([Plut.], *Mor.* 851E). This intense diplomatic effort was soon to prove fruitful: by 284 at the latest Demochares won over for Athens the important fort of Eleusis ([Plut.], *Mor.* 851F).⁶

¹ IG II² 1492B (*Syll*³ 334), ll. 124-137; see **A20** (II), above.

² [Plut.], *Mor.* 851E; on the historical context, cf. Gullath 1982: 177-79.

³ Plut., *Demetr.*, 24.11; on the date, see Smith 1962; Marasco 1984b: 52-59 and above, **A19** (III).

⁴ Ferguson 1911: 137-38 n. 6. It must be said that although his assumption remains plausible, his argumentation is untenable. Contrary to his assertion, the Athenians had no reason to be discreet about Demochares' assumed relationship with Lysimachos in 271/0, so as not to displease Gonatas (cf. Tarn's pertinent remark [1913: 42-43 n. 10], that the decree's condemnation of "those who destroyed the constitution" [[Plut.] *Mor.* 851E] targets not only Stratokles but Poliorketes as well). Moreover, his argument that Demochares' embassy to an Antipatros bears evidence to his connection with Lysimachos is also untenable (see in the text, below).

⁵ For example, Tarn 1913: 42-43 n. 10; Habicht 1970: 214-15; T. L. Shear 1978: 80; Osborne 1982: 156-57; Marasco 1984b: 63; Franco 1990: 123 and 1993: 200; Lund 1993: 101, 181; Quaß 1993: 101; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: 27; Kralli 2000: 154.

⁶ Although this episode appears as the only event which could justify Plutarch's claim that Demochares was "a man of valour at war" (Demochares, *FGrHist* 75 T 1 [[Plut.], *Mor.* 847C]), the takeover of Eleusis may very well have been achieved through bribery; in any case, the royal donations were a decisive factor. 284/3, the year in which the new festival to celebrate the event was instituted and which Philippides financed (IG II² 657, ll. 43-45; see above **A40** [III]) is the *terminus ante quem* for the takeover. Kevin Clinton (2003: 80-81) unnecessarily doubts that Eleusis was won over by the Athenians in 284 (see Paschidis 2006b: 307 n. 4); Oliver's similar argument (2007: 125-26) that the new festival may have been celebrated at the city Eleusinion and that, therefore, it need not signify that Eleusis was won over by the Athenians does not take into account that Demochares was praised precisely for winning over Eleusis.

All four embassies in which Demochares was involved merit careful examination. Supposing that his activities are described in chronological order in the decree in his honour, then all embassies fall within 286/5-285/4, that is, before the takeover of Eleusis. This is certain for the embassies to Lysimachos, which must be identified with the more than one embassy to Lysimachos which are mentioned in the decree in honour of Artemidoros of Perinthos, Lysimachos' courtier, who helped in their favourable outcome.¹ The decree for Artemidoros was enacted in 286/5, Pryt. IX (spring 285), by which time Demochares must have already returned from the second embassy.²

Demochares' embassies to Lysimachos form the main argument of those who suppose that it was to his court that he had fled after 303. This is not a necessary assumption, however. Immediately after the revolt, Athens hastened to come into contact with practically every king and ruler in the Balkans and beyond, in order to avert future threat from the adventurous Poliorketes.³ Lysimachos was then Poliorketes' strongest rival and it is natural that one of the leaders of Athens would turn to him. Besides, Demochares did not carry out the negotiations with Lysimachos by himself: Artemidoros certainly intervened on Athens' behalf and was sent by the king to Athens more than once;⁴ Bithys of Lysimacheia, honoured by Athens in the same period, most probably also played a part;⁵ the comedy-writer Philippides son of Philokles, the intermediary *par excellence* between Lysimachos and Athens, was also explicitly honoured for his intervention during these embassies.⁶ In other words, prior contacts of Demochares with Lysimachos (*per se* perfectly plausible) are not a necessary inference from his involvement in the embassies; this involvement need prove nothing more than the vital importance which the alliance with Lysimachos had for the new regime.⁷

The same is true for the embassy to Ptolemy. Just as powerfull as Lysimachos, Ptolemy had offered Athens decisive help during the revolt and would continue to

¹ *Agora* 16.172.

² Cf. Osborne 1982: 157.

³ See **A40** (III), above.

⁴ It is usually assumed that Artemidoros' embassies predate the Athenian embassies to Lysimachos, because they are recorded first in the decree in his honour (see, for example, Osborne 1982: 157; Landucci Gattinoni 1992: 229; Lund 1993: 85, 102; Franco 1990: 123-25 remains sceptical); but they could just as well be an answer to the Athenian embassies. As to the aims of the embassies, Osborne labels them "of an essentially exploratory nature", while Lund assumes that they also involved the coordination of the attempts to reconquer the Piraeus.

⁵ Osborne 1981: D87 (*IG II²* 808); on Bithys, see p. 122 n. 6, above.

⁶ *IG II²* 657, ll. 31-36; cf. **A40** [III], above.

⁷ Pausanias pertinently remarks (1.9.4) that the Athenians erected a statue for Lysimachos not so much because of the favour which the king displayed towards Athens, but mainly because the Athenians thought him extremely useful at that juncture.

do so militarily, diplomatically and financially.¹ No evidence contests the assumption that this embassy also belongs to 286-284, the period of maximum diplomatic activity on the part of the new regime.

The embassy to Antipatros is more problematic, as even the identity of the Antipatros in question is uncertain. Antipatros son of Kassandros, temporarily king of the Macedonians is to be ruled out, since he had already been murdered by his father-in-law Lysimachos, to whose court he had fled in 287.² In all probability, therefore, the embassy was to Antipatros Etesias, the nephew of Kassandros and later king of Macedonia for a period of a few weeks (ca. May-June 279).³ A second problem is the date of the embassy. Possible dates are: 1) 286/5-285/4, to which period all other diplomatic activities of Demochares also date; 2) 285/4-279; 3) during the few weeks of Etesias' reign in 279; 4) the period after Etesias' dethronement, which he spent in the court of Ptolemy II.⁴ The last choice is obviously to be ruled out, since a dethroned fugitive king could be of no use to Athens.⁵ The third choice, which seems self-evident to most scholars,⁶ is implausible. Plutarch does not use the royal title for any of the rulers connected with the embassies of Demochares. More importantly, Etesias ruled for an extremely short period of time, in a very turbulent period of Macedonian history; it hardly seems possible that the Athenians would have expected to receive help from a king who had not yet consolidated his position –and eventually failed to do so. A date in the years 285/4-279 seems plausible, but it is mainly historical circumstances which point to a date in the years 286/5-285/4.⁷ The decade 287-277 is notorious for the

¹ IG II² 650 and 682; SEG 28 (1978) 60; *Agora* 16.173 (Osborne 1981: D77); cf. **A40** [III], **A46-A47**, above, and **A50**, below.

² Just. 16.2.4; Porph., *FGrHist* 260 F 3.5; cf. T. L. Shear 1978: 82 n. 225, with earlier bibliography.

³ On the identification of the Antipatros to whom Demochares turned to with Antipatros Etesias, see Beloch 1927: 451-52; T. L. Shear 1978: 82 n. 225; Gauthier 1979: 370; Marasco 1984b: 72-73; F. W. Walbank 1988: 254 n. 1; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 8; Kralli 2000: 154 n. 51.

⁴ See *PCairZen* 1.59019, l. 6.

⁵ Beloch 1927: 452 (who assumes that the embassy took place in 279 or slightly later) and Kralli 2000: 154 n. 51 (who finds more probably a date after 279) are the only scholars not rejecting this option.

⁶ Habicht 1979: 82; Bringmann (Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 8); Dreyer 1999: 235, 241, 271, accept it without argumentation. Dreyer, in fact, bases a complicated assumption, which connects the embassy with the takeover of Eleusis and the –unattested– takeover of the Piraeus in ca. 280 (cf. *ibid.* 235-37).

⁷ T. L. Shear 1978: 82 n. 225 also places the embassy in 286/5, but for the wrong reasons: he accepts Tarn's assumption (1913: 37; 1934: 36; also accepted by Heinen 1972: 58) that Antipatros Etesias, after the dethronement and/or murder of Philip IV, Antipatros II and Alexander V (297-294), had sought refuge at Lysimachos' court, where Demochares met him while visiting Lysimachos. But Tarn's assumption is untenable. Why would Antipatros Etesias seek refuge at the court of the man who had murdered his cousin, Antipatros II, only a year earlier? Lysimachos obviously aimed for the Macedonian throne and Etesias was an obstacle, not a possible ally.

lack of stability in Macedonian politics. In the spring of 285 Pyrrhos, king of Macedonia since 287, had already lost control of the area, to the benefit of Lysimachos who was most probably then declared king of the Macedonians.¹ After that, it would be extremely inelegant on the part of the Athenians –whose close relations with Lysimachos we just saw– to seek help from a possible usurper of the Macedonian throne. The most probable date for the embassy to Antipatros is therefore 286/5, before the rise of Lysimachos to the Macedonian throne. Demochares, who led this embassy personally, most probably met Antipatros *en route* to Lysimachos, the two embassies to whom predate April 285. As to the motive behind this visit, I believe that the answer is once again provided by the uncertainty of power in Macedonia: Antipatros, a nephew of Kassandros, must have seemed to the Athenians a possible contender for the Macedonian throne or, at least, a *Machthaber* worthy of consideration in the rulerless Macedonia of 286/5. In any case, this embassy confirms the thorough knowledge of the intricate details of international politics that politicians of Hellenistic cities, from Demades onwards, could exhibit.

There is another mention of Demochares' relationship to a king. According to the biography of Zenon, "Demochares... claimed that he [*scil.* Zenon] only had to speak and write about anything he needed to Antigonos [*scil.* Gonatas], who would grant him any request; Zenon, upon hearing this, never sought Demochares' company again".² Ferguson and Tarn had assumed that this means that Demochares tried to use the well-known friendship between Zenon and Antigonos Gonatas in order to achieve his personal ambitions.³ Marasco and Erskine argued that Demochares' goal was to exact a favourable decision from Gonatas, perhaps related to the occupation of the Piraeus.⁴ No such assumption is *a priori* impossible. It would not be the first attestation of a politician of the period trying to gain the sympathy of his former enemies in order to achieve personal goals or serve his city's interests. Moreover, the removal of the Macedonian garrison from the Piraeus was the primary goal of Athenian politics after the revolt of 287, and it was of such

Marasco 1984b: 74 also dates the embassy to 286-284, because it is mentioned prior to the takeover of Eleusis; in other words, he takes it for granted that Demochares' achievements are cited in chronological order.

¹ Hammond 1988: 233-36; Landucci Gattinoni 1992: 197-209.

² Diog. Laert. 7.14 = SVF I 4: Δημοχάρους δὲ τοῦ Λάχητος ἀπαζομένου αὐτὸν (*scil.* Zenon) καὶ φάσκοντος λέγειν καὶ γράφειν ὧν ἂν χρεῖαν ἔχη πρὸς Ἀντίγονον, ὡς ἐκείνου πάντα παρέξοντος, ἀκούσας οὐκέτ' αὐτῷ συνδιέτριψε.

³ Ferguson 1911: 172; Tarn 1913: 94 n. 11.

⁴ Marasco 1984b: 78-80; Erskine 1990: 87-89. Erskine also assumes that Zenon tried to intervene and that this is why he sent his pupil Persaios to the Macedonian court; but this runs contrary to the attested violent dismissal of such an intervention by Zenon. Sonnabend 1996: 259-61 doubts this theory and convincingly argues (253-64) against the idea that Zenon's friendship with members of various royal courts had any concrete political result.

importance to the Athenians that it could justify even their coming to a compromise with the chief enemy of the city, the Macedonian king. Nevertheless, a different interpretation of the passage, which would exonerate Demochares from the suspicion of an *entente* with Gonatas, is possible. Diogenes does not state that Demochares *asked* Zenon to intervene; he merely states that Demochares *claimed* –this is the normal interpretation of φημι here–¹ that Zenon could ask anything of Gonatas; in other words, that Demochares actually asked Zenon to intervene is an inference of modern scholarship.² In fact, the passage need imply nothing more than that a meeting between the two men took place, during which Demochares (ironically?) mentioned the friendship between the philosopher and the king and its possible results. If this is correct, Demochares did not actually ask for mediation, but, quite the contrary, judged Zenon’s relationship with Gonatas negatively; in that case, Zenon’s annoyance should not be taken to mean that he had refused to intervene upon Demochares’ request; the philosopher was simply indignant at the innuendo that he depended on royal generosity.

If the above analysis of Demochares’ embassies is correct, then all his public offices and diplomatic endeavours belong to 286/5. The only public intervention which assuredly postdates 286/5, is the decree which Demochares proposed in honour of his long-deceased uncle Demosthenes in 280/79.³ This was a gesture of self-evident symbolic importance, but it nonetheless does not suffice to prove that he continued to play a leading role in Athenian politics after the mid-280’s. Even if the episode with Zenon is assumed to imply an effort on the part of Demochares to come to terms with Gonatas, it should still be most likely dated in that decade, the period of maximum Athenian zeal against the presence of the Macedonian garrison at the Piraeus.⁴ His mediating activity during this decade –as we saw, no connection of his with any court is certain prior to that period– was of no great importance as such. Four embassies, all within the same year, are not enough to include Demochares in the statesmen who drew most of their power from their role as intermediaries. On the other hand, Demochares, having built his whole political profile on his intractable opposition towards Macedonian kings –the only statesman of his times who never envisaged any other constitution other than a full democracy and whose words and deeds were always meant to protect that democracy, according to the decree in his honour–,⁵ started off his second period

¹ For the rarity of φημι in the sense “to tell someone to do something”, cf. Rigsby 2003: 62.

² In his translation for the Loeb Classical Library, R. D. Hicks seems to understand this, when he comments: “Zeno must have foreseen that this compliment *would be followed* by a request...” (my emphasis).

³ [Plut.], *Mor.* 850F-851C.

⁴ The fact that there is no activity of Demochares securely dated in the 270’s allows the assumption that his death occurred long before 271/0, the year of the posthumous decree in his honour.

⁵ [Plut.], *Mor.* 851F.

of political preeminence with four embassies to powerful or prospective rulers and, perhaps, ended it by attempting to contact the king who posed as his city's chief enemy. This is a reminder that, whatever a politician's political affiliation and no matter how high the degree of his personal integrity, a close and personal connection with the royal courts was a *sine qua non* for any aspiring statesman of the period.

A50. Epicharmos son of Kallistratides of Kolonos

—IG II² 650 (Syll³ 367; T. L. Shear 1978: 92-93, T9; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 14); other sources: IG II² 685; *Agora* 15.91

Epicharmos proposed honours for Zenon, a known Ptolemaic officer¹ in the summer of 286/5.² Zenon, commander of a squadron of transport vessels of the Ptolemaic fleet,³ was honoured for his –ongoing, if one judges by the present tense used in the decree– help in the safe import of wheat into Athens, a significant contribution to the city's salvation, according to the decree. His efforts were part of the close collaboration between Athens and the Ptolemies from the revolt of 287 onwards.⁴

Epicharmos is also known from a number of later sources. He proposed honours for the *taxiarchoi* of 276/5, and was a treasurer of the council, probably soon after 263/2.⁵ Even if this last source may belong to the period after the Chremonidean War, this insignificant position of Epicharmos should not lead to assumptions about his political involvement in the age of Gonatas' rule.

A51. [Memnon son of Memnon ?] of Aphidnai

—[. . . .¹². . . .]τος Ἀφιδναῖος; *Agora* 16.172 (Osborne 1981: D74 [IG II² 662-663] + SEG 38 [1988] 71).

This is the proposer of the naturalization decree for Artemidoros son of Apollodoros of Perinthos, an officer of Lysimachos, in the end of the ninth prytany of 286/5.⁶ As we saw earlier (A49, above), Artemidoros had played a key role in the

¹ *ProsPtol* VI 15043; he is also known from a roughly contemporary honorific decree of Ios (IG XII 5, 1004; see D56, below), where he is said to be a subordinate of the nesiarch Bakchon.

² IG II² 650 (Syll³ 367; T. L. Shear 1978: 92-93, T9; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 14).

³ For the ἄφρακτοι as light transport vessels, normally not engaged in military operations, see Heinen 1981: 190.

⁴ See Habicht 1992: 69-71 and A46, A47, A49, above. Davies 1971: 526-27 connects Zenon's mission with the embassy of Phaidros, which he identifies with the embassy proposed by Demochares (A49, above). But Zenon's activity clearly predates the embassy proposed by Demochares; Davies tries to circumvent this difficulty by assuming that the present tense of Zenon's decree implies that a benefaction was expected from Zenon in the immediate future, rather than that he had already helped Athens in the recent past; *contra* Ameling in: Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: 34.

⁵ IG II² 685 and *Agora* 15.91, respectively; on the date of the latter inscription, see Tracy 2003: 152; *contra* Byrne 2004: 315.

⁶ *Agora* 16.172.

negotiations between Athens and Lysimachos in 286/5, not only at the king's court, where he advocated Athenian interests, but also in Athens, where he was sent twice, before or after the corresponding embassies of Demochares.

The traces of the proposer's patronym and his demotic do not allow certain restorations. [ἸΜέμων Μέδον]τος Ἀφιδναῖος, however, is a plausible, as well as attractive suggestion. Memnon is known from two decrees he proposed in 305/4 and 302/1.¹ If the restoration proposed here is accepted, Memnon, like Demochares, was another politician of 307-301 who resurfaced under the democratic post-287 regime.² In any case, the mastermind behind the honours for Artemidoros must have been Demochares, who must have testified in the assembly for Artemidoros' positive role in the negotiations with Lysimachos.

A52. Nikeratos son of Phileas of Kephale

— *IG II² 657* (Syll³ 374; T. L. Shear 1978: 94-95, T11; Bielman 1994: 74-80 n° 20; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 6; *PCG VII* 333-35, T3)

Nikeratos proposed the honorific decree for Philippides son of Philokles (**A40**), in the autumn of 283. He is otherwise unknown and we should pay little attention to the fact that he proposed the decree, since, as all 'career decrees', the text most probably follows closely the text of the official request of the honourand. The main reason why Philippides 'chose' Nikeratos as the proposer of the decree was perhaps that Nikeratos was a fellow demesman of his. There is, therefore, no point in assuming any connection of Nikeratos with the court of Lysimachos, although such a connection is perfectly plausible.

A53. Komeas son of Chaireas of Lamprai

— *IG II² 672* (cf. *Hesperia* 7 [1938] 307-308 n° 32, two joining fragments attesting Komeas' patronym [for the join, see Bugh 1988: 209 and Tracy 2003: 88] and *SEG* 38 [1988] 74, a copy of the same decree)

The Athenian cleruchy of Lemnos had a chequered history in the Hellenistic period. In late 314 the Athenians, with the blessings of Kassandros, attempted to

¹ *IG II² 500* and *Agora* 16.123. The suggestion that Memnon or a relative of his was the proposer of our decree belongs to Byrne 2004: 320-21. I had independently made the same suggestion in my thesis (submitted in 2003). The necessary vacant space before the proposer's name is hardly a problem; in fact it finds its exact parallel in the decree for Artemidoros: in l. 6, there is a vacant space before the honourand's name. This arrangement reminds one of the inscribing habits of the previous democratic period (307-301), when the names of the proposers are often thus emphasized (Tracy 2000); this is also, for example, the case with one of the decrees which Memnon proposed (*Agora* 16.123). According to Woodhead 1997: 196, Spoudias son of Memnon of Aphidnai, president of the council in 226/5 (*Agora* 16.224 [*SEG* 25 (1971) 106; *ISE* 28]), probably belongs to the same family.

² For descendants of rich families of the last quarter of the fourth century making a public appearance after 287, see Habicht [2006]: 444 n. 69.

reconquer the island, which had recently entered Antigonos' sphere of influence; the campaign ended in disaster.¹ They only succeeded in regaining the island through diplomacy: in 305 (?), Antigonos restored the island to Athens.²

Sometime after Antigonos' defeat and death at Ipsos, Lemnos entered Lysimachos' realm; after the latter's defeat and death at Kouroupedion in 281, Seleukos I acquired the island and, just before his death in the summer of the same year, restored once more Herakleia and Myrina to the grateful Athenians,³ who subsequently erected a statue in his honour.⁴

IG II² 672 preserves three decrees related to Lemnos. The first (ll. 1-17) is a decree of the Athenian *demos* probably dated to late spring 278, only three years after the restoration of the island to Athens. This decree honours Komeas, appointed by Athens as hipparch of Lemnos, for successfully fulfilling his duties. Appended is a related decree (ll. 17-39) of the *demos* of Hephaisteia – which may be distinguished from the cleruchy;⁵ this decree honours Komeas for acting as an arbitrator between the two demes of the island and for his good administration. The third decree is the one which is of interest to our discussion (ll. 39-46) and it is unfortunate that it is so badly preserved. The only certainty is that Komeas led an embassy of the Athenian people (l. 42), apparently to Seleukos I, who is mentioned in l. 39.

The king's death in the summer / autumn of 281 is the *terminus ante quem* for the embassy. Since relations between Athens and Seleukos were probably inexistent before the Lemnos affair,⁶ the embassy most probably belongs to 281, immediately after the battle of Kouroupedion,⁷ hence it most probable resulted in the restoration of the island to Athenian hands.

Komeas is otherwise unknown. The fact that he led the embassy which resulted in the restoration of Lemnos and then served as the hipparch of the island, that is, as governor of the cleruchy,⁸ affords the assumption that he already had interests on the island; there is no evidence suggesting that these interests had also brought him into contact with the Seleukid realm before his embassy to Seleukos.

¹ Diod. Sic. 19.68.2-4; cf. **A18**, above and Appendix 1, below.

² *I. di Cos* ED 71[abce] I A (Osborne 1981: D51, without ll. 20-31); *IG II² 1492* [Syll³ 334] B, ll. 124-134; *ISE 8* (*SEG 3* [1927] 117); for dating this event in 305 and not in 307, see above, **A19** (II).

³ Phylarchos, *FGrHist* 81 F 29 (Ath. 6.254f-255a). For the possible reasons behind this restoration, cf. Lund 1992: 203-204.

⁴ Paus. 1.16.1; for divine honours to Seleukos by the cleruchs, see Habicht 1970: 89-90.

⁵ Salomon 1997.

⁶ Habicht 1989: 7-8.

⁷ Salomon 1997: 132, with earlier bibliography.

⁸ Salomon 1997: 129-39.

A54. Euchares son of Euarchos of Konthyle

— *IG II² 487*; *SEG 28 (1978) 60* (Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 16)

There are only two decrees providing information on Euchares' political career, which are separated by a thirty-three year interval. In late 304/3 or early 303/2, Euchares, secretary of the council of 304/3, was honoured for assuring the inscription and exposition of laws.¹ As argued above (**A19 [III]**), the rhetoric of the decree should probably be considered as bearing further testimony to the intense reaction on the part of Athenian democrats against Poliorketes and Stratokles in the first half of 303.

Euchares reappears in late 270, proposing honours for Kallias of Sphettos.² The timing of the honours for an Athenian citizen / Ptolemaic official, whose activities always revolved around the relation of his home city with the Ptolemaic court, is certainly not accidental. Only a few years later the Chremonidean War would break out; the emphasis on good relations between Athens and Alexandria, steadily good since 287,³ is easy to understand in view of the coming clash with Macedonia.

Once again, the phrasing of the decree was probably due to Kallias himself and his official request which would have set the whole procedure off, rather than to Euchares. Nonetheless, Euchares may have had some involvement, since Kallias was not at Athens at the time.⁴

A55-56. Glaukon and Chremonides sons of Eteokles of Aithale

— Glaukon: Paus. 6.16.9; Teles, *Περὶ φυγῆς* 23 (Hense); *IG II² 3079 (Syll³ 365)*; *IG XII 1, 25*; *IvO 178 and 296 (Syll³ 462; SEG 32 [1982] 415)*; *FD III 2, 72*; Étienne / Piérart 1975; *SEG 25 (1971) 186 and 443 (ISE 53)*; *PCairZen 2.59173 (Ijsewijn 1961: 70-71 n° 31)*

— Chremonides: Diog. Laert. 7.17; Polyainos 5.18; Teles, *Περὶ φυγῆς* 23 (Hense); *SVA III 476 (IG II² 686-687)*; *SEG 25 (1971) 207 (ISE 21)*

The second of the three couples of brothers who played an important role in third-century Athens (cf. **A46-47**, above and **A71-72**, below) was active before, during, as well as after the Chremonidean War, Athens' second attempt to attain real independence from the Macedonians. Glaukon and Chremonides sons of Eteokles were offspring of a rich family known already from the last quarter of the fourth

¹ *IG II² 487*.

² *SEG 28 (1978) 60* (Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 16); see **A47**, above.

³ Cf. Habicht [2006]: 147.

⁴ For the honourands' role in 'career decrees', see Gauthier 1985: 83-88; for the partial exception formed by the case of Kallias, *ibid.* 86-87; Kallias was not honoured with *sitesis* at the *prytaneion*, probably because he did not reside in Athens (on the *sitesis*, see Gow 1963: 89-90; Osborne 1981b and 1982: 215; O'Sullivan 1997: 114-16). Despite Kralli's (2000) arguments to the contrary, the fact that honours for Kallias came so long after 287 is a strong argument in favour of the theory of Gauthier and Osborne that a Lykourgan law prescribed a minimum age (perhaps of sixty) for the *megistai timai*.

century, exclusively for its members' religious offices.¹ The two brothers (or at least Glaukon) obviously shared the family's bent for religion, which in part also shaped their later political and ideological agenda: their public rhetoric stems from the glorious past of the city in all its connotations.² They also appear to have had philosophical inclinations: Chremonides is said to have been a student of the founder of the Stoa, Zenon.³ A lot of ink has been spent, in my view in vain, for or against the view that their ideology was influenced by Stoic philosophy.⁴

Glaukon was the second-born.⁵ Probably already in the 280's he served as a phylarch, twice as *agonothetes* and twice as general of the infantry,⁶ in other words he was a distinguished figure of the post-287 regime. He served once more as general of the infantry, in 266/5,⁷ at the beginning of the Chremonidean War. In the meantime, he had developed a rich diplomatic activity. He was honoured as *proxenos* and benefactor in Delphi in the 270's, and as *proxenos* in Rhodes, probably in the same period, and in Orchomenos in Arkadia, after an embassy just before the outbreak of the Chremonidean War.⁸ Glaukon combined political activity in Athens and diplomatic activity throughout Greece with making dedications to Panhellenic sanctuaries and taking part in Panhellenic festivals.⁹

¹ Their grand-father Chremonides was a *mystes* of the Eleusinia (*IG II² 1933*, l. 11); their father Eteokles was *agonothetes* in the early third century (*IG II² 3458*; on Eteokles cf. also *IG II² 3845*); their sister Pheidostrate was a priestess of Aglauros (*IG II² 3459*).

² Cf. Pouilloux 1975: 380-82.

³ Diog. Laert. 7.17 (Zenon, *SVF I 286*).

⁴ See mainly Sartori 1963, arguing against, and Erskine 1990: 90-95, tentatively in favour of Stoic influence being detectable in the ideological formation of the two brothers; see also the careful reservations put forward by Heinen 1972: 124 regarding the importance of the relation of Chremonides with Zenon: as an offspring of a respected family, Chremonides is expected to have been a pupil of a known philosopher. Apart from that, any attempt to discern concrete Stoic influence in the *Weltanschauung* of the two brothers is, I believe, futile; their view of the world seems to have drawn principally on the traditional Athenian ideological and religious set of values (patriotism, piety, opposition to the 'uncivilized'). Even the significance with which the notion of *homonoiā* was invested, a novel element due to Stoicism, according to Erskine, may very well stem from an earlier period (Thériault 1996b, with earlier bibliography).

⁵ Pouilloux 1975: 377-78 argues convincingly against contrary earlier opinions.

⁶ *IG II² 3079* (*Syll³ 365*); see also Appendix 2, below.

⁷ *SEG 25* (1971) 186, with Habicht 2003b. Heinen 1972: 126 mistakenly writes that he was general ἐπὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν, misled by the office recorded in the following line; offices, however, precede names in this inscription.

⁸ Delphi: *FD III 2*, 72; on the date of the archon Erasippos, see the table in *SEG 45* (1995) 463. Interestingly, this is the first text inscribed on the main building of the Athenian Treasury in Delphi. Rhodes: *IG XII 1*, 25; for the date, see Étienne / Piérart 1975: 57. Orchomenos: *SEG 25* (1971) 443 (*ISE 53*), for which a safe *terminus (paullo) ante quem* is the Chremonidean decree, in which the Orchomenians appear as allies of the Spartans (*SVA III 476*, l. 39).

⁹ Festivals: Olympieia and Great Panathenaia in Athens (*IG II² 3079*); Olympic festival in Olympia (Paus. 6.16.9); dedications: Olympia (*IvO 178*), probably Delphi (*FD III 2*, 72), Rhodes (*IG XII 1*, 25).

On Chremonides' life before the decree and the war bearing his name we know nothing. The earliest¹ testimony of his life and the reason for his relative notoriety is the decree he proposed in early autumn 268, by which the anti-Macedonian alliance was officially acknowledged and ambassadors of various allies were honoured.² We shall discuss the text of the decree later. The fact that Chremonides proposed it was probably due to chance.³ In any case Glaukon's political role was certainly more significant than that of his brother;⁴ Glaukon, along with Aristides son of Mnesitheos and Kallippos son of Moirokles, appear to have been the main instigators of the anti-Macedonian alliance.⁵

After the disastrous outcome of the war, both brothers fled to the court of Ptolemy II, whom they served as advisers and close collaborators (σύμβουλοι and πάρεδροι), according to Teles the Cynic.⁶ Chremonides had military duties as well; he was the admiral of the fleet in the sea battle of Ephesos, where he was defeated by the Rhodian fleet.⁷ The last mention of Glaukon is in 255, when he was a priest

¹ A statue base inscribed with his name (*SEG* 25 [1971] 207 [*ISE* 21]) cannot be securely dated, but probably belongs to the beginning of the war.

² *SVA* III 476.

³ Glaukon, who appears to have led the diplomatic preparation for the alliance, may have been abroad at the time.

⁴ Pouilloux 1975; Étienne / Piérart 1975: 56-58. Earlier bibliography focused mainly on Chremonides, since the war, already in antiquity (Hegesandros, *FHG* IV 415, fr. 9), bore Chremonides' name, while evidence on Glaukon only gradually came to light.

⁵ See Habicht 1976 and 1995: 145. Glaukon was probably one of the two representatives of Athens in the alliance (the other being Kallippos; see *SVA* III 476.69); see, for example, Sartori 1963: 149 n. 136; Heinen 1972: 126. Our knowledge on Aristides son of Mnesitheos will be greatly expanded when a deme decree of Lamprai in his honour is published: according to the preliminary report by B. Petrakos (*Ergon* 2003: 15), Aristides, among other things, is credited with leading an embassy to Gonatas, who was in Asia at the time, and then with serving twice as general of the countryside and with successfully repelling Gonatas' attack against the fort of Eleusis.

⁶ Teles, *Περὶ φυγῆς* 23 (Hense); the work must be dated after 240, since Hippomedon of Sparta, mentioned in the same passage, fled to the Ptolemaic court in 241 (see **B18**, below); This does not imply, however, that Glaukon was then still alive (see Buraselis 1982b: 156 n. 1).

⁷ Polyainos 5.18. On the sea battle of Ephesos and the possible context of the temporary confrontation between Rhodes and the Ptolemies (Second Syrian War [260-253] or slightly later), see Seibert 1976; Will 1979: 236-37; Berthold 1984: 89-91; Reger 1994b: 41; Wiemer 2002: 98-100. The battle is also mentioned by the *Lindian Chronicle* (*Lindos* II 2 C, 37). On the contrary, the rest of the same passage of Teles (*Περὶ φυγῆς* 23 [Hense]: 'Ἴνα μὴ τὰ παλαιὰ σοὶ λέγω ἀλλὰ τὰ καθ' ἡμᾶς καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον οὐκ ἐπὶ στόλου τηλικούτου ἐξαπεστάλη καὶ χρημάτων τοσοῦτον πιστευόμενος καὶ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἔχων ὡς βούλοιο χρῆσθαι;) is not necessarily related to either Chremonides or the sea battle of Ephesos (Seibert 1976: 52-54). Seibert believes that the subject of ἐξαπεστάλη (and of the rest of the verbs in the passage) is Glaukon and assumes that he was sent on some important mission by Philadelphos; this assumption, however, does not help to solve syntactic difficulties. As Seibert himself concedes (cf. O'Neil 1977: 80 n. 16), Hippomedon can just as well be the subject. In fact, the unusual authority with which the subject of the verbs is invested by the

of Alexander in the capital.¹ This appointment testifies to his high position at court and fits well the apparent piety of the Athenian statesman.

I saved for the end the two more problematic sources on Glaukon, the base of a statue Ptolemy III erected in his honour at Olympia, probably early in his reign, and the famous decree of the *koinon* of the Greeks (the periodic gathering of representatives of Greek cities at Plataiai, in honour of the dead of the war against the Persians). By this decree Glaukon was honoured for his goodwill to “all Greeks” (πᾶσι τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν), both in Athens and while in the service of Philadelphos, and particularly for his dedications to the sanctuary of Zeus Eleutherios.² Glaukon’s diplomatic activity in the context of this Panhellenic gathering, his benefactions to the sanctuary and the political significance of the emphasis placed by the Plataian decree on Homonoia –echoed also in the Chremonidean decree– undoubtedly belong to the years immediately before the war. The ideological emphasis which Glaukon placed on the fight of the Greeks against –old and new– ‘barbarians’ also echoes the Chremonidean decree and has been analysed adequately,³ so that further analysis here would be superfluous. The main unresolved issue is the date of the decree and its implications for the understanding of both Glaukon’s career and Ptolemaic policy in the Aegean.

The first editors of the decree broadly dated it to 261-246 in general, pointing out that the rise of Ptolemy III to the throne is the –indisputable– *terminus ante quem*; they did not, however, examine the reasons behind the honours accorded to Glaukon.⁴ Buraselis argued that Glaukon was honoured posthumously and that the decree should be dated to 250-245, when Boiotia had temporarily swung from neutrality to a pro-Macedonian policy, and Athens took its first, careful steps towards independence after the war.⁵ Despite Étienne’s later objections, Buraselis’ arguments are convincing.⁶ If the decree was indeed posthumous, then the statue

king, although it could apply to Chremonides or Glaukon, does not apply to any known activity of either of them. On the contrary, Hippomedon, who was ἐπὶ Θράκης καθεσταμένος, had a large area of key strategic importance under his authority; his office in Thrace fits the details of the text perfectly (fleet, plenipotentiary authority, financial independence). In other words, it is much more likely that the text refers to Hippomedon; in any case, it would be imprudent to use it as a source on the career of either of the sons of Eteokles.

¹ PCairZen 2.59173 (Ijsewijn 1961: 70-71 n° 31).

² Étienne / Piérart 1975: 51-53. Secondary literature on the *koinon* of the Greeks, the Eleutheria of Plataiai and the cult of Homonoia, subjects which need not concern us here, is extensive. Apart from the treatment of Étienne / Piérart 1975: 63-74, with earlier bibliography, see, especially on Homonoia, West 1977; Étienne 1985: 260; Thériault 1996: 101-130 and 1996b.

³ Étienne / Piérart 1975: 68-71; Pouilloux 1975: 379-82.

⁴ Étienne / Piérart 1975: 56-58.

⁵ Buraselis 1982b.

⁶ Étienne’s objections (1985: 261-63, without taking into account Buraselis’ article, but merely his communication in the VIII Epigraphical Congress) focus on three points. 1) The phrase καὶ

which Ptolemy III erected in Glaukon's honour¹ was also posthumous, an assumption that the text of the statue base anyway suggests. Should all this be right, Glaukon's past deeds were exploited after his death in pursuit of ends he himself had not managed to achieve while alive: as a heroized dead he was turned by the *koinon* of the Greeks (Plataiai), and the Ptolemies (Olympia) to a symbol of Panhellenic unity.

To return to our main point of interest, the question than need concern us is the nature and content of Glaukon's and Chremonides' relation with the Ptolemies *before* the start of the war. Any contact during the war is easy to explain as part of the regular contacts between military allies; after the war, the two brothers were mere members of the Ptolemaic administration, as the Macedonian occupation of Athens forbade even wishful thinking of their returning home.

Diplomatic activity in preparation for the Chremonidean War is mainly attested in the Peloponnese. After 272 and the Ptolemaic alliance with Areus of Sparta, Ptolemaic propaganda is made more visible, its more marked example being the statue of Areus erected at Olympia by Philadelphos.² Athenian documents referring to the alliance are only few, perhaps because, as we saw, relations with the Ptolemies remained steadily good after 287; the flow of Athenian ambassadors and *theoroi* to Alexandria, for example, remained steady, as the Kallias decree (enacted only two years before the Chremonidean decree) attests,³ while the statuary complex of Ptolemies I and II and Arsinoe II probably belongs to the same period.⁴ An interesting fragment of Alexis, which includes a toast to

ζῶσιν καὶ μετηλλαχόσιν does not *prove* that Glaukon is dead; this is correct. 2) *Proedria* in the games was only very exceptionally offered to the dead. Although Étienne considers this point decisive, one should take into account not only actual attestations of posthumously awarded *proedria* (Lykourgos and Demochares), but also a number of other cases of various posthumous honours awarded in public ceremonies, where the heroized dead were considered to 'participate' symbolically (see in detail Buraselis 1982b: 145-51). 3) Glaukon, according to Étienne, died during the reign of Ptolemy III and good relations between Boiotia and the Ptolemies in his reign are unlikely. This is the weakest point in his argumentation: as even himself considers possible (see Étienne / Piérart 1975: 62 n. 36) and Buraselis convincingly argues (1982b: 153-56), the statue in Olympia was also posthumously erected, and, therefore, there is no reason not to accept a date late in the reign of Philadelphos for Glaukon's death. A strong argument in favour of Buraselis' theory has been put forward by Knoepfler 1992: 474 n° 114, who pointed out that the lack of a crown among the honours for Glaukon is more fitting to posthumous honours.

¹ IVO 296 (Syll³ 462).

² IVO 308 (Syll³ 433; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 58).

³ See **A47**, above. A Ptolemaic embassy to Athens attested in the biographical tradition for Zenon (Diog. Laert. 7.24) may well belong to the same period, although Heinen 1972: 136-37 correctly points out that the episode should not be used as a historical source, because it belongs to a *topos* of that tradition, which included Zenon's responses to various ambassadors (see SVF I fr. 284).

⁴ Paus. 1.8.6; cf. Kotsidu 2000: n°s 16-17.

Ptolemy II, Arsinoe II and Homonoia, reflects the notion of unity and concord among the Greeks against the Macedonian foe that the sons of Eteokles meticulously advanced.¹

The mention of Arsinoe brings us to one of the most hotly debated issues related to the Chremonidean War, namely to the question of the queen's (possible) role in the war's outbreak. As is well-known, in the decree Chremonides stresses that "king Ptolemy, in accordance to the disposition of his ancestors and his sister, is clearly striving for the Greeks' common freedom" (βασιλεὺς Πτολεμαῖος ἀκολούθως τεῖ τῶν προγόνων καὶ τεῖ τῆς ἀδελφῆς προαιρέσει φανερός ἐστιν σπουδάζων ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας).² The reference to the queen's προαίρεσις in relation to a purely political matter is certainly peculiar. A number of theories falling between two extremes have been advanced:³ for some, Arsinoe had significant political power and the Chremonidean War was the manifestation of her personal political design, which was almost independent from the wishes of her royal husband;⁴ for others, Arsinoe had no real political power (let alone power independent from that of the king's), her connection with political and military affairs was merely due to the propagandist projection of her high royal status, and Chremonides' emphasis on her role was nothing more than a "formule de courtoisie"⁵ to the recently deceased queen.⁶

¹ Alexis, *PCG* II fr. 246 (Ath. 11.502b-c).

² *SVA* III 476, ll. 16-18.

³ Hazzard 2000: 94-100 offers a useful survey.

⁴ The old theory (Tarn 1913: 290-93, 313; Macurdy 1932: 119-20; Sartori 1963: 124-26; Longega 1968: 93-95; cf. Heinen 1972: 97-99), according to which Arsinoe's plan was to have Gonatas dethroned and Ptolemaios –her son from her marriage to Lysimachos– rise to the Macedonian throne, has been now rightfully abandoned. A more realistic version, although not better documented, is Hauben's assumption (1970: esp. 64-67 and 1983: 111-14) that Arsinoe's programme was complimentary to her husband's designs and not independent from it: establishing Ptolemaic sovereignty at sea, under the leadership of Kallikrates of Samos, the mastermind of the whole plan and her personal protégé. The most extreme formulation of the theory of Arsinoe's political power belongs to Savalli-Lestrade 1994: 420-21, who, while admitting that no testimony to the political power of any other queen exists, asserts that Arsinoe's political role was not only independent from, but also "dominante rispetto a quella del consorte".

⁵ According to the aphorism of Will 1979: 222.

⁶ That Arsinoe did not have any real and independent political power is asserted, among others, by Heinen 1972: 97-100; Will 1979: 221-22; Burstein 1982; Hazzard 2000: 94-100. The most commonly held view concerning the date of Arsinoe's death is July 9, 270; Grzybek 1990: 103-112 argued for a date in July 1-2, 268, but his theory was rejected by most Egyptologists (see, for example, Cadell 1998, convincingly arguing in favour of the traditional date in 270); cf. the thorough discussion of Benett 2001ff.: s.v. Arsinoe II, n. 17.

Although the role of Hellenistic queens cannot be discussed here,¹ it must be stressed that it is necessary to distinguish between two levels of power potentially exercised by the queens. Even if undoubtedly present in the spheres of economy, diplomacy and interstate relations, in a formal but also essential role, Hellenistic queens did not exercise autonomous power over public affairs, and were deprived of an institutionalized political role. On the other hand, it is undeniable that, depending on each queen's abilities, they could exert significant influence at court, and therefore, on the level of decision-making as well; this was assured by their undoubtedly high position in court hierarchy and by their role as a powerful symbol of royal authority. All this effects that, as such, Arsinoe's accentuated position in ruler cult or her being mentioned in a decree or in Attic comedy in the context of Panhellenic unity, cannot *prove* that Ptolemaic foreign policy on the eve of the Chremonidean War was her doing; such an assumption could only be based on independent direct evidence, which we do not have.²

In fact, a closer look at the Chremonidean decree shows that reference to her was more or less required for rhetorical reasons and need not imply that she had any part in decision-making. The motivation clause begins with an invocation of the old alliance between Athens and Sparta during the Persian wars, which brought glory to the allies and freedom to all Greeks (ll. 7-13). Now, continued Chremonides, circumstances were similar; next comes a reference to Ptolemy, the third main ally. A reference to the 'glorious past' of this third ally in connection with the freedom of the Greeks was required for reasons of rhetorical symmetry and diplomatic courtesy. The problem was that Philadelphos had no such glorious past; accordingly, the "disposition" of his ancestors and Arsinoe "in favour of the Greeks' common freedom" was called into play. But who were these ancestors?³ Chremonides cannot be referring to Lagos, Philadelphos' grand-father and his (inexistent) activity in favour of the freedom of the Greeks. The only possible solution is that the reference is to the –dead and deified, just like Arsinoe– God Saviours, Ptolemy I and Berenike I.⁴ Arsinoe need not have actually had any specific "disposition" towards the issue of the freedom of the Greeks, no more than Berenike did; her political power need not have been any greater than the power of her predecessor.⁵ In other words, the Chremonidean decree is probably irrelevant to the question of Arsinoe's power.

¹ See Savalli-Lestrade 1994, with earlier bibliography, whose conclusions, but for the emphasis she puts on Arsinoe's role, I follow here; see also Bringmann 1997 and Bielman 2003.

² It is interesting, for example, that Arsinoe is not mentioned at all in the Kallias decree, dated to 270 (SEG 28 [1978] 60), that is, in a period when the diplomatic preparations for the military alliance between Athens and the Ptolemies were well under way.

³ Will 1979: 222 also notes the peculiar plural.

⁴ See Heinen 1972: 132-34, with parallels.

⁵ Cf. Heinen 1972: 134.

Nevertheless, the fact itself that Arsinoe is mentioned in the Chremonidean decree still requires an explanation. In 1895, Ulrich Köhler put forward a theory forgotten –or even ridiculed¹ today: he argued that it was the circle of court intellectuals, who maintained close ties with the anti-Macedonian leadership of their home cities, who primarily pursued the war, rather than Philadelphos himself. Arsinoe, according to Köhler, was the recipient of their pressure and ensured that their request would be favourably received by the king.² This theory is of course to be rejected, at least as far as its first part is concerned: the Chremonidean War definitely served the long-term strategic interests of the Ptolemies (the ‘harassment’ of Macedonian rule in mainland Greece so as to maintain Ptolemaic control of the Aegean) as well as their short-term objectives (detering the stabilization of Gonatas’ power, after his final victory over Pyrrhos in 272). On the other hand, it is equally indisputable that the war served the interests of Sparta (and Areus personally), and, of course, Athens.³ In other words, whether the Ptolemaic side was the instigator of the alliance⁴ or not is of little importance for present purposes. Furthermore, the second part of Köhler’s theory should probably not be *a priori* rejected. Hellenistic queens –as well as other members of the royal family– had their own personal networks of contacts and *philoí*.⁵ Since they constituted a distinct pole of court influence, their good favour was actively sought after by those wishing to approach the source of real power, that is, the king. Arsinoe was the queen to best fit that description. Her marriage with her brother in 273 had religious and ideological connotations from the start,⁶ and the concomitant emphasis put on her role by Ptolemaic propaganda made her good “disposition” an essential asset for any diplomat wishing to receive Ptolemaic help. Arsinoe herself consciously played the part of the intermediary with the Greek world; we know, for example, that she was in regular correspondence with Straton, director of the Peripatos.⁷ Is it possible that the “goodwill” of Glaukon towards the queen (advertised by the Ptolemaic dedications at Olympia),⁸ was more than a formulaic phrase devoid of true meaning? Is it possible that the corresponding “goodwill” of Arsinoe attested in the Chremonidean decree reflects not

¹ Hammond 1988: 278 n. 7.

² Köhler 1895: 976–77.

³ Cf. Habicht 1979: 111–12; Marasco 1980: 141–42.

⁴ This is the prevailing view: Heinen 1972: 117–42 is still fundamental.

⁵ Savalli-Lestrade 1994: 429–31, with the relevant sources; on the queens’ role as benefactors, see Bringmann 1997. The fact that Phila (see **D9** and **D30–31**, below), wife of Poliorketes and the first royal lady for whom the title βασιλίσσα is attested, already has a personal network of contacts and a ‘court’ and that she also acted as a benefactor and intermediary, is illuminating.

⁶ Hazzard 2000: 85–93, with earlier bibliography.

⁷ Diog. Laert. 5.60.

⁸ IvO 178; 296 (Syll³ 462; SEG 32 [1982] 415).

some complex strategic plan of hers, nor only her indisputable symbolic image as the other half of the royal couple, but also her role as an intermediary in diplomatic contacts? In other words, is it possible that the peculiar reference to Arsinoe was a “formule de courtoisie” which should not, however, be explained as a ceremonial reminder of the dead queen, but as a homage to her active role in the contacts between Athenian politicians and the Ptolemaic court?

Contacts of Glaukon and Chremonides with the Ptolemaic court have two aspects. Their official aspect has little significance for the present study. The alliance with the Ptolemies was a strategic choice of the Athenian state; Glaukon and Chremonides merely worked diligently to consolidate this alliance. The second aspect, the procedural one, is more interesting. If the above analysis of Arsinoe’s role has any foundation, the pious and sophisticated sons of Eteokles strove to capitalize on Arsinoe’s religious role (before and after her death), on the Ptolemaic court’s penchant for establishing contacts with the intellectual elite of the Greek world, and, on a more practical level, on the queen’s network of contacts, in order to consolidate an alliance with Philadelphos –an alliance useful to both sides. As was often the case, skillful was the intermediary who chose the more opportune channels of communication.

A57. Aristo[---]

— Ἀριστο[---^{30(?)} ---]: *I. Eleusis* 180

Kevin Clinton recently published a fragmentary but, for the purposes of this study, highly informative decree of Athenian soldiers stationed at Eleusis (*I. Eleusis* 180). Only the beginning of the honourand’s name has been preserved: Aristo[---].¹ The largest part of the motivation clause could lead to the assumption that we are dealing with yet another royal officer, who was διατρίβων by a king whose name has not preserved (l. 4): he was acting in favour of Athens by words and deeds (ll. 5-6), was involved in a monetary donation of uncertain context by the king, had in some way contributed to “the salvation of the city” (l. 7) and facilitated the favourable reception of Athenian ambassadors and individuals at the royal court (ll. 7-10). The last four surviving lines of the motivation clause (ll. 10-13), however, reveal that the honourand was an Athenian who was afterwards elected by the people general over the Eleusinian *chora*, that is over the western and northwestern part of the Attic countryside;² among other things, the honourand fortified the land (ἐχαράκωσε, l. 11).

¹ If one accepts Clinton’s restoration in ll. 7-8, which gives a *stoichedon* line of fifty-seven letters, then thirty letters are missing from the full name of the honourand.

² For the two districts of the Attic countryside, the district of Eleusis (including the forts of Panakton and Phyle), and the district of the *paralia* (with jurisdiction over Rhamnous, the eastern coastline and Sounion), both probably established soon after 285, see Habicht 1982: 43-44.

It is unfortunate that neither the name of the honourand nor the date and context of the honours he received are adequately preserved. The only chronological indication available is that the cutter of the inscription worked during the period 286/5 - ca. 239.¹ Clinton dates the document to “279 (?) – 266” and restores the name of Ptolemy II as the name of the king to whose administration Aristo[---] formerly belonged. Publication of Clinton’s historical commentary pending, suffice it to say here that his suggestion is plausible. Within the period during which the cutter was active, the eve of the Chremonidean War –or even the war itself– would be a plausible juncture at which a general of the Attic countryside would have needed to supervise fortifications; likewise, the royal court to which an Athenian general responsible for the defence of Attica against Antigonos Gonatas is most likely to have previously belonged is the Ptolemaic court. If that were the case, then Aristo[---] would have a career in many ways similar to that of Kallias of Spheetos (A47). At least two other scenarios, however, appear equally plausible, which means that it would be imprudent for us to dwell on very specific assumptions over the honourand’s career.²

Even if we cannot ascertain the honourand’s name, the royal court to which he initially belonged, or the date of his generalship, the fact remains that the unknown honourand is another clear case of an individual belonging to two worlds: he was an Athenian citizen who was a member of the royal administration and, afterwards, an elected general of Athens. His two posts can only have been interconnected. It is highly improbable that it was by chance that a member of a royal administration was afterwards elected general of the Athenian people at a time of military preparations, if not war; the necessary conclusion is that he was a

¹ In his epigraphic commentary of *I. Eleusis* 180, Clinton records his career span as 286/5-245/4, but see Tracy 2003: 80-98.

² Between 286/5 and 239, when the cutter of this decree was active, there were at least two more periods of military preparations to which the efforts of the general to fortify the countryside could equally have belonged: one at the beginning and one towards the end of the period. Soon before or soon after 251 until soon after 248/7 (see p. 216 n. 2-3, below) Athens was at war with Alexandros son of Krateros, pretender to the Macedonian throne; in that case, Aristo[---] may well have been an Athenian officer of Antigonos Gonatas (like Apollodoros [A61], Herakleitos [A62], Apollonios and Dikaiarchos [A69-70]), who was later reintegrated into the administration and political life of his city of origin. Or, alternatively, the juncture of military preparations may have been that which followed the democratic uprising of 287, when we know that the Athenians took every available measure to protect themselves from an eventual return of Poliorketes, equipping themselves with money, provisions and alliances (see A49, above), an effort perhaps alluded to by the phrase “salvation of the city” in l. 7; if the late 280’s is the date of the honourand’s generalship, then the king is most probably Ptolemy II, as Clinton has proposed. This last scenario may be reinforced by the appearance of the text; judging by l. 2, the cutter does not seem to have used blank spaces to highlight proper names or parts of the decree, as he usually did after ca. 270 (cf. Tracy 2003: 94-96).

general of the Athenian state who was also a representative of the royal court, either as an officer not officially but in essence appointed by the king –if the court was that of Pella–, or as a symbol of the alliance between Athens and the Ptolemies –if the court was that of Alexandria. Intermediaries did not only facilitate communication between the two sides, the public discourse of euergetism, the flow of money and other benefactions from the court to the city; occasionally, they were an active liaison, an actual embodiment of the bond between city and king.

Under Macedonian rule (262-229)

A58. Thrason son of Thrason of Anakaia

— Diog. Laert. 7.10-12, 15 (SVF I 4, 7-8)

The first known Athenian decree after the defeat and capitulation of Athens in the Chremonidean War¹ has been handed down to us by a literary source. In early 261/0 (?) the founder of the Stoa Zenon, a philosopher whose close relation with Antigonos Gonatas is well-attested, died.² Diogenes Laertios records the posthumous decree in his honour, approved in the end of the fifth prytany of 261/0 (?).³ It is generally agreed that the text is authentic albeit problematic in some of its details; it may be a compilation of two honorific decrees, one of them enacted while the philosopher was still alive.⁴

¹ I follow the dating of the Chremonidean War as established by Heinen 1972. It is now almost unanimously accepted that the archon Peithidemos, in whose archonship the decree of Chremonides was enacted, should be dated to 268/7. The alternative dating of the beginning of the war, put forward by Dreyer 1999: ch. 4 (cf. also Gabbert 1997: 77 n. 13), is apparently now finally disproved by an unpublished decree found at Skala Oropou (see *Ergon* 2003, 15-16 with Habicht [2006]: 444-45). The suggestion of John Morgan (see Knoepfler 1995: 159; cf. the parallel line of approach by T. Dorandi [1990, 1990b and 1991b: 25-26], which is called “quite unconvincing” by one of the leading experts on Athenian archons, M. J. Osborne [2000: 518 n. 24]) that Antipatros, in whose archonship Athens capitulated, and Arrheneides should be dated to 263/2 and 262/1 respectively and not to 262/1 and 261/0, has been endorsed by Knoepfler (*ibid.*), Lefèvre (*CID* IV p. 26), Tracy (2003: 56), and now Habicht ([2006]: 444-45) and is not rejected by Osborne 2004: 204 n. 19. I admit that I am reluctant to accept yet another revision of the established chronology based on mostly unpublished work and I prefer to follow the established dating until more solid evidence becomes available. In any case, redating Antipatros and Arrheneides would only affect the period of 263-260 (see Osborne, *ibid.*), which is of marginal importance to the present study.

² Zenon was not included in the present catalogue because, although the *potential* political importance of Zenon’s friendship with Gonatas was obvious to all, this friendship probably did not play any role in Athenian political life; see Sonnabend 1996: 253-64, with earlier bibliography and **A49**, above. This also applies to Gonatas’ relationship with Zenon’s successor, Kleanthes (Diog. Laert. 7.168-169; Plut. 830C [SVF I 463, 597]).

³ Diog. Laert. 7.10-12 (SVF I 7-8).

⁴ Sonnabend 1996: 259, with earlier bibliography and Haake 2007: 121-29 (who disagrees with the assumption that Diogenes combines two separate decrees). The decree recorded by Diogenes

The proposer of the decree was Thrason son of Thrason from the rather insignificant deme of Anakaia.¹ A personal connection with the philosopher is not attested, but cannot be ruled out.² What is certain is that Zenon was buried at the Kerameikos not on Athenian initiative, but at the explicit request of Gonatas to Thrason himself during an embassy to the Macedonian court.³

The content of the negotiations in that embassy, which was obviously part of the frequent contacts with the new overlord after the end of the war, is not known. What is interesting is that Thrason carried out the royal wish immediately, but had the discretion not to mention it in the decree, in contrast to Ktesias (A15) and Stratokles (A19 [IV]), who, in 318 and 303 respectively, did not hesitate to record that the decrees they proposed were the result of an explicit royal request. It is also interesting that Thrason was one of the six members of the committee which supervised the erection of Zenon's grave monument. Stephen Tracy⁴ made the interesting observation that the text of Diogenes speaks of a committee of five but then actually names six individuals, including Thrason; this allows the assumption that Thrason was added more or less as a representative of the king.

A59. Demetrios son of Phanostratos of Phaleron

— Hegesandros, *FHG* IV 415, fr. 8 (Ath. 4.167e-f); *I. Eleusis* 195 (IG II² 2971); *SEG* 28 (1978) 63; *I. Eleusis* 194 (IG II² 1285)

A telling illustration of Macedonian rule being re-established over Athens after the Chremonidean War is the reappearance of the family of Demetrios of Phaleron, half a century after the philosopher fled from Athens. There is no certain evidence on his family for the first half of the third century.⁵ After the war, however, his

mentions a golden crown, an honour which was normally not awarded posthumously, and burial at the Kerameikos, while Diogenes earlier (7.6 = *SVF* I 3) mentioned a golden crown and a bronze statue. Since honours for a known friend of Gonatas are unlikely to have been awarded during the war, it is probable that Zenon was first honoured immediately after the end of the war, some months before his death.

¹ If the homonymous councillors of the fourth century (*LGPN* II s.v. Θράσων n^{os} 10-11) belong to Thrason's family (for which see *ibid.* n^{os} 10-14), this is the only family of that deme with more than two known members. Thrason son of Thrasonides of Athens, honoured at Praisos in Crete in the mid-third century (*I. Cret.* III vi 9). This may not be insignificant, since for Praisos and other Cretan cities not participating in the Chremonidean War (see Chaniotis 1996: 33, with earlier bibliography), one cannot rule out contacts with Macedonia.

² Tarn 1913: 309 n. 106 discerns an emotional charge in Thrason's decree, which would make a personal involvement more likely.

³ Diog. Laert. 7.15 (*SVF* I 4)

⁴ Tracy 2003: 16-17 and 2003b: 57-58.

⁵ Phanostratos, eponymous archon in 254/3, could be the philosopher's son, but this is far from certain.

homonymous grandson appears to have held a number of offices. Demetrios was already known from a passage of Hegesandros: Members of the Areios Pagos reprimanded him on his dissolute way of life, a charge to which he replied that he bothered no one and spent his own money, in contrast to public figures who led an equally debauched life on bribe money; king Antigonos Gonatas appreciated this bold reply and “appointed him as *thesmothetes*”.¹ Christian Habicht, combining this passage with a passage of Apollodoros, which informs us that, after the city’s capitulation during the archonship of Antipatros (262/1?), “the constitution was abolished and all was done according to the will of one man”,² was led to the conclusion that Gonatas appointed Demetrios as a royal overseer in Athens and that Demetrios assumed the less insulting for Athenians and more traditional office of the *thesmothetes*.³ Habicht’s theory was generally accepted and later received further corroboration by Stephen Tracy’s discovery that a statue base from Eleusis (*I. Eleusis* 195), inscribed with the name of a Demetrios son of Phanostratos, hipparch and thrice a general, cannot refer to the philosopher, and therefore has to refer to his grandson.⁴ Demetrios also served as treasurer of the prytaneis of the council in the 240’s.⁵

Roland Oetjen (2000) has recently convincingly contested Habicht’s theory, arguing that: 1) The Eleusis inscription should be dated after 255 when its letter-cutter appears to be active; if this is correct, it is surprising that the text does not refer to the highest office to which Demetrios was supposedly appointed by Gonatas. 2) Demetrios’ position as treasurer of the council came at the end of his career. It seems very unlikely that the supreme ruler of the city, the man in whose hands power was concentrated, according to Apollodoros, would have ended his career in such an insignificant office. 3) It would be much simpler to identify the philosopher’s grandson with Demetrios of *I. Eleusis* 194 (*IG II²* 1285), who assumed his first military office in 256/5,⁶ and followed a career perfectly compatible with that of Demetrios of *I. Eleusis* 195. The only obstacle to this identification is exactly Habicht’s theory on the supreme power of Demetrios after 261. Therefore, it is preferable to assume that there was no royal overseer, that the man in whose hands power in Athens lay was actually Gonatas himself, and that the philosopher’s grandson was appointed by the king to the traditional and honorary, but rather

¹ Hegesandros, *FHG* IV 415, fr. 8 (Ath. 4.167e-f): θεσμοθέτην αὐτὸν κατέστησεν.

² Apollodoros, *FGrHist* 244 F 44: [τὰς] ἀρχὰς [ἀνηιρήσθ]αι καὶ πᾶν ἐν[ός] βουλευ[ματος τε]λεῖσθαι (for this reading and restorations, see Dorandi 1990b: 130). Ἀρχαὶ here must have the meaning of “constitutional form”, as in Plut., *Demetr.* 34.4-5 (cf. p. 130 n. 1, above), since we know that Athenian offices remained very much in place after the capitulation of the city (cf. Tracy 2003: 16).

³ Habicht 1982: 15-20; cf. 1995: 156-58.

⁴ Tracy 1995: 43-44 and 171-74.

⁵ *SEG* 28 (1978) 63; for the date, see Oetjen 2000: 114, with earlier bibliography.

⁶ On the date of the archon Antimachos, see Osborne 2000: 515; cf. Tracy 2003: 167.

insignificant office of *thesmothetes*, one of six such officials, charged with no particular duties.¹

These convincing modifications to Habicht's theory, now accepted by Habicht himself,² nevertheless leave one important parameter of Demetrios' career intact: the fact that his career was given a significant boost³ by the king's active intervention. It would be even more impressive an act, if Gonatas did actually take the trouble of ensuring⁴ the appointment of Demetrios to the politically insignificant office of the *thesmothetes* and not as a Head of State; this royal whim to interfere with the way Athenian administration was staffed, even at lower levels, exemplifies the degree of royal control over Athenian politics.

A60. Lyandros son of Lysiades of Anaphlystos

— *IG II² 682 (Syll³ 409; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 15), ll. 92-96; cf. Agora 15.89*

Lyandros, whose only other known activity is that he was treasurer of the council in 254/3,⁵ was the proposer of the decree in honour of Phaidros son of Thymochares in 259/8 or the beginning of 258/7 (**A46**, above). Although the text of the decree, as is the case with all 'career decrees', drew on a *curriculum vitae* approved by the honourand, we should not downplay the significance of the act of proposing such a decree. In the context of post-Chremonidean Athens it was certainly a political act of note to propose a decree exalting the efforts which a statesman put into achieving a compromise between the revolted city of 288/7 and Poliorketes.

A61. Apollodoros son of Apollodoros of Otryne

— *I. Rhann. 8 (Pouilloux 1954: n° 7; ISE 22)*

Apollodoros son of Apollodoros, "appointed as general by king Antigonos and the people and elected to the coastal district" ([κ]ατασταθείς στρατηγός ὑπό τε τοῦ βασιλέως Ἀντιγόνου καὶ | [ὑπό τοῦ δήμου καὶ] χειροτονηθείς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν

¹ Habicht 2003: 54 (with some reservations) and [2006]: 448 n. 4 (with fewer reservations); Tracy 2003b: 57 and Kralli 2003: 62-63 concur.

² Habicht 2003: 53-55.

³ Oetjen 2000: 117 takes it for granted that his appointment as *thesmothetes* came at the beginning of the Macedonian rule, and points out that Demetrios may not have been over thirty years old, as the law for holders of any office required. Nonetheless, there is no reason to assume that the appointment came in 261. His hipparchy is mentioned in the next phrase of the same passage, with no apparent connection to his appointment as *thesmothetes*. Hegesandros (or Athenaios) merely piles up testimonies of his life. In other words, Demetrios may have been already politically active when he was appointed *thesmothetes*.

⁴ There is no reason to accept Hegesandros' phrase as it stands. Gonatas most probably did not literally "appoint" Demetrios literally, but merely intervened, publicly or unofficially, in the legal procedure of appointment.

⁵ *Agora 15.89.*

τὴν παραλίαν (*I. Rhamn.* 8, ll. 7-8), probably in 256/5,¹ is a unique case. His is the only certain case² of an Athenian general of the third century, who was explicitly stated to have been appointed both by the appropriate civic body (the Athenian *demos*) and the king of the Macedonians.³

Apollodoros was honoured by the *isoteleis* of Rhamnous, for his help in soldiers of the garrison being included in the *isoteleis*, a measure which was taken at the king's request (ll. 12-13). The timing is noteworthy: almost simultaneously with the 'liberation' of Athens in ca. 255,⁴ the former occupation force of Rhamnous was incorporated into the life of the city, as its members acquired a legal position practically equal to that of the other demesmen. This development sheds new light on the ongoing discussion on the status of the forts of Attica and their relation with the Athenian generalships of the *paralia* and of the Eleusinian district from 255 to 229 (a subject discussed in Appendix 3). Whatever the precise institutional framework of the Attic countryside, its forts and garrisons, one thing becomes clear: the lessening of direct royal control over Athenian institutions certainly did not entail leaving these institutions work as they pleased. Supervision by the Macedonian administration may have become more discreet and subtle, but, at the same time, Macedonian control was ensured by the incorporation of the forces implementing it into the city's own institutions; thus, external control was being transformed into internal self-restraint. This policy may have finally failed, as the pro-independence policy of Eurykleides and Mikion would later prove, but it was, nonetheless, a novel approach in the context of the kings' effort to secure control over the cities without infringing on the cities' aspirations for autonomy.

Apollodoros is otherwise unknown; hence we are ignorant about any possible past connection of his with the Macedonian administration. The name is often attested among the ranks of the higher social stratum of Otryne, especially after the middle of the third century,⁵ but its commonness does not necessarily mean that we are dealing with the same family in every case.

¹ For this new restoration, its possible meaning and its consequences, as well as for the date of Apollodoros' generalship, see Appendix 3, below.

² For another possible example, see *I. Rhamn.* 16, with Appendix 3, below.

³ Habicht 1982: 47-55.

⁴ Eusebios, *Chron.* II 120 (Schoene, who reproduces both the Latin version of St. Jerome, which dates the event to 256/5, and the Armenian version, which dates it to 255/4); Paus. 3.6.6; cf. Habicht 1995: 171; Tracy 2003b: 58-59.

⁵ The one most likely to have been a relative of our Apollodoros is Apollodoros son of Sogenes of Otryne, perhaps general of the *paralia* (*I. Rhamn.* 59, undated by Petrakos, dated to the late 220's by Arnaoutoglou 2007: 331), who was also a contributor in the *epidosis* of 248/7 (*Agora* 16.213 [*IG* II² 791; *SEG* 32 (1982) 118], ll. 68-69); Arnaoutoglou 2007: 324 and 335 reasonably assumes that our Apollodoros was the uncle of Apollodoros son of Sogenes. A certain descendant of the latter is Sogenes (who had a son named Apollodoros), who contributed to another *epidosis* in the middle

A62. Herakleitos son of Asklepiades of Athmonon

— *IG II² 677* (Syll³ 401); *IG II² 1225* (Syll³ 454; Maier 1959: n° 24; Bielman 1994: n° 25)

Herakleitos, an important figure of Athenian public life of the 250's, is known from two honorific decrees. From the first (*IG II² 677*), most probably enacted sometime in the latter half of the 250's,¹ only the end of the motivation clause has been preserved. The embellishment of the Stadium during the reorganizing of the Panathenaia,² the dedication of votive stelai³ commemorating the victories of Gonatas against the barbarians (that is, against the Gauls in Lysimacheia in 277) to the sanctuary of Athena Nike (ll. 1-6), and, more generally, his goodwill towards the king and Athens (in that order; ll. 12-14) are among the reasons given for the honours awarded to Herakleitos.

The second decree (*IG II² 1225*) is richer in details. Soon after the war with Alexandros of Krateros had ended, the Salaminians honoured Herakleitos, “presently” general of the Piraeus,⁴ for rebuilding the walls of the island during the war and saving a Salaminian who had been abducted by pirates. What is interesting is that Herakleitos had “previously” also served “by the side of king Antigonos” (ll. 2-3: *πρότερον παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ Ἀντιγόνῳ τεταγμένος*).

Herakleitos' career can be summarized as follows. Already in the 250's he was an officer of Gonatas. There is no way of knowing when he entered the royal service, nor what his duties were, not even if he ever lived in Athens before his appointment by the king as general of the Piraeus.⁵ The first secure attestations of his activity in his city of origin are his donations for the Panathenaia and the dedication to the Acropolis, probably in the latter half of the 250's. He may have

of the second century (*IG II² 2334*, ll. 19-22). Finally, a son of an Apollodoros of Otryne served as general of the hoplites towards the end of the third century (*Hesperia* 15 [1946] 221 n° 48).

¹ See Dinsmoor 1931: 175-76; Nachtergaele 1977: 180-81; Habicht 1979: 71; Tracy 2003: 96.

² The Panathenaia of 254, the first after the ‘liberation’ of ca. 255, would have been a perfect juncture for the reorganization of the festival and a donation by someone like Herakleitos, a royal officer and an Athenian citizen at the same time (cf. T. L. Shear 1978: 11 n. 11).

³ For the restoration [στῆλ]ας (and not [γραφ]άς) ἐχούσας ὑπομνήματα in ll. 4-5, and the meaning of the dedication, see Kontoleon 1964: 196-97 and Schmidt-Dounas 1996: 132 n. 89, with further bibliography.

⁴ As well as of the forts that fell under his jurisdiction (ll. 8-9), that is, Mounychia, Sounion and Salamis (Plut., *Arat.* 34.6; cf. Appendix 3, below).

⁵ It is often assumed (for example, by Tarn 1913: 327 n. 40; Bengtson 1964: 380) that Herakleitos was phrourarch of Salamis before his appointment as general of the Piraeus; Bielman 1994: 102 correctly points out that this is not a necessary assumption. The fact that he appears being honoured for activities pertaining to Salaminian interests is due to the fact that this is a Salaminian decree; moreover, the formulaic phrasing of the Salaminian decree (καὶ τοῖς ἰδίαι Σαλαμίνων ἀφικνουμένοις πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα...) actually favours the assumption that Herakleitos was a courtier mediating between representatives of a city and the king rather than that he was a resident of that city.

been already general of the Piraeus;¹ in any case, he certainly held that office during the revolt of Alexandros son of Krateros (which lasted from shortly before or shortly after 251 to before 245) and maintained his office after the calling of truce between Alexandros and the Athenians, soon after 248/7. He was replaced by Diogenes of Macedonia, some time before 233.²

Two aspects of Herakleitos' connection with Athens are worth noticing. The first is the publicity Herakleitos secured for Gonatas' military achievements over the barbarians. This is the second known case of this kind of propaganda in a Greek city. Nonetheless, the other relevant decree in honour of Gonatas, proposed by Menedemos in Eretria, belongs to a very different context.³ Firstly, it was contemporary with the events it commemorated and did not postdate them by twenty years, as did the dedications of Herakleitos. Secondly, as we shall see (**D95**, below), the "modest and without unnecessary adulation" (ἀπλοῦν τε καὶ ἀκόλακον) decree of Menedemos aimed at the consolidation of the pro-Macedonian orientation of Eretria against the wishes of a strong opposition. The propaganda act of Herakleitos, on the contrary, belongs to a period when Macedonian control over Athens was secure: had Athenian docility seemed difficult to maintain, the lessening of the

¹ The 'liberation' of ca. 255 provides us with a reasonable (although entirely hypothetical) juncture at which to place Herakleitos' appointment. Without actually lessening royal control, appointing an Athenian as commander of the Macedonian forces of the Piraeus could be construed as a move of good will on the part of Gonatas and would find its parallel in the joint appointment of Apollodoros of Otryne as general of the *paralia* (for 256/5?) by the king and the Athenians (see the preceding entry). The only known predecessor of Herakleitos was Hierokles of Karia, who must have served until 260 or slightly later (Reger 1992: 373-77 and Knoepfler 2001: 295 n. 173, with earlier bibliography).

² For the chronology of Alexandros' revolt, see p. 216 n. 2-3, below. The famous, although still unpublished, Rhamnousian decree in honour of Archandros, general of the *paralia* (Ergon 1993: 7-8; Petrakos 1999: I 36-37) shows that the war between Alexandros and Athens was still raging during the archonship of Diomedon, that is, in 248/7 (on that date, see 145 n. 1, above). Since by the time of the Salaminian decree the war had already ended (l. 12: πολέμου γενομένου), at least for Athens, and Herakleitos was still general, we must conclude that he remained at his post at least until 248/7. Herakleitos' successor was Diogenes (see the sources in Osborne 1983: T100). Some restore his name in the famous *epidosis* for the salvation of the city (Agora 16.213 [SEG 32 (1982) 118; IG II² 791; Syll³ 491; cf. Migeotte 1992: n° 17], l. 48), also under Diomedon (tenth prytany) and assume that Diogenes was already then general of the Piraeus (see Habicht 1982: 26 n. 70; Bielman 1994: 102; Oliver 2007: 202 n. 57, with earlier bibliography); should the reconstruction of Herakleitos' career proposed here be correct, this cannot be the case. Moreover, even if the Diogenes of the *epidosis* was the -future- general of the Piraeus, he may well have been a subordinate of Herakleitos at the time; he bears no title in the list of contributors, while he is mentioned only ninth in order, a rather degrading place for the general of the Piraeus. The first secure attestation of Diogenes as general of the Piraeus belongs to the aftermath of the battle of Phylakia between the Achaians and Macedonia (Plut., *Arat.* 34.2; on the date, see Urban 1979: 65, with earlier bibliography).

³ Diog. Laert. 2.141-142; cf. Knoepfler 2001: 391-97 and **D95**, below.

formal signs of subjugation to Macedonian power would have been impossible. Thirdly, and most importantly, Menedemos' decree was a decision of the political leadership of the city, while the dedication of the stelai on the Acropolis was the work of a man who certainly already belonged to the royal administration and, as general of the Piraeus, could officially represent the royal power over the city. In that sense, despite the fact that it is carried out by an Athenian in origin, this act of propaganda reflects royal policy rather than flattery on the part of the city.

The double identity of Herakleitos is also manifest in the second interesting aspect of his career. As stated above, we do not even know whether he lived in Athens before his appointment to the generalship of the Piraeus. The Salaminians honoured him as a royal officer, not as an Athenian citizen. The Athenian decree's language is neutral. Had the prosopographical data not been preserved, it would be hard to tell whether he was an Athenian or not; his donations and dedications could just as well have been made by a foreign benefactor. On the other hand, the fact that he was an Athenian citizen is certainly not devoid of importance. Athenians could, and obviously did, appeal to his Athenian identity when negotiating with him as a general of the Macedonian army and Herakleitos himself, or even the king, could invoke his Athenian identity when circumstances required them to do so.¹

A63. [---] from Leukonoion

— [---^{ca.11} --- Λευκο]νοεύς: SEG 3 (1927) 89 (IG II² 477 + Add. p. 661)

The name of the proposer of this very fragmentary decree of the middle of the third century cannot be recovered. The date of the decree has become a focal point for the controversy over the dating of Athenian archons.² Osborne's certainty that the eponymous archon is Philostratos (who now has to be placed in 260/59) is probably over-optimistic;³ I still believe that the agnostic position of

¹ It would be interesting to know the activity of the members of Herakleitos' family in Athens in the years that followed. A homonymous fellow demesman who was eponymous archon in 218/7 (IG II² 1706, l. 119) could have been a relative (grandson?) of his, although the connection is not certain.

² The list of names of the eponymous archons that have been successively proposed for this decree and their possible dates demonstrates the degree of uncertainty: Euxenippos in 305/4 (Koehler, *IG*), Sosistratos in 261/0 (Ferguson 1911: 24 and 77 n. 1; Tarn 1934: 39), Polystratos in 261/0 (Meritt 1938: 140-42), Demokles in 278/7 (Dinsmoor 1939: 55-57), Philostratos in 254/3 (Pritchett / Meritt 1940: xxi and 98), Alkibiades in 255/4 (Meritt 1969: 434 and 1977: 175), Polystratos in 260/59 (Meritt 1981: 88), Philostratos in 253/2 or 252/1 or 260/59 (Osborne 1989: 236-37 and 2000: 515).

³ Osborne 1989: 237 argues that the name of the archon in the genitive must have ten and a half letters (others' calculations for this non-*stoichedon* text range between ten and twelve: see Habicht 1979: 123), including the preserved final hypsilon, and that the only fitting name is

Heinen and Habicht¹ remains the safest choice: the decree cannot be dated with certainty on the basis of its preamble.

Instead, let us have a closer look on the actual content of the decree, which in the case of inscriptions that are used in the archon list debate is often almost completely ignored. The otherwise unknown honourand, whose name according to Wilhelm should be restored as Theoi[tes],² was honoured for his mediation between Athenian envoys and king Antigonos Gonatas at a time when the king was at Nikaia in Lokris. According to Wilhelm's almost certain restoration, the embassy led to the "renewal of the friendship and peace with king Antigonos" (SEG 3 [1927] 89, ll. 17-19: [εἰς τὴν ἀνανέω]σιν τῆς φιλί[[ας καὶ εἰρήνης πρὸς βασιλ]έα Ἀντίγο[[νον]). This is a valuable chronological indication. The renewal of peace and friendship points to a time after the end of the Chremonidean War, when peace and friendship were concluded for the first time.³ The most likely juncture for such a renewal is obviously the 'liberation' of the city by Gonatas in ca. 255. In that respect, it is interesting that one of the archons whose name can be restored in the preamble is Phanostratos, archon in 254/3.⁴ This would prove that the renewal of friendship and peace between Athens and Gonatas was part of the Athenian policy of the king in 256-254, of which a number of traces have been preserved: 'liberation' of the city,⁵ that is, most probably, removal of the garrison from the civic centre, perhaps appointment of an Athenian in the (Macedonian) generalship of the Piraeus,⁶ splendid celebration of the Panathenaia of 254 (?) –a celebration co-financed by royal donations and serving royal propaganda–,⁷

Philostratos. I fail to understand why the restoration [Φανοστράτο]ν (11 letters), for example, is "too long" (Osborne, *ibid.*).

¹ Heinen 1972: 68 and 189; Habicht 1979: 123-24.

² Wilhelm 1925: 39-42. The name is extremely rare; apart from three examples from the Peloponnese (see *LGPN* I), I know of only one attestation elsewhere (Eretria, *IG* XII 9, 246, l. 186).

³ *Contra* Ferguson 1911: 24 and 77 n. 1, who argues that the decree should be dated immediately after the end of the war.

⁴ Cf. p. 179 n. 3, above. The secretary of the council in this decree comes from tribe I (Antigonis). If the date is 254/3, this would mean that the secretary cycle was not operational in 254/3 (see the table of Osborne 2000: 515). This is hardly a valid counter-argument however. Osborne himself had earlier (1989) argued in detail against the necessity of the assumption that the secretary cycle was maintained after 261. In his more recent reconstruction of the archon list of that period (Osborne 2000: 515) he discerns one or two periods during which there *might* have been a secretary cycle. We know that 253/2 belonged to the second of these periods and Osborne believes that it is more likely that the cycle started precisely in that year, with the tribe (Aigeis, tribe IV) which served in 262/1, the year of Athens' capitulation. It should be added that the year of this decree was an intercalary one, as was 254/3, according to its place in the Metonic cycle.

⁵ Eusebios, *Chron.* II 120 [Schoene]; Paus. 3.6.6.

⁶ See the preceding entry.

⁷ *IG* II² 677 (*Syll*³ 401); cf. the preceding entry.

divine honours for Gonatas,¹ integration of the Macedonian garrison of Rhamnous into civic institutions.²

A64. Lykomedes son of Diochares of Konthyle

— [Λυκομήδης Διοχάρ]ου Κορθυλήθεν: IG II² 777

IG II² 777, dated to 253/2, Pryt. X³ is a very fragmentary honorific decree for one [---]tratos and his son, who appear to have mediated between Athenian envoys and the Macedonian court. This must have been part of a long series of decrees honouring intermediaries between Athens and Macedonia after the 'liberation' of ca. 255, if the pattern of 307-302 was followed.

According to Habicht's apt restoration,⁴ the proposer of the decree was most probably Lykomedes son of Diochares of Konthyle. Lykomedes proposed two more decrees in the first half of the 250's: an honorific decree for the *prytaneis* of the Aigeis (259/8) and a decree honouring unknown Rhodians (256/5).⁵ He also served as a priest of Asklepios in the same period.⁶ Finally, he may have been one of the two councillors of the period who served thrice in the council.⁷ The fact that we are so well informed about Lykomedes' activity during an otherwise very poorly documented period, makes him a distinguished figure of post-Chremonidean Athens and allows the assumption that he was favourably disposed towards the Macedonians, to say the least.

Despite its fragmentary status, the decree is an interesting source on the mechanisms of mediation. The honourand's father seems to have been an officer of Poliorketes (ll. 8-9), while he and his sons were officers of Gonatas. The fact that his father is mentioned must mean that he was equally well-disposed towards Athens, making this decree another attestation of a connection of a city with a courtier's family spreading over more than one generation. This lasting bond with the families of opportunely positioned individuals was a major pursuit for many cities. The goodwill of these individuals, which the city actively pursued and rewarded with honours, was then bequeathed to their offspring, who often served successive kings.

¹ See **A68**, below.

² *I. Rhamn.* 8; see **A61**, above.

³ According to the latest reconstruction of the archon list (Osborne 2000, 2003 and 2004; Tracy 2003: 165-68).

⁴ Habicht 1982: 202; cf. Tracy 2003: 142.

⁵ *Agora* 15.89, ll. 23-41 and IG II² 769 + 441 (on which see Habicht 1982: 202 n. 15, with earlier bibliography, and Tracy 2003: 141-42) respectively. Dates again follow Osborne 2000, 2003 and 2004 and Tracy 2003: 165-68.

⁶ IG II² 1534, l. B 221 (Aleshire 1989: cat. V 96).

⁷ See Tracy 2003: 23.

A65. Chairedemos son of Epicharinos of Kolonos

— *IG II² 1225 (Syll³ 454; Maier 1959: n° 24; Bielman 1994: n° 25)*

Chairedemos was the otherwise unknown proposer of the Salaminian decree for Herakleitos son of Asklepiades, general of the Piraeus (**A62**), shortly after 248/7.

A66. [---] son of [---]machos of Xypete

— [---^{ca. 11 (?)} ---]μάχου Ξυπεταιών: *IG II² 562*

Proposer of an honorific decree for yet another friend of Macedonian kings (*IG II² 562*). The decree can only be dated on the basis of the career span of its letter-cutter, the “letter-cutter of *IG II² 788*”, who was active between *ca.* 260 and *ca.* 235.¹ If accepted, however, Adolf Wilhelm’s restoration of part of the motivation clause seems to preclude assigning a date after the Chremonidean War to the decree: [ἐπειδὴ¹⁰ διατρίβ]ων παρὰ τοῖς [βασιλεῦσι ---] would point to Antigonos Monophthalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes.² Wilhelm’s restoration is, I believe, obligatory: the honourand was honoured for his help towards Athenian ambassadors (ll. 5-6: [ἀφικ]νοῦμ[ε]νοι, safely restored), and this embassy was most probably to a royal court, since παρὰ τοῖς is not compatible with the assumption that it was an embassy to another city. This means that we are dealing with a *philos* of two kings. It would be (hardly) possible to assume that the honourand had a surprisingly long career, that the kings in question were in fact Monophthalmos and Poliorketes and that the decree refers to the honourand’s past career. Nonetheless, even if, in order to accommodate a reference to the past ([ἐπειδὴ *nomen* πρότερόν τε *vel sim.* διατρίβ]ων παρὰ τοῖς [βασιλεῦσι ---]),³ we assumed that the length of the lines was longer than Wilhelm’s restoration would require, still, the present tense immediately following the reference to the kings (l. 5: διατελεῖ) makes it clear that the honourand was by the side of two kings at the time when the decree was issued. Since the only royal court with which Athens had official contacts between 262 and 229 was the Macedonian court,⁴ I believe that this decree is yet another attestation of the assumption of the royal title by Demetrios II before the death of Antigonos Gonatas, a fact attested to by other sources as well, but still unnecessarily rejected by a strand of modern scholarship.⁵

¹ Tracy 1988: 317, with earlier bibliography on our text; cf. Tracy 2003: 128.

² Cf. Habicht 1982: 199; Tracy does not discuss the ramification of his new dating.

³ Cf. *IG II² 498*.

⁴ See p. 190-92, with the notes, below.

⁵ A synopsis of the debate can be found in F. W. Walbank 1988: 317-18; Hatzopoulos 1990: 144-47; Knoepfler 2001: 145 n. 232-33. The joint kingship of Gonatas and Demetrios II is perhaps alluded to by Justin (who calls Demetrios a king in 28.1.1-2, in the context of events that may date before 246; cf. Grainger 1999: 134-35; *contra* Dany 1999: 100-103, both citing the extensive earlier bibliography) and by a highly debated manumission act from Beroia (*EKM I 45*).

The proposer was the son of a certain [---]machos of Xypete. Habicht,¹ who followed the traditional dating of the decree to the late fourth century, argued that he is to be connected to a known family of that deme, whose known members include Euthymachos son of Eudikos, (attested ca. 325-320)² and Euthymachos son of Euthippos, councillor in 273/2.³ Despite the lower date assigned to the decree, Habicht's suggestion is still plausible.⁴

A67. Ameinokles son of Tachyllos of Kydathenaioi

— *I. Eleusis* 193 (*IG II²* 1280; Kotsidu 2000: n° 15 E)

Ameinokles proposed a decree of the Eleusinians and the garrison of Eleusis, probably not long after 245. The decree only informs us that Gonatas visited Eleusis; the remainder of the text is unfortunately lost.⁵

Ameinokles' homonymous grand-father was a councillor in 304/3.⁶ Both the grand-father's public office and the grand-son's political activity coincided with the presence of a Macedonian king in Athens, a fact which, nevertheless, need not have any bearing on our discussion.

A68. Elpinikos son of Mnesippos of Rhamnous

— *I. Rhamn.* 7 (*SEG* 41 [1991] 75; Kotsidu 2000: n° 50 E) and 17 (Pouilloux 1954: n° 15; *ISE* 25; *SEG* 25 [1971] 155; Bielman 1994: n° 30)

Elpinikos son of Mnesippos proposed two decrees of Rhamnous, which are crucial for our understanding of ruler cult in Hellenistic Athens. We already knew from *I. Rhamn.* 17 that godlike honours for Gonatas were awarded before 235 (cf. below) but *I. Rhamn.* 7 changed our preconceived idea that Antigonos Gonatas was personally opposed to divine honours and was awarded such honours only posthumously; Elpinikos proposed the institution of an annual sacrifice on the king's birthday (Hekatombaion 19), during the Nemesia; the proposal was made while the

¹ Habicht 1982: 199-200.

² *SEG* 18 (1962) 36, ll. 524-25 (*IG II²* 1557, l. 82).

³ *Agora* 15.78, l. 4.

⁴ Habicht thought that the proposer was the councillor's father and that he was named Euthippos or Eudikos son of Euthymachos. Tracy 1988: 317 argued that the new dating of the decree confutes Habicht's suggestions but I see no reason why the connection with this family cannot be maintained. The proposer could, for instance, have been called Euthippos son of Euthymachos and could have been the son of the councillor of 273/2.

⁵ *I. Eleusis* 193. In ll. 5-6, instead of Hiller's (ad *IG II²* 1280) reading ἐ[ξ] Ἐρ[ετρίας], Clinton now reads and restores ἐς Ἐλ[ευσ]ῖ[να]; therefore, the traditional assumption that Gonatas visited Eleusis after he had reconquered Euboia from Alexandros son of Krateros (Habicht 1982: 59-62), is now unnecessary. The aftermath of the reconquest of Corinth by Gonatas in 245, that is, a period in which the king widely publicized his new sway over southern Greece extensively (cf. Paschidis 1996: 254-55) is as likely a juncture for the king's visit to Eleusis as any other.

⁶ *Agora* 15.61, l. 64.

king was still alive (as the present tense in l. 3 makes perfectly clear). We also learn that there was already an altar in the king's honour at Rhamnous (ll. 16-17), as well as that Gonatas had already been honoured with godlike honours by the Athenian state (ll. 5-6). As Gauthier and Habicht pointed out immediately after the publication of the inscription, the most likely juncture for such honours¹ is the 'liberation' of the city in ca. 255 and the decree must be dated soon afterwards.²

With the later decree (*I. Rhamn.* 17), Elpinikos proposed honours for Dikaiarchos son of Apollonios of Thria; Elpinikos was also a member of the five-member committee which was to supervise the carrying out of the deme's decision. The decree provides abundant information on the honourand and his father. Apollonios had been appointed phrourarch of Rhamnous by Gonatas; his son also served at Rhamnous, under his father's command, and they were both honoured by the deme for their service (ll. 2-12).³ Apollonios then became phrourarch of Eleusis and was accordingly honoured by the Eleusinians (ll. 12-14), while his son Dikaiarchos was originally assigned to the garrison at Panakton (ll. 14-17), and then to Eretria, where he still was when the decree was enacted, that is, in 235/4 (ll. 17-19). He was honoured primarily for his help to the stock-breeders of the Attic countryside during the Demetrian war of the 230's (ll. 19-21) and for liberating a citizen of Rhamnous who was a prisoner awaiting execution in Eretria, at the request of the Athenian general Philokedes (ll. 21-25). He also financed the annual sacrifice in honour of Nemesis and Gonatas, which the Rhamnousians were unable to perform because of the war (ll. 27-30).

The political activity of Elpinikos was apparently confined to the local level, hence its understanding necessitates a closer look at the peculiarities of local politics at Rhamnous. A significant part of public life at Rhamnous necessarily revolved around the deme's relations with members and officers of the garrison, in time of war, but also in time of peace.⁴ The strong Macedonian presence at Rhamnous after the Chremonidean War, as well as (if the analysis in Appendix 3, below is correct), the (official or not) continued hold that the king kept on the garrison until 229, meant that local political life also revolved around the deme's relationship with representatives of royal power. As we saw, the integration of

¹ On the later gradual diminishing of the cult of Gonatas and on the importance of the conversion of sacrifices "to the king" to sacrifices "for the king", see Mikalson 1998: 160-61; cf. Appendix 4, below.

² Gauthier, *BullEpigr* 1994, 299; Habicht 1996: 133. Kralli 2003 argues that the reason for the godlike honours for Gonatas may have been his providing military help during the war against Alexandros son of Krateros; I have explained elsewhere (Paschidis 2006b: 308-309) the reasons why I do not find this theory convincing (cf. Tracy 2003: 19-20).

³ For the date of this appointment, see Appendix 3, below.

⁴ See Petrakos 1999: I 163-74 and the insightful analysis of the relationship of garrisons with local societies by Chaniotis 2002 and Ma 2002.

the garrison into the local society soon acquired institutional confirmation, with the inclusion of the soldiers in the *isoteleis*.¹ The two decrees proposed by Elpinikos help illustrate the resulting web of relations. With the earlier decree, enacted soon after 255, Elpinikos transcribed the official Athenian policy of godlike honours for the king into the local context of Rhamnous; in fact, he outbid state policy: the ceremony he instituted is not attested for the civic centre.² The later decree attests to the close connection between prominent demesmen like Elpinikos and the commanders of the garrison, over a number of years. Although Dikaiarchos served at Eretria at the time, citizens of Rhamnous could appeal to the lasting personal ties they had forged with his father and use them as leverage to achieve their goal. Thus, owing to their useful connections with Antigonid officers, Elpinikos and his like acquired added status in the local society. This web of interpersonal ties belonged to the core of the whole structure of benefaction relationships: ties between Elpinikos and Dikaiarchos, that is, between a citizen of an Attic deme and a low-ranking Antigonid officer, were no different than similar ties at state level, between a prominent politician and a close *philos* of the king, for example. The *grande politique* of the Athenian state did not differ, structurally or in its details, from the local politics of Rhamnous.

A69. Apollonios of Thria — A70. Dikaiarchos son of Apollonios of Thria

— *I. Rhamn.* 17 (Pouilloux 1954: n° 15; *ISE* 25; *SEG* 25 [1971] 155; Bielman 1994: n° 30)

We have already talked about the career of Apollonios and his son Dikaiarchos in the Macedonian army, particularly in forts of Attica and Euboia, in the preceding entry. Until recently, another Rhamnousian honorific decree, this time enacted by Athenians serving at the Rhamnous garrison, was believed to refer to Dikaiarchos (*I. Rhamn.* 19). If the two Dikaiarchoi were one and the same, *I. Rhamn.* 19 could not have been the decree recording the past honours to which the decree of Elpinikos refers (*I. Rhamn.* 17, ll. 10-11): these past honours consisted in awarding a golden crown to Dikaiarchos and his father, whereas *I. Rhamn.* 19 stipulated that Dikaiarchos alone be awarded an olive crown. Therefore, if one wished to maintain the identification of the two honourands, one would be obliged to assume that *I. Rhamn.* 19 records a later, third set of honours for Dikaiarchos, by then probably at the command of the garrison of Rhamnous. There remains a major difficulty, however: the honourand of *I. Rhamn.* 19 received an olive crown; this was an honour consistently reserved for low-ranking officers at Rhamnous,³ and was thus unsuitable for a man who had served for several years as the commander

¹ See *I. Rhamn.* 8 and **A61**, above.

² Cf., however, the celebration of the birthday of Gonatas' son Alkyoneus, mentioned in Diog. Laert. 4.41 and 5.68.

³ See the index of *I. Rhamn.*

of important forts of Attica and Euboea. It is therefore preferable to follow R. Oetjen, who has argued that Dikaiarchos of *I. Rhamn.* 19 was a homonymous grandson of our Dikaiarchos, at the early stages of his career.¹ As regards our investigation, this in turn means that the close bond between the family of Apollonios and the society of Rhamnous was maintained for at least four generations; it means, moreover, that the clear break from the Macedonian past in post-229 Athens did not affect this bond, despite the fact that the family's relationship with Rhamnous began while its members were at the service of the Macedonian king.

Until now, in both this and in the preceding entry, the fact that Apollonios and Dikaiarchos were Athenians has not been commented upon. In one sense, their place of origin is irrelevant to our discussion. They were, first and foremost, Antigonal officers, acting in their official capacity, and their benefactions to Rhamnous (and Eleusis) were performed within the scope of that capacity. They were not only Athenian officials, who just happened to have connections with the royal administration; they were also official members of that administration, who acted on its behalf and served its interests –and just happened to be Athenians. But formal analysis rarely conveys the whole picture. The fact that they were Athenians was anything but irrelevant to the pursuits of all interested parties, which formed the web of personal ties that revolved around them. It was not irrelevant to the local society, which could appeal to their origin, expecting to receive a favourable response to its requests; it was not irrelevant to the interests of the king, who could use their origin for lessening any displeasure arising from his continued control of the garrison; finally, it was not irrelevant to their personal interests, because, as their Athenian origin was considered a useful asset by both other parties, it could also prove useful for their career. This intricate balance of interests becomes apparent in the wording of the decree in their honour: save for the information that they were appointed by the king, these honorific decrees are in no way different than the decrees honouring officers of the Athenian state for carrying out their duties beneficially for their fellow citizens. As often with public discourse pertaining to the relationship between city and king, the first impression that the language is deceitful and distorts the harsh facts is valid but actually misleading, because *both* sides had an interest to cover reality up, in order to accommodate for the royal presence in civic life.

¹ R. Oetjen, *Die Garnison der Festung Rhamnus in Attika im dritten Jahrhundert v. Chr.*, M.A. thesis, Hamburg 1998 [*non vidi*]; see Habicht 2003: 53. It should be noted that *I. Rhamn.* 19 had originally been dated to the late third century (*IG II²* 1311; Pouilloux 1954: n° 13). Dikaiarchos son of Apollonios of Thria, known from funerary monuments for him (*IG II²* 6250) and his daughter (*Agora* 17.151), is either the Dikaiarchos of *I. Rhamn.* 19 or a later descendant of his.

From independence to Rome (229-192)

A71-72. Eurykleides and Mikion sons of Mikion of Kephisia

— Polyb. 5.106.7-8; Plut., *Arat.* 41.3; Paus. 2.9.4; *Agora* 16.213 (*IG* II² 791; *SEG* 32 [1982] 118); *IG* II² 834; 844, ll. 33-42; 1300; 1705 + *SEG* 32 (1982) 169; *SEG* 2 (1924) 9 and *SEG* 19 (1963) 78 (?)

After Phaidros and Kallias (A46-47) and Glaukon and Chremonides (A55-56), the third important couple of brothers in third-century Athens were Eurykleides and Mikion. The sources on their family's past are limited; it appears to have been a rich and prominent family, attested from the early fourth century and perhaps even earlier.¹ Surprisingly, the family has no recorded political presence until the sons of Mikion. After them, the family remained politically and socially prominent for a long time.²

Eurykleides, probably the eldest son, is recorded to have held public offices already in 248/7, during the archonship of Diomedon:³ he was the treasurer of the military supervising the famous *epidosis* "for the salvation of the city and the preservation of the countryside".⁴ Eurykleides and Mikion also contributed to the *epidosis*, offering 200 drachmas each (ll. 34-35). The new dating of Diomedon means that the military events surmised from the urgency of the *epidosis* were related to the war with Alexandros son of Krateros. The future publication of an important decree of Rhamnous will offer new insights into this war and its implications for Athens;⁵ for now, we shall confine ourselves to Eurykleides' role as sketched by this decree.

His name and office are extraordinarily emphasized, cut in larger letters at the beginning of the text. Equal emphasis is placed on the fact that he was to be the sole responsible for administering the fund (ll. 9-10), which was strictly meant to be used for military purposes (ll. 27-29).⁶ Besides, his election to the office of military treasurer in time of war shows that Eurykleides was already a statesman of some repute.⁷ His birth should be dated to the mid-280's,⁸ which means that, as a young man, he must have witnessed the exalted climate of the Chremonidean

¹ Euripides son of Eurykleides was a councillor in 367/6 (*Agora* 15.14, l. 22). Habicht 1982: 181 argued that the rarity of the name Eurykleides, which seems to be associated primarily with the deme of Kephisia, means that Eurykleides, *choregos* at the Dionysia of 459/8 (*IG* II² 2318, l. 47) belonged to the same family. For the same reason, the same can be said for Eurykleides, *hierophantes* of the Eleusinia under Demetrios of Phaleron (Diog. Laert. 2.101).

² See Habicht 1982: 179-82, with the sources, to which now add Habicht 2006b.

³ For the date, see Osborne 2000 and Oliver 2002: 7.

⁴ *Agora* 16.213 (*IG* II² 791; *SEG* 32 [1982] 118; cf. Migeotte 1992: n° 17).

⁵ See p. 172 n. 1, above. On the dates of the war, see p. 216 n. 2-3, below.

⁶ Cf. Henry 1977: 70; Woodhead 1997: 304.

⁷ Habicht 1982: 121-22.

⁸ Habicht 1982: 122, slightly modified because of the new dating of Diomedon.

War, Athens' defeat, and the period of strict Macedonian control up to 255, events that appear to have had a lasting influence on his political agenda.

With the exception of the eponymous archonship of Eurykleides in 244/3 or 243/2,¹ the rest of the public offices held by the two brothers appear to postdate 229. Eurykleides served (twice?) as general of the hoplites in the 220's,² he served as *agonothetes*,³ and supervised his son Mikion's tenure as military treasurer and later as *agonothetes* (ca. 220-215).⁴ The only known office held by his brother Mikion is the *agonothesia* of the Panathenaia, perhaps in 226/5.⁵ But these offices do not adequately portray the status of the two brothers. From 229 and for almost two decades⁶ they were the undoubted leaders of the city; this is the unanimous understanding of the relevant literary and epigraphical sources. It is noteworthy that the two brothers are always jointly mentioned; this leaves no doubt that they closely collaborated with one another.⁷

The two brothers' moment of glory was undoubtedly the removal –albeit in a not so glorious manner– of the Macedonian army from Attica towards the end of 230/29.⁸ The Athenians convinced the commander of the Piraeus Diogenes to leave Attica in exchange of a bribe of 150 talents. Eurykleides was once again the mastermind behind the procurement of the money.⁹ Apart from the expected rich citizens and metics, Aratos of Sikyon, who offered 20 or 25 talents, with the hope

¹ SEG 2 (1924) 9; perhaps also SEG 19 (1963) 78, l. 12, according to Habicht 1979: 141. On the date, see Osborne 1999: 80; 2004: 206; Tracy 2003: 121-24 and 167.

² IG II² 1300; IG II² 1705 + SEG 32 (1982) 169. It may be one and the same generalship. The second inscription's date is 226/5 rather than 222/1 (Habicht 1982: 45-47). Tracy 1988: 315 unconvincedly redates it to before 229; the fact that the rest of its letter-cutter's work is dated to ca. 255-235 does not preclude that he was active for another decade (his redating is accepted by Habicht [2006]: 174). Tracy 1990: 228, 243 also dates the other inscription mentioning a generalship of Eurykleides (IG II² 1300), to ca. 230. Habicht [2006]: 449 n. 18 reports the existence of an unpublished decree of indeterminate date honouring Eurykleides as a general of the hoplites.

³ IG II² 834, l. 4.

⁴ IG II² 834, ll. 5-7; cf. Habicht 1982: 122-23.

⁵ IG II² 1705 + SEG 32 (1982) 169.

⁶ Eurykleides' 'career decree' (IG II² 834) is dated to ca. 215 (Habicht 1982: 120-22). The last mention of the two brothers is dated 212/11 (IG II² 844, ll. 33-42; on the date, see Habicht 1982: 159-61), and they probably died soon after that. Pausanias 2.9.4 says that the two brothers were murdered by Philip V; this is certainly a product of later anti-Macedonian propaganda, but is a useful chronological indication. If it is derived from the same sources on which Plutarch and Polybios draw for Philip V's character change after 215 (see the passages of Polybios gathered by F. W. Walbank 1967: 231), 215 is a safe *terminus post quem* for the death of the two brothers, in agreement with the rest of the evidence.

⁷ See Polyb. 5.106.7 (who calls them "leading statesmen [of Athens]"); Plut., *Arat.* 41.3; Paus. 2.9.4; IG II² 834, ll. 10-11; IG II² 844, ll. 33-42.

⁸ For the sources and the details, see mainly Habicht 1982: 79-93; cf. Le Bohec 1993: 165-72; Habicht [2006]: 193-95.

⁹ IG II² 834, ll. 10-14.

of incorporating Athens into the Achaian *koinon*, was also among the donors; the city also resorted to loans from abroad.¹ Despite earlier views that Ptolemy III was among the donors, this is not attested to by our sources and is thus far from certain.² The liberation was celebrated with appropriate magnificence, both at the religious level and at the level of public rhetoric. Diogenes received heroic honours and his memory persisted even in Late Hellenistic Athens.³ The cult of Demos and the Charites, a new cult incorporating a number of traditional elements, was instituted; Demos and the Charites personified the new confidence of the Athenian state, its gratitude to those who helped in the city's liberation and to those who were expected to help the city in the future, as well as its hope that peace and prosperity were assured for the city's youth.⁴ The new cult was most likely the brain child of the sons of Mikion: its priesthood remained for a whole century, and perhaps exclusively, in the family's hands.⁵

The liberation of 229 was accompanied by careful military preparation⁶ and a foreign policy of strict neutrality. This caused the wrath of Aratos, who saw his plans to lure Athens into the Achaian *koinon* being cancelled, hence the harsh account of the two brothers' foreign policy by Polybios (5.106.7-8), who is drawing mainly on Aratos' *Memoirs*. As is well-known, Polybios terms Athenian neutrality "withdrawal from Greek politics" and goes on to criticize their effusive flattery of all kings, particularly Ptolemy III. For Polybios, and Aratos, this was the result of the two brothers' "lack of solid judgement" (ἀκρισία). For Plutarch (*Arat.* 41.3), another admirer of Aratos, the two brothers hindered willing Athenians from helping Achaia in the crisis of 225, when Kleomenes III was conquering one city of the *koinon* after another.

Both accounts require a twofold correction. Firstly, the decision not to become part of the Achaian *koinon* was a very sensible move for Athens. In 229 the Achaians were still enemies of Macedonia; the Athenians had no intention of becoming part

¹ See Habicht 1982: 81, with relevant sources and bibliography. Contrary to an earlier theory, Boiotian cities did not participate in these loans: see Migeotte 1989 (cf. already Migeotte 1984: 32) and Knoepfler 1992: 474-75 n° 117.

² See Urban 1979: 52-54 and Habicht 1982: 80 n. 7, with earlier bibliography, and in the text, below.

³ See Habicht 1982: 83-84; Gauthier 1985: 64-65; Mikalson 1998: 171-72; for the sources, cf. Osborne 1983: T100 and Osborne / Byrne 1996: n° 3469.

⁴ See mainly Habicht 1982: 84-93; Mikalson 1998: 172-78; Monaco 2001.

⁵ In Eurykleides' 'career decree' it is stated that the honourand erected temples and *temene* (*IG* II² 834, ll. 25-26). Moretti (*ISE* 27) plausibly assumes that Eurykleides is the priest of Demos and the Charites mentioned in *IG* II² 4676. For later members of the family as priests of the cult, see Habicht 1982: 179-82.

⁶ Harbours and walls in Attica were rebuilt on Eurykleides' initiative (*IG* II² 834, ll. 14-16) with funds coming from a new *epidosis* (*IG* II² 835; 786; *SEG* 14 [1957] 87; perhaps *IG* II² 857); see Habicht 1982: 82, with further bibliography).

of an offensive alliance against the Macedonian king, whose overlordship they had just succeeded in removing. As we shall later see, (cf. **A75**, below), the removal of Macedonian garrisons was accompanied by a policy of appeasing the Macedonians. Athens' refusal to help Achaia in 225 was equally justified: in contrast to the uncertainty over the succession to the Macedonian throne prevailing in 229, Antigonos Doson was now a king firmly established and Athens enjoyed with him a relationship of mutual tolerance (see again **A75**, below). Moreover, men like Eurykleides and Mikion had a political and ideological background forged during the Chremonidean War, when public speech and Athenian self-image must have been dominated by the notions of the city's traditional independence and autonomy. Such men should never have been expected to give up sovereignty by making the city part of a wider statal formation, within which political dynamics and the geostrategic juncture were certain to assure Athens a secondary place.

The second correction needed concerns Athens' relationship with Hellenistic kings and Ptolemy III, in particular. At least since the time of Demades, Athenian democrats had a firm policy of entering into contacts with kings not posing a threat to the city's autonomy; these contacts were never seen by its instigators as conflicting with the overarching objective of real autonomy. On a more practical level, the anticipated attempt of Antigonos Doson to reaffirm Macedonian control in southern Greece meant that securing help from any royal court was a matter of survival for Athenian leaders. As regards the present discussion, this means that, in the time of Eurykleides and Mikion, any contacts Athenians may have had with any of the kings do not *a priori* imply that a personal relationship of the two Athenian leaders with the corresponding royal courts existed. Any such contact must have had the two brothers' approval; this is probably alluded to in Eurykleides' 'career decree', where, according to Habicht's felicitous restoration,¹ we read that the honourand had also "brought Greek cities and kings to Athens' side".² Nonetheless, any direct personal involvement of Eurykleides and Mikion in these contacts remains to be proven.

The Ptolemaic court was the obvious primary target of this Athenian 'friendship attack'. There is, however, no indication of any contacts with Ptolemy III Euergetes prior to 229,³ nor any evidence suggesting that Euergetes had contributed to the bribery of the Macedonian commander. Channels of communications with Alexandria, which had been severed in 262, are only attested again in 226,⁴ although the assumption that contacts were resumed immediately after 229 remains fairly plausible. The turning point for Athens' relationship with the Ptolemaic court

¹ Habicht 1982: 118-19.

² IG II² 834, ll. 16-17: καὶ πόλεις ἑλληνίδας καὶ βασιλεῖς προσήγγαγετο.

³ The fact that the poet Kallimachos may have been in Athens in 248/7 and may have contributed to the *epidosis* of that year (see Oliver 2002) is obviously coincidental.

⁴ IG II² 838; cf. **A73-74**, below.

came in 224/3, when the official cult of Euergetes was instituted.¹ This cult was an improved version of the cult instituted in 307 for Antigonos and Demetrios: a tribe was named after the king, his statue was erected among the statues of the eponymous heroes in the *agora*, the annual celebration of the Ptolemaieia was inaugurated –all elements present in 307 as well–, but also a new deme was formed in honour of the queen (Βερενικίδα) and a priesthood for the cult was instituted, both being newly introduced elements.² Paradoxically, the reasons for these lavish honours are nowhere stated. There is no doubt that a formal alliance with Euergetes was concluded, and that this alliance was considered crucial for the city's salvation at this juncture. As Habicht has epigrammatically pointed out,³ the foundation of Antigonos Doson's Greek Alliance in the very same year means that Athens was surrounded by enemies or potential enemies. Relations with the Ptolemies remained particularly close until the beginning of the first century, although they gradually shifted in character, especially after 200 and the inclusion of Athens in the pro-Roman camp: the Ptolemies were gradually perceived less and less as powerful allies and potential saviours and more and more as rich foreign benefactors.⁴

But the Ptolemies were not the only royal family Athenians strove to enter into contact with in the age of Eurykleides and Mikion (229 - ca. 210). Direct political contacts with Antigonos Doson and then with Philip V are also attested;⁵ the excellent relationship of the Attalids with philosophers residing in Athens, already

¹ Habicht 1982: 108-109 is decisive for the date.

² The priesthood of Antigonos and Demetrios as Saviours supposedly instituted after 307 according to Plutarch (*Demetr.* 10.4) is not attested in the epigraphic sources (gathered by Kotsidu 2000: 38-45); cf. Habicht 1970: 44-48; Mikalson 1998: 80, 83-85; Dreyer 1998.

³ Habicht 1982: 109-112.

⁴ See Habicht 1992: 75-90. Sources on Athens and the Ptolemies from 224/3 to 190 (apart from sources on the cult of the Ptolemies): 1) In the autumn of 226, Kastor, a Ptolemaic official and perhaps emissary of Euergetes in Greece, was honoured (*IG II²* 838; cf. **A73-74**, below). 2) Towards the end of the 220's Thraseas son of Aetos of Aspendos, a high-ranking Ptolemaic official and already (in 224/3) a naturalized Athenian, was honoured (Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: 17 E [*IG II²* 836]; on Thraseas, see Wilhelm 1936: 32-36 and mainly Jones / Habicht 1989: 335-46). 3) Between 224/3 and 222/1 the Athenians reciprocated the crowns they were offered by the Ephesians; the close relationship between the two cities is explicitly connected with their common goodwill towards Euergetes (*Agora* 16.225 [*ISE* 30]). 4) In 215 or 197, an Athenian ambassador died in Alexandria (*SEG* 20 [1964] 505 [*SB* 9418]; see **A79**, below). 5) In 200, Athenians asked for Ptolemaic help in view of their war with Philip V (*Livy* 31.9.18; see **A80**, below). 6) In 200 and 198, Polykrates of Argos, a high-ranking Ptolemaic official, his daughters and his wife are recorded among the victors in the Panathenaia (*IG II²* 2313, ll. 9, 13, 15, 60, 62; on Polykrates, see Tracy / Habicht 1991: 229-30). 7) In 194/3 (?) yet another royal official was honoured; he may have belonged to the Ptolemaic court (*IG II²* 888; cf. **A81**, below).

⁵ Doson: *Agora* 16.224 (*SEG* 25 [1971] 106; *ISE* 28; see **A75**, below); Philip V: *I. Eleusis* 207 (*IG II²* 1303; see **A77**, below).

from the mid-third century,¹ did not necessarily have a political impact, but, if nothing else, promoted a favourable image of the dynasty in Athens; the same can be said for the Seleukids;² finally, Athens entertained good relations with the Achaians, the Boiotians and the Aitolians.³ This far-reaching policy of good relations and neutrality paid off; Beloch made the perceptive remark that Athens managed to maintain peace for a whole generation after 229, at a time when the whole of mainland Greece was at war.⁴

As stated above, Eurykleides' and Mikion's undoubted leading position means that all such contacts must have had their approval. Nonetheless, even the slightest hint of any personal involvement of theirs in this concerted diplomatic effort is nowhere to be found in our sources. The brief reference to foreign policy in Eurykleides' 'career decree', mentioned above, sketches the outcome of his policy; it does not prove his personal involvement.⁵ This argument *e silentio* would be as weak as usual, but it is strengthened by other evidence as well. In the Hellenistic history of Athens, one can hardly find any major political leader who was not personally involved in contacts with the royal courts, particularly in circumstances crucial for the city's survival. The situation in 229 is in many ways comparable to the situation after 287. Then, as now, the Macedonian yoke had been removed and contacts with a number of kings were immediately sought after. The contacts of post-287 Athens were carried out by the protagonists of political life: As soon as he returned to the city in 286, Demochares (**A49**) hastened to undertake or propose four embassies to kings or even prospective kings. Under Eurykleides and Mikion, on the contrary, although diplomatic activity was even more intense, the undoubted leaders of the city seem to be invisible. The

¹ Mainly with Arkesilaos of Pitane (see mainly Sonnabend 1996: 315-20) and Lykon of Alexandria Troas (see mainly Sonnabend 1996: 272-74 and Haake 2007: 82-89, 240-41). Official contacts of Athens with the Attalids are not attested before 200 (see Habicht 1990b).

² The Stoic philosopher Aristokreon of Soli or Seleukeia (see mainly Habicht 1989: 13-14 [= 1994: 170-71] and Sonnabend 1996: 283-86) served as an intermediary between Athens and the Seleukids (*IG II² 785 [Syll³ 474]*), although much later, in 184/83. The metic Aristokreon, who contributed to the *epidosis* of 229, to the bribery of the Macedonian garrison and to the financing of defence works at the Piraeus (*IG II² 786 [Syll³ 475]*), was most probably not the philosopher himself, as it was thought earlier (when *IG II² 785* and *786* were dated to approximately the same period), but his grandfather (see Haake 2007: 131-41, who prefers the assumption that the two are father and son –but this is impossible, given that the intermediary of 184/3 is named Ἀριστοκρέων Ναυσικράτου). On the relationship between Antiochos III and Athens, see Habicht 1989: 10-11 (= 1994: 167-69); cf. **A83**, below.

³ Habicht 1982: 131-33.

⁴ Beloch 1925: 641.

⁵ The phrasing is unusually succinct. Had Eurykleides participated in embassies, or formally proposed them, this would certainly have been mentioned in the text, like in all similar decrees (see, for example, **A38**, **A40**, **A46**, **A47**, **A49**, above and **A80**, below).

absence of direct evidence for the two brothers' personal involvement in diplomacy is even more striking if one considers that Eurykleides and Mikion were, in general, anything but discreet in their public presence. Eurykleides served as first general of the hoplites probably upon the reinstatement of the office after 229 and probably was, as we saw, the first priest of Demos and the Charites, a cult whose priesthood remained in the hand of his family for a whole century. The family is, on the contrary, absent from the cult of the Ptolemies, not only at its inception in 224/3 but also later.¹

If this 'invisibility' of the sons of Mikion is not due to the state of our sources, then their involvement in diplomatic practice has an important difference from anything we have encountered so far in Hellenistic Athens –in fact, from anything we shall encounter in the rest of Greece as well. Eurykleides and Mikion drew the broad directions of Athenian foreign policy but were not personally involved in the diplomatic process. One might think that the target set in 229 and followed even after the two brothers' death, and until *ca.* 200, that is, strict neutrality towards all major powers of the Greek world, might account for their stance. Neutrality, however, was not inconsistent with carrying out specific diplomatic missions. If the lack of personal involvement of the two brothers is to be taken for a fact, I suspect that the reason behind it was much more practical. Exactly because the Athenians decided to maintain contacts with all major players of the day, it was thought unwise to rely on the diplomatic cunning of two men. Ancient diplomacy, as nearly all cases in the present catalogue show, heavily depended on (and was performed through) interpersonal networks. This personal aspect of diplomacy means that carrying out Eurykleides' and Mikion's foreign policy would have been less effective if the two brothers relied on their own personal networks. When a city wished to

¹ This statement is contradicted by the unanimous assumption that Eurykleides or Mikion were also priests of Euergetes and Berenike (Wilhelm 1909: 76-81; Moretti, *ISE* 27; Habicht 1982: 107 n. 128; Mikalson 1998: 179). This assumption is based on *IG* II² 4676 (Wilhelm 1909: 76-78 n° 64; *ISE* 27; Kotsidu 2000: n° 18 E3), an inscription on a bench from the theater of Dionysos. In the first line reference is made to the dedication of the monument: [--- ἱερεὺς Δήμου καὶ Ἰ Χαρ]ίτων ἀνέθ[η-κεν]; the priest of Demos and the Charites (again), the priest of Euergetes and Berenike and the priest of Diogenes (according to Wilhelm) or Demokratia (according to Maass 1972: 110-13, who believes this is the same bench as *IG* II² 5029a) are mentioned in the following lines, in smaller letters; no names of priests are preserved nor can they be restored. The dedicant of the first line must be Eurykleides or Mikion, as all scholars assume. This, however, does not imply that either of them also served as a priest of Euergetes and the other cults. If that was the reason why the other cults were mentioned, there would have been no reason to repeat the office of the priest of Demos and the Charites in l. 2. In my opinion, the only priest who was mentioned by name was the dedicant in l. 1, who just happened to be a priest of Demos and the Charites (and may well be identified with Eurykleides or Mikion); the following lines merely recorded the arrangement of the seats for the priests of three new Athenian cults, whoever these priests were for each year.

maintain contacts with a large number of kingdoms, cities and other statal formations, it was much more effective to use channels of communications distinct for each target; the case of Prytanis (A75, below) provides a useful example. In topographical terms, Eurykleides and Mikion may have preferred to place themselves outside the web of personal contacts, in order to be able to supervise it more effectively.

A73. Ktesias of Thorikos — A74. Chaireas son of Archeneos of Pallene

— IG II² 838

In early fall 226, an extraordinary (σύγκλητος) Athenian assembly¹ honoured Kastor, a φίλος and οἰκεῖος of Ptolemy III Euergetes (IG II² 838). From the partly preserved motivation clause one can only surmise that Kastor was perhaps an official of the Ptolemaic navy (l. 22) who was probably on a diplomatic mission (only in Athens or in Greece in general?).²

This is the first attested contact between Athens and the Ptolemies after the end of the Chremonidean War, although there is no reason not to assume that such contacts ensued immediately after the removal of the Macedonian garrisons in 229.³ In 226, such contacts were certainly justified by the new, dangerous for Athens, international state of affairs (see A75, below, in more detail). It was these same international developments which led to the rapprochement with the Macedonian king; honours for Prytanis, the ambassador to Antigonos Doson, were voted only seven days after the honours for Kastor.

The otherwise unknown Ktesias of Thorikos proposed the convocation of the extraordinary assembly.⁴ The decree itself was proposed by Chaireas son of Archeneos of Pallene. Chaireas, later *thesmothetes* in 215/4,⁵ was probably a relative of Archonides son of Chaireas, proposer of a decree of 228 for someone who may have had some connection with Antigonos Gonatas.⁶ Other than that he belonged to a family with an interest in diplomacy, nothing else is known of Chaireas.

¹ On this type of assemblies, see M. H. Hansen 1983: 73-81 and 2007. There is no reason to suppose that the procedure reveals some sort of emergency; most decrees voted by extraordinary assemblies were honorific (Hansen 1983: 155 and 2007: 299-300).

² On Kastor's son Philon, *archisomatophylax* of Ptolemy V and equally diplomatically active in Greece, see Olshausen 1974: 58-59 n° 36.

³ Cf. Habicht 1982: 106.

⁴ The restoration is due to Habicht 1982: 202-203 and was later confirmed by Tracy 1990: 43. Ktesias son of Kteson of Thorikos (SEG 18 [1962] 36A, l. 503) was most probably his ancestor.

⁵ IG II² 1706, l. 108.

⁶ IG II² 833. On the identity of the king, see mainly Wilhelm 1925: 58 and Habicht 1982: 104 n. 114. The unknown honourand was not necessarily honoured for his royal connections; he was most probably one of Diogenes' subordinates who had left the Attic forts a few months earlier.

A75. *Prytanis son of Astykleides of Karystos

— Polyb. 5.93.8; *Agora* 16.224 (SEG 25 [1971] 106; ISE 28); IG II² 443; other sources: Plut., *Mor.* 612D; Hegesandros, *FHG* IV 417, fr. 21 (Ath. 11.477e); *Suda*, s.v. Εὐφορίων

In the fall of 226, three years after the removal of the Macedonian garrisons from Attica, the Athenians honoured the peripatetic philosopher Prytanis son of Astykleides of Karystos, who carried out an embassy to Antigonos Doson (*Agora* 16.224).¹ The decree was proposed by Thoukritos son of Alkimachos (on whom see the following entry). The honours were substantial: public praise, a golden crown and dining at the *prytaneion*.² The account of Prytanis' efforts during the embassy is also noteworthy: in order to meet Doson, Prytanis disregarded the difficulties, dangers and expenses involved (ll. 16-18); he talked to the king "courageously, as if he was making every effort in favour of his own country" (ll. 20-22) and hastened back to the city to convey the content of his discussions.

The embassy's goal is nowhere stated, but there should be no doubt that Athenians strove to secure Doson's respect for their city's neutrality, and his leniency for the way the Macedonian garrisons had been expelled. The recent shift in the balance of international affairs had justifiably worried the Athenians. Dow and Edson³ thought that Athenians were worried because of Doson's campaign in Karia. Although this campaign clearly showed that stability in the Macedonian court had been reestablished by the dynamic new king, it was the more immediate surrounding that must have worried Athenians the most, as Fine and Habicht convincingly argued:⁴ the winter of 227/6 saw the first contacts between Aratos and Doson, and in spring 226, the king made his intention of helping the Achaians against Kleomenes III public;⁵ as is known, these contacts ultimately resulted in a full alliance between Achaia and Doson. Moreover, at least part of the Boiotians, who may have already concluded an alliance with the Achaians,⁶ actively pursued Macedonia's friendship and alliance.⁷ The danger for Athens was imminent: the city risked being surrounded by a number of allied states under the undoubted leadership of Macedonia.

¹ Doson's name is lost due to a later *rasura*, but there is no doubt that he was named in l. 16; perhaps he was named again in l. 19; see Woodhead's apparatus.

² The fact that Prytanis was honoured with a *δειπνον* (ll. 44-45) and not only ἐπὶ ξένια at the *prytaneion*, as was usual for foreigners, is not significant. Firstly, this distinction had become less rigid by the end of the third century; secondly, a *δειπνον* was far more appropriate for someone, even a foreigner, who carried out an official mission set by the Athenian people (see Osborne 1981b: 154-55).

³ Dow / Edson 1937: 169-72.

⁴ Fine 1940: 144 and, mainly, Habicht 1982: 104-105.

⁵ Polyb. 2.47-50; see in detail **B13**, below.

⁶ See Habicht 1982: 100 n. 100.

⁷ Polyb. 20.5.

It is therefore certain that Prytanis' mission was to secure that Doson accepted Athenian neutrality. Did his mission meet with success? Dow, Edson and Le Bohec believe that it did, otherwise honouring him would have been absurd; nonetheless, they provide no explanation for the fact that his success was not recorded.¹ Moretti and Sonnabend, on the contrary, argue that he must have failed, since no tangible result is recorded.² In my view, both theories overlook the crucial importance of mediation *per se*, as well as the objectives of Athenian diplomacy after 229. Instead of trying to read between the lines of the decree, trying to find the reasons why the result of the embassy was not recorded, it would be more fruitful to accept the motivation clause as it stands. Prytanis was honoured *exactly because* he travelled to Doson's court and spoke to the king "for the things which are mutually useful" (l. 20: ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῆι χρησίμων), and for no other reason. The chief objective of Athenian foreign policy as set out by Eurykleides and Mikion was neutrality, based on good relations with all major players of the Greek mainland and all Hellenistic kings. The essential prerequisite for this objective was the existence of channels of communication with all interested parties, including the Macedonian king, the chief threat to Athens. That is exactly what the city expected of Prytanis: the opening of such a channel. In this respect, his mission was accomplished. The hortatory intention formula (ll. 41-43: εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶι | διατηροῦντι τὴν αἴρεσιν εὐρέσθαι παρὰ τοῦ | δήμου καὶ ἄλλο ἀγαθὸν ὅτου ἂν δοκῆι ἄξιος εἶναι) is highly indicative of what the city expected of Prytanis in the future; if he continued to work for the consolidation of Doson's leniency towards the Athenians, he would receive more honours. The emphasis placed on the dangers and the trouble which Prytanis' mission involved is also indicative; it anticipates the phrasing of honorific decrees for ambassadors of Greek cities to Rome, in which the undertaking of an embassy is often given as a reason for honours almost on a par with the result of the embassy.³

This line of interpretation has now received further epigraphical confirmation. Stephen Tracy pointed out that the crown on the stele carrying Prytanis' decree is identical with the crown of *IG II² 443*, of which only the dedication is preserved: [Ἡ] β[ο]υλή, | ὁ δῆμος | [Πρ]ύτανιν.⁴ This must mean that *IG II² 443* is either a copy of the decree under discussion or another decree in honour of

¹ Dow / Edson 1937: 170; Le Bohec 1993: 187.

² Moretti, *ISE* I, p. 63; Sonnabend 1996: 282. Haake 2007: 89-99 does not address the issue.

³ For examples of the emphasis on the difficulty of embassies to Rome, see, for example, Canali de Rossi 1997: n^{os} 171 (*FD III* 4, 43), ll. 8-9; 236e (*Syll³* 591; *I. Lampsakos* 4), ll. 12-15; 337 (*Syll³* 656), ll. 20-23 and *SEG* 39 (1989) 1243 II, ll. 19-24 and 1244 I, ll. 17-22; cf. Wörrle 2005: 153-55. Canali de Rossi 1997: n^o 337, the famous embassy of Teian ambassadors to Rome on behalf of Abydos, is characteristic, as the embassy's result was similarly not recorded.

⁴ Tracy 1990: 52-53. In the *IG* the Π of Prytanis' name is recorded as visible, but Tracy's picture (fig. 6) leaves no doubt that it is not.

Prytanis. Since our decree does not refer to more than one copy, the latter option is more plausible: *IG II² 443* recorded the additional honours that the city had promised Prytanis in 226. There is every reason to assume that the reason for these new honours was the continuation of Prytanis' mediating activity.

Now we can better assess Prytanis' role in 226. By the end of the Chremonidean War Prytanis was already a known philosopher.¹ Although no direct evidence exists to prove that he had contacts with Macedonia prior to his embassy, there is every reason to believe that he did. Prytanis' homeland, Karystos, was one of Antigonos Gonatas' more important –and more stable– strongholds in southern Greece.² Among the six foreigners receiving the greatest honours awarded by the Athenian people,³ there were three Karystians: the first two were Aristonikos son of Aristomedes, *sphairistes* of Alexander III, who was honoured probably because of his connections with the Macedonian court,⁴ and Timosthenes son of Demophanes, who was honoured for his help against Kassandros in 306, an occasion which certainly allows us to assume that Timosthenes has some sort of connection with Poliorketes;⁵ it is interesting that his homonymous grandson confirmed these hereditary honours in 228.⁶ Nonetheless, the very fact that Prytanis was a prominent philosopher is the strongest circumstantial evidence for his relations with the Macedonian court (or its local representatives); philosophers were almost expected to socialize with kings, and this was a relationship actively sought after by both sides, especially in post-Chremonidean Athens.⁷

While there is no certainty that Prytanis' relationship with the Macedonian court already had a past before the embassy of 226, it is certain that it had a future. As we saw, Prytanis probably continued to mediate in favour of Athens; but he personally benefited from his role as an intermediary, as well. In 222 or

¹ He was a teacher of Euphorion (Hegesandros, *FHG IV* 417 fr. 21 [Ath. 11.477e]; *Suda*, s.v. Εὐφορίων).

² According to Picard 1979: 275, Karystos did not even join the revolt of Alexandros son of Krateros.

³ See Gauthier 1985: 77–89, who follows a looser definition of greatest honours; Osborne 1981b speaks only of *sitesis* at the *prytaneion* and the erection of a statue.

⁴ Osborne 1981: D49 (*IG II² 385b*); Ath. 1.19a. He was probably honoured during the Four-Year War with Kassandros. On the heroic honours later accorded to Aristonikos in Karystos –if we are in fact dealing with the same Aristonikos–, see *IG XII 9*, 207, l. 41 and **D96**, below. Cf., in general, Dow 1963 and Osborne 1982: 127–29.

⁵ Osborne 1981: D43 (*IG II² 467*).

⁶ Osborne 1981: D90 (*IG II² 832*).

⁷ Diog. Laert. 4.39 records with some surprise the fact that Arkesilaos refused to meet Gonatas or send him short congratulatory letters (ἐπιστόλια), as so many others did after the king's victory near Kos in 255; the irony of the matter is that Arkesilaos was in fact a close friend of Hierokles, Gonatas' phrourarch in the Piraeus. The birthday celebration for Alkyoneus, Gonatas' son, an occasion lavishly funded by the king, seems to have been a meeting occasion for intellectuals living in Athens (Diog. Laert. 4.41 and 5.68).

221, Doson sent Prytanis as a law-giver to the city of Megalopolis, which had been ravaged by the war with Kleomenes.¹

In conclusion, the embassy of Prytanis exemplifies most of the key features of mediation between city and king. The city chose as intermediaries persons who already had access to the corresponding royal court, or, at any rate, were expected to be favourably received there; Prytanis was expected to be thus received because he was a philosopher.² This applied even in cases –perhaps particularly in those– where the relations with the king were not very good. The intermediaries, on the other hand, exploited their mission not only to further their status at home –or, in Prytanis’ case, second home– but also to forge or further their relationship with that particular royal court. The more the intermediaries cultivated their royal contacts, the more these contacts became doubly useful to them: on the one hand, their city was most likely to ask for their services again, while on the other, they increased their chances for a future career in the royal administration.

A76. Thoukritos son of Alkimachos of Myrrhinous

— *Agora* 16.224 (*SEG* 25 [1971] 106; *ISE* 28); other sources: *I. Rhamn.* 10; 11; 129; 130; *I. Eleusis* 183 (*IG II²* 1279; *SEG* 22 [1967] 125); *Agora* 15.130, l. 88.

Thoukritos is included in the present catalogue as the proposer of the decree in honour of Prytanis of Karystos (cf. the preceding entry). His proposal, however, is the last recorded act of a long, mostly military, career. Thoukritos was hipparch in 259/8 and general of the *paralia* in 257/6, 255/4, 253/2 and 251/0.³

The fact that Thoukritos was a military leader in the 250’s, both before and after the ‘liberation’ granted by Gonatas in ca. 255, obliges us to assume that he entertained close relations with the Macedonian administration. This assumption makes Thoukritos’ involvement in the embassy to Doson more interesting. In the first attempt of Athens to contact the Macedonian throne after the real liberation of 229, both the ambassador himself and the proposer of the decree in his honour

¹ Polyb. 5.93.8. This is recorded by Polybios in 217, but the explicit mention of Doson as the king who sent Prytanis to Megalopolis makes a date before 221 certain. Some scholars date Prytanis’ mission before 223/2 (see Haake 2007: 89 n. 326, with earlier bibliography), but the context of Megalopolis’ social problems makes a date after the battle of Sellasia preferable. In any case, Prytanis’ mission in Megalopolis was a complete failure. The philosopher failed to solve the problems caused by the return of the rich estate holders (κτηματικοί) who had been expelled by Kleomenes; since the opponents of the estate holders were particularly displeased with Prytanis’ legislation, we can assume that Prytanis restored them their land and did not allow the enlargement of the body politic with the inclusion of inhabitants possessing no land.

² Cf. Sonnabend 1996: 281–82.

³ *I. Rhamn.* 10; 11; 129; 130; *I. Eleusis* 183; for the dates, see Osborne 2000: 511–12 and Appendix 3, below. Thoukritos was also *prytanis* in 220/19 (*Agora* 15.130, l. 88).

were individuals for whom the Athenian state had every reason to expect that they would be favourably received at the Macedonian court.¹

A77. Theophrastos

— *I. Eleusis* 207 (*IG II²* 1303; *SEG* 25 [1971] 157; *ISE* 31, with an improved text, but without ll. 25-36)

A decree of soldiers serving at the forts of Eleusis, Panakton and Phyle, dated soon after 218/7 (*I. Eleusis* 207),² is the only secure source on an apparently important statesman of the age of Eurykleides and Mikion.³ He was gymnasiarch in 224/3, hipparch in 220/19, and general of the Eleusinian district in 218/7. His wealth must have been considerable; apart from the amounts he spent during the crucial year 224/3 (see below), he funded *hippeis*, *lochagoi*, and members of the council during the year of his hipparchy.⁴

As we saw above (A71-72), a series of divine honours were voted for the city's now close ally Ptolemy III Euergetes in 224/3. Theophrastos, then a gymnasiarch, supervised *ιδίαι* –which can only mean that he personally funded– a new contest for the king. This was probably not a private initiative. If Habicht is correct in assuming that the “gymnasium of king Ptolemy” was actually donated by Ptolemy III,⁵ then Theophrastos' initiative must have been an expression of official Athenian

¹ In fact, the case of Thoukritos serves to demonstrate the political importance of proposing such decrees (cf. p. 27 n. 2, above), a working hypothesis which often finds confirmation in the present study.

² The last chronological indication provided by the text is Theophrastos' generalship in 218/7 (l. 22; cf. l. 26: “the year in which he was general”). The following lines are only partially preserved and it is, thus, not certain whether any other office was originally mentioned, in any case, Moretti's dating of the decree exactly in 217/6 is hardly secure.

³ Since the honouand's demotic is not preserved, any prosopographical connection is insecure. It is, however, interesting that the name occurs at least three times (*LGP*N II, s.v. Θεόφραστος n^{os} 20-22) among the members of a prominent family from Hagnous, with an ancestry going back to Themistokles of the Persian wars (cf. Davies 1971: 219-20), which furthermore played an important role in the Eleusinian mysteries from the second century to the first century AD (see the stemma in the comments of *IG II²* 3510). Theophrastos was a general of Eleusis honoured by the Eleusinians; after l. 20, the decree in his honour (set up at Eleusis) deals extensively with the year of his generalship (see l. 26: [τὸ]ν ἐ[νια]υτὸν ὃν [ἐ]στρα[τή]γ[η]σε), and could well refer to his benefactions to Eleusis. All these are indications that Theophrastos belonged to the family of the Theophrastoi from Hagnous.

⁴ For the meaning of *ἰππέας πάντα ἵπποτροφῶν*, see mainly Moretti, *ISE* I, pp. 70-71 and Bugh 1988: 192-93, with earlier bibliography. Moretti rightly insists on the fact that the twelve to eighteen talents with which we come up if the phrase is taken literally is too high a figure to be correct, but goes from one extreme to the other, by assuming that Theophrastos did nothing more than secure the delivery of the rations provided by the state to the cavalry men; Bugh's assumption that Theophrastos' benefaction either did not cover the whole year or took the form of supplementary rations is more plausible.

⁵ Habicht 1982: 112-17; cf. Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n^o 17 A.

policy.¹ The contribution of Theophrastos was most probably monetary; personal expenditure of this kind was becoming more and more an expected burden for gymnasiarchs of the Hellenistic period.²

Theophrastos may have been indirectly involved in the developments on another front of Athenian foreign policy, regarding the city's relations with another royal court. In his capacity of the general of Eleusis, he must have been one of the generals who in 218 refused to offer refuge to Megaleas, a Macedonian involved in the infamous 'Apelles affair' at the Macedonian court.³ This prudent stance is characteristic of Athenian foreign policy under Eurykleides and Mikion. Accepting Megaleas' request for refuge would certainly put Athens in the camp of Philip V's enemies and this is what, at the time, the city wanted to avoid at all costs. It is no accident that one of the embassies of Demainetos to Philip and the Aitolians, aiming at Athens' neutrality being accepted by the belligerent king, should probably be dated in 218/7, as well (see the following entry).

A78. Demainetos son of Hermokles of Athmonon

— *I. Eleusis 211 (IG II² 1304; Syll³ 547)*

Demainetos was the predecessor of Theophrastos in the generalship of the Eleusinian district (219/8); he also served as general in 215/4 and 211/10.⁴ He led embassies *πλεονάκις* to Philip V and the Aitolians, in order to ensure Athens' neutrality in the Social war, "so that friendship and peace be maintained by both sides for our people and so that the city, distracted by no one, be restored to its old felicity" (ll. 6-8: *ὅπως ἂν παρ' ἐκατέρων τῶι [δ]ήμῳ ἢ τε φιλί[α κ]αὶ ἡ εἰρήνη διατηρῆται καὶ μηδ' ὕ[φ]' ἐνὸς περι[σ]πωμένη ἡ πόλις [ἀ]ποκατασταθεῖ εἰς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐδαιμονίαν*) – here is a phrase concisely summarizing Athenian foreign policy under Eurykleides and Mikion. Demainetos is otherwise unknown; his embassies must have been carried out on various occasions during the war (220-217), as Habicht assumed.⁵

¹ See Habicht 1982: 108 n. 36: he correctly points out that Moretti is wrong in believing that it is possible that the Ptolemaieia of the Athenian state were probably instituted on Theophrastos' private initiative.

² Cf. Quaß 1993: 286-91.

³ Polyb. 5.27.1. Megaleas reached Attica via Corinth; since he did not even reach the city centre, his fate was decided while he was precisely within the jurisdiction of the general of the Eleusinian district (cf. Habicht 1982: 131 n. 53). The date is 218, probably late summer or early fall (F. W. Walbank 1940: 337), hence in the Attic year 218/7, when Theophrastos was the general of Eleusis.

⁴ *I. Eleusis 211 (IG II² 1304; Syll³ 547)*, another decree of soldiers serving at Eleusis, Panakton and Phyle.

⁵ See Habicht 1982: 134-35; Ferguson 1911: 248, on the contrary, thought that the sequence of events recorded in the decree is strictly chronological, and that the embassies should all date from 220/19. Habicht (*ibid.*; cf. Habicht [2006]: 209-10) also assumes that Demainetos took part in the repeated efforts of Rhodes, Chios, Byzantium and Ptolemy IV to end the war (Polyb. 5.24.11-12,

A79. Asklepiades son of Zenon (of Phyle?)

— SEG 20 (1964) 505 (SB 9418)

Asklepiades was an Athenian ambassador to the Ptolemaic court, who died during his mission, as his funerary urn found in Alexandria informs us. The ambassador's death is dated in *ca.* August 215 or 197.¹ In any case, Asklepiades' embassy is yet another attestation of the very good relations between Athens and the Ptolemies, practically until the end of the kingdom.²

Fraser's identification of the ambassador with the general of the Eleusinian district Asklepiades son of Zenon of Phyle, honoured by soldiers of the countryside in 225/4,³ remains very plausible whichever of the two datings one opts for, but all the more so if one accepts the higher date.

A80. Kephisodoros son of Aristodemos of Xypete

— Paus. 1.36.5-6; Polyb. 18.10.11; *Agora* 16.261 (*ISE* 33; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 39); Osborne 1981: D90 (*IG* II² 832); *I. Eleusis* 210 (*IG* II² 1958), l. 38

After the deaths of Eurykleides and Mikion in *ca.* 210 and throughout the last decade of the third century, Kephisodoros was the undoubted political leader of Athens. Nothing is known of his family.⁴ Already politically active after 229,⁵

28.1-2, 100.9-11; cf. Ager 1996: 145-47 n° 53). It is true that Athens had every interest in seeing the war coming to an end, but Polybios, who is very careful on each occasion to mention the provenance of the ambassadors in each case, never mentions Athenian ambassadors; moreover, it would be inexplicable why such an important diplomatic activity was not mentioned in the decree.

¹ The date is Gorpiaios of the eighth year of Ptolemy IV or Ptolemy V. Fraser 1960: 158-61 n° 14, who first edited the inscription, prefers the former date; on stylistic and historical reasons, Callaghan 1983: 33-34 favours the second. Huß 1976: 118-20 offered an alternative reading of the text (Διὰ Ἡρακλείδου ἄγορα[στοῦ] instead of Διὰ Ἡρακλείδου [.] ἡ Γορπ[ιαίου]), which led him to a date after 212 or 209 (since the only known *agorastes* in the preceding period is Theodotos), perhaps precisely in 209, when diplomatic efforts of the Ptolemies and other Greek states to end the war between the Aitolians and Philip began. Nevertheless, Huß's version of the text does not include the mention of the year, an obligatory element of the epitaphs on Ptolemaic funerary urns (see, for example, Giannikouri 2000: 234, with earlier bibliography) and is therefore doubtful.

² See **A71-A74**, above.

³ *I. Eleusis* 200 (*IG* II² 2978); this Asklepiades is also attested as a cavalryman in *AM* 85 (1970) 208 n° 70.

⁴ Two Kephisodoroi of Xypete are attested in funerary inscriptions, one for the mid-fourth century and one for the second or first century (*IG* II² 6932 and 6936 respectively), but the name is too common, anyway.

⁵ Although the patronym and the demotic of Kephisodoros is not preserved in *Agora* 16.261, there is no doubt that he should be identified with Kephisodoros son of Aristodemos of Xypete, proposer of the naturalization decree for Timosthenes of Karystos (Osborne 1981: D90 [*IG* II² 832]) in March 228; cf. Osborne 1982: 180 and Woodhead 1997: 365, with further bibliography. When Kephisodoros applied for honours in 196/5 (for the date, see Woodhead 1997: 362-63), he reported that he had been politically active for over thirty years (*Agora* 16.261, l. 9). He should probably also be identified with Kephisodoros of Xypete serving in the Attic countryside under general Ekphantos

Kephisodoros is chiefly known for reversing the policy of strict neutrality of Eurykleides and Mikion, by taking sides on the eve of the Second Macedonian war. The declaration of war against Philip V in the spring of 200, the military events which followed, the *damnatio memoriae* of the Antigonid dynasty in public inscriptions, the exploitation of Athens' war against Philip by Rome as a pretext for declaring war against Philip, the following military and diplomatic developments of the war and the benefits of Kephisodoros' policy for Athens need not concern us here.¹

His leading role is attested to mainly by Pausanias (1.36.5-6), according to whom Kephisodoros, a sworn enemy of Philip V, managed to ally Athens with Attalos I, Ptolemy IV, the Aitolians, the Rhodians and the Cretans and, above all, with the Romans, to whom he led an embassy seeking help. Somewhat vaguer, but more interesting in its rhetoric,² is the phrasing of the 'career decree' in his honour: "he proposed a manner by which the people could both maintain its former friends as close allies and win over new ones... and he proposed good alliances and advantageous to the people and performed embassies on issues of the greatest importance for the salvation of the cities and the countryside".³

Pausanias mentions only one embassy to Rome, probably Livy's second Athenian embassy in early 200.⁴ Nonetheless, the plural *πρεσβείας* of the decree

(*I. Eleusis* 210, l. 38; the editors of *LGPN* II, s.v. Κηφισόδωρος n° 122 take the identification for granted). Tracy 1990: 244 and Habicht 1982: 161-62 believe that the fact that Ekphantos proposed a decree in 212/1 (*Agora* 15.129) means that *I. Eleusis* 210 should also be dated to ca. 210 (which is also the date given by Clinton). This assumption, unnecessary as such, has the additional disadvantage that it forbids the identification between the two Kephisodoroi: Kephisodoros of *I. Eleusis* 210 is at the beginning of his career, while Kephisodoros of *Agora* 16.261 was an experienced statesman by 210 (Habicht, paradoxically, continues to identify the two, despite his dating of *I. Eleusis* 210). But, I see no reason why Ekphantos cannot have been a general in, let us say, 230 and have proposed a decree in 212/1; on this assumption, Kephisodoros of *I. Eleusis* 210 may well be the known statesman.

¹ From the extensive bibliography available, see Will 1982: 130-64 (with earlier bibliography); Habicht 1982: 142-58 and 1995: 197-206; Gruen 1984: 382-98 and index, s.v. Macedonian War, Second; Meadows 1993; Warrior 1996. A recently published Athenian proxeny decree for a Rhodian (Daly 2007), may be related to these events, but could also belong to a later context.

² Cf. Golan 2000, who makes the pertinent remark that what, in reality, constituted a complete change of policy, is presented in the decree as a partial continuation of Eurykleides and Mikion's policy.

³ *Agora* 16.261, ll. 17-23: εισηγημένος δὲ καὶ δι' οὗ τρόπου τοὺς τε ὄντας φίλους ὁ δῆμος διατηρήσει βεβαίους ἐν τεῖ πίστει μένοντας καὶ ἑτέρους προσκτήσεται... καὶ συμμαχίας καλὰς συμβουλευτικῶς καὶ συνεννηνοχίας τῷ δήμῳ καὶ πρεσβείας πεπρεσβευτικῶς ὑπὲρ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σωτηρίαν ταῖς πόλεσιν καὶ τῇ χώρῃ.

⁴ Livy 31.5.5-9 (cf. App., *Mac.* 4); cf. Meadows 1993: 52-54. The three Athenian embassies to Rome recorded by Livy have caused very long discussions (Warrior 1996: 97-100 offers a useful summary). Warrior believes that the first two embassies recorded by Livy (31.1.9 and 31.5.5-9) are one and the same (which is very likely) and that the embassy mentioned by Pausanias is a later one,

clearly shows that Kephisodoros could boast of more than one decisive embassy in 195. Accordingly, he may have been involved in the first Athenian embassy to Rome, in the fall of 201 (if it ever happened),¹ in the slightly later (winter 201/0?) embassy to Philopator,² in the embassy to Attalos I in Aigina (probably in the same period),³ in the third embassy to Roman officials in Apollonia (fall 200; if it ever happened),⁴ or even in some unattested embassy to Crete, Aitolia or Rhodes.⁵ We can only be certain that he led at least one more embassy to Rome, in 198, where he participated in the fruitless negotiations aiming to bring the war to an end.⁶

For present purposes, we should probably not overemphasize Kephisodoros' relations with the Attalid and Ptolemaic courts, even if he was personally involved in the corresponding embassies. The main target of Kephisodoros' foreign policy was the alliance with Rome, the new pole of power in Greek affairs, strong enough to potentially crush Macedonia, Athens' main enemy, but at the same time distant enough not to pose an (immediate) threat to Athens. Strategically, relations with the Ptolemies and the Attalids came as a result of Athens' relations with Rome; they were subsequently actively maintained for a long time, but with a definite shift from forming a strategic alliance towards establishing relations of euergetism.

In 195, when he received the highest honours by his fellow countrymen, Kephisodoros must have been at least sixty-five years old; we hear nothing of him after this decree. By 192, when Athens temporarily oscillated between Rome and Antiochos III (see **A83**, below), Kephisodoros must have already passed away.

dated to the summer of 200; this, however, depends entirely on her proposed reconstruction of the events of 200.

¹ Livy 31.1.9.

² Livy 31.9.1. Habicht 1992: 75 n. 42 (= 1994: 149 n. 50) also assumes that he took part in that embassy.

³ Polyb. 16.25.1.

⁴ Livy 31.14.3 (on the date, cf. 31.22.4). The historicity of this third embassy has been often doubted (see Gruen 1984: 386, with further bibliography).

⁵ Meadows 1993: 54 believes that Pausanias 1.36.5 implies that there was only *one* embassy to all kings and states mentioned in that passage as allies of Athens, and places this embassy in December 201 (cf. already Ferguson 1911: 269-70). His theory is based on a literal reading of Pausanias' phrase συμμάχους δὲ ἐπήγετο; this phrase, however –just as its exactly parallel phrase provided by the phrase καὶ πόλεις ἑλληνίδας καὶ βασιλεῖς προσηγγάγετο, used in the decree in honour of Eurykleides (*IG* II² 834, ll. 16-17); cf. **A71-72**, above–, refers to the result of the *policy* of Kephisodoros in general and not to the result of particular embassies. It would be completely unnecessary to limit the implementation of that policy to only one embassy on the very eve of war.

⁶ Polyb. 18.10.11; for Athenian benefits, see Habicht [2006]: 224-25.

A81. Demokles

— Δημοκλῆς Ἀριστ[---]: IG II² 888

Demokles is the otherwise unknown proposer of an honorific decree approved in 194/3 (IG II² 888).¹ Although only the upper left part of the text is preserved, it is clear that the unknown honourand was a member of a royal court (ll. 6, 9) and proved useful to Athenian ambassadors (ll. 6-7). An *agonothesia* is also mentioned (l. 10), the context of which is difficult to recover. There should be no doubt that the honourand was not only a high-ranking courtier of the Attalids or the Ptolemies,² but that he also lavished more benefactions upon Athens.

A82. [Timokl]es (?) son of Menekrates (of Kikkyna ?)

— IG II² 886

Proposer of an honorific decree voted in the seventh prytany of 193/2 (IG II² 886).³ The unknown honourand, a citizen of Pergamon or some other Attalid city, had come to Athens as a *theoros* for the Panathenaia; he sojourned in the city studying philosophy for a long time, was actively involved in the city's defence against Philip V in 200, along with other students of the director of the Academy, Euandros,⁴ and then returned home, where he intervened for the preservation of good relations between Athens and Attalos I,⁵ and more specifically for the liberation of Athenian captives (l. 17: --- τῶν ἀλό[ντων ---]);⁶ he most probably continued to benefit the city he studied in in a variety of ways.

Koehler's old proposal that the honourand should be identified with Hegesinous of Pergamon, successor to Euandros as head of the Academy, is epigraphically

¹ On the date of archon Dionysios, see Habicht 1982: 165-68. The proposer's very common name and the very common beginning of his patronym forbid any prosopographical identifications.

² Habicht 1992: 77 n. 51 opts for the second choice.

³ On the date, see already Dinsmoor 1938: 184-85 and Woodhead 1997: 367-68.

⁴ Euandros led the Academy after Lakydes' death in 207. For the testimonia on Academic philosophers of this period, see Mette 1985; for the date, Habicht 1982: 163-65; Dorandi 1991b: 7-10.

⁵ In ll. 15-16 Kirchner restored [ὅπως ἐπαύξει ὁ β]ασιλεὺς Ἄτταλος ἦν ἐκ νέου ἔχει πρὸς [τὸν δῆμον εὖνοιαν]. This restoration is unacceptable for many reasons: 1) Attalos I, dead since 197, cannot have been referred to in the present tense. 2) To the best of my knowledge, the phrase ἦν ἐκ νέου ἔχει... εὖνοιαν has no parallels, while it does not really make much sense. 3) The last preserved letter of l. 15 is not necessarily a N (see Koehler's edition in IG II 385 -where he only transcribes a lower vertical hasta-, the photograph of the stone published by Tracy 1990: 97, fig. 11 and the photograph of the squeeze in *Images from the Squeeze Collection of the Ohio State University* (<http://epigraphy.osu.edu/attic/IG.II_500-1000/IG.II2_886.cfm>), where no certain trace of a letter is visible).

⁶ Habicht 1990b: 564 (= 1994: 186-87); Sonnabend 1996: 287, with earlier bibliography in n. 264. It is to be noted that Bielman 1994 does not include this inscription in her catalogue of inscriptions recording the liberation of captives.

attractive,¹ but unlikely: the honourand returned to Attalid territory, while Hege-sinous must have remained in Athens.² Equally interesting but also unlikely is Habicht's suggestion³ that the honourand was no other than Attalos (later Attalos II), Eumenes II's brother, who, precisely in 192, led an embassy to Rome,⁴ having probably passed through Athens, as well. As Habicht himself concedes, the restoration of his name is epigraphically difficult; moreover, it is difficult to imagine a member of the royal family of Pergamon participating in the defence of Attica, obeying a decree of the Athenian people (ll. 10-11).

Whoever the honourand might have been, the decree in his honour bears even further testimony to the excellent relations of the Attalids with the philosophical schools of Athens, throughout the second half of the third century.⁵ Attalos I himself funded the construction of new facilities for the Academy (the Lakydeion, named after the then director of the school).⁶ If the unknown honourand in our decree was already in Athens before Lakydes' death in 207,⁷ he may well have intervened for the construction of the Lakydeion.

Nonetheless, relations between Athens and Pergamon acquired a clearly political character only a little earlier than their official alliance in 200, when Athens declared war on Philip V, as Attalos and the Rhodians had done, and, for the third time since 307, voted divine honours for a Hellenistic ruler.⁸ As with the Ptolemies, relations with the Attalids were maintained until the very end of the Attalid kingdom, the Attalid kings being the royal benefactors of Athens *par excellence*.⁹

The timing of the honours voted for an intermediary between Athens and Pergamon in early 192 was anything but accidental. As we shall see in more detail in the following entry, the political climate in Athens was tense: the pro-Antiochic and/or anti-Roman political faction actively promoted an alliance of the city with

¹ The restoration [Ἡγησίνοϋς Περγαμηνὸς] would perfectly fit the number of missing letters in l. 6.

² Cf. Mattingly 1971: 27 (with a wrong date) and Sonnabend 1996: 288 n. 269; see also Haake 2007: 99-104, against other assumptions based on this decree.

³ Habicht 1990b: 564 (= 1994: 186-87).

⁴ Livy 35.23.10.

⁵ See Sonnabend 1996: 315-20 and 272-74 on Arkesilaos of Pitane (Academy) and Lykon of Alexandria Troas (Peripatos). Not surprisingly, both came from cities in the Attalid realm.

⁶ Diog. Laert. 4.60.

⁷ The first dated event which the decree records is the Macedonian invasion of 200, but the unknown scholar is said to have lived in Athens already "for a long time" (l. 9: [ἐπὶ πλ]εῖω).

⁸ The honours included the creation of a tribe named Attalis in the king's honour (Polyb. 16.25.9; Livy 31.15.6) and of a deme (Apollonieis) in honour of queen Apollonis (for bibliography, see Habicht [2006]: 461 n. 12), as well as a cult of Attalos, attested for the first time in 193/2 (Agora 15.259, l. 86; for the first priest of this cult, see Habicht 1990b: 562 [= 1994: 185] n. 7); cf. Kotsidu 2000: n° 28). For relations between Attalos I and Athens, cf. Schalles 1985: 136-43.

⁹ For Attalid donations to Athens, see Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n°s 26-31.

Antiochos III. Precisely in early 192, an embassy of the Senate arrived in Greece, aiming at assuring pro-Roman policies by Rome's allies in view of the coming war with Antiochos.¹ The arrival of the ambassadors in Athens undoubtedly strengthened the position of pro-Roman politicians, who by the end of the year finally overcame their adversaries. Under such turbulent circumstances, our decree may well have been itself one of the moves the pro-Roman faction made to gain ground. Public discourse in favour of Attalid benefactions probably represents a seemingly innocuous attempt of the pro-Roman faction to reassert the alliance with Rome's main ally in the coming war. In the summer or autumn of 192, Eumenes II personally visited Athens at the request of Flamininus, in order to further promote pro-Roman policy.² Flamininus' request shows two things: the strength of anti-Roman feelings in Athens and the effectiveness of Attalid persuasion in Athenian political life.

I believe that the proposer of the decree should be identified with Timokles son of Me[---] from Kikynna, vice-secretary of the council in the last decade of the third century.³ He may also have had family ties with Menekrates son of Zenon from the same deme, an ephebe in 220/19,⁴ who was the father of Zenon son of Menekrates, victor in the Panathenaia of 162.⁵ If all these identifications are correct, the proposer of the decree for the Pergamene scholar was an offspring of an aristocratic family, politically active for many decades. Given that the pro-Roman faction in 192 was dominated by members of rich aristocratic families (cf. in the following entry), this should hardly come as a surprise.

A83. Apollodoros

— Livy 35.50.4

192 was a crucial year for Roman interests in Greece. The Aitolians, in an effort to precipitate the involvement of the unwilling Antiochos III in their imminent confrontations with the Romans, championed the establishment of regimes friendly to the king in Demetrias, Chalkis and Sparta.⁶ Preparations for the coming war on the part of Antiochos and the Aitolians and, perhaps even more, the rumours

¹ Livy 35.31.2; cf. the following entry.

² Livy 35.39.2; on the date, cf. p. 207 n. 6, below.

³ Agora 15.137 (IG II² 913). In the IG, the number of letters missing from the *lacuna* in l. 7, with the vice-secretary's patronym, are reckoned as amounting to seven: ([καὶ τὸν ὄπο]γραμματέα Τιμοκλῆν Με[. . .^{c.7}. . . . Κικκυνέα ἀναγράψαι δὲ τό]δε τὸ ψήφισμα); in Agora 15 an estimate of the number of missing letters was avoided. The restoration Τιμοκλῆν Με[νεκράτου] exceeds only by one letter the estimate in IG, producing a line of forty-seven letters in a non-*stoichedon* inscription with lines varying between forty-five and forty-eight letters.

⁴ *Hesperia* 15 (1946) 192 n° 37, l. 16; for the demotic, see Tracy / Habicht 1991: 208.

⁵ SEG 41 (1991) 115, l. III 28. Zenon is probably identical to Zenon son of Me[---], an ephebe in the first half of the second century (IG II² 2980a, l. 5).

⁶ See the summary account of Will 1982: 195-204.

about the extent of these preparations, led the Roman Senate to dispatch not only military contingents to Greece, but also an embassy which aimed to consolidate the pro-Roman attitude of its allies.¹ The embassy reached Greece in early 192.² The fact that Athens was the ambassadors' first stop shows the power of the pro-Seleukid faction in the city.³ Another indication of the faction's power is that, when exiled by his countrymen, the leader of the anti-Roman faction of Chalkis, Euthymides, sought refuge in Athens.⁴ After Euthymides and his associates, aided by the Aitolian general Thoas, unsuccessfully attempted to conquer Chalkis, he again sought refuge in Athens.⁵ Immediately after this second visit of Euthymides to Athens,⁶ Flamininus requested Eumenes II to leave a garrison of 500 at Chalkis and go to Athens –a final indication of Roman concern over Athens' position. The dispatch of an Achaian force of 500 men to Chalkis and the Piraeus was decided immediately after the extraordinary Achaian *synkletos* in ca. November 192.⁷ According to the –obviously not objective– account of Livy, this dispatch was justified because Athens was on the brink of civil war, with leaders of the anti-Roman faction, bribed by Antiochos, attempting to win over the *venalem multitudinem*. The pro-Roman faction, led by Leon, called Flamininus to help and thus succeeded in convicting and banishing the leader of the opposing faction Apollodoros.⁸ Thereafter, Athens remained a loyal ally of Rome for more than a century.

Apollodoros is otherwise unknown,⁹ and, as Habicht aptly remarks, his name was so common in Attica that any attempt of identification would be extremely precarious.¹⁰ On the contrary, there should be no doubt that the leader of the pro-Roman faction was Leon (II) son of Kichesias of Aixone, an offspring of an important family attested from the time of Alexander III to the end of the first

¹ Livy 35.23.

² Livy 35.31.1-3; for the date, see, for example, F. W. Walbank 1940: 195 and 344; Klaffenbach, *IG IX 1² 1*, *Prolegomena* xxxviii.

³ The pro-Seleukid faction did not, however, possess the majority: Flamininus convinced the Athenians to send representatives to the assembly of the Aitolian *koinon*; their mission was to deter the Aitolians from actions against the Romans (Livy 35.32.7). For the events in Chalkis and Demetrias, the other two stops of the Roman embassy, see mainly Deininger 1971: 80-86 and 76-80 and below, **C37-38, C45, D87-89**.

⁴ Livy 35.37.6.

⁵ Livy 35.38.13.

⁶ Livy 35.39.1, summer or early autumn of 192; the events next recorded by Livy are the disembarkment of Antiochos at Demetrias, the Aitolian assembly in October (35.43) and the end of the year in Rome (35.40.2: *consulibus designatis*; 35.41.1: *iam fere in exitu annus erat*).

⁷ Livy 35.50.3. For the date, see Aymard 1938: 325 n. 3.

⁸ Livy 35.50.4.

⁹ Deininger 1971: 89 n. 2, convincingly refutes earlier attempts to identify him with known Athenians.

¹⁰ Habicht [2006]: 230; there are 263 Apollodoroi in *LGPV* II.

century.¹ This conforms to the general picture arising from our sources, at least until 168: in all Greek cities the pro-Roman faction consistently comprised members of leading aristocratic families; the anti-Roman faction was also led by politicians of the same social stratum who, nonetheless, often, and regardless of their true intentions, sought followers among the *πλήθος*, the *multitudo*.² Our total ignorance about Apollodoros' career does not allow any assumptions as to whether there also was a domestic agenda in his policy against Rome or not.

The assumption that Apollodoros' personal ties with the Seleukid court –if he had any– significantly coloured his anti-Roman policy would be equally unfounded. Taunting of anti-Roman politicians with being the bribed puppets of Antiochos was an expected instrument of Roman propaganda (and Livy) and, in the absence of supporting evidence, should not be invested with any credibility. The only secure attestation of any sort of relations between Athens and Antiochos III,³ in ca. 201, hardly suggests particularly close ties.⁴ It is true that, despite the king's defeat by the Romans, relations with the Seleukids were improved surprisingly quickly, already by 186,⁵ an indication that part of Athenian statesmen was favourably disposed towards the Seleukids. The fact remains, however, that the details of the relationship of Apollodoros, the only known representative of the pro-Antiochic faction in Athens, with the Seleukid court elude us.

¹ See F. W. Walbank 1979: 131 and Habicht 1982: 194–97.

² See the details in Deininger 1971, although I do not share his view that inner political struggle in the cities played a major part in the decision to either confront or join Rome (cf. Briscoe 1974 and de Ste. Croix 1981: 523–24).

³ On past Athenian ties with the Seleukids, see Habicht 1989: 7–9 (= 1994: 164–66). There are several occasions of Seleukid presence in Athens which could be dated to the reign of Antiochos III, but no certainty can be attained. The golden *aegis* with a *gorgoneion* above the theatre of Dionysos, (Paus. 5.12.4), is sometimes (hesitantly) dated to the reign of Antiochos III (see Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 23) but more probably dates to the reign of Antiochos IV (see Themelis 2003: 168–72); Antiochos IV is said to have inherited his goodwill towards Athens from his ancestors, that is, Antiochos III (SEG 32 [1982] 131, with Habicht 1989: n. 33); finally, the mediating activity of Philonides of Laodikeia (I. Eleusis 221 [IG II² 1236]) could perhaps belong to the reign of Antiochos III (Habicht 1989: 17 = 1994: 174–75; cf. Haake 2007: 148–59).

⁴ Athens satisfied the request of ambassadors of Alabanda in Karia (in essence of Antiochos himself) to acknowledge the *asylia* of the city (Rigsby 1996: n° 162 [SEG 28 (1978) 75; Osborne 1981: D95]). The date is controversial: ca. 203 used to be the date agreed upon by most scholars (bibliography *apud* Osborne 1982: 184 n. 849), but Philaitolos of Delphi, in whose archonship the amphictionic *asylia* decree for Alabanda was enacted (CID IV 99 [FD III 4, 163; Rigsby 1996: n° 163]), is now dated to 202/1 or, more likely, to 201/0 (Lefèvre 1998: 312 and CID IV p. 22 and 24); accordingly, Rigsby 1996: 329 dates the embassy of Alabanda to Athens to the spring of 201. He also makes the pertinent remark (Rigsby 1996: 331) that the Athenians, unlike the amphictiony, did not grant a crown to Antiochos, obviously in an attempt not to displease the Ptolemies, their traditional allies.

⁵ See the details in Habicht 1989: 17–26 (= 1994: 174–82).

THE PELOPONNESE

ARGOS

B1. An ancestor of Aristomachos (I)

— *ISE 23 (IG II² 774 + Add.) + SEG 39 (1989) 131*

The Attic honorific decree in honour of Aristomachos (I) son of Aristippos (I) of Argos,¹ most probably dated to the late 240's,² relates earlier activities of the honourend and his ancestors in the interest of the city. One of those ancestors, [---]ος ὁ Ἄρι[---] (l. 8), helped Athens during the Four-Year War against Kassandros (307-304), as well as later on (ll. 7-31).

The identity of this ancestor of Aristomachos (I) is not easy to establish. As the names Aristippos and Aristomachos were favoured by the members of this family of third-century Argive rulers,³ it has been assumed that this ancestor should be identified with [Ἀρίστιππος ὁ Ἄρι[στομάχου πατήρ], that is, the well-known Aristippos I (**B3**, below).⁴ Wilhelm, however, followed by Mitsos and Moretti, argued that Aristippos (I), supporter of Gonatas in 272,⁵ cannot be the one referred to here, since [---]ος ὁ Ἄρι[---] appears as a leading figure, and therefore of advanced age, already in 307-304. He therefore suggested the restoration [Ἀριστό][μαχος ὁ πάππος]ος ὁ Ἄρι[στομάχου].⁶ It must be noted that Wilhelm is less emphatic than

¹ *ISE 23 (IG II² 774) + SEG 39 (1989) 131*. On the main body of the decree, see **B4**, below. Given that the identity of the individual dealt with in this entry is uncertain, I maintain the traditional 'numbering' of the members of this Argive family in order to avoid confusion.

² It was most probably enacted in the archonship of Lysiades (Osborne 1989: 221-25). *SEG 47 (1997) 151* (unpublished) no longer allows dating Lysiades' archonship in the early 240's; Osborne 2004: 205-206 tentatively dates his archonship to 242/1, while Tracy 2003: 168 avoids opting for a precise date.

³ See **B3-6**, below. It is highly probable that Aristodamos son of Aristomachos, victor at the Lykaia of 316 (?) (*IG V 2, 549, l. 26*) and Aristippos, proposer of a late fourth- or early third-century decree (*SEG 13 [1956] 243*), on whom cf. n. 6, below, were members of the same family.

⁴ So Koehler (*IG II 5, 371c*) and Kirchner (*IG II² 774*).

⁵ Plut., *Pyrrh.* 30.2; cf. **B3**, below.

⁶ Wilhelm 1925: 31-34, followed by Mitsos 1952: 41, Moretti, *ISE I*, p. 50 n. 1 and Landucci Gattinoni 2006: 330 (De Sanctis 1936: 141-44 and Charneux 1991: 315 remain sceptical). Nonetheless, if the Aristippos of 272 is to be identified with Aristippos son of Archandros of Argos, honoured in Delphi in 276/5 (*CID IV 15 [FD III 1, 88; Syll³ 406]*; on the date, see Lefèvre 1998: 311), then Aristomachos' grandfather was not named Aristomachos but Archandros. This does not, of course,

Moretti. For Wilhelm the restoration [Ἀρίστιππος] ὁ Ἀριστομάχου πατὴρ] was preferable for linguistic reasons rather than necessary for historical reasons. It is true that in Attic honorific decrees the usual phrasing is “X father of Y”, not “X, Y’s father”;¹ on the other hand, I know of no parallel for Wilhelm’s restoration either,² and it would probably be unwise to found our choice on such thin stylistic grounds. Moreover, it must be stressed that the assumption that Aristippos (I) was a leading public figure already in 307-304 is not very probable, but is not impossible either.³ In other words, it is impossible to ascertain whether the ancestor of Aristomachos (I) to which the decree refers is his father Aristippos or his grandfather, named either Aristomachos or Archandros.

It is not only the identity of this ancestor which is in doubt; uncertainties remain as to his exact activities in favour of Athens (ll. 10-31). The reference to Kassandros in l. 11 (Κασσάνδρου δέ ---) leads us to the assumption that he helped Athens during the Four-year War (307-304). It is noteworthy that Argos was freed from Kassandros’ presence only in 303,⁴ which means that the ancestor of Aristomachos helped Athens not in an official Argive capacity but, most probably, as an individual, on behalf of Poliorketes. After a break in the text between the

affect the core of Wilhelm’s argument and restoration: [Ἀρχανδρος ὁ πάππος] ὁ Ἀριστομάχου] would be a variation of Wilhelm’s restoration.

¹ See, for example, SEG 45 [1995] 101: Φιλόμελος ὁ πατὴρ Φιλιππίδου.

² The closest parallel is “Y’s grandfather X” (Osborne 1981: D90 [IG II² 832]: ὁ δὲ Τιμοσθένου πάππος Τιμοσθένης).

³ A certain Aristippos proposed a late fourth- or early third-century decree (SEG 13 [1956] 243; on the date [judging from the letter forms, after 315], see Perlman 2000: 153-55) and it is tempting to identify him with Aristippos I, thus confuting Wilhelm’s argument. There are two more, but rather weak, counter-arguments to Wilhelm’s assertion. Firstly, if the person in question was actually the grandfather of Aristomachos (I), one would expect at least a summary mention of his father as well, in conformity to the formula of the goodwill of the benefactor’s ancestors. This mention, however, could have been made in the missing passage between the two fragments of the inscription (but see p. 211 n. 1, below). Even if it was never made, this would not be surprising: a staunch supporter of the Antigonids, as all members of this family were, would have had few opportunities to help Athens between the battle of Ipsos and the end of the Chremonidean War. A second counter-argument concerns Wilhelm’s restoration of ll. 31-32 -π[ρογονικὴν] οὖν παρειληφώς ὁ Ἀ[ρι]στόμαχος [τὴν π]ρὸς τ[ὸν δῆμον φι]λοτιμίαν-, a restoration for which I know of no parallels (προγονικὴ εὐνοία in SEG 47 [1997] 1646 has a collective sense); one would expect the usual term πατρικὴ φιλοτιμία (or εὐνοία), on which see, for example, SEG 37 (1987) 82; IG II² 399 (ISE 2) and 844; I. *Rhamn.* 17 (SEG 25 [1971] 155). Nonetheless, one can reject Wilhelm’s restoration of ll. 31-32 but still maintain his restoration in l. 8, since the adjective πατρικός could be used for any generation of male ancestors (cf. **B12**, below). Charneux 1991: 322-23 also has doubts about Wilhelm’s restoration of ll. 31-32; he points out that the term προγονικός is very rare before Polybios. The restoration π[ατρικὴν] οὖν παρειληφώς ὁ Ἀ[ρι]στόμαχος [τὴν π]ρὸς τ[ὸν δῆμον φι]λοτιμίαν, which I consider more probable, may give a line of slightly less letters than the rest (39 against an average of ca. 40-43 letters), but is still epigraphically possible.

⁴ Plut., *Demetr.* 25; Ath. 10.415a; ISE 5 and 39.

two fragments, further help offered by the same ancestor,¹ now an Argive general (l. 24: στρατ[ηγὸς ὦν], is recorded: he convinced Argive military forces to act in a manner worthy of the old friendship between the two cities (ll. 24-26); when another military force (on whose identity see below) departed from Athens, the Argive forces saw to the safety of the Athenians within the Long Walls and at the Piraeus (ll. 27-31).

ll. 29-30 are crucial for the understanding of this part of the text: ὡς συ[ν]έβη τοὺς ὑ[πὸ] ^{ca. 9-10} ταχθέν[τ]ας τὴν ἀποχώρησιν (*scil.* from Athens)² ποιήσα[σθαι]. Three restorations are possible: ὑ[πὸ] Κασσάνδρου], ὑ[πὸ] Δημητρίου], and ὑ[πὸ] Λαχάρου].³ Wilhelm favoured the second choice:⁴ according to his reconstruction, after the withdrawal of Poliorketes from Athens and the battle of Ipsos, civil strife broke out in Athens; under the auspices of Kassandros, Lachares strengthened his position, and the ancestor of Aristomachos, a loyal ally of Poliorketes, helped the remaining Athenian democrats reconquer the parts of the city which Lachares controlled. This reconstruction is unlikely. Firstly, Lachares' tyrannid cannot be placed so early.⁵ Secondly, Moretti convincingly points out that a decree enacted when Antigonos Gonatas still controlled Athens would not have so emphatically stressed the danger which Poliorketes' withdrawal posed to the city.⁶ For the same reason, one should add, a reference to Poliorketes without his royal title would be unacceptable. The first option (ὑ[πὸ] Κασσάνδρου]) is unlikely, as well. Although, as we have seen,⁷ it is possible that Kassandros had temporarily taken control of certain parts of Athens in 304, the absence of an explicit reference to Poliorketes would be surprising; according to Plutarch,⁸ it was he who vanquished Kassandros in 304 and broke the latter's siege of the city. Besides, the ancestor of Aristomachos could not have been an officially designated general of a city which was still occupied by Pleistarchos in 304. Theoretically, the third option (ὑ[πὸ] Λαχάρου]), stumbles upon the same objection raised against restoring the name of Kassandros: the takeover of Athens in 295 is presented by Plutarch as exclusively Poliorketes' making.⁹ In reality, however, things were less easy for him: Poliorketes lost his

¹ Theoretically, it is possible that a different ancestor (the father of Aristomachos?) is now meant. Nonetheless, the fact that the two passages record similar activities makes it more probable that we are dealing with the same ancestor.

² Wilhelm 1925: 19-22 is decisive (cf. Charneux 1991: 315 n. 118) against the view of Koehler (*IG* II 5, 371c) and Kirchner (*IG* II² 774) that a withdrawal from Argos is meant -which would in turn mean that the help mentioned was Athenian help offered to Argos and not vice-versa.

³ Cf. Moretti, *ISE* I, p. 49.

⁴ Wilhelm 1925: 28-30.

⁵ See **A41**, above.

⁶ *ISE* I, p. 49.

⁷ See **A19** (III), above.

⁸ Plut., *Demetr.* 23.1-2.

⁹ Plut., *Demetr.* 33-34.

fleet during the early stages of the siege, which ended without a definitive victor, then turned to the Peloponnese, and finally succeeded in conquering Athens only because of the starvation caused by the long blockade. It is therefore anything but unlikely that he brought with him auxiliary forces from the newly conquered cities of the Peloponnese, including the Argive contingent led by the ancestor of Aristomachos.¹

In conclusion, the only certainty regarding the activity of Aristomachos' ancestor is that he helped Athens militarily on two crucial occasions, first (in 304) as an individual, then (in 295?) as an Argive general. If he is to be identified with Aristippos (I), this would have been the very start of his career and it is certain that his close affiliation to the Antigonid cause decisively contributed to the consolidation of his power in Argos. If, on the other hand, he is to be identified with the father of Aristippos (I), the latter's connection with the Antigonid throne appears to have been, as in many similar cases, a bond inherited from his father.

B2. Aristetas — B3. Aristippos (I) (son of Aristomachos or Archandros)

— Plut., *Pyrrh.* 30.2 and 32.1; Polyainos 8.68

Argos was the last stop in the rich and eventful career of king Pyrrhos. In the summer of 272 Pyrrhos had just failed to take over Sparta for Kleonymos, a contender for the throne of Sparta,² and was looking for a base from which he could confront Antigonos Gonatas, who had already defeated Pyrrhos' son Ptolemaios in Macedonia and had crossed the Isthmus, aiming at a final confrontation with the Aiakid king.³ This is why Pyrrhos accepted the invitation of Aristetas, leader of one of the two feuding factions of Argos, to come to the city. The leader of the other faction was Aristippos, a member of the family which was to rule over Argos for the greatest part of the third century.⁴

Given the portrayal of the family's rule in the literary sources as nothing less than a tyrannid – a tyrannid, moreover, protected by Macedonian arms – it is *prima facie* tempting to consider Aristetas as the leader of an anti-Macedonian democratic faction.⁵ This temptation, however, would lead to oversimplification. The exact phrasing of Plutarch is enlightening: “In Argos there was a feud between Aristetas and Aristippos; since Aristippos was known to be a friend of Antigonos,

¹ The restoration ὑ[πὸ Λαχάρου] was proposed by De Sanctis 1936: 141-44 and accepted by Manni 1951: 107-108 and Landucci Gattinoni 2006: 331-33.

² Plut., *Pyrrh.* 26.14-30; cf. Lévêque 1957: 592-606.

³ Cf. Lévêque 1957: 606-608; Will 1979: 215.

⁴ See the preceding and the three following entries.

⁵ So Mitsos 1945: 67 and Lévêque 1957: 608-609.

Aristeas managed to act first and called upon Pyrrhos to come to Argos”.¹ The whole affair clearly begins with a struggle for power between Aristippos –apparently already in power–² and Aristeas. That the two contenders for rule over Argos had opposing agendas of domestic and foreign policy is possible, but unattested; even if they did, this was clearly of secondary importance to Plutarch. What mattered was that Aristippos was known to entertain friendly relations with Gonatas; Aristeas had no choice but to anticipate Aristippos’ move (literally: φθάσας) and seek high protection in Gonatas’ rival. In pursuing their personal political objectives, actual or aspiring Hellenistic civic leaders could ally themselves with any powerful ruler; this need not, however, imply a corresponding domestic policy or long-term orientation of foreign policy.

This interpretation is further corroborated by subsequent events. Pyrrhos, after a skirmish with the Spartans who pursued his forces (which led to the death of his son Ptolemaios), reached Argolis, made camp in Nauplia and challenged Gonatas to battle (Plut., *Pyrrh.* 30.5-31.4). The Argives then sent a double embassy to Gonatas and Pyrrhos, asking both not to attempt to conquer the city and promising to remain strictly neutral in return (31.5-6). Gonatas accepted and sent his son³ as a hostage to the Argives, but Pyrrhos, although pretending to accept the terms, offered no guarantees, thus arousing Argives’ suspicion (31.7). He then invaded the city at night, through a gate left open by Aristeas (32.1); the Argives perceived the attack and expeditiously called Gonatas (32.2); the final battle between the two kings ensued, resulting in Pyrrhos’ death (32.3-34.6).

Who were “the Argives” who sent the double embassy? For a number of reasons it is unlikely that they were Aristippos or Aristeas. The treacherous actions of Aristeas make it clear that he was well aware of Pyrrhos’ intent to invade the city; moreover, neutrality would have hardly furthered his plans, especially if Aristippos was already in power. But neither did Aristippos have much to gain from a policy of strict neutrality: a final confrontation between Pyrrhos and Gonatas would be a good opportunity for him to get rid of Aristeas with the help of the Macedonian forces, and this is precisely what happened. It is therefore more plausible that the double embassy was instigated by a third political faction in Argos, people who were astute enough to understand that the victory of *any* king in or near Argos would also bring about the predominance of Aristeas or Aristippos –perhaps even the abolition of the constitution–, but also strong enough to enforce an official

¹ Plut., *Pyrrh.* 30.2: Ἐν γὰρ Ἄργει στάσις ἦν Ἀριστείου πρὸς Ἀρίστιππον· ἐπεὶ δ’ ὁ Ἀρίστιππος ἐδόκει χρῆσθαι φίλῳ τῷ Ἀντιγόνῳ, φθάσας ὁ Ἀριστείας ἐκάλει τὸν Πύρρον εἰς τὸ Ἄργος. Polyainos 8.68 also mentions Aristeas’ invitation to Pyrrhos.

² This is inferred from Plutarch’s account and corroborated by the possible identification of Aristippos with Aristippos son of Archandros, honoured in Delphi in 276/5 (*CID* IV 15 [*FD* III 1, 88; *Syll*³ 406]; on the date, see Lefèvre 1998: 311).

³ Probably Alkyoneus, mentioned immediately below (34.7).

embassy to both kings. In other words, it is perhaps preferable not to see Aristippos and Aristeas as the leaders of an oligarchic and a democratic faction respectively, factions which are unattested and may not have existed as such, but simply as two powerful statesmen who sought to take advantage of a troubled juncture in order to take over the leadership of the city, within or outside the boundaries of constitutional legitimacy.

In contrast to Aristippos, Aristeas is otherwise unknown. It is interesting that an Aristippos, the writer of an antiquarian work on Arkadia, deals with an issue also dealt with by an Argive historian named Aristeas.¹ The dating of both writers is insecure² and Aristippos seems to be interested in Arkadia and not Argos. Nonetheless, the two contenders for power in Argos could possibly be identified with the two writers.³ Even if we discard this possibility, it is clear that Aristeas belonged to a powerful Argive family;⁴ otherwise he would not have been in a position to claim power from Aristippos and lead a group of citizens who did not hesitate to facilitate the conquest of the city by foreign forces. Either way, his choice of high protector cost him the end of his political ambitions, if not his life.

Aristippos, on the other hand, made the right (or more fortunate) choice and reaped the appropriate benefits, maintaining sway over political life in Argos. Despite the unanimous scholarly verdict that Aristippos was a tyrant,⁵ it is not clear whether this sway was tyrannical, or, at least, whether it was tyrannical from the start. The only relevant allusion in the sources is Phylarchos' statement that Aristomachos (II), his grandson, "not only became a tyrant, but was descended

¹ *FGrHist* 317 F 1.

² This Aristippos is the second writer by that name mentioned by Diogenes Laertios (2.83 = Aristippos, *FGrHist* 317 T 1) after the homonymous philosopher of Kyrene, who is dated to the first half of the fourth century; the fact that the passage of Aristeas which Aristippos cites deals with Sarapis (*FGrHist* 317 F 1) dates both Aristeas' and Aristippos' work during or after Ptolemy I's reign. Jacoby (*FGrHist* IIIb, *Kommentar* 71-72), who dates both writers much later, believes that Aristippos knew the work of Ariaites of Tegea (mid-second century at the latest), but this is conjectural. We can only be certain that Aristippos and Aristeas lived after the early third and before the late second century.

³ The fact that Aristippos wrote about Arkadia does not mean that he was not an Argive. Argos and Arkadia were so closely connected mythologically (see Jacoby, *FGrHist* IIIb, *Kommentar* 72), that Arkadian mythology could reasonably have attracted the interest of an Argive scholar.

⁴ Although drawing such conclusions based on onomastics is highly hazardous, it is perhaps not accidental that all the leaders of Argos during the period under examination bore names deriving from ἄριστος: Aristomachos, Aristippos, Aristeas, Aristoteles.

⁵ Tarn 1913: 280, Beloch 1925: 579 n. 3, F. W. Walbank 1956: 265, Berve 1967: 396 and Mandel 1979: 294, all take it for granted that after Pyrrhos' defeat Aristippos ruled as a tyrant with the help of Gonatas; Gabbert 1997: 41 goes even further and claims that Aristippos became a tyrant "well before 272".

from tyrants as well”.¹ The plural “tyrants” could be taken to refer not only to his father, Aristomachos (I) son of Aristippos (I), but also to his grandfather, Aristippos (I). But this is only an indirect and highly rhetorical allusion, which could mean nothing more than that Aristomachos (II) was an offspring of a family of rulers –which he clearly was. The inscription on the booty from the street fight against Pyrrhos dedicated by the Argives to the gods at Mycenae² maintains all democratic forms: τοῖς Ἀργεῖοι θεοῖς ἀπὸ β[ασιλέως] Πύρρο[υ]. Aristippos is not even mentioned, as one would expect for someone who had abolished the constitution –an abolition unattested by Plutarch, who is our only source on Aristippos. It is clear that, at least in the immediate aftermath of the battle between Pyrrhos and Gonatas, Aristippos ruled constitutionally. His (personal or familial) ties with the Antigonids, perhaps already established by the late fourth century, certainly helped him consolidate his power; but he did not abolish constitutional form.

B4. Aristomachos (I) son of Aristippos (I)

– Plut., *Arat.* 25; Agatharchides, *FGrHist* 86 F 9; *ISE* 23 (*IG* II² 774 + *Add.*) + *SEG* 39 (1989) 131; *ISE* 45 (*IG* IV² 1, 621)

Aristomachos (I) son of Aristippos (I) belonged to the second or third generation of this ruling Argive family.³ As we have already seen, we know nothing about his father’s activity after 272. Nevertheless, it is clear that Aristomachos (I) inherited power (constitutional or not) from him; he probably dominated Argive political life from his father’s death to the end of the 240’s.⁴

Aristomachos is first attested in the Attic decree in his honour, already dealt with here (**B1**, above). His goodwill towards Athens, inherited from his ancestors, was proven on two occasions. The first was when he “spoke in favour of the freedom of the people in the best of manners on every occasion”.⁵ This rather

¹ Phylarchos, *FGrHist* 81 F 54 (*apud* Polyb. 2.59.5): οὐ μόνον αὐτὸν... γεγονέναι τύραννον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τυράννων πεφυκέναι.

² *ISE* 37a.

³ See **B1** and **B3**, above.

⁴ Urban 1979: 20-21 and 45 (cf. Porter 1937: xxxii) argues that Aristomachos did not rule over Argos before the liberation of Sikyon by Aratos in 251, and that he must have taken over the leadership of the city with Gonatas’ help. This would be a reasonable assumption if we accepted the traditional portrayal of Aristomachos as Gonatas’ puppet and the liberation of Sikyon as an outright anti-Macedonian action; both parts of that assumption, however, should probably be modified (see in the text, below and **B13**, respectively). Besides, literary sources on Hellenistic Argos leave the distinct impression that there was no interval in the family’s rule over the city from 272 (at the latest) to 222. The date of Aristomachos’ death can be surmised from Plutarch. Both Aratos’ failed attempt to take over Argos and, “soon after” (χρόνου βραχείος διεθόντος), Aristomachos’ murder by his slaves (Plut., *Arat.* 25.4) took place not long after the takeover of Corinth by Aratos in 243/2.

⁵ *ISE* 23, ll. 34-35: μνεῖαν διατετέ[λ]εκεν πο[ιού]μενος περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας [τ]οῦ δήμου τὴν ἀρίσ[την] ἐμ παντ[ὶ] καιρῶ[ν].

vague reference to the freedom of the people should probably be connected with the ‘liberation’ of Athens by Gonatas in ca. 255.¹ Apparently, the Athenians made use of the influence which Aristomachos, a faithful ally of Gonatas, exerted with the Macedonians, in order to achieve the withdrawal of the Macedonian garrison from the civic centre and to ease Macedonian control over Athenian politics. As far as Argos is concerned, it must be noted that Aristomachos did not only inherit power from his father, but also excellent relations with the Macedonian throne; the two were interconnected, anyway.

The main activity of Aristomachos for the benefit of Athens, however, belongs to the period of the war of the two cities against Alexandros son of Krateros, pretender to the Macedonian throne (ll. 36-43). The time limits of Alexandros’ revolt are one of the unresolved issues of the chronology of the third century: it started either shortly before or soon after the takeover of Sikyon by Aratos in 251,² and was already over (due to Alexandros’ death) in 245, when Gonatas took over Corinth from Nikaia, Alexandros’ widow.³ According to the Athenian decree,

¹ Eusebios, *Chron.* II 120 Schoene.

² The old prevailing view was that the revolt predated the takeover of Sikyon; the revolt was thus usually dated to 253/2; see mainly Beloch 1927: 519-22 and Will 1979: 317-18, with further bibliography. The clearest confutation of this view can already be found in Porter 1937: xxxviii-xli; cf. Treves 1955: 85-94 and, mainly, the careful analysis of Urban 1979: 16-38 (which has since gained unanimous approval with the exception of Scholten 2000: 256-58, who merely reframes the old arguments in favour of 253/2) and Knoepfler 2001: 286-95. Among the few literary sources on Alexandros, one should keep *IG XII 9*, 212, despite the interesting redating of the inscriptions by Billows 1993; see Knoepfler 2001: 328-44 n° XXV. In my view, the whole discussion is unnecessarily complicated by the fact that practically all scholars dealing with the date of the revolt fail to make the distinction between clear and independent chronological indications and chronological conclusions based on mostly unfounded assumptions about alliances between the protagonists of the period. Tellingly, Porter, after having convincingly argued that “from none of these sources can the date of the revolt be fixed beyond a vague ‘circa 250 B.C.’” (1937: xxxvii), moves on to yet another hypothetical scenario of complicated alliances. The only secure *terminus ante quem* (see further Appendix 5, below) for the start of the revolt is 248/7, when military events related to the war between Alexandros and Athens are attested in the Attic countryside (see p. 178 n. 2, above).

³ Plut., *Arat.* 17. Alexandros’ death cannot be dated long before the takeover of Corinth by Gonatas: whether or not it is true that Alexandros’ death was caused by poisoning and was machinated by Gonatas himself, the king sent his son Demetrios to Corinth for a prearranged marriage to Nikaia “immediately” afterwards (Plut., *Arat.* 17.2: εὐθύς); see Will 1979: 318 and Knoepfler 2001: 286-95 with all relevant bibliography. 245 is a likely, even if not certain, date for the takeover of Corinth: it must predate the summer of 243, when it was Aratos who conquered the city, and be placed either soon before (F. W. Walbank 1988: 595) or soon after (Buraselis 1982: 173-74) the sea battle of Andros in 245 (for this date, see Buraselis 1982: 119-41 and F. W. Walbank 1988: 587-95). In fact, since the two festivals that Gonatas founded at Delos precisely that year (*IG XI 2*, 298) seem to reflect Macedonian successes in the Aegean (cf. Paschidis 1996: 254-55), 245 is probably a *terminus ad quem*. If those who argue that Alexandros still controlled

when the Argives had the chance to sign a separate truce (ἀνοχάς) with Alexandros after 248/7¹, and despite Alexandros' haste² and insistence on signing the truce, Aristomachos was able to include Athens in the signing parties of the truce, by offering a bribe of fifty talents from his own money to Alexandros.

To confine discussion to Argos, I should point out that the way the truce of Aristomachos with Alexandros has been treated by modern scholarship is in many ways indicative of twentieth-century preconceptions about Hellenistic alliances. Aristomachos is the first member of the family explicitly called a tyrant in the sources,³ and even those who remain sceptical about the theory of a 'tyrannid system' imposed by Gonatas in southern Greece do believe that Argos is one of the few cases where this 'system' is attested.⁴ And yet, in the most crucial period for Antigonid control in the Peloponnese, when, one must assume,⁵ Gonatas would have mobilized all potential allies against Alexandros, Aristomachos, supposedly an imposed tyrant, and certainly closely tied through family bonds and alliance with the Macedonian throne, did not hesitate to conclude a truce with Alexandros. To remove the paradox, it has been assumed that Gonatas had already signed a truce with Alexandros;⁶ there is, however, not the slightest reference to the Macedonian king in *ISE* 23, our only source on the truce. The argument thus becomes circular: if we take it for granted that Aristomachos (and Athens) blindly followed royal orders, the truce between Aristomachos and Alexandros *must have* followed a truce between Gonatas and Alexandros. It is much more plausible (and closer to what the sources actually say), however, to assume that Argos and Athens simply distanced themselves from a war which, in essence, did not concern them. In other words, the supposed puppet of the Macedonian throne followed a policy which had exactly the same results as the policy followed by the Achaians, the staunch opponents of Macedonia, who concluded an alliance with Alexandros after the first attempt of Aratos to conquer Corinth.⁷ Many of the 'tyrants' of this

central Greece by the time Aratos' trip to Egypt began (see Knoepfler 2001: 291-93) are right, and if I am right in dating the trip to late 246 / early 245 (Appendix 5, below), then the death of Alexandros can be dated with relative precision to early 245 and the takeover of Corinth by Gonatas to the spring or summer of the same year.

¹ For the date, see p. 145 n. 1, above.

² Charneux 1991: 322-23 disagrees with the restoration καὶ τ[αῦτα | σπεύδ]οντος proposed by Wilhelm and accepted by Moretti, and proposes καὶ τ[ὴν εἰρήνην δ]όντος.

³ Agatharchides, *FGrHist* 86 F 9 (Ath. 6.246e): Ἀριστομάχου τοῦ Ἀργείων τυράννου; Plut., *Arat.* 25.1: τὸν τύραννον αὐτῶν Ἀριστόμαχον (cf. *ibid.* 25.2: ὑπὸ τοῦ τυράννου).

⁴ See, for example, Tarn 1913: 277-81; Gabbert 1997: 42.

⁵ We know almost nothing about Gonatas' reaction to the revolt, other than the rumour that he instigated the poisoning of Alexandros (Plut., *Arat.* 17.2); cf. Will 1979: 322-23.

⁶ See Habicht 1982: 24-25; Urban 1979: 45; F. W. Walbank 1988: 302-303; Habicht [2006]: 186; cf. Buraselis 1982b: 158 with n. 3.

⁷ Plut., *Arat.* 18.2.

period –if the term, derived from our mostly anti-Macedonian and pro-Achaian sources, has any value–¹ may have owed their power to their Macedonian connections, but this need not imply that they were deliberately “implanted” (to use a famous Polybian phrase)² by Gonatas, nor that they were unable to follow policies contrary to the Macedonian interests if they deemed it necessary for their own personal interests, or, secondarily, for the interests of their cities.

Aristomachos’ end is equally indicative of the circumspection with which one must read the passages of Plutarch and Polybios referring to Aratos (the ultimate source on which both writers drew). Plutarch reports how, after the conquest of Corinth in 243/2, Aratos turned his interest to Argos, the city in which he had lived in his childhood as an exile, “aspiring to pay his debt to the city where he had been brought up by giving it back its freedom, and to attach the city to the Achaian *koinon*”.³ Clearly, the order of Aratos’ desires must be reversed; his main objective was the incorporation of Argos into the Achaian *koinon*, not its liberation from the ‘tyrant’. Argos *had* to be presented as a tyrannid by our pro-Achaian sources, so that Aratos could pose as its liberator.⁴ Still, he did not manage to find many allies in Argos. Aischylos and Charimenes, the leaders of the insurrection, ended up betraying each other before they had reached their goal (Plut., *Arat.*

¹ The sources on Argos, in particular, pose a peculiar paradox. The literary sources draw the picture of an uninterrupted tyranny from 272 to 224. The epigraphic evidence, however, paints a different picture: there are ten to twenty decrees from that period, which show that the assembly functioned regularly, summoned at least once a month, and that the council did so as well (Rhodes 1997: 68-71), while the names of the ‘tyrants’ are not mentioned even once. There are only two constitutional changes of an oligarhic nature, which can be surmised from the epigraphic sources: the replacement of generals by the *polemarchoi* under Kassandros (Piérart 2000: 309) and, perhaps, the strengthening of the generals’ power in the early third century (Moretti, *ISE* I, p. 96-97, on *ISE* 41). During the second and third quarter of the century, when one would expect signs of the ‘tyrannical’ rule of Aristomachos (I), Aristippos (II) and Aristomachos (II) to manifest themselves, epigraphical evidence points to the opposite direction: this is when the chairman of the council reappears and the generals disappear (Rhodes 1997: 68-69). This discrepancy in the two types of sources is reproduced in modern scholarship on Hellenistic Argos: scholars focusing on literary sources do not seem to take into consideration the epigraphic evidence and vice versa (to give but one example, Piérart [2000: 310], one of the leading experts on Argive epigraphy, speaks of the democratic constitution of Argos, kept in place in its broad lines until even after 146 and interrupted by some “coups d’État”).

² Polyb. 2.41.10: πλείστους γὰρ δὴ μονάρχους οὗτος [scil. Antigonos Gonatas] ἐμφυτεύσαι δοκεῖ τοῖς Ἕλλησι.

³ Plut., *Arat.* 25.1-2: τῇ τε πόλει θρεπτῆρια τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀποδοῦναι φιλοτιμούμενος καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς προσκομίσαι τὴν πόλιν.

⁴ This, of course, does not mean that Aristomachos enjoyed popular support or exercised power in a legitimate manner. The fact that he had to resort to disarming the citizens (Plut., *Arat.* 25.2-3) clearly means that the political situation in Argos was tense, to say the least. My point is that, regardless of the institutional realities in the city, Aratos and the sources which follow him had to present the Argive regime as a tyrannid.

25.2-3). Soon after, however, Aristomachos was murdered by two of his slaves (25.4), perhaps on the instigation of Aratos.

B5. Aristippos (II) son of Aristomachos (I)

— Plut., *Arat.* 25-29 and *Mor.* 781E; *ISE* 45 (*IG* IV² 1, 621) (?)

Even after the murder of Aristomachos (I) (see the preceding entry), Aratos did not manage to win Argos over to the Achaian side. Aristippos (II)¹ anticipated him (φθάσας; this is the second time we meet this participle, which seems to sum up well the turbulence of political life in third-century Peloponnese) and took over the rule of the city; Aratos led an Achaian contingent against Argos, the Argives offered no help to the intruder/‘liberator’ and Aristippos brought the Achaian *koinon* to trial for unwarranted military invasion; the Mantinean judges forced the humiliated Achaians to pay half a talent in indemnities (Plut., *Arat.* 25.4-5).²

The inclusion of Aristippos (II) in the present catalogue is due to the information provided by Plutarch, immediately after the narrative of this episode. Aristippos hated and was afraid of Aratos and arranged for his murder; “king Antigonos was his accomplice” (25.6). Plutarch’s accusation may reflect actual events. Aristippos had every reason to consider Aratos the main threat to his power and Gonatas had every reason to consider the Sikyonian statesman the main obstacle to his influence in the Peloponnese; moreover, there should be no doubt that Aristippos had inherited the personal bond with the king from his father (cf. 26.1: Ἀντίγονον μὲν ἔχων σύμμαχον).

Yet again, one must bear in mind the rhetorical needs of the narrative of Plutarch (that is, of Aratos himself). Aratos had just led the *koinon* to a humiliating conviction for illegal invasion and had failed twice to overthrow a tyrannid supposedly hated by the people, only to face the almost complete indifference of the Argives to his cause. The image of Plutarch’s hero needed a face-lift; thus, the scholar from Chaironeia (perhaps even Aratos himself) had to resort to a digression on the life of Aristippos, and paint it with the darkest of colours: the tyrant has murdered all his enemies in the city,³ has a large number of bodyguards (26.1),

¹ I have to point out that neither of the sources on Aristippos (Plutarch and, perhaps, *ISE* 45) explicitly call Aristippos the son of Aristomachos. Nonetheless, the alternation of these two names in this family makes the assumption practically certain.

² On this episode, see Harter-Uibopuu 1998: 112-14.

³ Polybios 2.59.9 says the same of Aristomachos (II), who appears to have murdered eighty leading citizens after an invasion by Aratos. If he is mistaken and the whole episode actually involved Aristippos (II) (cf. p. 223 n. 5, below), his phrasing is noteworthy: “because none of those inside the city who had joined his cause made a move, because they were afraid of the tyrant” (2.59.8: διὰ τὸ μηδένα συγκινηθῆναι τῶν ἔσωθεν αὐτῷ ταξαμένων, διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ τυράννου φόβον). Once again it is difficult to disentangle historical reality from the self-justifications of

has, just like his ally Gonatas, spies who report back to him all over the place (25.6), remains locked in his own palace out of fear, sneaking out at dawn like the snake out of its lair (26.2-3),¹ while Aratos holds power not with arms but because of his virtue, pays no attention to luxurious clothing, and is the enemy of all tyrants (26.4).

The details of Aristippos' end are, once again, revealing of the highly polemical rhetoric of the sources against this Argive family. After his repeated failed attempts to conquer Argos, Aratos finally managed, probably in 235,² to ambush Aristippos near Kleonai; during the skirmish Aristippos was killed by a certain Tragiskos (Plut., *Arat.* 27-29.5). Yet, once again, Argos remained in the hands of the family of Aristomachos. With the help of a certain Agias and "the royal forces", the dead tyrant's brother, Aristomachos (II) son of Aristomachos (I) (on whom see the following entry), managed to make a surprise attack on the city and take control of it (29.6). It is often assumed that Agias was the commander of the Macedonian garrison of Argos.³ Had there been such a garrison, however,⁴ Plutarch (who drew on Aratos' *Memoirs*) would not have failed to mention it, either in his digression on Argos under Aristippos (II) (*Arat.* 26) or in his description of the battles in the city (*Arat.* 27) or of the last fatal attack of Aristippos at Kleonai (*Arat.* 29). Besides, the text clearly says that the Macedonian contingent "invaded the city by surprise" (29.6: *παρεισπεσόντων*)⁵, not that it returned to the city or that it reconquered it. *A posteriori*, this means that, despite the alliance between Aristippos (II) and Gonatas, the former's tyrannid did not rest on support provided by resident Macedonian forces.

B6. Aristomachos (II) son of Aristomachos (I)

— Phylarchos, *FGrHist* 81 F 54 (Polyb. 2.59.1-2); Polyb. 2.44.3 and 59-60; Plut., *Arat.* 29.6; 35.1-6; 39.5; 44.5-6; *Cleom.* 17.7-8; *ISE* 45 (*IG* IV² 1, 621); *IG* V 2, 1, 9 (*Syll*³ 510)

As we just saw, the last member of the leading family of third-century Argos seized power with the help of Macedonian forces in 235. As expected, his inherited personal ties with Macedonian kings were actively maintained. Polybios claims that the death of Demetrios II, who funded Peloponnesian tyrants on a

Aratos: with their powerful ally already within the city walls, it is difficult to imagine that sworn enemies of the tyrant did not join Aratos' cause.

¹ Plutarch uses this image again in his *Πρὸς ἡγεμόνα ἀπαίδευτον* (781E), where he mistakenly calls the tyrant Aristodemos.

² See Beloch 1927: 529.

³ For example, Porter 1937: xxvii; Mandel 1978: 302; see the reservations of Flacelière / Chambry 1979: 102 (who point out that it is unclear if he was an Argive or a Macedonian).

⁴ On the garrisons of Gonatas, see Gabbert 1997: 33-40, with earlier bibliography.

⁵ *Παρεισπίπτω* in Plutarch is used mainly to denote a surprise attack of an enemy, often with a small military force (see, for example, *Arat.* 22.3; *Pyrrh.* 32.1; *Cleom.* 14.1 and 21.3; *Tim.* 13.5; *Alc.* 30.6).

regular basis, brought them to despair.¹ Nevertheless, Aristomachos (II) did not show sufficient loyalty to his high protector.

Polybios goes on to say that the Peloponnesian tyrants, seeing that Macedonian protection was temporarily interrupted, agreed either through the promise of honours or through bribery to abandon their tyrannical rule and to incorporate their cities into the Achaian *koinon*. Among them, Lydiadas of Megalopolis, Xenon of Hermione, Kleonymos of Phlious and Aristomachos of Argos are named.² Plutarch clarifies that Aristomachos' decision was "facilitated" by fifty talents which he requested from the Achaians in order to pay off his mercenary army. Despite the machinations of another former tyrant, Lydiadas of Megalopolis, the unexpected alliance between Aristomachos and Aratos was confirmed during the autumn assembly of the *koinon* in 229, with the election of Aristomachos as general for 228/7.³

Tension between Aristomachos and Aratos immediately arose because of the former's eagerness and the latter's reluctance to attack Kleomenes III of Sparta, the traditional enemy of Argos; inevitably, Aratos won.⁴ Aristomachos disappears from the scene⁵ until 225, at a time when the *koinon* was in turbulence due to the unofficial agreement between Aratos and Macedonia and the appeal Kleomenes' reforms in Sparta had to several Achaians. During the Nemea of that year Kleomenes invaded Argos; the garrison surrendered without a fight and the Argives were forced into an alliance with Sparta. At least, this is Plutarch's version in the *Life of Kleomenes*.⁶ In the *Life of Aratos* he draws a slightly different picture: the Argives (and the Phliasians, another city which was previously led by a tyrant who had reached an agreement with the Achaian *koinon*) "joined him [*scil.* Kleomenes]" (προσεχώρησαν αὐτῷ), that is, allied with Sparta of their own will, after the Spartans had conquered Pellene, Pheneos and Penteleion.⁷ Finally, Polybios gives a radically divergent account. In the context of his polemic against the historical

¹ Polyb. 2.44.3: οἱ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ μοναρχοὶ δυσελπιστήσαντες ἐπὶ τῷ μετελλαχῆναι μὲν τὸν Δημήτριον, ὃς ἦν αὐτοῖς οἰονεὶ χορηγὸς καὶ μισθοδότης...

² Polyb. 2.44.5-6.

³ Plut., *Arat.* 35.1-5.

⁴ Plut., *Arat.* 35.6.

⁵ It is probably in this period (229-225) that the monument erected by the *koinon* of the Asinaioi in honour of Aristomachos, his niece (?) Apia (perhaps the future wife of Nabis of Sparta, called Apega in the manuscripts of Polybios 13.7.6) and another individual (IG IV² 1, 621 [ISE 45]) should be dated (Wilhelm 1909: 110-12 [cf. Wilhelm 1921: 71-72]; Moretti, *ISE* I, p. 119). On the contrary, the honouring of Aristomachos with an armour and *isopoliteia* by Tegea (IG V 2, 1, 9 [Syll³ 510]) is best dated to the period of alliance between Argos and Sparta after 225, as Tegea was in Kleomenes' sphere of influence since 229 (Polyb. 2.46.2; Plut., *Cleom.* 4; cf. Urban 1979: 168-70; Although in IG V 2, *praef.* 4.131-32 Hiller dated the inscription to 229-225, he also dates it after 225 in his comments in *Sylloge*).

⁶ Plut., *Cleom.* 17.5-8.

⁷ Plut., *Arat.* 39.5.

method of Phylarchos, which occupies six whole chapters in his second book (2.56-61), he particularly condemns the favourable treatment of Aristomachos by Phylarchos, who, in his known dramatic style, deplores the unjust end of the tyrant (on which see below) (2.59-60). Among other accusations made against Aristomachos, Polybios claims that Aristomachos “judged his future hopes more profitable if he sided with Kleomenes” and, accordingly, betrayed the Achaians and entered into Kleomenes’ alliance at “a most critical time” (2.60.6).

Aristomachos’ choice, willing or not, did not prove the right one. The descent of Antigonos Doson to the Peloponnese played a decisive role in determining the outcome of the Kleomenic War. In the summer of 224 a revolt broke out in Argos under the leadership of Aristoteles, a personal friend of Aratos; the city was subsequently occupied by Achaian and Macedonian forces. While Doson was still in the city, settling political matters,¹ Aratos convinced the Argives to surrender the properties of the tyrants and the traitors to the king. Aristomachos’ fate was sealed: his countrymen arrested him, tortured him and drowned him at Kenchreai.² According to Phylarchos, whose positive attitude towards Kleomenes apparently annoyed Polybios on a par with the dramatic and non-scientific character of his work, Aristomachos’ end caused the commiseration, even the outrage, of many Argives.³

Making a balanced sketch of the career of Aristomachos (II) once again necessitates distancing ourselves from the traditional depiction of him as a puppet of the Macedonians, as the tyrant / overseer of Macedonian interests. Aristomachos undoubtedly seized power with Macedonian military assistance and most probably maintained very good relations with Demetrios II: his family had enjoyed a personal relationship with the Antigonids for almost seventy years.⁴ This did not stop him, however, from weighing up diplomatic and military junctures, his sole criterion being what would best serve his personal interests and the interests of his city. In 229 Macedonia was without a king, ruled by a viceroy whose position

¹ Polyb. 2.54.2.

² Plut., *Arat.* 44.5-6.

³ Phylarchos, *FGrHist* 81 F 54 (Polyb. 2.59.1-2).

⁴ The longevity of personal and familial ties between Argive noblemen and the Macedonian court is reflected even much later, in the events of 198 (Livy 32.22.9-12). When the Achaian *koinon* was finally convinced by Flamininus to break its alliance with Philip V, the only cities which opposed this choice were Dyme and Megalopolis, out of gratitude to Philip, and *quidam Argivorum... praeterquam quod Macedonum reges ab se oriundos credunt, privatis etiam hospitibus familiarique amicitia plerique illigati Philippo erant* (32.22.11). Their opposition to the alliance with Rome was so steadfast that it led to a *de facto* fragmentation of the *koinon*; soon afterwards, the Argive *principes* turned the city over to Philokles, general of Philip V (32.25). It is particularly interesting that the argument of existing personal ties of friendship and hospitality (even kinship, one should add, since Philip had married Polykratea of Argos) is further strengthened by the close mythological connection between Argos and Macedonia (cf. Briscoe 1973: 211, with sources and bibliography).

was at risk from domestic opposition¹ and external menace (invasion of the Dardanoi); moreover, Sparta, Argos' old enemy, was aggressively expanding in Arkadia, a move tolerated or supported by the Aitolians.² Changing sides and joining the Achaian *koinon* was a perfectly reasonable move for Aristomachos and the other 'tyrants'. Incorporation into the *koinon* guaranteed safety for their cities and their own leading position.

In 225 it was again the geostrategic surrounding that fully justified his new turnabout. Kleomenes was at the height of his success on all fronts, while Achaia was in severe unrest:³ large numbers of people were attracted by Kleomenes' reform project,⁴ while members of the Achaian elite saw Aratos' agreement with Doso as an opportunity to denounce his policy and his leadership. At that juncture, Sparta seemed to be the likeliest victor. Aristomachos' personal role in Argos' turnabout may not even have been decisive. As we have already seen, Plutarch, both in the *Life of Aratos* (for which his main source was the *ὑπομνήματα* of the Achaian statesman) and in the *Life of Kleomenes* (for which he drew mainly on Phylarchos) does not even mention Aristomachos in his account of events. It is only Polybios –whose polemic against Aristomachos has the sole purpose of vindicating the policy of Aratos, his hero– who claims that the alliance of Argos with Sparta was the work of Aristomachos' betrayal. The actual sequence of events is impossible to establish. Aristomachos may have lost (temporarily or not) control of the situation in Argos and may have striven to win Kleomenes' favour in order to maintain or regain power. Alternatively, he may have thought that siding with the reformer king of Sparta would appease the growing opposition to his rule.⁵ In both cases, the impersonal account of Plutarch (*Ἀργεῖοι προσεχώρησαν*

¹ See Hatzopoulos 1996: I 303-312.

² Polyb. 2.46.2; Plut., *Cleom.* 4.

³ Plut., *Cleom.* 17.5.

⁴ Plut., *Agis* 38.5: τῶν μὲν δήμων νομὴν τε χώρας καὶ χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς ἐλπιδόντων. It should have been clear, however, that Kleomenes did not plan to proceed to the cancellation of debts and to the redistribution of land in conquered territories (Fine 1940: 146; Marasco 1981: 487-88); the Argives were severely disappointed with Kleomenes for that reason (Plut., *Cleom.* 20.6).

⁵ Polybios 2.59.9 reports the murder of eighty Argive aristocrats by Aristomachos after the unsuccessful attempt of Aratos to conquer Argos. Nevertheless, the only attested Achaian invasion of Argos during the rule of Aristomachos (II) is that of 224. But at the time the leader of the Achaian forces was Timoxenos and not Aratos, who did not reach the city in time, according to what Polybios says a few chapters earlier (2.53.2); moreover, Timoxenos' invasion was not unsuccessful; finally, the description matches exactly the several unsuccessful attempts of Aratos to take Argos during the rules of Aristomachos (I) and Aristippos (II) (see **B4-5**, above). It is therefore very probable that Polybios confuses events from different periods; this assumption is corroborated by the fact that in 2.59 he interrupts his narration of events in chronological order and uses disparate pieces of information from Aratos' *ὑπομνήματα* in order to accuse Phylarchos. F. W. Walbank 1957: 266 assumes that the assassinations were perpetrated by Aristippos (II), but confusion between the two Aristomachoi is just as likely. In any case, even if the episode does

αὐτῶ) may be more realistic than the personal polemic of Polybios (ὁ δέ... τὴν τε πατρίδα καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ προαίρεσιν ἀποσπάσας ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν... προσένειμε τοῖς ἐχθροῖς).

All in all, Aristomachos' career is not different than that of other protagonists of the period. He rose to power by exploiting family tradition (by inheriting leadership and personal ties with the Macedonian court) and Macedonian arms, and afterwards chose his alliances according to geostrategic juncture and personal interest.

B7. Orthagoras son of Pythilas of Kleodaidai

— Perlman 2000: A17-18 (Vollgraff 1915: 366-71, A-B) and A20 (SEG 17 [1960] 144)

Orthagoras son of Pythilas of the phratry of Kleodaidai and the *kome* Sticheleion, is the proposer of three Argive decrees, by which Demetrios son of [. . .]phanes of Boiotia, Lichas son of Exakestos of Barka in Cyrenaica¹ and Theogenes son of Theokles of Myndos were honoured as *proxenoi* and benefactors of Argos, *theorodokoi* of the sanctuary of Zeus at Nemea and of the sanctuary of Hera at Argos.² The decrees for Lichas and Theogenes were enacted on the same day; prosopographical considerations and letter forms point to the second half (probably third quarter) of the third century.³

Demetrios and Lichas are otherwise unknown. Lichas and Theogenes were originally considered as certainly connected with the Ptolemaic court, because of the misreading and the restorations of the first editor, which led him to believe that the decrees were set up at an Alexandreion, where the Ptolemies were worshipped along with Alexander.⁴ In effect, the decrees were set up ἐν τῶι ἱερῶι τοῦ Ἀπ[όλλωνος του Λυκείου] and the connection with the Ptolemaic court thus became less self-evident. Nonetheless, Lichas' provenance from a city which had just been founded by Ptolemy III Euergetes certainly allows the assumption that he was somehow connected with the Ptolemies. Indications for such connections are even stronger for Theogenes son of Theokles of Myndos in Karia. He must be a descendant of Theokles son of Theogenes of Myndos (*ProsPtol* VI 15147), who in *ca.*

belong to the rule of Aristomachos (II), it is much more likely that it is an unattested attempt of Aratos to reconquer Argos immediately after Aristomachos' rise to power in 235, than an equally unattested episode of 225 (cf. Flacelière / Chambry 1979: 118 n. 3), since the Kleomenic War is described in sufficient detail in our sources. If the episode is dated to 235, the extermination of the political elite of the city would have been irrelevant with Kleomenes and should probably be understood as an attempt of Aristomachos (II) to remove the opposition and not as a measure to satisfy popular demand.

¹ On his home city, see Laronde 1987: 382-83, 396-401.

² SEG 17 (1960) 144 (Demetrios), Perlman 2000: A17 (Lichas) and A18 (Theogenes).

³ Perlman 2000: 154 and 223.

⁴ See the bibliography cited by Charneux 1966: 235 n. 6 and Laronde 1987: 397.

280 was sent by his countrymen to Samos, after an intervention of Philokles of Sidon, to judge a case of unfulfilled contracts.¹ In other words, our Theogenes came from a city which had been conquered by the Ptolemies already after the battle of Kouroupedion and remained under Ptolemaic rule without interruption until 195,² and belonged to a family with attested ties with the court of Alexandria.

Even if we take the connection of Lichas and Theogenes with the Ptolemaic administration for granted, however, this should not lead us to any far-fetched conclusions regarding the political connection between Argos and the Ptolemies. The high standing of the Nemea in the Greek world alone³ would be a sufficient reason for Ptolemaic presence at Argos.⁴

This means that the decrees alone do not provide us with sufficient evidence to consider their proposer Orthagoras as a supporter of the Ptolemies or as someone with a personal connection (or aspiring to such a connection) with the Ptolemaic administration. Nevertheless, other sources on his family confirm this assumption. In the catalogue of victors at the Panathenaia of 198⁵ a certain Pythilas son of Orthagoras of Athens is attested. Given the extreme rarity of the form Πυθίλας,⁶ he may very well be a descendant of the proposer of the Argive decrees –on the assumption that some member of the family (or even Pythilas himself) received the Athenian citizenship.⁷ The victors recorded immediately below Pythilas reinforce the impression that a connection between Orthagoras and the Ptolemies existed: Zeuxo daughter of Ariston of Kyrene and her husband, Polykrates son of Mnasiadas of Argos, a well-known official of Ptolemy IV, responsible for the reorganization of the Ptolemaic army soon before the battle of

¹ IG XII 6, 95.

² Upper chronological limit: IG XII 6, 95; duration of Ptolemaic control: Bagnall 1976: 97-98.

³ Cf. the following entry and the mission of Argive *theoroi* to the Ptolemaic court for the Nemea of 253 (PLond VII 1973 [SB 3.7263], according to Bergmans 1979); these *theoroi* prolonged their stay in Egypt and turned their mission into a sightseeing tour around the Arsinoites, organized by Ptolemy II.

⁴ On the keen interest of the Ptolemies in significant Greek sanctuaries and panhellenic games, cf. Buraselis 1993: 260.

⁵ IG II² 2313, l. 58; on the date, see Tracy / Habicht 1991: 218.

⁶ To the best of my knowledge, it is only attested once more, in Athens (LGPN II, s.v. Πυθίλας n° 2, of a later period).

⁷ This was already suggested by Vollgraff 1915: 367 and Kirchner in the IG. Osborne 1983 does not include him among naturalized Athenians. Habicht 1986: 92-94 reiterated the suggestion, and (paradoxically without reference to Habicht's article) so did Tracy / Habicht 1991: 226. An attractive assumption regarding the reasons for the naturalization would be that some member of the family contributed money for the bribery of the Macedonian garrison in 229. Diopethes son of Orthagores, victor at the Panathenaia of 166 (SEG 41 [1991] 115, l. II 35; cf. Tracy / Habicht 1991: 206-207) also belongs to Orthagoras' family.

Raphia in 217, and later general of Cyprus between 202 and 197.¹ In other words, two prominent Argive families are recorded at Athens at the same time. Since a member of one of the two families had a career in the Ptolemaic court and a member of the other family proposed honours for individuals who may have been Ptolemaic officials, it is likely that bonds of friendship (or even kinship) existed between the two families.

If these –admittedly rather hypothetical– assumptions are correct, Orthagoras, in contrast to Polykrates, maintained a connection with the Ptolemies while remaining at Argos. As stated above, the decrees for Lichas and Theogenes do not necessarily have any political weight, although even official contacts with the Ptolemaic court should not be totally surprising.² In that case, the decrees which Orthagoras proposed do not provide information neither on any sort of Ptolemaic policy on Argos nor on Lichas and Theogenes, but on the proposer himself. The only connection with the Ptolemaic court we can justifiably assume is that of Orthagoras as an individual, not as an Argive politician.

The decrees have an additional interest; they enrich the unidimensional picture of Hellenistic Argos as drawn in the literary sources:³ next to the uninterrupted sequence, from 272 to 224, of tyrants who, if not implanted by Macedonians, were pro-Macedonian (Aristippos [I], Aristomachos [I], Aristippos [II], Aristomachos [II]), we find Argive citizens connected with the Ptolemaic court in more than one ways.

TROIZEN

B8. Theognetos son of Theoxenos — B9. [---] son of Asklepiades

— Bielman 1994: n° 19 (*IG IV 750*)

A now lost stele from Troizen⁴ preserved part of a long honorific decree of the Troizenians in honour of two fellow countrymen of theirs, Theognetos son of Theoxenos and [---] son of Asklepiades and, primarily, in honour of a stranger whose name and ethnic had not been preserved. The details of the events for which all three were honoured elude us. They certainly involved the capture of

¹ Polyb. 5.64.5-7; for other sources on Polykrates, see F. W. Walbank 1957: 589; Bagnall 1976: 253-55; Tracy / Habicht 1991: 229-30. Polykrates, although an offspring of an aristocratic family (Polybios claims his father Mnasiadas had won glory in athletic competitions), does not appear to have been involved in Argive politics. This may mean that he sought his fortune abroad at a young age.

² See especially *SEG* 41 (1991) 279, an honorific decree of the third century for someone who aided Argive ambassadors, according to the convincing restoration of Charneux 1991: 297 n. 3 ([ἐ]πειδὴ ἀπαγγέλουσιν οἱ πρέσβεις (vel θεωροί) οἱ ἀποσταλέντες ὑπὸ τῆς πόλιος]). This must have been an embassy to a king (l. 5: [βασ]ιλεύς). The letter following the royal title is Γ or Π, hence the king is most probably a Ptolemy.

³ Cf. p. 218 n. 1, above.

⁴ Bielman 1994: 69-73 n° 19. The two joining fragments apparently contained the end of the decree; an unspecifiable part of the text is missing above the surviving text.

Troizenian citizens, perhaps of the tribe of the Hylleis (although there are alternative interpretations), and most probably including women and children.¹ The two Troizenian ambassadors first approached Lysimachos (ll. 4 and 40)² and then the unknown benefactor, who is definitely the central figure: it was his initiatives that made things happen (ll. 12 ff.). The fact that Myndos and Halikarnassos, both probably colonies of Troizen,³ are mentioned,⁴ as well as other elusive details of the text,⁵ lead to the conclusion that the main honourand was a citizen of a Karian city, probably Myndos. In his turn, this intermediary approached⁶ queen Stratonike, the daughter of Demetrios Poliorketes and wife of Seleukos and subsequently of the successor Antiochos;⁷ she ensured that the ships which had also been captured were released, and then went to Halikarnassos where she arranged for the ransoming of the captive Troizenians (ll. 21-25).

The historical context is usually assumed to be the aftermath of Poliorketes' last, unsuccessful campaign in Asia (286-285).⁸ The campaign's explicit aim was

¹ Ll. 2-3: [--- γυναιξί κα]ῖ τέκνοις; l. 8: [ἐλε]υθέρων σωμάτων ἀπὸ Ὑλλ[έων (?)]; ll. 24-25: [ὄπως τὰ τε σώματα τὰ ἀπαχ]θέντα λυτρωθῆ. On the Hylleis, see Steph. Byz., s.v. Ὑλλεῖς. The fact that the captives belonged to only one tribe is surprising. The only possible solution to the paradox, if the restoration is correct, would be to assume that the Troizenian contingent (if the captives were on a military mission; see below) was organized by tribe. There is, however, another solution. Given that the captives were in Karia (see below), another restoration of l. 8 is possible: ἀπὸ Ὑλλ[αρίμων]; in that case ἀπὸ would be a preposition of place and not a preposition of origin, and the meaning would be that the captives were captured in the vicinity of this Karian city and were subsequently transported elsewhere.

² In l. 4 Lysimachos is mentioned without his royal title; the royal title is also missing in l. 40, but the number of missing letters requires its restoration there. This seemingly not very complimentary mention of Lysimachos may reflect the fact that he apparently did not provide any help (see below). I believe we can discard the possibility that Seleukos I was mentioned in l. 1, as it is sometimes assumed ([---] Σελ[ευκ--- (?)]).

³ See the sources in Bielman 1994: 71 n. 1 and Robert 1936: 87.

⁴ L. 6: Μυνδίων ἐπιμέλεια; ll. 23-24: [κατελθὼν δὲ ἐς Ἄλικαρ]νασσόν.

⁵ Ll. 27-28: ὁ δᾶμος ὁ Τρ[οζανίων --- μα]τρόπολιν ἐοῦσαν. Fraenkel restores thus in the *IG* text: ὁ δᾶμος ὁ Τρ[οζανίων ἀμῶν τὰν πατρίδα μα]τρόπολιν ἐοῦσαν, in an obvious effort to accommodate the shift from nominative (ὁ δᾶμος) to accusative (ματρόπολιν), both referring to Troizen. The result is not satisfactory, but I have no alternatives to offer.

⁶ The technical term ἐπρέσβευσε which Fraenkel restores in the beginning of l. 21 is improbable, since the official embassy was that of the Troizenians; [συν]επρέσβευσε is much more plausible, since συμπρεσβεύω and συμπρεσβευτής often refer to persons accompanying an embassy without officially taking part in it (Kienast 1973: 540-41).

⁷ The marriage of Stratonike to Antiochos postdates 294 (Plut., *Demetr.* 38). This means that at the time of the decree (most probably soon after 285; see below) she was married to the successor to the throne and not to king Seleukos, hence, according to Seleukid protocol, she was a queen of the Upper Satrapies (Plut., *Demetr.* 38.1); her generic title here is due to the fact that she was the daughter of a king and the (ex-) wife of another (Carney 2000: 225-28).

⁸ Plut., *Demetr.* 46.4-49.9; cf. Mastrocinque 1979: 54-56.

the reconquest of Karia and Lydia, then under Lysimachos' rule.¹ Among the 11,000 men who Poliorketes finally mustered, it is also assumed, there must have been a Troizenian contingent, captured by the enemy. But, which enemy? Bielman points out that the release of the ships is explicitly connected with Stratonike (ll. 21-23), hence the Troizenian fleet must have been captured by Seleukid forces.² What, then, was the point of the embassy to Lysimachos? Perhaps part of the Troizenian forces was captured by Lysimachos,³ while the Troizenian fleet was captured by Seleukos.⁴ The ambassadors probably turned to Lysimachos first, from whom they failed to extract a promise of release of the captives without ransom, then turned to the unknown benefactor who saw to their ransoming (l. 25: λυτρωθῆν), and then, assisted by him, to Stratonike who also ensured the release of the ships. The two ambassadors are otherwise unknown.⁵

The whole effort of the Troizenians has two interesting aspects. The first is the well-attested use of real or invented ties of kinship by Hellenistic states in order to ensure benefactions, diplomatic help or other political benefits from another state or a king.⁶ Often, the alleged kinship concerns the main target of the 'applicants'.⁷ In other cases, however, the ties of the alleged kinship concern an intermediary, either a whole city, as in the case of the famous embassy of Teos on behalf of Abdera to Rome,⁸ or even an individual, as in our case. The force of the argument of kinship should not be underestimated. Far from being a mere invented pretext, kinship was used as a tool to *create* ties –personal and interstatal. For the metropolis it offered a chance to establish contacts with cities which lay much closer to the decision-making centres.⁹ On the other hand, kinship with the

¹ Plut., *Demetr.* 46.4.

² Bielman 1994: 73 n. 20. Incidentally, this also means that Lysimachos was not the sole master of Karia in 287 (despite what Plutarch, *Demetr.* 46.4 claims), a point that Billows 1989: 192 overlooks in his work on the career of Eupolemos. For the date of Eupolemos' rule over Karia, see Buraselis 1982: 11-22 (Eupolemos as a dynast in 311-302), with earlier bibliography, Billows 1989 (who dates his rule in 294-286 and is followed by Gregory 1995: 24-26; cf. Billows 1995: 93-94), Kobes 1996: 104-105 and Descat 1998 (both dating Eupolemos' rule to 315-313), and, mainly, the wise reservations of Gauthier, *BullEpigr* 1990, 303 and 1999, 152.

³ Either early in the campaign, when Poliorketes won and then lost Sardeis and was pursued by Agathokles (Plut., *Demetr.* 46.6-9), or, less likely, later, when Lysimachos' forces assisted Seleukid troops in their hunt for Poliorketes (Plut., *Demetr.* 48.4).

⁴ A fundamental difficulty remains: if the captives belonged to a military contingent, why did they include women and children (l. 3)?

⁵ The name Theognetos is attested at Troizen (*IG IV 823*, l. 38, fourth century), and so is the very common, especially in this area, patronym of the other ambassador (Asklepiades, *IG IV 816*).

⁶ See mainly Curty 1995.

⁷ See **C32-34**, below.

⁸ Ager 1996: n° 169 (*Syll.*³ 656).

⁹ It seems that for the Troizenians in the Hellenistic period the release of captives was a major concern, and that the ties of kinship between Troizen and other cities were often exploited

old centres of Hellenism provided the ‘colonies’ and their Greek or Hellenized leading statesmen (like our Myndian intermediary) with a diplomatic tool which generated civic pride and supralocal status.

The second interesting aspect is that the Troizenians approached not the king himself but another member of the royal family. There are three reasons for this course of action. Firstly, Seleukos would have no reason to favourably receive the Troizenians, comrades-in-arms of his enemy. The ambassadors had no other choice than to turn to the king’s ex-wife, who was also the daughter of Poliorketes; they could reasonably claim that the reason behind the misfortunes of their fellow countrymen was precisely the help they had provided to her father.¹ Secondly, Stratonike did not only have the moral obligation to help them but also the appropriate high standing at court. She was the wife of the co-ruler, the ex-wife of the founder of the dynasty, the daughter of a king, and, most importantly, she was portrayed by Seleukos (and later by Antiochos) as a symbol of dynastic continuity.² Finally, and regardless of the actual political power of the queen, we cannot overlook the possibility that the unknown Myndian intermediary had prior contacts with the queen, as is attested in other similar cases.

SIKYON

B10. Alexion

— Diod. Sic. 19.67.1

In the summer of 314 Polyperchon and his son Alexandros negotiated an alliance with their former enemy Kassandros (Diod. Sic. 19.64.3-4). Antigonos’ general Aristodemos strove to occupy various positions in the Peloponnese in order to counter the strength of the newly formed alliance (19.66.2-3). When the Dymaians tried to rid themselves of Kassandros’ garrison, Alexandros reacted (19.66.4-6). A second revolt of the Dymaians forced him to leave his base at Sikyon once more in order to suppress the rebellion; while on his way to Dyme, however, he was murdered “by Alexion of Sikyon and some others who pretended to be his friends” (19.67.1). With the help of the Macedonian garrison Kratesipolis, the

with that objective. Out of nine preserved Hellenistic decrees from Troizen, five involve the release of captives: the decree under discussion; *IG IV 752*; Bielman 1994: n° 43 (*IG IV 756*) and n° 40 (Robert 1936: n° 53); Wilhelm 1908: 70-72. The last two, probably dealing with the same case despite Bielman’s reservations (1994: 151), are comparable to the decree under discussion, since the honourend who was involved in the release of only one Troizenian was also a citizen of a Karian city.

¹ Stratonike seems to have emphasized the fact that she was the daughter of Poliorketes, perhaps even more than the fact that she was the wife of a king and of his successor (Carney 2000: 171-72 and 326 n. 123).

² See the observations of Kuhrt / Sherwin-White 1991: 83-85 on the Borsippa cylinder and Carney 2000: 305 n. 70; the latter correctly points out that the cylinder shows Stratonike’s significance as a political symbol rather than a carrier based on real political power.

widow of Alexandros, managed to suppress the bloody revolt which ensued in Sikyon; after the end of the hostilities she arrested thirty leaders of the revolt, probably including Alexion, and crucified them (19.67.2).

In modern scholarship Alexion is often termed a democrat¹ and/or an anti-Macedonian,² a characterization which, in my opinion, is both unfounded and misleading. Firstly, Diodoros does not connect Alexion with the revolt of the Sikyonians after Alexandros' death. In addition, it should be obvious that Alexion belonged to the group of Sikyonian statesmen who collaborated with Alexandros, otherwise he would not have been in a position to "pretend to be a friend"; in fact, he must have belonged to the Sikyonian collaborators of Alexandros already before the latter's –very recent– alliance with Kassandros. The timing of the murder suggests that, *de facto* if not consciously, Alexion promoted the interests of Antigonos. This does not exclude other political, even 'patriotic' motives,³ which should not, however, deter us from adopting a more global perspective which avoids convenient but hypothetical political labels.

B11. Timokleidas

— *FD III 4*, 464; *Plut., Arat. 2* (?); *Paus. 2.8.1* (?).

A statue base in Delphi, bearing an honorific inscription, is also related to the events of these years in Sikyon. The honourands are Alexandros son of Polyperchon and his wife Kratesipolis, and the dedicant is Timokleidas. The inscription probably predates Alexandros' death.⁴ This means that Timokleidas also belonged to the leaders of Sikyon who collaborated with Alexandros. The assessment of his role in the events which followed depends on whether he is to be identified with another Timokleidas, known to have been active in Hellenistic Sikyon.

This second Timokleidas belongs to a long series of tyrants of the first half of the third century. Unfortunately, the history of Sikyon during this period is known only from two summary and contradictory passages of Plutarch (*Arat. 2*) and Pausanias (2.8.1-2). Both begin their account with the end of the tyrannid of Kleon. According to Plutarch, Timokleidas and Kleinias (Aratos' father) were elected as archons; after the natural death of Timokleidas, Abantidas murdered Kleinias and became a tyrant. According to Pausanias, Euthydemos and Timokleidas ruled jointly after the death of Kleon, until the people deposed them and brought Kleinias to power. Kleinias' murder by Abantidas is the only event that can be dated; it belongs to 264, when Aratos was seven years old (*Plut., Arat. 2.2*). The

¹ Among others, by Beloch 1925: 121; Scallet 1928: 79; Griffin 1982: 77.

² See, for example, Heckel 1992: 202 n. 159.

³ In 314, that is, one year after the declaration of Tyros on the freedom of the Greek cities (*Diod. Sic. 19.61.3*), an alliance with Antigonos must have seemed an attractive prospect for a citizen of the Greek mainland, in view of the imminent threat posed by Kassandros.

⁴ See the comments of Pouilloux (*FD III 4*, p. 143 and n. 5) and his pl. 18B.

sequence of previous events and their date are difficult to establish. Kleon is usually placed in the period after 272,¹ in which case Timokleidas the dedicant at Delphi (before 314) cannot be identified with the 'tyrant' Timokleidas (260's) –who may, of course, be a descendant of his. Nevertheless, dating Kleon after 272 is entirely hypothetical and improbable; he should probably be dated much earlier.² The earlier he is dated the more possible the identification of the two Timokleidai becomes. Either way, the official position of the second Timokleidas³ and his relationship with the royal courts remain unknown.

Even if the two homonymous leaders are not one and the same, they most probably belong to the same family, a family which maintained a leading position in the city for almost a century after Alexandros' death.⁴ The family's continued power after Alexandros' murder suggests that Timokleidas did not take part in the revolt against the son of Polyperchon and his Macedonian garrison.

B12. The ancestors of Aratos

— Plut., *Arat.* 2.1-3 and 4.2; Paus. 2.8.1-2

As we just saw, Kleinias, Aratos' father, was one of the leading Sikyonian statesmen in the second quarter of the third century.⁵ As we also saw, the precise sequence of events relating to his rule is unclear. It is likely that, after

¹ So Lippold 1923: 2541; Porter 1937: xxv and 50; Berve 1967: I.393; Griffin 1982: 79; F. W. Walbank 1988: 273-74. Even those who disagree, like Beloch 1925: 580; 1927: 384, place him only slightly earlier, in the mid-270's.

² The only chronological indication regarding Kleon is that he ruled "over the present city" (Paus. 2.8.1: ἐν τῇ νῦν πόλει), that is, after the resettlement of 303 (Diod. Sic. 20.102.2-3). If Euthydemus, who succeeded him according to Pausanias, is to be identified with the representative of the Sikyonians in the Amphictionic council of 272 (*CID IV 25*), we have a firm *terminus ante quem* for Kleon (cf. Porter 1937: 50). Even if we do not accept this identification, or assume that Euthydemus represented the Sikyonians before he rose to power, the fact that two or three different regimes followed Kleon's death until 264 makes the dating of Kleon's leadership after 272 strenuously low. Kleon could very well be the tyrant under whose rule the Sikyonians whom Aratos repatriated in 251 after fifty years of exile (Plut., *Arat.* 9.4; Cic., *Off.* 2.81) were exiled, perhaps in the troubled times after the battle of Ipsos.

³ The scenario put forward by Berve 1967: I. 393-94 is the only scenario which manages to combine the contradictory reports of Plutarch and Pausanias: after Kleon, Euthydemus and Timokleidas ruled jointly, and then Timokleidas restored constitutional form and ruled lawfully along with Kleinias.

⁴ Timokleidas son of Theutimos of Sikyon, honoured at Delos in the late third century, must be a later offspring of the family (*IG XI 4, 704*; Roussel's dating, based on letter forms, excludes the identification with the Timokleidas of the literary sources, originally suggested by Dürrbach and, more recently, Vial 1984: 98, without further arguments; Vial cites the unpublished dissertation of Marie-Françoise Baslez, *Les étrangers à Délos. Formes et évolution de la vie de relation dans un sanctuaire panhellénique* [Paris IV, 1982], n° 232, which I have not been able to consult).

⁵ See mainly Plut., *Arat.* 2.1: [the Sikyonians] εἶλοντο Τιμοκλείδαν καὶ Κλεινίαν, ἄνδρας ἐνδόξους τὰ μάλιστα καὶ ἐν δυνάμει τῶν πολιτῶν ὄντας.

Timokleidas' (natural?) death, Kleinias became the sole ruler of the city, probably within the limits of constitutional form,¹ until his murder by Abantidas in 264.

The vague title of this entry refers to a later remark by Plutarch, according to which Nikokles, tyrant of Sikyon before the mid-third century, suspected Aratos and kept his activities under close watch, for fear that he would seek help for the liberation of the city from Ptolemy II or Antigonos Gonatas, "because they were connected with ties of friendship and hospitality with his ancestors" (Plut., *Arat.* 4.2: φίλοις οὔσι καὶ ξένοις πατρώοις).

The term πατρώος (or πατρικός) ξένος is of particular interest, since it does not only mean "xenos of the father" but also "ancestral xenos".² In other words, Aratos' relationship with the Ptolemies and the Antigonids need not have its origins in the time of his father. In fact, if we take the term ξένος literally, the likeliest occasion when an ancestor of Aratos could have provided hospitality to ancestors of Ptolemy II and Antigonos Gonatas would be in 308 and 303 respectively, when Ptolemy I and Demetrios Poliorketes were in the Peloponnese.³ Even if we focus on the less binding term φίλος, this is the likeliest period for a close personal liaison to have developed between a Sikyonian and Ptolemy I, who did not show particular interest in the Peloponnese neither earlier nor later. In 308 Kleinias was probably too young to attract the friendship of a king – Aratos was born thirty-seven years later. It is therefore more plausible to trace the beginning of the family's ties with the royal courts to Kleinias' father.

What is particularly interesting for the present discussion is that Kleinias' father (?) not only managed to survive politically after the expulsion of the Ptolemaic garrison in 303⁴ and to form a bond with the new overlord of the city, but also to maintain the family's personal relationship with the Ptolemaic court.⁵ Personal ties with Hellenistic rulers were a significant political asset for a Hellenistic family of statesmen, to be maintained even after a change of allegiance. The resilience of these ties was proved decades later, when Aratos, twenty years old and politically inexperienced, did not hesitate to ask Philadelphos and Gonatas to help him liberate his country.

¹ Plutarch and Pausanias agree that Kleinias was lawfully elected (Plut., *Arat.* 2.1: εἴλοντο; Paus. 2.8.2: ὁ δῆμος Κλεινίαν... προσησάμενος); we should not forget, however, that the ultimate source of both writers is Aratos himself, who had every reason to stress the lawfulness of his father's power.

² The earliest example is already found in the *Iliad* (6.215); cf. Herman 1987: 70 and 166; for the use of the term by Polybios, see Glockmann / Helms 1998: II 1. 190.

³ Diod. Sic. 20.37.1-2 (Ptolemy); 20.102-3 (Poliorketes). Porter 1937: 52 also dates the beginning of the relationship at this time.

⁴ Diod. Sic. 20.102.2-3.

⁵ In that sense, F. W. Walbank's (1933: 30) description of Kleinias' policy as a "neutral and moderate policy" acquires a whole new meaning.

B13. Aratos son of Kleinias

— *RE*, s.v. *Aratos* n° 2

The personality of Aratos and his political activity have been thoroughly studied and are well known;¹ in what follows, I shall concentrate on the aspects of his career concerning the main subject of the present study.

I. Before the liberation of Sikyon

Aratos' relationship with Hellenistic rulers marks the very start of his political career. As we already saw, he turned to Antigonos Gonatas and Ptolemy II Philadelphos, with whom his family had ties of friendship and hospitality, in order to seek help for the removal of the tyrant of Sikyon Nikokles.² Gonatas, despite giving an affirmative answer, delayed sending help, while help arriving from Alexandria was, as Aratos perfectly understood, a remote possibility; as a result, he decided to depose the tyrant on his own, in the early spring of 251.³

Despite this explicit assertion of Plutarch –that is, of Aratos' himself–, the justified distrust of the way Aratos presents his activities and the almost contemporary revolt of Alexandros son of Krateros against the Macedonian throne⁴ have led to a plethora of complicated hypotheses about unattested alliances between Aratos, Nikokles, Alexandros and Gonatas during that time. The two main tendencies are to consider Aratos an ally of Gonatas and the latter's instrument against the revolted Alexandros, or, on the contrary, to consider Nikokles as the ally of Gonatas, in which case the liberation of Sikyon is understood as an expression of Aratos' anti-Macedonian feelings. Analysing or refuting these assumptions would

¹ In the 1920's and 1930's two monographs on Aratos and three commented editions of Plutarch's *Life of Aratos* appeared (Ferrabino 1921; F. W. Walbank 1933; Theunissen 1935; Porter 1937; Koster 1937). For later bibliography, at least for the purposes of this study, see mainly Bickerman 1943; F. W. Walbank 1957 and 1967: 56-89; Errington 1967; Gruen 1972; Urban 1979; Marasco 1981; Orsi 1991; Knoepfler 2001: 289-93.

² Plut., *Arat.* 4.2; cf. the preceding entry.

³ Plut., *Arat.* 4.3. I follow the 'traditional' dating of the early history of the Achaian *koinon* (see the tables of F. W. Walbank 1957: 233-344 and Urban 1979: 215-16) and not the revised chronological scheme put forward by Errington 1969: 266-71. Despite Plutarch's assertion (*Arat.* 53.5) that the liberation of Sikyon took place in Daisios, which corresponds to Attic Anthesterion (ca. February – March), modern scholarship dates it to May 251 (see, for example, Porter 1937: xxxvi; Koster 1937: lxiv; F. W. Walbank 1933: 176, 203 and 1957: 235-36; Urban 1979: 13), because of the equation of Daisios with Thargelion (May – June) in other Plutarchean passages (*Cam.* 19; *Alex.* 16). Nevertheless, in these passages Plutarch refers to Daisios of the Macedonian calendar, while in *Arat.* 4.3 he refers to the local Sikyonian Daisios, which can either be an original Sikyonian month or a sign of Macedonian influence. Since we have no further information on the Sikyonian calendar, both options are plausible (cf. Errington 1969: 268 n. 2; Trümper 1997: 83 n. 379), but the very specific equation of the Sikyonian Daisios with Anthesterion by Plutarch should be preferred.

⁴ On the dating of this revolt and the lack of evidence for the various assumptions about alliances in the Peloponnese of the 250's, cf. p. 216 n. 2-3, above.

require a lengthy discussion, irrelevant to the purposes of this study. Suffice it to say here that the theory of an alliance between Gonatas and Aratos has been convincingly refuted by Porter and Urban.¹ Regarding the supposed anti-Macedonian disposition of Aratos, I hope to show elsewhere that there is no evidence for contacts of Alexandros with the Ptolemaic court, for contacts of Nikokles with Gonatas, or for Aratos' actions in 251 depending upon the wishes of Gonatas, Alexandros or Ptolemy. Sources on the mid-third century are so inadequate that the temptation to fill our blanks with assumptions resting on shaky foundations is strong, but should be nonetheless resisted. In other words, the liberation of Sikyon has been exalted to a central episode of the period exactly because it is one of the very few events of the period that is recorded in some detail. If we look at the wider picture, the deposition of a tyrant in a small city of the Peloponnese by a twenty-year-old aristocrat was hardly a landmark for the *grande politique* of the period.

II. *The trip to Egypt and the first period of Aratos' rule (250-243)*

The first face to face contact of Aratos with a king took place during his mission to Alexandria (Plut., *Arat.* 12-14; Cic., *Off.* 2.82). Unfortunately, Plutarch's record of that mission is in many respects problematic: the date of the trip to Alexandria and the understanding of events before and after it depend on a series of vague data and require a careful examination, which I defer to Appendix 3. The results are as follows:

1) Shortly before his trip Aratos had received a donation of twenty-five talents, most probably from Antigonos Gonatas (Plut., *Arat.* 11.2). The effort of Gonatas to win Aratos over to his side must be connected with the king's efforts to suppress Alexandros' revolt. Following the Macedonian plan, Aratos did attempt to conquer Corinth, Alexandros' stronghold, but failed, and soon after came to terms with the contender for the Macedonian throne (Plut., *Arat.* 18.2).

2) Aratos' trip to Alexandria did not take place immediately after the liberation of Sikyon, when the overwhelming majority of scholars date it, but rather later; we cannot even rule out the possibility that it dates to the first months of the rule of Ptolemy III (winter 246/5 – spring 245).

3) In 245, shortly after his trip to Alexandria, Aratos was forced to temporarily submit to Gonatas' power, who now occupied Corinth and dominated the Aegean (Plut., *Arat.* 15).

4) Very soon, however, he proved disloyal to his new temporary allegiance. In 243 he conquered Corinth (Plut., *Arat.* 18-24; Polyb. 2.43.4, 50.9), while at the same time made the alliance of the Achaian *koinon* with Ptolemy III official, by appointing the king as the leader of the alliance (Plut., *Arat.* 24.4).

¹ See mainly Urban 1979: 16-38.

Some basic aspects of Aratos' early relationship with the kings in the period 250-243 are detectable. One important factor was financial support. The twenty-five talents he received from Gonatas (?) are described as a donation offered personally to Aratos, not to the city of Sikyon or the Achaian *koinon*.¹ The 150 talents he received from Ptolemy after his visit to Alexandria, forty up front and the rest in yearly instalments, were a donation to the city of Sikyon, but once again this donation is described as given to Aratos personally;² according to ancient diplomatic practice it was more or less expected that Aratos would embezzle this sum, and he is specifically praised by Plutarch for not doing so.³ The profit for Aratos was not only material and immediate; it was also political and long-term. By using part of these sums to alleviate the explosive social problems of Sikyon, Aratos became a key figure in Sikyon's political scene: after his mission to Alexandria he was elected "plenipotentiary arbitrator for settling property issues of the exiles".⁴

A second important aspect is the way by which an aspirant statesman could take advantage of prior contacts with one or more kings when circumstances permitted it. It is clear that in the 240's Gonatas considered Aratos an important figure, and solicited his alliance actively. This effort was facilitated by past familial and personal ties between the two men. Ptolemy's benevolence towards Aratos was due not only to his geostrategic interests in the Aegean and the Peloponnese, but also to a personal bond already forged in the past; according to Plutarch, Aratos regularly sent paintings of the famous school of Sikyon to Alexandria.⁵

These prior personal bonds illuminate the third important aspect of Aratos' early relation with the kings. Having open channels of communication with both opposing courts, Aratos had the significant advantage of choosing his ally, after weighing his (and his Achaian collaborators') short-term interests and aspirations against the conjunctural military and diplomatic context.

III. 243-227: the anti-Macedonian statesman

The next period in Aratos' career is the one least interesting for the purposes of this study. Aratos in that period was the leader of an Achaian *koinon* which was

¹ Plut., *Arat.* 11.2: Ἦκε δ' αὐτῷ καὶ χρημάτων δωρεὰ παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι τάλαντα. Ταῦτ' ἔλαβε μὲν ὁ Ἄρατος, λαβὼν δὲ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ πολίταις ἐπέδωκεν...

² Plut., *Arat.* 13.6: δωρεὰν ἔλαβε τῇ πόλει.

³ Plut., *Arat.* 14.1.

⁴ Plut., *Arat.* 14.2: αὐτοκράτωρ διαλλακτῆς καὶ κύριος ὅλως ἐπὶ τὰς φυγαδικὰς οἰκονομίας. Aratos decided to share this office with fifteen fellow countrymen of his (*ibid.*).

⁵ Plut., *Arat.* 12.6; Cic., *Off.* 2.82.

systematically expansionist,¹ as well as steadfastly anti-Macedonian² and pro-Ptolemaic.³ Ptolemy III Euergetes was the leader of the official alliance between the two parties,⁴ and soon (in 243 or soon after) the opposite camp was formed by the alliance of the Aitolians with the Macedonian king, an alliance with an explicit aim to dismember the Achaian *koinon*.⁵ The Aitolian defeat at Pellene in 241 led to a truce and a peace treaty with the Aitolians and Macedonia (winter 241/0), but the Achaian stance towards Macedonia did not change, as their alliance with the Aitolians (239?) and the Demetrian War which ensued clearly demonstrates.⁶

IV. 227 - 224: the supposedly unwilling ally of the Macedonians

What brought about the radical change of Aratos' attitude towards Macedonia was the outbreak of the Kleomenic War in 229 and the successes of the Spartan king during the first years of the war. The contacts of Aratos with Antigonos Doson and the way he imposed the alliance with Macedonia to the Achaians are of particular interest to this study and thus require a detailed discussion.

The first attested contact between Aratos and Doson is the Achaian embassy to the king in the winter of 227/6.⁷ Leaving aside Aratos' motive for the time being, it is worthwhile to take a closer look on his manoeuvring. Knowing that calling the Macedonian army to the Peloponnese to help fight Kleomenes would cause strong reactions in Achaia, Aratos "thought it better to handle the affair in secret"

¹ Corinth, Heraion, Lechaion: 243; Megara, Troizen, Epidaurus: 243 or soon after; Kleonai, Megalopolis: 235; Orchomenos, Mantinea: 234 (?); Aigina, Argos, Hermione, Phlious: 229.

² The political vision of Aratos is described by Polybios (2.43.8) as "to drive the Macedonians out of the Peloponnese and depose all tyrants" (τοὺς Μακεδόνας μὲν ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου, τὰς δὲ μοναρχίας καταλύσαι); a valuable and much more realistic assessment is provided by Plut., *Arat.* 24.5: "nothing was so dear to him as the increase of the Achaians' power" (οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῆς αὐξήσεως τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐπίπροσθεν ποιούμενον). Whether Plutarch's statement (*Arat.* 25.6) that Gonatas and the tyrant of Argos Aristippos attempted to murder Aratos is true or not, it is certain that Aratos' relations with Gonatas after 243 and, later, with Demetrios II were hostile.

³ The steady flow of Ptolemaic money must have contributed to the ease with which the Achaians used bribery to achieve their aims: sixty talents for the capturing of the Acrocorinth in 243 (Plut., *Arat.* 19.1), twenty (Plut., *Arat.* 34.6) or twenty-five (Paus. 2.8.6) talents for the liberation of Athens in 229, fifty talents for the incorporation of Argos into the *koinon* again in 229 (Plut., *Arat.* 35.2).

⁴ Plut., *Arat.* 24.4; Paus. 2.8.5. Sparta of Agis IV was later also included (Plut., *Agis* 13.6).

⁵ Polyb. 2.43.9 and 9.34.6; cf. Urban 1979: 54-55 and SVA III 490, with earlier bibliography.

⁶ For this period (241-229) in the history of the Achaian *koinon*, see mainly Urban 1979: 54-96 and (for the Aitolian point of view) Scholten 2000: 132-62, with earlier bibliography.

⁷ The embassy was originally dated to 226/5; F. W. Walbank 1933: 189-201, following Ferrabino 1921: 255-62, suggested 229; his arguments were convincingly confuted by Porter 1937: lxxi-lxxv and Fine 1940: 137-39, who dated the embassy to 227/6, a date generally accepted ever since (see, for example, F. W. Walbank 1957: 248; Gruen 1972: 609 and n. 1; Urban 1979: 133 with n. 151; F. W. Walbank 1988: 346; Orsi 1991: 43; Le Bohec 1993: 364 and n. 4).

(Polyb. 2.47.9: ἀδήλως ταῦτα διεννοεῖτο χειρίζειν). He convinced Nikophanes and Kerkidas of Megalopolis, family friends of his,¹ to convince the Megalopolitans to ask the Achaian *koinon* for permission to ask for Macedonian help. The Megalopolitans voted in favour of the sending of the embassy, led by the two friends of Aratos, and asked for the consent of confederate authorities. In the autumn assembly of 227 the *koinon* consented, and Nikophanes and Kerkidas went to Macedonia to consult with the king (2.48.4-8). Although this was technically not an Achaian but a Megalopolitan embassy,² the two ambassadors talked only briefly about their own city (2.48.8); the discussions which followed dealt with wider diplomatic and strategic issues of the Greek mainland.³ The double nature of the embassy is equally evident in what followed. The two ambassadors conveyed to Megalopolis Doso's goodwill and a letter by which he pledged to help the city if the *koinon* consented (2.50.1-4); they also reported back to Aratos κατ' ἰδίαν Doso's planned stance "towards the Achaians and towards him personally" (2.50.5: πρὸς τε τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ πρὸς αὐτόν). The last act of this part of the show took place in the spring assembly of 226: the Megalopolitans earnestly asked the *koinon* to accept Macedonian help, and Aratos hesitantly declined; help from the Macedonians, he claimed, should be the Achaians' last resort, in case they failed to save their cities on their own, as would be proper and profitable (2.50.10-11).

For the time being, it will suffice to bear in mind that, already by 227, Aratos thought it was useful to begin tentative discussions with the king of Macedonia. He knew the time for a full alliance had not yet arrived. His allies formed a very small (if one judges by the secrecy of the proceedings) group of Achaian politicians; the Megalopolitans, traditional enemies of Sparta and friends of the Macedonians, understandably played an important role within this group.

It has been suggested that the insistence of Polybios on the secrecy of Aratos' handling of the negotiations suggests that Aratos had tentative contacts with Doso already before 227,⁴ but this is unlikely. Firstly, Polybios does not record any prior contacts between Aratos and Doso, and there is no reason to doubt him, since in his account of the embassy of 227 he clearly does not follow Aratos' apologetics.⁵ Moreover, Aratos had no particular reason for having any contacts

¹ Cf. B33-34, above; on the term πατρικοὶ ξένοι, see the preceding entry.

² Bickerman 1943: 289; F. W. Walbank 1957: 248; Urban 1979: 126-27; Orsi 1991: 42.

³ The overemphasizing of the Aitolian danger by Nikophanes and Kerkidas (or by Aratos himself) and the degree to which their analysis can be considered as indicative of the existence of a triple alliance between Aitolia, Sparta and Macedonia (for a discussion of the problem, see mainly Urban 1979: 92-112) need not concern us here. Rather than being a realistic description of the balance of powers in 227, the ambassadors' analysis mostly served Polybios as a rhetorical ploy aiming to exculpate Aratos (cf. Orsi 1991: 45-47).

⁴ See F.W. Walbank 1957: 246.

⁵ Walbank (*ibid.*) believes that Plutarch, when writing that Aratos contacted Doso ἐκ πολλοῦ καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης (*Arat.* 38.11), corroborates his assumption about prior contacts

with Doson before 227, as a) for the first couple of years of his rule Doson was a weak king, whose power was threatened by domestic dissent and external dangers, b) 229 was the year of the *koinon*'s maximum territorial expansion,¹ which effects that an alliance with the former enemy was not yet a necessity, and c) Kleomenes did not pose a serious threat before his successes in Arkadia in the summer of 227.²

The understanding of events between the spring assembly of 226 and the spring assembly of 224, when the alliance between the Achaians and Doson became official, is hampered by significant discrepancies in our three sources.³ An outline of the main facts is necessary.

In the autumn of 226 Kleomenes won his second important battle against the Achaians at Hekatombaion in Achaia, as well as an important diplomatic battle when he became the recipient of the Ptolemaic monetary grant instead of Aratos. By the time of the spring assembly of 225 Kleomenes' successes and his will to negotiate with the Achaians had created a positive climate for peace. Aratos, however, "having already agreed upon basic issues with Antigonos" (Plut., *Cleom.* 17.2: ἤδη διωμολογημένων αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίγονον τῶν μεγίστων), put forward unacceptable conditions for the presence of Kleomenes at the assembly. His stance triggered a political crisis: in all the cities of the *koinon* many expressed their wish to join Kleomenes and his popular policy and/or their dislike for Aratos, "some of them enraged because he was planning to bring the Macedonians to the Peloponnese" (*ibid.*, 17.5: ἐνίων δὲ καὶ δι' ὀργῆς ἐχόντων ὡς ἐπάγοντα τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ Μακεδόνας). Several cities were conquered by Kleomenes or willingly joined him: Pellene, Pheneos, Penteleion, Argos, Kleonai, Phlious, Troizen, Epidaurus, Hermione and Corinth (apart from the Acrocorinth). Aratos, narrowly escaping arrest at Corinth, sought refuge at Sikyon and called an extraordinary *synodos* of the *koinon* (obviously attended mostly by his followers and fellow countrymen), which appointed him general plenipotentiary (Plut., *Arat.* 41.1); all this happened during the summer of 225.⁴ Aratos sought the help of the Athenians and the Aitolians, but in vain. Kleomenes made a last attempt to reach an agreement with Aratos, by proposing the installation of a joint garrison of Achaians and Spartans on the Acrocorinth, an alliance under his leadership and a yearly monetary grant to Aratos (Plut., *Arat.* 41.5; *Cleom.* 19.8). Aratos refused, Kleomenes besieged Sikyon

between the two. But Plutarch, in the *Lives* both of Aratos and Kleomenes (*Cleom.* 16) places his digression on the morally questionable negotiations of Aratos with Doson in the context of the events of 225, shortly before the official treaty between the Achaians and the Macedonians, and *Arat.* 38.11 explicitly refers to the embassy of 227.

¹ Cf. Will 1979: 364-66 and Urban 1979: 97.

² See F. W. Walbank 1957: 250. On Aratos' contempt for Kleomenes before the war, see Plut., *Cleom.* 3-4.

³ Polyb. 2.51-52; Plut. *Arat.* 38-42; *Cleom.* 16-19; on the *Quellenforschung*, see p. 242-43, below.

⁴ On the date, see Porter 1937: lxxviii-lxxx and Orsi 1991: 67-69.

for three months, and in the spring of 224 the Achaians were convinced to accept Aratos' proposal for an official alliance with Doson, offering him Acrocorinth in exchange.

There remains, however, a central episode which needs to be examined apart: the mission (or missions) of Aratos son of Aratos to Doson.¹ Plutarch (*Cleom.* 19.9) mentions such a mission in a context which allows us to date it between the autumn of 225 and the spring of 224: When Aratos rejected Kleomenes' last negotiating effort after the conquest of Corinth, "he sent his son to Antigonos along with the other hostages, and convinced the Achaians to vote in favour of surrendering the Acrocorinth to Antigonos; Kleomenes then conquered the *chora* of Sikyon...". In the *Life of Aratos* he gives a slightly different account: the siege of Sikyon predates the synod of Aigion (*Arat.* 41.7), Aratos the younger is still by his father's side (42.2) and is sent to Doson, again "along with the other hostages", after the assembly of Aigion, where the alliance was formally decided, that is, in the late spring of 224. Polybios offers a third version of the sequence of events (2.51-52). He justifies the invitation extended to Doson by enumerating the factors which made the position of the Achaians desperate. Initially (2.51.2) he mentions a diplomatic factor, the fact that the Ptolemaic monetary grant was given to Kleomenes instead of Aratos, probably in the winter of 226/5.² Then he mentions the military successes of Kleomenes; the most recent was the battle at Hekatombaion, in the autumn of 226 (2.51.3). It is after that, Polybios continues, that the Achaians "unanimously" (ὁμοθυμαδόν) turned to Doson and that Aratos sent his son on an embassy, in which he "made the final agreement about the help" (2.51.5: ἐβεβαιώσατο τὰ περὶ τῆς βοηθείας). Both sides knew that the handing over of the Acrocorinth would prove a thorny issue and therefore "their council was initially adjourned so that the guarantees offered could be fully considered" (2.51.7: ὑπέρθεσιν ἔσχε τὸ διαβούλιον χάριν τῆς περὶ τῶν πίστεων ἐπισκέψεως). Then, Kleomenes' successes in 225, the conquest of Corinth and the siege of Sikyon are mentioned; the secession of Corinth from the *koinon*, in particular, provided the Achaians with an "occasion and reasonable ground" (2.52.3: ἀφορμὴ καὶ πρόφασις εὐλόγος), which Aratos exploited to hand the Acrocorinth over to Doson (2.52.3-4). In other words, Polybios dates the mission of Aratos the younger to early 225.

¹ Although from a formal point of view the mission was of Aratos the younger, it is discussed here rather than in the following entry, as the son of Aratos obviously also conveyed his father's thoughts, proposals and promises.

² For the dating of this second development, see p. 529 n. 6, below.

Is it that we are dealing with one mission, dated to three different periods (early 225, early 224, spring 224) by Polybios and Plutarch, or two?¹ The latter option is much more plausible. According to both accounts by Plutarch, Aratos the younger was sent as a hostage, therefore after the Achaian assembly had voted in favour of the alliance with Doso; this was a mission aimed at ratifying the treaty, and the Achaian emissaries were to remain hostages until the handing over of the Acrocorinth.² Conversely, the account of Polybios refers to a previous stage in the negotiations, *prior* to the final Achaian decision in favour of the alliance.³ Aratos the younger was therefore sent twice to Macedonia by his father, once in early 225, when the situation for the Achaians was ominous but not desperate, and once after the conclusion of the alliance, in the spring of 224.

Two questions remain: what was Aratos' capacity in the first mission and what did he negotiate about? Polybios (2.51.5) calls him an ambassador, the verb ἐβεβαιώσατο used in the same passage probably (but not necessarily) points to an official capacity as well,⁴ and the phrase ὑπέρθεσιν ἔσχε τὸ διαβούλιον χάριν τῆς περὶ τῶν πίστεων ἐπισκέψεως (2.51.7) equally points to the ending of an official negotiation;⁵ in all likelihood, Aratos the younger's mission was official.⁶ This, however, is perhaps of secondary importance; the precedent of the Megalopolitan embassy demonstrates that an official envoy of the *koinon* could perfectly well be used by Aratos to promote his personal, unofficial agenda; the more so, since the

¹ In favour of the first option, see Gruen 1972: 624 (with reservations); Urban 1979: 145-46; in favour of the second, see Porter 1937: lxxiii-lxv; F. W. Walbank 1957: 251 and (with reservations) Orsi 1991: 51-80.

² The dating of this mission by Plut., *Cleom.* 19.9 *before* the siege of Sikyon and the Achaian assembly (19.9) is due either to a mistake or to a conscious effort of Phylarchos, Plutarch's main source in this *Life*, to exonerate his hero's policy: a conciliatory Kleomenes is presented as making his final attack against the Achaians only after Aratos allied himself with the Macedonians.

³ The *πίσταις* (guarantees) which had to be reconsidered after the first mission (Polyb. 2.51.7) must have been the sending of hostages, that is, the second mission; this is the sense of *πίσταις* in the treaty between Kleomenes and Ptolemy III in 226/5 (Polyb. 5.35.1), when Kleomenes sent his wife and children as hostages to Alexandria to ensure the monetary grant of Ptolemy (cf. also Polyb. 15.18.8: ὁμήρουσ δούναί πίστεωσ χάριν in the treaty between Rome and Carthage). It is true that after Aratos' mission Polybios seems to refer to the handing over of Acrocorinth as a *πίστις* (2.52.4: προτείνας [*scil.* Aratos] Ἀντιγόνω τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον... ἱκανὴν δὲ πίστιν παρέσχετο τῆσ πρὸσ τὰ μέλλοντα κοινωνίασ); but here the term *πίστις* is not a technical term as in the other examples. The handing over of the Acrocorinth was part of the deal, not a guarantee for the observance of its terms.

⁴ Cf. Orsi 1991: 79.

⁵ Cf. Polyb. 18.42.7; 18.47.9; 24.2.2.

⁶ *Pace* Orsi 1979: 51-80, who, after a detailed linguistic analysis, convincingly argues that Polybios' phraseology *could also* point to an unofficial negotiation. I still believe, however, that there is no reason to choose the least likely interpretation of the terms in both cases, and to overlook the fact that the usually careful Polybios explicitly calls Aratos the younger an ambassador.

envoy was his own son. As for the content of his negotiations, it should be obvious that he did not merely ask Doson what the price for his help would be.¹ It is clear from the Polybian passage that the handing over of Acrocorinth had already been agreed upon, otherwise, the main issue for “the Achaians”, that is, for Aratos, his son, his collaborators and his supporters, would not have been *how* to hand over the Acrocorinth despite Corinth’s understandable unwillingness (2.51.6), but *if* they would hand it over. Officially, the Achaians ratified the handing over of the Acrocorinth only in the spring of 224 (when they had no choice, anyway); nonetheless, Aratos, although he had not perhaps given his full consent,² knew perfectly well that there was no other way to ensure Macedonian help. He merely delayed the final ratification of the treaty, because in early 225 the Achaians were not ready for such a drastic measure. The only other option would have been to do what the majority of the Achaians wanted: enter into negotiations and call some kind of truce with Kleomenes.³ But this is precisely what Aratos wanted to avoid. In the spring of 224, with Kleomenes literally *ante portas* and Aratos as a plenipotentiary general, even his political enemies were not in a position to resist Doson’s offer. This is why Doson prepared his descent to the Peloponnese already before the Achaian assembly, “waiting for events to unfold in accordance with Aratos’ policy”.⁴

This appears to be a reasonable interpretation of the sources on Aratos’ relations with the Macedonians between 227 and 224. In 1972, however, Erich Gruen put

¹ So, for example, F. W. Walbank 1957: 251 and 1988: 348; Le Bohec 1993: 367.

² Plutarch, in *Cleom.* 17.2 (ἤδη διωμολογημένων αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίγονον τῶν μεγίστων; the time is the spring assembly of 225), appears to be following Phylarchos’ exaggerations. If Aratos had already fully agreed on the handing over of Acrocorinth in early 225, he would not be seeking help from Athens and Aitolia immediately after his appointment as plenipotentiary general in the summer of the same year (Plut., *Arat.* 41.3).

³ Plut., *Cleom.* 17.1. Phylarchos, on whom Plutarch mainly draws here, would have every reason to exaggerate the pro-Kleomenic feelings of the Achaians, so as to exalt the image of his hero. If, however, the Achaians had “unanimously” turned to Doson in early 225, as Polybios claims (2.51.4), they would not have risen against Aratos and his inflexible policy a few months later (Plut., *Cleom.* 17.5 –Phylarchos and Plutarch may overdramatize this episode but it is unnecessary to assume that they invented it).

⁴ Polyb. 2.52.6: παραδοκῶν τὸ μέλλον κατὰ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς Ἀράτου. The word ὑποθέσεις is usually translated as “advice” (perhaps because of the parallel in 2.48.8: κατὰ τὰς ἐντολὰς τὰς Ἀράτου καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις; *LSJ* considers the two phrases as having the same meaning). But Aratos secretly advising Doson to be ready to interfere would mean that a full agreement had already been concluded between the two and that Aratos took it for granted that the assembly would ratify his proposals. This is not unlikely, but in any event, Polybios would not have phrased it in this manner, blemishing the image of the man whose apologetics he generally followed. It is therefore preferable to understand “according to Aratos’ policy” which is a more usual meaning of the term ὑπόθεσις (see the examples cited in *LSJ*).

forward an exactly opposite interpretation, which was, to a large extent, followed by Urban.¹ According to his theory, Aratos did not actually intend to enter into negotiations with Doson in 227 (which were the sole work of the Megalopolitans); he wished for an entente with Sparta, and consistently remained an anti-Macedonian until 224,² when, under the pressure of a desperate military situation, he consented to an agreement with Doson. According to Gruen, all the reports about Aratos' secret diplomatic activity in 227 are figments of Phylarchos' imagination, aiming to put a blemish on Aratos' politics, and Polybios used them because they fitted his moral interpretation of history in Aratos' time, when, according to Polybios' view, the Achaians' central political goal should have been the annihilation of tyrants and Kleomenes, in particular.

The sources of Polybios for the embassy of 227 do constitute a problem. Polybios plainly states that Aratos withheld many details of his relations with the Macedonians in his *ὑπομνήματα*; Plutarch more or less says the same.³ This does not mean, however, that he suppressed *all* information on the embassy of 227, as Gruen assumes;⁴ one of the sources of Polybios could very well have been Aratos – if read carefully. A second source may have been Phylarchos, who certainly exaggerated the conspiratorial role of Aratos. It is implausible, however, that Polybios would use a writer whom just a few paragraphs below (2.56-63) he vilified as totally untrustworthy as his exclusive source on such an important episode. If Polybios used Phylarchos, he must have used him along with Aratos and/or local oral tradition⁵ from his home city of Megalopolis.⁶ As member of the political elite of

¹ Gruen 1972; Ehrhardt 1975: 250-55; Urban 1979: 117-55. Le Bohec 1993: 366-67 proposes an unnecessary compromise: the embassy was of the Megalopolitans, without Aratos' interference, who took advantage of it in order to enter into secret negotiations with Doson.

² Or, according to the version put forward by Urban 1979: 130-31, until the defeat at Hekatombaion. Indicative of Gruen's insistence on presenting Aratos as consistently anti-Macedonian is his interpretation of the mission of Aratos the younger in 225 (1972: 624): "The mission was presumably dispatched by vote of the League –not necessarily at Aratos' behest. If Aratos *managed* to secure a place for his son on the embassy, it may well have been in order to soften as much as possible any terms required by Doson" (my emphasis).

³ Polyb. 2.47.11; Plut., *Arat.* 38.11.

⁴ Gruen 1972: 617; see the important observations of Fine 1940: 149 n. 69 and Bickerman 1943: 298.

⁵ Gruen 1972: 617 correctly discards the possibility of a third written source.

⁶ Gruen 1972: 618 (with earlier bibliography, mostly contrary to his view; cf. Urban 1979: 132 and n. 148 and Cruces 1995: 39-45) emphatically denies the possibility that Polybios used oral traditions, due to the famous passage (4.2.1-3) where Polybios explains that he starts his narrative in 220, because it was only after that time that he could evaluate the credibility of oral tradition. *Pace* Gruen, this passage does not mean that Polybios *never* used oral sources for events prior to 220; it merely means that he only used oral testimony for the period before 220 when he considered that testimony dependable, which, *in general*, was not possible for older events (cf. Ehrhardt 1975: 252-53, who, except for this point, accepts Gruen's theory).

Megalopolis himself, Polybios was well placed to judge the credibility of such an oral tradition. As for the reason why Polybios decided to report such details on the embassy of 227, Gruen may be correct.¹ A secret agreement with Doso, a king whom Polybios consistently presents as a moral ruler, was certainly a lesser evil for Polybios in view of the possibility of a victory for the 'tyrant' Kleomenes. What is under discussion here, however, is not Polybios' views and motives, but Aratos' policy and actions. In that respect, I see no reason to refute Plutarch, who (in a rare display of sound historical judgement) points out that Phylarchos' account would not be credible if Polybios had not also used it.² In a sense, Gruen's theory goes to extremes that not even Polybios would have reached. While accepting as facts a whole series of arguments clearly emanating from Aratos' own apologetics (his consistent anti-Macedonian stance; his agreement with the Macedonians only in the face of the imminent danger of total defeat; the abhorrence of tyrants as the core of his policy justifying temporary alliances), whatever contradicts the image which Aratos appropriated for himself Gruen considers false and an invention of Phylarchos' groundless propaganda (the deliberate *rapprochement* with the Macedonians, contrary to the wishes of a large part of the Achaeans; the antagonism with Kleomenes at all costs, the leadership of the whole Peloponnese being the trophy). In any case, Aratos' stance after 224 provides further support to the simpler interpretation of the combined accounts of Plutarch and Polybios put forward above.

Despite Gruen's affirmation to the contrary,³ Aratos' policy between 227 and 224 presents no inconsistencies. Consciously and consistently, the Sikyonian statesman advanced an agreement with the Macedonians as a counterpoise to Kleomenes' increasing power and influence. In the beginning (in 227), the contact with Doso was of an exploratory nature and his personal part in it was kept secret; perhaps the embassy of 227 was, at the time, nothing more than an exploration of a future possibility, a safeguard designed as a last-minute solution for a danger which had not yet come. His veto during the spring assembly of 226 against the alliance with Doso was certainly a hypocritical move aiming at upholding his position in the leadership of the *koinon*, but may have also reflected his true beliefs at the time. Later, when Kleomenes' successes and the imminent or ongoing social unrest in the cities of the *koinon* and, above all, the prospect of losing power and Kleomenes becoming the undoubted leader of the whole Peloponnese, led him to put his old contingency plan into actual work: an alliance

¹ Gruen 1972: 619-20; cf. Orsi 1991: 45-47.

² Plut., *Arat.* 38.11. Gruen 1972: 616 and Urban 1979: 129-30, among others, think that it is unlikely that Aratos sought an understanding with Doso in 227, while he was still receiving Ptolemaic grants. But Aratos had no official personal contact with Doso in 227 and thus did not jeopardize the donations he received from Alexandria by entering into secret negotiations with Doso.

³ Gruen 1972: 610-11 and 617.

with his former arch-enemy was actively pursued. Whether we accept Phylarchos' claim that he had already agreed to the handing over of the Acrocorinth or not, in early 225 Aratos certainly knew that the price he and the Achaians would pay for maintaining their leading position in the Peloponnese would be the return of the Macedonians in the area. In the summer of 225, facing the danger of imminent annihilation, he bent constitutional form, ignored all reaction against his plans and assumed full power as plenipotentiary general. The only way out now, for his personal leadership to be consolidated and for the salvation of the Achaians, was to officially ask for Macedonian help, which he did in the spring of 224.

V. 224 - 213: *the courtier*

After Doson's descent to the Peloponnese, Aratos' political and military activity is attested only in connection with the interests, actions and machinations of the Macedonian court.¹ Despite being regularly elected as general of the *koinon* until his death, Aratos took part in only three military operations: in all three Macedonian forces participated as well; in two out of three Aratos commanded exclusively Macedonian contingents.² His involvement in affairs unrelated to Macedonian interests seems to have been limited to the active support of the Social War against the Aitolians (which resulted in the inevitable invitation of Philip to the Peloponnese after the defeat at Kaphyai in 220), his successful mediation in the political crisis of Megalopolis in 217, and his unsuccessful mediation in

¹ Cf. F. W. Walbank 1933: 103 (cf. 109), who points out that Aratos and the Achaian elite in general simply disappear from the sources during the crucial year 223. The only political action attributed to Aratos which was contrary to Macedonian interests is obviously unhistorical, a by-product of Apelles' calumny against his enemy at court (see p. 249-50 n. 5, below).

² All three had either undecided or disastrous results. In 224 he arrived at Argos too late to help Aristoteles with the expulsion of the Kleomenic garrison (Plut., *Arat.* 44.3; *Cleom.* 41.7; Polyb. 2.53.2; Polybios does not mention the Macedonian contingent which Aratos commanded, but only the Achaian contingent, led by Timoxenos, which apparently arrived at Argos in time). In 220 he offered a brilliant example of inept military command during the pursuit of Aitolian forces, which led to the battle of Kaphyai (Polyb. 4.10-12). In 218 he commanded the phalanx in Philip's army in Lakonia (Polyb. 5.23.7). To his (military) credit, only the fact that he actively prepared the Achaians for war can be adduced (Polyb. 5.91-92). The first occasion on which he commanded Macedonian forces in 224 is understandable: Aratos had gone to Megaris to welcome Doson (see Plut., *Arat.* 43.1) and probably followed him thereafter; moreover, the situation was critical and any help would have been welcome. Nevertheless, the fact that the first action of the undoubted leader of the *koinon* after Doson's descent was to command a Macedonian contingent (in other words, to act as a Macedonian officer), although a tactical Achaian force under Timoxenos had already been sent to Sparta, must have been striking; the more so, if we take into account that Aratos was still the plenipotentiary general (he may have held this position until the battle of Sellasia; see F.W. Walbank 1957: 254-55).

a similar crisis in Messene in 215.¹ Given that the last two were mere mediation attempts of an old and respected politician, no involvement of Aratos in affairs exclusively relevant to the *koinon* is attested after 220 (despite the detailed sources on that period), with the exception of his regular election to the office of general.

When we turn to the affairs related to the Macedonians the picture becomes dramatically different. To begin with, Aratos was the main proposer of honours for Doson, of grants to be given to the Macedonians and of measures facilitating Macedonian activities in a number of ways. He proposed the handing over of the possessions of the tyrants of Argos to Doson in 224;² he allowed the installation of a Macedonian garrison at Orchomenos;³ he proposed a law, according to which the Achaians were not allowed to contact another king without Doson's consent;⁴ he led honorific festivals for Doson, including sacrifices, processions and games;⁵ in 223, after Mantinea's conquest and destruction by Doson, he proposed its renaming to Antigoneia;⁶ after the explicit demand of Philip V, expressed at a private meeting where only Aratos and his son were present on behalf of the Achaian *koinon*, he convinced the Achaians during the spring assembly of 218 to immediately offer Philip fifty talents and 10,000 rations of wheat, and to promise him seventeen talents a month for the remainder of the campaign.⁷

¹ Support of the Social War: Polyb. 4.7; invitation extended to Philip V: Polyb. 4.15; Megalopolis: Polyb. 5.93; Messene: Plut., *Arat.* 49.3.

² Plut., *Arat.* 44.5.

³ Plut., *Arat.* 45.1.

⁴ Plut., *Arat.* 45.2. This was a very important commitment, apparently pursued by a number of kings in that period. It may even have been a prerequisite for the conclusion of an alliance with Macedonia (see SVA III 501, ll. 2-3; 502, ll. 10-18; cf. Le Bohec 1993: 396). Cf. also the partial parallel of Euromos in Karia and Antiochos III (*SEG* 43 [1993] 707 [Ma 1999: n° 30]), where the two *kosmoi* – a new office created after the alliance with Antiochos and, therefore, presumably under his control – were appointed as solely responsible for the official correspondence, in other words for the city's diplomatic relations. For such restrictions on international diplomacy set by kings to cities, cf. Ma 1999: 157.

⁵ Plut., *Arat.* 45.3.

⁶ Plut., *Arat.* 45.8. All the above are accusations made by his political enemies, reproduced by Phylarchos; nonetheless, Plutarch, who hastens to justify his hero, does not refute any of the charges, and Polybios gives a similar picture; cf. Errington 1967: 20-21.

⁷ Polyb. 5.1.6-12. Immediately before this, Eperatos (**B41**), a political enemy of Aratos, had been elected general. Polybios has Aratos initially opposing the Macedonian demands for grants and Philip regretting having allowed Apelles to plot to have Eperatos elected, and apologizing to Aratos (5.1.9). It is more realistic for us to believe that the exact opposite happened: Aratos, seeing that his status both in the institutions of the *koinon* and at court was being reduced, must have promised the grants to Philip in order to regain royal favour.

The main feature of Aratos' policy after 224 is his close personal relation first with Doson and then with Philip V. Doson enjoyed Aratos' company,¹ preserved his statue at Corinth despite the destruction of the statues of other liberators of the city,² bestowed honours upon him,³ and sent him Philip, the successor to the Macedonian throne, of whom Aratos became first the political and moral educator,⁴ and then a close *philos* and adviser.⁵ Despite the slander by Apelles and his circle⁶ (to which we shall return), Philip initially maintained his good relation with Aratos,⁷ until the affair of Messene (215-213),⁸ when Aratos distanced himself from Philip because of the king's malignancy, only then beginning to surface, if we are to believe our sources, or, more simply, because he lost the king's favour, which he did not ever again regain until his death (or murder by Philip) in 213.⁹ There is no doubt that this portrait is largely exaggerated in our sources, at least as to the central role attributed to Aratos at court and the moralizing interpretation of his relation with Philip. Such an interpretation, however, bears testimony to Aratos' influence at court rather than to the contrary.¹⁰

¹ Plut., *Arat.* 43.4.

² Plut., *Arat.* 45.5.

³ Plut., *Arat.* 43.8; 46.1.

⁴ Plut., *Arat.* 46.2-3; 48.4; cf. Livy 32.21.23: *cum senem infelicem parentem etiam appellare solitus esset.*

⁵ Aratos as one of the king's *philo*i (in the formal meaning of the term): Polyb. 4.85.4-5; 5.12.5. Polybios repeatedly (5.5.8 and 10; 5.7.4; 5.12.7; 9.23.9 and mainly 7.12-14) portrays Aratos giving politically sound and morally correct advice to Philip, in contrast to the king's other advisers, all presented as incompetent and corrupt. Since it is precisely at the time of Philip V that we begin to have fixed court titles in the Macedonian court (Le Bohec 1985: 118-19), I would be tempted to interpret Livy's *parens*, the title by which Philip addressed Aratos (Livy 32.21.23), as a court title or, at least, as the model for one; *πατήρ* and *συγγενής* are known court titles in other Hellenistic courts, already in this period (Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 80-81, 370, 375 with earlier bibliography). Le Bohec 1985: 96 denies that Aratos belonged to the royal *philo*i (in the technical sense of the term) because Aratos was present at court only when Philip was in the Peloponnese, and because he advised Philip only on issues pertaining to the Achaian *koinon*. The second argument, as we shall see, is unfounded; the first is mostly valid, but there are exceptions (Leukas, 218 [Polyb. 2.15], invitation to Illyria [Plut., *Arat.* 51.1]); either way, it is hardly necessary for a courtier to be constantly by the king's side in order to be termed a *philos*, as even Le Bohec concedes (1985: 120).

⁶ Polyb. 4.76, 82, 84-87; 5.1, 15-16; Plut., *Arat.* 48.

⁷ For example, he regularly lodged at Aratos' house: see Polyb. 5.27.3 (Philip denied an official invitation by the city's officials, in order to accept Aratos' invitation).

⁸ Plut., *Arat.* 49-51.

⁹ Polyb. 8.12.2; Plut., *Arat.* 52; Paus. 2.9.4; Livy 32.21.23; perhaps Alkaios, *Anth. Pal.* 9.519. It is impossible to tell whether the *hetairos* whom Philip murders in Alkaios' epigram is Aratos, Aratos the younger or Chariteles of Kyparissia (see F. W. Walbank 1940: 79 n. 2), on whom see **B31**, below.

¹⁰ Errington 1967: 19-22 believes that this depiction of Aratos at court is exclusively a product of Aratos' own propaganda. In my opinion, this goes from one extreme –that is, from taking the Plutarchean narrative at face value– to the other –that is, to denying that any truth lies in it. To begin with, the *Ἰπομνήματα* of Aratos probably ended with the battle of Sellasia

Moreover, Aratos was not merely a representative of the Achaians at the Macedonian court,¹ a statesman of the *koinon* who just happened to have a close relationship with the *koinon*'s powerful ally. On a series of occasions, he appears to have worked *outside* federal institutions on the one hand, and in informal or even formal positions *within* the Macedonian administration on the other. Already in 224 and again in 218, he commanded exclusively Macedonian military contingents.² He was not only a *philos* of and adviser to Philip but officially participated –or it was considered possible that he participated, which has the same bearing on our discussion– at least once (Tegea, 220) in the royal council.³ When Philip suddenly arrived in the Peloponnese in the winter of 219/8, he first came in touch with Aratos, invited him by his side, and only then did he notify the acting general of the *koinon* (Aratos the younger) and the cities.⁴ During the trial of Leontios in 218, Aratos was the official accuser in front of the royal *philois*.⁵ One

(Polyb. 1.3.2; 4.2.1), a fact which Errington only notes in a footnote (20 n. 9), along with the assumption that oral family tradition was Plutarch's source on the later period. That family (or, more generally, Achaian) oral tradition friendly to Aratos existed is undeniable; that this was the source of the moralizing exaggerations about his role at court is plausible; that all these assumptions should lead us to deny Aratos *any* influence at the Macedonian court –which is the only significant issue for present purposes– is implausible. Besides, Errington himself (1967: 25) admits that “Aratos was present on several occasions of crisis and... played a substantial part as companion of the king”. I fail to understand why “It was wholly in Aratos' interest to represent his own position as being close to Doson” (*ibid.* 21). Aratos consistently strove to pose as the Achaian patriot *par excellence*, as a tyrannicide whose entire career was devoted to promoting Achaian interests; later, friendly to him, tradition elevated him to the status of, more or less, “the last of the Greeks” (cf. Plut., *Arat.* 24.2). If Aratos' contacts with Doson and Philip had been limited, it would have served his posthumous fame better if he had posed as an unwilling ally of the Macedonians, who had entered this circumstantial alliance only in order to deal with the Spartan danger, and who then continued to take care of his homeland's affairs, without maintaining undue ties with the enemies of the freedom of the Greeks. The very existence of the tradition of Aratos the good and moral adviser to the king presupposes that Aratos had a high standing at the Macedonian court, a high standing which needed to be justified and embellished.

¹ As, for example, in Polyb. 4.76.8-9.

² See p. 244 n. 2, above.

³ Polyb. 4.23.5-24.3 (cf. 5.102.2, which is, however, an informal διαβούλιον, not the official royal συνέδριον, which was a state organ). Whether or not Philip's decision was due to Aratos is irrelevant; even if it was not, the fact remains that for Polybios it was plausible that Aratos officially took part in the *synedrion*. F. W. Walbank 1957: 470 marks the event as noteworthy, but without further analysis; Errington 1967: 22-23 confuses the royal council with the Allies' *synedrion* which decided on the war with the Aitolians. The participation of an acting leader of a state in a key institution of another state is particularly striking and vividly brings forth the double nature of Aratos' activities. This does not mean that he was a regular member of the council, of course; even so, his participation in 220 remains significant: it was considered necessary *exactly because of* his double identity as a leader of the Achaians and a royal *philos*.

⁴ Polyb. 4.67.8.

⁵ Polyb. 5.16.6.

wonders: what was Aratos' official capacity in 217, when Philip sent him, Taurion, "commander general of royal affairs in the Peloponnese" since 221,¹ "and some others who had come with them [*scil.* the representatives of the allies]" to Aitolia? Did he represent the Achaians and the alliance or the *philo*i of Philip, in whose meeting he had just participated? The leaders of the delegation were clearly Aratos and Taurion, and the latter was a royal official. A close look at the diplomatic preparation of the negotiations shows that the Macedonians were the exclusive interlocutor of the Aitolians: it is Philip who made the first move (ignoring mediators from Chios, Rhodes, Byzantion and Alexandria and sending a captive of Naupaktos to the Aitolians), he who called the representatives of the allies, he who sent Aratos and Taurion, he who received Aitolian emissaries *after* the mission of Aratos and Taurion –if Aratos represented the allies why did not the Aitolians contact them as well?–, he who then sent the representatives of the allies to the Aitolians with precise instructions, just before official negotiations began.² In other words, the diplomatic contacts of 217 make better sense if Aratos is considered a representative of the Macedonian king –not of the Achaians or of the allies in general. Finally, one wonders, in what capacity was Aratos to follow Philip to Illyria, as the latter asked him to do?³

Aratos' capacity as a member of the Macedonian administration does not mean that his status in the Peloponnese was in any way diminished. He was still, as we have already seen, regularly elected to the highest office of the *koinon*. Even after his death, his family remained influential until the time of Plutarch.⁴ What changed during his last years, I would suggest, was the source of his status and legitimacy. Aratos' power no longer rested on his past achievements, on the growth and glory of the Achaian *koinon*, but on his close connection with the Macedonian court.

Aratos' near absence from current politics in Achaia and his close connection with Philip and his administration, has led to the creation of a complex construction of hypotheses about an Achaian agenda that Aratos was supposedly promoting

¹ Polyb. 4.6.4; Taurion's office is described as ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ βασιλικῶν πραγμάτων.

² Polyb. 5.102.2: Philip's διαβούλιον; 102.4-7: missions of Kleonikos of Naupaktos; 102.8-10: invitation of the representatives of the allies by Philip and meeting at Panormos in Achaia; 103.1: mission of Aratos and Taurion; 103.3: Aitolian ambassadors to Philip; 103.7: mission of representatives of the allies, with instructions by Philip and start of official negotiations. Holleaux 1921: 163 n. 2 and Heuß 1963: 140-41 also point out Philip's leading role, offering two opposing but, perhaps, equally valid interpretations: the former insists on Philip's haste to end the war with the Aitolians, while the latter emphasizes the distinct (and equal, but this is an exaggeration) roles of Philip and the Allies: Philip prepares the negotiations, the Allies conduct them.

³ Plut., *Arat.* 51.1.

⁴ Plut., *Arat.* 54.8: Τὸ δ' Ἀράτου γένος ἐν τῇ Σικυῶνι καὶ τῇ Πελλήνῃ διέμεινε καθ' ἡμᾶς. The son of Aratos the younger, also named Aratos (even the insistence on the name proves the undeniable high status of the family), was an ambassador of the *koinon* to Egypt in 181 (Polyb. 24.6.3).

'from the inside', through his powerful ally. It has been suggested, for example, without a shred of supporting evidence and without even the benefit of plausibility, that Aratos' influence may be traced in Doson's decision to found the Greek Alliance of 224.¹ It has also been regularly assumed that Aratos strongly influenced Philip V in favour of Achaian interests: the whole history of the Social War has been read in the light of the supposedly pro-Achaian influence of Aratos, a counterpoise to the anti-Achaian policy of Apelles and other Macedonian high officers, to a point that Aratos is turned into a key figure of Macedonian politics. Any development which *could* be interpreted as promoting Achaian interests is explained as a sign of Aratos exerting strong influence with Philip V; any opposite development is regarded as a sign that Apelles' influence was gaining the upper hand. Even the liquidation of the latter and his circle is considered Aratos' success.²

There are serious obstacles to such an interpretation of the events of period. To begin with, there is the inexorable Occam's razor. There is not even one passage in the sources in which Aratos appears to have Achaian interests in mind when acting as Philip's adviser;³ his advice always revolves around strategic, political and moral dilemmas of kingship in general or of the Macedonian king in particular.⁴ Had Polybios known or had he been in a position to plausibly assume that Aratos promoted an Achaian agenda at court, he would certainly not have missed the opportunity to emphasize this, so as to exalt Aratos, the "perfect statesman".⁵ Moreover, if we accept that the aim of Aratos the courtier was to

¹ F. W. Walbank 1933: 105; Will 1979: 390-91 (both hesitantly); Errington 1967: 19-20 and Le Bohec 1993: 396 convincingly confute this.

² See mainly F. W. Walbank 1933: 114-54; 1940: 24-67. The most convincing confutation of this view can be found in Errington 1967, who, however, goes to the other extreme (see p. 246 n. 10, above).

³ There are two (partial) exceptions which do not affect my argument. 1) In 219 Aratos conveyed to Philip the displeasure of the Achaian youth against Apelles (Polyb. 4.76.8-9). But in this case Aratos acted not as Philip's adviser but as a spokesperson for the Achaian public opinion. 2) According to an often cited passage of Plutarch, Aratos not only made Philip a personal friend of his but also turned him into a statesman who was favourably disposed to Greek affairs (*Arat.* 46.3: παραλαβὼν αὐτὸν ὁ Ἄρατος οὕτως διέθηκεν ὥστε πολλῆς μὲν εὐνοίας πρὸς αὐτόν, πολλῆς δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἑλληνικὰς πράξεις φιλοτιμίας καὶ ὁρμῆς εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἀποστεῖλαι. But a) this was before Philip's rise to power; b) the comment is clearly connected with Plutarch's overall motif of Aratos as a moral influence over Philip; c) it does not involve specific political advice; d) it is not even related to the Achaians specifically, supposedly Aratos' main concern.

⁴ Polyb. 4.85.4-5; 5.5.8-10, 7.4, 12.7; 9.23.9 and mainly 7.12-13.

⁵ Polyb. 4.8.2: τέλειος ἀνὴρ εἰς τὸν πραγματικὸν τρόπον. It is particularly characteristic that in the Amphidamos affair (Polyb. 4.84-86), the only occasion on which Aratos could have exploited his position at court to promote the Achaian interests, Polybios emphatically denies that this was the case. Apelles accused Aratos of encouraging Amphidamos not to convince the

promote Achaian interests, we also have to accept that he failed miserably. The ones who mostly benefited both from the Alliance of 224 and by the Social War of 220-217, were, without a doubt, the Macedonians.¹ By 217 Philip was not only the undeniable ruler of the Greek mainland, but also had at his disposition a tool, the Alliance, which allowed him to impose his will without unnecessarily offending other states (cities and *koina*) and their sensitivities over autonomy. Finally, in the ‘Apelles affair’, as Errington has demonstrated,² Aratos’ role was not central. Apelles’ motive was not the subjugation of Achaia and its inclusion in the Macedonian territory, as Polybios claimed,³ but perhaps his opposition to the naval policy of Philip, which would be detrimental to his status, since the king would depend even more on the advisers who favoured such a policy (Taurion, Demetrios of Pharos, Aratos).

VI. A general assessment

The dominant feature of Aratos’ later career is his ambivalent position between the Achaian *koinon* and the royal court. It would be a mistake to overlook the reality of his attachment to the court, and continue to view him through the prism of his ‘golden age’ –the period when he was the liberator of Sikyon and Corinth, the Achaian patriot fighting the Macedonians– or try to interpret his actions either as a secret plan to promote Achaian interests (which would make his presence at court a mere tactical manoeuvre) or by minimizing his role as a royal *philos* (which would make him a powerless pawn, used for the machinations of Doso and Philip). A much simpler interpretation, which has the advantage of removing the apparent paradox of his about-turn in his relation with the Macedonians, would be to view Aratos’ main motive both before and after 227 as

Eleians to ally themselves with the Macedonians, as Philip had asked him to. Aratos, according to Apelles, had told Amphidamos that “in no way would it be to the Peloponnesians’ advantage if Philip became the master of the Eleians” (4.84.8). Polybios stresses Aratos’ ‘innocence’, proven by the deposition of Amphidamos himself. Errington 1967: 24-25 gives a confusing account of the affair and implies that Aratos could have been guilty, or, at least, that the charge was well-founded. This cannot have been the case; Aratos, the main instigator of the war against the Aitolians, is unlikely to have sought the enfeeblement of the anti-Aitolian alliance; Philip would certainly not believe such an accusation and Aratos had no difficulty refuting it. As Errington himself points out, this rather insignificant episode was used by Polybios to point out that Aratos had regained the king’s favour.

¹ Even F. W. Walbank 1933: 153 has to admit this.

² See Errington 1967: 22-36; one need not agree with Errington that such a conspiracy never existed (a question which need not concern us here, however), nor with every point of his reconstruction of events (see p. 246 n. 10, above).

³ Polyb. 4.76.1; 4.82.2.

to preserve his own personal power.¹ His leading position in the *koinon* was incompatible with any sort of agreement with Kleomenes,² and inviting the Macedonians to the scene was the unavoidable next step. After 224, the preservation of his status, authority and power, relied on his *de facto* inclusion in the royal administration, and on the Macedonian rule over Greece; this was hardly an unacceptable career choice for a Hellenistic statesman.

Aratos, in a sense, ended his career in the way he had started it: he attempted to rise to power (before 251) and then to keep himself in power (after 227) by exploiting his personal ties with one or more Hellenistic kings –in the latter period, even by joining the ranks of the Macedonian administration. The fact that, in between, he became the liberator of the Peloponnese from the Macedonian yoke, a model for statesmanship for the traditional world of the *poleis*, was a secondary result –a collateral benefit. We should not be misled by his own rhetoric (the main source of his posthumous fame), which consciously stressed the ‘liberating’ period of his career (243-227). It was the local and international juncture of the mid-third century that allowed him this course of action; when the juncture changed, his horizon was limited once again to linking his personal interests with those of the royal court.

B14. Aratos son of Aratos

– Polyb. 2.51.5; 4.37.1, 70.2 and 72.7; 7.12.9; Plut. *Arat.* 42.2; 49.1-2; 50.1-3; 54.1-3; *Cleom.* 19.9; Livy 27.31.8; 32.21.23-24

We have already dealt with Aratos the younger’s two missions to Doson, in early 225 and in the spring of 224 respectively (see the preceding entry, section IV). In his first mission he probably acted as an official ambassador of the Achaians, who, nevertheless, mainly conducted secret negotiations on behalf of his father; he may even not have had the authorization to conclude an agreement, hence the formal agreement was postponed for a later stage, as we have already seen. In his second mission Aratos the younger and the other Achaian hostages simply reported to Doson the Achaians’ decision to accept the king’s terms for forming the alliance (handing over of the Acrocorinth) and they themselves served as the guarantee for Achaians adhering to this crucial term; they obviously followed Doson to the Peloponnese and were only set free after the installation of the Macedonian garrison at the Acrocorinth.

¹ Aratos’ explicit aim was the unification of the Peloponnese under the leadership of the Achaians, that is, under his own leadership (cf. Plut., *Cleom.* 3.4). As it has often been observed (see, for example, Fine 1940: 132; Pédech 1964: 159), the main obstacles to the achievement of this goal were Kleomenes and the Aitolians: Aratos conducted wars against these adversaries (the Kleomenic and the Social Wars), both with the decisive help of the Macedonians.

² Fine 1940: 147 also emphasizes that Aratos’ chief motive was the preservation of his personal power.

The official authority of Aratos the younger may have been limited, his missions, however, were of vital importance to his future career. His first mission was at the same time his first political appearance within the institutional framework of the *koinon* and his introduction to the royal court, his σύστασις to the king.¹ Although it may sound paradoxical, his second mission was even more important in that respect. Taking hostages in the context of an international treaty was a regular practice in ancient diplomacy² and the hostage was not by default considered to be in an inferior position;³ in royal courts, in particular, the distinction between hostage and guest is very hard to make.⁴ In that sense, Aratos the younger, as a hostage, had an excellent opportunity to forge lasting personal bonds with members of the court.

In fact, the rest of the evidence on Aratos the younger is exclusively related to the court, with the exception of his service as general in 219/8 –a service so unsuccessful that it cost the *koinon* its whole western part and his father failing to get reelected in the elections of the following year.⁵ Other than that, we only learn that Philip seduced Aratos the younger's wife Polykrateia,⁶ breaking the laws of hospitality and betraying the love of his friend.⁷ The rage and taunt of Aratos the younger against Philip at Messene in 213⁸ are presented as a moral outburst against the supposedly bloody policy of Philip at Messene, but the whole episode reads more like a court fight, where moral rage is the only means of reaction left to a cheated husband.⁹ After that, evidence on Aratos the younger has an even greater dramatic tone: Philip is portrayed as leading him to madness before murdering him, shortly after the supposed murder of his father in 213.¹⁰

These court libels and the degree to which they correspond to reality need not concern us here. What is more interesting for present discussion is that, while

¹ For the role of third parties in the initiation of a 'ritualized friendship', see p. 472, below.

² To limit myself to examples from the Hellenistic world, see SVA III 405, 425, 427, 442, 472, 505, 513. The phenomenon was so unexceptional (cf. Giovannini 2007: 247-48) that Marasco's (1981: 503) assumption that the hostage situation of Aratos the younger was used in his father's apologetics (emphasis on the personal and family sacrifices of Aratos for the benefit of Achaia) is unwarranted.

³ Kleomenes sent his mother and children as hostages to Ptolemy III in 226/5, so as to assure a monetary grant by the king (Plut., *Cleom.* 22.4 and SVA III 505).

⁴ Cf. Herman 1987: 126-27.

⁵ Aratos the younger's election: Polyb. 4.37.1; disastrous generalship: F. W. Walbank 1957: 535-36; Errington 1967: 24.

⁶ Plut., *Arat.* 49.2; Livy 27.31.8. Polykrateia may have been Perseus' mother: see Meloni 1953: 4-15 and Carney 2000: 193-94, with further bibliography.

⁷ Plut., *Arat.* 50.2.

⁸ Polyb. 7.12.9; Plut., *Arat.* 50.1.

⁹ Cf. Plut., *Arat.* 51.4: Aratos the elder knew that his son, despite the *hybris* he had suffered, could not react.

¹⁰ Plut., *Arat.* 54.1-3; Livy 32.23-24.

Aratos the elder's position at the Macedonian court was the product of his own choices –choices, moreover, made late in his career–, Aratos the younger's career revolved around the Macedonian court from its very beginning. Of course, he became general of the Achaians, and his homonymous son was also politically active within the *koinon*;¹ but it would certainly have been interesting to know if Aratos III would have chosen Achaia over the royal court, if his father and grandfather had not lost royal favour –and their lives– at court.

B15-16. Dionysodoros and Deinokrates sons of Deinokrates

– Dionysodoros: Polyb. 16.3.7-14, 6.11 and 8.4-5; 18.1.3 and 2.2; Livy 32.32.11; SEG 39 (1989) 1334 (Merkelbach / Stauber, *SGO* I, 06/02/05)

– Deinokrates: Polyb. 16.3.7

Dionysodoros was known from literary sources as an admiral of Attalos I in the sea battle of Chios in 201² and as his emissary in the conference of Nikaia in ca. November 198.³ Although Livy does not name him explicitly, he was most probably the emissary of Attalos in the crucial assembly of the Achaian *koinon* –which took place at his home city of Sikyon, a few weeks later–, where the Achaians decided to break their alliance with Philip V and ally themselves with the Romans.⁴ His brother Deinokrates was also an admiral, but it is obvious that Dionysodoros was his senior, both in age and in rank in the Attalid administration.⁵ Our knowledge on Dionysodoros was significantly enhanced by the publication and masterly analysis by Helmut Müller of a dedicatory epigram for Dionysos and Attalos, dated to the first period of the king's reign (230-220).⁶

Dionysodoros, whose Sikyonian origin we learn from this inscription, dedicated the statue of a Skirtos (a Satyros, son of Hermes, or a dancer / acrobat of Dionysiac cult), made by the famous sculptor Thoinias of Sikyon, to Dionysos Kathegemon (among other things, god of theatre and literature) and to king Attalos. The epigram is written in the Doric dialect, which points to the home city both of the dedicant and the sculptor, but also to Phlious, the home city of Pratinas, the creator of satyric drama; Dionysodoros admits to following Pratinas' conception of the genre (λήμμα).⁷ Moreover, the epigram, apparently written by the dedicant

¹ Polyb. 24.6.3.

² Polyb. 16.3.7-14, 6.11 and 8.4-5.

³ Polyb. 18.1.3 and 2.2; Livy 32.32.11; Dionysodoros was the first among the accusers of Philip to take the stand.

⁴ Livy 32.19.5-23.3. Cf. Müller 1989: 511, who points out that Dionysodoros was the commander general of the Aegean forces of Attalos and his main diplomatic representative in 200-198.

⁵ Deinokrates took his father's name, as was more usual for second-born sons; cf. Müller 1989: 509 n. 42.

⁶ SEG 39 (1989) 1334; for the date, see Müller 1989: 501-505.

⁷ A textual detail: in ll. 4-5 the editor transcribes ἄδε τέχνα Θοινίου, τὸ δὲ λήμμα πρατίνειον; I believe that it is preferable to follow Lebek's proposal (1990: 297-98; it has been since unani-

himself,¹ deliberately imitates the style of Dioskourides, another poet of satyric drama. All this points to an atmosphere of philological refinement, theatrical education, libraries and literary circles, which, prior to the publication of this epigram, was hard to imagine for the Attalid court at such an early date, and which is analysed in detail by the first editor of the epigram.²

We do not know when Dionysodoros entered the Attalid administration. The early date of the epigram and the close personal relationship between Dionysodoros and Attalos I it may point to, lead to the assumption that Dionysodoros may have been attached to Attalos even before the latter's rise to the throne. Müller points out that it was rare for an Attalid *philos* at such an early date not to come from Asia Minor, and assumes that Dionysodoros' father, Deinokrates, had already been related to the court;³ this is plausible, but since we only know of three other *philoï* of Attalos I,⁴ not certain.

The reason why Dionysodoros (and, secondarily, his brother) are included in this catalogue is that we can reasonably assume that they played a part in the benefactions of Attalos to Sikyon. These benefactions are first attested in the spring of 197,⁵ when Attalos was in Sikyon both before and after⁶ the meeting at Mycenae with Flamininus, Nikostratos, general of the Achaians, and Nabis of Sparta. Attalos offered Sikyon ten talents and 1,000 medimni of wheat; the city multiplied the honours which it had previously bestowed on the king (on which

viously accepted: Kerkhecker 1991, *SEG* 39 (1989) 1334, Merkelbach / Stauber, *SGO* I 06/02/05, p. 585): ἄ δὲ τέχνα Θοινίου, which slightly modifies the meaning: "Dionysodoros offered the Skirtos –and yet the art is of Thoinias and the concept of Pratinas". This syntax, more reasonable *per se*, perhaps lends the epigram a slightly humorous subtext, which would be an additional indication of the familiarity of Dionysodoros to the king.

¹ Lehnus 1996 disagrees with Müller's suggestion that the epigram was written by Dionysodoros himself, and suggests Mnasalkes, another Sikyonian, as the possible author of the epigram. It is certainly not difficult to imagine a military and diplomatic officer like Dionysodoros writing poems, but, even if Dionysodoros did not compose the epigram, he was certainly in a position to commission its composition and to appreciate the result; this means that Müller's observations on the literary circle of the Attalid court retain their validity, no matter who was the actual author.

² Müller 1989: 527-39. The 'Peloponnesian' character of the epigram (dialect, Dionysodoros, Sikyon, Thoinias, Pratinas), the avant-garde content (playful attitude of the dedicant; see p. 253 n. 7, above) and form (phalakeian metre), the motif of associating the king with a god, all exemplify the dedicant's excellent strategy of self-promotion and, in conjunction with his military and diplomatic skills, give the sum of a king's expectations from a Greek courtier: experience and skill in administration and war, cultural refinement, a touch of 'old Greece', flattery and praise; in other words, everything that a monarch needed in time of war and administrative responsibilities, and when he needed to advertise his power and authority.

³ Müller 1989: 510 n. 50.

⁴ Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 123-26.

⁵ Polyb. 18.16.1; Livy 32.40.8-9; on the date, see F. W. Walbank 1967: 570.

⁶ Livy 32.39.5 (before) and 32.40.8 (after).

see below), by erecting a golden statue of his and instituting yearly sacrifices in his honour. The Polybian notice of the bond of euergetism between the two sides, already forged in the past, is interesting: “King Attalos had been honoured greatly by the city of the Sikyonians previously, after he had ransomed for them at great expense the sacred land of Apollo, in return for which they erected a ten-cubit high colossus by Apollo’s statue in the *agora*”.¹ It is usually believed that this first donation should be dated to the autumn of 198, when the king was again in the vicinity of the city, after the assembly where the alliance of the Achaians with the Romans against Philip was formed.² This seems a reasonable assumption, and would strengthen the possibility of Dionysodoros’ involvement, since, as we saw above, the general was in Greece and perhaps was also present at that assembly. Polybios, however, seems to understand the ransoming of sacred land as part of a series of benefactions; his *πρότερον* (in relation to the spring of 197) should not necessarily be taken to mean “a few months earlier”.³ But when would *πρότερον* be? If we exclude the period 200-198, when Sikyon and Attalos were formally enemies –since the Achaian *koinon* was still an unwilling⁴ ally of Philip, who was at war with Attalos–⁵, a likely candidate would be the period 205-200, when the diplomatic obstacle posed by the war between Philip and Attalos did not yet exist.⁶ There is another reason why this period should be preferred as the date of the first donation: the needs which led the city to mortgage the sacred land of Apollo⁷ must date from the First Macedonian War.⁸ If, despite some difficulties, we

¹ Polyb. 18.16.1-2: ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἄτταλος ἐτιμᾶτο μὲν καὶ πρότερον ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν Σικυωνίων πόλεως διαφερόντως, ἐξ οὗ τὴν ἱεράν χώραν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ἐλυτρώσατο χρημάτων αὐτοῖς οὐκ ὀλίγων, ἀνθ’ ὧν καὶ τὸν κολοσσὸν αὐτοῦ τὸν δεκάπηχυν ἔστησαν παρὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἀγοράν; cf. Livy 32.40.8. It has been suggested that the stoa next to the *bouleuterion* of Sikyon is an Attalid donation: see Schalles 1985: 48 n. 308 and Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: 118 n° 73A.

² Livy 32.19.5-23.3 (assembly); 32.23.4 (Attalos in the Peloponnese); cf. F. W. Walbank 1967: 570; Schalles 1985: 126 n. 726; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: 123.

³ Livy’s *quondam* when he speaks about the first donation is not decisive, since Livy simply paraphrases Polybios (F. W. Walbank 1967: 570); nonetheless, the fact that when reading this Polybian passage Livy understood that the donation had been made “sometime in the past” is perhaps not irrelevant.

⁴ Aymard 1938: 50-69 remains useful.

⁵ This, in fact, is the main argument of F. W. Walbank 1967: 570 in favour of dating the donation to the autumn of 198.

⁶ Cf. Aymard 1938: 143.

⁷ For the meaning of *λύτρωσις* of sacred land, see F. W. Walbank 1967: 571.

⁸ To give but one example, the reorganization of the Achaian army by Philopoimen in 208 (Polyb. 11.9-10; Plut., *Philop.* 9; Paus. 8.50.1; Polyainos 6.4.3) must have required important sums of money; the fight against luxury, also carried out by Philopoimen, points to financial difficulties, as well. Moreover, mercenaries were used in the war against Machanidas of Sparta (Polyb. 11.11.4); this must have further inflated the *koinon*’s military budget. For the financial difficulties

date the first donation to 205-200;¹ the assumption that Dionysodoros must have played a part in it would be further strengthened, regardless of what Attalos' motives might have been.² If Attalos was not aware of the financial difficulties of the Sikyonians, either from first-hand knowledge or from a request made by the Sikyonians themselves (an unlikely event, given their alliance with Philip), it must have been Dionysodoros who pointed out to the king this opportunity for him to act as a benefactor.³

If this is correct, then Dionysodoros performed an important function in the context of the relationship between Sikyon and the Attalid court: he enabled the forging of a new bond of euergetism. Having access both to the city and to the court, Dionysodoros was an intermediary perhaps not in the sense that he facilitated an already existing relationship between the city and the king, but in the sense that he helped create a new one; in other words, he may not have been an instrument in the relationship but its instigator.

SPARTA

B17. Areus I

— Bradford 1977: s.v. Ἀρεύς (1); on his relations with the Ptolemies, see mainly SVA III 476 (IG II² 687); Syll³ 433 (IvO 308; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n^o 58); ISE 54 (SEG 25 [1971] 444)

Areus I (309/8-265) was in many respects the first Hellenistic king of Sparta.⁴ His foreign policy was energetic and multilateral. Apart from his relation with the Ptolemies, on which we shall mainly focus, he led a large, ambitious but stillborn coalition of cities and *koina* against the Aitolians and the Macedonians in 280;⁵ in 272 he helped the Gortynians in a mission characteristic of Spartan mercenary

which the *koinon* had in paying its mercenaries already during the Social War, see Polyb. 4.60.2; 5.30.5-6 and 91.4, with Aymard 1938: 43-44.

¹ Namely, the Achaian law enacted on Aratos' proposal, which forbade contacts with any king without the consent of the Macedonian king (Plut., *Arat.* 45.2; see p. 245 and n. 4, above). Technically, this law might not have forbidden accepting a donation by another king, but still it would have posed serious obstacles to the communication between the two sides, which was an indispensable element of euergetism.

² Aymard 1938: 143 assumes that Attalos' donations were a means of appeasing Achaian concerns for the danger which his presence at Aigina since 209 must have represented. Since Attalos had a rather limited strategic interest in the Aegean (cf. Allen 1983: 65-85), it might be preferable to view the donations in the context of the Attalids' extended network of euergetism, centred especially around the cultural centres of 'old Greece', a network which mostly aimed at the recognition of the new dynasty's legitimacy (see Schalles 1985: 36-45; Virgilio 1993: 29-65).

³ Cf. the parallel of the Athenian Philippides (A40) who, at the court of king Lysimachos, διαλεχθεῖς τῷ βασιλεῖ ἐκόμισεν τῷ δήμῳ δωρεάν... (IG II² 657, ll. 11-12).

⁴ For Areus in general, see mainly Marasco 1980 and Cartledge 1989: 28-37.

⁵ Sources and analysis *apud* Marasco 1980: 63-73.

tradition but also of the new needs of the city¹ – a mission which ended abruptly when Areus had to return to Lakonia to repel Pyrrhos' invasion; he may have visited Sicily (although this is probably due to confusion in the literary tradition);² he may even have tried to enter into relations with the Jews,³ and, finally, he was one of the leaders of the anti-Macedonian coalition in the Chremonidean War (see below).

This active foreign policy has occasionally led to the groundless assumption that Areus entertained relations with the Ptolemies or even with Antiochos I already by 279. In reality, and despite the consistently anti-Macedonian policy of Hellenistic Sparta,⁴ it is unlikely that during the period between the crushing defeat of 280 and the eve of the Chremonidean War Spartan ambition went beyond the recovery of its erstwhile unbeatable military machine.⁵ This, however, does not mean that the personal ambitions of Areus did not transcend the boundaries of Lakedaimon, certainly after 272 and perhaps even earlier.

Such personal ambitions are reflected in the only irrefutable pieces of evidence we have on Areus' relation with the Ptolemies, dating between 272 and the eve of the Chremonidean War.⁶ The decree of Chremonides in 268 informs us that Philadelphos had already concluded an alliance with Sparta.⁷ As has long been observed, next to the statal entity which he represented, the decree refers to Areus personally. Such a reference runs contrary to Spartan tradition and reflects Areus' particular position in the Spartan state, a position which Areus himself sought to

¹ *I. Cret.* II xi 12; Plut., *Pyrrh.* 26.2. Marasco 1980: 85-87 convincingly argues that the main target of the mission was the procurement of mercenaries, who were now necessary because of the demographic stagnation of Spartan aristocracy.

² Plut., *Mor.* 217F, with Marasco 1980: 84 n. 73.

³ For the infamous letter of Areus to the Jews (*I Mac.* 12:20-23; Joseph., *AJ* 12.225-27) and the problem of its authenticity, see Cartledge 1989: 239 n. 22, with earlier bibliography.

⁴ The only exception is the tactical manoeuvre of 272, when Areus collaborated with Gonatas to repel Pyrrhos' attack (Plut., *Pyrrh.* 29.11). It is perhaps then (Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: 50 opt for 283) that an episode characteristic of the Spartans' anti-Macedonian feelings should be dated (Plut., *Mor.* 233E): when an anonymous Spartan ambassador returned from an embassy to the Macedonian king, having secured a medimnos of wheat for each citizen, he was fined for addressing Antigonos Gonatas as king.

⁵ For the rejection of a number of assumptions about Sparta entertaining relations with the Ptolemies or the Seleukids at that time, see again the careful analysis of Marasco 1980: 49, 75-77, 87-90, 99-100.

⁶ An interesting but overrated piece of relative evidence is the existence of a road in Alexandria named after Arsinoe Chalkioikos (Bell 1924: 19-20). The epithet undoubtedly points to Athena Chalkioikos, patron goddess of Sparta, and has been seen as a reflection of Arsinoe's personal involvement in the relationship between Sparta and the Ptolemies (Bell 1924: 23-24, Longega 1968: 106; Fraser 1972: I.238). This, however, is not the only possible interpretation (see Heinen 1972: 99).

⁷ *SVA* III 476, ll. 21-22. The alliance cannot have predated 272 (Heinen 1972: 127).

underline, at least outside the borders of Sparta.¹ The same kind of self-promotion can be seen in the coins minted by Areus, for the first time in Spartan history,² but also in the statues erected in his honour by his allies in the Peloponnese (by the Orchomenians in Arkadia,³ by the Eleians⁴ and by Ptolemy II⁵ in Olympia), which date to the eve of the war or to its very early stages.⁶ The dedicatory inscriptions emphasize Areus' εὐνοία to Ptolemy, the city of Orchomenos or even "all Greeks" (Olympia). The propagandistic purpose of the statue of Areus in Olympia is further emphasized if we accept Dittenberger's assumption that it was erected next to the statues of Ptolemy I and Berenike, which had been dedicated by Kallikrates of Samos.⁷ If this was the case, Areus was presented not only as an honoured ally of the king, but as associated with the deified ex-royal couple. His honouring by the Orchomenians is equally interesting, especially if compared to the honours for the Athenian ambassadors who invited Orchomenos to the alliance:⁸ the Athenians received proxeny and the status of *euergetes*, with no reference to Ptolemy, while Areus received a statue with a note that he was well disposed towards Ptolemy. All in all, the image of his kingship which Areus seems to have promoted on the eve of the Chremonidean War centred on the leadership of the Greeks' common struggle against the Macedonians and on his particular personal bond with king Ptolemy.

Consequently, in the case of Areus it is not the beginning of his relationship with the king that matters; this simply reflects the common interests of Sparta and Philadelphos;⁹ in other words, it was a political alliance carrying no traces of a

¹ SVA III 476, ll. 26, 29, 40, 55 (for the absence of the royal title of Areus, see Heinen 1972: 130); see Marasco 1980: 131-135, with earlier bibliography.

² On the aims of Areus' numismatic policy, see Cartledge 1989: 35: "to sell an image of Areus on the open market of Hellenistic conceptual and dynastic exchange"; this apt formulation should nonetheless be mitigated on account of the very small number of surviving specimens (Mørkholm 1991: 149). On Areus' coinage, see also Palagia 2006: 206-208.

³ ISE 54.

⁴ Paus. 6.12.5 and 15.9.

⁵ Syll³ 433 (IvO 308; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 58)

⁶ Marasco 1980: 130 n. 143 leaves the possibility open that the statues of the Eleians and the Orchomenians date to 280. As far as the statue set up by the Orchomenians is concerned, this is unlikely, because the honours for Areus were clearly parallel with the honours for the Athenian ambassadors (ISE 53); as for the statue set up by the Eleians, I see no reason to date it so early. Heinen 1972: 130 believes that the honouring of Areus by Ptolemy at Olympia may have been irrelevant to the Chremonidean War, and that it could be dated anytime between 272 and 265, while Buraselis 1982b: 156 n. 3 does not rule out the possibility that the honours may even have been posthumous. Both suggestions are plausible, but the eve of the war remains the period when this propaganda tool would have made better sense.

⁷ IvO 306-307.

⁸ ISE 53.

⁹ Cf. Marasco 1980: 141-42.

personal policy being at work. At the same time, however, Areus used his relationship with Ptolemy in order to promote his status outside the borders of his state and thus advance his personal interests.

B18. Hippomedon son of Agesilaos

— Bradford 1977: s.v. Ἴππομέδων (1); *ProsPtol* 14605

Agesilaos was the main adversary of Agis IV within the king's reformist faction; his son Hippomedon, a successful military officer popular with Sparta's youth, was more favourably disposed to the king's reform plans; when the counter-reform faction of Leonidas seized power in 241, Hippomedon managed to save his father from certain death.¹ Immediately afterwards, father and son self-exiled; Hippomedon found refuge at the Ptolemaic court, when he soon rose high in the hierarchy and became one of the chief advisers of Ptolemy III Euergetes and general of the Hellespont and Thrace.² He remained influential even after Euergetes' death, as is shown by the fact that he is named in a catalogue of high-ranking officials of Ptolemy IV.³ To Polybios' surprise, Lykourgos, of disputed origin, was proclaimed Eurypontid king of Sparta in 219, although two sons of Archidamos (and grandsons of Hippomedon) and Hippomedon himself were still alive.⁴ This does not mean that Hippomedon was present at Sparta;⁵ it may mean, however, that, despite his high position in the Ptolemaic administration, Hippomedon was still well informed about the political situation at Sparta, and perhaps even had some involvement in Spartan politics. This is quite common in the case of many individuals dealt with in this study: citizens of a city who happened to have a long career at a royal court often maintained their political ties with their homeland, not only to leave the possibility of their return open, but also to enhance their status by serving as intermediaries between the king and their home city.

In that light, the assumption that Hippomedon was involved in the alliance between Kleomenes III and Euergetes, concluded in the winter of 226/5, is rendered more plausible.⁶ The alliance, as we shall see in the following entry, fully

¹ Plut., *Agis* 6.5 and 16.4-5; on the date, see Marasco 1981: 656-57.

² Teles, *Περὶ φυγῆς* 23 (Hense); *Samothrace* 2, 1, p. 39-40, App. 1 (*IG* XII 8, 156; *Syll*³ 502). For the problem of the beginning of his generalship in Thrace, see **D50**, below.

³ *PTebt* 8, col. 2; see Bagnall 1976: 160-61.

⁴ Polyb. 4.35.13-14.

⁵ Theoretically, one could still suppose that Hippomedon was general of Thrace from 241 to 219 and then returned to Sparta. It is unlikely, however, that Hippomedon (then in his sixties) returned to a city which had been crushingly defeated at war, a city, moreover, which his employer had abandoned in 224.

⁶ Jacoby (*FGrHist* III b *Kommentar* 622-23) suggests that the philosopher Sphaيروس of Borysthenes, the teacher of Kleomenes and a resident of Egypt on perhaps more than one occasion (for the sources, see *FGrHist* 585 *Testimonia* and *SVF* 1.620-630), may also have played a part in the alliance between Kleomenes III and Euergetes. Nonetheless, Sphaيروس' influence on the reform

served the strategic interests of both sides, but Hippomedon may have played a part in concluding the alliance. To begin with, he was perfectly placed for such a role, as a high-ranking Ptolemaic officer and, at the same time, a Spartan of noble birth. Moreover, he may have been favourably disposed to Kleomenes' efforts to reinstate and expand Agis' reform plan. Finally, the alliance between Kleomenes and Euergetes served not only the Ptolemaic interests in general, but also Hippomedon's particular interests as general of the Hellespont and Thrace. Antigonos Doson had just returned from his Karian expedition –the first time when Macedonians were again present in Asia and the Aegean after a considerable time. Creating a diversion in the Greek mainland, which would keep the Macedonian king busy, was not only standard Ptolemaic policy but also a move of vital importance to the general of the Hellespont and Thrace. In other words, if Hippomedon indeed facilitated the alliance of Kleomenes and Euergetes, he served the interests of his homeland and his king, but also his personal interests, as a Spartan, as a courtier and as an administrator.

B19. Kleomenes III

— Bradford 1977: s.v. Κλεομένης (1); Kleomenes and Euergetes (until 224): Polyb. 2.51.2; Phylarchos, *FGrHist* 81 F 58 (Polyb. 2.63.1); Plut., *Cleom.* 22.4-9; *IvO* 309 (Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 59); Kleomenes after Sellasia: Polyb. 5.35-39; Plut., *Cleom.* 31-37; Paus. 2.9.3; Just. 28.4.

In the winter of 226/5¹ Ptolemy III Euergetes ceased financing Aratos and the Achaian *koinon*² and started financing Kleomenes. As it had already become evident that the Achaians would soon ally themselves with Doson, Euergetes correctly saw that the king of Sparta could be the one to keep Doson busy in the Peloponnese.³ Ptolemaic money would partly finance the war, and would also cover the annual grant offered by Kleomenes to Aratos in 225.⁴ The alliance between Sparta and Egypt was widely advertised throughout the Peloponnese. Like Areus, Kleomenes received an honorific statue at Olympia by Euergetes.⁵ Ptolemy stopped financing Kleomenes some time before Sellasia, however, after an agreement between

plan of Kleomenes, and the dates of his (one or more?) sojourns in Egypt are hardly certain, and his involvement in the diplomatic contacts between Kleomenes and Euergetes rather unlikely (cf. Oliva 1981: 231-34; Erskine 1990: 97-99; Sonnabend 1996: 274-80).

¹ For the date, see p. 529 n. 6, below.

² Bringmann (in Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: 97) claims that financing Kleomenes does not necessarily mean that the financing of Aratos by Ptolemy ceased, and that the two opponents may have been financed simultaneously for a while, perhaps already since 229. This is not only unlikely but also contradicted by Polybios' explicit assertion (2.51.2) that "Ptolemy discarded [the alliance with] the *koinon* and began to finance Kleomenes".

³ Polyb. 2.51.2. Kleomenes' mother Kratesikleia and his children were sent to Egypt as hostages, to guarantee Kleomenes' adherence to the alliance (Plut., *Cleom.* 22.4; cf. Polyb. 5.35.1).

⁴ Plut., *Arat.* 41.5; *Cleom.* 19.8.

⁵ *IvO* 309 (Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 59).

himself and Doson.¹ This was a terrible blow to Kleomenes, not in financial terms –as Polybios admits–, but as a major diplomatic setback: Kleomenes was abandoned by his most powerful ally on the eve of the crucial and final confrontation with his enemies.

As with the alliance between Areus and Philadelphos, we need not insist on the alliance between Kleomenes and Euergetes itself, which clearly benefited both sides: Kleomenes gained financial ease and, most of all, political cover,² while Euergetes replaced Aratos with a more likely troublemaker against the Macedonians, a useful tool for the standard Ptolemaic policy of harassing the Macedonians in the Greek mainland.

The main interest of Kleomenes' case lies in the fact that Sparta's abandonment by Euergetes did not entail the abandonment of Kleomenes as well.³ After Sellasia, Kleomenes sought refuge in Alexandria, received a renewed annual grant of twenty-four talents and maintained his hopes of returning to Sparta with Ptolemaic help.⁴ When Ptolemy IV Philopator rose to the throne, Kleomenes' request became more pressing: after the death of Doson and the outbreak of the Social War a year later, circumstances were favourable for his return.⁵ It is even assumed that he maintained contacts with his supporters in Sparta and that he

¹ Phylarchos, *FGrHist* 81 F 58 (= Polyb. 2.63.1), overdramatizing events as usual, says that the grant was terminated ten days before the battle of Sellasia. This is the literary motif of the 'stab in the back' (cf. F. W. Walbank 1957: 270; the episode of the supposed treason of the general of the *kryptoi* Damoteles, supposedly bribed by Doson [Plut., *Cleom.* 28.4-5 with Marasco 1981: 578-79] serves the same purpose) and cannot be used to date the termination of the grant. Diplomatic contacts between Doson and Euergetes existed already (see Plut., *Cleom.* 22.9), so that the termination of the grant can be placed earlier than the battle of Sellasia, perhaps already in 224, when Doson's descent to the Peloponnese must have meant that Kleomenes was no longer useful to Euergetes; cf. Will 1979: 400-401 and Marasco 1981: 522-23 and 564-65.

² The fact that Euergetes did not offer Kleomenes military help is not important. The alliance with the powerful king of Alexandria was a sufficient tool of diplomatic pressure on the undecided cities of the Peloponnese.

³ According to Phylarchos, when Euergetes ceased financing Kleomenes, he advised him to negotiate with Doson (Phylarchos, *FGrHist* 81 F 58 [= Polyb. 2.63.1]).

⁴ Polyb. 5.35.1; Plut., *Cleom.* 32. According to Plutarch (*Cleom.* 32.5), the grant was used by Kleomenes to cover his personal needs and those of his friends, as well as for benefactions to various other exiles in Egypt. Kleomenes merely sustained himself and his informal mercenary guard; when he asked Ptolemy IV Philopator to help him return to Sparta he asked for military help and money (Polyb. 5.35.4). In an obvious effort to explain the paradox of Kleomenes taking refuge at the court of the king who 'betrayed' him, Phylarchos presents Euergetes as particularly benevolent towards Kleomenes, to the point that he has him promising the exiled Spartan king military and financial help for his return (Plut., *Cleom.* 32.4); this is in fact unlikely (Marasco 1981: 613).

⁵ See Polyb. 5.35.2 and Plut., *Cleom.* 34.1.

may have financed them too.¹ There is no concrete evidence for this, however, and it seems unlikely that Kleomenes would have been able to intervene from a distance.² His only hope would have been to assure official, and substantial, Ptolemaic assistance; dynastic troubles, court quarrels and the redirection of Ptolemaic foreign policy, however, did not allow his hopes to materialize. His mercenary activities, his implication in court machinations, his losing favour with the king and his tragicomic coup d'état which led to his death in 219 are described in detail in the sources,³ but need not concern us here.

Kleomenes' career presents many similarities to that of his great enemy, Aratos. Both were, in different times, the most powerful men in the Peloponnese; both needed help from a powerful king in order to deal with their enemies; both ended up simple courtiers –Aratos partly, Kleomenes exclusively;⁴ finally, historiographical tradition on both of them saw clearly the tragic character of their end: Aratos, one of the “last of the Greeks”,⁵ died saying: “these are the rewards of royal friendship”,⁶ while Kleomenes, “fit by nature to be a leader and a king”⁷ died trying to ‘liberate’ the surprised and unwilling Alexandrians. These are, without a doubt, exaggerations of Hellenistic historiography and Plutarch –exaggerations, nonetheless, which reflect the awareness on the part of their contemporaries that Aratos and Kleomenes marked the end of an era, at least for the southern Greek world of the *poleis*.

¹ See Marasco 1981: 614-15; Shimron 1972: 65. The latter's insistence on the existence of a Kleomenic “party” is particularly anachronistic (cf. Cartledge 1989: 61).

² Financing friends and other exiles merely attests to Kleomenes maintaining some elementary prestige at court, not to him having concrete political plans for the Peloponnese. Moreover, Plutarch (*Cleom.* 32.5) explicitly says that Kleomenes financed exiles *in Egypt*, not that he offered any kind of support to a political faction in the Peloponnese. Marasco 1981: 635-37 suggests that Nikagoras of Messene, a key figure in the court machinations which led to Kleomenes' death according to our sources (Plut., *Cleom.* 35; Polyb. 5.37-38.6), may have been an official emissary of the Messenians, aiming to get Kleomenes out of the picture, since Messene was worried over the possibility of the king's return and of an alliance of his with the Aitolians. This is completely unfounded; as Oliva 1971: 236-39 correctly points out, the only thing that we can safely say for Nikagoras of Messene is that he was a personal enemy of Kleomenes in the Ptolemaic court.

³ Polyb. 5.35-39 and Plut., *Cleom.* 32-37; cf. Paus. 2.9.3 and Just. 28.4.

⁴ Cf. Marasco 1981: 610: Kleomenes ended up a “cortigiano... e capo dei mercenari”.

⁵ Plut., *Arat.* 24.2.

⁶ Plut., *Arat.* 52.4: ταῦτα... ἐπίχειρα τῆς βασιλικῆς φιλίας.

⁷ Polyb. 5.39.6: ἡγεμονικὸς καὶ βασιλικὸς τῆ φύσει. The fact that this is Polybios' final judgement on Kleomenes –whom he despised and presented as a tyrant– is significant.

Trouble at Sparta, 220-218:**B20-25. Adeimantos, Polyphontas, Sthenelaos, Alkamenes, Thyestes, Bionidas — B26. Omias — B27. Gyridas — B28. Cheilon**

— Polyb. 4.22.3-12 (on n^{os} 20-25); 4.23-24 (on Omias); 4.35.5 (on Gyridas); 4.81 (on Cheilon)

The particularly violent social and political unrest at Sparta from 220 to 218, known to us in unusual detail, is very enlightening regarding the interconnection between financial problems, political choices and orientation of foreign policy in the struggle for power in Hellenistic cities. It is mainly the third factor which will be dealt with here, namely the role played by the alliance formed between some of the protagonists and the Macedonian king.

After the battle of Sellasia, Dason incorporated Sparta into his Greek Alliance¹ and placed Brachylles son of Neon, an offspring of a powerful pro-Macedonian Boiotian family, as the royal *epistates* of the city. The measures taken by the royal emissary during his probably very short stay at Sparta² can only be surmised indirectly. It is practically certain that Kleomenes' constitutional reforms were abolished: the ephors were reinstated –with more power in fact, since the election of kings was postponed–,³ and this was accompanied by the usual rhetoric of returning to Sparta's ancestral constitution,⁴ but also by the rhetoric of “freedom”, a term obviously pointing to the *de facto* abolition of the kingship.⁵ The fate of Kleomenes' land reforms is more uncertain. Some of the landlords who had been banished under his rule probably returned, but it is doubtful whether they regained full possession of their former lands. The problem of land property remained acute and was in fact aggravated by Sparta's territorial losses after Sellasia. Friction between old and new proprietors, between old and new citizens –although the latter suffered heavy losses at Sellasia–, between the supporters of

¹ For the long discussion on whether Sparta was a full member of the Alliance or merely an ally of the Macedonians, see, for example, Shimron 1972: 66-68 (the main exponent of the latter view) and Le Bohec 1993: 388, with further bibliography. I believe that Polyb. 4.24.4-6 should leave no doubt that Sparta was a full member.

² Brachylles as an *epistates*: Polyb. 20.5.12 (on Brachylles and his family, see **C20-22**, below). The events of 220 (see section I, below), during which Brachylles and the Macedonian garrison are nowhere mentioned, make it clear that his stay was short. He probably left Sparta before Dason's death in the autumn of 221, since the presence of a royal *epistates* would be hardly compatible either with the Spartan rhetoric of freedom and return to the ancestral constitution or with the election of anti-Macedonian ephors during the same autumn. In any case, his departure was not caused by the revolt of 220, as Chrimes 1949: 12 unnecessarily assumes.

³ Cartledge 1989: 62 terms post-Sellasia Sparta an ephor state.

⁴ Polyb. 2.70.1; 5.9.9; Plut., *Cleom.* 30.1; Paus. 2.9.2.

⁵ Polyb. 4.22.4; 5.9.9; 9.29.8; 9.36.4. The events of the autumn of 220 make it clear that this rhetoric was completely unsuccessful in appeasing popular outrage for the abolition of kingship; see Polyb. 4.34.5: ... καὶ μὴ περιορᾶν τὸν πλείω χρόνον παρὰ τοὺς νόμους καταλελυμένην τὴν τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν ἀρχήν.

Kleomenes and/or the kingship in general and the supporters of the ephors paved the way for civil strife to break out.¹

I. *Adeimantos, Polyphontas and other pro-Macedonian statesmen*

In late summer 220, Philip V was informed that a bloody civil war had broken out in Sparta (Polyb. 4.22.3-5). Three out of the five Spartan ephors had long been supporting an alliance with the Aitolians,² and had in fact signed a secret agreement with them (4.16.5). After the departure of the Aitolians and Philip's descent to the Peloponnese, however, fearing for their future and that the two pro-Macedonian ephors, Adeimantos –who was aware of their plans– and Polyphontas, would notify Philip, they organized a meeting of citizens under arms at the *temenos* of Athena Chalkioikos, under the pretext that the Macedonians were attacking the city. Adeimantos, displaying total lack of sound political judgement, delivered a pro-Macedonian speech, in which the Macedonians were presented as benefactors and saviours of the city. He was murdered on the spot by some young Spartans, who had planned the murder with the pro-Aitolian ephors. Adeimantos' supporters, Sthenelaos, Alkamenes, Thyestes and Bionidas, suffered the same fate, while Polyphontas and his supporters had wisely abstained from the meeting and sought refuge by Philip (4.22.6-12).

Adeimantos, his supporters and Polyphontas are otherwise unknown. Their names allow the assumption that at least Alkamenes and Sthenelaos were members of the old Lakonian aristocracy,³ but this is in no way surprising, especially if these men belonged to the group of Spartans who were repatriated after Sellasia and, therefore, had every reason to consider the Macedonians “benefactors and saviours” (4.22.10); benefactors not only κοινῇ, to all Lakedaimonians, but to them personally as well, κατ' ἰδίαν (5.9.9).⁴ The group seems to have been small and with no particular popular support. The fact that in the autumn⁵ of 221, only months after the defeat at Sellasia, three out of the five ephors elected had anti-Macedonian tendencies, the apparently mass accession of Spartan youth⁶ to the

¹ Chrimes 1949: 21-22; Oliva 1971: 264-66 (confuting Shimron 1972: 55-63, who assumed that Kleomenes' reforms had remained intact) and Cartledge 1989: 57-58.

² See Polyb. 4.9.6: the men of the contingent which Sparta had reluctantly contributed to the allied forces against the Aitolians a few months earlier “conducted themselves as reservists or spectators rather than as allies” (ἐφ' ἑδρών καὶ θεωρῶν μᾶλλον ἢ συμμάχων ἔχοντες τάξι).
³ Alkamenes and Sthenelaos (the only names of this group's members attested in Lakonia) were the names of a number of kings and Spartan high officials. Alkamenes (*LGPN* IIIA, s.v. Ἀλκαμένης n° 7) was the name of the son of the well-known ephor of the Peloponnesian War Sthenelaidas, whose name is a derivative of Sthenelaos.

⁴ Cf. Oliva 1971: 265-66.
⁵ For the date of the election of the ephors, see F. W. Walbank 1957: 483.
⁶ For the role of the youth, see also Polyb. 4.34.6, 35.1 and 35.15; cf. the far-fetched observations of Shimron 1972: 70.

anti-Macedonian camp, the fact that those whose goodwill towards the Macedonians had to be won are described as οἱ πολλοί (4.24.8) and, particularly, the violence with which the anti-Macedonians acted, despite the fact that Philip was practically *ante portas*, make it clear that the appeal of the Kleomenic past remained most powerful.

II. *Omi*as, the moderates (?) and the final prevalence of the pro-Aitolians

Following these events, the leaders of the anti-Macedonian majority sent representatives to Philip at Mt Parthenion; they blamed the events on the other faction, asked Philip not to invade Lakonia until peace had been restored to their city, and promised to maintain their friendship with the Macedonians and adhere to their obligations to the alliance (4.23.1-2). Philip denied the legality of the embassy, asked for ἀξιόχρεοι representatives (that is, most probably, for plenipotentiary ambassadors), and continued his course, aiming to make camp by Tegea (4.23.2-3). The new Spartan embassy had ten members and was led by the otherwise unknown *Omi*as. The ambassadors, taking the stand in front of the royal council at Tegea, again blamed Adeimantos and his supporters for the civil war,¹ again promised to adhere to their obligations towards the alliance and Philip,² and left, obviously at Philip's demand (4.23.4-7). The council was divided: some advised the razing of the city, a measure which would deter other prospective rebels; others advised Philip only to chastise the instigators of the slaughters and hand over the government of the city to "his friends". Philip decided, perhaps on the advice of Aratos, not to punish either the city or the chief instigators of the revolt, but only to send Petraios, "one of his friends", who, with the help of *Omi*as, would "urge the multitude" (παρακαλέσοντα τοὺς πολλούς) to maintain their friendly relations with the Macedonians, to Sparta; Petraios was also to supervise the repetition of the Spartans' oath, confirming their adherence to the Alliance (4.23.8-24.9).³

¹ These constant accusations against the pro-Macedonian ephors acquire their full meaning if we remind ourselves that Polyphontas must have been present while the case was 'tried': the aim of the ambassadors was to refute the charges that Polyphontas must have raised against them (cf. F. W. Walbank 1940: 31). The whole affair strongly reminds one of the mutual recriminations of Athenian representatives in front of Polyperchon and Philip III in 318 (Plut., *Phoc.* 33.8-12; see **A3** [III] and **A10-A13**, above). In both cases, a matter of domestic policy (guilt for provoking civil war in the case of Sparta, high treason in the case of Athens), in which the king should have had no competence whatsoever, was in fact tried by the king.

² Their speech as reported by Polybios (4.23.6: καὶ μηδενὸς ἐν μηδενὶ φανήσεσθαι δεύτεροι κατὰ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν εὐνοϊαν τῶν δοκούντων ἀληθινῶν αὐτῷ φίλων ὑπάρχειν) makes it clear that the Spartan ambassadors came to Philip as supplicants rather than as representatives of an autonomous state.

³ Ferrabino 1921: 149-51 assumes that Philip may have made territorial concessions to Sparta in return for its renewed alliance. This is improbable: the Spartans were in no position to

Petraios did not content himself with “urging” the Spartans; in the elections of the autumn of 220, pro-Macedonian ephors were elected, a clear sign that Petraios was still present and influenced the election. He probably left the city immediately afterwards.¹ After his departure, the pro-Aitolian leaders secretly asked the Aitolians to send to Sparta an ambassador who would negotiate a new alliance (Polyb. 4.34.3). The Aitolian ambassador, Machatas, presented himself to the ephors, as the protocol demanded, but the ephors did not allow him to attend the assembly. A gap in the manuscripts of Polybios does not allow us to tell the group of people that was infuriated by their move.² Whoever they were, they openly proposed the reinstatement of kingship; the ephors, in an effort to procrastinate dealing with this constitutional issue and to appease the crowd, gave Machatas permission to address the assembly, whereby the Aitolian openly suggested a new alliance (4.34.4-7). Intense discussions ensued. Some members of the *gerousia*, in an attempt to avert the dissolution of the alliance with the Macedonians, reminded the crowd of Dason’s kind treatment of Sparta and of the help Macedonians had provided the city during the Aitolian raid on Lakonia in 240,³ and temporarily succeeded in maintaining the alliance with Philip (4.34.8-11). The pro-Aitolian leaders, however, instigated a new slaughter of ephors and of members of the *gerousia* (Gyridas is the only victim recorded by name) by the temple of Athena Chalkioikos, banished those who spoke against the Aitolians, chose ephors from among their faction, and concluded an official alliance with the Aitolian *koinon* (4.35.1-5). Polybios (4.35.6) insists that the chief instigators of these events were supporters of Kleomenes, who still awaited the return of their king.⁴ Any sign of pro-Macedonian or even neutral policy disappeared until the winter of the following year.

At first glance, Omias appears to have belonged to the pro-Aitolian leaders who organized the murdering of Adeimantos and his supporters.⁵ A closer look, however, allows the suggestion that he belonged to a distinct group, which leaned neither towards the Macedonian nor towards the Aitolian side. To begin with, the

request anything more than that their city be not destructed. Polyphontas may have returned to Sparta with Petraios (Shimron 1972: 73 n. 46).

¹ As in the case of Brachylles, the fact that Petraios is not mentioned in connection with the new slaughters which followed must be taken to mean that he had departed after the elections. We meet him again in Thessaly in the spring of 218 (Polyb. 5.17.6).

² Reiske’s restoration of 4.34.5 (Καὶ παραυτίκα προσήει [*scil.* Machatas] τοῖς ἐφόροις <οἱ δὲ κατεῖχον αὐτὸν καὶ διεκώλυον πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος παριέναι· ἐφ’ ᾧ ἀγανακτοῦντες οἱ νέοι συντρέχοντες ἐθορύβουν> οἴομενοι δεῖν τῷ τε Μαχατᾶ δίδοσθαι τὴν ἔφοδον ἐπὶ τοὺς πολλούς...) is fairly plausible, given that the youth are mentioned in the next paragraph.

³ On this episode, see F. W. Walbank 1957: 483.

⁴ Beloch 1925: 724 suggests that these events at Sparta are correlated with Kleomenes’ activity in Alexandria; see, however, F. W. Walbank 1957: 484.

⁵ Cf. Oliva 1971: 267; Shimron 1972: 72.

fact that a second embassy was demanded by Philip is significant. Philip's dismissal of the first embassy must mean that the king, well-informed by Polyphontas who was by his side, wished to give a clear message that he would not confer with the murderers of his supporters. Besides, it is difficult to imagine that the Spartans sent a representative of the hostile anti-Macedonian leadership as the leader of an embassy whose aim was clearly to beg for Philip's leniency. Another incident suggesting that a third group besides the pro-Macedonian and pro-Aitolian groups existed is the vote against the alliance with the Aitolians in the autumn of 220. The fact that the alliance was put to vote means that Petraios had left the city, and therefore the rejection of the alliance cannot be explained by direct Macedonian pressure, nor can it be explained by the presence of pro-Macedonian ephors, since, as we have already seen, the pro-Macedonian faction had few supporters –at least not enough to ensure a majority vote against the alliance with the Aitolians without foreign pressure. We need, therefore, to assume that a moderate faction also existed, whose members, either for fear of Macedonian retributions or because they had reservations for the impetus for reforms that the pro-Aitolians were developing, were opposed to the alliance with the Aitolians, although they had not connected their fate with the prevalence of the Macedonians, as Adeimantos or Gyridas had done.¹ It is perhaps this group which was responsible for the way Sparta responded to the representatives of the allies, who had asked Spartans to declare war on the Aitolians, before the outbreak of the second revolt (Polyb. 4.34.1):² the Spartans “finally”, that is, after some vacillation, refused to answer either way.³

III. *Cheilon and the unorthodox invoking of the Kleomeneic tradition*

After electing new ephors and concluding an alliance with the Aitolians, the anti-Macedonian faction proceeded to the promised constitutional reform, namely, the reinstatement of the kings for the first time after three years. Agesipolis III, the Agiad king, was a minor with no part in the events and was soon afterwards exiled.⁴ Lykourgos was appointed as the Eurypontid king; according to Polybios,

¹ It is perhaps significant that the leaders of the second revolt murdered the ephors and Gyridas, that is, the outright pro-Macedonians, but only banished “those who spoke against the Aitolians”.

² The time is obviously *after* the election of pro-Macedonian ephors, although this is mentioned some paragraphs later; Polybios, upon mentioning Sparta once again in his account of events in 4.34.1, proceeds to a digression, which explains the events which had followed the embassy of the summer of 220.

³ Cf. F. W. Walbank 1957: 482-83, who also points out the neutrality of Spartans' answer.

⁴ Livy 34.26.14.

Lykourgos was of humble birth and had to bribe the ephors to ensure his election.¹ His consistently pro-Aitolian activity need not concern us here.²

During the following winter (219/8), a new contender for Spartan power appeared, a certain Cheilon, who claimed that he had rights to royal power because of his descent. In order to achieve his goal he proposed the full reinstatement of the Kleomenic programme, namely redistribution of land by lot. With two hundred personal supporters and friends he attacked Lykourgos, who managed to escape, and the ephors, who did not manage to escape and were accordingly slaughtered –the third slaughter of ephors within eighteen months. The coup d'état, however, had insufficient numbers of supporters, and Cheilon was soon forced to seek refuge in Achaia, while the Spartans, fearing an attack by Philip, hastily gathered the harvest and abandoned the siege of Athenaiion, in the vicinity of Megalopolis (Polyb. 4.81).

It is already clear from Polybios' account that Cheilon's Kleomenic rhetoric was a smokescreen, a demagogue's ploy to seize power.³ This means three things: firstly, that Lykourgos was not very popular;⁴ secondly, that the social and financial problems of post-Kleomenic Sparta had not been solved yet, leaving room for ambitious demagogues to use them as political weapons;⁵ thirdly, that no matter what the intentions of a prospective Spartan leader were, regarding both domestic and foreign policy, neither the avowedly pro-Macedonian policy of Adeimantos and Gyridas nor the consistently anti-Macedonian policy of Lykourgos could gain real popular support, unless they were accompanied by measures addressing these social and financial problems. Someone was bound to realize that the best method to rise to power was to play the card of the Kleomenic paradigm once again.

The fact that after his failure Cheilon sought refuge in Achaia, and particularly the fact that his fellow countrymen were certain that Philip would probably invade Lakonia after his departure suggest that Cheilon may have come into contact with the Macedonians. This does not mean that he was Philip's agent, as it has been assumed.⁶ At the time, Philip had a number of successes in Triphylia and

¹ Polyb. 4.35.9-15. The accusation of low birth may be inaccurate and can be explained by Lykourgos' anti-Achaian stance (Chrimes 1949: 23; Oliva 1971: 269 n. 1; Shimron 1972: 73; Cartledge 1989: 62).

² It is sometimes assumed that Lykourgos was the leader of pro-Aitolian revolts (F. W. Walbank 1957: 484; Oliva 1971: 268 n. 5), but if that was the case Polybios would have surely mentioned him by name in his relevant account.

³ Polyb. 4.81.2: νομίσας δ', εἰ τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔλθοι Κλεομένει... ταχέως ἐπακολουθήσειν αὐτῷ τὸ πλῆθος.

⁴ Lykourgos may not even have enjoyed the support of the ephors; that he did not become apparent later, when the ephors attempted to arrest him ἐπὶ νεωτερισμῷ (Polyb. 5.29.8-9), but it was probably also the case during Cheilon's revolt (see Shimron 1972: 76-77).

⁵ This is correctly pointed out by Oliva 1971: 270 (*contra* Shimron 1972: 74-75).

⁶ Ferrabino 1921: 179-80; *contra* Oliva 1971: 270 n. 5 and Cartledge 1989: 64.

was at a short distance from the Spartan outpost of Athenaion.¹ For a man whose sole objective was to rise to power reaching an understanding with the Macedonian king must have seemed the sensible thing to do. His enemy's enemy would become his friend –temporarily, without doubt. The acute problems Sparta was facing concealed the irony of the matter: the last supporter of Kleomenes' reform plans was a secret ally of the Macedonian king.

MESSENIA – MESSENE

B29. Nikodemos (son of Nikarchides?)

— Plut., *Dem.* 13.4; *FD III* 4, 7 (*Syll³* 325) (?)

According to the Plutarchean *Life of Demosthenes* (13), the great orator and politician cannot be accused of a two-faced political attitude like Demades, Melanopos or Nikodemos of Messene; the latter initially favoured Kassandros, later acted ὑπὲρ Δημητρίου, and justified his actions by saying that “it is always advantageous to be docile to those who hold power”.²

It is not certain when Nikodemos switched allegiance. Plutarch's anecdote presupposes that Poliorketes had already wrested Messene from the hands of Kassandros (hence he was now κρατῶν). The two possible dates are either 303, when Poliorketes conquered a number of Peloponnesian cities,³ or 295, when, interrupting the siege of Athens, he conquered Messene.⁴ As Messene is not explicitly recorded among Poliorketes' conquests in 303, Beloch favoured the latter choice.⁵ An argument *e silentio* regarding Hellenistic events, however, is by definition insecure, and we know that Plutarch's account of Poliorketes' Peloponnesian campaign in 303 is defective in more than one respects.⁶ Besides, Plutarch does not say that Poliorketes *conquered* Messene in 295, but merely that he *besieged* it, that he was wounded during the siege and then that, “after subduing some cities which had revolted, repeated his siege of Athens”. His vague reference to “some cities” could lead to the conclusion that Messene was not one of them.⁷ Finally,

¹ If these events were actually contemporaneous, as Polybios relates.

² Plut., *Dem.* 13.4: ἀεὶ γὰρ εἶναι συμφέρον ἀκροᾶσθαι τῶν κρατούντων. Plutarch's choice of verb is interesting: apart from the literal meaning “to listen to”, ἀκροῶμαι also has the connotation of “to attend to” and “to obey”, suitable for a whole range of subordinates, from a student who “listens to” a teacher to a citizen who “obeys” an archon (see the examples cited in *LSJ*, s.v.).

³ Plut., *Demetr.* 25.

⁴ Plut., *Demetr.* 33.3-5.

⁵ Beloch 1927: 368.

⁶ Cf. **A19** (III), above, and especially p. 91 n. 3.

⁷ If the treaty between Lysimachos and Messene (*SEG* 51 [2001] 457) dates to the eve of Poliorketes' siege in 295, as Matthaïou (1991: 269 and 2001: 231; cf. *BullEpigr* 1995: 263) reasonably suggests, one of the reasons for Poliorketes' failure to conquer Messene may have been that Lysimachos offered Messene military assistance. The first editor (Themelis 1993: 85) dated the inscription to 286-281. Given that this is the only attestation of Lysimachos interfering in

Plutarch's anecdote emphasizes Nikodemos' sudden (αὐθις) switch of allegiance. This must be taken to imply that Kassandros was still alive, hence the date should be 303¹ and not 295, when Nikodemos' turnabout would be perfectly justified (as the king he favoured had died), and Plutarch's anecdote would thus lose its meaning.

There are several gaps in our knowledge of Messene's history in the Hellenistic period. It belonged to Polyperchon's sphere of influence in 318² and was conquered by Kassandros in 316 or early 315.³ In 313 the city changed hands once again and was 'liberated' by Telesphoros, Antigonos' general.⁴ In 311 Messene took part in the rebuilding of Thebes under the aegis of Kassandros,⁵ which could mean that it had entered once again his sphere of influence, but more probably simply reflects the traditional ties of friendship between Messene and Thebes.⁶

During the archonship of Megakles, most probably in 323/2,⁷ Delphi honoured Nikodemos son of Nikarchides of Messene with proxeny.⁸ Is this the statesman referred to by Plutarch?⁹ If Nikodemos was politically active already at the time of the Lamian War, his change of allegiance from Kassandros to Poliorketes may not have been the only one he had to resort to for his political survival. It is perhaps not insignificant that the only piece of evidence on him is a phrase which could serve as the epigraph of this study: ἀεὶ γὰρ εἶναι συμφέρον ἀκροᾶσθαι τῶν κρατούντων.

Peloponnesian affairs (Matthaiou 2001: 231), the choice between the two dates is not easy. Nevertheless, the treaty seems to imply the existence of an imminent danger for the Messenians, which favours a dating in 295 and not after 286, when Lysimachos was facing no major opponent in the Greek mainland.

¹ This is also the opinion of Pomtow, *ad Syll*³ 325.

² SEG 43 (1993) 135; Diod. Sic. 19.64.1.

³ Diod. Sic. 19.64.1. For the date of Kassandros' Peloponnesian campaign (usually dated either to the summer of 316, according to the 'high' chronology followed here, or to the summer of 315, according to the 'low' chronology), cf. lately Landucci Gattinoni 2003: 19-23, who, while following the 'high' chronology, favours a date in the first months of 315.

⁴ Diod. Sic. 19.74.2. One should resist the temptation to date Nikodemos' turnabout then: Poliorketes had no participation in the Peloponnesian events of 313.

⁵ Paus. 9.7.1.

⁶ After its refoundation by Epameinondas in 369, Messene maintained close relations with Thebes, Boiotia in general and the sanctuary of Trophonios in particular (see Paus. 4.16.7 [cf. 9.39.14]; 4.27.5-7; 4.32.4-6, with the comments of Nafissi 1995: 162).

⁷ See Bousquet 1985: 249-50.

⁸ *FD* III 4, 7 (*Syll*³ 325).

⁹ Pomtow *ad Syll*³ 325 thinks so, and Roebuck 1941: 61 n. 13 tentatively agrees. It should be noted that Pomtow's assumption that the Ionic form of Nikodemos' name should be explained by his long exile is unfounded.

B30. Gorgos (son of Eukletos?)

— Polyb. 5.5.4-5; 7.10.2-5; Paus. 6.14.11 (?); SEG 43 (1993) 143 (?)

In the spring of 218, in the midst of the Social War, two embassies reached Philip V in Kephallenia (Polyb. 5.5). The Akarnanians asked Philip to invade Aitolia, while the Messenians οἱ περὶ τὸν Γόργον suggested to him a surprise attack in Messenia, which was occupied by Lykourgos, king of Sparta and enemy of the Allies. According to Polybios, Gorgos and the Messenians¹ found an advocate in Leontios who, in the context of the so-called ‘conspiracy of Apelles’, wished to see the king cut off from his forces in the Peloponnese and embarrassed by Aitolian raids on Thessaly. Philip preferred to listen to Aratos instead, and prepared an invasion of Aitolia.²

A Polybian passage of uncertain placement, excerpted in the *Suda*, informs us that Gorgos “was second to no Messenian in wealth and noble origin”, that in his youth he was the most important and more often crowned athlete, and that after the end of his athletic career he became successfully involved in politics, earning equal glory, and was considered most efficient and wise in his political dealings.³ Pausanias describes a statue of a Messenian athlete of the pentathlon named Gorgos son of Eukletos.⁴ It is unanimously accepted that this is the statue of the ambassador of 218.⁵

Had we known nothing else about Messene in that period, we would have only surmised that Gorgos was a popular aristocrat of Messene, who took part in an

¹ At first glance, the vague phrase οἱ περὶ τὸν Γόργον allows the assumption that Gorgos was not an official member of the embassy, in which case he could be already at Philip’s court, perhaps as a commander of the Messenian contingent already sent to support the king (Polyb. 5.5.4). This would be an unwarranted assumption, however, since Polybios often uses this phraseology when referring to the leader of an embassy (see 2.48.8, where οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη refers to the embassy led by Nikophanes, or 21.29.10 and 21.30.13, where the ambassadors οἱ περὶ Δαμοτέλην include Damoteles himself [cf. Holleaux, *Études* V 263 n. 5]).

² The whole episode is part of the argumentation of Polybios (and Aratos) on the ‘conspiracy’ of Apelles. As Errington 1967: 31 points out, nothing more than different strategies proposed by different φίλοι should be read into it. The attack on Messenia would not have been an irrational move from a strategic point of view, but Philip preferred a more unexpected attack on Aitolia itself. On the ‘conspiracy’ of Apelles, cf. **B13** [V], above.

³ Polyb. 7.10.2-5 (*Suda*, s.v. Γόργος).

⁴ Paus. 6.14.11.

⁵ See Lippold 1934; F. W. Walbank 1967: 57; Maddoli *et al.* 1999: 279. I have to admit that Polybios’ Gorgos, πάντων ἐνδοξότατος... τῶν περὶ τοὺς γυμνικούς ἀγῶνας φιλοστεφανούτων, better fits another Gorgos mentioned by Pausanias (6.15.9), who won four times in the pentathlon and twice in other events, but who is described as an Elean. Themelis 1999: 25 dates a victory of Gorgos in Olympia to 232, without further argumentation. The athlete and statesman of Polybios could also be connected with Gorgos, κιστιόκοσμος and προστάτης of Athena Kyprissia at Messene in roughly the same period (SEG 43 [1993] 143), while Eukletos son of Eukleides, honoured in 323/2 (?) at Delphi (*FD* III 4, 8), could be one of his ancestors (great-grandfather?).

embassy to a Macedonian king. We happen, however, to have a lot of evidence on Messene in the 210's and we must try to establish whether Gorgos played any part in the events of the period.

Immediately after Doson's death in 221, the Aitolians started plundering the land of the Messenians, their former allies.¹ The Messenians asked the Achaians for help and entered the Alliance formed by Doson,² which declared war on the Aitolians in 220.³ Nevertheless, the Messenians, whose request for help was the cause of the war, refrained from military involvement in it. Polybios explains that, despite the opposite view of "the multitude", the oligarchs in power cared only for their personal interests (presumably for the safety of their extended land properties) and were opposed to war.⁴ Until Gorgos' embassy in 218, Messene is not heard of again. This means that the embassy led by Gorgos marked a change of policy; instead of the inactive neutrality favoured by the oligarch ephors Oinis and Nikippos in 220, now the active alliance with the Macedonians and the Allies, and the military confrontation with the occupying force of the Spartans were sought. Next to the pro-Aitolian and pacifist oligarchs and the bellicose democrats, Walbank saw in this change of policy the prevalence of a third faction, which he termed pro-Achaian moderate democrats, and of which he believed that Gorgos was the leader.⁵ The existence of such a faction remains hypothetical. As Walbank conceded, all sources on Gorgos make his inclusion in the democrats, however moderate, not very likely. There were many members of the oligarchic leadership, who already in 221 opposed the pro-Aitolian policy of Oinis and Nikippos.⁶ It is, therefore, more likely that the change of policy inaugurated by Gorgos was the result of short-term changes of strategy within the same ruling faction rather than the result of the prevalence of a different faction with a significantly different political agenda.⁷ The oligarchs of Messene may have been

¹ Polyb. 4.3 ff.; cf. Will 1982: 71-72.

² Polyb. 4.16.1. Some Messenians were favourably disposed towards the Achaians and the Macedonians even before 221; see Fine 1940: 155-56.

³ Polyb. 4.25.

⁴ Polyb. 4.31-32.

⁵ See mostly F. W. Walbank 1957: 258 and 541; 1968: 57. Roebuck 1941: 69-70 has a similar but more cautious analysis.

⁶ That was the case of the ephor Skyron (Polyb. 4.4).

⁷ Differences in the orientation of foreign policy did not always correspond with differences in the domestic agenda, and vice versa: the democrats who were exiled from Messene in 223 chose the oligarchic and anti-Kleomenic Megalopolis as their place of exile (Polyb. 2.55.3), probably on account of the traditionally excellent relationship between the two cities (cf. Polyb. 4.33 and Roebuck 1941: 70). Incidentally, Walbank's earlier suggestion (1940: 72 n. 3) that during the rule of Gorgos there was a constitutional change in Messene is even less convincing. Walbank thought it was significant that the generals are referred to in 215/4 (Plut., *Arat.* 49.4), while until 220 the ephors seem to be the highest archons (Polyb. 4.4.2 and 31.2). Firstly, a constitutional

reluctant to risk military operations in areas where their estates lay in 220, but now that the Spartan invasion had already brought the war to them, they had no reason not to fight or not to seek Achaian and Macedonian help –help which, given the oligarchic structure of the Achaian elite, they had no reason to fear would undermine their leading position. Consequently, the assumption that a ‘third party’ led by Gorgos existed is unwarranted.

The next episode in Messene’s history is the infamous ‘Messene affair’ of 215–213, that is, Philip’s intervention in the civil war which had broken out in the city and his subsequent invasion of Messenia.¹ The details are difficult to establish, especially because Polybios seems to be more interested in his polemic against Philip V, whom he presents as a blood-thirsty and almost paranoid king,² and because his seventh book has been preserved in a very fragmentary state. A possible outline of events could read as follows: Messenian democrats attempted to seize power in 215/4 with Philip’s support.³ The king’s support may have been offered in exchange for the installation of a Macedonian garrison on the Messenian acropolis. During the civil unrest the “demagogues”⁴ turned the crowds against the archons and their supporters; the result was the death of 200 oligarch leaders and supporters. Under Achaian pressure, Philip withdrew his support to the democrats and campaigned twice to Messenia; the first campaign was led by him personally, while the second was led by Demetrios of Pharos, who was killed during a siege.

If *Suda*’s excerpt on Gorgos does come from Polybios’ seventh book as is fairly probable, what could Gorgos’ role have been in this affair? Walbank believed that 7.10.2 (the praise for Gorgos), should be placed before Philip’s intervention and that 7.10.1, explicitly dated “when the Messenians were under a democracy” and mentioning the exile of the oligarchs and the ‘Kleomenic’ measures of the

change making the generals the highest archons of the city would not befit a regime led by a man whom Walbank describes as a “moderate democrat”; secondly, ephors and generals could very well co-exist: it is perfectly understandable that the generals, who must have been responsible for maintaining order, are mentioned in our sources for the troubled period of 215–213 (cf. Roebuck 1941: 81–82 n. 76).

¹ Polyb. 7.10–14; 8.8a and 8; Plut., *Arat.* 49–51.2; Strab. 8.361; Paus. 4.29.1–5 and 32.2; cf. F. W. Walbank 1940: 72–74, 299–300; Roebuck 1941: 81–84; Gruen 1981: 171–73; Will 1982: 86; Hammond 1988: 396–97.

² Polybios’ digression on Philip’ character (7.11) is interposed in the account of Messenian affairs.

³ This support was certainly not part of Philip’s supposed support to democratic regimes, as it has been sometimes assumed; see Mendels 1977 and Gruen 1981, with earlier bibliography. It is not even clear whether Philip’s support for the democrats came before or after the revolt.

⁴ Plut., *Arat.* 49.5.

democratic regime, relates later events.¹ There is no doubt that 7.10.1 relates events of a later phase, but I do not endorse the date Walbank proposed for 7.10.2. The praise for Gorgos, presented as a brilliant and glorious aristocrat, must belong to a recapitulating passage, and it is possible that Polybios offered a summary of Gorgos' career in the context of the latter's death. Gorgos certainly belonged to the ἀξιόλογοι Messenians (to whom Polybios' sympathies were directed), who ran into trouble with the new regime. If, as we saw earlier, there is no reason to include Gorgos in any other faction than the ruling oligarchic faction, it is very likely that he was one of the archons killed during the last phase of the civil war.

For the purposes of present discussion, suffice it to say that Gorgos belonged to the ruling oligarchs of Messene, who changed their neutral foreign policy and opted for an active alliance with Macedonia, on account of the danger posed by the Aitolians (in 220) and especially by the Spartans (in 218). The alliance was temporary for both sides: the Messenians switched back and forth from neutrality to asking Philip for military assistance, and the king switched his support from the oligarchs to the democrats and then back to the oligarchs, whom he was not able to save. All these events, however, have more to do with the short-term meanders of Hellenistic strategic decisions and foreign policy than with stable ties between city and king, let alone with any kind of personal strategy of Gorgos regarding the Macedonian court. His connection with the Macedonians was a brief and uncharacteristic event both of his life and of Messenian history.

KYPARISSIA

B31. Chariteles

— Livy 32.21.23

Among the crimes of Philip V in the Peloponnese, as reported by the pro-Roman general of the Achaian *koinon* Aristainos during the crucial assembly of 198, was the *contra ius omne ac fas* murder of Chariteles, a *xenos* (*hospitem*) of Philip from Kyparissia, during a banquet (Livy 32.21.23). Given that in the same passage Livy refers to the Messenian events of 215-213 discussed in the preceding entry, we may assume that Chariteles' death occurred during the same period. If we take the murder charge at face value, the time must be Philip's first campaign against Messene, the only one which the king led in person. Chariteles is otherwise unknown.² It has been suggested that an epigram of Alkaios of Messene refers to the murder of Chariteles, but it could equally refer to the murder of Aratos or his homonymous son (B13-14, above).³

¹ F. W. Walbank 1967: 2 (where it is mistakenly stated that 7.10.1 comes from the *Suda*, while in fact it is 7.10.2) and 57.

² The name is otherwise unattested not only in Messenia but also in the rest of the Peloponnese before the second century AD.

³ *Anth. Pal.* 9.519, where Philip is accused of poisoning his friends; cf. F. W. Walbank 1940: 79 n. 2.

The fact that Chariteles was Philip's *xenos* suggests that their relationship had a past. Thus, it is more probable that Chariteles belonged to the Messenian aristocracy than to the democrats, who were allies of Philip for only a short period of time. The parallel fates of Chariteles and Gorgos point to the same conclusion. Both seem to be presented by Polybios as innocent victims attesting to the catastrophic change in Philip's character.

ARKADIA – MEGALOPOLIS

B32. Damis

— Diod. Sic. 18.70.1-72.1 and 19.64.1

Megalopolis is one of the five cities excepted from the general amnesty and the return of the exiles ordained by Polyperchon's *diagramma* in 319.¹ More specifically, the citizens of Megalopolis who had been banished "on account of treason" along with Polyainetos were not allowed to return to their home city. Nothing else is known of Polyainetos and his treason. Given that Megalopolis remained neutral during the Lamian War, as also did all the other cities of Arkadia,² Polyainetos may have been banished because he sought the inclusion of Megalopolis in the anti-Macedonian alliance; but the reason for his exile may have (also?) been related to domestic politics.

Polyperchon then ordered several cities to banish or execute "those who had led the regimes set up by Antipatros".³ His order was apparently not followed by most concerned. A few months later he descended to the Peloponnese; from some cities he gathered representatives in order to consolidate their alliance with him, while to other cities he sent ambassadors "ordering the death of the archons imposed by Antipatros during the oligarchy and restoring the autonomy to the peoples".⁴ Democratic regimes were instituted in most cities and oligarchic leaders were banished; the Megalopolitans were the only ones to "maintain their friendship with Kassandros"; Polyperchon had no choice but to besiege the city.

Diodoros describes the unsuccessful siege in long detail (18.70.1-72.1). The leader of the Megalopolitan oligarchs who continued to remain loyal to Kassandros was Damis, who had taken part in Alexander's campaign in Asia and thus knew how to deal with Polyperchon's elephants. Diodoros' description hardly reminds one of an extreme oligarchic regime: the assembly was regularly convened even during the siege (18.70.1) and decided that foreigners and slaves should

¹ Diod. Sic. 18.56 (Megalopolis: 18.56.5).

² Paus. 8.27.10 (cf. 8.6.2).

³ Diod. Sic. 18.57.1.

⁴ Diod. Sic. 18.69.4: προστάτων τοὺς μὲν δι' Ἀντιπάτρου καθεσταμένους ἄρχοντας ἐπὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας θανατῶσαι, τοῖς δὲ δήμοις ἀποδοῦναι τὴν αὐτονομίαν. The fact that Polyperchon sent embassies to more than one city seems to imply that most cities had not obeyed his order before he arrived to the Peloponnese in person.

participate in the military preparations (*ibid.*), while the entire population participated in the defence of the city (18.70.2 and 6). In other words, the “friends of Kassandros” at Megalopolis must have enjoyed strong popular support. This is another indication that clear-cut classifications of politicians (oligarchs / democrats), even when made by our sources, can often be misleading; it is also an indication that rigid schemata which would want oligarchs aligning themselves with Kassandros and, accordingly, democrats aligning themselves first with Polyperchon and then with Poliorketes, regardless of the particular circumstances, are too simplistic to account for the complexities of local politics at different junctures.

Two years later, in 316 (or early 315) Kassandros returned to the Peloponnese, where he stayed for a short period of time. When he came back a year later, he enjoyed important successes: he wrested Corinth from the hands of Alexandros son of Polyperchon, conquered Orchomenos in Arkadia, unsuccessfully attempted to conquer Messene, and then returned to Arkadia where he “left Damis as *epimeletes* of Megalopolis”, in order to attend the Nemea of Argos (summer 315).¹ In effect, Kassandros only confirmed the leadership of his supporter. It is particularly enlightening for the purposes of this study that, if we only had this testimony on Damis, we would come to a totally misleading conclusion about political life at Megalopolis. Damis was not an *epimeletes* of the city in the sense that Demetrios of Phaleron was *epimeletes* of Athens: he was not the overseer of a foreign ruler, imposed to an unwilling city which had no option but to confirm his appointment; he was already a city leader, perhaps already after his return from Asia, and his political prevalence was only confirmed by the passing ruler whom he supported.

The fate of Damis is unknown. He was most probably removed from the city leadership either by Telesphoros, Antigonos’ general, in 313, or, at the latest, by Poliorketes in 303.²

B33-34. Nikophanes and Kerkidas

— Polyb. 2.48-49 (embassy to Antigonos Doson) and 2.65.3 (Kerkidas and the battle of Sellasia)

We have already (B13 [III], above) dealt with the embassy led by Nikophanes and Kerkidas³ to Antigonos Doson in the winter of 227/6, presumably on behalf of the

¹ Diod. Sic. 19.54.3-4 (first campaign), 19.63.4-64.4 (second campaign). The manuscripts of 19.64.1 read Δᾶμιν μὲν ἐπιμελητὴν τῆς πόλεως ἀπέλιπεν, but the fact that Kassandros was in Arkadia and that Damis is mentioned make Niese’s correction (ἐπιμελητὴν τῆς «Μεγάλης» πόλεως) practically certain.

² Diod. Sic. 19.74.1 (Telesphoros); Plut., *Demetr.* 25 (Poliorketes).

³ The stress should most probably fall on the last syllable, thus Κερκιδᾶς (Cruces 1995: 205-207).

Megalopolitans, but in effect on behalf of their family friend Aratos.¹ Nikophanes is otherwise unknown. Kerkidas, however, is later attested as the commander of the Megalopolitan contingent of 1,000 men in the battle of Sellasia in 222; his men were armed “in the Macedonian manner”, which probably means that they had not only received training suitable for a Macedonian phalanx, but also military equipment donated by the king.²

Kerkidas is often identified with the homonymous law-giver, poet and Cynic philosopher mentioned in other sources.³ The biographical information on this (second?) Kerkidas poses a number of problems. Fortunately, these problems have recently been thoroughly dealt with by Cruces, whose conclusions I summarily repeat here:⁴ 1) Two distinct traditions on Kerkidas existed; one was historiographical and considered him a law-giver and a statesman, and the other was biographical and considered him mostly a Cynic philosopher; the two traditions were rarely connected with the poetic work attributed to him. 2) The biographical tradition on Kerkidas as a Cynic philosopher probably originated with Diogenes Laertios (6.76) –who mentions Kerkidas as a source for the life of Diogenes ‘the Dog’–, and was created to accommodate the taxonomy needs of librarians in the Roman period. 3) The first source explicitly connecting the historiographical tradition with the poet is Stephanos Byzantios (s.v. Μεγάλη Πόλις). 4) It is probable that the law-giver and statesman Kerkidas should be identified with the “philosopher” (historian?) Kerkidas, but it is implausible that he should be identified with the homonymous poet.

This complicates things even further, as far as the ambassador Kerkidas is concerned. Is he the law-giver / statesman / scholar, the poet or none of the above? His identification with the poet seems very unlikely, despite the fact that they were active during the same period. The very interesting fr. 1 of the poet Kerkidas, which describes the society of his time with the darkest of colours and vehemently criticizes the rich, is very difficult to attribute to the family friend of Aratos, ambassador to Doson and enemy of Kleomenes and his reform plans.⁵ The

¹ Nikophanes and Kerkidas were not the only ambassadors: Polybios always refers to the embassy as οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη or οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη καὶ Κερκιδᾶν (2.48.8, 50.3 and 50.5). The phrase οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη may either be due to economy or it can reflect his actual leadership.

² Polyb. 2.65.3; cf. F. W. Walbank 1957: 275.

³ See F. W. Walbank 1957: 247; Oliva 1971: 248-50; Fuks 1973 [1984: 24-25]; Marasco 1981: 71; Davies 1984: 295; Le Bohec 1993: 365; further bibliography in Cruces 1995: 3-37.

⁴ Cruces 1995: 3-63, esp. 60-63.

⁵ The only way to identify Kerkidas the ambassador with Kerkidas the poet would be to consider the latter an oligarch, whose message to his peers was: “open up your eyes and figure out ways to rectify the situation, or else it will soon be too late” (so Tarn / Griffith 1952: 279 and particularly Fuks 1973 [1984: 24-25]). The view of Davies 1984: 295, that Kerkidas’ poem cannot have been subversive, as it was written by a well-off statesman who favoured an alliance with Doson, is a clear case of *petitio principii*. Cruces 1995: 12 pertinently remarks that the atmosphere

identification of the ambassador with Kerkidas the law-giver is not unlikely, but there is no evidence to support it:¹ if we dissociate the law-giver from the poet, there is no way to date the law-giver. Those who accept the identification of the two men as the same person have suggested various periods during which the activity of Kerkidas the law-giver could be dated, but there are serious obstacles to all datings.² Finally, it should be noted that the (otherwise rare) name Kerkidas, was quite common in Megalopolis and Arkadia.³

of fr. 1 is very close to the atmosphere in Megalopolis in 217 as described by Polybios. This does not necessarily favour the identification of the poet with the statesman; the problems of Megalopolis in 217 were those with which the entire Peloponnese was faced throughout the third century and the similarity in descriptions should neither surprise us nor lead us to conclude that they were the work of the same man.

¹ See, however, p. 279 n. 4, below.

² Powell 1925: 201 argues that Kerkidas acted as a law-giver of Megalopolis after the murder of the tyrant Aristodemos, probably soon after rather than soon before the liberation of Sikyon by Aratos in 251. The instigators of the murder and of the constitutional changes which ensued were Ekdemos and Demophanes (there is some confusion about the names: see F. W. Walbank 1967: 224 and Laronde 1987: 410 n. 36, with the sources and bibliography), but still, Powell's assumption is not *prima facie* unacceptable, as by 249 or 248 (Laronde 1987: 381-82), Ekdemos and Demophanes had already left for Kyrene. The problem with Powell's dating is that sometime in the 240's Megalopolis fell again in the hands of a tyrant, namely Lydiadas, which would have left very little time for a successful law-giver (an ἄριστος νομοθέτης, according to Stephanos) to have concluded his work. The period until the death of Lydiadas in 227 (Polyb. 2.51.3, Plut., *Arat.* 37.3 and *Cleom.* 6.4), *pace* Gerhard 1921: 295-96 and others (see Cruces 1995: 10-11 n. 26), can also be safely ruled out: the ἄριστος νομοθέτης cannot have been a collaborator of a tyrant (and later ex-tyrant, but still *de facto* sole ruler of Megalopolis). It is equally difficult to date the law-giver after 222, when another law-giver, an unsuccessful one, was present at Megalopolis (Prytanis of Karystos [A75, above]). There remains the period 227-222, that is, precisely the period when the Kerkidas of Polybios was active. Such a date would particularly favour the identification of the law-giver with the ambassador. Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine that the "excellent laws" of Kerkidas led to such dramatic social tension that the appointment of a new law-giver by Doson became necessary only a few years later. Consequently, if we accept the identification of the law-giver with Aratos' friend, we have to date his law-giving after 217 (cf. Cruces 1995: 10-15, with earlier bibliography), when his friend Aratos succeeded in appeasing the social tension caused by the laws of Prytanis (Polyb. 5.93). But now we run into a different problem: Polybios claims that Aratos was the sole responsible for social peace at Megalopolis; however 'Aratocentric' his work may have been, the Megalopolitan historian would surely not have neglected to mention an "excellent law-giver", fellow countryman of his, active in Megalopolis only two decades before he himself was born.

³ Dem. 18.295 (a Kerkidas from Arkadia is accused of being a pro-Macedonian traitor of his country); *IG* V 2, 550 (a Kerkidas is secretary to the archons [γραφεὺς δαμιοργῶν] at the Lykaia of 308); *IG* V 2, 439, l. 40 (a Kerkidas is *choregos* in ca. 145). All three undoubtedly belonged to the elite of the city, perhaps even to the same family.

If we avoid identifying the Kerkidas of Polybios with the law-giver or the poet –because no evidence exists to support the first identification, while the second is unlikely–, the only information we are left with on Kerkidas and Nikophanes comes from Polybios. Even so, they represent an interesting case of mediation. The two Megalopolitans were intermediaries in two senses. Officially, they represented their city in an embassy to a royal court; unofficially, they were secret emissaries of Aratos to Doson. From a formal point of view they did not engage in personal diplomacy contravening the expressed wishes of the majority of their fellow countrymen as Aratos did. Megalopolis was a traditional ally of Macedonia¹ and a traditional enemy of Sparta; the enmity towards Sparta was further fuelled at this juncture by the fact that the *chora* of Megalopolis was the boundary between the *koinon* and Sparta. Moreover, Aratos chose these particular Megalopolitans not only because they were his family friends,² but because they seemed to him *πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολὴν εὐφυεῖς* (Polyb. 2.48.4), “suitable for the occasion”, that is, for his plan.³ Were the two Megalopolitans “suitable” only because they were family friends of his and shared his plan to become Macedonia’s allies or also because they were likely to be received favourably at court because of their prior connections with it, just like the other *εὐφυέστατος πρεσβευτῆς* of Polybios (5.74.6), namely Logbasi of Selge in Pisidia, whom his fellow countrymen sent to Achaios because he had raised Laodike, Achaios’ wife?⁴

ARKADIA (UNKNOWN CITY)

B35. [---] son of Philton (?)

– [--- Φί]λτων(ος) (?): Braunert 1951: 235 n° 12 (SB 1.1677)

A funerary urn from Alexandria records the death of [---]λτων Ἀρκάδο(ς) [. . .] ΕΙ[. . .] πρεσβε(υτοῦ), in February or March 228.⁵ The letters before the ethnic belong to the name or, more probably, to the patronym of the ambassador. Of the

¹ Polyb. 2.48.1-3; cf. 2.50.4 for the joy with which the Megalopolitans received Doson’s letter.

² For the term *πατρικοὶ ξένοι*, see **B12**, above.

³ “Suitable” is practically the only meaning *εὐφυῆς* has in Polybios. Apart from the exact parallel noted in the text below (5.74.6), see 1.30.15: *πόλεως... εὐφροῦς ὑπαρχούσης πρὸς τὰς προκειμένους ἐπιβολάς*.

⁴ If that was an additional reason for the choice of Nikophanes and Kerkidas, we cannot rule out the possibility that they were scholars, always an excellent choice for ambassadors to royal courts. The other two Megalopolitans who had been particularly active politically in an earlier period, namely Ekdemos and Demophanes (see Sonnabend 1996: 264-71, with the sources and bibliography), were also scholars. If this, admittedly far-fetched assumption is accepted, it could be used as an additional argument in favour of identifying the ambassador Keridas with the homonymous law-giver and scholar.

⁵ Braunert 1951: 235 n° 12, with discussion on the date.

Thrasyboulos was a ‘democrat’;¹ as we shall see in the following entry, the only thing we can safely say about both Aristotimos and those who plotted against him is that they were members of the aristocracy of Elis.² In any case, it is interesting to note that a supporter of Pyrrhos remained politically active even after the pro-Macedonian tyrant had risen to power.

The statue of Pyrrhos erected by Thrasyboulos is the only attestation of the king’s relationship with Elis –no doubt a circumstantial affair. The pair of prospective civic leaders, Thrasyboulos and Aristotimos, and their relationship with Pyrrhos and Gonatas, strongly reminds one of Aristeas and Aristippos at Argos and their relationship with the same kings at the same time (see **B2-3**, above). There is no reason not to assume that Thrasyboulos, like Aristeas, sought to establish a relationship with Pyrrhos because his rival Aristotimos had already done so with Gonatas. This is a motif not infrequently attested: the ties of prominent statesmen with Hellenistic kings were, at least initially, the effect and not the cause of civil unrest.

B37. Aristotimos son of Damaretos

— Plut., *Mor.* 251A-253F; Paus. 5.5.1; Just. 26.1

The tyrannid of Aristotimos, which followed shortly after the death of king Pyrrhos in 272 and lasted for five or six months,³ has a prominent place in the discussion about the supposed ‘system of tyrannids’ set up by Gonatas in the Peloponnese. His short rule is reported in detail in two sources, Plutarch’s *Γυναικῶν ἀρεταί* (*Mor.* 251A-253F) and Justin 26.1; Pausanias (5.5.1) has a brief account.

¹ As Bernert 1936 calls him.

² Stadter 1965: 85 n. 192 (followed by Gómez Espelosín 1991: 108) makes the attractive hypothesis that the anonymous seer whom Aristotimos consulted the night before the revolt against him (Plut., *Mor.* 252F) was Thrasyboulos; this would make him a former associate of the tyrant. Nevertheless, this hypothesis requires that Thrasyboulos be identified with the seer honoured by the Mantineians (which is plausible but uncertain) and would effect that Plutarch, who explicitly names Thrasyboulos as one of the conspirators, forgot to mention him by name a paragraph earlier.

³ The date is provided by Justin (26.1.1-4). The honouring of Alexineides of Elis by Delphi is related to the date of Aristotimos’ tyrannid. The amphictionic decree in Alexineides’ honour (*CID* IV 25 [*FD* III 3, 185; *Syll*³ 418A]), issued during the archonship of Eudokos II, describes him as Ἡλεῖος ἐν Αἰτωλίᾳ οἰκῶν, which must be taken to imply that he was an exiled opponent of Aristotimos; on the other hand, the Delphic decree in his honour (*FD* III 3, 187 [*Syll*³ 418C]), issued during the archonship of Straton, describes him simply as Ἡλεῖος, an indication that Aristotimos was already dead. Unfortunately, the dating of both archons depends on the date of Aristotimos, and this results in various circular arguments; see Scholten 1990; Knoepfler 1995: 145-46; Lefèvre 1995: 172-74 and Scholten 2000: 57 n. 91.

Both Plutarch and Trogus / Justin certainly draw on Phylarchos, while Pausanias may draw on a different source.¹

Struggle for power in Elis seems to have been confined within the leading families of the city. Both Aristotimos and his opponents undoubtedly were members of the elite, and neither side seems to have had a democratic political agenda in any sense of the word.² Furthermore, we need to stress once again that the distinction between pro-Macedonians and anti-Macedonians does not *a priori* directly correspond with the distinction between oligarchs and democrats.

As far as the contacts of the protagonists with foreign powers are concerned, it is important to stress that Plutarch and Justin agree that Aristotimos rose to power on his own, after a civil struggle, and only afterwards made use of his Macedonian connections in order to maintain power –in fact Justin does not even mention the Macedonian interference.³ It is only Pausanias who states that Aristotimos seized power with Macedonian help.⁴ Taking into account the passionately antimonarchic feelings of Phylarchos, whose main theme in the first five books of his work is precisely Gonatas' policy in southern Greece,⁵ I would suggest that the first version of events is more plausible: had Phylarchos known, or had he been able to plausibly assume, that it was the Macedonian army which brought Aristotimos to power he would have surely not neglected to report this.

¹ See mainly Stadter 1965: 86-88; cf. Tarn 1913: 280 n. 15 and 288 n. 3; Beloch 1925: 581 n. 1; Flacelière 1937: 194; Berve 1967: 713 (with an erroneous citation of Dion Chrysostomos [2.76]: the tyrant mentioned along with Phalaris is not Aristotimos, but Apollodoros of Kassandria; Gómez Espelosín 1991: 109 reproduces the error); Gómez Espelosín 1991: 103. Despite the brevity of his account, Pausanias may draw on a different source, since he is the only one who records the patronym and papponym of Aristotimos and also records different names for the conspirators (Chilon instead of Plutarch's Thrasyboulos).

² The 'democratic' rhetoric of the conspirators against Aristotimos during their revolt (Plut., *Mor.* 253B: ἐκάλουν τοὺς πολίτας ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν; 253C: εἰ δῆμος ἀξιοῦντες εἶναι ταῦτα) is understandable as a tool to attract popular support, but does not necessarily imply a corresponding political agenda. The conspirators certainly belonged to the highest strata of Eleian aristocracy: Megisto led the women of Elis "because of her husband and her virtue, as she belonged to the leading class" (252B: διὰ τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἡγεμονικὴν ἔχουσα τάξιν), while Kyllon, the instigator of the revolt, was an associate of the tyrant (252D), the opponents of whom are explicitly said to have belonged to the "leading citizens" (Just. 26.1.5: *ex primoribus*). This does not imply, of course, that Aristotimos' rule enjoyed popular support, as Gómez Espelosín 1991: 105-108 unnecessarily assumes.

³ Plut., *Mor.* 251A: Ἀριστότιμος Ἠλείος ἐπαναστὰς τύραννος, ἴσχυε μὲν δι' Ἀντιγόνου τοῦ βασιλέως; Just. 26.1.3: *ita aut cum Antigono societatem iungebant (scil. cities in the Peloponnese), aut mutuis inter se odiis in bellum ruebant. Inter hunc turbatarum provinciarum motum Epiorum quoque urbs ab Aristotimo principe per tyrannidem occupatur.* The ethnic *Epiorum* is an error for *Eliorum*, unless Trogus (and Justin) uses for some reason a form of the homeric ethnic Ἐπειοί.

⁴ Paus. 5.5.1: ... Ἀριστότιμος... τυραννίδα ἔσχεν ἐν Ἠλείᾳ συμπαρασκευάσαντος αὐτῷ τὰ ἐς τὴν ἐπίθεσιν Ἀντιγόνου τοῦ Δημητρίου βασιλεύοντος ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ.

⁵ Pédech 1989: 415.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that Aristotimos relied on his alliance with Macedonia (or his personal ties with prominent Macedonians) in order to maintain his position: when the revolt of his opponents became imminent, he hastened to ask the help of Krateros, who immediately set out with a large force and reached Olympia on the very day the revolt broke out.¹

Aitolians' interest in what was going on at Elis was perhaps keener than that of the Macedonians. It is in Aitolia that prominent Eleians, banished by Aristotimos, sought refuge,² it is from Aitolia that they returned to Elis and seized the fort of Amymone (with Aitolian help?),³ and it is the Aitolians who officially interfered in the Eleian civil strife, with an embassy demanding that women and children be released from prison.⁴ Later, the Aitolians honoured with a statue at Olympia the instigator of the revolt, Kyl(l)on,⁵ whose son was later also honoured at Delphi, then in the hands of the Aitolians;⁶ it is no accident that Elis was the most loyal ally of the Aitolians for the next fifty years and served as their main base in the Peloponnese.

By 272 Aitolia and Macedonia were at peace, a tense peace, however.⁷ The expansion of Aitolian influence in Elis was the logical next step after the inclusion of the Ainians and of Doris in the Aitolian *koinon* in early 272.⁸ For Gonatas the expansion of Aitolian influence was an unpleasant and potentially negative development. This may mean that the reason for Krateros' attempt to help Aristotimos against the exiles, who clearly had Aitolian support, was twofold: his move was not only due to his wish to support a tyrant with personal ties of friendship with Gonatas and/or Krateros himself, but also to more general considerations of the balance of power in the Peloponnese.

B38. Amphidamos

— Polyb. 4.75.2-6, 84.2-9, 86.3-7

The general of Elis Amphidamos is known through a brief account of his activity during the Social War. In 219 he led a small force of 200 mercenaries and tried to protect non-belligerent Eleians trying to escape from Philip's attack. When the Macedonian army approached their entrenchment, Amphidamos surrendered without a fight (Polyb. 4.75.2-6), which is not surprising given the considerable lack of enthusiasm for war or of even rudimentary preparation for it

¹ Plut., *Mor.* 253A.

² Plut., *Mor.* 251C; Just. 26.1.5.

³ Plut., *Mor.* 252A.

⁴ Just. 26.1.5.

⁵ Paus. 6.14.11.

⁶ *FD III 3*, 191 (*Syll³* 423), under Kallikles (I or II), that is, in 258/7 or 257/6 or 249/8.

⁷ See Flacelière 1937: 194-95; Will 1979: 217; Scholten 2000: 46-58.

⁸ Scholten 2000: 51.

that the Eleians had displayed.¹ The captive general “begged through certain persons for an audition with the king” (4.84.2: ἔσπευσε διὰ τινῶν εἰς λόγους ἐλθεῖν τῷ βασιλεῖ) and when he succeeded in doing so he promised Philip that he would convince the Eleians to enter into an alliance with the king; in exchange, Philip promised to set the captives free with no ransom, guaranteed Elis’ security from its enemies (namely from its traditional allies, the very demanding Aitolians), as well as its freedom, autonomy and exemption from billeting and taxes (4.84.2-5). Amphidamos failed blatantly (4.84.6);² his fellow countrymen tried to arrest him and send him to Aitolia as traitor (4.86.3), but he managed to escape and seek refuge by Philip at Dyme (4.86.4).³

Two aspects of this episode are noteworthy. The first is the procedure followed for the first contact with the king, which had to be carried out through a third party, especially in this case, as the captive enemy leader would not be able to gain the king’s trust easily. The second is the personal gain Amphidamos would have obtained had he succeeded. It is obvious that, had he managed to bring the most loyal allies of the Aitolians to Philip’s alliance, he would not only have ensured benefits for his homeland, but also full personal protection from the pro-Aitolian political enemies of his.

B39. Kallistratos

— Polyb. 20.3 (cf. Livy 36.5.1-8)

Early in the winter of 192/1 a number of ambassadors, including the otherwise unknown Kallistratos of Elis, visited Antiochos III at Chalkis.⁴ The Eleians requested that Antiochos dispatch to Elis armed forces, which would protect them from the Achaians, who had declared war on them. Antiochos sent a force of 1,000 men under the leadership of Euphanes of Crete (Polyb. 20.3). This was an expected move on the part of the Eleians: along with the Messenians they were loyal allies

¹ See Polyb. 4.69.3-9, 73, 77.7, 83.3. Without a particularly large force, and having to face (apart from the Eleians) the Aitolians and mercenaries as well, Philip managed to capture more than 5,000 people (4.75.7).

² There is not the slightest trace of pro-Macedonian feelings in Elis, at least in this period, *pace* F. W. Walbank 1940: 19 n. 1 (who erroneously states that the Eleians erected the statuary complex of Doson and Philip; the passage of Pausanias which he cites [6.16.3] mentions two different complexes, one in which [the personification of] Hellas crowned Doson who, in his turn crowned Philip, and another complex in which [the personification of] Elis crowned Poliorketes and Ptolemy I) and Larsen 1968: 343 (who, without any supporting piece of evidence [cf. the justified criticism of Scholten 2000: 219 n. 57], assumes that the majority of Eleians supported the alliance with Philip).

³ At Philip’s camp (4.86.5-7) Amphidamos resolved the misunderstanding created by Apelles (4.84.7-9), who had blamed Aratos for the reluctance of the Eleians to ally themselves with Philip. The accusation was completely unfounded (see p. 249 n. 5, above).

⁴ Cf. F. W. Walbank 1979: 65. Kallistratos is not mentioned in Livy’s parallel passage (36.5.1-8).

of the Aitolians, who, in turn were Antiochos' allies. Soon after, however, and after some ambivalence, the Eleians were forced to join the pro-Roman camp and the Achaian *koinon*.¹

ACHAIA AND THE ACHAIA KOINON

B40. Timoxenos

— Polyb. 2.53.2; 4.6.4; 4.82.8; 5.106.1; Plut., *Arat.* 38.2-4; 47.3; *Cleom.* 20.8

Timoxenos –his city of origin is unknown– served as general of the Achaian *koinon* in 225/4, when Aratos refused the generalship,² perhaps in 224/3, although this is not very probable,³ in 221/20,⁴ and probably in 216/5.⁵ As Apelles and Philip V opted to support the election of Eperatos, he failed to get elected in 218/7, despite Aratos' support.⁶ The generalship of Timoxenos in the crucial year of 225/4, when the rapprochement between Achaia and Macedonia was finalized, his military duties during the even more crucial year of 224/3, when this rapprochement became official, his harmonious cooperation with Taurion, commander general of the Macedonian forces in the Peloponnese in 220,⁷ and his political support to and from Aratos, make it clear that he was in complete agreement with the pro-Macedonian agenda of the Sikyonian statesman. In fact, Timoxenos was a member of the inner circle of Aratos' supporters, and assumed the politically dangerous mission to represent the faction of Aratos in two elections, at times when the political atmosphere was particularly negative for the Sikyonian: in 225/4, when –after having suffered successive military defeats and promoted his unpopular policy of an alliance with the Macedonian king– Aratos wisely abstained from running for office, and in 218/7, when the loss of the western Achaian cities during the catastrophic generalship of Aratos the younger had boosted the support for Aratos' opponents and prevented Aratos from running for office (cf. the following entry). It is interesting that despite the close collaboration between

¹ Livy 36.31.3 (ambivalence); Paus. 8.3.5 and Livy 38.32.5 (the Eleians join the *koinon*). Their incorporation into the *koinon* must have taken place after the battle of Thermopylai in 191, when Euphanes' forces departed (F. W. Walbank 1940: 208-209 n. 3 and 1979: 66).

² Plut., *Arat.* 38.2-4.

³ Polyb. 2.53.2 calls him a general in the context of that year's events; Plutarch (*Cleom.* 20.8), however, does not. For the chronological problems of the generalship of 224/3, see F. W. Walbank 1957: 254-55. As Walbank points out, it is more likely that Timoxenos was simply a military commander of the Achaian contingent which took part in the takeover of Argos, rather than a general in the political sense. Aratos, elected plenipotentiary general in the summer of 225 (Plut., *Arat.* 41.3), probably still held the office.

⁴ Polyb. 4.6.4-7, 7.6-10; Plut., *Arat.* 47.3.

⁵ Polyb. 5.106.1 with F. W. Walbank 1957: 630.

⁶ Polyb. 4.82.8 (cf. the following entry).

⁷ Polyb. 4.6.4-7.

Timoxenos and Aratos, the latter did not hesitate to belittle Timoxenos in 220,¹ by seizing power five days before the scheduled succession of Timoxenos, whom he accused of indolence and lack of military foresight. The promotion of his own image as a diligent general, able to arouse the patriotic feelings of the Achaians in view of the coming Social War, mattered more to Aratos than the smear on his close collaborator's public image.

B41. Eperatos of Pharai

— Polyb. 4.82.2-8; 5.1.2, 1.7, 5.11, 30.1, 30.7, 91.4; Plut., *Arat.* 48

In the elections of 219 Aratos failed to get elected as general for 218/7, although he was traditionally elected to the generalship every two years, and it was now again his turn. According to Polybios,² Apelles and Philip V, who both attended the elections personally, were responsible for this, as they forcefully pressured the Achaians to elect Eperatos of Pharai in Aratos' stead. Apelles' plan, always according to Polybios, was to lessen Aratos' influence over Philip so as to have his hands free in order to promote his wider plan to fully subjugate the Achaians to the Macedonian rule.

The first part of this reasoning can be accepted without reservations; any courtier would have wished to see the influence of another courtier over the king being decreased.³ The second part, however, should be treated with great circumspection. Aratos, as we saw earlier (**B13** [V]), did not show the slightest trace of anti-Macedonian tendencies. This part of Polybios' account, with Apelles seeking to undermine an Achaian patriot, clearly belongs to Aratos' own apologetics.

Nevertheless, the argument purportedly used by Apelles when addressing Philip is interesting: if Aratos was to get elected, Philip would have nothing more to gain than what was officially stipulated by the terms of the agreement between Achaia and Macedonia, whereas if the candidate favoured by Apelles was elected, Philip would be able to "treat all Peloponnesians as he pleased".⁴ The argument is convincing: a statesman owing his election exclusively to Macedonian interference would obviously be more vulnerable to Macedonian demands than an established leader of high political status, earned previously and independently of his relations with the Macedonian court.⁵

¹ Polyb. 4.7.6-10; Plut., *Arat.* 47.3.

² Polyb. 4.82.2-8; cf. Plut., *Arat.* 48.1.

³ To accept this hardly means that we also need to accept that Aratos had the amount of influence at court which he claimed he had; see above, **B13** (V).

⁴ Polyb. 4.82.5: χρήσεται πᾶσι Πελοποννησίοις κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν.

⁵ Conjunctural strategic considerations must also have played a part in Philip's preference for Eperatos: the choice of a statesman coming from one of the western Achaian cities, which were greatly suffering from the attacks of the Aitolians and the Eleians, reflect Philip's strategic concerns for the area; see F. W. Walbank 1957: 535-36 and Errington 1967: 24.

The particulars of Eperatos' approach by Apelles are also noteworthy. Apelles asked around to find out who were the principal political opponents of Aratos in each city, then invited them for a meeting, offered them entertainment and "asked them to award him their friendship".¹ Naturally, the fact that Polybios claims that the initiative belonged to Apelles may simply reflect his need to present him as the protagonist of the plot against Aratos; one can easily imagine an Achaian politician who opposed the favourite of the Macedonian court trying to seize every opportunity to forge personal ties of friendship with influential courtiers, especially those who wished to see Aratos' influence over Philip reduced.²

Whether the first move was made by Apelles or by Eperatos, it is clear that the latter benefited from the political objectives of Apelles and the strategic objectives of Philip. Eperatos, lacking the easy access Aratos had to the king, hastened to take advantage of this juncture and to forge a parallel network of personal contacts with the royal court. It is important to note that the antagonism between Eperatos and Aratos is only reflected in these opposing channels of communication with Philip, that is, in their methods for maintaining (Aratos) or gaining (Eperatos) power; no real difference of political agenda is discernable. In that sense, the choice of Eperatos can certainly not be used as supporting evidence for the supposed preference Philip gave, at least in the early stages of his rule, to local leaders who were either more 'democratic' or would be more easily accepted by the lower strata of the local societies.³ Polybios (that is, the tradition friendly to Aratos) may have accused Eperatos of many things –indolence, indifference to military preparations, lack of control over soldiers and citizens alike–⁴ but never of being a democrat or a demagogue, by words or deeds.⁵

B42. Anaxilaos son of Aristeuos of Dyme

— Ἀναξίλαος Ἀριστέος Δυμαῖος; SEG 24 (1969) 1179 (Brauert 1951: 236 n° 23; SB I 1640; Cook 1966: n° 7; Rizakis, *Achaïe* I 753)

Anaxilaos is an otherwise unknown *architheoros* of the Achaian *koinon*, who died in Alexandria in 215. The nature of his *theoria* is uncertain. The date of his death (during the period of the closest Achaian alliance with Macedonia) and the basically religious character of his mission seem to contradict Braunert's suggestion⁶ that his mission was connected with the attempt made by Ptolemy IV

¹ Polyb. 4.82.4.

² An interesting parallel is the reaction of Aratos' political enemies to his relationship with the Ptolemies. When Gonatas publicly took pride in the fact that Aratos had joined the pro-Macedonian camp, his opponents in Achaia hastened to inform Ptolemy of the matter (Plut., *Arat.* 15.4).

³ The most convincing confutation of this theory can be found in Gruen 1981, with earlier bibliography; cf. Mendels 1977.

⁴ See Polyb. 5.1.8-10, 30.1, 91.4.

⁵ Cf. Gruen 1981: 174.

⁶ Braunert 1951: 255-56.

Philopator in 217 to mediate between Philip V and the Aitolians for the end of the Social War.¹

Poor as the evidence on Anaxilaos may be, it may still serve to draw our attention to the fact that the close political attachment of a Hellenistic city or a *koinon* to one king (Philip V, in our case) in no way excluded contacts with other courts, at least of a ceremonial nature.

B43. Kykliadas son of Damaretos of Pharai

— Livy 27.31.10; 31.25; 32.19.2 and 32.10; Polyb. 18.1.2, 34.4; SEG 36 (1986) 397.

Kykliadas of Pharai – a city in western Achaia² served twice as general of the Achaian *koinon*, and is usually considered the last leader of the pro-Macedonian faction in Achaia. This is only partly true, as I hope to show below.

Kykliadas' first generalship is dated to 210/09; the only event of that year with which he is directly connected is Philip V's raid on Eleia in the summer of 209.³ Kykliadas must also have been the instigator of the Achaian embassy to Philip, which asked him for help against Machanidas of Sparta and led to the king's descent to the Peloponnese.⁴ Both were natural moves for an Achaian leader of the period and were connected with the mutual obligations of both sides of the alliance; they, therefore, require no further discussion.

A relevant source is a votive inscription from Aigion (SEG 36 [1986] 397), obviously dating to the aftermath of the conquest of Pyrgos in Eleia in 209.⁵ Judging from Livy's description, the conquest was mostly the work of Philip,⁶ who received the greatest part of the spoils. Nevertheless, Kykliadas and the Achaians advertised the event as a mostly Achaian victory, leaving the obligatory reference to the Macedonian allies for the end of the text: Ἀχαιοὶ καὶ στραταγὸς Κυκλιάδας Δαμαρέτου Φαραίου τοῖς θεοῖς, νικάσας μετὰ τῶ[ν Μακεδόνων]. This is perfectly understandable in the context of Achaian public rhetoric. For the purposes of present discussion, we only need to note that neither the literary nor the epigraphical evidence suggests that Kykliadas was more closely connected with the Macedonians than his office required. Errington's assumption that the election of Kykliadas was the result of Philip's intervention is not supported by existing evidence.⁷

¹ Polyb. 5.100.9; cf. Ager 1996: 145-47 n° 53; Magnetto 1997: 322-28 n° 52; cf. C10, below.

² His patronym and ethnic became known from SEG 36 (1986) 397.

³ Livy 27.31.10; cf. Rizakis *Achaïe* I: n° 164, with comments and bibliography.

⁴ Livy 27.29.9; cf. Errington 1969: 55.

⁵ Livy 27.31.7-9; on the date, cf. Papapostolou 1987: 100-102.

⁶ Cf. Lehmann 1967: 208.

⁷ Errington 1969: 49-54. His hypothetical scenario is as follows: Kykliadas was a front for the real leader, Philopoimen, who was a pro-Macedonian at the time (pp. 27-48); Philip had sent Philopoimen to Crete on purpose and then recalled him to the Peloponnese, so that he would

Kykliadas' second generalship in 200/199 is more interesting. The strategic juncture was similar to that of 210. Macedonia, by now the Achaians' ally for a quarter of a century, was again at war with Rome, and the Achaians once again had problems with Sparta and the expansionist aspirations of its king, Nabis. But domestic political juncture in Achaia was considerably different than it had been in 210. In the decade which had passed the Achaian army, under the supervision of Philopoimen, had become a trustworthy force which allowed the Achaians not to hesitate to start a war with Sparta in 201, for the first time since 224 without Macedonian help. The first generation of pro-Macedonian leaders were extinct, having given their place to leaders like Philopoimen, whose main concern seems to have been the independent growth of Achaian power,¹ after twenty-five years of protection by –bordering on dependence from– Macedonia.² The Roman embassy on tour in mainland Greece in the spring of 200³ must have helped such Achaian leaders realize the advantages which their alliance with Rome would have.⁴

The assembly of the Achaian *koinon* in late 200,⁵ convened to discuss the war with Nabis, was attended by Philip in person. The king proposed to take over the

take over the reorganization of the *koinon* on behalf of the Macedonian king. It should be stressed once more that no evidence exists to support any of this. Moreover, nothing proves that Kykliadas was a failure as a military commander: Livy 31.52.3 only says that Philopoimen, Polybios' hero, was better. Kykliadas led the Achaian army into a victorious battle in Messenia against the Aitolians and the Eleians soon afterwards (Livy 27.33.5), apparently with no Macedonian help, as Errington himself concedes (1969: 59), as well as in the offensive in Eleia (a detail which Errington 1969: 57-58 suppresses, mentioning only the reorganized cavalry of Philopoimen, as does Plutarch [*Philop.* 7.7-9]); the latter was duly advertised as a personal victory of Kykliadas. Finally, it should be noted that the election of Kykliadas does not seem to have marked a turn in Achaian foreign policy. The *koinon* had not been neutral at the outbreak of the First Macedonian War, therefore 210 marked no change in Achaian policy towards the Macedonians (*pace* Papapostolou 1987: 99, who is perhaps influenced by the colourful but exaggerated analysis of Holleaux 1921: 225-28 on the growing disillusionment of the Achaians with the Macedonians during this period; I find Aymard 1938: 50-69 more realistic). At least officially, the Achaians were allies of the Macedonians from 224 until 199; the lack of any reference to them in the first years of the First Macedonian War is simply due to the fact that the primary theatre of operations during this period was in the north.

¹ Errington 1969: 70-98 speaks of a "new patriotism".

² This ambivalent disposition towards Macedonia may be reflected in the –probably forged (cf. Errington 1969: 70-72)– tradition on the attempted murder of Philopoimen by Philip (Plut., *Philop.* 12.2; Paus. 8.50.4; Just. 29.4.11). This tradition reflects a mutual suspicion, which, however, had not yet led to open conflict.

³ Sources and bibliography: F. W. Walbank 1967: 533-34; Gruen 1984: 392-97 (who dates the embassy earlier); Warrior 1996: 43-73; Grainger 2002: 24-29. The Roman embassy in Achaia: Polyb. 16.27.4.

⁴ For all the above developments, Aymard 1938: 41-69 is still very useful.

⁵ Perhaps late November – early December (Warrior 1996: 83).

burden of the war against the Spartan king (which had taken an ominous turn after Philopoimen's departure for Crete), in exchange for Achaian help in defending his forts at Oreos, Chalkis and Corinth (Livy 31.25.2-7). This was a transparent attempt of Philip to constrain the Achaians to maintain their alliance with Macedonia against Rome (31.25.8). In order to avoid such a commitment, Kykliadas advanced the procedural argument that the Achaians should not deliberate on an issue outside the set agenda of the assembly (31.25.9); Livy notes that he thus acted *fortiter ac libere* (31.25.10).¹ The only gain of the disillusioned king was a handful of Achaian volunteers for his cause (31.25.11).

Why did the supposedly pro-Macedonian Kykliadas, *inter adsentatores regios ante eam diem habitus* (31.25.10), not agree to assume the responsibilities emanating from the alliance of his state with Philip in such critical a moment for the Macedonian king? Is it because he foresaw the negative vote of the Achaian representatives or because he took umbrage at Philip's Machiavellian proposal, as Aymard assumed?² Or because he could neither decline nor accept Philip's offer without damaging his popularity, as Bastini argued?³ Both explanations are possible; it is, however, much simpler to take what Livy says at face value: Kykliadas, displaying sound political judgement, did not wish to see the Achaians committed to a war against Rome. It is no accident that this is precisely how the feelings of the Achaians in general were perceived by Philip.⁴ In other words, the policy favoured by Kykliadas was that of cautious neutrality, without severance of the *koinon's* ties with Macedonia.⁵ This was made clear some weeks later, when the Achaians, obviously with the consent of their general, sent an embassy to the Rhodians to convince them to accept a peace treaty with Philip.⁶ This move served Macedonian interests, and could be taken to indicate Kykliadas' pro-Macedonian stance.⁷ Nevertheless, given that a month later Kykliadas finally declined Philip's offer, it also shows the limits of the supposed pro-Macedonian feelings of Kykliadas. He tried to achieve peace with Rome, both for Achaia and Philip;⁸ when

¹ Livy, of course, writes that it was the assembly which proved *fortiter ac libere*; this does not change the fact that the praise was primarily intended for Kykliadas, otherwise the next phrase (*inter adsentatores regios ante eam diem habitus*) would be meaningless.

² Aymard 1938: 67. Errington 1969: 87 avoids offering an explanation ("Cycliadas felt unable to allow the Achaians to vote on the offer").

³ Bastini 1987: 41-43.

⁴ Polyb. 16.38: ὁρῶν τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς εὐλαβῶς διακειμένους πρὸς τὸν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων πόλεμον... The events of this passage must belong to 200/199 (F. W. Walbank 1967: 25).

⁵ Cf. Lehmann 1967: 213-14, esp. 214: "... wuchs Kykliadas bei dieser Gelegenheit über die Rolle eines Parteivertreters hinaus und stellte sein staatsmännisches Format unter Beweis".

⁶ Polyb. 16.35. The embassy reached Rhodes immediately after the fall of Abydos.

⁷ Errington 1969: 85-86 is exaggerating when he calls this embassy an "anti-Roman mission".

⁸ Cf. Lehmann 1967: 211, who presents Kykliadas as the Achaian representative mostly desiring peace in 200.

the latter chose war, Kykliadas simply did not follow. Supporters of an alliance with a king were perfectly capable of making the distinction between the king's interests and those of their homeland.

This kind of policy was not only advanced by Kykliadas. In the winter of 199/8, that is, *after* the election of Aristainos, later the leader of the pro-Roman faction and a political opponent of Kykliadas, the Achaians did not change their course. Philip elicited a sworn reconfirmation of the alliance between Achaia and Macedonia, by promising to hand over Orchomenos, Heraia (until then in Macedonian control) and Triphylia to the Achaians.¹ Once again, there is no word of a dispatch of Achaian forces to assist the Macedonian army; and Livy, who usually reproduces Polybios' information on Philip, would not have left out such an important detail. The only success of Philip was that he bought off –at a steep price– the neutrality of the Achaians.²

Soon afterwards, the Achaians banished Kykliadas.³ Unfortunately, the reasons for his banishment were analysed by Polybios in his almost wholly lost book 17,⁴ and Livy's summary account is probably misleading. He relates that the Achaians had banished Kykliadas, *principem factionis ad Philippum trahentium res*, and now were under the command of general Aristainos, *qui Romanis gentem iungi volebat*,⁵ thus implying that Kykliadas had been banished because of his pro-Macedonian

¹ Livy 32.5.4-5. For the complex discussion about whether these promises actually materialized, see Aymard 1938: 59-61 n. 53. The date is inferred from Livy (Aymard 1938: 68; Lehmann 1967: 214-15; Deininger 1971: 41; Gruen 1984: 445 n. 35; Bastini 1987: 45).

² Cf. Aymard 1938: 47, 78-79, who, while considering Kykliadas a pro-Macedonian and Philopoimen's sole opponent in 200, convincingly argues that Aristainos' policy was anti-Macedonian rather than pro-Roman until 198 (cf. Deininger 1971: 41). If we set aside modern preconceptions about organized political 'parties', we can note that the differences between the policies of Philopoimen, Kykliadas and Aristainos were not really fundamental; in one way or another, they all mostly tried to steer a careful course between the two protagonists of the war, namely, Rome and Macedonia (cf. Gruen 1984: 445 n. 35).

³ The exact date is not known (cf. Bastini 1987: 46). Deininger 1971: 41-42 n. 6 convincingly argues that Kykliadas' banishment followed the reconfirmation of the alliance between Achaia and Macedonia (winter 199/8); Aristainos probably sought to get rid of his opponent soon after his election. Lehmann 1967: 215, who dates Kykliadas' banishment in the summer of 198, without further comment, is probably misled by Livy's narrative, in which Kykliadas' banishment is mentioned retrospectively.

⁴ See Polyb. 18.1.2: Κυκλιάδας ἐκπεπωκώς ἐκ Πελοποννήσου διὰ τὰς πρότερον ὕφ' ἡμῶν εἰρημένως αἰτίας. We do not even know if Polybios judged Kykliadas negatively, as is usually assumed on the basis of Kykliadas' supposedly pro-Macedonian policy and Polybios' high opinion of Aristainos (18.13.8-11); cf. Bastini 1987: 41; Lehmann 1967: 213-14. Livy undoubtedly draws on Polybios for his description of Kykliadas' policy in 200 as *fortiter ac libere* (31.25.10); this means that the Megalopolitan historian's high opinion of Aristainos in 198 does not necessarily effect that he had a low opinion of Kykliadas.

⁵ Livy 32.19.2.

convictions.¹ Nevertheless, the aim of this passage of Livy is to explain why the Romans now had better chances to win the Achaians over to their side, not to recount the reasons behind the exile of Kykliadas. It is perfectly reasonable to assume that Kykliadas was banished because of the rivalry between the two leaders, and only secondarily because his foreign policy was of a different orientation than that of Aristainos.

Once banished, however, Kykliadas had no choice but to seek refuge by Philip. We next find him among Philip's diplomatic representatives both in the conference of Nikaia in the winter of 198/7² and after the battle of Kynos Kephalai.³ Having lost in the political game at home, he had no other choice but to seek his fortune elsewhere,⁴ namely at the royal court of which he had been a rather circumspect ally.

B44. Memnon son of Peisias of Pellene

— Livy 32.22.5-8

In the assembly of the Achaian *koinon* at Sikyon in the autumn of 198⁵ representatives of the Romans, Attalos I, the Rhodians and the Athenians tried to convince the Achaians to dissolve their alliance with Macedonia and enter into an alliance with Rome; the Romans had already offered to hand over Corinth to the Achaians in exchange.⁶ There was great ambivalence in the assembly. Even after the speech of the general Aristainos, who did not fail to make it perfectly clear to the Achaians that they had no other choice and that neutrality was no longer an option for them,⁷ five out of the ten *damiorgoi* put forward a procedural obstacle: a vote on an alliance with Rome would be contrary to the terms of the alliance with

¹ This is what most scholars assume or imply: see, for example, Aymard 1938: 68 and Bastini 1987: 46.

² Polyb. 18.1.2; Livy 32.32.10. According to Aymard 1938: 116-17 and F. W. Walbank 1967: 549, the presence of Kykliadas and Brachylles of Boiotia was due to Philip's effort to summon representatives from southern Greece as a counterpoise to the great number of Greek representatives who would testify against him.

³ Polyb. 18.34.4.

⁴ I see no reason to assume, as Aymard 1938: 168 and 176 n. 43 does, that Kykliadas returned to Achaia after Kynos Kephalai.

⁵ Livy 32.19-22; Paus. 7.8.1-2; App., *Mac.* 7; Zon. 9.16. The analysis of this assembly by Aymard 1938: 1-102 remains fundamental; cf. Deininger 1971: 42-46; Bastini 1987: 46-50. The assembly cannot be dated with greater precision; it should be noted, however, that the election of Nikostratos, general for 198/7, had not yet taken place (Aymard 1938: 80 n. 49).

⁶ Livy 32.19.5.

⁷ Livy 32.21.30-37. Aymard 1938: 92 makes an insightful observation about the speech of Aristainos (despite the objections of Lehmann 1967: 219 and Bastini 1987: 48): "... ce discours ne fait appel qu'à un unique sentiment: la peur".

Philip, hence illegal.¹ The pro-Roman *damiorgoi* won the majority of the board over (thus opening the way for the vote and, finally, for the enactment of the new alliance) in a dramatic way: Peisias,² the father of Memnon of Pellene, one of the pro-Macedonian *damiorgoi*, threatened to kill his son on the spot if the latter did not change his vote.³ This episode probably reflects a wider violent confrontation⁴ between Romans' and Philip's supporters (or, to be more precise, between those in favour and those against concluding an alliance with the Romans); the latter probably expressed the views of the majority of the Achaians.⁵ As any other source on Memnon is lacking, his role in this anti-Roman and/or pro-Macedonian faction remains unknown.

¹ Livy 32.22.3. This subterfuge reminds one of Kykliadas' attempt to stall the decision in 200 (see the preceding entry).

² Peisias is also known from a catalogue of *theorodokoi* found at Hermione (Perlman 2000: 244 n° H1 [IG IV 727A]).

³ Livy 32.22.5-8.

⁴ Cf. App., *Mac.* 7: ἐγκειμένων δὲ βιαίως τῶν ῥωμαϊζόντων, with Deininger 1971: 44 n. 17.

⁵ Deininger 1971: 44-45.

MAINLAND GREECE

MEGARIS

MEGARA

C1-6. Phokinos son of Eualkes, Aristotimos son of Menekrates, Damoteles son of Dameas, Theodoros son of Panchares, Prothymos son of Zeuxis and Timon son of Agathon

– Heath 1913: n° III; *IG VII* 1-7; for other possible sources, see the notes

I. The date of the decrees

These six Megarian generals are recorded as having held office for (at least) four consecutive years.¹ Their date depends on whether king Demetrios, officers of whom were honoured by four of the decrees enacted during their synarchy,² is to be identified with Demetrios Poliorketes or Demetrios II. Until 1942 there was a general consensus that the king in question is Poliorketes. Feyel then argued that he is in fact Demetrios II, leading to a new consensus until 1979, when it was Urban who argued again in favour of the identification of the king with Poliorketes; from then on, a new consensus has been reached.³ Regardless of the king's identity, the

¹ All these decrees were apparently inscribed on the *peribolos* wall of the Olympieion (see Kaloyéropoulou 1974: 143). The comparison with the annually elected eponymous *basileis* shows that the decrees form two distinct sets: (a) decrees recording five annually elected generals and (b) decrees recording six generals who remained in power for four consecutive years. The disposition of the decrees on the building block published by Heath 1913 (the first decree recording six generals is inscribed to the right of the decrees recording five annual generals) shows that decrees of type (a) predate those of type (b). The commonly accepted relative dating of the decrees is as follows: year 1: *IG VII* 8-11 and 3473; year 2: *IG VII* 12-13; year 3: *IG VII* 14; year 4: Heath 1913: n° I-II; year 5: Heath 1913: n° III; year 6: *IG VII* 4-6; year 7: *IG VII* 7; year 8: *IG VII* 1-3 (cf. Heath 1913: 87-88 and Rhodes 1997: 109-110; the latter's table is slightly misleading, as it places Kaloyéropoulou 1974 in a ninth year, although he admits that this is a decree erected at a different place and with no temporal relevance to the rest of the series; on its possible date, see p. 298 n. 6, below). It must be pointed out that years 1-4 are not necessarily consecutive, nor should they be necessarily placed immediately before years 5-8, which are the years under discussion. We are only (practically) certain about the fact that years 1-4 predate years 5-8.

² *IG VII* 5, 6, 1, and, probably, 4 (see p. 300 n. 2, below).

³ For the bibliography until 1942, see Feyel 1942: 86; from then on, see Feyel 1942: 85-97; Kaloyéropoulou 1974: 145-46; Ehrhardt 1975: 213-14; Étienne / Knoepfler 1976: 323-31 and Urban 1979: 66-70, who is followed by, among others, Roesch 1982: 470; Marasco 1983: 221-22; Walbank 1988: 329; Habicht 1989b: 321-22; Billows 1990: 450-51; Rhodes 1997: 111-12; Scholten 2000: 272.

fact that royal officers were honoured during the rule of six generals who remained in power for four years, rather than being annually elected, makes it clear that this was an institutional change imposed by a king who controlled the city: the synarchy of six generals ruling over Megara for at least four years was (directly or not) appointed by a Macedonian king. If the king mentioned in the decrees is Poliorketes, there are two possible dates for the synarchy: either 307-304, in the aftermath of the conquest of Megara by Poliorketes in the summer of 307,¹ or sometime during the second period of Poliorketes' rule over mainland Greece (295-287), when we know that Megara were still under Macedonian control.² If, on the other hand, the king is identified with Demetrios II, the four-year rule of the six generals probably corresponds to ca. 235-232, for reasons discussed below. In either case, it is possible that their rule extended to more than four years. Finally, it has to be noted in advance that in the fourth year of their synarchy, at the latest,³ a Macedonian garrison was established at Aigosthena, the city's port in the Gulf of Corinth.

The evidence provided by history, prosopography and letter forms for the dating of these decrees will be discussed in what follows. There is no reason to repeat Feyel's reconstruction of events, which has been abandoned for reasons independent from the dating of the decrees.⁴ Urban's main argument against Feyel's dating is that no evidence exists that Megara were conquered by the Macedonians at any point during the period between 243 (when the city was incorporated into the Achaian *koinon*)⁵ and 224 (when it joined the Boiotian *koinon* "with the consent of the Achaians"); in fact, continues Urban, the relevant passage of Polybios⁶ does not

¹ Plut., *Demetr.* 9.4-10; Diod. Sic. 20.46.3; Philochoros, *FGrHist* 328 F 66; cf. Plut., *Mor.* 5E and 475C; Diog. Laert. 2.115; for the precise date (first days of the Attic year 307/6), see p. 78 n. 4, above. The conquest of 307, despite the clemency supposedly shown by the king and highlighted in the literary sources, definitely marks the onset of the city's final decay (Meyer 1931: 195; Feyel 1942: 216 n. 3).

² Plut., *Demetr.* 39.1. Apparently, the battle of Ipsos did not change the *status quo* at Megara (cf. Plut., *Demetr.* 30.4). Since Antigonos Gonatas had to besiege the city (Phylarchos, *FGrHist* 81 F 36; Polyainos 4.6.3; Ael., *NA* 11.6 and 16.36) before or during the Chremonidean War (Heinen 1972: 170-72 opts for the latter period), Megara had regained independence sometime after 287, perhaps already by 279 (see Paus. 10.20.3-4, with Tarn 1913: 132 n. 44 and F. W. Walbank 1988: 249 n. 5).

³ *IG VII 1* (Syll^P 331).

⁴ Feyel's reconstruction is partly founded on the assumption that Aigosthena were detached from Megara and incorporated into the Boiotian *koinon* in 235/4, an assumption which has been now disproved: Aigosthena remained a *kome* of Megara until the incorporation of the city itself into the Boiotian *koinon* in 224, when they became an independent *polis*, as did Pagai, the other port of Megara (Étienne / Knoepfler 1976: 323-31).

⁵ Pol. 2.43.5; Plut., *Arat.* 24.3.

⁶ Pol. 20.6.8: Μεγαρεῖς γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐπολιτεύοντο μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἀπὸ τῶν κατ' Ἀντίγονον τὸν Γονατᾶν χρόνων· ὅτε δὲ Κλεομένης εἰς τὸν Ἴσθμὸν προεκάθισεν, διακλεισθέντες προσέθεντο τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς μετὰ τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν γνώμης.

even allow the assumption that an unrecorded Macedonian conquest of Megara ever took place during this period: according to Urban, Megara belonged to the Achaian *koinon* without interruption from 243 to 224. He does not, however, address Feyel's main argument: the fact that in 235 the forts of the Eleusinian district were, at least nominally, in the hands of the Athenians must be taken to mean that Megara were considered safe for the king, therefore under his control and certainly not under Achaian control.¹ In other words, despite the Polybian passage, the conquest of Megara by Demetrios II, contemporaneous with the invasion of Boiotia in ca. 235, should not only be unsurprising but should actually be expected. If we date the four-year synarchy at this juncture, its chronological limits are probably 235 (?) and 232 (?) –the dates are far from certain but will be used hereafter for reasons of convenience.² Urban's second argument is that, if the decrees are dated to the rule of Demetrios II, then the archons in the decrees predating the 'Macedonian' period should not be στραταγοί, but δαμιοργοί, as in another inscription of the period during which Megara were incorporated into the Achaian *koinon*.³ This is not a decisive argument either, as: 1) there is no reason to assume that the decrees predating the 'Macedonian' period should be dated *immediately* before the first year of the synarchy of the six generals; they may well date to the

¹ It is usually held that Eleusis was handed over to the Athenians precisely in 235 (see *I. Eleusis* 196 [IG II² 1299], with Habicht 1982: 57-59; Walbank 1988: 326-27; Habicht [2006]: 182). The same Attic decree and the argument used by Feyel in the case of Megara are used in order to date Demetrios II's invasion of Boiotia (Pol. 20.5.3) in 236/5. If control of Boiotia by the Macedonians was necessary in order for Eleusis to be handed over to the Athenians, control of nearby Megara was an essential precondition. I should stress that, if my analysis in Appendix 3 on the status of the Athenian generalships of the countryside and the forts of Attica is correct, Feyel's argument about Megara (and Habicht's parallel argument about Boiotia) are not as strong as previously thought: if I am correct, there probably was no clear-cut change in the status of the forts and the generalships in 235; both before and after 235, the king may have interfered in the appointment of phrourarchs, although the forts were nominally in Athenian jurisdiction. Nevertheless, Feyel's argument still holds: without possession of Megara, such a debonair respect of Athenian sovereignty by the Macedonian king in the midst of a war against a coalition of the two most powerful states of the Greek mainland is unimaginable. Moreover, dating the control of Boiotia by Demetrios in ca. 236/5 continues to make sense, regardless of the validity of Habicht's argument regarding Eleusis (cf. Scholten 2000: 272-73 n. 72).

² We know practically nothing about the calendar of Megara. If the calendars of Megarian colonies reflect calendric use in the metropolis, as is fairly probable, then the Megarian year began soon after the onset of winter (Trümpy 1997: 147-55, especially 151 n. 647 for the beginning of the year). If the conquest of Megara belongs to the Attic year 236/5 (which is plausible, but far from certain; see the previous note), year 1 of the synarchy of six generals is either 236/5 (winter to autumn) or, less likely, 235/4 (winter to autumn). In order to avoid too complicated recordings of years in what follows, I shall take Megarian 236/5 to be the first year of the synarchy and use the, roughly corresponding, Julian years (hence: year 1=235).

³ IG VII 41.

(non-Achaian) period *before* 243;¹ 2) the inscription mentioning the *damiorgoi* should not necessarily be dated to 243-224, and may in fact be later;² 3) in any case, this solitary reference to *damiorgoi* as chief magistrates cannot lead to definite conclusions, given our almost complete ignorance of the city's history in the third century. One of the secondary arguments which Urban put forward in favour of dating the decrees during the rule of Poliorketes is that the provenance of the honourands in the whole series of decrees (eastern Aegean, Asia Minor, cities of the Achaian *koinon*) does not fit the period of the Demetrian War. This, in my view, has particularly weak foundations.³

Prosopography, as we shall see in detail below,⁴ is inconclusive; dating the decrees to Poliorketes' rule may lead to more plausible identifications, but a date under Demetrios II can certainly not be excluded.

Finally, let us turn to letter forms. Feyel is the last of the scholars who commented on the date of the decrees to have actually performed an autopsy of part of the material.⁵ Neither Urban, nor scholars who follow his dating saw the inscriptions themselves.⁶ Nonetheless, Heath's and Feyel's detailed description of

¹ In fact, the more plausible reconstruction of the stemma of Damoteles' family (see p. 301 n. 4, below) corroborates the dating of these decrees prior to 243.

² Feyel 1942: 91 dated (without comments) *IG VII 41* to the next 'Achaian' period of Megara (which began in 206/5 rather than in 192; see F. W. Walbank 1979: 73-74, with earlier bibliography). This is less improbable than Urban 1979: 69 believed: Dittenberger only dated it to 243-224 because he believed that its letter forms excluded a date after 192. If, however, we accept 206/5 as the date of Megara's second incorporation into the *koinon*, as is more probable, then letter forms constitute less of a problem.

³ Urban 1979: 69-70 (followed by Billows 1990: 450-51). The presence of people from various, even distant, cities at Megara, a city of a strategic geographical position, should not be surprising. Moreover, the sample of the honourands explicitly associated with the Macedonian king is too limited to allow wider conclusions to be drawn: we have no reason to deny the possibility of an Eresian, two Erythraians and a Boiotian finding their way to the court of Demetrios II. As far as the other, 'non-royal', honourands are concerned, even the honouring of citizens of states hostile to Megara during the Demetrian War is not necessarily problematic: these men were honoured as individuals, not as representatives of their state.

⁴ The question of the identity of one of the generals predating the 'Macedonian' synarchy should be briefly dealt with here. According to Feyel 1942: 88, Dionysios son of Herodoros (general in Heath 1913: nos I-II), is to be identified with Dionysios, whose son Herodoros is recorded in an inscription of Pagai (*IG VII 215*, dated under the Boiotian archonship of Charilaos, that is, in 219, according to Étienne / Knoepfler 1976). If one accepts Urban's dating of the Megarian decrees, the general Dionysios was probably the great grandfather of Herodoros of the Pagai inscription.

⁵ He examined the block bearing the –crucial for the date– decrees Heath 1913: I-III.

⁶ In fact, Urban's only comment on letter forms is partly misleading (1979: 68): he (correctly) argues that the decree Kaloyéropoulou 1974 probably postdates the decrees under discussion. Kaloyéropoulou's dating of that decree (1974: 144) in the first half of the third century, however, cannot be correct: alphas have a straight, curved or even broken middle stroke, sigmas have parallel horizontal strokes, mus are often curved in the middle, round letters are slightly smaller

the letters could suffice to cast doubt on the dating of the decrees to Poliorkete's rule.¹ Dating by letter forms is notoriously unreliable; in this case, however, it may prove helpful in choosing between two dates seventy years apart; and Feyel has convincingly argued that the letter forms of Heath 1913: n° III are hardly possible to reconcile with a late-fourth-century date.

In sum, both historical considerations and paleography favour a date under Demetrios II, while prosopography does not exclude it. Thus, with the necessary reservations, I would suggest that the decrees date to *ca.* 235-232, that is, to the period of the Demetrian War.

II. *Leading families of Megara*

The order by which the generals are recorded in the decrees seems to be significant. During the first three years of the synarchy (years 5 to 7 of the whole series of decrees, that is, perhaps, 235-233), the order is the following: Phokinos, Aristotimos, Damoteles, Theodoros, Prothymos, Timon. In the fourth year (year 8, perhaps 232)² the order is almost the same, except that Damoteles is mentioned

than the rest and fairly pronounced serifs are evident in many letters, especially alphas (see the photograph in her p. 139). In my view, these features place the decree *after* the middle of the century. As the editor correctly points out (1974: 144), the fact that the honourand was a Boiotian means that the date is either before or after 224-205, a period when Megara was part of the Boiotian *koinon* (for the lower limit, see p. 298 n. 2, above). Since Kaloyéropoulou 1974 is later than the decrees of the Olympieion, the only problem with dating her decree to *ca.* 230-225 would be the assumption that Megara was consistently part of the Achaian *koinon* from 243 to 224, an assumption which is nonetheless hardly necessary, as we saw above. It is to be noted that Robert / Knoepfler, *BullEpiqr* 1974, 264, accept Kaloyéropoulou's dating and identify Kallias, son of Hippias, general in the proxeny decree, with the homonymous honourand of a Delphic decree of the first quarter of the third century (*FD III 1*, 169, archon Ainiselas, that is, *ca.* 290-280, according to Knoepfler; but cf. Nacthergael 1977: 219 n. 10). According to the date proposed here for the decree Kaloyéropoulou 1974, the Kallias honoured at Delphi must be the grandfather of the Megarian general Kallias.

¹ See Heath 1913: 85-86; Feyel 1942: 88-90. The block is now kept at the Archaeological Museum of Megara, where, in 2003, I was able to verify Heath's and Feyel's description (my sincere thanks are due to my friend and colleague Peter Liddel for kindly providing me with photographs of the block in 2007): most alphas have a curved middle stroke; triangular letters have slanted strokes with extensions above the letter; there are pronounced serifs throughout; sigmas usually have parallel horizontal strokes; round letters are slightly smaller than the rest. An interesting detail of editorial practice may also be of use. Already by the time *IG VII* was edited, most of the inscriptions under discussion (*IG VII* 2-4, 7, 10-14) had been lost; among the surviving inscriptions, *IG VII* 1, 5 and 6 were collated by Lolling, while Dittenberger saw a squeeze only of *IG VII* 8 and 9. These were the only inscriptions of the whole series of which the great epigraphist saw a squeeze, and are also the only inscriptions of the series which he transcribed with serifs in the *IG*. Perhaps this is why Dittenberger dated the decrees recording five generals (*IG VII* 8-14) *after* those recording six generals (*IG VII* 1-7), a dating which cannot be accepted (see p. 295 n. 1, above).

² Years 1-3 of the synarchy: Heath 1913: n° III; *IG VII* 4-7; year 4 of the synarchy: *IG VII* 1-3.

first. This variation could be due to procedural reasons (with the general responsible for proposing the decree recorded first)¹ or to a change in the correlation of power between the generals.

At least three of the persons honoured during the synarchy are explicitly said to be royal officials: in 234 (?), Kleon and Philon sons of Kleon of Erythrai were honoured for their goodwill towards Megara and their actions, which proved advantageous for the city (*IG* VII 5-6). In 232 (?), Zoilos son of Kelainos of Boiotia, phrourarch of Aigosthena, was naturalized and honoured with a golden crown (*IG* VII 1). The motivation clause is tellingly awkward: the only reason for the honours the proposer could think of was the discipline which the honourand and his soldiers had shown. Mys son of Proteas of Eresos (?) was probably another officer of Demetrios II (*IG* VII 4).² All the honourands are otherwise unknown.³

¹ This interpretation rests on an older proxeny decree of Megara (?), whose proposer (Δερκιάδας) may be one of the generals ([. . .]άδας) of that year. This inscription (Graindor 1917: 49-54 n° 30 [31]) was found at an antique shop in Athens and its later fate is unknown. Graindor attributed it to Megara mostly because Nisaia, a port of Megara, is probably mentioned in l. 13 (ll. 11-13: [τεταγμένος τε ἐπὶ τὰς] | [φ]ρουρᾶς [τὰς κατασταθείσας ἐπὶ τὰς] | Νισα[ίας ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως Ἀντιγόνου (?)], according to his own extended restoration. But the text poses many problems of interpretation. The preserved letters in the beginning of l. 13 (ΝΙΣΑ) allow many different restorations (for example, [ἐνεφά]νισα[ν], [ἐμφα]νίσα[ς], [συναγω]νισά[μενος] etc.). The language of the decree, “une sorte de κοινή βεότιenne” (see [προβεβωλε]υμένον, εἶμεν, δᾶμον), does not necessarily effect that it should be attributed to Megara, as the editor himself points out (Graindor 1917: 50). Neither do onomastics help: the only name attested in Megaris (at the then autonomous Aigosthena, second century) but not in other parts of central Greece is Kallirhoos. The names Mnasiochos, Alexos and Derkiadas are only attested in this decree, while the names Kalligeitos and Matreas are attested both in Megaris and Boiotia (see *LGN* IIIB, s.v.). The text itself makes attribution to Megara somewhat unsafe. The titles of the eponymous archon and the high officials are wholly restored, and so are the references to Megara; the name of the proposer and the phrase προβεβωλευμένον εἶμεν are unattested in the rest of Megarian decrees (the reference to the *probouleus* was standard practice in autonomous Aigosthena in the second century); the patronym of the generals is not recorded, in contrast to Megarian decrees. Incidentally, the reference to the garrison does not necessarily imply that the honourand was a phrourarch appointed by a foreign king. In conclusion, although the attribution of this decree to Megara and Graindor's restorations remain perhaps possible, I would greatly hesitate to use this decree as a source for the history of Megara. Both Graindor 1917: 54 and Feysel 1942: 102 n. 2 (who accepts Graindor's restoration with many reservations) date the decree under Gonatas rather than under Doson, because of the letter forms. The mediocre quality of the photographs of the squeeze published by Graindor and the obviously bad quality of the engraving itself allow no certainty.

² The body of the text does not connect Mys with king Demetrios. In l. 1, however, there are traces of a phrase ending with διατρίβων, which may mean that the author of the text did not initially wish to state that Mys belonged to the royal administration (or that the engraver simply forgot to engrave this part of the text) and that the phrase was added later (cf. Billows 1990: 406 n° 76, with Dittenberger's objections in the comments of the *IG*).

³ Marasco 1983: 221-22 identifies Zoilos son of Kelainos of Boiotia, phrourarch of Aigosthena, with a Zoilos mentioned by Plutarch (*Demetr.* 21.5) in the context of the siege of Rhodes. Even if

Among the generals, Aristotimos and Prothymos are otherwise unknown. Phokinos son of Eualkes is probably the grandson of Phokinos of Megara, who was honoured as *proxenos* at Delphi in the early third century,¹ and perhaps a descendant of Phokinos (no ethnic), who was honoured as *proxenos* at Athens in 340/39.² In the same year for which Damoteles is named first in the list of generals (232), his son Dameas became secretary of the people;³ the leader of the city apparently introduced his son to the political scene. Other members of the same family include Dameas son of Matrokles, a former general of Megara, and Matrokles son of Damoteles, honoured at Delphi in the first quarter of the third century.⁴ Timon

we accepted the dating of the decree under Poliorketes, this identification is highly implausible. To begin with, Zoilos in Plutarch's text is apparently a Cypriot, as Billows 1990: 442-43 n° 124 convincingly argues; but even if he was not a Cypriot, he certainly was a craftsman (he manufactured sturdy armour suits), which means that, by ancient social standards, he would not have made a suitable candidate for the leadership of the garrison of such an important port.

¹ SEG 2 (1924) 255. For those who date the decrees under Poliorketes the two men are one and the same, hence the patronym of the honourand at Delphi is (wholly) restored as Eualkes. According to a rather hypothetical theory advanced by Reinach, this Phokinos was also honoured with Athenian citizenship in the end of the fourth century, on the proposal of Stratokles; he based this theory on the fact that an ephebe named [Eua]lkes son of Phokinos, with a restored demotic (Δ[ιομειεύς]), is attested in the mid-240's, which would make him a fellow demesman of Stratokles (IG II² 766 + SEG 21 [1965] 392 with comments by Osborne 1983: 86, T92 and Habicht 1989b: 321-22). Even if we accept this theory, it is perfectly compatible with the dating proposed here for the Megarian decrees: the ancestor of Eualkes (?) son of Phokinos of Diomeia (?) could be the Phokinos who was honoured at Delphi, irrespective of when the homonymous general of Megara is dated. If the dating proposed here is followed, the fact that Eualkes was a resident of Athens soon before Phokinos became general of Megara hardly poses a problem: the two could belong to different branches of the family. In any case, it has to be noted that the prosopographical data of the family of Phokinos, although in no way preclude the dating of the decrees under Demetrios II, constitute the only prosopographical evidence in favour of dating the decrees under Poliorketes, as Habicht points out.

² IG II² 231.

³ IG VII 1-3.

⁴ IG VII 8-11 and 3473 (Dameas); FD III 1, 169 (Matrokles; on the uncertainty of the date, see Nachtergaele 1977: 297 n. 10, with earlier bibliography). According to Urban 1979: 68 n. 324 the secretary Dameas son of Damoteles and Matrokles son of Damoteles were brothers, and their respective sons were the generals Damoteles and Dameas; this stemma appears attractive but –even if one accepted the dating of the decrees under Poliorketes– does not observe the chronological order of the proxeny decrees (see p. 295 n. 1, above), according to which it is clear that the secretary Dameas son of Damoteles must be the son and not the father (as in Urban's stemma) of the general Damoteles son of Dameas. If we assume that year 1 of the series of proxeny decrees and the first year of the four 'Macedonian' years (= year 5 of the series of proxeny decrees) stand apart at some distance (a perfectly plausible assumption; see again p. 295 n. 1, above), a possible stemma of the family would be: Matrokles → Damoteles son of Matrokles (FD III 1, 169) → Matrokles son of Damoteles (*proxenos* of Delphi, first quarter of the third century, FD III 1, 169) → Dameas son of Matrokles (general of Megara, early second half of the third century [?], IG VII 8-

was the offspring of a family also honoured at Delphi.¹ Perhaps more significant is the fact that the generals Timon son of Agathon (certainly) and Theodoros son of Pancharas (probably) are the fathers of Agathon son of Timon and Thokles son of Theodoros respectively, generals of Megara, attested in a later proxeny decree.² The fact that the city's supreme office was held by members of the same families before, during, as well as after the period of Macedonian domination testifies to the –expected– high social status of the generals who rose to power with the consent –to say the least– of the Macedonian king, but also to the enhanced status with which their alliance with the king provided them, regardless of the vicissitudes of the city's changing alliances.³

11 and 3473) → Damoteles son of Dameas (general of Megara, 235-232 [?], Heath 1913: n° III; *IG* VII 1-7) → Dameas son of Damoteles (secretary of the people, 232 [?], *IG* VII 1-3).

¹ A Timon son of Agathon was honoured at Delphi during the archonship of Herakleidas (*FD* III 1, 181). The date is uncertain, as three archons of that name are known: one in 315-280 (probably towards the end of that period), one in 274/3, and one perhaps in 220-210 (Daux 1943: F21, G6 and K20 respectively; on Herakleidas III, see Oulhen 1998: 221-22). The archon of *FD* III 1, 181 is usually assumed to be Herakleidas I, which would once again mean that the honourend at Delphi and the general of Megara are one and the same. See, however, the reservations of Feyel 1942: 89-90 (who mistakenly attributes the Delphic decree to Herakleidas III) and Daux 1943: 29, 34, who believes that it is equally possible that he is Herakleidas II, as Bourguet had assumed in his edition of the inscription (with different dates).

² Kaloyéropoulou 1974: 140, l. 6 (for the date [230-225?], see p. 298 n. 6, above).

³ This conclusion is not only valid for the six generals of the 'Macedonian' period. Diokleidas son of Pyrrhos, emissary of Antigonos Doson (rather than Gonatas) to Amorgos (*IG* XII 7, 221b; for the date, see **D53**, below) is obviously the son of Pyrrhos son of Diokleidas, general of Megara sometime before 235 (Heath 1913: n° I-II; Urban 1979: 68 n. 324, because of his dating of the Megarian decrees in the fourth century, is forced to assume that the emissary of Antigonos is the son of the general, and that the Antigonos in question is Antigonos Gonatas, which is the least likely solution: see again **D53**, below). If my datings are accepted, they would effect that the son of the general of Megara took advantage of the Megarian elite's ties with the Macedonian court in order to enter the royal administration.

BOIOTIA

OROPOS

C7. Amphidemos son of Amphimedēs

– *I. Orop.* 4-6 (*IG VII* 4256-4257 and *SEG* 15 [1958] 264 respectively)

Amphidemos¹ was a polemarch (the annual highest-ranking political archon) of Oropos and a proposer of three honorific decrees (*I. Orop.* 4-6) for four Macedonians. The three decrees date to the same year, to a period when Oropos belonged to the Boiotian *koinon*.² Oropos had been an apple of discord between Boiotians and Athenians for centuries. In 322, most probably, it gained independence from Athens, since in Polyperchon's decree in 319 it is dictated that "the Oropians shall continue to possess Oropos as they now do". This independence was maintained until 313, when Kassandros conquered the city; soon afterwards, Polemaios, general of Antigonos the One-Eyed, ousted Kassandros' garrison and "handed over" (παρέδωκε) the city to the Boiotians. This 'Boiotian phase' in the history of Oropos lasted until 303, when it was once again given to the Athenians by Poliorketes, along with other forts of Attica, which Kassandros had occupied a year earlier.³ Since letter forms seem to date the decrees to the late fourth century, their date must be 313-303.

The laconic motivation clause –a usual phenomenon in Boiotian honorific decrees– gives us only general information on the honourands. Moreover, none of the four honourands is otherwise securely attested in other sources, although Alkanor son of Arkesilaos (*I. Orop.* 5) could perhaps be the son of the satrap of Mesopotamia after the settlement at Babylon in 323.⁴ In any case, the fact that four Macedonians were honoured in the same year, not only as *proxenoi* and benefactors, with tax exemption, right of ownership, *asylia* and safety, but also with naturalization –an honour which is never attested in the decrees of the *koinon*, is

¹ Few and uncertain traces of his family can be detected. Kratylos son of Amphidamos, ἀφειδρι-ατεύων of the *koinon* in the archonship of Triax (*IG VII* 2724a; on the date, cf. Feyel 1942: 73; Knoepfler 1992: 450-51) was probably his son. This Kratylos may be identified with the Kratylos who was responsible for the rebuilding of the walls of Oropos (*I. Orop.* 302) soon after 295.

² On the polemarchs of the Boiotian *koinon*, especially in the third century, see Roesch 1965: 162-76. Petrakos dates the decrees in the period of Oropos' independence (322-313), although in his comments he refers to the view that the presence of polemarchs points to a period when Oropos was part of the *koinon*. It is to be noted that polemarchs in the cities of the Boiotian *koinon* did not normally propose decrees, at least not in the third century (Roesch 1965: 168-69). Dating all three decrees to the same year is obligatory, as the other two polemarchs and the eponymous priest of Amphiaraios are also the same in all three decrees.

³ Polyperchon's decree: Diod. Sic. 18.56.6 (Ὀρωπὸν δὲ Ὀρωπίου ἐχρεῖν καθάπερ νῦν; cf. Knoepfler 2001: 377); Kassandros: Diod. Sic. 19.77.6; Polemaios: Diod. Sic. 19.78.3; Kassandros, Poliorketes and handing Oropos over to the Athenians: *SEG* 36 (1986) 165, ll. 19-22; *ISE* 8; cf. **A19** (III), above.

⁴ Diod. Sic. 18.3.3; Just. 13.4.23; Dexippos, *FGrHist* 100 F 8; cf. Tataki 1998: 265 n° 278.

extremely rare in the decrees of Boiotian cities, and only three more times attested in Oropos—¹ allows us to safely assume that the honourands were officers of Polemaios, honoured soon after the events of 313.

The gratitude of Oropos was obviously due to the removal of Kassandros' garrison. It would be interesting to know whether the Oropians themselves consented to the inclusion of their city in the Boiotian *koinon* or whether this was simply agreed upon by Antigonos and the Boiotians. The fact that the Oropians erected a statue of P(e)isis of Thespias, commander of the Boiotian contingent which fought by the side of Polemaios,² does not necessarily prove a pro-Boiotian attitude on their part; it is merely the equivalent of the honours for the other occupying force, the Macedonians. In both cases, the leaders of the city were more or less obliged to praise and honour their new 'liberators'.

C8. Aristomenes son of Meilichos

— *I. Orop.* 57 (cf. *I. Orop.* 83; 59 [?]; *Syll*³ 519)

Aristomenes proposed a proxeny decree of Oropos (*I. Orop.* 57) for Autokles son of Ainesidemos of Chalkis; although this is not indicated by the decree, there is no doubt that the honourand is the homonymous *philos* of Demetrios II, also honoured as *proxenos* at Delos.³ The decree should not be necessarily dated during the reign of Demetrios;⁴ there is no reason not to assume that Autokles remained at the service of Doson or even Philip V, and, in fact, the most reasonable dating of the priest of Amphiaraios Spintharos, by whose priesthood the decree is dated, seems to point to a date later than the reign of Demetrios II.⁵

¹ I know of no case of naturalization by a federal Boiotian decree; cf. Roesch 1982: 303, who erroneously writes that naturalizations by decrees of Boiotian cities are also unknown. Naturalizations by Boiotian cities: Haliartos: *SEG* 28 (1978) 453 (ca. 300-280); Oropos: *I. Orop.* 14 (first half of the third century); 162-163 (last quarter of the third century). According to Feyel 1942: 285-300, *IG* VII 2433, a catalogue found at Thebes is a catalogue of new citizens naturalized at the request of Philip V, and the many erasures of the inscription are a testimony of the city's reluctance to accept the inclusion in the body politic of all those whose inclusion the king demanded. If this theory is accepted, it would offer additional evidence for the reluctance of Boiotians to grant naturalizations.

² *I. Orop.* 366; on Peisis, see **C15**, below.

³ *IG* XI 4, 679-680. His son Autokles son of Autokles was also honoured as *proxenos* at Delos (*IG* XI 4, 681-682; cf. 1194). On the family, cf. also Étienne / Knoepfler 1976: 297-99; Le Bohec 1985: 102 n° 1 with earlier bibliography.

⁴ Pace Étienne / Knoepfler 1976: 296-300, especially 298 n. 119, where they show that the decree *could* be dated during the reign of Demetrios II, but not that it *has to be* dated then, as they write in their text (p. 299).

⁵ Étienne / Knoepfler 1976: 299-300 realize the awkwardness of placing Spintharos in 239-229 when they admit that the archon Charidamos, who predates the priesthood of Spintharos, should be placed not too far from 215-208 (hence the old dating of Spintharos by Feyel and Roesch in ca. 220-206; Feyel 1942: 49; Roesch 1965: 89). In other words, a date for Spintharos under Philip V seems more likely. As we do not know the archons corresponding to the priests of the group of

To the same conclusion point the rest of the attestations of Aristomenes and his family.¹ Aristomenes proposed at least one more proxeny decree,² and was one of the Boiotian hostages the Achaians asked for in the context of the alliance between Achaia, Boiotia and Phokis (before 224, perhaps in 228 or, rather, 227).³ In other words, his activity in the 220's is the only datable period of his career. We have plenty of evidence on his family, however, apparently one of the most important families of Oropos in the last quarter of the third century. His father, Meilichos son of Aristogeiton, proposed a proxeny decree for Herakleitos son of Euandros of Kassandreia in ca. 230-225.⁴ Three brothers of Aristomenes are known. Aristogeiton son of Meilichos was the president of the assembly which enacted the honours for Menippos son of Kratippos of Pergamon, friend of Attalos I (?).⁵ Kleomachos son of Meilichos may be identical with Kleomachos, priest of Amphiaraos in 224 (?);⁶

Spintharos (see Étienne / Knoepfler 1976: 297 n. 116 and 299 n. 121), dating Spintharos' priesthood later does not significantly change the chronological scheme of Étienne / Knoepfler. On the basis of all available evidence on Boiotian archons and priests, and without any changes to Étienne's and Knoepfler's chronological scheme, we can say that Spintharos certainly dates before 202 and probably before 216, but not long before that, hence more likely in the reign of Doson or the first years of the reign of Philip, rather than in the reign of Demetrios II. It should be noted that Knoepfler 2003: 93-94 takes for granted both a date of *I. Orop.* 57 in the reign of Demetrios II and a date for Spintharos in ca. 230, giving the impression that these are two independent chronological indications, while, in fact, the latter depends on the former.

¹ Cf. Knoepfler 2003: 93-94.

² *I. Orop.* 83 (undatable), which honours Apollothemis son of Praxidas of Byzantion. The restoration of the name Aristomenes in *I. Orop.* 59 (also dated under Spintharos) as the name of the proposer by Petrakos is bold (only the first letter of the proposer's name is preserved) but not improbable.

³ *Syll*³ 519; cf. *IG IX* 1, 98 and, for the date, Feyer 1942: 123-25; Roesch 1982: 359-67; Knoepfler 2003: 99-105.

⁴ *I. Orop.* 71, dated by the archon Philon (in what follows, the dates of the archons of the Boiotian *koinon* follow Étienne / Knoepfler 1976: 264-350, with the slight modifications of Knoepfler 1992: 425-29, unless otherwise stated). The honourand of this decree is otherwise unknown, hence it is not necessary to consider him a Macedonian officer. It should be noted, however, that one of the three ambassadors of Philip V to Hannibal was also called Herakleitos (Livy 23.39.3); a Boiotian (Kriton) was another member of the same embassy. [Μείλιχος Ἀριστογεΐτονος, who proposed a decree in 205 (?)] (*I. Orop.* 177, archon Dionysios), is rather difficult to identify with the father of Aristomenes (cf. *LGPN* IIIB, where the two are tentatively distinguished and Petrakos' comments on *I. Orop.* 71, where he does not mention *I. Orop.* 177): in 230-225, Meilichos, Aristomenes' father, must have been of mature age, since his son was politically active, and it does not seem probable that he was still alive thirty years later. On the contrary, there is no reason to doubt that Meilichos son of Aristogeiton of *I. Orop.* 71 is the father of Aristomenes, Aristogeiton and Lysandros sons of Meilichos, as Knoepfler 2003: 95 does; the fact that he is attested simultaneously with his sons is hardly problematic.

⁵ *I. Orop.* 107; see the following entry.

⁶ *I. Orop.* 75-77 (Knoepfler 2003: 94 has some justified reservations about this plausible identification). In n° 76 the Oropians honoured Διονύσιον Ἡρακλεί[[του ---]. The honourand's

either way, he proposed two proxeny decrees for Phokians of Elateia in the end of the century¹ and was also honoured as *proxenos* by Elateia in the same period;² the family's ties with Phokis are obviously related to the diplomatic activity of Aristomenes there in the 220's. Finally, Lysandros son of Meilichos proposed an undatable proxeny decree of the *koinon* and an equally undatable proxeny decree of Oropos.³ He also presided at the assembly of the *koinon* which enacted three proxeny decrees under Pampeirichos (shortly before 224), and held the office of archon of Oropos probably in the early second century.⁴ This short survey shows that no attestation of Aristomenes, his brothers, or even of his father, can be securely dated as early as the reign of Demetrios II.

Thus, we cannot define the precise historical context of the honouring of the Macedonian official which Aristomenes proposed. It could date from the reign of Demetrios II, Antigonos Doson or, perhaps more probably, from the beginning of the reign of Philip V. Fortunately, this is of no central importance to the purposes of this study. From the time of the Demetrian War, when the presence of the Macedonian army in the area led to the alliance between Boiotia and Macedonia⁵ and up until the end of the century, relations between the two states varied from tense (229-227) or amiable neutrality (227-224 and 221 onwards, despite the formal alliance after 224) to full cooperation (224-222);⁶ accordingly, the honouring of a

ethnic should have eight to eleven letters (l. 6 –the line in question– has 34 letters plus the missing ones, l. 5 has 42, l. 7 has 45, if Leonardos' restorations are correct). Should we restore Διονύσιον Ἡρακλεί[του Κασσανδρέα], and assume that the honourend is the son of Herakleitos, whose honorific decree Meilichos, father of Kleomachos, proposed (*I. Orop.* 71)?

¹ *I. Orop.* 176 (archon Dionysios, 205 [?]) and 186-187 (archon Straton, 204 or slightly later).

² *IG IX 1*, 100. Petrakos (*I. Orop.*, p. 140) claims that honours for Elateians at Oropos and honours for Kleomachos at Elateia were enacted in the same year. Gennaios, one of the honourends of Kleomachos' decrees (*I. Orop.* 186) must be identified with Gennaios, eponymous of Elateia in the decree that honours Kleomachos; this does not mean, however, that the two decrees fall necessarily in the same year.

³ *I. Orop.* 49 (archon Antigon) and *I. Orop.* 52 accordingly. Contrary to the *communis opinio*, Knoepfler 1992: 454 n° 81 correctly saw that *I. Orop.* 303 (archon Potidaichos), an important decree on the reconstruction of the city walls of Oropos which was also enacted on the proposal of a Lysandros son of Meilichos, cannot belong to the 220's and should be dated, on account of its letter forms, to the first quarter of the third century (ca. 285?). This means that Lysandros son of Meilichos of *I. Orop.* 303 was an ancestor of this important family.

⁴ *I. Orop.* 35, 36, 37 (president of the assembly); *I. Orop.* 325 and 506 (archon).

⁵ Polyb. 20.5.3.

⁶ This is not the place to discuss the history of Boiotia in this period (cf. still Feyel 1942: 83-180, although his chronology and some of his conclusions have been significantly modified since). For the period 229-227, see **C20-22**, below. For the date of the official alliance between the two states, not long before 224, see Feyel 1942: 127-30. Boiotia then entered the Greek Alliance of Doson (Polyb. 4.9.4 and 4.15.1) and the Boiotian contingent in the battle of Sellasia (Polyb. 2.65.4) was the largest Allied contingent next to the one of the Achaians; according to Feyel 1942: 131, it represented 1/6 of the total forces which the Boiotian *koinon* could muster.

Macedonian official could have been decreed under the reign of any of these three kings.

Nonetheless, it is important to remark that, once again, it was a member of a leading local family who handled the official procedure (if not the underlying political relationship as well) for the honours for a representative of royal power. As usual, such a leading family was by default interested in diplomacy, whether its members served as hostages in Achaia, proposed proxeny decrees for Phokians or honoured Macedonian officials.

C9. Dionysodoros son of Soter

— *I. Orop.* 107 (*IG VII* 387)

Dionysodoros proposed a proxeny decree for Menippos son of Kratippos of Pergamon, who “having resided at the city, conducted himself in a manner worthy both of himself and of the king’s will”.¹ The honouree’s origin undoubtedly means that the king in question was an Attalid king, most probably Attalos I; in that case the decree should probably be dated in the 210’s.² This date is also plausible for historical reasons: it would be difficult to envisage friendly relations between Attalos and the Boiotians after 210, when Attalos was an ally of the Romans, who were enemies of Philip, himself an ally of the Boiotians –officially, at least. In 208 the tension between Attalos and Boiotia was so high that the Boiotians were afraid of an imminent Attalid invasion.³ Only after 197, when the Boiotians officially entered the pro-Roman alliance,⁴ would a relationship with the Attalids have been feasible again.

Nonetheless, Attalid interest in Boiotia goes back to the times of the dynasty’s founder, Philetairos. We know of Philetairos’ donations to Thespiiai, and of a dedication of Philetairos’ brother, Eumenes, at Oropos.⁵ These donations, of course, belong to the realm of cultural propaganda and benefaction and should not be

Boiotia, however, does not seem to have taken part in the Social War (Feyel 1942: 136-47) and the neutral stance of the Boiotians was maintained until 208, when they asked for Philip’s help, for fear of an attack by the Romans and Attalos I (Polyb. 10.42.2). In 205, Boiotia was still mentioned as an ally of Macedonia in the treaty of Phoinike (Livy 29.12.14). Nevertheless, the Boiotians maintained solid relations with the Ptolemies (see **C10**, below).

¹ *I. Orop.* 107, ll. 5-6: ἐπιδημήσας τε ἀνεστ[ράφη] ἀξίω[ς μὲν] αὐτοῦ, ἀξίως δὲ τῆς τοῦ βασιλέ-[ω]ς αἰρ[έσεως]. The inscription is engraved on the front face of a statue base of the king.

² The president of the assembly which enacted the decree was Aristogeiton son of Meilichos, whose activity belongs to the last thirty years of the third century, as we saw in the preceding entry. The decree is older than *I. Orop.* 108 (inscribed on the same face of the base), which is dated by the priesthood of Olympichos, who is slightly later than Spintharos (Étienne / Knoepfler 1976: 297 n. 116; Petrakos *ad I. Orop.* 111), on whom see p. 304 n. 5, above.

³ Polyb. 10.42.2.

⁴ Livy 33.1-2.

⁵ Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n^{os} 86-89 and *I. Orop.* 388 respectively.

taken to imply strategic motives. The same is probably true for Attalos I, whose policy of making various benefactions to the old cultural centres of the Greek mainland (Athens, Delphi, Delos) is well attested.¹

Dionysodoros is otherwise unknown.²

C10. Neandros son of Neandrides

— *I. Orop.* 175 (*IG VII* 298; *OGIS* 81; Kotsidu 2000: n° 82 E)

Neandros proposed a proxeny decree of Oropos for Phormion son of Nymphaios of Byzantion, enacted in the (federal) archonship of Dionysios, in 205 (?) (*I. Orop.* 175). The uncharacteristically, for Boiotian standards, detailed motivation clause informs us that the honourend had given proof of his goodwill towards the city even before he entered the service of Ptolemy IV (ll. 7-8) and that “now, by the side of king Ptolemy, he often speaks to the interest of the city (ll. 9-10: νῦν παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ Πτολεμαίῳ πολλ[οὺς καὶ] συμφέροντας λόγους ποιεῖται ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεω[ς]). The honourend is otherwise unknown,³ but Nymphaios son of Athenaios of Byzantion, honoured as *proxenos* by the Tenians,⁴ was probably his father, and Nympho daughter of Nymph(a)ios, *kanephoros* at Alexandria in 220/19 and 219/18,⁵ was probably his sister. Although the reasons for his honouring are hardly specific, Phormion received the highest honours save for naturalization: presidency at the games is only attested in this decree, while priority access to the council and the assembly was an equally rarely bestowed honour.⁶ The proposer himself is otherwise unknown as well, but Aristonous son of Neandrides, who proposed another decree in 215-205,⁷ was possibly his brother.

Official relations of the *koinon* with the Ptolemaic court are probably attested for the first time during the reign of Ptolemy IV Philopator. The only possible exception⁸ is the honouring of Sosibios son of Dioskourides by Tanagra and

¹ See Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n°s 26-27 (Athens), 91-92 (Delphi), 172-175 (Delos).

² In *LGNP* III B (Διονυσόδωρος n° 14), he is erroneously dated to the end of the second century.

³ See *ProsPtol* 14635.

⁴ *IG XII* 5, 802 (cf. Rigsby 1996: 163).

⁵ Ijsewijn 1961: 83-84 n° 68.

⁶ See the comments of Petrakos.

⁷ *I. Orop.* 125 (archon Hipparchos).

⁸ According to Chaniotis' suggestion (*SEG* 47 [1997] 490), the honourend of the proxeny decree of Oropos *I. Orop.* 148 was probably Artemidoros son of Artemidoros of Perge, an officer of Ptolemy III, known until now exclusively from inscriptions of Thera (*IG XII* 3, 421-422; *IG XII* 3 *Suppl.* 1333-1350; *ProsPtol* 15188). The possible stations of his long career were Perge, Alexandria, Miletos, Tenos, Thera (on his career and on his *temenos* at Thera, see Palagia 1992, with earlier bibliography). At Thera he held no office (Bagnall 1976: 134); apparently he settled there after the end of his service and stayed there until his death at a very advanced age. The fact that his presence at Thera is connected with his retirement, and the lack of any reference to the Ptolemies in the decree of Oropos, raises serious doubts as to whether his honouring at Oropos should be taken as an indication that any sort of relations existed between Oropos or the Boiotians and

Orchomenos,¹ but, although Sosibios was a high-ranking official of the Ptolemaic administration already by the mid-240's, the fact that he was the most powerful courtier of Philopator along with Agathokles,² renders a date under Philopator more probable than a date under Euergetes.³ The aforementioned decree of Oropos is inscribed on a base which supported the statues of Philopator and queen Arsinoe, erected shortly after their wedding in 220.⁴ In 213 a Boiotian *theoros* died in Alexandria.⁵ Finally,⁶ Ptolemaic donations in Boiotia are attested at Oropos itself (a gold phiale was dedicated by Philopator and recorded in a later inventory of the Amphiaraeion),⁷ and, mainly, at Thespiai, where Philopator and Arsinoe financed the Mouseia and were accordingly honoured.⁸

These contacts are explained by Philopator's overarching objective for the Greek mainland: peace. The first Ptolemaic attempt at pacification dates from 217,

the Ptolemaic court. The Amphiaraeion at Oropos was one of the most respected sanctuaries of the Greek world, and Artemidoros, whose piety is abundantly attested by the Theraian evidence, most probably visited it as a private pilgrim, not as an unofficial representative of the Ptolemaic administration.

¹ IG VII 507 (OGIS 80) and 3166 respectively.

² On Sosibios, see *ProsPtol* 17239 and Olshausen 1974: 43-45 n° 24.

³ Feyel 1942: 258 (followed by Huß 1976: 125) takes the date under Philopator for granted, and assumes that Sosibios was the architect of the policy of attracting the Boiotians through benefaction. The editors of *LGPN* IIIB apparently date the inscription of Tanagra under Euergetes and the inscription from Orchomenos under Philopator (see s.v. Εὐξίθιος n° 4; Μειλίων n° 1 [Tanagra]; Ἀριστόδαμος n° 12; Εὐδικός n° 2 [Orchomenos]); given that the local archons are otherwise unknown, I fail to see the reason behind the distinction. The presence of a patronymic adjective in the decree of Orchomenos (Ἀριστοδάμω Μνασιγενεῖω ἄρχοντος) cannot provide a *terminus ante quem* either: Étienne / Knoepfler 1976: 271 have observed that patronymic adjectives occasionally appear even after 220. Given that no other chronological indication exists, I believe that it is safer to assume a date under Philopator, when Sosibios was most powerful and when relations between the two states are attested in a number of sources.

⁴ *I. Orop.* 427. That there was a statue of Philopator as well is confirmed by the decree for Phormion (ll. 25-26). On the date of the wedding, see Hölbl 1994: 111, with bibliography.

⁵ SEG 24 (1969) 1180 (see **C23**, below).

⁶ It should be noted that a victory by a Ptolemy Philopator at the Basileia of Lebadeia (*Nouveaux Choix* 22) certainly does not belong to the reign of Ptolemy IV, *pace* Huß 1976: 121-25 (see already Holleaux, *Études* I 135-42 and pl. III and Étienne / Knoepfler 1976: 246-50 [who could not have known Huß's arguments]).

⁷ *I. Orop.* 325, l. 59. Ameling (Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 79) misinterprets Keil 1890: 606-608, who merely recognized the temporal proximity between the catalogue (Lysandros son of Meilichos being the archon at Oropos) and the decree for Phormion (Dionysios being the archon of the *koinon*), and writes that the inventory and the decree are dated by the same archon and thus belong to the same year. Lysandros' archonship at Oropos cannot be dated more accurately than it has been dated by Petrakos (late third – early second century; *I. Orop.* 325 and 506). Even if the inventory postdates Philopator's death, however, the dedication of the phiale is still to be ascribed to him, as the inventory records past dedications.

⁸ See **C16-18**, below.

when emissaries from Alexandria were part of the second attempt of various states to mediate between Philip V and the Aitolians in order to bring the Social War to an end.¹ The second Ptolemaic attempt dates from 209–206, when, once again, the Ptolemies collaborated with a number of states to achieve peace between Philip and the Aitolians during the First Macedonian War.² The strategic motives behind the attempt of Philopator's court to bring peace to the Greek mainland and to attract neutral powers –such as Boiotia and Athens– as allies have long been debated.³ Perhaps the theory put forward by Huß (which is actually a combination of earlier assumptions) is the more attractive one, although it is as hypothetical as any other theory advanced to date: the aim of the Alexandrian court was probably to bring peace to the Greek mainland so as to be able to attract Philip V as an ally against Antiochos III, without allowing him to become so powerful as to pose a danger to Ptolemaic interests.⁴

Regarding Boiotian motives, there is no reason to seek for any real strategic plan. Although formally allies of Philip until the Second Macedonian War, the Boiotians remained neutral during the Social War and probably had no involvement in the First Macedonian War before 208.⁵ They therefore had no reason not to accept Ptolemaic donations. This type of relationship did not affect their relation with Philip, as long as it remained on the level of euergetism. At the treaty of Phoinike in 205 the Boiotians were still *foederi adscripti* of Macedonia.⁶

C11. Philonautes (?)

– [Φ]ίλον[αύτης ---]: *I. Orop.* 199

Philonautes is the proposer of another third-century proxeny decree of Oropos. The honourand, [---]γης Σωά[νδρου ---] (*I. Orop.* 199, ll. 2–3) was a *philos* of a king, most probably a king of the Macedonians.⁷ If the proposer is to be identified with

¹ Polyb. 5.100.9; cf. Ager 1996: 145–47 n° 53; Magnetto 1997: 322–28 n° 52. Philip had just conquered Phthiotic Thebes, which means that Ptolemaic representatives were in Boiotia's vicinity.

² Ager 1996: 157–61 n° 57; Magnetto 1997: 349–59 n° 56. In 209 the representatives met Philip at Phalara (Livy 27.30.4), in 208 at Elateia (Livy 28.7.13), and in 207 they visited Aitolia (App., *Mac.* 3.1); in all three cases they were again very close to Boiotia.

³ Apart from the bibliography cited by Ager and Magnetto (see the two preceding notes), see Eckstein 2002 (on the First Macedonian War).

⁴ See Huß 1976: 129–31.

⁵ See p. 306 n. 6, above.

⁶ Livy 29.12.14.

⁷ Given that the first letter of the other lines of this *stoichedon* text is not preserved, the first letter of the third line may be a T instead of a Γ. Two photographs of the stone that Prof. Petrakos had the kindness to send to me do not invalidate this assumption: the surface of the stone to the left of the point of contact between the horizontal and vertical stroke of the letter is broken, and the width of other letters, especially the sigma, allows the assumption that this may be the right part of a T (I must point out that both Prof. Petrakos and Leonardos, who, as Prof. Petrakos

Philonautes son of Hermogenes, or if he was related to him, then he was related to the family of Kalligeiton, one of the most important families of the city during the second half of the third and the first half of the second century.¹

C12. [--- ---]os

— *I. Orop.* 239

Proposer of an Oropian proxeny decree of the second half of the third century.² The small surviving fragment mentions honours for [--- ---]μωνος, [διατριβῶν] παρὰ τῷ βασι[[λεῖ ---]. The king is most probably a king of Macedonia, but we can go no further.

TANAGRA

C13. Meilion son of Aphroditos

— Μειλίων Ἀφροδίτω: *IG VII 507 (OGIS 80)*

Meilion is the otherwise unknown proposer of a proxeny decree for Sosibios son of Dioskourides, the powerful courtier of Ptolemy IV Philopator. On the relations between Boiotia and the Ptolemies and on the date of the decree, see **C10**, above.

ORCHOMENOS

C14. Eudikos son of Thion

— *IG VII 3166*

Eudikos is the otherwise unknown proposer of a proxeny decree for Sosibios son of Dioskourides. On the relations between Boiotia and the Ptolemies and on the date of the decree, see **C10**, above. Another Alexandrian was honoured as *proxenos* at Orchomenos, roughly in the same period (*IG VII 3167*).

informed me, had studied the inscription more than once, believe that it is more likely that the letter is a gamma). The rare name Soandros is attested once again at Oropos, in an epitaph of the second or first century (*I. Orop.* 688). The deceased is called Soandros son of Sokrates. Could the honourand of our decree be [Σωκρά]της Σωά[νδρου], an ancestor of the deceased in *I. Orop.* 688? The latter has no ethnic, hence could be an Oropian, but this does not mean that the honourand of the third century was an Oropian as well, as the vast majority of honorific decrees of the Amphiaraeion are proxeny decrees and therefore honour foreigners.

¹ See *I. Orop.* 428-429, with the sources which Petrakos cites. It is interesting that another member of the family proposed honours for a Macedonian (*I. Orop.* 98).

² Petrakos (*I. Orop.* 239) dates the decree to the third century in general. The letter forms (see his pl. 16: alpha has a curved or broken middle stroke, tau and other letters have pronounced serifs) probably do not allow a date before the middle of the century.

THESPIAI

C15. P(e)isis son of Charias

— Plut., *Demetr.* 39.1-5; *I. Orop.* 366 (*IG VII 427*); *CEG II 789* (*ISE 71*; *FD III 4, 463*)

Peisis son of Charias of Thespiai¹ is attested in two very different contexts: he is known to have collaborated with Antigonid forces as well as to have fought against them. As we shall see and as one should expect for events of the period, there were probably more shades of grey in both contexts.

The Oropians erected a statue in honour of Peisis (*I. Orop.* 366), most probably after 313, when Antigonos' general Polemaios, with the military assistance of the Boiotians, expelled the garrisons of Kassandros from Thebes and Oropos and incorporated the latter into the Boiotian *koinon*.² Peisis apparently led the Boiotian forces and this is when his association with the Antigonids seems to have begun. It is probably to the same period that the Delphic epigram in honour of Peisis should be dated. The epigram praises Peisis as a leader of the Boiotian cavalry, which decisively contributed to the liberation of Lokrian Opous by an enemy garrison (*CEG II 789*). The garrison must have been that of Kassandros, which was ousted after repeated attacks by Polemaios in 313.³

Sometime after the battle of Ipsos, the Boiotians distanced themselves from their alliance with Poliorketes; the result was that in 293 or 292⁴ Poliorketes, now king of the Macedonians, campaigned against them.⁵ A truce and friendship treaty

¹ His name is attested as Πείσις in Plut., *Demetr.* 39.2 and 4 and in the Delphic epigram (*CEG II 789*), but as Πίσις in the inscription of Oropos (*I. Orop.* 366).

² Diod. Sic. 19.78. The Boiotian contingent was significant: an infantry of 2,200 and a cavalry of 1,300 (19.77.4). On these events, cf. **C7**, above.

³ Diod. Sic. 19.78.5. On the date of the epigram, see the comments of Pouilloux *ad FD III 4, 463* and the bibliography cited by Moretti (*ISE II* pp. 1-2) and Gullath 1982: 159. Moretti correctly insists on the fact that Diodoros does not say that Polemaios conquered Opous, only that he besieged it; but the takeover could have come at a later date and Diodoros (not the most careful of copyists) may well have left it out; as Pouilloux points out, it is preferable to associate the epigram with the attested attack against Opous in 313, rather than with an unattested one, dated to 300-292 and aimed against the garrison of Poliorketes and not Kassandros, as Moretti tends to accept.

⁴ On the date of the two revolts, see Beloch 1927: 248; Lévêque 1957: 136 n. 1; Wehrli 1968: 174-76; Gullath 1982: 189-91. The first revolt (Plut., *Demetr.* 39.2) is the first event reported by Plutarch after Poliorketes' rise to the Macedonian throne. The event reported afterwards, Lysimachos' captivity in the hands of Dromichaites (39.6), probably belongs to 292 (cf. Lund 1993: 45, with sources in n. 95); "immediately afterwards" (ταχέως) came the second Boiotian revolt (39.6-7), which must be dated to 292 or 291 at the latest. The siege of Thebes after the second revolt was long (39.7-40.6) and the next event reported is the celebration of the Pythia at Athens in 290 (40.7-8; on the events of 290-289, cf. Lefèvre 1998b: 136-37, with earlier bibliography).

⁵ Polyainos 4.7.11 probably refers to this first campaign.

were initially concluded, but the presence of the Spartan army of Kleonymos¹ convinced Peisis, “then first in rank in glory and power”, to lead the revolt of the Boiotians. Poliorketes besieged Thebes, Kleonymos departed and the Boiotians surrendered unconditionally. The king then installed garrisons at many cities and appointed Hieronymos of Kardias as *epimeletes* of Boiotia but, paradoxically, treated Peisis with the utmost leniency; he even appointed him polemarch at Thespias (Plut., *Demetr.* 39.2-5).² The Boiotians then took advantage of the king’s temporary absence in Thrace and revolted for the second time. They were defeated by Antigonos Gonatas who had remained in the area and, when Poliorketes returned, a second long siege of Thebes ensued (39.6-40.6) in 291.³ During the second revolt, Peisis is not mentioned at all.

There are lacunae in our knowledge about Peisis’ career. A collaborator of the Antigonids already by 313, probably also in 304-302, when Boiotia was again under Poliorketes’ rule, he was still the *de facto* ruler of the Boiotians in 293, albeit now as an opponent of the king, ready to lead his fellow countrymen to battle against the Macedonians. The turnabout of Peisis, which certainly predates 295 and should probably be dated to the aftermath of the battle of Ipsos,⁴ is not particularly surprising. The self-confidence of the Boiotians, who could count on a powerful army,⁵ must have resurfaced after Poliorketes’ defeat and loss of territory, power and status in the aftermath of the battle of Ipsos; Peisis merely led an inevitable revolt. One should not forget that his collaboration with the Antigonid army in 313 (perhaps in 304 as well) was a collaboration with the liberators of Boiotia from the garrisons of Kassandros. Peisis’ temporary attachment to the Antigonid camp was perfectly compatible with the pursuit of real autonomy and independence.⁶

At first glance, Poliorketes’ leniency to the leader of the revolted Boiotians in 292 seems surprising and the former collaboration of Peisis with the Antigonids could certainly not have provided Poliorketes with sufficient reason for that.

¹ It is usually assumed that this was an official mission of the Spartan army (Beloch 1925: 224; Marasco 1980: 51-55; Cartledge 1989: 31); I agree with the reservations of Lévêque 1957: 136, who points out that this could be a ‘private’ operation, a usual endeavour of Spartan leaders.

² Roesch 1982: 434 assumes that Peisis’ appointment lasted more than one year, which was the usual term of office for polemarchs; this is probable (cf. the parallel of Olympiodoros in Athens [A44]), but not certain.

³ For other possible sources on the two revolts, see Gullath 1982: 192-93.

⁴ *Termini ante quem* are the alliance between the Boiotians and the Aitolians (IG IX 1² 1, 170 [SVA III 463]), which cannot be dated with any greater accuracy than to 301-292) and the fact that Lachares fled to Boiotia when Poliorketes reconquered Athens in 295 (Paus. 1.25.8; Polyainos 3.7.1).

⁵ Cf. Holleaux, *Études* I 61.

⁶ Cf. the Delphic epigram for Peisis, where (according to the likeliest version of l. 2) the glory which Peisis would gain in “the powerful cities of Greece” (Ἑλλάδος ἐμ μεγάλοις ἄστεσι) is exalted. Peisis saw himself as a glorious leader of the world of the *poleis*; neither the Delphic epigram nor the Oropian inscription has the slightest reference to the Macedonians.

Plutarch and Diodoros tell us that the king treated the Boiotians “magnanimously” (μεγαλοψύχως), with the exception of some of the “instigators of the revolt” whom he had executed. Two out of the three relevant passages refer to the second revolt but the third could refer to the first.¹ In any case, one would expect that the leaders of the revolt would have been treated harshly in both revolts. Why did the king treat Peisis differently? There are two possible assumptions –one not excluding the other. The first would be that the re-establishment of good relations between Peisis and the Macedonians was to the advantage of both sides: Poliorketes needed local leaders with authority to impose his unpopular rule and Peisis not only remained alive but also in power. Another assumption would be that Peisis changed camps *during* the revolt. It would not be surprising if, for example, under the pressure of the Macedonian army, it was he who first suggested an unconditional surrender to the king. Either way, there is no doubt that after the restoration of his bond with the Antigonids, Peisis defended his choices. After having reported how Poliorketes imposed garrisons and Hieronymos as harmost and extracted a significant sum as retribution by the Boiotians, Plutarch writes: “(Demetrios) seemed to treat (the Boiotians) leniently, the more so because of Peisis” (39.4: ἔδοξεν ἠπίως κεχρηῆσθαι καὶ μάλιστα διὰ Πίσιν). These particular measures can certainly not be described as lenient: autonomy, the absence of garrisons and the lack of tribute were the three pursuits of any Hellenistic state in its relations with any king, friendly or not. The description of the measures as lenient and the attribution of this leniency to Peisis very probably stem from the apologetics of Peisis himself.² Just like Phokion had done in Athens in 322,³ Peisis must have claimed that the new regime was far better than what the revolted could have hoped for.

Finally, it is probably not accidental that Peisis is completely absent from the description of the second revolt. If he abided by his renewed alliance with the

¹ Plut., *Demetr.* 40.6 (thirteen executed, explicitly after the second revolt); Diod. Sic. 21.14.1 (ten executed, explicitly after the second revolt) and 21.14.2 (fourteen executed; the only temporal indication is the phrase: ὁ βασιλεὺς Δημήτριος, παραλαβὼν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις, προσηνέχθη τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς μεγαλοψύχως). It is usually assumed that all three passages refer to the second revolt (see, for example, Wehrli 1968: 175; Gullath 1982: 190). I believe that Diod. Sic. 21.14.2 could refer to the first revolt: μεγαλοψύχως here corresponds to ἠπίως κεχρηῆσθαι of Plut., *Demetr.* 39.4, which refers to the first revolt and Poliorketes’ leniency is much more downplayed in the descriptions of the second revolt (Plut., *Demetr.* 40.5-6 and Diod. Sic. 21.14.1). Either way, the fragmentary use of Diodoros by later writers allows no certainty.

² Plutarch’s details on Boiotia were obviously drawn from Hieronymos, with whom Peisis, as a polemarch, must have collaborated.

³ For the description of Antipatros’ terms in 322 as “benevolent” by the pro-Phokionic propaganda, see Diod. Sic. 18.18.4, Plut., *Phoc.* 27.6 and **A3** [1], above.

Macedonians he was soon surpassed by the events that followed and the anti-Macedonian feelings of the Boiotians, particularly the Thebans.¹

C16. Damaretos — C17. Philainetos — C18. Euphronios

— *IThesp* 152-154 (Jamot 1895: 328-30 n° 4; Feyel 1942b: 103-111 n° 5)

Three royal letters engraved on the same stone (*IThesp* 152-154; 154 is at the top left of the stone, 152 at the top right, and 153 occupies the whole width of the lower part of the stone), belong to the large number of attestations of the Mouseia, the great penteteric festival of Thespiiai.² The second (*IThesp* 152) and the third (*IThesp* 153) letters attest to the presence of three ambassadors of Thespiiai, namely Damaretos, Philainetos and Euphronios, at the same royal court.³ The sender of the third letter (*IThesp* 153, l. 1), the one best preserved, comments on a letter previously sent by his sister, which must be identified with the second letter.⁴ The royal couple are certainly Ptolemy IV Philopator and Arsinoe III.⁵

We have already discussed the very good relations that Boiotia entertained with the court of Philopator,⁶ despite the official alliance between the Boiotians and the Macedonians. In the case of Thespiiai, in particular, these relations were even closer. The Ptolemaic court supported the Mouseia in a number of ways. A catalogue of the last decade of the third century (208?)⁷ informs us that the royal

¹ Judging by the rarity of the name in Boiotian onomastics, the family of Peisis probably had little influence in following periods. The secretary and *pyrphoros* of Thespiiai in the second half of the second century Pisis son of Kanas (Roesch 1982: 190 n° 35 and 191 n° 36 [the latter also in *SEG* 32 (1982) 436]), could possibly be a descendant of Peisis. Peisis' patronym (Charias) is attested two more times at Thespiiai, in third-century catalogues (*IG* VII 1752, l. 12 and *SEG* 37 [1987] 385, l. 35).

² On the Mouseia, see Jamot 1895 (first edition of the royal letters); Holleaux, *Études* I 89-120; Feyel 1942b: 88-132 (the first thorough treatment of the reorganization of the festival) and 1942: 258-61 (a summary of his theory); Schachter 1986: 163-79 (with a full list of sources); Knoepfler 1996 (with a new theory on the reorganization).

³ *IThesp* 153, l. 5 (all three ambassadors) and *IThesp* 152, l. 5 (at least Damaretos).

⁴ That *IThesp* 152 was sent by the same queen who is referred to in *IThesp* 153 is confirmed by the fact that the ambassadors mentioned in the two letters are the same, and by the probable reading ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδελφοῦν in *IThesp* 152, l. 4 (Feyel 1942b: 108 n. 2).

⁵ The first editor believed they were Ptolemy II Philadelphos and Arsinoe II (Jamot 1895: 346-48). After Holleaux, *Études* I 116-20, there is general agreement on the couple's identity.

⁶ See **C10**, above.

⁷ *IThesp* 62 (Holleaux, *Études* I 101-102; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 85); on various issues regarding the lease of the estates, see Sosin 2000: 51-58. Ameling (in Bringmann / von Steuben) dates the inscription under Ptolemy III, because he takes it for granted (without argumentation) that the archon Philon (l. 27) was an archon of the *koinon* and that he is to be identified with Philon I (dated to 220) and not Philon II (dated to 206). If Philon was an archon of the *koinon*, there would be no reason not to identify him with Philon II and thus date the donation under Ptolemy IV, as all scholars do (see, for example, Knoepfler 1996: 145-46, 167 and the bibliography cited by Ameling). But Philon was certainly an archon of Thespiiai, not of the *koinon*: with the

couple donated revenues with which estates were bought and then rented out in order to provide a steady resource for the *temenos* of the Muses, and Philopator's letter probably records the funding of prizes for the thymelic games by Arsinoe (*IThesp* 153, ll. 2-4).¹ According to Knoepfler's convincing analysis,² the reorganization of the festival as a penteteric one was not a consequence of the Ptolemaic donations, as Feysel had thought,³ but had already occurred between 230 and 218, perhaps in the mid-220's;⁴ the Ptolemaic donation merely introduced prizes to be awarded at the pre-existing annual contests, when these coincided with the penteteric festival and its thymelic contests. The Thespians expressed their gratitude by erecting a statue of Arsinoe on the Helikon.⁵

Several problems remain regarding our understanding of the letters and of the Thespian embassy. The first is the identity of the sender of the first letter. Feysel thought that it was Antiochos III⁶ and that there must have been a similar embassy

exception of a few texts which have a clear federal character anyway, the archon of the *koinon* is always defined as archon Βοιωτοῖς, ἐν κοινῷ Βοιωτῶν, ἐν Ὀρχηστῷ *vel sim.* (see Roesch 1982: 286), hence it is unanimously accepted that Philon here is a local archon (see, for example, Holleaux, *Études* I 90; Huß 1976: 121 n. 89; Knoepfler 1992: 427 n° 32 and 1996: 145-46, 160). The date of Philon depends on the date of the archon of the *koinon* Lykinos, who was his contemporary (see *IThesp* 161 [SEG 32 (1982) 434]). Lykinos is certainly dated in the period 210-203 (Feysel 1942: 29-30, 74; Roesch 1965: 90); according to Étienne / Knoepfler 1976: 311 (whose argument is not fully convincing), the only possible years are 210, 209 or 204 (Étienne 1985: 263 favours the last choice, while Knoepfler 1992: 426-27 n° 32 one of the first two, with a preference for 209). A separate issue is whether the archon during the term of office of whose the catalogue *IThesp* 62 dates (l. 1), is Philon (Holleaux, *Études* I 103), his predecessor (so Ameling), or his successor, as Knoepfler 1996: 145 n. 11 convincingly argues. If Philon is dated to 209, which is not certain, the inscription most probably dates from 208.

¹ Feysel's restorations at this point are not perhaps the more plausible ones (see *BullEpigr* 1942, 69 and Knoepfler 1996: 162), but this is certainly the meaning.

² Knoepfler 1996.

³ Feysel 1942b: 88-132 and 1942: 258-61. His view was unanimously accepted until Knoepfler's study was published.

⁴ Knoepfler 1996: 167 points out that the reorganization was connected with the general effort of the Boiotians to elevate some of their sanctuaries into religious centres of Panhellenic importance in the 220's (see *CID* IV 70-72, 76-77, with further bibliography). If *CID* IV 77 refers to the sanctuary of the Muses, then the Thespians succeeded in having the sanctuary's *asylia* recognized simultaneously with the reorganization of the festival (cf. Knoepfler 1996: 167; Rigsby 1996: 76; Lefèvre 1998: 77 and 351), perhaps with Ptolemaic encouragement (see in the text, below).

⁵ Paus. 9.31.1; the statue may have represented the queen as the tenth Muse (Knoepfler 1996: 154). For Philopator's and Arsinoe's interest in the cult of the Muses, see Holleaux, *Études* I 105; Fraser 1972: I 313 and II 467. Holleaux associated with this whole affair the honours for three Alexandrians at Thespiai during roughly the same period (*IThesp* 19 [IG VII 1722]).

⁶ Feysel 1942b: 111 (followed by Schachter 1986: 164); the argument by which Feysel ruled out Philip V (the sender of the letter uses the first person plural, while Philip V used the first singular) is still valid (see Hatzopoulos 1996: II n°s 9-19). Incidentally, Feysel was the first to establish that the letters are three and not two.

to Philip V. The content of the letters and their disposition on the stone allow a different suggestion, however. The disposition of the texts points to a unitary ensemble. The sender of the first letter (*IThesp* 154) officially recognized the games (ll. 4-5: --- ἀποδεδέγμ]εθα τὸν ἀγῶ[[να ---]),¹ wishing to please the Thespians (l. 1) and the *koinon* (l. 3). Arsinoe's letter (*IThesp* 152) mentions a mission of a Ptolemaic courtier² and highlights the queen's *eunoia* to the sanctuary and her decision to help it. Philopator's letter (*IThesp* 153), although better preserved than the other two, seems to refer exclusively to the donation of the royal sister and wife, to its confirmation and to procedural details involving the Thespian ambassadors. If only the second and third letters belonged to senders from Alexandria, the lack of recognition of the games by the royal couple would be surprising.³ It is, therefore, more probable that all three letters emanated from Alexandria. In the first letter Philopator or, more probably, Euergetes (if we accept Knoepfler's dating of the reorganization of the festival), recognized the penteteric games, in the second letter Arsinoe offered an additional prize for the contests, and in the third letter Philopator recognized his sister's donation.⁴ Besides, there is no reason to assume that the first letter was contemporary with the other two: the Thespians simply gathered on the same monument a Ptolemaic dossier on the Mouseia, in chronological order. In fact, if we accept that the first letter contained the recognition of the festival, and therefore followed their proclamation, the three letters cannot have been contemporary, since the proclamation of games was carried out by *theoroi*⁵ and not by ambassadors, as the three Thespians are explicitly called (*IThesp*

¹ The restoration is provided by Feyel, without comment; it is also accepted by the editors of *IThesp*. This use of ἀποδέχομαι is attested once again for the Mouseia (*IThesp* 157 [IG VII 1735b; Feyel 1942b: 91 n° 2A) and seems to have been used elsewhere as well, exclusively for penteteric games: the Soteria at Delphi (*FD* III 3, 215), the games of Artemis Leukophryene (*I. Magnesia* 16 [Rigsby 1996: n° 66]), the Didymeia at Miletos (*Syll*³ 590), the Nikephoria at Pergamon (*FD* III 3, 240 [Rigsby 1996: n° 178]). The same verb was of course widely used in replies to requests for the recognition of *asylia* (see the index of Rigsby 1996), while often penteteric games and *asylia* were simultaneously recognized. If we accept the view that the Thespians requested the recognition of the Mouseion's *asylia* by the Delphic amphictiony (see p. 316 n. 4, above), then the first royal letter may also have involved recognition of *asylia*.

² On his possible identity, see Knoepfler 1996: 160 n. 66.

³ The games were certainly not recognized in the third letter; this probably stands for the second letter as well: Arsinoe would not have recognized the games without the explicit approval of Philopator.

⁴ For a parallel of a festival being recognized by a king and subsequent members of the dynasty further supporting the original recognition, see Rigsby 1996: n°s 69 and 70.

⁵ As is the case in the other inscriptions mentioning the Mouseia: see Feyel 1942b: 93 n° 2B (*IThesp* 156bis); 96-97 n° 3.

153, l. 5). Finally, this interpretation offers further support to Knoepfler's theory that the reorganization of the Mouseia predates the Ptolemaic donation.¹

The second issue is the aim of the embassy. Both Feyel (and those who follow him) and Knoepfler take it for granted that the revenue which the royal couple donated, which is recorded in the catalogue of 208 (?), was the result of the embassy mentioned by the letters and that, consequently, the aim of the embassy was to secure resources for the celebration of the penteteric games.² Both legs of the argument, however, are far from certain. Firstly, it is probable but not certain that the revenue of the catalogue was the donation promised by Arsinoe and Philopator.³ Secondly, it is not obligatory to assume that securing resources was the *official* aim of the embassy. Its stated aim could have been, for example, the proclamation of honours for the royal couple – a very ordinary pretext used by embassies with different, unstated agendas in the Hellenistic and later periods⁴; the royal donation need not be anything else than the expected – required by protocol one is tempted to say – additional royal benefaction.⁵

¹ A Thespian decree (*IThesp* 155 [IG VII 2410]) seems to contradict both Knoepfler's theory and my assumption about the sender of the first letter. According to Feyel's restorations (Feyel 1942b: 101 n° 4), the decree contains instructions for the *theoroi* who will proclaim the new thymelic game and mentions letters by king Ptolemy, queen Arsinoe and another king, as well as the honours which the city awarded them. It must be stressed, however, that the restorations are extensive and, rather than confirming, actually result from Feyel's theory. Positively mentioned are: the penteteric Mouseia and their prizes (ll. 2-5), an emissary of the city (as the infinitive διαλέγεσθαι in l. 6 shows), past letters of a king and a queen, most probably Philopator and Arsinoe (ll. 8-9: [-- γε]γραμμένα πρότερον ---) | κὴ τᾶς βασιλίσσης[ας ---]; Feyel's assumption that a third king, belonging to another dynasty, was mentioned in l. 9, obviously stems from his interpretation of the letters), and, perhaps, honours by the city (ll. 11-12: κὴ τὰ πᾶρ τᾶς πόλιος προγεγονότα φιλόανθρωπα (?) πὸ]τ ἐκείνως; the lack of syllabic cut is, however, problematic, *pace* Feyel 1942b: 102). Even if we accept the core of Feyel's restorations, there is certainly no *a priori* reason to accept his restoration of the name of a third king in l. 9.

² Feyel 1942b: 115 and 1942: 261; Schachter 1986: 164; Knoepfler 1996: 162, 167.

³ In the catalogue (*IThesp* 62, ll. 3-5), Philopator's and Arsinoe's donation is thus described: [συνεσσαπέστι]λαν ἐς τῶν καθιερωμέν[ων τῆς Μώσης τεμενῶν (?)] | τὰς ποθόδως ἀργυρίω δραχ[μάς etc.]; the restoration is due to Holleaux (who offers some alternatives in *Études* I 105). One cannot exclude the restoration ἀγώνων instead of τεμενῶν, which would identify the donation mentioned in the letters with the revenue mentioned in the catalogue. I know of no parallels for the phrase καθιερωμένος ἀγών, but from the middle of the second century the Panhellenic penteteric games were called ἱεροί, while there is also a –disputed– use of the term in Boiotia of the 220's (Rigsby 1996: n° 2 [IG VII 4136; *Syll*³ 635], where one can find references to ἱερός ἀγών and to later examples on pp. 64-65).

⁴ See p. 79 n. 4, above.

⁵ Cf., for example, Rigsby 1996: n° 69 (*I. Magnesia* 18; *RC* 31), ll. 20-25: ... καὶ βουλόμενοι φανεράν ποιεῖν τὴν ἑαυτῶν προαίρεσιν ἀποδεχόμεθα τὰς ἐψηφισμένας ὑφ' ὑμῶν τ[ι]μὰς τῆι θεᾷ, πρόκειταί τε ἡμῖν συναύξειν ταῦτα ἐν οἷς ἂν ὑμεῖς τε παρακαλῆτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπινοῶμεν. This characteristic

This brings us to the third and final problem regarding this embassy: its date. If the catalogue is dated to 208 and if the donation recorded in it is identical with the one recorded in the letters, the embassy should be dated to 210 or 209. If either one of the two assumptions is rejected, the embassy can be dated only broadly, during Philopator's reign.

There is no other certain source on Damaretos, Philainetos or Euphronios. The latter, however, may be identified with Euphronios son of Molon, polemarch of Thespiiai in ca. 210.¹ It would have been interesting to know if any of the three ambassadors participated in the earlier (?) proclamation of the festival.

THEBES

C19. Krates son of Askondas

– Plut., *Demetr.* 46.1; for the rest of the sources, see Giannantoni 1983: II 705-757

For the probable mediation of Krates, the Cynic philosopher, to Demetrios Poliorketes, for the liberation of Thebes in 287 (Plut., *Demetr.* 46.1), see the entry on Krates and his relation with Athens (**A48**).

C20. Askondas — C21. Neon son of Askondas — C22. Brachylles son of Neon

– Askondas: Polyb. 20.5.5

– Neon: Polyb. 20.5.4-14; *IG* VII 3091; *SEG* 11 (1954) 414 (Perlman 2000: 192-94 n° E.5), l. 30

– Brachylles: Polyb. 18.1.2; 18.43; 20.5.12-14; 20.7.3; 22.4.7; Plut., *Fam.* 6.1; Livy 33.27.8

There is no doubt that the leading family of the *koinon* of the Boiotians in the second half of the third century was the family of Askondas of Thebes. The family's past is not known;² what is certain is that already during the Demetrian War – when the Boiotians surrendered unconditionally to Demetrios and allied themselves with Macedonia – its members were considered “the most pro-Macedonian”

text bears close resemblance to the surviving parts of Arsinoe's letter (l. 6: [προ(?)]αἴρεσίν μου; l. 8: ἡμῶν εὐνοία; ll. 8-9: συντη|ροῦσι φανεράν ποιεῖν).

¹ *IThesp* 84 (*SEG* 23 [1968] 271), l. 62 (for the date, see Roesch 1982: 18-19; Étienne / Knoepfler 1976: 305 n. 148; Knoepfler 1992: 468, n° 98). Roesch 1965: 16 n° 9 and 19 takes the identification for granted. All three names of the ambassadors are attested at Hellenistic Thespiiai (see *LGPN* IIIB, in the relevant entries), but no other plausible identification is possible.

² It is tempting to connect Askondas with the philosopher Krates son of Askondas (see the preceding entry and **A48**), especially since the name is not very common in Boiotia (two further examples are recorded by *LGPN* IIIB, s.v. Ἀσκώνδας and Φασκώνδας). Such a connection would be valuable for this study, since it would prolong the duration of the family's ties with the Macedonian court by one more generation. There is a significant obstacle, however. The literary tradition on Krates seems to be particularly well-informed: the names of his brother (Pasikles), his wife (Hipparchia) and his son (Krates) are preserved (see Giannantoni 1985: III 503-508 and the stemma of the family in Koumanoudes 1979: 128 n° 1208). If he was also connected with the most important family of Thebes in the third century, one would expect this connection to be documented in the biographical tradition.

Boiotian statesmen (Polyb. 20.5.3-5, esp. 20.5.5: οἱ μάλιστα τότε μακεδονίζοντες). Askondas was probably old by then: in the Larymna incident of 227 (see below) he was perhaps still alive,¹ but he is not mentioned again. Immediately afterwards, his son Neon seems to have been the leading statesman of the *koinon*.

An early crucial episode in the career of Neon took place at Larymna in 227 (Polyb. 20.5.7-11).² On his way to Asia for his Karian expedition, Antigonos Doson found himself sailing by Larymna in Boiotia, where he met an unexpected low tide, which made him run aground. Rumours spread in Boiotia that a Macedonian invasion was imminent; Neon, the hipparch of the *koinon*, rushed to the area with the whole Boiotian cavalry, surprised the Macedonians, who despaired of the situation, but, “although he was in a position to inflict great damage to the Macedonians he preferred to spare them despite their expectations”. Doson was able to continue his expedition to Karia unhindered. The Boiotians, according to Polybios, approved Neon’s stance, but his Theban fellow countrymen³ were very displeased.

Despite Feyel’s effort to use this episode to show that Boiotia’s relations with Doson were good already at the beginning of his rule, this episode is a clear indication of great circumspection, to say the least, on the part of both sides.⁴ The Boiotians suspected a Macedonian attack and Doson expected an attack by the Boiotian cavalry. This tension was obviously the result of Doson’s aggressive policy in central Greece in 228 in general, and especially of the takeover of Opous in Lokris, which had been in Boiotian hands during the Demetrian War.⁵ This near-hostility sheds a different light on Neon’s initiative. The pro-Macedonian policy of Askondas and Neon met with “great opposition” in Boiotia (20.5.5: μεγάλην ἀντιπολιτείαν), particularly in their home city of Thebes (20.5.10 and 13); as a hipparch, Neon must have rushed to Larymna on the explicit orders of the boiotarchs, the top-ranking officials of the *koinon*.⁶ If Neon had not been already well-disposed towards the Macedonian throne and if a personal understanding between the two

¹ Polyb. 20.5.6: κατίσχυσαν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀσκώνδαν either means that Askondas was still alive or that the policy instituted by him prevailed.

² The date depends on the date of Doson’s Karian expedition, for which 227 is not certain, but remains the far more probable option (despite the doubts of Le Bohec 1993: 332-33, who has the earlier bibliography).

³ It should be noted that neither Polybios nor IG VII 3091 (Neon as *agonothetes* of the Basileia) mention the family’s origin; the family’s ethnic is attested only in the proxeny catalogue of Epidauros (SEG 11 (1954) 414 [Perlman 2000: 192-94 n° E.5], l. 30).

⁴ See Feyel 1942: 117-19; Ehrhardt 1975: 257-59; Étienne / Knoepfler 1976: 334-37; F. W. Walbank 1988: 343; Le Bohec 1993: 189-94.

⁵ On the conquest of Opous, see mainly Étienne / Knoepfler 1976: 331-34. On Doson’s aggressiveness in central Greece in 228 (against the Aitolians, with territorial gains in Thessaly, raids on Phokis [an ally of the Boiotians] and Doris), see Le Bohec 1993: 154-63 and Scholten 2000: 165-78, with the sources and bibliography.

⁶ On the office of the hipparch, see Roesch 1965: 109-110.

men had not been reached, it is very doubtful that the king would have been able to convince the Boiotian authorities that his goal was not Boiotia but far-away Asia. The fact that Neon managed to impose –at Larymna and later, as is made evident by the fact that Boiotian authorities consented to his actions– a neutrality which was to Doso's advantage exemplifies how important it was for a king to have statesmen who were well-disposed towards him even in potentially hostile states.¹

As is expected, Neon's family immediately cashed in on this "big favour" (Polyb. 20.5.11: *μεγάλην χάριν*) that Doso owed him. Both Doso and, later, Philip V contributed decisively to the consolidation of the family's power, by granting money and by assisting in the political annihilation of the family's opponents in Thebes itself, the centre of anti-Macedonian politics in Boiotia (Polyb. 20.5.13). Moreover, Neon's son Brachylles was appointed by Doso *epistates* of Sparta after the battle of Sellasia in 222 (Polyb. 20.5.12). It is not the first time that we meet a son of a statesman maintaining his father's ties with a royal court, nor the first time that we meet a *philos* of a king going over from local politics to the royal administration.²

Brachylles' sojourn at Sparta did not last for more than a few months.³ He remained in the royal service and probably did not return to Boiotia until much later. Two indications of the Polybian narrative confirm this. The first is that by the end of the century a certain Opheltas, unconnected with Askondas' family, appears in our sources as the leader of the Boiotians.⁴ The second is that when we next meet Brachylles in the conference of Nikaia in the winter of 198/7 he is (still?) in Philip's entourage, as an individual and not as a representative of the Boiotians.⁵

Brachylles fought with Philip in the battle of Kynos Kephalai in 197, was captured by the Romans, but returned to Boiotia with the rest of the Boiotian captives⁶ after a request of Boiotian authorities to Flamininus (Polyb. 18.43.1-3).

¹ Herman 1987: 42 seems to ignore that Neon's father was also a *μακεδονίζων* and considers the Larymna incident a characteristic example of the forging of a friendly relationship between a king and an individual; nothing in Polybios allows us to surmise that the two men did not know each other, and the logical assumption, given the pro-Macedonian past of the family, is that they did.

² The relationship of Aratos and his homonymous son (**B13-14**) with the Macedonian court is a close parallel, despite the different treatment of the two families in the sources.

³ See p. 263 n. 2, above.

⁴ Polyb. 20.6.4-6. The date is uncertain. Polybios considers the incorporation of Megara into the Achaian *koinon* a result of the destitute state of Boiotia under Opheltas (20.6.7); this event is dated either to 206/5 or, less likely, 193/2 (p. 298 n. 2, above).

⁵ Polyb. 18.1.2. Two non-Macedonians accompanied the king: *ἐκ Βοιωτίας Βραχύλλης, Ἀχαιοὺς δὲ Κυκλιάδας*. Kykliadas had already been banished by the Achaians (see **B43**, above), therefore he was certainly not representing them; judging by Polybios' terminology, the same must be true of Brachylles: Brachylles is *ἐκ Βοιωτίας*, and Polybios uses in the same passage the preposition *παρά* (18.1.4) for representatives of kings or states. On Philip's possible motives for taking two 'southerners' with him, see Aymard 1938: 116-17 and F. W. Walbank 1967: 549.

⁶ There is no reason to assume that Brachylles led a Boiotian contingent in the battle, as Livy claims (33.27.8: *Brachyllem quendam, quam quod praefectus Boeotorum apud regem militantium fuisset*),

Despite Philip's defeat, the majority of Boiotians remained loyal to the alliance with Macedonia and this policy was consummated by Brachylles' election to the office of boiotarch (18.43.3).¹ Zeuxippos and Peisistratos, pro-Roman statesmen and/or political opponents of Brachylles and the pro-Macedonians,² reacted immediately; with Flamininus' tolerance and with the help of the Aitolian general Alexamenos, they plotted to have Brachylles murdered (Polyb. 18.43.5-12; cf. Livy 33.27.5-11). They prevailed politically, but anti-Roman feelings remained strong in Boiotia (Livy 33.28-29).

Askondas' family hardly vanished after Brachylles' murder. His son, Neon II, figures again as the leader of anti-Roman Boiotians in the 170's; he sought refuge at the Macedonian court after his banishment and the dissolution of the *koinon* in 171, remained by Perseus' side even after the defeat at Pydna and was executed by Paulus at Amphipolis in 167.³

The relationship of the family of Askondas with the Macedonian administration and royal family serves to highlight two aspects, encountered more than once in this catalogue. The first is the duration and durability of the relationship. During a period of seventy years, Askondas, Neon I, Brachylles (for a few months) and Neon II were the Macedonian kings' more faithful allies in the region.⁴ This does not mean that Boiotia was a Macedonian protectorate – Neon I, for example, seems to have sincerely favoured neutrality, not blind adherence to Macedonian plans. It does mean, however, that the Macedonian king could rest assured that the Boiotians would not be outright hostile. In troubled times this simple certainty was of almost equal importance with the territorial control of a region. The danger from which Neon I saved Doson at Larymna was not some abstract danger

and most scholars accept (see, for example, F. W. Walbank 1967: 549 and Deininger 1971: 51). Firstly, the parallel text of Polybios (18.43.3: ταχὺ δὲ πάντων ἀνακομισθέντων ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας, ἐν οἷς ἦν καὶ Βραχύλλης...) does not suggest that Brachylles was the leader of the Boiotians. Secondly, the Boiotians cannot have officially participated in the battle by Philip's side whether they had entered an alliance with Rome in 197, as Livy seems to report (33.1-2), or had merely expressed their intent to conclude a treaty which had not been signed (as Roesch 1982: 277 and 369-70 assumes). The same is true for the Boiotian forces that took part in the slightly earlier battle of Corinth (Livy 33.14.5; for the date, see p. 344 n. 3, below). It seems more likely that this was a group of Boiotian volunteers, members of the pro-Macedonian Boiotian faction, in which case Livy is probably misinterpreting his source (cf. Briscoe 1973: 301).

¹ The pro-Macedonian feelings then prevailing are also evident in the events of early 197: Flamininus had to enter Thebes with a ruse, so that the Thebans, unwillingly and under the threat of Roman arms, would join the anti-Macedonian alliance (Livy 33.1-2).

² Antiphilos (eponymous in 197) and Dikaiarchos also belonged to the leaders of the pro-Roman faction (Livy 33.1-2).

³ See briefly Koumanoudes 1979: 148 n° 1402 with the sources and, in more detail, Deininger 1971: 153-59, 164-67.

⁴ If we added the philosopher Krates (see p. 319 n. 2, above) the duration would be even longer.

of geostrategic complications; it was an imminent threat to the king's life. It is particularly noteworthy that members of the family remained loyal friends, allies, or officers in three adverse junctures for Macedonian kings: Larymna in 227, after Kynos Kephalai, and during the Third Macedonian War. Askondas' family also benefited from its relationship with the Macedonian king. The son of Doson's benefactor had the best credentials to be appointed to an important office and things then simply took their course. Moreover, we have the unambiguous statement of Polybios that the family's prevalence in Boiotia was directly due to Macedonian money and influence. Once again, the benefits for intermediaries and their offspring lie on two different levels: the city (or the *koinon*) and the court.

This brings us to the second important motif, namely the blurring of the lines between a career in the city or the *koinon* and a career in the royal administration. Askondas and Neon I were Boiotian statesmen and nothing more. According to our present state of knowledge, Bracchyles was a member of the royal administration from the beginning of his career and almost to the end of his life; yet, in 197 he went back to the family's source of power, Boiotia, and led it, for the first and last time. Neon II was a Boiotian leader, but his bond with Perseus made his transition to the court not only inevitable but also fluent and unremarkable. This smooth transition from one political arena to the other is, I would suggest, a phenomenon of pivotal importance for the understanding of the whole period.

BOIOTIA – UNKNOWN CITY

C23. Damokles (?) son of Nearchos

— Δαμο[κλής (?)] Νεάρχου: *SEG* 24 (1969) 1180 (Braunert 1951: 236 n° 24; *SB* I 1641; Cook 1966: 24 n° 8)

A Boiotian *theoros* who died in Alexandria in 213. His name should probably be restored as Δαμο[κλής], a name very popular in Boiotia,¹ in, among other cities, Thespiai, Tanagra and Orchomenos –cities that, as we saw above, had cultivated relations with the court of Ptolemy IV Philopator.² His very common patronym is paradoxically unattested in Boiotia.

PHOKIS

ELATEIA

C24. Xanthippos son of Ampharetos

— Paus. 10.4.10; *FD* III 4, 218-221 (*Syll*^P 361; *SEG* 18 [1962] 117 [only n°s 218 and 220]; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 102 [only n°s 220, 221])

Xanthippos is one of the few known personalities of Hellenistic Phokis. His actions are mostly known from a monument which the Phokians erected in his

¹ See the entry of *LGPN* IIIB.

² See **C10**, above.

honour at Delphi.¹ The two epigrams inform us that, while still at a young age,² Xanthippos liberated Elateia (most probably his home town)³ from the garrison of Kassandros and later, “in his middle years”,⁴ repeated his feat, again breaking the “enslaving bonds of tyrants” (δ[ούλ]ια δ[εσμ]ῶν τυράννων) imposed on Elateia, with the financial help of Lysimachos, king of Macedonia, with whom he had cultivated good relations.⁵

The first liberation of Elateia must date from 304, when garrisons of Kassandros were ousted from many cities of central Greece, mostly under the pressure of Poliorketes.⁶ The fact that the epigram salutes only the brave actions of the Phokians and does not mention the king’s contribution, presented as decisive in the literary sources, does not necessarily mean that Poliorketes did not take part in the incident: literary sources tend to focus on royal actions while local tradition had every reason to exalt the actions of local forces.⁷ Nevertheless, the fact that Pausanias does not mention a royal intervention either⁸ makes it more probable that the Phokians ousted the garrison of Kassandros on their own.

¹ See *FD* III 4, 218-221.

² *FD* III 4, 218, l. 3 and 220, l. 5.

³ Although always taken for granted, Xanthippos’ origin from Elateia is not explicitly attested. In the Delphic monument he always bears the ethnic Phokian; references to his homeland (*FD* III 4, 218, l. 2; 220-221, l. 4) could refer either to Elateia or to Phokis as a whole. Lund 1992: 101 erroneously calls him an Athenian.

⁴ *FD* III 4, 220, l. 6: ἐν μέσῃ ἀλικίᾳ. Xanthippos is described as “in his prime”, πρωθίβης (*FD* III 4, 218, l. 3) in the events of 304.

⁵ *FD* III 4, 220. The fact that the epigram so unreservedly emphasizes that the contribution of Lysimachos was monetary allows the assumption that the garrison was bought off and not ousted by military action, just as in Athens in 229.

⁶ On Poliorketes’ activity, see Diod. Sic. 20.100.5-6 (removal of the Boiotian garrison from Chalkis, alliance with Boiotia and Aitolia); Plut., *Demetr.* 23.1-3 (removal of Kassandros’ garrisons from the forts of the Attic countryside, alliance with Boiotia, pursuit of Kassandros up to Thermopylai and liberation of the Greeks “within the Gates”, ἐντὸς τῶν Πυλῶν); *SEG* 36 (1986) 165 (forts of Attica); cf. Gullath 1982: 179-83 and Billows 1990: 169. Pomtow (see *Syll*^P 361) dates the liberation of Elateia to 301, after Demetrios’ departure for Asia, and identifies this incident with the one recorded by Paus. 10.18.7 (successful defence of the Phokians with the help of Olympiodoros of Athens against the siege of Kassandros). Pausanias, however, clearly distinguishes the ousting of Kassandros from Elateia with the, obviously later, unsuccessful siege (see 10.34.2 and 10.18.7, 10.34.3 respectively) and the epigram undoubtedly refers to the first episode (cf. Flacelière 1937: 47-48 n. 8). The latter episode is dated either later in 304 or, more likely, in 301-297; cf. Gullath 1982: 184-85; McInerney 1999: 241.

⁷ For a parallel from the same region, see the activity of Peisis of Thespiiai (C15) in 313: the Opountian epigram (*CEG* II 789) does not mention the actions of Polemaios, general of Antigonos, who led the siege against Kassandros’ garrison.

⁸ Paus. 10.34.2: Ἐλατεῦσι δὲ ἐξεγένετο μὲν Κάσσανδρον καὶ τὴν Μακεδόνων ἀπώσασθαι στρατιάν.

The second liberation must belong to 285-281, the only period when Lysimachos could have been called king of Macedonia. This means that the “tyrant” of the epigram is Antigonos Gonatas and that Xanthippos’ feat was the removal of his garrison, probably immediately after 285, when news of Poliorketes’ capture must have boosted the moral of those who wished to oust Macedonian garrisons. Xanthippos correctly assessed the situation and rushed to seek help from Lysimachos, the undisputed victor at that juncture, in order to promote the goals of the *koinon*.

In other words, on two occasions Xanthippos showed two important virtues for a leader of a small state in the Hellenistic period: a rapid understanding of the shifts in the balance of power, and the ability to take advantage of the antagonism between the protagonists of the period. In 304 he liberated his home-town from Kassandros by taking advantage of Poliorketes’ onward march, if not by collaborating with him. In 301 or slightly later he probably collaborated with Olympiodoros, then a collaborator of Poliorketes, in order to repel a new attack by Kassandros.¹ It would be very interesting to know what his stance was in 293 or 292, when Poliorketes must have passed from Thessaly through Phokis or its vicinity in order to invade Boiotia.² The fact that no invasion of Phokis is mentioned could be taken as an indication that the attitude of Xanthippos (and the Phokians) towards the Antigonids had not changed. But when, after 285, it became clear that Poliorketes’ luck had finally run out, Xanthippos had no qualms about immediately approaching the chief enemy of Poliorketes in order to oust the Antigonid garrison. In that sense, the approach of Lysimachos is not very important for the purposes of this study; it was a conjunctural manoeuvre, serving the overarching goal of Phokian independence.

That Xanthippos achieved, more than once, the liberation of Elateia from royal control with the help of other kings does not tarnish his success; at least it certainly did not tarnish it in the eyes of his compatriots, who elected him ten times to the highest offices of the *koinon*³ and honoured him both during his

¹ Although Xanthippos is not mentioned in connection to this incident, his leading position in Phokis throughout the period 304-281 should leave no doubt that he took part in it.

² Plut., *Demetr.* 39.1; Polyainos 4.7.11.

³ *FD* III 4, 220, l. 11: τοῦνεκα καὶ Φωκεῖς δεκάκις, ξένε, ταγὸν ἔθεντο. The term ταγὸς can either be the actual name of the office or a generic (or poetic) term used to denote the highest office (for a probable parallel from Macedonia, see *EKM* I 392). In the Phokian *koinon* of the late third century, the highest office was that of the *phokarches* (*IG* IX 1, 97, 99 and 101; *I. Magnesia* 34, l. 35; the κοινοὶ στρατηγοὶ of *IG* IX 1, 98 may be an earlier version of the same office [see Roesch 1982: 364]; for earlier periods, see Giovannini 1971: 52-53). In the second century the highest office was again that of the generals (the general in *IG* IX 1, 89 served as eponymous; cf. McInerney 1999: 252-53). Subordinates of the *phokarchai* were the *artisteres* (*IG* IX 1, 97), with unknown duties.

lifetime and after his death with heroic honours, the memory of which had not died out even in the times of Pausanias.¹

ABAI

C25. Ameinias — C26. Pancharidas — C27. Sotimos — C28. Archedamos — C29. Euanor — C30. Archias — C31. Nikoboulos

— IG IX 1, 78 (Syll³ 552)

The great strategic importance of Phokis made it one of the main fronts of the Social War for Philip V, despite the fact that the Phokians were formally his allies.² In 218 Philip tried to conquer the area, taking advantage of local strife; he failed at first, but succeeded a few months later (and until 196); he installed garrisons at various places as well as a general ἐπὶ τῆς Φωκίδος.³ During the First Macedonian War Phokis remained a base for military operations; the fact that it is not mentioned among Philip's allies in the treaty of Phoinike in 205 probably means that its part under Macedonian occupation was considered to be under the king's direct control.⁴

This treatment of Phokis as a Macedonian dominion is manifest in a royal letter (dated to September 209 rather than 208)⁵ to the *koinon* of the Abaioi, the political community around the homonymous sanctuary and oracle of Apollo in

¹ His cult, in the form of Heros Archegetes, was integrated with that of Phokos, the original eponymous hero of the Phokians (Paus. 10.4.10).

² By 220 the *koinon* of the Phokians had already suffered for more than five decades from the pressure of its neighbours, especially the Aitolians, who had incorporated the greater part of Phokis in their own territories (see Lefèvre 1998: 32-33; McInerney 1999: 245-46; Scholten 2000: 154-55, with sources and bibliography). The Phokians allied themselves with the Boiotians in the early 220's (Syll³ 519; IG IX 1, 98; cf. C8, above), suffered Aitolian raids during the same period (Polyb. 4.25.2; cf. F. W. Walbank 1957: 471 for the date) and entered Doson's Greek Alliance in 224 (Polyb. 4.9.4; 4.15.1; cf. SVA III 507).

³ Polyb. 5.24.12, 26.1, 26.16 (reference to unspecified πράξεις of 218); 5.96.4-8 (commander over the Phokis, garrisons); cf. F. W. Walbank 1957: 558-59; McInerney 1999: 247-48.

⁴ See McInerney 1999: 248-49, who aptly remarks that "the Phokians would find themselves not so much the pawns as the very chessboard on which the military moves of the period were played out".

⁵ IG IX 1, 78 (Syll³ 552) dated to Hyperberetaios of the thirteenth regnal year of Philip. It is still not clear if Philip's first regnal year was 222/1 (F. W. Walbank 1940: 295-99 and mainly Habicht 1970b: 273-79, with an important correction to the letter to Larisa) or 221/0 (Hatzopoulos 1996: I 53 n. 2, who now recognizes that EKM I 4 is irrelevant to the problem, since it dates from the reign of Antigonos Doson [BullEpigr 1998, 247 and Hatzopoulos 2001: 165-66 n° 5]). I tend to agree with the former (majoritarian) view, although the arguments in its favour are still not decisive. A recently published letter of Philip to the Amphipolitans (SEG 46 [1996] 716) does not solve the problem: the temporary acquittal of taxes (ἐπίσχεσις τελών) due by Amphipolis, granted in the twenty-fourth year of Philip is undoubtedly connected with the aftermath of the battle of Kynos Kephalai (cf. Hatzopoulos 1996: II n° 39), but given that the battle's date is May / June 197 (F. W. Walbank 1940: 322-23), the Macedonian year in question can either be 198/7 or 197/6.

eastern Phokis.¹ In order to preserve the immunity of the sanctuary against the rapacious intentions of the Macedonian official Herakleides,² the Abaioi were forced to send an embassy of seven³ to the king and protest about his officer's attitude. The king answered with the utmost conciseness: "wishing to favour both the god and yourselves, I wrote to Herakleides not to disturb you; greetings" (καὶ διὰ τὸν θεὸν οὖν καὶ ὑμῖν βουλόμενος χαρίζεσθαι γέγρα[φ]α τῷ Ἡρακλείδῃ μὴ ἐνο[χ]λεῖν ὑμᾶς ἔρρωσθε). This short note, however, was deemed worthy of engraving on a stele, obviously to increase protection from future arbitrary exactions by Herakleides or other Macedonian officials.

None of the ambassadors is with certainty known from other sources, which is not surprising, given the extreme scarcity of sources on the Abaioi. Archedamos, however, could be a son of Euboulos son of Archedamos (from eastern Phokis?), a rich man who procured a significant loan to Orchomenos some years earlier.⁴

¹ On the glorious past of the oracle and on its archaeological remains, see McInerney 1999: 59-60 and 288-89 respectively.

² Polybios mentions two high-ranking officials by that (very common) name in the administration of Philip V. Herakleides of Taras, the mechanic, an emissary of the king to Crete and Rhodes in 205 (Polyb. 13.4-5) is described with the darkest of colours by Polybios (a crude man of low origins, a prostitute, a traitor by nature, with a particular inclination for evil, etc.), which is why he is usually identified with the Herakleides who oppressed the Phokians (F. W. Walbank 1940: 93 n. 1; 1967: 417; McInerney 1999: 260 n. 42). He seems to have initially collaborated with the Romans, and then with the Carthaginians; only afterwards did he seek refuge at the Macedonian court (Polyb. 13.4.7), apparently in the early stages of the First Macedonian War. The other Herakleides recorded by Polybios was a commander of the Thessalian cavalry in the battle of Kynos Kephalai, who came from Gyrtion in Perrhaibia (Polyb. 18.22.2; the parallel passage of Livy [33.7.11] does not mention him). Launey 1987: 219 n. 1 tentatively identifies him with the Herakleides of the Phokian inscription.

³ The dispatch of such a large number of ambassadors is indicative of the crucial character of the mission for the Abaioi: cf. the seven-member embassy of Pallantion to Argos in 318 or slightly later (Bielman 1994: n° 14 [SEG 11 (1954) 1084; SVA III 419; ISE 52]) or the thirty-member Cretan embassy to Rome in 69 (Diod. Sic. 40.1); for the number of ambassadors in general, see Kienast 1973: 537-39. If the embassy belongs to 208, the ambassadors may have met Philip in northern Phokis, where many battles with the Aitolians were fought in the first half of the year (see F. W. Walbank 1940: 95-96 and IG IX 1², Prol. xxxi 58-64, with the sources).

⁴ IG VII 3171 (Migeotte 1984: n° 12). For Euboulos' origin from eastern Phokis, see Migeotte 1984: 53.

DORIS

KYTENION

C32. Lamprias son of Pankles — C33. Ainetos son of Polytas — C34. Phegeus son of Sotion

— SEG 38 (1988) 1476 (Curty 1995: n° 75)

A much discussed epigraphic dossier from Xanthos in Lykia (SEG 38 [1988] 1476)¹ informs us of the misfortunes of the small *koinon* of the Dorians in the 220's and of the grand tour of three ambassadors of Kytenion, a member of the *koinon*, all over the Greek world in the first half of 205, on a mission whose aim was to procure funds to alleviate the city's permanent financial difficulties.

In 228 Antigonos Doson raided central Greece in order to gain territories and boost the Macedonian throne's wounded status. He turned against the Boiotians (from whom he won over Lokrian Opous), the Aitolians (from whom he gained territories in Thessaly) the Phokians, and, as the Xanthos dossier informs us, the Dorians.² Doson took advantage of the fact that the fortification walls of many cities throughout Doris had collapsed due to an earthquake,³ and of the absence of the Dorian army, which had taken over the protection of Delphi. He conquered Doris, razed the walls and plundered the cities (ll. 93-99). Twenty-two years later, the peace treaty between the Aitolians and Philip V in 206⁴ gave the Dorians a chance to heal their long-standing wounds. They requested from the Aitolian *koinon* the authorization to send an embassy "to the cities and to the kings Ptolemy and Antiochos, with whom they were related through a common descent from Herakles" (ll. 74-76: ποτὶ τὰς πόλεις τὰς συγγενεῖς καὶ τοὺς βασιλεῖς τοὺς ἀπὸ Ἡρακλέους Πτολεμαῖον καὶ Ἀντίοχον); the authorization was granted and covering letters were sent to accompany it (ll. 73-88); subsequently, three Dorians of Kytenion set

¹ Ll. 1-73 contain the decree of Xanthos, ll. 73-79 the Aitolian decree which authorized the missions of the Kytenians, ll. 79-88 a letter of Aitolian generals to Xanthos, and ll. 88-110 the letter of the Kytenians to Xanthos.

² See Étienne / Knoepfler 1976: 331-34; Le Bohec 1993: 154-63; Scholten 2000: 165-78, with sources and bibliography. The Xanthian dossier's first editor preferred to date Doson's raid on Doris in 222 (Bousquet 1988: 45-53). The arguments of F. W. Walbank 1989 (cf. already 1988: 339-40) and Gauthier (*BullEpigr* 1989, 275) were decisive against this view.

³ In the first years of the 220's there seems to have been intense seismic activity in mainland Greece and the Aegean: the present dossier: earthquake in Doris in 228 or slightly earlier; Polyb. 5.88-90: earthquake at Rhodes, ca. 228-226; 20.5.7: παράδοξος ἄμπωτις at Larymna of Boiotia in 227. Bousquet 1988: 42-43 points out that an earthquake of seven or eight degrees on the Richter scale would have been needed for fortification walls to have collapsed. For cities asking for help from royal courts or, later, Rome after an earthquake, see C. P. Jones 1990: 521-22. For ancient earthquakes and the management of disasters in antiquity in general, see Sonnabend 1999.

⁴ Livy 29.12.1; App., *Mac.* 3.2; for the date, see F. W. Walbank 1967: 278. The generalship of Agelaos in Aitolia, under which the embassy was authorized (l. 79) should be dated to 206/5 (Bousquet 1988: 26).

off on a long tour throughout the Greek world; the express aim of the embassy was to secure funds in order to rebuild the walls of their city (ll. 32-33, 63-64, 78-79, 84, 102-103).¹

The financial difficulties of the Xanthians,² their hardly generous yet conspicuously advertised contribution,³ as well as the important mythological references of the letters⁴ need not concern us here. It would be interesting to know which other Doric –or ‘Doric’– cities the ambassadors visited, but this is not recorded. The cities of Karia were probably among their targets. Karia was a regular stop on the route from Greece to Alexandria, especially if the ambassadors had visited Rhodes, also a Doric city;⁵ moreover, Karia had close ties with the Delphic oracle.⁶ It is not clear why Attalos I, also a descendant of Herakles according to court propaganda, was not included in the embassy’s targets.⁷

¹ The Aitolian letter mentions a second aim: invigorating the city’s demographic condition, ὅπως συνοικισθῆι (*scil.* the city) τὰν ταχίσταν (l. 79). Bousquet 1988: 19 correctly translates: “afin qu’elle soit répeuplée le plus tôt possible”. For the terms συνοικίζω / συνοικισμὸς in the Hellenistic period, when they mostly carry the sense of rebuilding, demographic boost or reunification (especially of a city destroyed or in decay), and not of synoecism in the political sense, cf. Robert 1983: 188-91 (who also uses Xanthos’ dossier); Gauthier 1989: 22-23. For the central importance of Kyttenion to Doris, see ll. 32-33 (μεγίστην πόλιν) and Rousset 1989: 221-22.

² Ll. 49-65.

³ It is remarkable that the Xanthians, who only donated 500 drachmas (which the city archons loaned; l. 63), did not hesitate to commission an inscription of 4,579 letters on a stele measuring 1,94 x 0,52 x 0,56 (Bousquet 1988: 12-13). On the basis of the prices as fixed in 279 at Delos (where the competition between engravers had led to the decrease of prices to a third of what they had been some decades before, a development which cannot have occurred at Xanthos), the engraving of the letters alone must have cost ca. twenty drachmas, while procuring and setting up such a stele must have cost at least another five or six drachmas (my calculations are on the basis of *IG IX 2, 161A*; for the cost of setting up an inscription, cf. Mulliez 1998: 819-822, with earlier bibliography). In other words, the advertising of this insignificant donation must have cost at least 5% (and probably a great deal more) of the sum donated.

⁴ See already the highly informative analysis of Bousquet 1998: 29-41; cf. Curty 1995: 189-91; Hadzis 1997; Antonetti 1999: 368-70; Jones 1999: 61-62, 139-43.

⁵ Before Antiochos’ operations, which began in 203, many cities of Karia were probably autonomous or under Rhodian control (see, for example, Ma 1999: 70).

⁶ Bousquet 1988: 37 assumes that Alabanda / Antiocheia of the Chrysaoreis of Karia, a city whose *asylia* was recognized by the Delphic amphictiony slightly later (*CID IV 99*; Rigsby 1996: n° 163) was one of the cities which the ambassadors visited. If so, this can also be assumed for other Karian cities mentioned in the same list of *theorodokoi* (see Robert, *OMS I 327-44*).

⁷ Bousquet 1988: 39 assumes that the presence of an Attalid garrison in the neighbouring city of Lilaia in Phokis 208 (*FD III 4, 132-135 [ISE 81]*) made Attalos unpopular with the Dorians. In fact, the opposite is more likely: the presence of Attalid forces so close to Phokis should render Attalos a primary target of the effort to attract benefactors. Attalos had been a benefactor of the Aitolians from the mid-220’s (Polyb. 4.65.6; the case involves again the rebuilding of walls), their ally by 212 at the latest (Livy 26.24.8; cf. *SVA III 536*) and, of course, during the First Macedonian War, especially during the operations of 210-208 (cf. Will 1982: 89-94); in general, Attalos was a

Another interesting question which has not been dealt with so far is where and when the ambassadors met Antiochos –or, in fact, if they met him at all. The embassy cannot have set out from Doris before the autumn of 206, since authorization for the embassy was granted in the Aitolian year 206/5.¹ In 205, Antiochos was in Persis, from where he conducted operations in the Persian Gulf and Arabia.² In the spring of 204 he was at Babylon.³ It does not seem probable that the Kytenians, with their obviously limited allowance for the embassy, travelled as far as Persis,⁴ or that they waited for a whole year to meet him at –equally far-away– Babylonia; it seems more probable that they did not meet him in person. In that case, they must have met with Zeuxis, second in command for all the areas west of the Taurus Mountains for the greatest part of Antiochos' reign.⁵

The most interesting aspect of this embassy, however, is the bidirectional exploitation of mythological ties of kinship, which became the object of a rather complex diplomatic transaction. The Kytenians and their superior authorities (the Dorians and the Aitolians) placed particular emphasis on the ties of kinship between the Ptolemies and the Seleukids on the one hand –descendants of the Argeads and therefore of Herakles– and the Dorians on the other (ll. 40-42, 47-49, 75-76, 109-110).⁶ Philip and the Antigonids were not included, for obvious political reasons. The result was that, on the level of discourse, the Ptolemies and the Seleukids were presented with a distinct advantage: these were the rightful descendants of the Argeads and the Temenids, kings from the breed of Herakles, and not Philip, a mere descendant of a Macedonian noble.⁷ Moreover, this transparent form of flattery was not directed only to the kings in question, but also to dependent cities. The Kytenians made sure that the Xanthians understood that, should they

known benefactor of cities of metropolitan Greece (Schalles 1985: 60-68, 104-143; Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n^o 26-27, 91-92, 172-175). The Kytenians may have avoided Attalos for two reasons: either because the unknown terms of the treaty between the Aitolians and Philip in 206 included a clause dissolving the alliance between Aitolia and Attalos, in which case the Aitolians thought it would be unwise to contact Attalos a few months after signing this treaty, or because the Aitolians and/or the Dorians thought it would be indelicate to contact simultaneously Antiochos III and one of his enemies.

¹ Ll. 73-74 and 79-80; cf. Bousquet 1988: 26.

² Polyb. 13.9; *I. Magnesia* 18 (OGIS 231, RC 31; Rigsby 1996: n^o 69) ll. 9-10. For the date, see the comments of Kern in *I. Magnesia* and Holleaux, *Études* III 178 n. 4; Schmitt 1964: 28; Ager 1996: 196.

³ See Ma 1999: 64, with the sources.

⁴ It must be said that long distance did not stop ambassadors of Magnesia from visiting Antiochos at Persis: *I. Magnesia* 18, ll. 9-10.

⁵ On Zeuxis, see Ma 1999: 123-30, with earlier bibliography, to which add Malay 2004 (who cites further bibliography in 407 n. 1).

⁶ Bousquet 1988: 40 n. 50 and Curty 1995: 191 aptly point out that relations of kinship with Antiochos are only recorded in the Aitolians' 'general use' letter and not in the more specific, and therefore more careful, letter of the Kytenians to Xanthos.

⁷ Cf. Bousquet 1988: 40-41 and Gauthier, *BullEpigr* 1989, 275.

satisfied Kytenians' request, they would not only please the recipients of the donation, but also, –in fact, “mainly” (μάλιστα)– the Xanthians' “kinsman”, king Ptolemy (ll. 108-110). The Xanthians took the hint: in their decree it was explicitly recorded that they satisfied the request of the Dorians both because they were their kinsmen *and* because they were kinsmen of king Ptolemy (ll. 45-48).¹ In other words, the Xanthians not only accepted the descent of the king from Herakles, but stressed that their donation, despite the city's hard-pressed finances, was granted partly to please the common kinsman of both sides (of the Dorians and the Xanthians), that is, king Ptolemy. It now becomes apparent that the advertisement of their insignificant donation by this verbose and costly inscription did not only serve to bolster up Xanthians' self-esteem and their sense of 'Greekness',² but also to inform the Ptolemaic authorities that the Xanthians accepted this central feature of royal propaganda. At the same time, the Kytenians achieved their aim on many levels: they received money from the Xanthians –insignificant as the sum may have been; they secured publicity for the donation of the Xanthians and for their kinship with people of Doric descent all over the Greek world; they 'forced' the royal court and other cities depending on it to accept them favourably. Despite Kytenion's financial problems and its overall lack of resources and power, the citizens of this remote and insignificant Greek city proved that they were perfectly capable of navigating their way through the meanders of Hellenistic diplomacy.³

The profundity of the three Kytenian ambassadors and the effectiveness with which they exploited their knowledge of mythology⁴ makes it clear that they were

¹ It is not clear from the texts if the Dorians visited Xanthos or Ptolemy first. The former option is more likely: had the ambassadors visited the royal court first, one would expect some sort of reference to royal *eunoia*.

² Erskine 2003 analyses Xanthians' eagerness to publicize their ties with the Dorians mainly within the context of the inclusive sense of Greekness which permeated much of the Hellenistic discourse of kinship.

³ Cf. Buraselis 1993: 261. These intricate patterns of the discourse of συγγένεια do not, in my view, make the Kytenian embassy a characteristic example of “peer polity interaction”, as Ma 2003 seems to believe; or, to put it differently, the Kytenian embassy shows the limits of Hellenistic peer polity interaction. Ma thinks of the network created by the language of kinship, interstate arbitration and common culture in terms of a “mesh of strong horizontal connections of collaboration, assertion and recognition” (2003: 30), so strong that this ‘horizontal’ discourse of kinship permeated even ‘vertical’ relationships, such as the relationship between city and king: “the protocols of peer polity interaction shaped the parameters of superpower behaviour” (*ibid.*). In the case of the Kytenian embassy, however, even if appearing to have been related to a ‘horizontal’ relationship, these protocols formed in fact the base of a ‘triangle’, with Ptolemy as its apex, if I am not pushing the topographical metaphor too far: without the relationship of both the Kytenians and the Xanthians with the king –a ‘vertical’ relationship of unequal weight by definition–, the discourse of the relationship of the Kytenians with the Xanthians would lose much of its performative effectiveness.

⁴ Ma 2003: 20 correctly emphasizes the literate nature of the Kytenians' discourse.

highly educated, perhaps even local intellectuals. Although they are not attested in other sources, their onomastics and prosopography also make it clear that they belonged to leading families of the city, as one would expect for the ambassadors of such an important embassy.¹

AITOLIA

C35. Sosippos

— Σώσιππος Αιτωλὸς ἐκ [.¹¹.]: *FD* III 4, 234 (*IG* IX 1² 1, 203)

Sosippos is the otherwise unknown dedicant of a statue of a king Ptolemy at Delphi (*FD* III, 4, 234). The king in question is most probably Euergetes.²

Although some circumstantial evidence exists on the formal –but not necessarily substantial or close– relations between Aitolia and the Ptolemies already from the first years of the Aitolian expansion,³ it was not before the Demetrian War that the two states got closer and began to cooperate diplomatically and militarily. The only relative sources are the monument of the Ptolemies at Thermon⁴ and two private dedications by Aitolians at Delphi (the statue dedicated by Sosippos and the dedication referred to in the following entry).⁵ By 228, the Aitolians and the Ptolemies were formal allies: Ptolemaic troops fought by the side of the Aitolians in the war against Doson.⁶

¹ Polytas son of Polyxenos, archon of the Kytienians in the mid-second century (*SEG* 40 (1990) 440) was most probably a descendant (son?) of the ambassador Ainetos son of Polytas (cf. already Rousset 1990: 453). The very rare and old name Phegeus (attested already in the *Iliad* 5.11 and 15) is attested once again at Kytention (*SEG* 40 [1990] 445, second century; Rousset 1990: 455-56 also assumes that this is the family of the ambassador Phegeus), while the names Lamprias and Ainetos are also attested elsewhere in Doris (see the relevant entries of *LGNP* IIIB).

² On the date, see Flacelière, *FD*; Huß 1976: 117 n. 67 (who does not exclude Philopator); Jacquemin 1985: 32; F. W. Walbank 1988: 340 n. 1; Scholten 2000: 138 n. 31 (who does not even exclude Philadelphos, perhaps because of Flacelière's dating of the letter forms to the mid-third century).

³ Collective *promanteia* at Delphi for Alexandrians in ca. 276 (*Syll*³ 404); recognition of the Ptolemaia by the amphictiony in 261 (*CID* IV 40); eleven seals of the first three Ptolemies in the epistolary archive of Kallipolis (Pantos 1985: n^{os} 249-259); cf. Scholten 2000: 137-38.

⁴ *IG* IX 1² 1, 56 (*ISE* 86).

⁵ For the date of the monument at Thermon, see the comments of Klaffenbach and Moretti (*apud IG* IX 1² 1, 56 and *ISE* 86 respectively), as well as Urban 1979: 64 n. 302, with further bibliography and, more recently, Bennett 2002 (unconvincingly dating the Thermon monument to 238). The fact that Euergetes' benefaction was offered "to the *ethnos* and to the other Greeks" (εἰς τὸ ἔθνος καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλλήνας) seems to point to the Demetrian War rather than to the events of 228 (see the following note), when the Aitolians fought without "other Greeks". The two private dedications can either date from the Demetrian War or from another point during Euergetes' reign.

⁶ *P. Haun.* 6.18; on the text, cf. Bülow-Jacobsen 1979; for the historical context, see Habicht 1980: 1; Scholten 2000: 171-72; for the events of 228, cf. the preceding entry.

The reasons for this private dedication by an Aitolian can only be guessed at. Most probably, Sosippos belonged to the great number of Aitolians who, throughout the third century but mainly in the reign of Philopator, offered their services to the Ptolemaic army.¹ When the Aitolians became official allies of the Ptolemies, Sosippos undoubtedly thought that the juncture was favourable for him to honour his (former or current) ‘employer’ at the Panhellenic sanctuary of Delphi, thus not only flattering the king but also publicizing his Alexandrian contacts to his fellow countrymen.

C36. Lamios (?)

— *FD* III 4, 233

Lamios (or the son of one Lamios) dedicated a statuary complex of Ptolemy III and his family at Delphi (*FD* III, 4, 233).² The monument has distinct similarities to the Ptolemaic monument at Thermon.³ This does not necessarily mean that the two monuments are contemporary, as is often assumed, but makes much more probable for the complex dedicated by Lamios a date in the reign of Ptolemy III rather than in the reign of Ptolemy IV.⁴

The name Lamios is too common in Aitolia to allow any identifications.⁵ The reasons for the dedication may not have been very different from that of Sosippos (see the preceding entry),⁶ although, admittedly, the setting of the monument (in front of the temple of Apollo) and its scale and magnificence make this dedication significantly more grandiose.

¹ Cf. Launey [1987]: 184-88; Scholten 2000: 23. It has been assumed (Scholten 2000: 182-83) that the increased number of Aitolians in the top ranks of the Ptolemaic army after 221 (Theodotos, Panaitolos, Nikolaos and Dorymenes [Polyb. 4.37.5; 5.61.5, 8-9; 5.62.2]) represents Aitolians who fled to Alexandria after Aitolia’s defeat by Dason in 228.

² The reconstruction of the monument by Klaffenbach (*IG* IX 1² 1, 202), according to which Lamios was a hipparch of the Aitolian *koinon*, does not take into account the new inscribed fragment mentioned by Flacelière 1937: 268 n. 3. As Kosmetatou 2002 pertinently remarks, Lamios may have been the honourand’s name or patronym. For the monument, see also the observations of Huß 1976: 105 n. 7 and Bennett 2002, whose far-reaching conclusions are justifiably questioned by Kosmetatou 2002.

³ *IG* IX 1² 1, 56 (*ISE* 86).

⁴ See the comments in *FD*.

⁵ See *LGPN* IIIA, the indices of *IG* IX 1² 1 and Grainger 2000: 206-209, with twenty-eight examples.

⁶ Jacquemin 1985: 32 offers an alternative theory, equally uncorroborated by the evidence as mine: Lamios or his son may have been ambassadors to Alexandria and thus may have benefited from a personal donation by Euergetes. Hintzen-Bohlen 1990: 145-46 thinks that the monument formed a “Parallelweihung” with that of Thermon; such an interpretation is partly misleading: the Thermon monument was erected to express the gratitude of the *koinon* and to manifest the political relation between the two states, while the monument at Delphi expressed the gratitude of an individual, regardless of any political connotations it may have carried.

C37-38. Thoas and Dikaiarchos sons of Alexandros of Trichonion

— Thoas: *RE*, s.v. Thoas n° 8; *LGPN* IIIA s.v. Θόας n° 2

— Dikaiarchos: Livy 35.12.6, 15-18; for the rest of the sources, see *LGPN* IIIA, s.v. Δικαίαρχος n° 11

Thoas son of Alexandros of Trichonion, four times elected as general of the Aitolian *koinon*,¹ was the undoubted leader² of the anti-Roman (and secondarily, as we shall see, pro-Antiochic) faction of the Aitolian governing elite³ before and after the Antiochic War. He served as secretary of the *koinon* in 205/4 and as general in 203/2,⁴ but we have more substantial information on his activity from 194/3, when he served as general for the second time, onwards. Dikaiarchos, Thoas' brother, served as general in 195/4,⁵ and was one of the members of the embassy to Rome in early 197.⁶

At the spring assembly of the *koinon* at Naupaktos in 193,⁷ the general Thoas expressed in the most inflammatory of ways the total disappointment of the Aitolians at the way they had been treated by the Romans after the end of the Second Macedonian War,⁸ and proposed an embassy to the kings, which would incite the latter to war against the Romans (Livy 35.12.3-5). The composition of the embassy is indicative of Thoas' perception of the international state of affairs at the time:

¹ In 203/2, 194/3, 181/80 and 173/2 (see *IG IX* 1² 1, pp. l-li).

² On Thoas' leadership, see Livy 35.33.7: *Thoas... ceterique factionis eiusdem*. His brother Dikaiarchos is also clearly attested as one of the leaders of the anti-Roman faction (Polyb. 21.31.13; Livy 38.10.6.).

³ Livy 35.32.2: *Thoas princeps gentis*. Not much is known about the family of Thoas. His father Alexandros may be identified with Alexandros of Trichonion, who led the Aitolian forces against Philip V at Thermon in 218 (Polyb. 5.13.3) and with Ἀλέξανδρος Ἀλέξιωνος Τριχονεύς, whose statue the Kytenieis dedicated (*IG IX* 1² 1, 68); cf. Klaffenbach, *ad loc.*; F. W. Walbank 1957: 549-50; Grainger 2000: 31, all of whom have justified reservations regarding this identification; the editors of *LGPN* IIIA tentatively accept that these two Alexandroi were one and the same person, but do not accept their identification with the father of Thoas. Thoas' son Alexandros is known from a statue base found at Thermon (*IG IX* 1² 1, 76), an indication that, despite the adventures of Thoas, the family maintained some political power. Alexandros son of Alexon, guarantor of a proxeny and secretary of the *koinon* in ca. 143/2 (*IG IX* 1² 1, 34, l. 22 and 137, l. 28) was certainly a descendant of the Alexandros of *IG IX* 1² 1, 68, and thus, if the above identification is accepted, the great-grandson of Thoas.

⁴ On the dates, see Klaffenbach *apud IG IX* 1² 1, 32.108.

⁵ See *IG IX* 1² 1, p. l, with the sources.

⁶ Polyb. 18.10.9.

⁷ On the date, see the bibliography cited by Briscoe 1981: 162. It should be noted that Hegeianax, one of Antiochos III's envoys to Rome, on his way home from Italy, must have come in contact with the Aitolians, since he was honoured as *proxenos* at Delphi in 193 (*Syll*³ 585, l. 44; cf. Grainger 2002: 147-49).

⁸ The Roman attitude is epigrammatically described by Polybios (18.34.1): [Flamininus] οὐκ ἐβούλετο Φίλιππον ἐκβαλὼν ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς Αἰτωλοῦς καταλιπεῖν δεσπότης τῶν Ἑλλήνων. Cf. Deininger 1971: 58-66, esp. 59: "Dieses Mißverhältnis... beruhte auf einer falschen Einschätzung der Möglichkeiten, des Wesens und der Ziele der römischen Politik".

Damokritos would visit Nabis, Nikandros would go to Philip V, and Thoas' brother Dikaiarchos to Antiochos III (35.12.6). Damokritos and Dikaiarchos were already leading statesmen of the *koinon*, and Nikandros, hipparch for that year, was soon to acquire similar status;¹ still, it is indicative of Thoas' intentions that he arranged for his brother to visit Antiochos. The master of Asia was the primary target of the embassy, and it was on him that the Aitolians placed most of their hopes. The ambassadors to Nabis and Philip presented Antiochos' invasion of Europe as a decision already taken and an imminent fact (35.12.9 and 13); for the Aitolians, Macedonia and Sparta would be merely a useful addition to a coalition led by Antiochos and the Aitolians. Thoas and Dikaiarchos secured their leading position by reserving for themselves the role of intermediaries between the two main constituent parts of the coalition from the very beginning.²

The diplomatic effort of Thoas and the Aitolians received significant help from a high-ranking officer of Antiochos, Alexandros of Akarnania, a former φίλος of Philip V.³ Although his assistance is not explicitly attested, in a slightly later royal council Alexandros used the Aitolian arguments *verbatim*: Antiochos must invade Greece immediately, the Aitolians are ready to take up arms, Nabis and Philip merely wait for the Aitolians' signal to join the anti-Roman alliance (35.18). It is no accident that a few months earlier Alexandros and his sons had been honoured with proxeny at Delphi.⁴

In the autumn of the same year, when his term of office ended, Thoas led another embassy to Antiochos (35.32.2), in a new effort to convince the Seleukid king to take action immediately. He returned to Aitolia with Menippos, an emissary of the king.⁵ Both of them exaggerated the military and financial strength of the king both in private conversations in Aitolia and in the spring assembly of 192. Menippos, no doubt with Thoas' approval, proclaimed the anti-Roman manifesto of the Aitolians and Antiochos (35.32.3-11). Despite the diplomatic efforts of the

¹ On Nikandros, see **C39**, below; Damokritos had already served as general in 200/199 (*IG IX 1*² 1, p. li); for the rest of the sources, see Grainger 2000: 141.

² The leading role of the two brothers was explicitly recognized after the war (Polyb. 21.31.13; Livy 38.10.6).

³ Alexandros as φίλος of Philip: Livy 35.18.1. He must have switched camps after the battle of Kynos Kephalai. To his 'Macedonian' period belongs his choice of names for his sons: Antigonos and Philippos (*Syll*³ 585, ll. 13-15).

⁴ *Syll*³ 585, ll. 13-15. Alexandros did not only advance the interests of the Aitolians, with whom he enjoyed a friendly relationship, but also his personal interests: a courtier known as *tamquam peritus Graeciae nec ignarus Romanorum* (Livy 35.18.2) would naturally have expected to be appointed as a senior officer of the Seleukid army if war broke out; his expectations were eventually met (on Alexandros, see also **C43-C44**, below).

⁵ On Menippos, see Olshausen 1974: 196-97 n° 139; Grainger 1997: 105; Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 30-31 n° 151; Tataki 1998: 370 n° 56; Grainger 2002: index. He was not related to the homonymous Seleukid official who was honoured at Keos (**D70**, below).

Athenians and Flamininus, the Aitolians decided to invite Antiochos as liberator of the Greeks and arbiter of their differences with the Romans (35.32.12-33.11).

The indecision of Antiochos, despite successful (Demetrias) and unsuccessful (Sparta, Chalkis) Aitolian efforts to provide him with bases during 192,¹ forced Thoas to lead yet another embassy to Antiochos in the late summer of the same year (35.42.4-14; cf. App., *Syr.* 46-47; Zon. 9.19). The insistence of the leaders of the anti-Roman faction that Antiochos should act immediately was due to strategic considerations but also to the domestic state of affairs: on the one hand, Antiochos' coming to Greece was necessary if the anti-Roman feelings in the Greek mainland were to be kept alive and active; on the other hand, the Aitolian faction which was hesitant to go to war against the Romans had regained control, as the election of Phaineas as general for 192/1² demonstrated. The internal political struggle in Aitolia continued even after Antiochos' disembarkation at Thessaly in October 192. In the extraordinary assembly of the *koinon* at Lamia, despite Antiochos' presence and speech (35.44), Phaineas attempted an impossible compromise: he proposed that Antiochos remain in Greece only as *reconciliator pacis* and arbiter of the differences between Aitolia and Rome (35.45.2-4). Thoas, more in concert with the dynamic of events which he and his faction had helped provoke, managed to convince the representatives to name Antiochos plenipotentiary general of the *koinon*, with a thirty-member consultative council of Aitolians by his side (Livy 35.45.5-9; cf. App., *Syr.* 46).³ Thoas' plan had worked: the anti-Roman coalition would have the king as its leader and Thoas and members of his faction in the king's council.⁴ The limited participation of Aitolians in the hostilities which ensued shows that his political opponents were still strong within Aitolia.⁵ This, perhaps, was not so important to Thoas. His plan was not simply to lead Aitolia to war; it was to become a member of the leadership of the coalition which would go to war. As in so many cases in the present catalogue, personal ambitions often led local statesmen outside the strict perimeter of their state.

After Antiochos' defeat at Thermopylai in April 191 and his return to Asia, the Romans laid siege to Herakleia, where the leadership of the Aitolian *koinon* had taken refuge. Thoas, along with Nikandros, led another embassy to the Seleukid king (Polyb. 20.10.16) in a desperate effort to secure troops (with or without the presence of the king) or, at least, money in order to face the Romans. Antiochos

¹ Livy 35.34-39; cf. **C45** and **D88-D89**, below. Thoas commanded the Aitolian force which attempted the takeover of Chalkis (Livy 35.34.5 and 38.11).

² The sources have been gathered by Klaffenbach, *IG IX 1² 1*, p. li.

³ Antiochos' real title was undoubtedly στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ: this is the term which Appian uses and Polybios must have used, since Livy renders it as *imperator*.

⁴ Thoas' inclusion in this council is attested at the meeting between Antiochos and the Aitolian *principes* at Demetrias in early 191 (Livy 36.6.6-7.21).

⁵ See Deininger 1971: 97; Will 1982: 205, 207.

merely sent money, made some vague promises that he would offer military assistance and decided to keep Thoas by his side (Livy 36.26).

Thoas' stay at the Seleukid court is of particular interest. Livy presents it as a royal decision and even uses the strong verb *retineo*, as if Thoas had become a hostage of Antiochos; he also makes it clear, however, that Thoas was more than eager to stay, so as to continue to oversee the fulfilment of the king's promises.¹ Hostages were often held in the context of treaties and alliances; this type of captivity, however, meant that party 'A', holding hostage someone from party 'B' of the agreement, expected that party 'B' would adhere to the terms of the agreement.² But, in this particular case, it was party 'B', that is, the Aitolians, who expected something from party 'A', that is, from Antiochos. It is absurd to believe that the 'hostage' was the one to oversee the captor, as Livy writes. In my view, it cannot have been Antiochos' demand that Thoas stay at court; in any case, it served none of his interests in mainland Greece.³ The king would obviously not have minded having a statesman with long experience in Greek affairs at his court; moreover, Thoas could be used as a pole of attraction for experienced soldiers to join the Seleukid army, as Skopas had been used as a *xenologos* of the Ptolemaic army.⁴ Nevertheless, it must have been Thoas himself who solicited his stay at the Seleukid court, as it was mainly to his advantage that this 'captivity' would work. His motives are obvious. The anti-Roman camp in Greece had already been more or less dissolved by 191; after Antiochos' departure, it was inevitable that the Romans would prevail. To remain as far away as possible from the victors, at least until the situation became clearer, was certainly the safest option for the Aitolian statesman who had been the principal instigator of the war. Ensuing developments vindicated his move: immediately after the Aitolian ambassadors departed from Herakleia,

¹ Livy 36.26.6: *Thoantem... retinuit, et ipsum haud invitum morantem, ut exactor praesens promissorum adesset.*

² See the examples given in p. 252 n. 2, above; cf. Briscoe 1981: 259.

³ Briscoe (*op. cit.*), who believes that the decision was the king's, writes that Antiochos' motives are unclear. His tentative suggestion that Antiochos did not trust Thoas (cf. Livy 36.15.2), which is why he preferred to keep him by his side, does not take into account that in this way the king deprived the Aitolians of the main supporter of the war, a war which he continued to finance. One can assume that Antiochos wished to maintain the channels of communication with the Aitolians open, despite the failure of his Greek policy, but, even so, Thoas would be of much more use in Aitolia rather than in the Seleukid court.

⁴ On Skopas, see the sources in Grainger 2000: 298-99. Skopas is absent from the present catalogue because no connection of his with the Ptolemies is attested before his exile in 205/4 (Polyb. 13.2.1), nor should it be necessarily assumed. For an experienced administrator and general like Skopas, turning to the Ptolemaic court after having been banished from his homeland would have been a sensible career move, even if he had had no prior contacts with Alexandria; this is what the aforementioned passage of Polybios implies: μετέωρος ἦν εἰς τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν, ταῖς ἐκεῖθεν ἐλπίσι πεπεισμένος ἀναπληρῶσειν τὰ λείποντα τοῦ βίου καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ πλεῖον ἐπιθυμίαν.

the city was conquered by the Romans, who captured the general Damokritos and forty-one leaders of the anti-Roman faction.¹ Once again, a diplomatic mission to a royal court was used as a means of escape in the face of imminent personal danger.

Soon afterwards, the Romans demanded the surrender of other anti-Roman leaders as well, including Dikaiarchos.² Apparently, the Roman demand was not satisfied: Dikaiarchos remained in Aitolia, where he was again elected general for 188/7 (?).³ Thoas, on the other hand, remained by Antiochos even after the king's defeat at Magnesia. The Romans repeatedly asked for his extradition, which they finally achieved in 188.⁴ He was later released from captivity, returned to Aitolia, and continued his political activity, albeit now as a member of the pro-Roman faction; this part of Thoas' career, however, belongs to a period which lies beyond the chronological limits of the present study.⁵

In examining Thoas' connection with the Seleukid court we should make the distinction between the political motives of the Aitolians and diplomatic manipulations revealing personal agendas. Approaching Antiochos, the strongest possible ally against the Romans, served the purposes of a large part of the Aitolian leadership; this kind of diplomatic activity and collaboration between states is of no particular interest to the present study. Thoas' handling of affairs, on the other hand, is of particular interest. From the very start, he succeeded in keeping for himself (initially through the mediation of his brother) the role of the principal intermediary between the two sides and, consequently, a leading position in their coalition. The benefits of this role are obvious and they are repeatedly observable throughout the present catalogue. In Thoas' case two of them are easy to recognize: the chief intermediary acquired status which exceeded the boundaries of the political entity to which he originally belonged, while his personal connection with the royal court could also ensure him a safe haven in troubled times.

¹ Livy 36.22-24; App., *Syr.* 94; Zon. 9.19. Characteristically, Phaineas, leader of the pro-Roman faction, led the Aitolian effort for an honourable surrender (Polyb. 20.9-10; Livy 36.28).

² Polyb. 20.10.5; Livy 36.28.3.

³ Dikaiarchos' second generalship is not explicitly attested but is surmised from the fact that his first generalship is called "the first" (τὸ α') in 195/4, and the fact that 188/7 is the only possible date for his (required) second generalship (see *IG IX 1*² 1, p. l-li).

⁴ Livy 37.45.17; 38.38.18; Polyb. 21.17.7; 21.42.11; Diod. Sic. 29.10.

⁵ Release from captivity (before 181): Polyb. 28.4.11; Diod. Sic. 29.31; general in 181/0 and 173/2: *IG IX 1*² 1, p. li; pro-Roman policy: Polyb. 28.4.10-13.

C39. Nikandros son of Bittos of Trichonion

— Polyb. 20.10.16; 20.11; Livy 35.12.6, 10-14; 36.29.3-11; for the rest of the sources, see *RE s.v.* Nikandros n° 4

One of the earliest attestations of Nikandros of Trichonion is in connection with the embassy to Philip V, which was part of the tripartite diplomatic effort proposed by Thoas in 193 (35.12.6, 10-14; see the preceding entry). Other than that, Nikandros is only known to have served as hipparch in 194/3 (with Thoas, then general, as his superior).¹ After his failed attempt to attract Philip into the anti-Roman alliance, he is next attested accompanying Thoas on the fourth Aitolian embassy to Antiochos, in the early summer of 191 (Polyb. 20.10.16; Livy 36.29.3), when the conquest of Herakleia by the Romans and the final defeat of the Aitolians was soon to come. In contrast to Thoas, who preferred to stay at the Seleukid court, Nikandros returned to Aitolia and was a key figure in subsequent events.

He disembarked at Phalara, the port of Lamia, while the negotiations between the Aitolians and Rome after the takeover of Herakleia were still under way.² Nikandros secretly sent to Lamia –which had just been evacuated by Philip– the money which Antiochos had dispatched to the Aitolians for the war. He then attempted to head for Hypata, avoiding both the Macedonian army, still in the outskirts of Lamia, and the Roman army, which was in Herakleia. He was nonetheless arrested by the Macedonians and brought to Philip. The king treated him with unexpected kindness, obviously not because of their meeting two years earlier, but because he wanted to pave the way for a future alliance between Aitolia and Macedonia. Nikandros was surprised by the favourable treatment he received from the king and subsequently remained favourably disposed towards the Macedonian throne until the times of Perseus, at least according to the testimony of Polybios (Polyb. 20.11; Livy 36.29.3-11), whose description at this point, however, does not seem to correspond to the events of later periods.³

When Nikandros returned to Hypata, Phaineas had already summoned an extraordinary assembly of the *koinon*, which would confirm the terms of the surrender to the Romans. Nikandros hastened to inflame the anti-Roman feelings of the majority (Polyb. 20.10.15) by insisting on Antiochos' promises that he would

¹ IG IX 1² 1, 187, l. 3.

² For the negotiations until the arrival of Nikandros, see Livy 36.27-28.

³ Polybios may have heard the details of this episode from Nikandros himself, during the latter's captivity in Rome (F. W. Walbank 1957: 34). It must be stressed, however, that the supposed pro-Macedonian feelings of Nikandros did not stop him from participating in military operations against Philip in 190/89 (see in the text below). In fact, there is no source that would justify Polybios' judgement on the pro-Macedonian feelings of Nikandros. The fact that he was banished to Rome in the beginning of the Third Macedonian War (see also in the text below) could be taken to imply that he favoured Perseus, but his steadfastly anti-Roman policy would certainly have constituted a sufficient reason for his banishment. These observations explain why Hammond 1988: 452 n. 2 doubted the historicity of a cordial meeting between Nikandros and Philip.

help. The Aitolians did not eventually sign the treaty and remained at war with Rome (20.10.16-17); for the next two years they would make repeated unsuccessful attempts to come to a compromise with the Romans.¹

A detail of Nikandros' argumentation should be commented upon. He particularly emphasized "the king's favour to him personally and his promises that he would help in the future" (20.10.16: <τὴν> τοῦ βασιλέως εἰς αὐτὸν προθυμίαν καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸ μέλλον ἐπαγγελίας). The royal ἐπαγγελίαι were directed to the Aitolians in general; the royal προθυμία, however, was directed to Nikandros personally. One is tempted to think that προθυμία in this passage simply means that the king received Nikandros warmly,² but this sense of the word is hardly ever attested in Polybios; when used by Polybios in a diplomatic context, the προθυμία displayed by a king almost always means that the king was favourably disposed towards another state and showed eagerness to offer his assistance; it is an abstract term of interstate relations, not a concrete term of diplomatic practice.³ In other words, Nikandros, bearer of royal promises and royal money,⁴ did not only convey the promises and the *eunoia* of the king to the Aitolians but presented himself as the main –present and possibly also future– channel of expression of this *eunoia*. Evidently, Nikandros, like Thoas before him, tried to secure the position of the chief

¹ On these diplomatic efforts of the Aitolians, see the details in Deininger 1971: 98-104.

² This is how the passage is usually translated. Paton, for example, in the Loeb edition, translates: "... informed them of King Antiochus's cordial reception of him".

³ See, for example, 2.50.3 and 11; 4.72.6; 21.3.2; 22.9.4; 31.3.2, 8.7. This is not, of course, the case only when the προθυμία is displayed by a king; see 3.44.11; 7.9.8; 10.17.14; 21.22.3; 22.5.2; 30.3.1. This diplomatic προθυμία is often accompanied by εὔνοια (perhaps to emphasize the difference from the phrase ὄρμη καὶ προθυμία, used in a military context), a term belonging even more clearly to the vocabulary of interstate relations. It is no accident that this is also the sense of προθυμία in epigraphic texts (see, for example, the index of the *Sylloge* or of Rigsby 1996). As far as I have been able to confirm, there is only one example of the term in the sense "warm reception" in Polybios, and even this is ambiguous: when the Lappaian received μετὰ πάσης προθυμίας the Lyttians, whose city had just been destroyed (4.54.5), the term προθυμία seems to refer both to the reception of the Lyttians and to the interstate relationship. In any case, μετὰ πάσης προθυμίας... ὑποδεξαμένων has different connotations from the phrase καὶ διασαφούντος τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως εἰς αὐτὸν προθυμίαν which concerns us here.

⁴ Interestingly, Nikandros does not mention the money he brought from the Seleukid court and managed to rescue from the Macedonians by sending it to Lamia (20.11.4). If this is not a simple oversight of Polybios, it is certainly a suspect omission, especially since this tangible proof of royal favour would have greatly served the rhetorical purposes of Nikandros' speech. The money does not show up in Polybios' narrative again and it is therefore not implausible to assume that Nikandros embezzled it. The embezzlement of royal funds given as a donation to a city or an *ethnos* by its bearer was apparently not uncommon: as we have seen, Aratos is explicitly praised for *not* embezzling such a donation (Plut., *Arat.* 14.1).

intermediary between the Aitolians and the Seleukid throne. It is no accident that a year later he was for the first time elected general of the *koinon* for 190/89.¹

Afterwards, Nikandros led the Aitolian efforts to secure territorial benefits, mainly from Philip, before the final settlement imposed by the Romans.² A final attempt to repel Roman forces at Ambrakia in 189 was doomed in advance,³ and Nikandros finally decided to send an embassy to Fulvius, which would negotiate the final surrender of the Aitolians;⁴ afterwards he and his opponent Phaineas led the embassy to Rome, which ratified the treaty.⁵ Nikandros remained politically active for a long time,⁶ and did not alter his anti-Roman stance, for which he was finally, some time before 171, banished to Rome, where he died in captivity.⁷

Evaluating the importance of Nikandros' contacts with Antiochos is partly hindered by the fact that the Aitolian statesman chose the losing side. If the victory of the Romans had not come so soon after his return from the Seleukid court, I believe it would be even clearer that, to a large extent, Nikandros owed his leading position in the *koinon* to his embassy to Antiochos in 191.

AKARNANIA

C40. Aristophantos

— Polyb. 5.6.1

In the spring of 218 two embassies met Philip V in Kephallenia. The Messenians proposed a surprise attack in Messenia, a large part of which was under the control of Lykourgos of Sparta, while the Akarnanians asked Philip to invade Aitolia. Leontios favoured the Messenian proposal, but Philip preferred to take Aratos' advice, agreed to fulfill the Akarnanian request, disembarked at the Ambrakian Gulf and headed for Thermon (Polyb. 5.5).⁸

There is no doubt that the mastermind behind the embassy was Aristophantos, the otherwise unknown general of the Akarnanians, who, "having with him the full force of the Akarnanians", hastened to meet Philip at Limnaia (5.6.1). The Akarnanian army must have proved very helpful in the raid and destruction of Thermon

¹ For the sources, see Klaffenbach, *IG IX 1² 1*, p. li. Nikandros' election in the fall of 190, when the Roman army was about to cross over to Asia for the final confrontation with Antiochos, is indicative of the strength of the anti-Roman faction. During the year Aitolian - Roman relations had remained unchanged (Deininger 1971: 98-104).

² Polyb. 21.25; Livy 38.1-3.

³ Polyb. 21.27-28; Livy 38.4-7.

⁴ Polyb. 21.28.18; Livy 38.8.1-2.

⁵ Polyb. 21.30.15.

⁶ He served as general in 184/3 and 177/6 (see *IG IX 1² 1*, p. li) and as *hieromnemon* at the amphictiony in 178 (*CID IV 108*).

⁷ Polyb. 28.4.6; cf. 20.11.10.

⁸ Cf. p. 271 n. 2, above, for the way Polybios used this episode to 'prove' the 'conspiracy of Apelles'.

which followed. This is not the first time that the Akarnanians allied themselves with Philip against the Aitolians. A year earlier, in 219, a force of 2,000 infantry and 200 cavalry had followed Philip to his raid on Aitolia (4.63.7). As Polybios notes (5.6.2), the constant raids of Aitolians on Akarnania had inflamed the belligerent feelings of the Akarnanians. It was the Aitolian pressure which had led to the incorporation of Akarnania into Doson's Greek Alliance.¹

Even if we had more information on Aristophantos, there would be no reason to investigate his actions and motives any further. The embassy which he sent to Philip and the participation of the Akarnanians in the war betray no traces of personal policies being at work; they were self-evident moves which expressed the wishes and needs of the overwhelming majority of the Akarnanians.

C41. Androkles — C42. Echedamos son of Mnasilochos of Leukas

— Androkles: Livy 33.16.4

— Echedamos: Livy 33.16.4; IG IX 1² 2, 583 (SVA III 523), l. 2

Aitolian pressure on Akarnania continued even after the end of the Social War. Inevitably, the Akarnanian alliance with Macedonia remained strong until the Second Macedonian War.² The turning point for Akarnania, as for many states in Greece, came in 198 with the military operations and, especially, the diplomatic endeavours of Flamininus, whose chief aim was the diplomatic isolation of Philip: Epirus and the majority of the Achaians abandoned the Macedonian camp that year.³ Flamininus' first attempt to win over the Akarnanians as well came in the winter of 198/7, when he sent his brother Lucius *ad temptandam Acarnanum gentem* (Livy 32.40.7). Lucius' mission was not successful, but helped create a pro-Roman faction⁴ for the first time in Akarnanian history,⁵ which was to make a dynamic appearance a few months later.

¹ On the Akarnanian *koinon* in the period 230-217, see mainly Dany 1999: 136-49, with sources and earlier bibliography.

² The reconquest of Akarnania was one of the strongest motives offered by the Romans to the Aitolians for the conclusion of the treaty of 212 (Livy 26.24.6-11; on the treaty, see SVA III 536 and Dany 1999: 153-62). The Akarnanians remained allies of Philip in the First Macedonian War, suffered repeated Aitolian raids (see Dany 1999: 162-64), and were *foederi adscripti* of Philip at the peace treaty of Phoinike in 205 (Livy 29.12.14; cf. SVA III 543). Livy explicitly connects the Akarnanians' animosity towards the Aitolians with the former's alliance with Macedonia (Livy 33.16.2).

³ Livy 32.10-11, 14.5-6 (Epirus); 32.19-23 (Achaia).

⁴ Cf. Dany 1999: 175.

⁵ Even if we accepted the historicity of Justin's testimony (28.1.2) that the Romans had mediated to the Aitolians on behalf of the Akarnanians in ca. 240 (for the long relevant discussion, see the references in Briscoe 1973: 96, who tends to reject the historical character of the episode, and Corsten 1992 and Dany 1999: 98-119, who accept it), this was certainly an isolated incident, which cannot as such account for the existence of Akarnanian statesmen favourable to Rome in 197.

By the spring of 197¹ the Boiotians –who had kept themselves aloof from the war until then– joined the Roman camp as well; the Akarnanians were now the sole allies of Philip in the Greek mainland.² At Kerkyra, Lucius summoned some of the Akarnanian *principes* –apparently the leaders of the pro-Roman faction (Livy 33.16.1). When these *principes* returned, an extraordinary assembly of the *koinon* was summoned at Leukas, with limited participation;³ the *principes* and the officials of the *koinon* managed to secure a vote in favour of an alliance with Rome. Those who had not attended the assembly, led by Androkles and Echedamos, *duo principes Acarnanum* who had just arrived a *Philippo missi*, did not accept the decision. The decree was declared invalid as *privatum decretum*, Archelaos and Bianor⁴ who had proposed it were found guilty of high treason, and general Zeuxis, who had allowed the vote, was deposed (33.16.3-5).⁵ Those convicted managed to win the pity of the representatives and achieved the annulment of the decrees against them, but the Akarnanians maintained their alliance with Philip (33.16.6-11). This resulted in the tight siege and finally the conquest of Leukas by Lucius and, after Kynos Kephalai, in the unconditional surrender of the Akarnanians (33.17).

There is no need to dwell here on the procedural details of the whole incident;⁶ we only need to focus on the presence, position and role of Androkles and

¹ For the date, see F. W. Walbank 1940: 323; Dany 1999: 175-76.

² Livy 33.1-2 (Boiotia); 33.16.1 (the Akarnanians as sole allies of Philip).

³ Livy 33.16.3: “Eo (at Leukas) *neque cuncti convenere Acarnanum populi... placuit*”.

⁴ Bianor may be identified with the Leukadian archon of the *koinon* in 216, Βιάνωρ Θάλωνος (IG IX 1² 2, 583, l. 20; the identification is owed to Habicht 1957b: 118). Echedamos was hipparch in the same year (l. 2; this almost certain identification is again Habicht's).

⁵ All this must have happened during a new assembly (where the pro-Macedonians had the majority), although Livy does not say so (see 33.16.4: Androkles and Echedamos arrived *in hoc fremitu gentis*).

⁶ Deininger 1971: 48 and n. 9 supposes that the pro-Macedonians willingly abstained from the first assembly in protest against the pro-Romans' ploy. But what followed clearly shows that the pro-Macedonians had the majority, so that they had no reason to abstain from the assembly. Besides, even some of those who *had* attended the first assembly disagreed with the pro-Roman vote (33.16.3). It is more probable that the pro-Roman officials summoned the assembly in haste, purposely avoiding notifying the most devoted pro-Macedonian cities (Oost 1954: 50; Briscoe 1973: 278; Dany 1999: 267-68). *Privatum decretum* is not a technical term. Larsen 1968: 270 n. 5 thinks that the decree was irregular because unanimity in the vote of the cities was required; this is totally unsubstantiated. Oost 1954: 51; Deininger 1971: 48; Briscoe 1973: 278 more plausibly assume that the pro-Macedonians claimed that, since attendance in the assembly which enacted the decree was below quorum, this was not a proper decree, but an expression of the private views of those who participated. Dany 1999: 269-70, on the other hand, assumes that Livy misunderstood a comment of Polybios that no individual had the right to suggest the dissolution of the alliance with Philip (a comment which would contain a phrase like εἰ δὲ ἔτας [cf. IG IX 1² 2, 583, l. 74], which was subsequently corrupted to ἰδιώτης and eventually translated to Livy's *privatum decretum*); but this is a rather speculative theory.

Echedamos. Livy calls them Akarnanian *principes*,¹ active leaders of the *koinon*. Therefore, the fact that they were “sent by Philip” should not be taken to mean that they belonged to the Macedonian administration, but rather, according to Dany’s attractive hypothesis,² that they were the commanders of the Akarnanian forces, who fought along with the Macedonians at Corinth and returned to Akarnania along with the contingent they commanded.³ This hypothesis explains the ease with which the pro-Romans achieved the reversal of the traditional Akarnanian foreign policy: during the illegal first assembly most of the prominent pro-Macedonian Akarnanians must have been away at Corinth. It also explains the reason why this policy was reinstated immediately after their return. Nevertheless, it should be noted that their return was the result of a direct order by Philip, who preferred depriving his army of an important addition at a very critical point in the war rather than losing his last Greek ally. This means that, although Androkles and Echedamos expressed the will of the majority of the Akarnanians, their policy was imposed in close collaboration with the Macedonian king. As was the case with Aristophantos, however, it would be a mistake to believe that the dominance of the pro-Macedonian faction was only due to the support and supervision of the Macedonian throne; in 197, as in 218, the geographical position of Akarnania and the opposition between the Akarnanians and the Aitolians were sufficient reasons for the former to ally themselves with Macedonia.⁴

Androkles is not otherwise attested.⁵ As we have already seen, Echedamos had already served as hipparch in 216 (*IG IX 1² 2*, 583, l. 2). We know nothing about the two men after the Akarnanian surrender to the Romans. Echedamos’ son in a sense continued his father’s anti-Roman policy, but chose to ally himself with a different monarch (see the following entry).

¹ That they belonged to the political elite of the *koinon* is confirmed by the fairly probable identification of Echedamos with a hipparch of 216 (*IG IX 1² 2*, 583, l. 2).

² Dany 1999: 179; cf. Deininger 1971: 48.

³ Livy 33.14.5. According to Livy (33.14.1), the battle of Corinth took place on the very same day as the battle of Kynos Kephalai. This precise synchronization is by definition suspect (Briscoe 1973: 275). If Dany’s hypothesis is accepted, the battle of Corinth must be dated slightly earlier. The Akarnanians who participated were probably an official contingent sent by the *koinon* and not mercenaries (Launey [1987]: 204; Klaffenbach, *IG IX 1² 2*, p. xxvi; Dany 1999: 179), in contrast to the Boiotian participants (cf. p. 321 n. 6, above).

⁴ Cf. Dany 1999: 176.

⁵ Androkles (no ethnic), officer of the Macedonian army in 168 (Livy 44.32.7), should probably be considered a Macedonian (cf. Tatakis 1998: 241 n° 143).

C43. Mnasilochos son of Echedamos of Leukas

— Polyb. 21.17.7, 42.11; Livy 36.11.8-12.11; 37.45.17; 38.38.18

In the early spring of 191¹ Antiochos III was at Stratos in Aitolia,² where he met with the Akarnanian *princeps* Mnasilochos. According to Livy, the latter had been bribed by the king and had managed to win over to the pro-Antiochic camp the Akarnanian general Klytos; he then devised a plan for the accession of Akarnania, either willingly or by force, to the anti-Roman camp. As the Roman fleet, stationed at Kephallenia, made Leukas an unattainable target, Mnasilochos' first target was to win over Medeon and Thyrraeion; control of these two cities would secure control over eastern Akarnania for Antiochos. He arranged for an inadequate Akarnanian force to be sent to Medeon and Thyrraeion, on the pretext of repelling Antiochos (Livy 36.11.8-11). When royal emissaries arrived at Medeon and asked that it allied with the king, its inhabitants, on the suggestion of general Klytos, requested permission to relegate the subject to an assembly of the *koinon*. Mnasilochos arranged for himself and his collaborators to comprise the Akarnanian embassy³ which would report this decision to the king. The ambassadors stalled on purpose, and, as a result, Antiochos reached the city gates. Klytos and Mnasilochos accepted the king into the city and the Medeonians, others willingly, others for fear, went over to the king's side; other Akarnanian cities followed suit.⁴ The citizens of Thyrraeion were not as friendly, although Antiochos had sent Mnasilochos and his co-ambassadors to prepare the ground. Encouraged by rumours that the Roman army was advancing, the Thyrraeians replied to Antiochos that they would not agree on any alliance without the consent of the Roman authorities. Antiochos was forced to leave a small force at Medeon and other positions in Akarnania and retired to Aitolia (33.12). He was followed by Mnasilochos, who, ever since, attached himself to the Seleukid court as other leaders of the anti-Roman

¹ For the date, see Livy 36.11.5; cf. Walbank 1940: 329, 344; Deininger 1971: 95; Dany 1999: 192.

² The movements of Antiochos' forces are described in an incomprehensible way by Livy 36.11.7-8 (cf. Briscoe 1981: 236). In any case, the adverb *ibi*, which denotes the place where Mnasilochos met Antiochos, must refer to Stratos (near the Akarnanian borders) mentioned immediately above. Oost 1954: 127 n. 146, assumes that it refers to Akarnania in general, not previously mentioned because Livy summarizes inadequately Polybios' original.

³ Livy gives the impression that Klytos and Mnasilochos were Medeonians and that the embassy was of Medeon (so Oost 1954: 127 n. 143, Deininger 1971: 95 n. 5, with reservations; Grainger 2002: 234-35; *contra* Dany 1999: 192 n. 10). Even if we do not accept that Mnasilochos came from Leukas (for the prosopographical data see the preceding entry), this is rather unlikely: for such a serious issue of foreign policy the Medeonians could not have decided on their own, without the approval of the federal institutions.

⁴ Numismatic evidence strongly suggests that Astakos was one of them; for the Akarnanian issues of coins with Seleukid symbols, see Dany 1999: 195-96 and 337-38 n^{os} VIII 1 and X 2-3, with earlier bibliography.

faction did.¹ After the war, the Romans demanded his surrender, which was effected after the treaty of Apameia in 188.² The fate of general Klytos is unknown. We also do not possess any further information regarding Akarnania before the end of the war; the next episode in Akarnanian history reveals that anti-Roman tendencies persisted in the area until the 170's.³

Although Livy often accuses the enemies of Rome of having been bribed, and thus his accusations should always be treated with circumspect, in this particular case Livy may be actually right. It is clear that very few Akarnanians had sympathy for the cause of Antiochos, the ally of the hated Aitolians.⁴ The feelings of the majority were made evident at Thyrraeion, where, despite the presence of the Seleukid army, the inadequacy of the Akarnanian force and the propaganda of Mnasilochos and his collaborators, the citizens refused to join the king.⁵ They are also made evident by the way Mnasilochos operated; had he thought that a significant part of the population would have welcomed the alliance with Antiochos, he would not have proceeded in such a secretive and dishonest manner, nor would he have proposed that forces be sent at Medeon and Thyrraeion *against* Antiochos. Naturally, Mnasilochos was not alone; tensions within the Akarnanian elite, perhaps centrifugal tendencies in some Akarnanian cities and the need to leave alternatives open⁶ can account for the support which Mnasilochos received from a part of the Akarnanian leadership. Still, it is clear that this group was small; perhaps not even general Klytos belonged to it, despite Livy's assertion to the contrary.⁷ Alexandros son of Antiochos must have exerted great influence on the group: an Akarnanian himself, he was a high-ranking φίλος of Antiochos, followed the king to Greece and led Seleukid forces in Aitolia during these events.⁸ He must have set a welcome example for Mnasilochos: accommodating the plans of a powerful ruler could prove personally beneficial even if it was contrary to the wishes of the majority. It is no accident that at Thyrraeion Mnasilochos presented himself as a Seleukid emissary rather than as an Akarnanian statesman; his ending up at the Seleukid court was the natural conclusion of his career.

¹ See C37, above and D88-89, below.

² Polyb. 21.17.7; 21.42.11; Livy 37.45.17; 38.38.18.

³ Deininger 1971: 175-76.

⁴ Livy 35.45.9; App., Syr. 12.

⁵ The fact that other Akarnanian cities joined Antiochos was certainly the result of fear rather than of strategic considerations.

⁶ If Antiochos came out as the victor, it would be dangerous for the Akarnanians to leave the Aitolians as the king's only allies in the area.

⁷ Klytos wisely delayed the decision of the *koinon*, despite the menace of the Seleukid army, and only accepted Antiochos at Medeon when it had become clear that otherwise the king would simply conquer the city. Although not necessarily hostile to the king, no pro-Antiochic tendency can be detected in his actions. Dany 1999: 193 also stresses Klytos' neutrality.

⁸ Livy 33.11.6. On the sources on Alexandros, cf. the following entry.

C44. Alexandros son of Antiochos

—Livy 35.18; 36.11.6; 36.20.5; *Syll*³ 585, ll. 13-15

For the role of Alexandros son of Antiochos –a high-ranking officer of Antiochos III– as an intermediary between the Seleukid court, the Aitolians and his Akarnanian fellow countrymen, see **C37-38** and **C43**, above. Alexandros was seriously wounded in the battle of Thermopylai in 191 and died shortly afterwards in Euboia (Livy 36.20.5).

THESSALY (196-190)**MAGNESIA - DEMETRIAS****C45. Eurylochos**

—Livy 35.31.3-32.1; 35.34.6-11; 35.39.3-7; 35.43.5; 36.33.6

The Magnetes were among the *ethne* which Flamininus declared free, autonomous and exempt from garrisons and taxes at the Isthmia of 196.¹ Nevertheless, a Roman garrison remained at Demetrias until the Romans' departure from Greece in the summer of 194.² The leaders of the new state undoubtedly had Roman approval and were chosen among the ranks of anti-Macedonian Magnetes. This anti-Macedonian tendency of the new leadership, necessary for the survival of the fragile new formation as it was, was bound to cause problems to the Romans, when the latter decided to seek the alliance of the defeated king of Macedonia.

Demetrias was deemed a necessary stop of the tour of Flamininus in 192, whose aim was to repress anti-Roman tendencies in the Greek mainland. A *pars principum*³ of the Magnetes had already aligned themselves with the Aitolians and Antiochos, for fear that, as the relations between Rome and Philip V had improved, Demetrias would be again handed over to the king (Livy 35.31.4-5 and 11).⁴ Leader of this *pars principum* was Eurylochos, the magnetarch for 192.⁵ At the early spring assembly

¹ Polyb. 18.46.5 and 47.6; Livy 33.32.5, 34.6.

² Livy 33.31.11; 34.23.8; 34.51.4.

³ As usually in Livy, *princeps* does not denote an archon but a member of the political elite (cf. Briscoe 1981: 191).

⁴ Although Livy hastens to include the rumour in *cetera vana adlatum* (35.31.5), this fear appears to have been justified. Livy himself points out that the Romans knew that they should speak very carefully to the Magnetes (35.31.4) and that they should publicly deny such a scheme without fully frustrating Philip's *spes incisa* (35.31.7). Cf. Deininger 1971: 76, with earlier bibliography in n. 2; Briscoe 1981: 190; Gruen 1984: 478.

⁵ One Eurylochos of Magnesia, commander of the *agema* of Ptolemy IV before and during the battle of Raphia, is mentioned by Polybios (5.63.12, 65.2). *Pace* Holleaux, (*Études* V 393), however, he should probably not be identified with Eurylochos the magnetarch of 192, as all the mercenary commanders mentioned in the first of the two relevant Polybian passages were considered, already during the reign of Demetrios II, experienced Macedonian officers. The Ptolemaic officer may have been the magnetarch's grandfather (so Deininger 1968: 671), although the name is very common in Thessaly.

of 192, in the presence of Flamininus, Eurylochos did not hesitate to denounce the Romans' plans and Roman control over Magnesia, causing the anger of the Roman, which was only tempered by the intervention of a pro-Roman leader, Zenon. In fear of his life, Eurylochos sneaked out of the assembly and sought refuge in Aitolia (35.31.8-32.1).

When the Aitolians decided to secure military bases for Antiochos by conquering Sparta, Chalkis and Demetrias (35.34.5), Diokles was sent to Demetrias; he was naturally accompanied by Eurylochos (35.34.6). In the early summer of 192, Eurylochos managed to let the Aitolian cavalry within the city gates. His followers greeted him with joy, and opposing political leaders were executed by the Aitolians (35.34.7-11); out of the three Aitolian missions, Demetrias proved the only successful one. Even when Roman officials visited the city in the end of the summer of 192 in an attempt to win Demetrias over, Eurylochos retained control of the situation (35.39.3-7). When king Antiochos finally disembarked at Pteleos of the Pagasetic Gulf in October, Eurylochos and the other *principes Magnetum* hastened to greet him and lead him triumphantly to Demetrias (35.43.5).

Antiochos' departure after the defeat at Thermopylai marked the end of Eurylochos' rule. The few soldiers of the garrison which the king had left behind at Demetrias¹ were a cause of disturbance rather than a guarantee of safety. Towards the end of 191, king Philip reached an understanding with them, secured them a safe return to Asia, announced to the citizens of Demetrias that if they surrendered they would be treated leniently, and invaded the city without meeting any resistance. The leaders of the anti-Roman faction fled and Eurylochos committed suicide (36.33).²

As is often the case with statesmen who associated themselves either with Philip or Antiochos during the Second Macedonian and the Antiochic Wars, it would be a mistake to seek for traces of some kind of 'personal diplomacy' in the activities of Eurylochos. Once again, it was historical and geostrategic (the Macedonian threat), as well as conjunctural considerations (the need of the Romans to secure Macedonia's alliance) which made him adopt an anti-Roman stance, rather than any prior contact of his with the Aitolians (unattested but not implausible) or the Seleukids (unattested and unlikely). It is perhaps no accident that, in contrast to Thoas, Mnasilochos or Euboulidas, when the anti-Roman coalition collapsed Eurylochos chose not to seek refuge at the king's court, but to take his own life.

¹ For the meaning of the *turba regionum* at Demetrias, see Deininger 1971: 79-80 n. 33.

² Plut., *Flam.* 15.6 merely mentions Philip's conquest of Demetrias.

EPIRUS (232-190)**C46. Charops son of Machatas, Thesprotian Opatos**

— Polyb. 20.3 (cf. Livy 36.5); *SEG* 40 (1990) 690; other sources: Livy 32.6.1, 11, 14.5; Diod. Sic. 30.5; Plut., *Fam.* 4.5; Polyb. 27.15.2-5; *BullEpigr* 1969, 347; cf. Mitford 1971: n° 42; *IG II²* 2313, l. 24

The Epirotes played a significant part in the ending of the First Macedonian War in 205.¹ The concern of the Epirotes for the war to come to an end is easy to understand. Epirus was surrounded by states directly or indirectly involved in the war (Rome, Illyria, Aitolia, Macedonia) and from the very start of the war the *koinon*'s leadership had adopted a careful policy: without distancing themselves from the alliance with Macedonia –an alliance uninterrupted for two decades–,² the Epirotes reached an understanding with the Romans, and thus earned the informal recognition of immunity for their territory by all belligerents.³

The same policy was followed by Epirote leaders in the Second Macedonian War, although (or, rather, exactly because) the Epirote territory was one of the main theatres of operations in 199 and 198.⁴ Despite the alliance with Macedonia, Charops son of Machatas, one of the leaders of the Epirotes, did not hesitate to inform the Romans of Philip's movements.⁵ The official leadership of the *koinon* tried in vain to maintain a policy of strict neutrality: the peace conference (early summer 198), held by the straits of the Aooos under the supervision of general Pausanias and the hipparch Alexandros, proved a complete failure for reasons

¹ Embassies to the proconsul P. Sempronius and to Philip V: Livy 29.12.8-9. Meeting of Philip V with the general of the *koinon* Philippos and the co-archons Aeropos and Derdas at Phoinike: Livy 29.12.11 (on the offices held by the three Epirotes, see Cabanes 1976: 360-62; Tréheux 1975 and Salmon 1987, with further bibliography and Cabanes' closing remarks). Negotiations between Sempronius, Philip V, and Amyndros king of Athamania, which led to the treaty of Phoinike: Livy: 29.12.12-16.

² After their incorporation into Doso's Greek Alliance in 224 (see the sources in *SVA III* 507), the Epirotes remained steady but perhaps reluctant allies of the Macedonians. For the history of the *koinon* from 225 to 205, see Cabanes 1976: 223-30 and 242-67.

³ For Epirus during the First Macedonian War, see mostly Cabanes 1976: 254-61. The delicate balance between adherence to the obligations arising from their alliance with Macedonia and neutrality had been the unchallenged policy of the *koinon* already since 220. This caused the harsh critique of Polybios (4.30.6-8, 36.8).

⁴ See in detail Cabanes 1976: 267-78 (cf. Oost 1954: 45-46; Hammond 1988: 423-24). Cabanes' analysis of Epirote policy during the Second Macedonian War is sounder than the analysis offered by Hammond 1967: 615-19, who inaccurately describes the Epirotes as faithful allies of Philip.

⁵ Livy 32.6.1, 11, 14.5; Diod. Sic. 30.5; Plut., *Fam.* 4.5; Polyb. 27.15.2. The earliest source on Charops appears to be his dedication at Dodona (*Ergon* 1968: 51-53; *BullEpigr* 1969, 347). The excavator, S. Dakaris, dated the letter forms to the end of the third century or the beginning of the second, but the inscription may be earlier (see the good photograph of the squeeze published in *Ergon*, p. 51 and cf. the opinion of the Roberts: "on pourrait même remonter plus haut s'il était nécessaire").

which need not concern us here.¹ Although we have no concrete evidence on Epirus' fate after the end of the war, it is certain that its geographical location led it to a closer relationship with Rome.² It is equally certain that the status of Charops –a pro-Roman and, according to Polybios,³ responsible for the removal of Philip from Epirus– was greatly enhanced. It is no accident that immediately after the end of the war he sent his homonymous grandson to Rome, so that he would learn to speak and write Latin, and get acquainted with prominent Romans.⁴

But personal contacts of Charops with the Great Powers of his time were not limited to Rome. His brother Demetrios had been a Ptolemaic official in Cyprus in 200-193.⁵ His son Alkemachos was a victor at the Panathenaia in 198.⁶ Charops himself had led a great Epirote *theoria* throughout the Aegean, to the Ptolemaic court, and possibly the Seleukid court as well; the aim of the *theoria* was the proclamation of the Naia of Dodona as penteteric, crown games.⁷ The date of the *theoria* is uncertain: Étienne and Cabanes date it to 192, simultaneously with the diplomatic contacts of Charops with which we shall deal shortly. I would suggest (a) that the *theoria* had no connection with the diplomatic contacts of 192, and (b) that it can be dated at any point within the period 197-192, 196-195 being the more plausible years.⁸ Theoretically, Charops' *theoria* had a religious cause; in reality,

¹ Livy 32.10.1-2; Diod. Sic. 28.11; App., *Mac.* 5; cf. Ager 1996: 192-94 n° 72 and especially Magnetto 1997: 440-47 n° 74, with a thorough analysis and bibliography.

² Rome and Epirus in 197-192: Oost 1954: 53-58; Hammond 1967: 620-22; Cabanes 1976: 276-78; further bibliography can be found in F. W. Walbank 1979: 315; Gruen 1984: 23; Ferrary 1988: 95-96 n. 166. We do not know the form of these relations. The alliance between the two states mentioned by Polybios among events belonging to 171 (27.15.12) is of unknown nature and date.

³ Polyb. 27.15.2.

⁴ Polyb. 27.15.4-5. Charops the younger set out for Rome probably soon after 196 (cf. Cabanes 1976: 289) and returned to Epirus shortly before the death of his grandfather, although he is not attested after 192. He seems to have been the first member of the political elite of the Greek world to have learnt Latin for political purposes (cf. Kaimio 1979: 205-206). Charops the elder seems to have realized what –according to Momigliano 1975: 38– Polybios did not: that knowing the language of allies or enemies was a powerful tool. For the rest of the career of Charops the younger, see Cabanes 1976: 284-307.

⁵ Mitford 1971: n° 42; for the restoration Θεσ[πρωτόν] (instead of Mitford's Θεσ[σαλόν]), which makes the identification possible, see Habicht 1974.

⁶ *IG II²* 2313, l. 24; cf. Tracy / Habicht 1991: 229.

⁷ *SEG* 40 (1990) 690. The identification of this Charops with the Charops of the literary sources is not certain but is certainly attractive (letter forms and historical considerations exclude his identification with Charops the younger; see Cabanes 1976: 105). On the Naia, see mainly Cabanes 1988, with all relevant sources. The name of Antiochos III is wholly restored. For reasons slightly different from those of the first editor, I agree with the restoration of the name of Antiochos III and not of Attalos I or Eumenes II in l. A 3 (see the following note).

⁸ For reasons set out already by Étienne 1987: 176-77 and 1990: 104, the inscription is certainly to be dated after the revival of the League of the Islanders under Rhodian tutelage (dated between 200 and 188, most probably immediately after the end of the Second Macedonian War: see

however, this *theoria* exemplifies one of the means employed within the framework of a multidimensional foreign policy, the main feature of which was maintaining friendly relations with neighbouring states and Great Powers.

Therefore, when Charops visited Antiochos in Chalkis, early in the winter of 192,¹ he most probably had already had prior contacts with the king. But the situation now was very different. The Aitolians, as we have seen, had been trying throughout the year to secure advance bases for Antiochos and expand the anti-Roman coalition, Antiochos had disembarked in Greece in October and the Roman army had disembarked at Apollonia already in early 192.² If after the end of the

Berthold 1984: 142; Nigdelis 1990: 215 n. 75; Étienne 1990: 100-101; Sheedy 1996: 428; Wiemer 2002: 271-76; Knoepfler 2005: 303-304). Étienne 1987: 177 and n. 12 and 1990: 105 confuses the embassy of Charops to Chalkis in ca. December 192 (Polyb. 20.3; see in the text, below) with the conference of Achaian allies, which Philopoimen organized at Tegea in the early spring of the same year, a conference in which *Epirotarum et Acarnanum principes* also took part (Livy 35.27.11; for the long discussion on the nature of the alliance between Epirus and Achaia and the reason why Epirote representatives participated in this meeting, see Cabanes 1976: 279-80 and Briscoe 1981: 185, with earlier bibliography). Charops may have participated in this conference (cf. Cabanes 1988: 76), although this is not explicitly attested. One has the impression that the main reason why Étienne (hesitantly followed by Cabanes 1988: 76-78, who is careful to distinguish between the two missions) dates Charops' *theoria* precisely in 192 is that he connects it with the two diplomatic missions (which he erroneously identifies): his argument seems to be that if Charops' tour included the Peloponnese (Livy) and Chalkis (Polybios) it may also have included the islands and Alexandria (*theoria* inscription). There are, however, serious obstacles to this theory, even if we overlook the aforementioned error. If we temporarily leave aside the question of the identity of the king in l. A3, the places which we know for a fact that the *theoria* of the Epirotes visited were the islands and Alexandria. In 192, either during the spring or during the winter, with the Greek mainland in turmoil and the war of Rome with Antiochos literally *ante portas*, it seems improbable that the undisputed leader of Epirus (a fairly probable theatre of operations) would have chosen to tour so far away from home, regarding an issue of secondary importance. The reorganization of the Naia and the proclamation of the reformed games are much easier to understand within the context of a peaceful period (despite the different nature of the mission, cf. the tour of Kytention's ambassadors immediately after the end of the First Macedonian War [C32-34, above]). The likeliest period is the one immediately after the end of the Second Macedonian War. After 196 peace (even if a temporary one) prevailed in Greece, the Rhodians had reached an *entente* with Antiochos (even if a fragile one: Magnetto 1997: 466; Ma 1999: 85, with sources and further bibliography), and, in the wake of a Rhodian mediation (FGrHist 260 F 47 and Olshausen 1973: 189-90 n° 134), the peace treaty between Antiochos and Ptolemy V was already under preparation (Ma 1999: 88-89). If we accept that the (first!) king that Charops' *theoria* visited was Antiochos –the master of Asia– and not Eumenes II –under constant pressure at the time–, the choice of the geographical ensemble visited by the *theoria* acquires its full meaning. At this juncture, the Aegean enjoyed a rare balance of powers: the League of the Islanders had just been revived under the control of the Rhodians, who had good relations with Antiochos, who in turn had good relations with Ptolemy V.

¹ Polyb. 20.3.1; Livy 36.5.1. For the date (November–December), see F. W. Walbank 1979: 65. Cabanes 1976: 280 places these events in the autumn, despite Polybios' (and Livy's) explicit dating.

² For all this, see succinctly Will 1982: 198-206.

Second Macedonian War Charops and the Epirotes had a window of opportunity for an open foreign policy, centred on peace and neutrality, now it was really expected of them to simply choose camp.

Nevertheless, Charops attempted to keep the policy of neutrality alive. He begged Antiochos not to prematurely draw¹ the Epirotes into a war in which his country would receive the first Roman attack; in return, he promised Antiochos a warm welcome in Epirote cities and ports if the king guaranteed their safety; otherwise, Charops continued, Antiochos should excuse them for continuing to fear war with the Romans. Antiochos replied that emissaries of his to Epirus would discuss the issue in the future,² something which probably never happened.³ As Livy fully understood, since he did not confine himself to the Polybian original but added his own judgement,⁴ the Epirotes wished to please the king without offering any pretext for revenge to the Romans. Justifiably believing that Antiochos would never bring his forces to Epirus, they hoped to avoid their participation in the anti-Roman coalition without at the same time risking retaliation by the king; in the unlikely event of Antiochos arriving at Epirus, they could certainly justify their reception of the king to the Romans as yielding to superior royal forces.⁵

It should again be stressed that the policy of Charops expressed the sentiments of the Epirote leadership. Already since the First Macedonian War, Epirus had striven to maintain a fragile neutral position, whether as a formal ally of Macedonia (as in the First Macedonian War) or of Rome (as in the Second Macedonian and the Antiochic War). The fact that Charops, originally the strongest advocate of a pro-Roman policy, followed the same policy highlights the fact that

¹ Polybios (20.3.2) uses the extremely rare verb προεμβιβάζω (εἰς τὸν πόλεμον), which, to the best of my knowledge, is used only by him; cf. 2.45.4, in a similar context. The use of the preposition πρό, with a temporal sense here, is not accidental. In 27.7.8, when the Rhodians accuse Eumenes of trying to incite them to war, Polybios uses the phrase ἐμβιβάζω εἰς τὸν πόλεμον. In that case the 'simple' ἐμβιβάζω is used because Eumenes' actions leading to war have already occurred. Here, conversely, the meaning must be that the situation was not yet ripe for war (as far as the Epirotes were concerned). Charops' negotiating position towards Antiochos can be formulated as follows: "Do not incite us to war yet; in the future, we shall see". This interpretation is in better accordance with the rest of Charops' speech (see in the text, above). Livy does not seem to have understood the insinuation, since he used the verb *deduco* (36.5.4), which would have been more suitable for the 'simple' ἐμβιβάζω.

² Polyb. 20.3; Livy 36.5 (Livy does not mention Charops by name).

³ Larsen 1968: 417; F. W. Walbank 1979: 65; *contra* Briscoe 1981: 227, who arbitrarily thinks that this is a conclusion *e silentio*.

⁴ See Oost 1954: 59-60. F. W. Walbank 1979: 65 disagrees and believes that Livy simply drew on a lost part of the Polybian passage; nevertheless, the passage of Polybios under discussion is so detailed that the possibility that part of the original might be missing is slim. Besides, I cannot see why Porphyrogenetos (in whose *Περὶ πρέσβεων* the passage of Polybios is preserved) would have failed to report such an ingenuous analysis of the embassy had he read it in Polybios.

⁵ Livy 36.5.3, 6-7.

the policy of neutrality was met with general acceptance. Neutrality, however, does not mean lack of contacts, and it is thus interesting that Charops chose to have a first personal contact with Antiochos well before this contact was to come in handy.

No matter how cautious the Epirotes had been, the Roman insistence on imposing their control in the East meant that this policy of non-aligned neutrality had now reached its limits. Only a year after the embassy to Antiochos, no doubt was left as to whose side the Epirotes had chosen.¹

The policy of Charops and the Epirotes between 198 and 190 against Rome proved impracticable despite its ingenuity. Although Charops displayed an early, realistic evaluation of Rome's strength, and decided to partly align Epirus with the new superpower, at the same time he and the Epirotes tried to adhere to the 'Hellenistic' diplomatic tradition: multilateral contacts with all powerful players, pursuit of international balance and neutrality towards strong neighbours. The failure of his policy epitomizes the failure of the Hellenistic world –not just of the world of the kings, but also of the world of *poleis* and *ethne*– to correctly assess and then face the new reality of the Roman offensive.

¹ The Epirotes barely avoided a declaration of war by the Romans. To their ambassadors, who hastened to declare Epirus' submission to Acilius during the Achaian assembly at Aigion in the autumn of 191, only a ninety-day truce was granted, so that they could head for Rome. There, they barely managed to secure the Senate's reluctant pardon (Livy 36.35.8-12). By the spring of 189, Epirus was officially by the side of Rome and at war with the Aitolians (Polyb. 21.26.8), and the Epirotes were participating in military operations (Livy 38.4.7-9).

THE ISLANDS OF THE AEGEAN

RHODES

D1. Kallikles son of Teison of Lindos — D2. Anaxipolis (son of Timaratos of Lindos?)

— *Lindos* II 2 D 95-115; other sources: Καλλικλῆς Τείσιωνος Κλάσιος; *Lindos* II 1 B 19; 51 c II 47; Ἀναξίπολις Τιμαράτου Φύσκιος; perhaps *Lindos* II 696

The third epiphany of Athena recorded in the famous *Anagraphe of Lindos* (*Lindos* II 2 D 95-115)¹ took place during the siege of Rhodes by Demetrios Poliorketes. The goddess appeared for six consecutive days in the dreams of Kallikles, priest for 306/5, ordering him to instruct Anaxipolis the *prytanis* to send a letter to king Ptolemy I and request help for the besieged city. Kallikles duly informed Anaxipolis and the councillors of the epiphany; the *prytanis* himself led the embassy to the king (ll. 114-115). Since the priesthood of Kallikles had just ended, the episode should be placed in early or mid-autumn 305, only weeks after the beginning of the siege.² The embassy –and its date– are confirmed by Diodoros, according to whom the Rhodians sent embassies to Ptolemy, Kassandros and Lysimachos at the beginning of the siege;³ one of those embassies must have been the embassy led by Anaxipolis.

Relations between Rhodes and the Ptolemies, friendly already by 311,⁴ continued to improve after the beginning of the siege by Poliorketes: Ptolemy was the only Successor who did not limit the aid he provided to money and food,⁵ but also sent military assistance.⁶ His contribution to the salvation of the city was so highly esteemed that the king received divine honours by the Rhodians in 304,

¹ On this inscription, in general, apart from Blinkenberg's comments in the Lindian corpus, see also Chaniotis 1988: 52-57 and Higbie 2003, with Bresson's (2006) detailed commentary.

² The Rhodian year began in the autumn (Trümpy 1997: 167-78). The siege was at full sway by the summer of 305 (Beloch 1927: 244-45; Wiemer 2002: 85-86).

³ Diod. Sic. 20.84.1.

⁴ See Hauben 1977: 328-34; Berthold 1984: 61-67; Magnetto 1997: 47-48; on the credibility of Diodoros' account of Rhodian foreign policy in the late fourth century (20.81), see also Funke 1999; Wiemer 2002: 39-41.

⁵ Diod. Sic. 20.96.3.

⁶ Diod. Sic. 20.88.9; 96.1-2; 98.1; 99.2. On the importance of the Ptolemaic military contribution, see Hauben 1977: 338; for another episode illustrating the relationship between the two states, see the following entry.

after an oracle of Ammon at Siwa.¹ It is interesting that a divine intervention was once again adduced by the Rhodians. In fact, according to Habicht's attractive hypothesis, the two episodes are interconnected: right from the start, the divine honours for Ptolemy were presented to the local audience as a measure ordained by Athena, the patron deity of Lindos, and only secondarily by Ammon, so that the king's deification would be more easily assimilated into the local religious system, without appearing to threaten it.²

Anaxipolis, *prytanis* and ambassador, is most likely to be identified with the homonymous *agonothetes* of the second half of the fourth century.³ Kallikles was an offspring of an important family numbering several priests of Athena among its members.⁴ Despite appearances, his mediating role may not have been central. The fact that the goddess ordered that Anaxipolis should be in charge of the whole affair probably means that the whole idea of divine intervention belongs to the *prytanis*.⁵ The embassy itself of course was certainly not a personal choice of either Anaxipolis or Kallikles; it was dictated by the main current of Rhodian foreign policy and the dire danger the city found itself in.

¹ It should be stressed that the extravagance of the honours awarded to Ptolemy was a direct consequence of the importance of his help: Lysimachos and Kassandros received only statues (Diod. Sic. 20.100.2). For the divine honours bestowed upon Ptolemy by the Rhodians, see Diod. Sic. 20.100.3-4; Gorgon, *FGrHist* 515 F 19 (*apud* Ath. 15.696f); Segre 1941: 29-30, ll. 15-18; cf. Habicht 1970: 109-110 n° 43 and 257-58. According to Pausanias (1.8.6), the Rhodians were the ones who accorded Ptolemy the epiclesis Soter; if this was the case, 304 seems to be the most appropriate time (Habicht 1970: 109-110, a view generally accepted since). Hazzard 1992 (cf. Hazzard 2000: 6 n. 16) questioned the credibility of this passage of Pausanias. Although Johnson 2000 has shown that some of Hazzard's arguments are weak, there remains the fact that the term Soter is not attested in Rhodian official documents of the period, which is striking, whether the term is taken in its religious sense (as Hazzard believes) or as part of the vocabulary of benefaction (as Johnson claims). In fact, Athenian practice may lend further support to Hazzard's questioning of Pausanias' testimony: the epithet Soter, which, according to literary sources (Plut., *Demetr.* 10.4), was awarded to Poliorketes by the Athenians in 307, is attested in Attic inscriptions as well (Kotsidu 2000: n° 9E) –in contrast to Rhodes.

² Habicht 1970: 233-34.

³ *Lindos* II 696, dated to ca. 330 (Blinkenberg) or slightly later (Pugliese Carratelli 1954: 262-63 n° 7); for the possible stemma of the family, see *Lindos* II, p. 263. It would be tempting, but imprudent, to assume that the *prytanis* of 306/5 was an ancestor of Anaxipolis of Rhodes, father of a Ptolemaic judge active in Karia shortly before 203 (*I. Mylasa* 126; for the assumption that this inscription belongs to the Ptolemaic rather than to the Seleukid period of Mylasa, see Marek 1984: 304-305 and Ma 1999: 269).

⁴ See *Lindos* II 1 E 5, (18), (32), 70.

⁵ The *prytaneis* appear to have played a central role in the deployment of Rhodian embassies: see Polyb. 29.10.4 with Grieb 2008: 283 (with earlier bibliography).

D3. Menedemos

— Diod. Sic. 20.93.2-4

During the siege by king Demetrios, the Rhodians attempted a naval counter-attack on three fronts, in an effort to destroy part of the Macedonian fleet. Leaders of the three squadrons were Damophilos, Menedemos and Amyntas.

Menedemos –otherwise unknown– sailed to Patara in Lykia, where he captured a transport squadron of Poliorketes. Among the spoils were clothes and the rest of the royal equipment which Phila had prepared for her husband (Diod. Sic. 20.93.3); Menedemos hastened to send the spoils to Alexandria, “because the clothes were purple and thus proper for a king to wear” (20.93.4).¹

The rationale behind this gracious gesture of Menedemos is twofold. Firstly, it was an expression of gratitude for (and reciprocation of) Ptolemaic benefactions: Ptolemy, as we saw, was the only Successor who sent not only material but also military assistance to the Rhodians. Of the three military missions² ordered by the king in order to help the Rhodians, only one preceded Menedemos’ gesture. It is thus safe to say that the gift of royal outfit was part of the material exchange between Rhodes and Alexandria. It was, however, the symbolic value of this exchange which was more important. By offering Ptolemy royal clothing, the Rhodians solemnly recognized Ptolemy’s recently acquired royal title.³ Moreover, the Rhodians offered Ptolemy the royal insignia of his main rival and, in a sense, their gift reversed the outcome of the sea battle of Salamis two years earlier: then, Poliorketes’ victory over Ptolemy gave the victor the opportunity to proclaim himself king; now, Poliorketes was being stripped of the symbols of royal power, which

¹ Diodoros’ version is preferable to Plutarch’s (*Demetr.* 22.1), according to which the Rhodians sent the whole ship to Ptolemy; the latter version is not only implausible –as it is difficult to believe that a city under naval siege would donate a whole ship to an ally in the midst of war– but also misses the full impact of the anecdote, the whole point of which is to imply that Ptolemy’s status was so high that any royal outfit (the rest of the spoils were not so important) was to be sent to him without a second thought.

² Diod. Sic. 20.88.9, 96.1-2 and 98.1; a fourth Ptolemaic mission (20.99.2) did not materialize because the siege came to an end.

³ The assumption of the royal title by Ptolemy was traditionally dated to late 305 or early 304 (O. Müller 1973: 93-100), that is, immediately before the series of events described here. A new Rhodian historiographical text (*P. Köln* 6.247; cf. Lehmann 1988: 14-17) seems to suggest that the assumption of the royal title by Ptolemy took place earlier, almost immediately after the assumption of the royal title by Antigonos and Demetrios. This is unreservedly taken for granted by Lehmann 1988: 6-10, and has been unanimously accepted since: see, for example, Hölbl 1994: 21; Weber 1993: 56; Mooren 1998: 123; Wiemer 2002: 83; as far as I have been able to confirm, the only exception is Bosworth 2000, who dates the text to 308, when, as he believes, Ptolemy assumed the royal title semi-officially. As I hope to show elsewhere in detail, any chronological inference from *P. Köln* 6.247 should be treated with great circumspect: this is a work of pro-Ptolemaic and anti-Antigonid Rhodian propaganda, which does not recount facts but interprets a whole era.

ended up in the hands of the Successor most worthy of the royal title, that is, Ptolemy, the ally of the Rhodians.

D4. Timasitheos son of Dionysios — D5. Epikrates son of Timasistratos

— Meadows 1996: 252-54 (*I. Iasos* 150; Curty 1995: n° 63); on Timasitheos, see also Braunert 1951: 237 n° 25 (*SB I* 1642; Cook 1966: n° 9)

A large stele from Iasos bearing four Rhodian decrees offers many details about the diplomatic contacts between Iasos, Rhodes, Olympichos and Philip V in the early years of the latter's reign.¹ The Iasians had suffered "wrongs" (l. 6: ἀδικήματα) in the hands of Podilos, a subordinate of Olympichos, the well-known governor of Seleukos II, Antigonos Doson and Philip V and semi-autonomous dynast in parts of Karia.² In order to ensure that their city would remain free and autonomous and that Olympichos' "wrongs" would cease, the Iasians turned for help to the Rhodians, their friends and relatives (ll. 10-11).³ The Rhodians promised to help (first decree, ll. 4-27), sent an embassy to Philip (third decree, ll. 39-ca. 65), from whom they elicited written orders advantageous for the Iasians (ll. 75-76), then turned to Podilos and Olympichos and informed them both of Philip's decisions and of their own determination to protect Iasos at all cost (fourth decree, ll. ca. 65-96); finally, they informed the Iasians of all their diplomatic efforts (second decree, ll. 28-38). All the Rhodian diplomatic missions were led by Timasitheos son of Dionysios and Epikrates son of Timasistratos.⁴

Timasitheos' involvement in Rhodian diplomacy continued: he died during an embassy to Alexandria in May 213.⁵ The context of this embassy is probably the

¹ *I. Iasos* 150, with the new readings of Meadows 1996. On the structure of the text and on the analysis of events and diplomacy, I follow Meadows 1996: 257-62 (cf. also Crowther 1995: 109-111), who aptly remarked that the preserved decrees are four and not three, as previously thought, and that the embassy recorded in ll. 43-44 was to Philip and not to Olympichos. Nonetheless, Gauthier, *BullEpigr* 1997, 536 showed that the decrees were not inscribed in chronological order, as Meadows thought (cf. Wiemer 2002: 186-89). The time limits of the whole series of events are Philip V's rise to the throne and the death of the Rhodian ambassador Timasitheos at Alexandria (cf. Meadows 1996: 257 n. 9).

² On Olympichos, see Crampa 1969: 86-96; Robert 1983: 147-50; Le Bohec 1993: 343-47; Billows 1995: 94-96; Ma / Derow / Meadows 1995: 76-79; Meadows 1996: 261-62; Kobes 1996: 80, 98-99, 109-111, 136-44, 193-95, 257-59; Ma 1999: 42, 47, 69-70, 168-69.

³ On the indirect kinship ties between Rhodes and Iasos and the distinction between friendship and kinship in this text, see Curty 1995: 157; cf. Jones 1999: 54.

⁴ They are explicitly mentioned as ambassadors to Olympichos (ll. 95-96) and the Iasians (ll. 37-38); if Gauthier's reconstruction of the order of the embassies –which I follow here– is correct, they must also have led the embassy to Philip, which is impossible by Meadows' reconstruction (1996: 261), according to which the embassy to Iasos was simultaneous with the one to Philip.

⁵ Braunert 1951: 237 n° 25 (*SB I*.1642; Cook 1966: 24 n° 9).

joint effort of the Ptolemies and the Rhodians to rescue Achaios, the pretender to the Seleukid throne (see the following entry).¹ Epikrates is otherwise unknown.

Despite its interest for Rhodian policy during the last quarter of the third century,² this incident need not occupy our attention here, since it is a form of mediation for a third party, and, moreover, a mediation from a position of power. The Rhodians displayed their strength by risking war with Olympichos and/or Philip, and the two Macedonians gave ground –Philip because he was busy on other fronts and not willing to open another, Olympichos because he lacked the backing of Philip, without which he understandably hesitated to confront the Rhodians.

D6. Nikomachos

– Polyb. 8.15.9-10; 8.17.4-8

Achaios was a relative of the Seleukid royal house, a trusted high-ranking Seleukid official already under Seleukos II, and the governor of Asia west of the Taurus range on behalf of Antiochos III. He obviously got carried away by his success against Attalos I and proclaimed himself king in 220.³ Antiochos actively campaigned against him in 216 and, within two months, managed to confine him to the acropolis of Sardeis (ca. autumn 215). An extended passage of Polybios (8.15-23) details the last phase of the siege. Bolis of Crete convinced Sosibios, the strong man of the Ptolemaic administration, to finance an attempt to rescue Achaios, but then betrayed the plan to Antiochos and delivered the insurgent bound in fetters to the king during the winter of 214/3.⁴

The first persons Bolis had contacted in order to gain Achaios' trust were Nikomachos at Rhodes and Melankomas at Ephesos; it was through them that Achaios negotiated with Ptolemy and “handled all his other foreign policy plans” (8.15.10: τὰς ἄλλας ἀπάσας τὰς ἔξωθεν ἐπιβολὰς ἐχείριζε). The εὐνοία and πίστις of Nikomachos to Achaios is described as the attitude of a father towards his son (8.15.9) –a terminology clearly pointing to emerging court titles.⁵ In other words, Nikomachos was undoubtedly a leading *philos* and a ‘foreign minister’ in the court of Achaios –a court in the making.

¹ So Huß 1976: 116 n. 62, with some reservations. A few years later, namely in 209, Philopator and the Rhodians collaborated again, in order to bring peace between the Aitolians and the Macedonians (Livy 27.30.4; cf. Ager 1996: n° 57; Magnetto 1997: n° 56).

² See the pertinent remarks of Meadows 1996: 262-65.

³ Polyb. 4.48.11-12; 5.57.5. On the date, see F. W. Walbank 1957: 570 and 584; on the coins minted in his name, see Gauthier 1989: 168-69; Mørkholm 1991: 126, 257 n^{os} 403-405 and pl. xxvii; on Achaios in general, see mainly Schmitt 1964: 158-88; Gauthier 1989: 16-18, 168-70; Billows 1995: 98-99.

⁴ On the dates, see Gauthier 1989: 16-18.

⁵ Cf. the ‘fatherly’ relation of Aratos and Philip V in roughly the same period and the court titles πατήρ and συγγενής (see p. 246 n. 5, above).

The question to be considered here is whether this bond between Nikomachos and Achaïos influenced the relationship of Rhodes with the pretender to the Seleukid throne. Contacts between the two sides went back to 220, to the time when Achaïos had just declared himself king. In the war which had broken out between Rhodes and Byzantium earlier in the year, Achaïos had initially promised to help Byzantium, but the Rhodians managed to convince the Ptolemaic administration to release Andromachos, Achaïos' father, from captivity. In exchange for this mediation and for some honours they bestowed upon the pretender, the Rhodians earned Achaïos' neutrality in their war.¹ No contacts of Rhodes with Achaïos are attested afterwards, but we have every reason to believe that they existed. The Ptolemaic administration was from the very beginning the closest ally of Achaïos,² and it would be paradoxical if Rhodes, a close ally of the Ptolemies and a state which shared the Ptolemaic concerns about the rising Seleukid power in Asia,³ had treated Achaïos any differently. It is, accordingly, no accident that a Rhodian and the Ptolemaic court were behind the last attempt to save Achaïos. Moreover, it should be stressed that Nikomachos was not merely a *philos* of Achaïos, a courtier in wait of a court, but also a Rhodian citizen who continued to live and be active at Rhodes.⁴ Had the Rhodians not wished Achaïos to remain

¹ Polyb. 4.48.1-4 and 51.1-6. Berthold 1984: 95-96 reasonably assumes that the only reason why Achaïos had originally promised to help the Byzantines was to force the Rhodians to undertake this mediation for his father's release. The reasons for Andromachos' captivity in Alexandria are not known. Beloch 1925: 686 n. 3 assumed that he had been captured by Attalos I in 225-223 and then sent to Alexandria for safe keeping; this is entirely hypothetical but, in the absence of a more plausible alternative, usually accepted (see Magnetto 1997: 314 n. 9, with earlier bibliography).

² Achaïos was the only obstacle preventing Antiochos from attacking Egypt. According to one tradition (Polyb. 5.42.7-8; cf. F. W. Walbank 1957: 502; Schmitt 1964: 161-64), the revolt of Achaïos itself was instigated by the Ptolemies, already by 222. After the release of Andromachos, the relationship of Achaïos with the Ptolemies remained excellent and widely known: see Polyb. 5.57.2, 66.3, 67.12-13. The objections of Will 1962: 112-28 and 1982: 30-31, 47 regarding the historicity of the relationship of Achaïos with the Ptolemies are exaggerated; cf. Schmitt 1964: 166-71 and Huß 1968: 88-94.

³ Will 1982: 29-30 and Berthold 1984: 97-98 point out that the Rhodians wished to see neither the strength of Antiochos augmented nor the strength of the Ptolemies diminished. The Rhodians participated in the negotiations between Philopator and Antiochos in 219/8 as representatives of the Ptolemaic side (Polyb. 5.63.5-6; cf. Ager 1996: 143-44 n° 52; Magnetto 1997: 316-21 n° 51). The term of the Ptolemaic side which eventually torpedoed these negotiations was precisely that Achaïos be part of the treaty (Polyb. 5.67.12-13; for the motive of the Ptolemaic administration to insist on a term which could obviously not be accepted, see Magnetto 1997: 317-18). For a possible official Rhodian involvement in the attempt to rescue Achaïos, see the preceding entry.

⁴ This is a crucial difference between Nikomachos and other royal 'friends' who are occasionally assumed to have acted as intermediaries between their city of origin and the royal court despite the lack of relevant evidence (to limit ourselves to Rhodes, one such case is Eukles, a Rhodian *philos* of Antiochos III, on whom see the remarks of Grainger 2002: 108 n. 33, with earlier bibliography).

in power, it is unlikely that they would have allowed his 'foreign minister' to operate using their city as his base. In other words, even if no direct evidence exists to confirm that formal relations existed between Rhodes and Achaïos after 220, we have every reason to believe that the Rhodians maintained their contacts with the adversary of Antiochos through Nikomachos.

D7. Leonidas son of Archenax of Lindos

— *Lindos* II 145 and 161

Leonidas dedicated to the gods a statue of Ptolemy V sometime during the first two decades of the second century (*Lindos* II 161). Earlier, he had erected a sumptuous monument for his parents (*Lindos* II 145). His connection with the Ptolemaic court is otherwise unattested; what is certain is that the excellent relationship between Rhodes and Alexandria in the third century¹ remained strong in the beginning of the second, although it was now Rhodes which dominated the Aegean—not the Ptolemies.²

KOS

D8. Nikomedes son of Aristandros

— *I. di Cos* ED 71a-g; 162; 203; Paton / Hicks 18-19; 221; cf. Billows 1990: 411-12 n° 82

Nikomedes son of Aristandros of Kos is mentioned in no literary source; nonetheless, he seems to have been one of the highest-ranking courtiers of Antigonos the One-Eyed. He is known exclusively from two large opisthographic stelai erected at Kos and preserving more than twenty-six foreign honorific decrees for him.³ The following conclusions can be safely drawn from these decrees:

¹ Except for the conflict between the two during or soon after the Second Syrian War (see p. 164 n. 7, above).

² For the refoundation of the League of the Islanders under Rhodian patronage in the beginning of the second century, see p. 350 n. 8, above.

³ Although the fragments of the two stelai bearing the decrees in honour of Nikomedes were known since the end of the 19th century, the only (almost) full edition of the decrees was published in 1993; but even this edition, which was based on the unpublished work of the late Mario Segre (*I. di Cos*), had the minimum of comments. Since the content of the decrees has not been fully studied yet, I thought that a catalogue of the decrees, in their original order on the monument, and of the principal editions and commentaries on these decrees might prove useful: Stele I: **1.** Athens: *I. di Cos* ED 71[abce] A, ll. 1-19 (Paton / Hicks 17; Herzog 1942: 12; Osborne 1981: D51). **2.** Athenian cleruchy of Lemnos: *I. di Cos* ED 71[abce] A, ll. 20-31. **3.** Gryneion in Aiolis: *I. di Cos* ED 71[abce] B, ll. 1-7. **4.** Phokaia: *I. di Cos* ED 71[abce] B, ll. 8-18. **5.** Unknown city (in Aiolis?): *I. di Cos* ED 71[abce] B, ll. 19-21. Herzog 1942: 12, in his brief catalogue of the decrees, mentions Antandros in Troas after Phokaia; he is undoubtedly referring to this decree, but neither the geographic order of the decrees nor the vestiges of this particular decree confirm his assumption about the identity of the city. **6.** Ionian city with a month Apatourion: *I. di Cos* ED 71f A, ll. 1-9. The man responsible for the erection of Nikomedes' statue in this city was [Pha]idrias son of Teisis. The name Phaidrias does not seem to be attested at cities of Ionia, but the name Teisis is attested at Priene

1) Nikomedes was a high-ranking official in Antigonos' court already after the death of Alexander III and until at least 305.¹

2) Foreign policy is the only known domain of activity of Nikomedes.²

3) Nikomedes belonged to the inner circle of Antigonos' collaborators, and he probably followed the king wherever the latter went.³

4) Demetrios Poliorketes is mentioned in none of these decrees. This may be due to the fragmentary state of preservation of the stelai, but it may also mean that Nikomedes was never part of Poliorketes' entourage. The particular series of cities honouring Nikomedes points to the same conclusion: with the exception of one decree from Athens –a city which, as we saw above (**A19** [II]), had particular

(*Milet* 1 3, 66); Segre had also thought of Priene as the city which might have enacted this decree (*I. di Cos*, p. 59). **7.** Unknown (Ionian?) city: *I. di Cos* ED 71f A, ll. 10-12. **8.** One or two cities: *I. di Cos* ED 71f B, ll. 1-5. **9.** Klazomenai (?): *I. di Cos* ED 71f B, ll. 6-15 (Pugliese Carratelli 1978: 156-57; *SEG* 28 [1978] 696). **10.** Unknown (Ionian?) city: *I. di Cos* ED 71f B, ll. 16-17. **11.** Unknown city: *I. di Cos* ED 203, ll. 1-5. **12.** Unknown city (whose ethnic in the dative plural ends in [---]ῶις) with a month Artemision: *I. di Cos* ED 203, ll. 6-8. **13.** One or two cities: *I. di Cos* ED 162. **14.** Chios: *I. di Cos* ED 71d A (Dunst 1959; *SEG* 18 [1962] 333). **15.** Erythrai (?): *I. di Cos* ED 71d B (cf. Herzog 1942: 18). Stele II: **16.** Unknown city: *I. di Cos* ED 71g A, ll. 1-8. **17.** Samos: *I. di Cos* ED 71g A, ll. 9-18 (Habicht 1957: 169-71 n° 3; *IG* XII 6, 148). **18.** Unknown city: *I. di Cos* ED 71g A, l. 19. **19.** Unknown city (in Troas?): *I. di Cos* ED 71g B, ll. 1-5. **20.** Amaxitos in Troas: *I. di Cos* ED 71g B, ll. 6-11. **21.** Unknown city (in Troas?): *I. di Cos* ED 71g B, ll. 11-15. Responsible for the erection of Nikomedes' statue were [---] son of [Aristo]phanes (?) and Phanod[emos] or Phanod[ikos]. The name Aristophanes, attested in Troas, is too common to allow any suggestions. To the best of my knowledge, the name Phanodemos, which Segre restores, is unattested in the area; the name Phanodikos, on the contrary, is attested at Prokonnesos, in one of the earliest inscriptions of Asia Minor (*Syll*³ 2), as well as in a Late Hellenistic inscription from Assos (*I. Assos* 11a). **22.** Alexandria Troas (?): *I. di Cos* ED 71g B, ll. 16-19. Three more fragments, apparently not found by Segre, have been published: **23.** Ephesos: Paton / Hicks 18, ll. 1-5 (cf. Herzog 1942: 12). **24.** Unknown (Ionian?) city: Paton / Hicks 18, l. 6. **25.** Unknown (Ionian?) city: Paton / Hicks 19, ll. 1-6. **26.** Unknown (Ionian?) city with a month Artemision: Paton / Hicks 19, ll. 7-11. Finally, a squeeze of yet another fragment, unrelated both to the ones found by Segre and the lost fragments published by Paton / Hicks, lies among Herzog's papers (see *ad IG* XII 6, 148); it may be the decree of Miletos announced by Herzog 1942: 12.

¹ The only decrees preserving chronological indications are the Athenian decree (dated to 305), the decree of the Athenian cleruchy of Lemnos (also dated to 305; on these two decrees, see above, **A19** [II]) and the Samian decree, probably dated to soon after Alexander's death (see the comments and the bibliography of *IG* XII 6, 148). The rest of the decrees are probably dated after 315 (cf. Sherwin-White 1978: 86 n. 30).

² Cf. p. 87 n. 4, above. Nikomedes was praised for the help he provided to ambassadors arriving at Antigonos' court from Athens, the Athenian cleruchy of Lemnos, from Samos, Ephesos and from two more cities (see p. 361 n. 3, above, n^{os} **1**, **2**, **5**, **6**, **17** and **23**); indirectly, help to ambassadors is also attested in the decrees of Gryneion, Phokaia and Chios (see *ibid.* n^{os} **3**, **4** and **14**). More importantly, no other activity of Nikomedes can be deduced from any of the surviving fragments.

³ The decree of Chios (n° **14**) is highly indicative: honours for Nikomedes were to be conveyed to him by the first Chian ambassadors who would be sent to Antigonos (*I. di Cos* ED 71d A, ll. 9-11).

reasons to approach Antigonos– all decrees seem to come from cities of western Asia Minor (Troas, Aiolis, Ionia) and the adjoining islands (Chios, Samos), and not from cities of the Greek mainland and the central Aegean, where Poliorketes was more active than his father.

Unfortunately, no source describing any activity of Nikomedes in favour of his home city exists.¹ There are, however, several attestations of the high regard he enjoyed among his fellow citizens. Statue bases for Nikomedes himself² and his mother Olympias,³ as well as a grand family monument,⁴ which was probably also adorned with a statue of Kleumachos, Nikomedes' brother (who was honoured by the Erythraians [?] along with his brother), have been preserved.⁵ The two stelai bearing the decrees in honour of Nikomedes were probably erected in the vicinity of this family monument. Finally, we know of at least one or two distant descendants of Nikomedes holding important offices at Kos,⁶ which means that the status of the family remained intact for a long time.

¹ If accepted, Herzog's extensive restoration of a very fragmentary Koan decree (Paton / Hicks 7) would invalidate the conclusions which I have come to thus far (Herzog 1942: 13-18; apparently followed by Pugliese Carratelli 1978: 156). According to Herzog, this is a decree in honour of Nikomedes, who attended to the safe return of fugitives or exiles from Asia to Kos, and led an embassy to Poliorketes (whom he followed to Athens), in order to convince the king to reverse his decision to pull down the walls of Halasarna. There are, however, several reasons not to accept Herzog's restorations: 1) The only certain elements of the decree are references to Halasarna, Athens and to an embassy to a king. The names of Nikomedes and Poliorketes are wholly restored. Herzog's restorations are therefore by definition bold. 2) As mentioned above, Nikomedes seems to have belonged to the permanent staff of Antigonos since the late 310's at the latest. This makes Herzog's scenario highly unrealistic: why would Nikomedes turn to Poliorketes in 307 (and, even more so, follow him to Athens) and not to the king by whose side he already served? 3) All scholars who have subsequently studied the decree (Paton / Hicks, Segre 1934: 185 and 1941b: 26-28, Sherwin-White 1978: 122-23 n. 217; Crowther 2004: 21-22, 26, 27-28), have dated the letter forms of Paton / Hicks 7 to the third century, most probably to the very end of the century (cf. p. 377 n. 1, below) and certainly not to the late fourth century. To sum up, Herzog's restorations are to be rejected on the basis of both internal and external criteria (see already *BullEpigr* 1942, 181-182).

² Paton / Hicks 221 (Herzog 1942: 19).

³ Paton / Hicks 227 (Herzog 1942: 18).

⁴ See Herzog 1942: 19, who unnecessarily assumes that the monument was later destroyed by the Koans in an act of *damnatio memoriae* (against this view, see the convincing counter-arguments of Sherwin-White 1978: 122-23 n. 13).

⁵ *I. di Cos* ED 71d B (Herzog 1942: 18). The transcription Κλευμάχῳι in the edition of *I. di Cos* is erroneous; Herzog's text (Κλευμάχῳι) is correct.

⁶ Kleumachos son of Nikomedes was a priest of Apollo in the late first century (Herzog 1901: 484 n° 4, l. A I 25). In the first century AD (*I. di Cos* ED 230), the *gerousia* granted permission for certain old statues to be reused, the statues of Kleumachos son of Nikomedes included (l. 12). This is probably not the homonymous priest of Apollo: if his statue was to be reused, he must have lived in a much earlier period (cf. Buraselis 2000: 113) and may even have been a son of our Nikomedes. It is also to be noted that the name Nikomedes became very common after 300, and

The main evidence, however, for the high status of Nikomedes at Kos is precisely the erection of the stelai bearing the decrees in his honour. The erection of honorific decrees by foreign cities in the honourand's homeland was an intrinsic facet of the practices of euergetism¹ and there is no *a priori* reason to assume that this act indicated anything else than the honourand's wish to publicize his honours at his homeland as well. Nikomedes, however, was no mere benefactor: he was exclusively honoured for his role as an intermediary between the cities which honoured him and the king. This means that it was not only his honouring by a number of Greek cities that was publicized at Kos; it was also Nikomedes' close bond with the king. By authorizing the publication of these foreign decrees at Kos, the Koans made them part of Koan public discourse and thus tacitly accepted the reasons for which Nikomedes had been honoured by the other cities; in other words, they recognized Antigonos' royal power.

If these observations are correct, we need to take a closer look at the foreign relations of Kos during the period in question. Kos enjoyed friendly relations with Seleukos I and, even more so, with Ptolemy I, from 315 to 308 or 306.² Apart from

is often attested in a father-son homonymy; although not all persons bearing the name necessarily belonged to the same family, the possibility that some of them did cannot be ruled out. The most eminent Koans bearing the name Nikomedes during the period covered by the present study were a *theorodokos* of Kos between 230 and 210 (Plassart 1921: 6, I 40-41; for the date, see Hatzopoulos 1991; Knoepfler 1993: 42-43; Hatzopoulos, *BullEpigr* 1994, 432 and 1996: I 130 n. 7; Oulhen 1998: 224), a mercenary commander in the army of Antiochos III in 210 (Polyb. 10.28.6 and 29.6), and a *monarchos* of Kos in 202/1 (Paton / Hicks 10).

¹ The closest parallel to the case of Nikomedes is provided by the honorific decrees from Argos, Rhodes, the *koinon* of the Boiotians, Byzantion, Kalchedon, Kyzikos, and Lampsakos for Eudamos son of Nikon for his mediation between their ambassadors and Antiochos IV; the decrees were set up at the honourand's home city of Seleukeia in Kilikia in 172 or 171 (Lampsakos: *I. Lampsakos* 6; other states: *Syll*³ 644-645 [see Hagel / Tomaschitz 1998: Sel 63, with earlier bibliography]). The generally accepted date was disputed by Börker 1978: 208 n. 50, with arguments apparently taking into account the evidence of Rhodian amphoras (see Grace 1985: 44), but maintained by the Roberts (*BullEpigr* 1979: 310) and other scholars (see Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: 210 and Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 54). Nonetheless, more recent datings of Rhodian amphoras by Finkielsztejn 2001 (see especially p. 176 and n. 53), Lawall 2002 and Habicht 2003c (especially 549) remove the only obstacle to dating the decrees during the reign of Antiochos IV. Other parallels are provided by the decrees in honour of Diodoros son of Dorotheos of Delphi (*FD* III 1, 487-496, late first century), and Hegesandros of Athens, although in the latter's case the decrees were not set up at his homeland but at Delphi (*FD* III 2, 135; on Hegesandros, see also *SEG* 2 [1924] 184).

² See Sherwin-White 1978: 82-85 and Billows 1990: 206 n. 48. The latter (1990: 209) –despite the lack of solid evidence, as he readily admits– allows for the possibility that the Antigoneion of Kos (*I. di Cos* ED 216, ll. 19-24) may have been founded in honour of Antigonos the One-Eyed, since by the reign of Antigonos Doson, when most scholars dated this inscription, it was already in need of repair. According to Billows, this would mean that the island entered Antigonos' sphere of influence for a short period of time between 315 and 309. *I. di Cos* ED 216, however, actually belongs to the second century (see p. 373 n. 3, below), which means that there is no reason not

the erection of the stelai bearing the decrees in honour of Nikomedes, the first attestation of relations between Kos and Antigonos is provided by the letter of Antigonos concerning the synoecism between Teos and Lebedos, dated to 303 or 302: the new state would use the laws of the Koans, whom the king asked for a copy of the laws.¹ In roughly the same period, perhaps even earlier than the synoecism between Teos and Lebedos, Koan arbiters resolved a territorial dispute between the Klazomenians and, most probably, the Teians, in accordance with the provisions of an edict of Antigonos.² As we saw, the stelai of Nikomedes were erected in 305 or soon afterwards, but not after 301, as no mention to Poliorketes is made in the decrees. In other words, the intense promotion of Nikomedes' image at Kos coincided with the inclusion of the island in Antigonos' sphere of influence. This observation, in its turn, allows us to assume that Nikomedes played a leading part in forging this alliance. The fact that Kos remained, at least formally, free and autonomous during its alliance with Antigonos³ could very well be a personal achievement of Nikomedes.⁴

D9. Ka[---]

— Kα[---^{ca.9} ---]: *I. di Cos* ED 20

He was the proposer of an amendment to an honorific decree for Dionysios of Sinope (*I. di Cos* ED 20, dated by letter forms to the late fourth century). The amendment regarded the proclamation of the honours in the honourand's home city.⁵ The two letters of the proposer's name that have been preserved allow a large number of restorations, none of them secure.⁶

to assign the Antigoneion to the cult of Antigonos Doson, a dating preferable for other reasons as well (see D17, below).

¹ RC 3-4 (*Syll*³ 344), ll. 58-66 (for the date, see Billows 1990: 214; Magnetto 1997: 57 n. 2). For the importance of this inscription in assessing the relations between Kos and Antigonos, see Sherwin-White 1978: 85, 88 and Billows 1990: 209.

² *I. di Cos* ED 173-174 (Ager 1996: 67-69 n° 15; Magnetto 1997: 70-78 n° 13); for the date, see Magnetto 1997: 75-76, who shows that the territorial dispute was not the result of the synoecism between Teos and Lebedos, which was never effectuated anyway, and assumes (78 n. 28) that the dispute took place slightly earlier than the synoecism. Slightly later (early third century?) Koan judges were sent to Samos (*IG* XII 6, 150; on the date, see p. 388 n. 4, below), but apparently without royal intervention (see Crowther 1999: 257).

³ Sherwin-White 1978: 88; Billows 1990: 209.

⁴ Cf. Sherwin-White 1978: 87: "For the Coans, Nicomedes, who seems to have smoothed the path of many Greek cities, must have been an asset in assuring good relations with the king".

⁵ For this phenomenon, cf. p. 364 n. 1, above.

⁶ My calculation of the number of missing letters is based on the average number of letters per line, in conjunction with the number of missing letters in the following line; cf. *I. di Cos*, pl. 7. The small number of missing letters effects either that both the name and the patronym of the proposer were extremely short or, rather, that the patronym was not recorded. The omission of the proposer's patronym was not rare in Kos in summary proxeny decrees (for example, Paton /

Although only the end of the motivation clause has been preserved,¹ it is clear that Dionysios was honoured as an intermediary, involved in the benefactions of a queen to the city. Segre and Habicht had no doubt that the queen in question was Phila, wife of Poliorketes,² but we shall have to return to the question of the queen's identity. In any case, the approximate date of the decree makes it clear that Dionysios was an Antigonid official. His very common name should discourage identifications. Habicht suggested that he should be identified with Dionysios, a *philos* of the Antigonids who was honoured at Athens, in approximately the same period, on the proposal of Stratokles; his suggestion is plausible but not at all certain.³

Queen Phila had a personal court entourage and showed interest in her husband's relations with Greek cities. Demarchos son of Taron of Lykia, her *somato-phylax*, was honoured by the Samians for his mediation between Samos and the queen.⁴ The queen herself may have also been honoured with a *temenos* at Samos –if the queen Phila in this instance is not Antigonos Gonatas' homonymous wife.⁵ Quite similar to the case under discussion is the case of Melesippos son of Bakchios of Plataiai, another διατρίβων παρὰ τῆι βασιλίσσηι, honoured by the Ephesians for the same reasons as Dionysios was.⁶

Hicks 2; *I. di Cos* ED 34; 73; 191), as well as in other decrees (for example, Paton / Hicks 5). The fact that the name in question belonged to the proposer of an amendment and not of the decree itself lends further support to the assumption that the patronym was omitted. Several names of the Koan onomasticon with ten to twelve letters can be restored here: Kalligenes, Kallignotos, Kallidamos, Kallidamos, Kallikrates, Kallimachos, Kallinikos, Kallipidas, Kallisthenes, Kallistratos, Kaphisokles, Karneiskos.

¹ Ll. 1-3: [---] παρὰ τ[ᾶς] πόλιος· εἰ δέ τις χρεια ἐστὶ τῶ[ι] | δάμωι καὶ δῆλεται χαρίζασθαι τῆι βασιλίσσηι, δίδωτι δωρεάν τῆι πόλει. The meaning of the conditional sentence is not clear to me. The meaning of the *protasis* is unproblematic: "If a certain need presents itself to the people and he [*scil.* Dionysios] wishes to please the queen...". The understanding of the *apodosis*, however, is encumbered by the ambiguity of δωρεάν. Is it a noun, in which case it is an object of δίδωτι, or an adverbial complement? In other words, is the meaning "he [will continue to] make donations to the city" or "he will offer to the city for free" –and what? Moreover, the present indicative of δίδωτι is hard to understand here: since this is the end of the motivation clause, one would expect an infinitive depending on a phrase such as, for instance, ἐπαγγέλλεται δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ λοιπόν. Perhaps the present tense is meant to emphasize Dionysios' unwavering beneficial behaviour.

² Segre, *ad I. di Cos* ED 20; Habicht 1996b: 85.

³ *IG II*² 560 with Habicht 1996b: 85 (cf. p. 80 n. 8, above).

⁴ *IG XII* 6, 30; cf. **D30-31**, below.

⁵ *IG XII* 6, 150; on the disputed date of this inscription, see p. 388 n. 4, below.

⁶ *I. Ephesos* 2003. On the contrary, cultic honours for Phila attested at Athens are, in my view, irrelevant. They are attested by a passage of Dionysios son of Tryphon, a Late Hellenistic grammarian (*apud* Ath. 6.255c), and by a fragment of Alexis (*PCG* II fr. 116 [*apud* Ath. 6.254a]). The first passage informs us that the flatterers of Poliorketes in the entourage of Adeimantos of Lampsakos erected a temple (the Philaion) and statues in honour of Phila-Aphrodite at Thria. The second passage mentions a toast in the honour of king Antigonos, the young Demetrios and Phila -

If the queen in the decree under discussion is to be identified with Phila, this would be the first testimony to the relations between Kos and Poliorketes, and the only testimony before Antigonos' death in 301.¹ A secondary problem regarding this theory would be that Kos did not need to turn to Poliorketes (through his royal consort), as the city could use the services of another Koan citizen, namely Nikomedes – a man very well positioned in the Antigonid court –, as an intermediary in its dealings with king Antigonos during the last two decades of the fourth century. Nonetheless, this problem is not important: it would not be the first time that citizens of a city in the Antigonid sphere of influence sought alternative channels of communication with Antigonos, Demetrios, or both.² Two other interpretations, however, are possible.

The first is that the decree dates to the period after 301. Kos was probably one of the cities which remained loyal to Poliorketes in the aftermath of the battle of Ipsos.³ We know that in 299 Phila travelled from Kilikia to Macedonia on a diplomatic mission to her brother Kassandros, a mortal enemy of her husband;⁴ The queen could have stopped over at Kos during her journey, taking the opportunity arising from her mission to exchange mutual courtesies and services with the Koans.⁵

Aphrodite; this comedy fragment probably reflects real honours bestowed upon Phila by Poliorketes' courtiers at Athens. Although these honours appear to have been approved by the Athenian state – as, otherwise, the erection of a temple would be surprising (cf. Carney 2000b: 31–32) –, there are good reasons for us to question the testimony of Dionysios. Temples were rarely erected for the cult of a ruler (Habicht 1970: 143); it would be paradoxical if a temple of queen Phila had been erected at Athens (and, moreover, not in the civic centre but in the countryside), a city where no temple for the king was ever erected (Habicht, *ibid.*). The 'temple' that Dionysios speaks of may be the sanctuary of Aphrodite at Daphni (Paus. 1.37.7; for the archaeological evidence, see Robert 1946: 30–31 n. 3 and Machaira 1993: 31 n. 30), and the divine honours to Phila, assimilated to Aphrodite, were most probably a court affair, unconnected with the Athenian state cult of Antigonos and Poliorketes and, therefore, not to be used as evidence for formal relations between Athens and the queen.

¹ The only other attestation of relations between Kos and Poliorketes is the arbitration of Knidian judges in a legal dispute between Kalymna and Koan citizens, which was judged on the basis of a *διάταγμα* of Poliorketes (*TitCal* 79 and 7 [Ager 1996: n° 21; Magnetto 1997: n° 14]). The fact that the *diatagma* was issued by Poliorketes alone, and not jointly by him and his father, probably means that the date is after 301. I see no reason to date the inscription as early as ca. 300, as Segre (*TitCal*), Migeotte 1984: 206, Magnetto 1997: 89 and Habicht 2000: 306 do, based on the assumption that Poliorketes was too occupied on other fronts to deal with such an issue in the 290's.

² See **A35**, above.

³ See n. 1, above and Sherwin-White 1978: 88.

⁴ Plut., *Demetr.* 32.4. For the status which Phila enjoyed among the Macedonian nobility as a daughter of Antipatros and ex-wife of Krateros, see Plut., *Demetr.* 14.2, with the commentary of Seibert 1967: 27.

⁵ Samos may have been another such stop of her journey (see **D30-31**, below).

The second alternative interpretation is to maintain Segre's date (before 301), but identify the queen not with Phila but with Stratonike, the wife of Antigonos. Apparently, the real reason why Segre and Habicht take the identification with Phila for granted is precisely the fact that there is more evidence on Phila. Nonetheless, it should be noted that Stratonike must have also carried the royal title after 306,¹ we know that she had a personal guard as well,² and it would be wrong to assume that she did not possess her own court entourage too, simply because this is not attested.

If either of the latter two interpretations is accepted, then there is no source linking Poliorketes with Kos before 301.³ If this, in turn, is the case, then this would be another indication of the central role played by Nikomedes in the relationship between Kos and Antigonos, for it would mean that Nikomedes' mediation offered the Koans such an efficient channel of communication with Antigonos, that there was no reason for them to cultivate parallel bonds with the entourage of Poliorketes before Antigonos' death.

D10. Aristolochos son of Zmendron — D11. Makareus son of Aratos

— Rigsby 1996: n^o 23-27; *SEG* 53 (2003) 850-851; on Aristolochos, see also *SEG* 48 (1998) 1098, l. A 34; on Makareus, see, perhaps, *I. di Cos* ED 132a, l. 1 (cf. n. 5, below)

In the context of the Koan *theoria* which toured throughout the Greek world in 242 in order to achieve recognition of the *asylia* of the sanctuary of Apollo and of the Panhellenic character of the penteteric Asklepieia (which would be celebrated for the first time in 241),⁴ three *theoroi* were assigned the Greek mainland. Their leader was Aristolochos son of Zmendron; he was accompanied by Herakleitos son of Timaitos and Makareus son of Aratos. All three seem to have belonged to known Koan families.⁵ For the family of Aristolochos, this *theoria* may have marked the

¹ The cult statue of a queen Stratonike erected at Delos in the late fourth or early third century (*IG* XII Suppl. 311 [*IG* XI 4, 514; Kotsidu 2000: n^o 123]) could very well have belonged to the mother of Poliorketes and not to his daughter (Billows 1990: 235 n. 118 and Carney 2000: 305 n. 71, both with the same mistaken citation). The fact that there is a large number of (later) Delian sources on Stratonike II (see Tréheux, *ID* Index I 17) is not a strong counter-argument.

² Diod. Sic. 19.16.4-5 with Billows 1990: 263 n. 42.

³ The presence of a Koan (Pleistias son of Moschion) in the inner circle of Poliorketes' staff (Diod. Sic. 20.50.4; *IG* XII 6, 48; cf. **D25**, below) does not invalidate my argument. The career of an individual by the side of Poliorketes or Antigonos and the organized political relations of the Koan state with the Antigonid court are two different things, not necessarily interconnected.

⁴ Rigsby 1996: 106-153 cites all the sources and the extensive bibliography prior to 2003, dispensing me from dealing here with a number of details about this *theoria*. Important new inscriptions which modify some of these details are to be found in Bosnakis / Hallof 2003; see also Rigsby 2004 and Buraselis 2004b.

⁵ The names and the patronyms of the *theoroi* are often attested in Kos. Aristolochos is obviously to be identified with [Ἀριστ]όλοχος Σμείνδρωνος, a contributor to an *epidosis* roughly

beginning of a lasting bond between members of the family and the Macedonian court (see **D17**, below). Aristolochos and Makareus probably began their tour in Macedonia,¹ then travelled through Thessaly (where they were joined by Herakleitos at Phthiotic Thebes) to the south² and ended up in the Peloponnese.³ Kassandrea, Amphipolis and Philippi recognized the *asylia* of the sanctuary according to the royal wish,⁴ which must mean that Aristolochos and Makareus had also visited Antigonos Gonatas himself.

If we set aside a number of sources, mostly of disputed date, which have been unnecessarily considered as attesting to Gonatas' influence over Kos after the king's

in the same period (SEG 48 [1998] 1098, l. A 34). Makareus was the name of a *monarchos* in ca. 220 or slightly later (*I. di Cos* ED 132a, l. 1; on the date, see Habicht 2000: 309 and 2004: 62); he may be identified with the *theoros* of 242. Aratos son of Makareus, a contributor to the *epidosis* of 202/1 (Paton / Hicks 10 c, l. 81), was clearly a son of the *theoros* of 242. Makareus, an *architheoros* in ca. 190 (*ID* 421, l. 62; 439 a l. 33; 442 B, l. 35; 461 Ba, l. 42; 465 e, l. 26; 1413 a l. 2; 1432 AbII, l. 60), was most probably the grandson of the *theoros* of 242. Habicht 2000: 309 n. 34 (hesitantly followed by Crowther 2004: 23 and 25) prefers to identify Makareus the *architheoros* of ca. 190 with the homonymous *monarchos* of ca. 220 of *I. di Cos* ED 132a.

¹ Rigsby 1996: n^{os} 23 (Pella); 24 (probably Pydna or Beroia); 25 (Kassandrea); 26 (Amphipolis); 27 (Philippi). The order of the decrees by which the *asylia* was recognized probably follows the reports of the *theoroi* (Rigsby 1996: 111), and, thus, may reflect their course.

² Decrees of Gonnoi, Homolion, Phthiotic Thebes and Megara are preserved on one opisthographic stele (SEG 53 [2003] 850), while decrees of two unidentified Thessalian cities are preserved on a different stele (SEG 53 [2003] 851; unlike the other Thessalian decrees, these are written in dialect). Herakleitos must have landed at Demetrias, and met the other two *theoroi* at nearby Phthiotic Thebes.

³ Rigsby 1996: n^{os} 14-18 (Sparta, Messene, Thelphousa, Elis, Aigeira).

⁴ See Rigsby 1996: n^{os} 25, l. 10; 26, ll. 12-13; 27, ll. 14-15. The fact that the Pellaian recognized the *asylia* of the Asklepieion "precisely as of the other sanctuaries" (Rigsby 1996: n^o 23, l. 13: καθάπερ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἱεροῖς), and not according to the royal will, has given rise to a number of interpretations, none of them, in my view, fully satisfactory. The arguments of Bengtson 1955: 462-63 need not be repeated here, as they are based on an oversight (see Hatzopoulos 1996: I 139-40 and Rigsby 1996: 135 n. 66). Hatzopoulos 1996: I 365-66 claims that the recognition of *asylia* was a prerogative of the central Macedonian government and not of the cities and implies that the Pellaian decree may reflect a "general regulation recognizing the inviolability of all sanctuaries", parallel to the one of the Achaians, attested by the decree of Aigeira (Rigsby 1996: n^o 18, ll. 6-8; cf. the alternative interpretation of these lines by Rigsby 1996: 131, confuted by Buraselis 2004b: 18). Nonetheless, if accepted, Hatzopoulos' theory would create a new problem: if there was a specific decision of the king (as Giovannini 1977: 469 and 471 had suggested) or of the Macedonian assembly on the issue of the *asylia* of foreign sanctuaries, then why did the decrees of the other Macedonian cities not refer to that decision but simply to royal will? Rigsby 1996: 134-35, on the other hand (partly followed by Buraselis 2004b: 19), assumes that Pella was the *theoria*'s first stop in Macedonia and, furthermore, that the *theoroi* addressed the assembly of Pella before they saw the king, hence the absence of a reference to the royal will in the Pellaian decree. In my opinion, however, failing to address the king of the Macedonians first and addressing a Macedonian city (be it a royal residence) instead would constitute a serious breach of protocol on the part of the *theoroi*.

naval victory over the Ptolemies off the coast of Kos in 255,¹ the *theoria* of 242 seems to have been the first official contact of Kos with the Macedonian court. We need not seek for a political motive behind the decision of various states to recognize the *asylia* of the Koan Asklepieion:² all kings of the period, despite their differences, granted the Koan request. On the contrary, the Koans' attempt to put the Asklepieion on the map as a Panhellenic religious centre had a definite political aspect; it reflected their attempt to steer a middle, neutral course in the midst of the incessant wars of the kings.³

D12. Phainis — D13. Philophron — D14. Archepolis

— Rigsby 1996: n° 8 (SEG 12 [1955] 369)

Phainis (the *architheoros*), Philophron and Archepolis were the three Koan *theoroi* to Ptolemy III in 242 (for the context, see the preceding entry). The three *theoroi* are otherwise unknown.⁴ Negotiations for the outcome of the mission had apparently begun before the *theoroi* arrived at Alexandria, if we judge by the fact that Euergetes' letter reported that the *theoroi* informed him that a statue of his had been erected at Kos (Rigsby 1996: n° 8, ll. 17-18) and that the Koans had recognized the local Ptolemaia celebrated at Hiera Nesos in the Arsinoites (ll. 18-19). The laconic and perfunctory tone of the royal letter is somewhat unusual, but

¹ All testimonies to the cult of a king Antigonos in Kos certainly belong to the period of Antigonos Doson (see **D17**, below). A Samian decree in honour of Koan judges in a period when Samos was under Macedonian rule (IG XII 6, 150) should probably be dated to the times of Antigonos the One-Eyed (see p. 388 n. 4, below). A passage of Hegesandros describing Astypalaia κατά τὴν τοῦ Ἀντιγόνου τοῦ Γονατᾶ... βασιλείαν (FHG IV 421 [apud Ath. 9.400d]) does not even bear testimony to an Antigonid hold over neighbouring Astypalaia (Reger 1994b: 59-60 n. 116), *pace* Fraser / Bean 1954: 157 n. 1; Huß 1976: 221; Buraselis 1982: 168 (with reservations), let alone Kos (*pace* Sherwin-White 1978: 109 n. 140). There remains Segre 1934: 169-79 (*I. di Cos* ED 48, without the text), an inscription attesting to the import of Thessalian grain to Kos, probably during the second quarter of the third century (cf. Crowther 2004: 26-27 n° 3). It has usually been assumed that this transaction reflects the good relations of Kos with Antigonos Gonatas (see, for example, Sherwin-White 1978: 109-110; Le Bohec 1993: 356). Nevertheless, it should be stressed that a) the –admittedly very poorly preserved– text does not seem to mention the king; b) the transaction may be explained without presupposing that the king interfered (cf. Rigsby 2004: 13); and c) even if the king explicitly allowed such a transaction, this would, by itself, only prove that Gonatas graciously helped the island at a difficult time, and can certainly not be used as evidence of a Macedonian sway over Kos.

² Cf. Rigsby 1996: 110.

³ Cf. Sherwin-White 1978: 111-12 and Buraselis 2004b: 19.

⁴ If we accept that all *theoroi* set off from Kos simultaneously, as is highly probable, Philophron son of Dardanos, one of the *theoroi* sent to Italian cities (Rigsby 1996: n° 46-47), cannot be identified with Philophron, the *theoros* sent to Alexandria. The names Philophron and Archepolis are often attested in third-century Kos.

may be explained by the frequent contacts between Kos and the Ptolemaic court, already from the mid-280's.¹

D15. Kaphisophon son of Philippos

— *I. di Cos* ED 136 (OGIS 42; SEG 33 [1983] 671); perhaps *I. di Cos* ED 78 (SEG 33 [1983] 672); *PMichZen* 55; Caelius Aurelianus, *De morbis chronicis* 2.34

Philippos, an influential doctor of Ptolemy III Euergetes,² belongs to the long series of Koan doctors, scientists and scholars who are known to have been active at the Ptolemaic court throughout the third century.³ Philippos' son, Kaphisophon, had come of age by 240; he later followed the family tradition and became a well-known doctor himself.⁴

At least one and possibly two Koan decrees honour Kaphisophon. The first (*I. di Cos* ED 136) is dated to ca. 240 or soon afterwards.⁵ Only the end of the motivation clause has been preserved. Kaphisophon seems to have been honoured primarily because Euergetes sent a letter to the Koan people, whereby he praised

¹ For an overview, see Sherwin-White 1978: 90-111, 113-114, to which add the Koan decree on the post-mortem cult of Arsinoe (*I. di Cos* ED 61 + 89).

² From *PMichZen* 55, dated to 240, we may infer that Philippos the doctor was so influential a figure that his son Kaphisophon was *a priori* considered a reliable witness. Kallimachos dedicated an epigram dealing with the therapeutic uses of poetry and poverty to Philippos (*Anth. Pal.* 12.150 [Callim., *Epigr.* 46 Pfeiffer]; cf. Fraser 1971: I 369-70, 590 and II 545 n. 279 and Massar 2005: 55). The second decree in honour of Kaphisophon may refer to Philippos as well, although this is not very likely; see p. 372 n. 1, below. Although neither in the papyrus nor in Kallimachos' epigram is Philippos explicitly described as a court doctor, the fact that he is described as an influential individual (papyrus) and as a familiar figure in court circles (epigram), makes this assumption practically certain.

³ For this phenomenon, see Sherwin-White 1978: 102-104. No representative of the famous medicine school of Kos is attested at any other royal court other than the court of the Ptolemies, hence Sherwin-White justifiably speaks of the "Ptolemies' effective monopolization of Coan talent in the third century" (*ibid.*, 104).

⁴ If Kaphisophon had been a doctor already by 240, he would not be called ὁ Φιλίππου τοῦ ἰατροῦ υἱὸς in *PMichZen* 55. Apart from the two decrees which will be dealt with presently, Kaphisophon is mentioned in a later medical treatise of Caelius Aurelianus: *De morbis chronicis* 2.34 (cf. Herzog [1983]: 64). Another doctor mentioned in that treatise is of interest here, namely Apollophanes, as he was also honoured at Kos at the request of Antiochos III (see p. 372 n. 4, below). Philippos son of Philippos, also a doctor, honoured at Delos in ca. 195 (*Clara Rhodos* 10 [1941] 37 n° 4; *IG* XI 4, 1078; *ID* 399 A 36) may well be Kaphisophon's brother.

⁵ For a date during the reign of Euergetes, and not of Philadelphos, as previously thought, see the convincing arguments of Sherwin-White 1978: 103-104 n. 107. The *terminus post quem* must be the first penteteric Asklepieia, celebrated in 241 and referred to in the decree, although, admittedly, the letter forms could allow an earlier dating (see *I. di Cos*, pl. 37). If the decree is dated to ca. 240, it should be noted that this is the period when Kos, until then unwaveringly pro-Ptolemaic since the 280's, sought to establish a more independent position in the Hellenistic power structure by cultivating friendly relations with all the great powers of the period (see **D10-11**, above).

Kaphisophon, then acting as the king's *architheoros* to Kos; among other things, the honourand offered a sacrifice to Asklepios and to the other gods.

According to Herzog's extensive –and hypothetical– restoration of a fragmentary Koan decree (*I. di Cos* ED 78) Kaphisophon was honoured by yet a second decree.¹ If Herzog's restorations are accepted, this would mean that Kaphisophon was honoured three times in all by Kos² for his continued mediation between the Koans and the court of Euergetes and for the warm welcome he offered to Koan *theoroi* and ambassadors to Alexandria. Thus, Kaphisophon's case would be another example of a well-known motif of relations of euergetism: the first honouring of an influential individual created a complex of mutual moral obligations, according to which the honourand had the 'obligation' to continue his mediating activity, and the city which honoured him had the 'obligation' to continue bestowing honours upon him; when the honourand was a citizen of the city in question, the moral pressure of patriotism also weighed in.³

Even if we do not accept Herzog's restorations of the second decree, it is made evident from the first decree that the Koans hastened to take advantage of Kaphisophon's high-standing in the Ptolemaic court. But the other two interested parties also had an interest in the doctor's honouring by his homeland. For the king, for whom Kos was a useful source of court scholars and scientists, the honours bestowed upon a court doctor would strengthen the flow of aspiring Koans to the court. For Kaphisophon himself, his role as an intermediary does not merely reflect his affection for his homeland but also his wish to promote his image at court –that is, his place of residence and his primary field of social, scientific and political activity–, as the royal letter praising him clearly shows.⁴

¹ The only piece of information that can be positively drawn from the decree is that the honourand was someone who had already been honoured by the city (ll. 10-11), probably for proving himself useful to Koan *theoroi* and ambassadors to Alexandria. Kaphisophon is obviously a plausible candidate, but there is altogether no certainty as to the honourand's identity (Marasco 1996: 450-51 accepts Herzog's restorations with reservations). Herzog's [1983] restorations in ll. 7-9, which would effect that the honourand was a doctor, thus confirming his identification with Kaphisophon, are attractive but, once again, not obligatory (cf. the different restorations of Segre). Even less likely is the wholly restored by Herzog and unnecessary reference to Kaphisophon's father Philippos in l. 5.

² The first set of honours would be those of the first decree, identified with the honours referred to in ll. 4-5 of the second decree; the second set of honours would be those referred to in ll. 9-10 of the second decree; and, finally, Kaphisophon would have been honoured for a third time with the crown recorded in the second decree (ll. 19-20).

³ Massar 2005: 113 also points out that Kaphisophon is honoured "en sa double capacité de citoyen de Cos rendant service à sa cité et de représentant de Ptolémée".

⁴ Had not the explicit references to Kaphisophon's mediating role survived, the royal letter itself would not afford such an interpretation. The similar letter of Antiochos III to the Koans (*SEG* 33 [1983] 673), by which Apollophanes of Seleukeia –a doctor of Seleukos II, Seleukos III and Antiochos himself, and an influential member of the Seleukid court (see Marasco 1996: 444-46

D16. [---]es son of Xa[nthippos (?)]

— [. . .]ης Ξα[νθίππου (?)]; *I. di Cos* ED 78 (SEG 33 [1983] 672), l. 21

According to Herzog's restorations, he was the proposer¹ of an amendment of the second decree in honour of Kaphisophon, on whom see the preceding entry.

D17. Diomedon son of Diodotos

— Herzog 1928: 30 (Sherwin-White 1978: 116 n. 175)

Diomedon dedicated a statue of a king Antigonos, who, on palaeographic grounds, can only have been Antigonos Doson.² The explicit mention of the royal title on the statue base makes it clear that the king was still alive, and, therefore, this becomes the first reference to the relations of Doson with Kos. Three more relevant sources are dated after the king's death and inform us that Doson had received divine honours by the Koans, who had erected a temple and instituted a state cult in his honour.³ The reasons behind these extraordinary honours remain unknown; it is not even clear whether the state cult was instituted during the king's

and Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 19-21 n^{os} 22-23; 24-25 n^o 27)– was praised, does not necessarily have the same political connotations as Euergetes' letter about Kaphisophon. In the case of Apollophanes the royal letter may simply reflect the wish of a court doctor to be honoured at the famed centre of medical science during, for example, a visit of his to the island for religious or educational purposes (hence the assumption of Herzog and Mastrocinque [see Herzog (1983)], followed by Mastrocinque 1995: 147-49 and Massar 2005: 113-14, that Apollophanes was an envoy of the king is not necessary). Equally non-political may have been the motives of Metrodoros of Amphipolis, court doctor of Antiochos I, who was also honoured by the Koans (*I. di Cos* ED 190; on the other sources, see Tataki 1998: 57 n^o 91; see also Crowther 2004: 23). On the other hand, Kaphisophon's wish to be honoured at the centre of scientific medicine was inseparable from his wish to acquire added status in his homeland; and the latter wish had a clear political significance.

¹ I have counted at least thirty-seven names with eight letters ending in –es in the Koan onomasticon, none of them associated with the name Xanthippos, which is the only name beginning with Xa- in the Koan onomasticon.

² Herzog 1928: 30 assumed that it was Antigonos the One-Eyed, but the letter forms of the statue base (especially the alphas with a broken middle bar) do not allow the identification of the king to whom the statue belonged with either of the first two kings Antigonoi, as Segre 1934: 183 and Sherwin-White 1978: 116 n. 176 also point out.

³ An amendment (on the proposal of Panamyas son of Theudotos) of a *lex sacra* pertaining to the cult of Dionysos Thylophoros stipulated that 200 drachmas be committed annually by priests of Dionysos to repairs of the sanctuary of Antigonos (*I. di Cos* ED 216, ll. B19-24). Segre 1941b: 29-34 and Sherwin-White 1978: 115 n. 171 dated the inscription to 220, firstly because they believed that Panamyas' amendment must be dated only shortly after the institution of the cult, and secondly because a Theudotos son of Panamyas is attested in ca. 200 (Paton / Hicks 44, l. 30). Nevertheless, the need of repairs suggests that the sanctuary had a long past and Crowther 2004: 24-25 (cf. Habicht 2000: 320) convincingly dates the inscription to the second quarter of the second century, on palaeographical grounds. The Antigoneion and the altar of the king are also mentioned in *I. di Cos* ED 85, also dating to the second century. Finally, Segre 1941b: 29 and 33, fig. 3 published a Hellenistic tile bearing the inscription: δαμοσία - Ἀντιγονείου.

lifetime or not.¹ An attractive context which would also explain Doso's interest in the south-eastern Aegean is his campaign to Karia in 227: the strategic location of Kos made it a particularly advantageous ally for any ruler wishing to campaign in south-western Asia Minor. A Koan decree in honour of a Kalymnian who contributed money "both to the ratified [---] to king Antigonos and to the [---] of the soldiers",² could be connected with the Karian campaign and, perhaps, with army supplies, but the laconic and poorly preserved reference allows no certainty.³

More interesting are the possible reasons for which an individual would have dedicated the statue of the king. The prosopography of Diomedon's family may hold some clues. Already in Segre's time, Diomedon had been connected with the Diomedon who, along with his brother Hippokritos, was the main Koan supporter of king Perseus during the Third Macedonian War.⁴ Moreover, Habicht reasonably assumed that Diomedon and Hippokritos of Kos, attested in 181 and 179 at Delos, are to be identified with the homonymous supporters of Perseus.⁵ The Delian inscriptions inform us that their father was called Zmendron. Habicht also identified the father of the two brothers with Zmendron son of Diomedon, a contributor to an *epidosis* in 202/1, *monarchos* of Kos in 186/5 and, according to an inscription which Habicht could not have known of, *epimeletes* of comedies and

¹ Sherwin-White 1978: 117 n. 178 assumes that the earthquake that devastated Rhodes in ca. 227 also hit Kos, and that donations by Doso to help rebuild the island were the reason behind the institution of the cult. Segre 1941b: 32-34 believed the cult was introduced after the sea-battle of Kos, which he dated under Doso. Habicht 1970: 64-65 wisely does not offer any interpretation for the cult.


² *TitCal* 74, ll. 11-13: ἔς τε τὸν ψαφι[σθέντα --- ca.16-17 ---] | [β]ασιλεῖ Ἀντιγόνῳ καὶ ἐς τὰν [--- ca.16-17 --- τῶν] | στρατιωτῶν.

³ The approximate date can only be determined by letter forms. The overwhelming majority of scholars believe that the king in question was Doso, although some allow for the possibility that he was, in fact, Gonatas. The letters are the characteristic Koan letters of the third century, notoriously difficult to date with any precision. Taking the conservatism of Koan engravers into account, the alphas (occasionally with arched middle bars), the sigmas (with completely parallel horizontal strokes) and especially the kappas (with diagonal bars of equal length) probably point to a date during the reign of Doso; see the photograph of the stone in Segre 1941b: 23 and the photograph of the squeeze at <www.csad.ox.ac.uk/CSAD/Images/Large/GIBM247>.

⁴ Polyb. 30.7.10. That the dedicant of the statue and the supporter of Perseus belonged to the same family has been accepted by Segre 1941b: 38; Sherwin-White 1978: 116-17; Habicht 1986: 91-92; Le Bohec 1993: 357. Sherwin-White and Le Bohec express some reservations, because the name Diomedon is frequently attested in Kos.

⁵ Habicht 1986: 91-92. The *architheoros* Diomedon son of Zmendron dedicated a phiale to Apollo on behalf of the Koans in 179 at the latest (*ID* 442 B, l. 109; 443 Bb, l. 34). Hippokritos (no patronym) also dedicated a phiale in 181 at the latest (*ID* 439 a, l. 36; 442 B, l. 38; 461 Bb, l. 45 [in the last passage he is called Hippokrates, which is obviously an engraver's mistake]). In my opinion, the two brothers' visit occurred at the same time, probably in 182, when the *architheoros* Diomedon must have announced the Asklepieia of 181.

agonothetes in the 180's.¹ What has not been observed, however, is that the ties of the family of the dedicant of Doson's statue with the Macedonian court did not only have a future, but most probably also a past. The name Zmendron is rare, both in Kos² and elsewhere; it is therefore probably not a coincidence that the patronym of the *architheoros* to Macedonia in 242 was also Zmendron (Rigsby 1996: n^{os} 23-27; see **D10**, above). We are therefore entitled to assume that the family's stemma was as follows:



If we accept this plausible stemma, a rather interesting picture emerges. Over four generations, the Koans' contacts with the Macedonian court were apparently exclusively handled by Zmendron's family, undoubtedly one of the leading families of third-/second-century Kos. The connection of the family with the throne of Pella had its origin in the visit of Aristolochos to Macedonia in 242. The personal channel of communication forged then, became functional and acquired a political facet when the international framework and the needs of Koan foreign policy allowed it, that is, when Doson's Karian campaign or donations by the king, or both, brought Kos to his sphere of influence. There is obviously no way to tell whether Diomedon (I), Aristolochos' nephew, played a part in this new development, but we do know that he appeared as an agent of the new relationship of Kos with Doson. Under Philip V, the situation was reversed: Kos became an ally of Rhodes and the Ptolemies, and an official member of the anti-Macedonian camp.³ Zmendron (II)

¹ *Epidosis*: Paton / Hicks 10 d, l. 14; *monarchos*: *TitCal* 88, l. 93; Klee 1918: 10 IIB, ll. 36-37 (for the date, see Habicht 2000: 305-306 and 2004: 63-64); *epimeletes* and *agonothetes*: *I. di. Cos* ED 234, ll. 14 and 27 (for the date, see Habicht 2000: 316-17). During the Asklepieia of 186/5, when Zmendron was the *monarchos*, his son Hippokritos was among the victors (Klee 1918: 10 IIB, ll. 46-47 and 54-55).

² The only Koans named Zmendron / Smendron, other than the ones referred to here, are another contributor to the *epidosis* of 202/1 (Paton / Hicks 10 d, l. 80), and a contributor to another, roughly contemporary *epidosis* (Paton / Hicks 11, l. 2), who may be no other than Zmendron son of Aristolochos.

³ See Sherwin-White 1978: 118-24.

maintained his family's high social standing, but was obviously in no position to take advantage of his Macedonian contacts.¹ By the time of the next generation, however, these contacts resurfaced: Diomedon (II) and Hippokritos were the most vociferous supporters of Perseus in Kos, regardless of the fact that the pro-Roman faction finally prevailed.

The diplomatic and political activity of this important family reflects many of the motifs recurring throughout this study: exploitation by an intermediary of a first contact with a royal court (not necessarily a contact of a political nature); bequest of the ties with the court to the next generation; longevity of these ties; influence of the bonds between a family and a royal court over the orientation of a city's foreign policy, even in a hostile domestic and international environment; utilization of these bonds by the city, when and if the majority of the body politic judged that they were to the city's benefit.

D18. Philinos — D19. Pasiias son of Aristagoras

— *I. di Cos* ED 17 + 130 + 26 + 194

Pasiias son of Aristagoras, otherwise unknown, proposed an honorific decree with a complex and highly problematic editing history. Herzog connected a fragment containing the beginning of a decree and the name of its proposer (*I. di Cos* ED 17) with a fragmentary decree referring to the fort of Halasarna (Paton / Hicks 7), and proposed that the honourand was no other than Nikomedes son of Aristandros; as we have already seen, Herzog's theory has to be rejected.² Segre, on the contrary, considered *I. di Cos* ED 17 as the beginning of a decree preserved in three other fragments (*I. di Cos* ED 130, 26 and 194), to which perhaps *I. di Cos* ED 110 and another, unpublished, fragment may also belong.³ Although a physical join was not possible, the fact that all these fragments are the work of the same letter-cutter, as well as other epigraphical data⁴ make Segre's assumption very likely. Things are

¹ By Paton / Hicks 7 (late third century; cf. p. 377 n. 1, below) someone was honoured for convincing a king not to raze the fort of Halasarna. As Sherwin-White 1978: 122-24 plausibly suggested, the context may well be an otherwise unattested but perfectly possible temporary occupation of the fort of Halasarna by Philip V. If that is the case, then the honourand, who must have been a Koan with close ties with the Macedonian king in a period of strong anti-Macedonian feelings in Kos, may have been no other than Zmendron (II).

² See p. 363 n. 1, above.

³ Crowther 2004: 26 and 27-28.

⁴ The height of the letters is precisely the same in all four fragments (0,012), while ED 26 and 194 also bear a similar damage of the stone. The fact that the thickness of ED 130 and 194 is different from the thickness of ED 17 and 26 (the latter two fragments being of equal thickness), is due to the second use of ED 17 and 26 and is, thus, no obstacle to the assumption that all four fragments belong to the same monument. Herzog's assumption that Paton / Hicks 7 and ED 17 were part of the same text was not unfounded: Paton / Hicks 7 has the same letter height and interlinear space with the other fragments in question and was the work of the same mason (see

further complicated by the dates proposed by various scholars for the fragments in question, ranging from the age of Alexander to the late third century. For the purposes of present discussion, it should suffice to accept Segre's theory that ED 17, 130, 26 and 194 are part of the same decree, to maintain that Paton / Hicks 7 is a contemporary but different decree and that all the fragments in question are probably dated to the late third century.¹

If the conclusions drawn here are correct, Philinos (ED 26, l. 3), a great benefactor of the people (ED 17, l. 2), was honoured by the Koans with unknown honours. His first benefaction was his mediation to the Ptolemaic court, which resulted in the import of wheat and barley from Cyprus (ED 130, ll. 2-3, 10), at the request of the people or Philinos (ED 130, l. 12) and at the order of a king Ptolemy (ED 130, l. 9), who not only allowed the export of grain from Cyprus (ED 26, l. 1),² but may have also donated the desired quantity to the Koans (ED 130, l. 13: [--- βασι]ιλέως δωρε[ά]).

The second and most important benefaction of Philinos (ED 26, l. 5ff.) is more difficult to determine, due to the fragmentary state of preservation of the text. There seems to be a reference to an arbitration court (l. 5: ἐν ἐκκλήτοις δικαστ[ηρί-οις (?)]³), as well as to Philinos' response to yet another Koan request (ἐπακολουθήσας, l. 6), which involved an important diplomatic mission (l. 7: μεγάλους κινδύνους

Crowther 2004: 26 and 27-28, with whom, however, I cannot agree that Paton / Hicks 7 and *I. di Cos* ED 17 + 130 + 26 + 194 are part of the same text: while the former refers to an embassy to a king who must have been hostile to the Koans [see p. 376 n. 1, above], the Philinos decree refers to contacts with a Ptolemy, a Koan ally).

¹ For the long and complicated story of the various dates proposed for the fragments in question, letter forms serving as the main argument in all cases (on the whole, a cautionary tale for the dangers of proposing historical reconstructions based on subjective evaluations of letter forms), see Crowther 2004: 21-22, with earlier bibliography. It should be noted that the late-third century date relies on the generally accepted, but not certain, connection of Paton / Hicks 7 and *I. di Cos* ED 49 with the Cretan War. It should be remarked, however, that the letters of this particular cutter (see Crowther 2004: figs. 1, 4, 42-43) could also point to an earlier date. For example, I fail to see how the letters of the Philinos decree can be dated almost eighty years later than the letters of *SEG* 49 (1999) 1106 (*OGIS* 43 + Holleaux, *Études* III 33; see Crowther 1999: n° 2 and 2004: fig. 10), safely dated to 280-260, and probably to the beginning of that period (see p. 378 n. 5, below).

² On the abrogation of the prohibition of the export of grain by competent authorities, see the examples collected by Gauthier 1979b: 85-88.

³ I see no other solution for the restoration of this line: the preposition ἐν does not allow the restoration δικαστ[αῖς] (one could suppose that EN in the beginning of the line is the ending of a verb and not the preposition ἐν, but in that case an article before ἐκκλήτοις δικαστ[αῖς] would be expected). On the institution of the ἔκκλητος πόλις, a variation of the institution of foreign arbitration, see mainly Gauthier 1972: 308-338 and 344-46. I know of no other examples of an ἔκκλητον δικαστήριον; the ἔκκλητος δίκη is usually connected with the institution of the ἔκκλητος πόλις, but in at least one case it seems to have the meaning of 'appeal trial' (Ager 1996: n° 90, ll. 3-4 and p. 252 n. 2).

ὑπ[ομείνας])¹ to a king (l. 9), apparently the same Ptolemy referred to earlier. The mission involved either the release of captives or, more probably, some sort of “recovery” –of city territory, of the city’s autonomy, or of constitutional order?– (l. 8: ἀγωνιζάμενος ἀνέσωσι[ε]),² and Philinos’ intervention proved successful (l. 10: αὐτοτελή).³ The following line (l. 11) is even more problematic: τὰν πολιτείαν ὁ δ᾿α[μ[ος ---]. If πολιτεία means citizenship, this would effect that Philinos was not a Koan citizen –despite the impression we get from the rest of the decree that such he was– and that Koan citizenship was part of the honours awarded to him by the decree under discussion. If, on the other hand, πολιτεία refers to constitutional order, this would mean that Philinos and king Ptolemy proved instrumental to the salvation of the city from some important domestic or external danger.⁴ In the latter case, however, we would have to assume that the arbitration referred to in ll. 3-5 was an affair completely irrelevant to Philinos’ other important activities, described in ll. 6 ff. It should be noted here that the earliest attestation of Koan relations with the Ptolemies (ca. 280 or slightly later) involves a mission of Koan judges to Naxos at the request of the nesiarch Bakchon.⁵ The Naxian decree belongs to a whole series of similar cases, all of them being the result of Ptolemaic

¹ For this restoration –slightly different than the restoration of Segre– and its meaning, see *Aphrodisias and Rome* 5: the reference to the troubles, expenses, hardships and dangers facing ambassadors is a *topos* of decrees in their honour, especially in later periods (see p. 196 n. 3, above).

² For another example of ἀγωνίζομαι in a diplomatic context see *ID* 1498, l. 15; for ἀνασώζω as a technical term for the release and repatriation of captives, which is the meaning most often attested in epigraphic texts, see Bielman 1994: 251-53; for its use in the political and/or military sense of “to recover”, see p. 134, above.

³ This is a reference either to a final court decision (see *LSJ*, s.v. αὐτοτελής, b 4) or to the autonomy that the city has (or maintains, or regains, *vel sim.*). If the former is the case, then the decision was issued by the courts mentioned in l. 5, or by the king; if the latter is the case, then the issue must have been of vital importance to the city.

⁴ Cf. the famous Nikouria decree, *Syll*³ 390 (*IG* XII 7, 506), ll. 13-15: τὰς τε πόλεις ἐλευθερώσας (*scil.* Ptolemy I) καὶ τοὺς νόμους ἀποδοὺς [κ]αὶ τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν πᾶσι καταστήσας [κ]αὶ τῶν εἰσφορῶν κουφίσας.

⁵ *SEG* 49 (1999) 1106 (*OGIS* 43 + Holleaux, *Études* III 33-34). Dating this decree soon after 280 is based on the acute observation of Louis Robert (see Holleaux, *Études* III 36-37) that the distinction between Ptolemy Soter (Ptolemy I) and king Ptolemy (Ptolemy II) in the decree means that Ptolemy I’s death and Ptolemy II’s rise to the throne must have been fairly recent events. Robert’s theory has since been unanimously accepted (see, for example, Sherwin-White 1978: 92 n. 51; Crowther 1999: 266). Hazzard 2000: 108 n. 29 and 174 doubts it, apparently because it confutes his theory that Ptolemy was called Soter only as late as 263. His theory is mainly based on the redating of the Nikouria decree (*Syll*³ 390), which partly rests on an untenable argument (cf. p. 148 n. 5, above), namely that the first Ptolemaia must have taken place in 282, and therefore the Ptolemaia of the Nikouria decree cannot have been the first festival of that name. As this is not the place to discuss Hazzard’s theory in detail, I would only like to remark that the use of the epithet Soter in official documents of *Greek cities* may very well have been earlier than the use of the term in official *Ptolemaic* documents (a use which does seem to postdate 263).

intervention.¹ An attractive hypothesis would then be that Philinos was sent as a judge to another city, after an intervention of the Ptolemaic administration.²

To conclude, the only certainty that this tantalizing but problematic text allows regarding Philinos is that he was somehow connected with the Ptolemaic court. At least after his first benefaction, which involved the donation (?) of grain, if not sooner, the Koans thought that he was well placed to influence the king on issues of more vital importance to the city. The name Philinos is often attested in Kos. The best known Koan bearing this name was the doctor and founder of the empiricist medical school at Alexandria.³ The only secure biographical information on Philinos the doctor is that he was a student of Erasistratos; he, thus, must have settled in Alexandria towards the end of Philadelphos' reign.⁴ As a student of Erasistratos and a resident of the Mouseion, Philinos undoubtedly had excellent access to the Ptolemaic court; this would fit well the description of the honourand (?) in the Philinos decree as an eminent figure (ED 26, ll. 3-4: [οὐκ *vel* μὴ] | εὐκαταφρόνητον ΠΕ[---]).⁵ In other words, the identification of the honourand of the decree with Philinos the doctor is attractive in more than one respect. The activity of the letter-cutter of the stele is placed in the late-fourth century, which would appear to confute the identification just proposed. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the career of a letter-cutter could easily span two or three decades.⁶ A date of the Philinos decree in the early years of Philopator's reign, for example, would be compatible both with Crowther's identification of the letter-cutter and with the identification of the honourand as Philinos the famous doctor, obviously honoured towards the end of his illustrious career.

A different line of approach leads to similar –still, equally hypothetical– conclusions. A Nisyrian decree erected at Kos honoured Philinos son of Aratidas of Kos.⁷ Although only the uninformative beginning of the motivation clause has been preserved, the presence of a Koan doctor called Aratidas, honoured at Kos during the second half of the second century affords the assumption that Philinos son of

¹ For other examples, see Crowther 1999: 266 n. 34.

² This assumption requires that the lines of the decree are long enough to accommodate the transition from the reference to the judicial mission of Philinos in ED 26, l. 5 to his diplomatic mission, referred to in the following lines; Segre, independently, also assumed that the lines were rather long (*I. di Cos*, p. 25).

³ Sources and fragments have been collected by Deichgräber 1930: 163-64.

⁴ Deichgräber 1930: 233; Fraser 1972: I 359.

⁵ Cf. *I. di Cos* ED 193, l. 6 (καὶ μὴ εὐκαταφρόνητον ἄνδρα), also in an honorific decree. It is not certain, however, that the adjective describes Philinos, who is referred to in the nominative in the preceding line.

⁶ For examples of Athenian letter-cutters with a career extending over thirty or more years, see Tracy 1995: 67-75, 120-28, 154-59, 164-69; for a possible example from Kos itself, see Crowther 2004: 25.

⁷ SEG 48 (1998) 1101.

Aratidas may also have belonged to a family of doctors.¹ Moreover, the honourand of the Nisyrian decree is also almost certainly to be identified with Philinos son of Aratidas, contributor to the Koan *epidosis* of 202/1;² if so, the Nisyrian decree should also be dated towards the end of the century (although, once again, letter forms could also afford a slightly earlier dating),³ and therefore in roughly the same period with the honours for our Philinos. Whatever the date of the Nisyrian decree, the alternation of the same names of doctors from the mid-third to the mid-second century, all of whom shared international repute and were active outside Kos seems to suggest that we are dealing with members of the same family. The honourand of the Philinos decree could very well belong to this family (whether he was a doctor himself or not); he could be identified either with the founder of the empiricist medical school at Alexandria or with his grandson, who could be the Philinos son of Aratidas, also honoured at Nisyros.⁴

D20. Stasilas son of Lykophron

— SVA 545 (*TitCal* test. XII)

Stasilas is the otherwise unknown proposer of the well-known decree concerning the restoration of the *ὁμοπολιτεία* between Kalymna and Kos, soon after 201 (SVA 545).⁵ The oath taken by the citizens of the two reunited cities included (ll. 18-19) the obligation to preserve their friendship and alliance with king Ptolemy V. After a temporary distancing in the 220's, relations between Kos and Alexandria had been re-established after Dason's death.⁶ The first *homopoliteia* between the two islands, probably under Ptolemaic patronage, should be dated during the last two decades of the third century;⁷ it was only temporarily dissolved during Philip V's operations in the south-eastern Aegean in 201. Nonetheless, the main ally of Kos in this period appears to have been Rhodes,⁸ which means that we should not overemphasize the Koans' alliance with the weakened Ptolemaic court.

¹ Aratidas the doctor: *Milet* I 3, 184; that the honourand of the Nisyrian decree belonged to this family of doctors was already proposed by Hallof / Hallof / Habicht 1998: 133-34.

² Paton / Hicks 10 b 22 and c 70.

³ See <<http://www.csad.ox.ac.uk/Kos/AAIG19m.jpg>>.

⁴ For a possible link between one or more of the Philinoi mentioned here and one of the most prominent Koan families, see Buraselis 2000: 21-24, who also mentions a later Philinos with attested dealings with a king: Philinos son of Python, one of the five ambassadors who would accompany a king (either Eumenes II or Ptolemy VI) to Kos (*I. di Cos* ED 235, ll. 68-73; on the date of this text [in the 170's] and on the identity of the king, cf. *SEG* 50 [2000] 764, with all relevant bibliography)

⁵ For a detailed discussion and the extensive relevant bibliography see SVA III 545 and Sherwin-White 1978: 124-29.

⁶ Sherwin-White 1978: 118-19, 124.

⁷ Sherwin-White 1978: 128; Buraselis 2000: 10 n. 18.

⁸ See Sherwin-White 1978: 118-19.

KALYMNA

D21. Nikostratos son of Nikophantos– *TitCal* 8

Towards the end of the fourth century, Moschion son of Moirichos of Thera was granted the Kalymnian citizenship (*TitCal* 8). The honourand, a military commander who had taken part in military operations of either Antigonos the One-Eyed or Demetrios Poliorketes, probably in Asia, was primarily honoured for providing assistance to the Kalymnians who had been campaigning (or served in a garrison which was situated) ἐν Μώγλοις. According to Segre's attractive hypothesis, the honourand is none other than Moschion the envoy of Antigonos the One-Eyed to Rhodes in 315.¹

Hellenistic Kalymna followed the alliances of its strong neighbour, Kos, into which it was finally incorporated towards the end of the third century. The decree makes it clear that during the period in question Kalymna, just like Kos, was in the Antigonid sphere of influence. Both islands probably remained in Poliorketes' realm even after Ipsos.²

The decree was proposed by the *prostatai*, the supreme archons of Kalymna,³ but it was Nikostratos son of Nikophantos, otherwise unknown, who testified before the assembly to Moschion's merits; one can safely assume that Nikostratos had himself served under Moschion's command.

D22. Lyson son of Kai[---]– *TitCal* 17

Lyson is the otherwise unknown proposer⁴ of a naturalization decree in honour of a judge sent to Kalymna by Philadelphos. Thus, this decree should be added to

¹ Diod. Sic. 19.57.4 (for the outcome of the embassy, see 19.58.5); cf. Olshausen 1974: 93 n° 71 (without reference to the Kalymnian inscription); Billows 1990: 406 n° 75. For the difficulties in locating Μώγλα (?), see the comments of Segre. Hiller von Gaertringen (*Gnomon* 19 [1935] 630) suggested that Μώγλοις is an engraver's mistake and that the Kalymnian contingent had taken part in operations at Pogla in Pisidia. In my opinion, we should not replace an otherwise unattested toponym recorded in an inscription with no other engraving mistakes, with a toponym also extremely rarely attested (to the best of my knowledge, only Ptol. 5.6.6 records it). It would be more plausible, for example, to assume that Mogla was a fort within Kalymna's territory, under the command of Moschion; this assumption would be in better accordance with the meaning of τεταγμένοι (l. 6), which, when used for citizens, usually denotes citizens serving in a fort within the city's jurisdiction (see, for example, the index of *I. Rhamn.*).

² See *TitCal* 79 and 7 (Ager 1996: n° 13; Magnetto 1997: n° 14), with p. 367 n. 1, above for the date.

³ Rhodes 1997: 223 reasonably assumes that putting a motion to a vote was the individual or collective prerogative of the *prostatai*.

⁴ Segre concludes from the end of l. 1 (... Λύσων ΚΑΙ) that the proposers were two, but the last three letters probably belong to Lyson's patronym, almost always mentioned in Kalymnian decrees (see *TitCal* 13; 18; 19; 30; 34; 43; 52; 58; only the proposer of *TitCal* 42 is referred to without his patronym; two proposers are attested only in *TitCal* 44, both with their patronyms).

the series of sources attesting to foreign judges having been sent to a city at the request or encouragement of Philadelphos during the period of Ptolemaic supremacy in the Aegean (ca. 285-260).¹

SAMOS

The age of Antigonos and Demetrios (ca. 320 - ca. 295)

D23. Naniskos son of Epigenes

— IG XII 6, 25

Naniskos proposed the naturalization decree in honour of Theotimides son of Theophilos, a Macedonian who had helped the Samians during their φυγή, that is, during their exile in the period of the Athenian cleruchy (365-322).² Theotimides had helped the Samians when he was διατρίβων παρ' Ἀντιγόνωι, while “now” (νῦν) he is said to remain useful both to the people in general and to individual Samians (IG XII 6, 25). The fact that Theotimides belonged to Antigonos' staff already before the Samians' return makes him the only known *philos* of Antigonos prior to 323.³ As Antigonos does not carry the royal title in the text, the decree should be dated to 320-306.⁴ Samos' inclusion in the sphere of influence of Antigonos (and afterwards of Poliorketes), from the aftermath of the conference of Triparadeisos in 320 to the island's takeover by Lysimachos (soon after 295),⁵ is well-attested (see the following entries) and has been the subject of much discussion, so that no detailed analysis is required here.⁶

Both the proposer and the honourand are otherwise unknown.

¹ See Crowther 1999: 266 n. 34. For the date, see the comments of Segre, who dates the decree to ca. 280, and Sherwin-White 1978: 124 n. 227 (with a slightly later date).

² On the exile, see, succinctly, Shipley 1987: 161-64.

³ Billows 1990: 437-38 n° 115.

⁴ See already Habicht 1957: 257 n. 140. Hallof dates the decree after 306, due to the reference to ἱερά τε καὶ τὰ βασιλικά (*scil.* issues dealt with by the assembly) in l. 23. The term “royal issues”, however, as Hallof himself concedes, is already attested during the reigns of Philip III and Alexander IV (IG XII 6, 18; 22; 45), and thus has no bearing upon the decree's date.

⁵ The onset of Antigonid influence over Samos cannot be precisely dated, but must have been the result of the granting of Asian territories to Antigonos at Triparadeisos (cf. Shipley 1987: 171). Habicht dated all φυγή decrees in the fourth century. But in several cases this is far from certain (cf. the objections to this principle put forward by Shipley 1987: 179 n. 77 and **D29-32**, below); moreover, given Poliorketes' presence in Ionia in 300-297, it would have been surprising if Samos had become hostile to his overlordship (cf. Shipley 1987: 174). The takeover of the island by Lysimachos is usually dated soon after 295 (Habicht 1957: 155-56; Will 1979: 90, 92; Mastrocinque 1979: 41; Shipley 1987: 174-75; Franco 1993: 160-61; Magnetto 1997: 129 and cf. **D33-34**, below); nevertheless, the first attractive *terminus ante quem* is 289/8 (*Syll*³ 368, cf. *Milet* VI 1, p. 157, with bibliography) and the secure *terminus ante quem* is only 283/2 (Magnetto 1997: n° 20 [Ager 1996: 89-93 n° 26; *I. Priene* 500 (RC 7) and 37]; cf. IG XII 6, 346, with bibliography).

⁶ See, for example, Shipley 1987: 171-81.

D24. [. .]os son of Ion

— IG XII 6, 20

[. .]os, son of Ion, was the proposer of a naturalization decree for someone who had helped the Samians during their φυγή (IG XII 6, 20). The honourand –to the question of the identity of whom we shall return– helped the Samians both during their exile and after their return in 322; the decree puts particular emphasis on the position of the honourand by the side of Antigonos and Poliorketes. The absence of the royal title again dates the decree between 320 and 306.

The honourand is named [. . .^{ca. 7} . . ο]ς Καρδιανός (ll. 2-3 and 11-12). Judging by l. 11, where the same sequence [. . .^{ca. 7} . . ο]ς must be in the accusative, since it is the object of the infinitive ἐπαινέσαι, the normal assumption would be that this sequence includes both the name and the patronym of the honourand (the latter in a genitive ending in –ος). That assumption, however, would effect that the whole sequence of name and patronym has nine letters in total, which is barely possible, but hardly plausible.¹ The only alternative is to assume that the sigma of l. 11 is an engraving mistake instead of a nu, (perhaps due to the confusion between the nominative of ll. 2-3 and the required accusative of ll. 11-12), which would allow us to assume that only the (nine-letter) name of the honourand and his ethnic was recorded in the motivation clause, and only his name was recorded in the decision. Reference by name only has many parallels in the decision of Samian decrees, although, admittedly, reference by name and ethnic has no parallels (at least not from Samos) for the formulation of the motivation clause.² If, despite these problems, we accept this alternative, then it is very tempting to identify the well-known historian Hieronymos of Kardia as the honourand: ἐπειδὴ [Ἱερῶ|νυμο]ς Καρδιανός (ll. 2-3)... ἐ[παι|νέσαι Ἱερῶνυμ]ο<ν> ἀρε[τ]ῆς [ἔνεκε] (ll. 11-12). This restoration would be compatible with the trace of the first letter of the honourand's name in l. 1 (the lower part of a vertical stroke) and has already been suggested by a number of scholars.³

¹ In that case, the name of the honourand would have, at most, four letters, since the third-declension ending would mean that the patronym had at least five letters in the genitive. The index of IG XII 6 has only eight three- or four-letter male names attested in Samos: Ἄγης, Βίων, Δίων, Ἐρωσ, Θέων, Ἴων, Λέως, Νέων. With any restoration of the patronym other than [Ἱων]ος (the only restoration allowing for more than three letters for the name of the honourand), the honourand's name could only be restored as Ἴων.

² In the motivation clause of Samian decrees of the late fourth century the honourand is referred to by name only in thirteen cases, by name and patronym in eight, and by name, patronym and ethnic in five cases, while in one more case the ethnic might have been recorded. On the contrary, I know of no Samian parallels for the combination name + ethnic, which is attested in Athens (for example, IG II² 360; 373; 408; 493) and elsewhere.

³ Hornblower 1981: 9 n. 24 (citing Habicht 1972: 106 n. 10, who originally tentatively suggested restoring the name of the tyrant of Kardia Hekataios and not of Hieronymos, but subsequently

Hieronimos had joined the staff of Antigonos in 317/6, after the death of his fellow countryman Eumenes.¹ Judging by the amount of details on the future Poliorketes in the fragments of Hieronimos, the historian apparently joined Demetrios' staff very early;² the historian's career would fit well the description of the honourand as someone who was by the side of both Antigonos and Demetrios in such an early period.³ The formulaic language in which the honourand's services before 322 are described do not allow assumptions about his past benefactions to the Samians;⁴ clearly, the honourand was honoured mostly on account of his present position by the side of the kings.

Ion, the proposer's patronym, is attested once more in Samos (late fifth – early fourth century).⁵ Several names of the Samian onomasticon can be restored at the beginning of the line.⁶

D25. Epikouros son of Zoilos

— *IG XII 6, 48*

Epikouros, otherwise unknown,⁷ proposed the decree in honour of Pleistias son of Moschion of Kos (*IG XII 6, 48*). Although only the beginning of the motivation clause has been preserved, it is probable that the honourand is to be identified with Pleistias the admiral of the Antigonid fleet in the sea battle of Salamis in

dismissed his suggestion because of the problems caused by l. 11); Billows 1990: 391-92; Landucci Gattinoni 1997: 27. Hallof does not mention these suggestions.

¹ Diod. Sic. 19.44.3; as usual (see p. 30 n. 2, above), I follow the 'high' chronology for the period 320-313.

² Hornblower 1981: 11-12.

³ The inscription in question and *IG XII 6, 21* are probably the only epigraphical sources outside Attica referring to Demetrios before 306.

⁴ It is unclear whether Hieronimos had followed Eumenes already before Alexander's death (cf. Hornblower 1981: 9). Shipley 1987: 164 n. 53 submits that the honourand of this decree had not offered his assistance to Samians in Kardia, but had contributed to Alexander's decision to order the return of the Samian exiles.

⁵ Meiggs – Lewis, *GHI* 95.

⁶ For example (see *LGPV I* and the index of *IG XII 6*): Αὔξρος, Δημος, Δῶρος, Ἴπιος, Καῖος, Λύκος, Νῆλος, Σίμος, Σῶσος. The most interesting is Καῖος (or Κάϊος), which is also the patronym of the well-known Samian historian and tyrant Douris (see **D33-34**, below). Douris' father cannot have been the proposer of the decree in question, as, according to a problematic passage of Pausanias (6.13.5 = Douris, *FGrHist* 76 T 4; see p. 391 n. 2, below), his patronym was probably Douris and not Ion. Simos is also attested as the name of another individual involved in the proposal of a decree, in roughly the same period (*IG XII 6, 96*), the Samian origin of which, however, is uncertain.

⁷ Two more proposers of decrees of that period are named Epikouros. Epikouros son of Drakon proposed one of the earliest φυγή decrees, namely, the decree in honour of Alexander's *hoplophylax* Gorgos son of Theodotos of Iasos, and the decree in honour of the latter's brother Minnion (*IG XII 6, 17*). Epikouros son of Alkithos proposed another honorific decree of the late fourth century (*IG XII 6, 149*). Other Samian attestations of the name Epikouros are to be found in Hallof 1995: 135 n. 8 and the index of *IG XII 6*.

306.¹ Nevertheless, the decree may predate that event, since, according to Hallof, the engraving is the work of a letter-cutter, whose known works date from 320-315.² The context in which Pleistias, obviously an Antigonid officer already by the 310's, helped the Samians is not recorded by the preserved part of the decree.

D26. Ouliades son of Semokles

— IG XII 6, 52

Ouliades was the proposer of an important but very poorly preserved Samian decree (IG XII 6, 52). The most interesting piece of information we derive from the text of the decree is that the unknown honourand offered his assistance to the Samian people “during an invasion on the island” (ll. 4-5: ἐμβολῆς γινομένης εἰς τὴν | [νησον ---]). The letter forms point to a date in the late fourth or early third century.³ According to Habicht's very probable restoration,⁴ the honourand led an Antigonid contingent which helped the Samians recapture the countryside. The invaders were most probably the Athenians referred to in l. 8. The likeliest date for this failed Athenian invasion of Samos during that period is 315 or 314.⁵

The proposer, who carries an old aristocratic Samian name,⁶ is otherwise unknown.

¹ Diod. Sic. 20.50.4. Pleistias is one of the three Koans known to have held a high-ranking position on the staff of Antigonos and Poliorketes (the other two being Nikomedes [D8] and Drakon [D27]) and the only one most probably belonging to the staff of Poliorketes. Hallof (1995: 136-38, and in his comments in the IG entry) has reservations about this identification, mainly because the preserved part of the text includes no reference to the honourand's relationship with the king, and because the end of the motivation clause (according to Hallof's restoration: [ἐπαγγέλλεται δὲ καὶ νῦν χρήσιμόν τε] καὶ πρόθυ[μον παρέξειν ---]) does not favour the assumption that Pleistias' relationship with the king would have been referred to later in the text. It should be noted, however, that Hallof's restoration is not obligatory, and thus cannot be considered to decidedly confute this otherwise highly probable identification.

² On the letter-cutter, see Tracy 1990b: 63-64.

³ Tracy 1990b: 61.

⁴ ll. 5-7: [ἀποσταλείς ὑπὸ Ἀντιγ]όνου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τοῦ | [Ἀντιγόνου συνεπολέμει μετὰ τοῦ δήμου] καὶ συνεπολιόρκει | [σπουδάζων ὅτι τάχος ὁ δῆμος] τὴν χώραν κομίσηται.

⁵ See A18, above and Appendix 1, below. IG XII 6, 51 may refer to the same invasion; unfortunately, its text has been preserved even more poorly. As Hallof points out in the comments of his edition, the only other possible date is immediately after Polyperchon's *diagramma* in 319: if the king Philip referred to in the equally poorly preserved IG XII 6, 75 is Philip III, then the war referred to there (ll. 6-7: διεπολέμη[σαν] (?)) could possibly be associated with an Athenian campaign against Samos during his reign.

⁶ Among others, the same name was borne by an admiral of 477 (Plut., *Arist.* 23.5), by a historian whose work predates the early third century (*I. Priene* 37, l. 120), and two important doctors (father and son) of the Late Hellenistic period (IG XII 7, 231).

D27. Theodektes (?) son of Hyblesios

— [Θεοδ]έκτης Ὑβλησίου: *IG XII 6, 29*

Theodektes was the proposer of yet another *φυγή* decree, in honour of Drakon son of Straton of Kos.¹ As in many such decrees, the text gives the distinct impression that the formulaic reference to the honourand's assistance during the Samians' exile was of secondary importance, and that the honourand's position *παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ Ἀντιγόνῳ* (l. 10) was what weighed more with the Samians in their decision to honour him. In fact, it is explicitly stated that Drakon assisted Samian ambassadors to the king (ll. 11-13).

Once again, the proposer is otherwise unknown,² but his patronym is a common, old and characteristically Samian name.³

D28. [---] son of Hegesion

— *IG XII 6, 26*

Proposer of yet another *φυγή* decree. The inscription is the work of Tracy's "cutter II",⁴ which probably means that it should be dated after 306. The honourand, [. . .³⁻⁴. .]os son of Kalleas of Arkadia, was another *δ[ια]τρίβ[ων]* by a king, undoubtedly either Antigonos or Demetrios –or both.

D29. Melouchos son of Myon

— *IG XII 6, 23*

Melouchos proposed the *φυγή* decree in honour of Horismos son of Damastros of Elaia in Aiolis. Apart from his assistance to the Samians during their exile, Horismos, a *διατρίβων παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ Δημητρίῳ* at the time when the decree was enacted, continued to use his position to the advantage of the city (*IG XII 6, 23*). As Poliorketes is recorded bearing the royal title, the decree is securely dated after 306, either before or after the battle of Ipsos.⁵ Both the honourand and the proposer are otherwise unknown.

¹ For other Koans in the service of Antigonos and/or Demetrios, see p. 385 n. 1, above.

² The restoration [Θεοδ]έκτης is owed to Rehm; the name is attested in Samos (see Habicht 1957: 187-88, with the sources).

³ See *LGN I*, the index of *IG XII 6* and the bibliography cited by Habicht 1957: 188 n. 46. One of the *exetastai* of the decree in honour of Boulagoras (*IG XII 6, 11*), two generations later, was also called Hyblesios.

⁴ Tracy 1990b: 64-72.

⁵ Habicht 1957: 257 n. 143 admits that the decree could belong to the early third century. On the problem of the lower limit of the *φυγή* decrees, see the two following entries.

D30. Molpos son of Pythagoras — D31. Amphidokos son of Skython

— IG XII 6, 30

Molpos and Amphidokos are the otherwise unknown¹ proposers² of the naturalization decree in honour of Demarchos son of Taron of Lykia, who had assisted the exiled Samians during their φυγή and, at the time when the decree was enacted, was in charge of the personal guard³ of queen Phila,⁴ Poliorketes' wife (IG XII 6, 30). The inscription is usually dated to 306-301, and more precisely to 305/4, when Poliorketes was occupied with the siege of Rhodes and Phila was in Kilikia.⁵ In my opinion, the decree could be dated anytime between 306 and the end of the Antigonid period of Samos (295 or soon after). During most of this period, Poliorketes was nowhere near the island; if, therefore, the reason why the Samians contacted Phila was that the king himself was otherwise occupied, any time between 305 and 295 would be equally likely for the decree to have been issued. Nonetheless, the assumption that the Samians only approached Phila because Poliorketes himself was out of reach at the time is unwarranted, as it overlooks the important public role of Hellenistic queens, especially in the sphere of euergetism,

¹ Molpos is a characteristically Ionian name (Robert, *OMS* V 441); his patronym, Pythagoras, is a very common Samian name, especially in earlier periods. Amphidokos son of Skython, on the other hand, bears a name and a patronym, which are both extremely rare in general and unattested in Samos in particular.

² Decrees with two proposers are rare in Samos (see IG XII 6, 32 and 122).

³ The description of Demarchos' position (διατρίβων παρὰ τῆι βασιλίσσηι Φίλαι καὶ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῆς φυλακῆς) has given rise to a number of diverging interpretations. He has been assumed to be the military commander of Samos on behalf of Antigonos (Bengtson 1964: 196), an Antigonid phrourarch stationed at Samos (Shipley 1987: 173), or even a general of parts of Asia Minor and the adjacent islands (Launey [1987]: 643 n. 2); interestingly, none of the aforementioned scholars make reference to earlier views. I prefer, as Hallof also does, to follow Robert, *Hellenica* XI-XII (1960) 107, who points out that Demarchos' φυλακῆ cannot have been of a territorial nature, since, if that were the case, his precise jurisdiction should have been stated. It should also be noted that Munro 1899: 339, the first editor of the famous letter of Antigonos to Skepsis in 311 (*RC* 1 [OGIS 5]), had restored the name of Demarchos in l. 5 (συναπεστείλαμε[ν] | [μετὰ Δημά]ρχου Αἰσχύ-λον; this restoration has been generally accepted (see Welles, *RC* p. 9; Wehrli 1964: 142; Olshausen 1974: 91 n° 67; Billows 1990: 379 n° 28). In my opinion, the restoration is not secure, as many names fit the preserved traces –why not restore, for example, [μετὰ Ἰππά]ρχου (on Hipparchos, see IG XII 6, 31 and the following entry)? The identification hesitantly proposed by Billows, namely that our Demarchos is to be identified with the homonymous satrap of Hellenistic Phrygia between 327 and 321 (Arr., *FGHist* 156 F 1.31) is equally insecure, as no source connects the satrap with Antigonos.

⁴ This decree is probably the first case in which a Hellenistic queen bears her official title in a public document (Carney 2000: 166, 225-26).

⁵ See already Curtius (cited in *Syll*³ 333), as well as Habicht 1957: 189, the comments and the bibliography cited in IG XII 6, 150 and Carney 2000: 303 n. 52. On the whereabouts of Phila at the time, see Plut., *Demetr.* 22.1 and 32.2; Diod. Sic. 20.93.4.

as well as the court entourage and personal network of contacts which the queens often maintained.¹

Besides, there is a more plausible juncture at which a contact between the Samians and Phila would have been perfectly justified. In 299 Poliorketes sent his wife from Kilikia to Macedonia, in an attempt to win the tolerance, if not the alliance, of Phila's brother and the king's chief enemy, Kassandros. As we have seen, it is possible that Phila stopped over at Kos and that she made some unknown benefactions to the Koans.² The Samian case may have been similar. Instead of assuming that a Samian embassy was sent to the queen, it would be preferable to assume that the queen herself, obviously along with her personal guard, led by Demarchos, stopped over at Samos on her way to Macedonia in 299. This assumption would be strengthened if the queen Phila, in whose honour a *temenos* was erected on Samos,³ was Phila I, wife of Poliorketes, as has been argued recently, and not Phila II, wife of Antigonos Gonatas, as was the prevailing view up to now.⁴ Scholars favouring a higher date for the *temenos* maintain that divine honours for Phila I should be dated immediately after 306, when the Antigoneia and Demetriaia attested to in another Samian decree are also apparently dated.⁵ Given,

¹ See Savalli-Lestrade 1994 and Bringmann 1997 and cf. **A55-56**, above.

² Plut., *Demetr.* 32.4 (mission to Kassandros); *I. di Cos* ED 20 (benefactions at Kos); cf. **D9**, above.

³ *IG XII 6*, 150, ll. 23-24; see the exemplary edition and analysis of Crowther 1999: 253-57 n° 1, with full bibliography.

⁴ Crowther 1999: 255-57, adds many arguments in favour of the higher dating. The letter forms are inconclusive. The general appearance of the letters seems to favour the lower dating, despite some Samian parallels adduced by Crowther (such a comparison, as Crowther himself admits, is methodologically unsafe, since the inscription in question was found at Kos). Nevertheless, as Crowther acutely observes, the letter forms have no real parallels in Kos, a fact which renders dating this decree by letter forms alone even more insecure than usual. Robert's general observation (*Hellenica* 7 [1949] 177 n. 4) that the rich and detailed wording of the decree seems to favour the lower date can be countered by the presence of textual details which favour the higher date (especially the use of *στῆσαι* in l. 22, which is attested only in fourth-century Samian decrees, as in third-century decrees *ἀναθεῖναι* is used in its stead). It is the historical arguments that make a strong case in favour of the higher dating: the close relations between the Koans, the Samians and the Antigonids is easier to place in the late fourth / early third century, rather than during the reign of Gonatas. Accepting the lower date would necessitate rewriting the history of Samos and the east Aegean in the third century, as this would be the only attestation of Gonatas as the overlord of Samos. Admittedly, a recently published inscription, attesting Gonatas' occupation of Kaunos in Karia in 270/69 (*I. Kaunos* 4) – a fact not only otherwise unattested, but even impossible for us to suspect –, serves as a useful reminder of the fact that the rewriting of third-century *grande histoire* is often made necessary...

⁵ *IG XII 6*, 56, ll. 6-8: καὶ νῦν τοῦ δήμου ψηφισαμένου ἄγειν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τοῖς εὐαγγελίοις Ἀντιγόνοια καὶ Δημητρίοια. This is a decree in honour of the famous actor Polos (Stephanis 1988: 382-84 n° 2187), who agreed to perform during the Antigoneia and the Demetriaia at a lowered fee. The fact that he was contacted by Samian ambassadors (ll. 8-9) is noteworthy: since it seems unlikely that an official embassy was sent to an actor, be it the most famous actor of his times,

however, that this is the only attestation of a cult in honour of Phila by a Greek state,¹ there is no reason not to date the honours for Phila after the battle of Ipsos, perhaps precisely in 299.

If the honours accorded to Phila by the Samians (and the Koans?) are dated to 299 –a dating which no source dictates, but all sources permit–, Phila’s mission in 299 can be viewed in a whole new light. After the battle of Ipsos, Poliorketes was a king without a kingdom, in desperate need not only of cities and territories under his influence or direct rule, but, perhaps even more so, of a reinforced status in the eyes of his former allies and of his present and future enemies. In that context, the benefactions made towards cities of the Aegean (always a crucial area for Antigonos and Poliorketes, and especially so in the 290’s) by the first Hellenistic queen after the extinction of the Temenids, during her stops en route to Macedonia, should be seen as an attempt on the part of Poliorketes to redeem his wounded image as a powerful king. In other words, the relationship of euergetism forged by Phila need not be seen as the product of Poliorketes’ strength (as they should be if dated to 306-301), but as part of Poliorketes’ attempt to regain that strength. Viewed in the context of 299, Phila’s activity in the Aegean was necessitated by a well-known motif of royal euergetism: being able to make benefactions proved a king worthy of the royal title and of maintaining his power and legitimacy.² Correspondingly, by ratifying the decree proposed by Molpos and Amphidokos, and thus accepting this bond of euergetism with Poliorketes, the Samians affirmed their respect for the royal power of Poliorketes, thereby assisting the king in his effort to consolidate his power. Moreover, by doing so, they were well aware of the significance of that affirmation and they undoubtedly expected future benefactions in return.³

D32. *Aspasios son of Theupropos*

— IG XII 6, 31

Aspasios, otherwise unknown, proposed the naturalization decree in honour of Hipparchos son of Heniochos of Kyrene. The honouree had helped the Samians during their exile, was later another *διατρίβων παρὰ [τῷ] βασιλεῖ Ἀντιγόνῳ (?)*, and, at the time when the decree was enacted (*νῦν*), he was *[τεταγμένο]ς ἐν Καρίαι,*

the ambassadors were probably on another mission when they chanced upon Polos and hired his services. A plausible context for such an embassy would be the embassy which the Samians must have sent to Antigonos and Demetrios to announce the institution of the festivals. If that is the case, then the Samians must have met Polos at the court of Antigonos, which would explain the actor’s willingness to perform at a lowered fee.

¹ For the cult of Phila at Athens, see p. 366 n. 6, above.

² Cf. [Strab.] 9.415, an important passage for the understanding of royal euergetism.

³ Cf. Ferrary 1988: 119, Gauthier 1993: 213 and, mainly, Ma 1999: 194-201.

where, among other things, he took care of Samian citizens under his command (IG XII 6, 31).

The decree is usually dated to 306-301¹ but, once more, an alternative date exists. It is true that occupation of parts of Karia² by Antigonid forces is positively attested for the period between 306 and 301.³ Nevertheless, the period immediately after Ipsos is an equally possible date for the enactment of the decree. In 299 Poliorketes wrested parts of Karia and Kilikia from Pleistarchos, Kassandros' brother.⁴ Given that Samos appears to have been one of the few allies that Poliorketes was left with, it is probable that Samian mercenaries or even an official Samian contingent took part in this campaign.⁵ The decree's description of Hipparchos' career probably also favours a date after Ipsos: there seems to be a clear break between the period when Hipparchos served at the court of Antigonos and the "present", when he was appointed to Karia.⁶

If the decree is dated after Ipsos, Aspasios, like Molpos and Amphidokos (D30-31), would be one of the Samian statesmen to have publicly declared their loyalty to the alliance with Poliorketes, in a crucial period for the king.

¹ See mainly Habicht 1957: 189-90, followed by Hallof in the *IG*. Habicht compares the decree's language with the language of other Samian *φρυγή* decrees; some of those decrees certainly belong to 306-301, but some (such as the decree in honour of Demarchos, *IG* XII 6, 30) may well be later (see the preceding entry). Besides, Habicht himself points out a number of original language features in the decree under discussion. In other words, one has the distinct impression that the main reason for the dating of this decree in 306-301 is Habicht's axiomatic dating of all *φρυγή* decrees in the fourth century (Habicht 1957: 257).

² The fact that not the whole of Karia fell within Hipparchos' jurisdiction is deduced from the use of *ἐν* (Bengtson 1964: 192-93; incidentally, Bengtson [*ibid.* 367 n. 3] mistakenly believed that the inscription could be dated to the period of Doso's campaign in Karia).

³ Diod. Sic. 20.46.6 and 97.5; cf. Mastrocinque 1979: 32-33. This is not the place to deal with the unsolved problem of the period and the territories over which Eupolemos' rule extended in Karia (see the bibliography cited in p. 228 n. 2, above).

⁴ Plut., *Demetr.* 31.6-32.4. For the complex problem of Pleistarchos' realm and its date, see Buraselis 1982: 22-33, with earlier bibliography; Billows 1989: 188-93 (cf. 92-93); Gregory 1995; Kobes 1996: 107-108, 121-25; Hüllden 2000: 385-91.

⁵ Launey [1987]: 237 leaves both choices open. Billows 1990: 392 n° 52 believes it was an official Samian contingent.

⁶ Ll. 4-7: καὶ κα[τεληλυθότων ἡμῶν] ἐ[ἰς τὴ]μ πόλιν διατρίβων παρὰ [τῶ]ι βασιλεῖ Ἀντιγό-
νωι (?)... νῦν [τε τεταγμένο]ς ἐγ Καρία. The contrast would be made clearer if we restored δὲ
instead of τε in the second clause; in fact, this is probably syntactically preferable: the combination
of νῦν with a copulative conjunction, often occurring in descriptions of an honourand's career,
in the case of Samian decrees is always καὶ νῦν, not νῦν τε; therefore δέ, in its enumerative
sense, may be preferable here.

The age of Lysimachos (295 or soon afterwards - 281)

D33. Kaios — D34. Douris son of Kaios

— Kaios: Paus. 6.13.5 — Douris: *FGrHist* 76, with the sources and fragments

One of the cruxes of the history of Hellenistic Samos is the date of the tyrannid of Kaios and his son, the famous historian Douris. There are only two relevant sources. Athenaios (8.337d [*FGrHist* 76 T 2]) speaks of the comedy writer Lynkeus, a pupil of Theophrastos “and a brother of Douris, the historian and tyrant of his country”.¹ The second source is a corrupted passage of Pausanias (6.13.5 [*FGrHist* 76 T 4]), which mentions a statue of Kaios the tyrant, victor at the Olympic games during the Samian φυγή, at Olympia.²

The conclusion of Habicht’s treatment³ of this tyrannid of father and son probably remains the wisest: the only thing we know for certain about this tyrannid is that it existed. If we follow the careful analysis of Shipley, both Kaios and Douris, who obviously succeeded his father after the latter’s death, rose to power after the battle of Ipsos and probably after the conquest of Samos by Lysimachos in 295 or slightly later. Political life in Samos in the years after 295 seems to have suffered an eclipse; no Samian decree can be securely dated during Lysimachos’ overlordship.⁴ This lack of sources does not facilitate the interpretation

¹ This is repeated by the *Suda*, with the additional information that Lynkeus was a contemporary of Menandros. On Lynkeus, see also *PCG* V 616-17; Kebric 1977: 5-6; Dalby 1991; Landucci Gattinoni 1997: 30-31 and 36-38.

² Χιόνιδος δὲ οὐ πόρρω τῆς ἐν Ὀλυμπίαι στήλης Καῖος ἔστηκεν... Παρὰ δὲ τὸν τύραννον... It has been suggested that Pausanias’ information may be derived from Douris himself (Shipley 1987: 169; *contra* Landucci Gattinoni 1997: 23). On Kaios’ name, see Paus. 6.13.5 (Douris, *FGrHist* 76 T 4) with Barron 1962. The manuscripts of Pausanias have καὶ δὲ ἔστηκεν ὁ Δούριος, Σάμιος, which is usually corrected to Σκαῖος ἔστηκεν ὁ Δούριος, Σάμιος. A Samian late-fourth century decree was proposed by Lysagoras ΚΑΙΟΥ (*IG* XII 6, 38); Habicht 1957: 190-92 n° 23, followed by Hallof in the *IG* edition, corrected the patronym to <Σ>καίου. As Barron has demonstrated, this double correction of Pausanias and the inscription is unnecessary (cf. Landucci Gattinoni 1997: 31-36 and *LGPN* I, s.v. Καῖος).

³ Habicht 1957: 156.

⁴ Shipley 1987: 175-81; see also Barron 1962; Berve 1967: 423-24; Kedric 1977: 3-9; Pédech 1989: 263-64; Lund 1992: 123-25; Franco 1993: 160-64; Landucci Gattinoni 1997: 16-28. Landucci Gattinoni in essence denies that there ever was a tyrannid either of Kaios or of Douris, and assumes that their regime was only deemed tyrannical by Hieronymos of Kardia, whose hostility towards the family was due to Kaios and Douris’ policy of detaching Samos from the realm of Antigonos and Demetrios. Lund returns to Kedric’s theory that Kaios became a tyrant immediately after the return of the Samians and that only Douris’ tyrannid should be dated after Ipsos. The rich epigraphic harvest of Samian decrees dated to the last two decades of the fourth century, however, reveals not only a fully functional democratic regime, but also the impressively large number of citizens who were politically active, thus confuting Kendric’s theory, no matter how one defines a tyrannid. Lund’s argument (1992: 124 and 238 n. 60) that the same observation is valid for the age of Lysimachos, to which at least fifteen of the decrees originally published by

of the tyrannid; was it due to endogenous causes, in which case it should be seen as merely tolerated by Lysimachos, or was it the product of royal intervention? Given that Lysimachos had no *a priori* reason to promote oligarchic or tyrannical regimes, nothing obliges us to accept the latter.¹ We may assume, however, that Douris' tyrannid served Lysimachos' purposes, namely the close (and often resented by the people) control of the cities in his realm. There is no way for us to know whether the end of the tyrannid came with the conquest of the island by Philadelphos in ca. 280, or sooner. Equally uncertain is whether Douris remained at Samos after the end of his tyrannid or whether he was banished.²

Habicht 1957 belong, is mistaken; it is probably due to a superficial reading of Habicht's argument, who merely writes that decrees n^{os} 1-33 certainly belong to the age of the Antigonids (p. 155), and that decrees n^{os} 34-48 can only be generally dated to 306-280 (p. 156); Habicht goes on, however, explicitly pointing out that: "Keine der hier vorgelegten Urkunden läßt sich diesem Zeitraum [scil. during Lysimachos' overlordship] mit völliger Gewißheit zuordnen" (*ibid.*), an observation still valid today. In fact, the only inscription originating from Samos itself which certainly dates to the age of Lysimachos is the dedication to the king (*IG XII 6, 346*). This dedication probably reflects Lysimachos' ruling in favour of Samos in the dispute between the island and Priene (Magnetto 1997: n° 20 [Ager 1996: 89-93 n° 26; *I. Priene* 500 (RC 7) and 37]) in 283/2.

¹ It is interesting that all three practically simultaneous monographs on Lysimachos in the 1990's more or less agree that the traditional depiction of Lysimachos as a king who imposed brutal tyrannids is overly exaggerated (Lund 1992: 119-27; Landucci Gattinoni 1992: 237-43; Franco 1993: 169-73).

² I cannot agree with Shipley 1987: 180 (cf. Berve 1967: 424) that Douris' tyrannid enjoyed popular support. The fact that he survived the conquest of the island by Philadelphos and the restoration of constitutional form, and that no exile of his is recorded does not mean that such an exile did not occur. It is remarkable that no direct attestation of his relationship with Lysimachos exists in the preserved fragments certainly belonging to Douris' work (*FGrHist* 76); such a relationship can only be indirectly inferred from the degree of ridicule which Douris reserves for Lysimachos' main rival, that is, Poliorketes. Other than that, there is only one reference to Lysimachos (F 55), a rather neutral account of the king's funeral. An anecdote about Lysimachos which is reported by Plutarch (*Demetr.* 25.6-9) has been assumed to belong to Douris' work (Kedric 1977: 57-58; Shipley 1987: 181), but, even so, it does not inform us on the historian's attitude towards Lysimachos. The attempt to attribute passages of Pausanias in defence of Lysimachos (1.9.8; 1.10.3) to Douris (Pédech 1989: 349-50) is a *petitio principii*. On the contrary, we know that Douris was not particularly fond of the Macedonians in general and that he had a negative opinion of all Diadochi (Kedric 1977: 22-23; Shipley 1987: 180-81; Pédech 1989: 351-59). Although it would be unsafe to assume that this negative attitude was also directed against Lysimachos, we certainly cannot rule out a detached –to say the least– depiction of Lysimachos as well. Was Douris' possible negative opinion of Lysimachos due to his removal from power *during* Lysimachos' reign (cf. Franco 1993: 160-64, who makes the same assumption, but for different reasons) –an assumption which would also explain the lack of any reference to his banishment after the takeover by Philadelphos–, or merely to his disillusionment with all the Diadochi (cf. Kedric 1977: 9: "Doubtless, he died a disillusioned man.")?

The age of the Ptolemies (ca. 280 - 221)

D35. Kallikrates son of Boiskos

— *IG XII 6*, 282; 283; 446; 588; for the rest of the sources, see *ProsPtol* 14607 and Hauben 1970; for a new epigram of Poseidippos on Kallikrates, see *PMilVogl.* VIII: VI 30-37)

Samos was conquered by Ptolemy II Philadelphos in 281 –the *annus mirabilis* of Hellenistic political history in more than one respect– or immediately afterwards.¹ Philadelphos' rule over the island was maintained uninterrupted at least until 260,² and Ptolemaic overlordship is again unequivocally attested during the reign of Euergetes; as we shall later see, however, the situation was more complicated in the intervening period (259-243).

The official form of the relationship between Samos and the Ptolemies is difficult to define. Samos is often described by modern scholarship as a direct Ptolemaic possession; in my view, the sources do not allow such certainty, and it is probably preferable to refer to Samos simply as belonging to the Ptolemaic sphere of influence.³

¹ The first source attesting to the Ptolemaic conquest of Samos is the famous Nikouria decree (*Syll³* 390), the decree by which the League of the Islanders, assembled at Samos (probably not a regular member of the *koinon*; see Bagnall 1976: 80 and Shipley 1987: 298, with earlier bibliography) at the invitation of Philokles and Bakchon the nesiarch, decided to participate in the celebration of the first Ptolemaia. This festival was celebrated for the first time after the death of Ptolemy I Soter in 283, almost certainly after 281 (the earliest possible date for the Ptolemaic conquest of Samos), most probably before the marriage between Arsinoe II and Philadelphos (279-274/3, probably towards the beginning of that period; see Hauben 1970: 35 n. 3; Fraser 1972: II 367 n. 228), as the queen is not mentioned in the decree, and –if the suggestion made above concerning the Panathenaia is accepted (see p. 149 n. 2)– before 278. In other words, the traditional dating of the first Ptolemaia in 280 or 279 (see the bibliography cited by Hazzard 2000: 47-52, on whose untenable alternative dating, see p. 378 n. 5, above) is almost certainly correct, which means that Samos was conquered by the Ptolemies in 281 or 280. Another early attestation of Ptolemaic overlordship over Samos is the mission of Myndian judges to Samos at the order of Philadelphos (*IG XII 6*, 95).

² The tyrant of Miletos Timarchos (ca. 260 to ca. 259; see Crampa 1969: 113-14, with earlier bibliography; Bagnall 1976: 174; Grieb 2008: 243-45) wrested the port of the *Saniorum* from the Ptolemies (*Front., Strat.* 3.2.11): there is no doubt that this is a corrupt form of *Samiorum* (Beloch 1925: 598 n. 1; Habicht 1957: 220 n. 74; Bagnall 1976: 80-81; Shipley 1987: 187), which means that Samos was in Ptolemaic hands in 260.

³ Bagnall's (1976: 80-88) still indispensable treatment of Ptolemaic Samos seems to describe the island both as a direct and as an indirect possession (see Shipley 1987: 297-301). The presence of the Ptolemaic administration on the island is explained by the fact that it constituted a very important naval base for Philadelphos and Euergetes (a fact highlighted by Polybios 5.35.11 for the early years of the reign of Philopator). On the other hand, it is hard to describe Samos as a 'regular' possession of the Ptolemies outside Egypt, since, as far as we know, no Ptolemaic official was ever stationed on the island apart from the military commanders –for whom no intervention in Samian politics or other domestic affairs is attested–, no Ptolemaic garrison was stationed in

The fact that Samos was a Ptolemaic naval base accounts for the large number of Samians serving in the Ptolemaic army, and especially in the navy.¹ Without a doubt, the most important Samian in the Ptolemaic army was Kallikrates son of Boiskos. No source on his Ptolemaic career can safely be dated before the Ptolemaic conquest in ca. 280; this favours the assumption that his recruitment in the Ptolemaic army was the result of that conquest: Kallikrates probably profited personally from the new status of Samos.² His long career in the Ptolemaic navy (where he served at least until 257), his particularly high position in the Ptolemaic court, his role as political, ideological and cultural intermediary between the old Greek world and Ptolemaic Egypt,³ his close ties with queen Arsinoe II and his role in her posthumous cult need not concern us here.⁴

Central to our discussion is the question whether (and how) the Samians took advantage of Kallikrates' high office and whether (and how) Kallikrates himself used his office to enhance his status at Samos. Other than to allow us to give an affirmative answer to both questions, the relevant sources do not offer much insight into the exact content of Kallikrates' role in local life. There exist two honorific inscriptions dedicated to Kallikrates by the Samians, an honorific inscription dedicated by Kallikrates to an otherwise unknown woman and a dedication by an unknown dedicant in honour of Philadelphos, Arsinoe II and Kallikrates.⁵ One of the two honorific inscriptions for the "benefactor" Kallikrates (*IG XII 6, 283*) is dated

or near the civic centre, and there is only one –highly ambiguous– attestation of taxation by the Ptolemaic administration (all evidence is gathered and discussed by Bagnall and Shipley). The only source clearly describing Samos as a possession of the Ptolemies (*IG XII 6, 12: ἐν... τῇ ἀποκαταστάσει τῆς πόλεως εἰς τὰ τοῦ βασιλέως Πτολεμαίου πράγματα*) is dated to precisely the end of Ptolemaic presence on the island (ca. 198), in the aftermath of grievous times for the Samians (conquest by Philip V in 201, catastrophic earthquake in 199/8, reconquest by Ptolemy V Epiphanes in 199 or 198) and can hardly be used (as it is used by Bagnall 1976: 82) to interpret Ptolemaic overlordship over Samos throughout the third century. Shipley 1987: 300 tries to circumvent the problem by describing the island as an indirectly governed possession ("[The absence of a resident bureaucracy] points to the island, though a 'possession' rather than an 'ally', being *indirectly*, not directly, governed"), but I wonder if the term "indirectly governed possession" would have had any formal meaning for third-century Samians. Since constitutional form was maintained, since no Ptolemaic governors existed, and since it is also probable that no direct, organized taxation in favour of the Ptolemaic state was in order, I do not think that Samos can be described as a Ptolemaic possession in any meaningful sense of the term– at least not any more than, for example, Athens can be described as a possession of the Macedonian throne in the age of Gonatas.

¹ Launey [1987]: 237–38.

² Hauben 1970: 63.

³ Bing 2004: 243–44.

⁴ See in general Hauben 1970; cf. lately Bing 2004.

⁵ *IG XII 6, 282, 283, 446 and 588* respectively. The restoration of Kallikrates' name in *IG XII 6, 316* is not secure.

to the second century; according to Gauthier it constitutes one of the earliest examples of the *post mortem* grant of the title of benefactor, an evolution which reflects the increasing importance of individual benefactors during the second and first centuries.¹ Similar conclusions may be drawn from the dedication IG XII 6, 588. The fact that its dedicant included Kallikrates in the group of benefactors *par excellence* –that is, the royal couple– means that Kallikrates was not only honoured as an intermediary between Samos and the Ptolemaic court, but as an agent of Ptolemaic benefactions himself, on a par with the king and queen –although it should be noted that the exalted position of Kallikrates may mostly reflect the attitude of the unknown dedicant, who may not even have been of Samian origin.² The same is true for the other, roughly contemporary, honorific inscription (IG XII 6, 282); the Samians honoured Kallikrates by dedicating his statue to the other gods and, first and foremost, to the dead and deified royal couple of the Soteres. Although the above sources are not particularly informative regarding the precise nature of Kallikrates' benefactions, one can at least be certain that the Samians used Kallikrates' high rank in order to secure concrete benefits for Samos.

Finally, the honorific inscription dedicated by Kallikrates himself (IG XII 6, 446) in honour of one Tinnis daughter of Dionysodoros,³ indirectly answers our second question. For this inscription proves that Kallikrates was not only honoured by the Samians as a distant representative of the Ptolemaic administration.

¹ Gauthier 1985: 59 n. 172.

² Hauben 1970: 39-40 prefers to attribute the exalted place reserved for Kallikrates in this dedication to Samian patriotism. It should also be noted that some of Dittenberger's restorations are problematic. In the last line, the great epigraphist correctly dismissed both the earlier restoration [ἀρετῆς ἔνεκ]εν and the epigraphically possible restoration [ὁ δεινὰ ἐποίησ]εν (which would make no sense for such a simple stele) after the ethnic of the dedicant, and proposed to restore [εὐχῆς ἔνεκ]εν, although he acknowledged that he knew of no parallels for such a phrase. It is actually rather rare: see, for example, *IGBulg* III 2, 1685; *RECAM* II 418; *IGUR* I 172. In none of the examples cited above is the phrase used for mortals, let alone living mortals, as the king and queen surely were at the time, judging from the use of the royal title and the preposition ὑπέρ (cf. Hauben 1970: 37). It is therefore much more reasonable to restore [εὐεργεσίας ἔνεκ]εν, a restoration epigraphically possible, abundantly attested, and offering a more straightforward interpretation of the dedication: the unknown dedicant, perhaps a subordinate of Kallikrates, was obviously personally indebted to the admiral. Equally problematic is the restoration [--- Σάμ]ιος ἀνέθηκεν in l. 4 (accepted by Dittenberger), with the unnecessary use of the ethnic within the city's limits (Hauben 1970: 37 n. 4 also expresses some reservations and Hallof correctly dismisses it); it is therefore preferable to assume that the dedicant was a stranger (if not a Samian with a third-declension patronym). Finally, it should be noted that the equally cumbersome restoration [καὶ] ὑπέρ Ἀρσινόη[ς βα]σιλίσσης] in ll. 2-3 was later withdrawn by Dittenberger himself (*OGIS* II p. 539), who subsequently proposed the much more sensible restoration [καὶ] ὑπέρ Ἀρσινόη[ς Φιλαδέλφου] (which does not necessarily mean that the queen had already died; cf. Hauben 1970: 37-38).

³ On the name Tinnis, see Hallof's commentary and bibliography in the *IG*.

He is attested here as taking part in his homeland's public life (along with other members of his family)¹ and shown to have (often?) visited Samos before finally settling in Alexandria.² His and his family's status remained outstanding for a long time, as his *post mortem* honouring proves.

D36. Amphilochos son of Lokros

— IG XII 6, 120

Amphilochos is the otherwise unknown³ ambassador designated by the Samians to present the Samian decree in honour of Aristolaos son of Ameinias of Macedonia, general of Karia, to the honourand (IG XII 6, 120). Aristolaos had helped both the city and individual Samians who had asked for his help (ll. 2-4) in difficult times (l. 22), “worthily acting according to the king's disposition” (ll. 4-5); he was honoured with Samian citizenship and the other highest honours awarded by the Samian people. The king in question is undoubtedly Philadelphos;⁴ Habicht dated the decree to 270-259, but I believe that we have reason to question both the upper and the lower limit.⁵ The difficult times alluded to by the decree could belong to a number of contexts (Chremonidean War, invasion of the island by the Milesian tyrant Timarchos, mutiny of Ptolemy the Son, conquest of the Samian

¹ The νεωποῖαι (temple superintendents) Kallikrates son of Kallikrates and Kallikrates son of Kallibios (Buschor 1953: 12-13; mid-third century) were probably his relatives –the former could even be his son (for another possible son of Kallikrates, attested in Alexandria, see Hauben 1970: 80). The rest of the individuals whom Shipley 1987: 311-12, endnote 6.18, identifies as possible members of the family of Kallikrates, are less secure cases. Hauben 1970: 71-75 convincingly argues against the identification of the Ptolemaic official Boiskos (OGIS 20) with Kallikrates' father and correctly points out (75 n. 6) that, if the latter inscription is dated to the reign of Euergetes, Boiskos may well be Kallikrates' son.

² Hauben 1970: 49 assumes that Kallikrates was in charge of the Ptolemaic naval base at Samos. Although this assumption rests mostly on Dunst's restorations in IG XII 6, 282, which should probably be rejected (see Robert, *BullEpigr* 1971, 507 and the critical apparatus of the IG edition), it remains a possibility. Even so, it does not necessarily mean that Kallikrates was a permanent resident of Samos.

³ Both his name and patronym are otherwise unattested in Samos.

⁴ Dating the decree during the reign of Philadelphos is suggested both by the highly probable identification of Aristolaos the general with the homonymous dedicant of a statue of Philadelphos at Olympia (Paus. 6.17.3; cf. Habicht 1957: 219), and by letter forms (see Habicht 1957: p. 219 n. 66 and pl. 133).

⁵ According to Habicht 1957: 219-21, the lower limit is provided by the alleged conquest of Samos by Antiochos II in 259, and the upper limit by Arsinoe's death, as, according to Habicht, had the queen died before the decree was issued, Aristolaos would also have dedicated a statue of the deceased queen at Olympia. As for the upper limit, there is no reason not to assume that Aristolaos dedicated the king's statue before 270 and before he was appointed as general of Karia; as for the lower limit, it rests upon an interpretation of the relations between Samos and Antiochos which, as we shall see in the following entry, is unnecessary.

Peraia by Antiochos II).¹ There is no reason to assume that Samos belonged to the jurisdiction of the general of Karia: the fact that an embassy transported the decree to Aristolaos probably means that the general was neither stationed on the island nor expected to visit it often.²

D37. Boulagoras son of Alexes

— IG XII 6, 11

Boulagoras was probably the most important political figure of mid-third-century Samos. His father was in charge of the Samian mint in ca. 306/5,³ his brother (?) Kleitophon proposed a decree in honour of an Athenian poet towards the end of the first half of the third century,⁴ and two of his sons participated in an *epidosis* in the same period.⁵ Boulagoras himself is known exclusively from the decree in

¹ For a possible indirect connection of Samos with the Chremonidean War, see IG XII 6, 119, with Bagnall 1976: 83-85. On Timarchos and Samos, see p. 393 n. 2, above. There is no reason to address here the extremely complicated issue of the identity, actions and date of Ptolemy the Son; four recent articles (Huß 1998; Tunny 2000; Gygax 2002; Huß 2004) cite the extensive earlier bibliography, but offer no definite solutions. It should only be noted that Ptolemy the Son, who was present at Miletos in 262/1 (*Milet* I 3, 139 [RC 14], ll. 8-9), revolted against the throne in 259 (see the sources in Huß 1998: 229-34), in collaboration with Timarchos (Trogus, *Prol.* 26), and that his revolt must surely have affected neighbouring Samos. The identifications proposed by Huß between Ptolemy the Son and other known Ptolemies of the third century cannot stand (see Tunny 2000: 86-89 and already Buraselis 1982: 136 n. 106; Walbank 1988: 590, 592); the result is that there is no way to date the end of the mutiny. If Ptolemy the Son shared the fate of his collaborator Timarchos (App., *Syr.* 65 and *OGIS* 226; cf. Walbank 1988: 590), he may have been naturalized already in 259 by Antiochos II. On the conquest of the Samian Peraia, see the following entry. Let me briefly mention here some Samian epigraphical evidence on the relationship between Samos and Philadelphos, which I have not mentioned so far: IG XII 6, 10 (honours for Straton son of Straton, Philadelphos' envoy, for favouring Samos on a financial issue [the honourand may be identified with Straton the Ptolemaic *gazophylax* of Halikarnassos in 257 (*PCairZen* 59036)]); 118 (naturalization of two Lampsakenes, friends of Philadelphos); 343 (statue base of Patroklos, the well-known general); 344 (base of the statue of a courtier of Philadelphos rather than of Euergetes); 347 (base of a statue of Berenike, daughter of Philadelphos, dated to ca. 270); 496 (base of a statue of Arsinoe II, also dated to ca. 270). Nausistratos, naturalized in the mid-third century (IG XII 6, 121) was not necessarily a Ptolemaic official (Bagnall 1976: 85).

² This is also pointed out by Bagnall 1976: 83, who, nevertheless, goes on to say that Samos may well have belonged to the general's jurisdiction.

³ Barron 1966: 122, 215-16.

⁴ IG XII 6, 122. The identification depends on the accentuation of Kleitophon's patronym: Habicht 1957: 225 thinks that the genitive is Ἀλεξοῦ, an alternative form of Ἀλεξέω (the form attested in the Boulagoras decree), which is the genitive of Ἀλεξῆς; Hallof, on the other hand, accentuates Ἀλέξου (Ἀλεξός in the nominative), which would mean that the two patronyms are different.

⁵ IG XII 6, 172C, ll. 17-18.

his honour, which was probably ratified in 242 (*IG XII 6, 11*).¹ We need not dwell here on his many benefactions, such as his many tenures of the office of public prosecutor (ll. 20-23), his replacing a deceased gymnasiarch (ll. 23-25), his three advance deposits of money used by the city for the purchase of grain in a time of dearth (ll. 36-49), his unofficial arbitrations between fellow citizens, his good advice and monetary grants to many individuals (ll. 49-52).² We need not deal either with the unexpectedly frugal honours which he was awarded by the Samians (ll. 52-60: a crown and a public proclamation of the decree).³

We shall only examine in some detail Boulagoras' relationship with two kings. The first was Antiochos II Theos. As the motivation clause explains in detail (ll. 5-20), when Anaia (that is, the Samian Peraia)⁴ came under the rule of Antiochos II, the Samians who lost their estates sent an embassy led by Boulagoras to ask the king for their restoration. The ambassador met the king in Ephesos and then followed him to Sardeis. Despite the fact that the estates in question had been claimed by "illustrious friends" (ἐνδοξότατοι φίλοι) of the king, Boulagoras managed to have the estates restored to their original Samian owners; this restoration was ratified by two royal letters sent to the Samians and to governors of the area respectively. Boulagoras' embassy is apparently dated after the end of the Second Syrian War (259-253).⁵

This episode is often seen as bearing testimony to Samos' inclusion in the Seleukid sphere of influence between 259 and 246.⁶ It should be noted, however,

¹ The *terminus post quem* is provided by the first Ptolemaia celebrated under Euergetes, in January 242 (see Hallof in the *IG* and Hazzard 2000: 53). It is highly likely that the Ptolemaia celebrated by Euergetes, mentioned in ll. 25-36, are precisely the first Ptolemaia of Euergetes; if so, the decree is to be dated to the Samian year 243/2 (ll. 25-26: ἔν τε τῶι ἐνεστηκότι ἐνιαυτῶι). The Samian year probably started in mid-summer, as the Athenian year also did (Trümper 1997: 78-89).

² On all these issues, see the comments and the bibliography of the *IG* entry.

³ Cf. Gauthier 1985: 70.

⁴ Literary and epigraphical sources on Anaia are to be found in *I. Ephesos VII 1*, p. 128-33 n^{os} 3137-3144; on the Samian Peraia in general, see Carusi 2003: 125-90.

⁵ On this war, which remains highly controversial because of the scarcity and complexity of the relevant sources, see Seibert 1976; Will 1979: 234-43; Buraselis 1982: 160-70. A date for the decree after the end of the war is rendered very probable by the fact that the seizure of the Samian estates is referred to as an event of the not very recent past (l. 14: ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῶι χρόνῳ); besides, it is difficult to envisage the Samians reclaiming their lands in the midst of war. Hallof / Mileta 1997: 283, followed by Carusi 2003: 177-78 and Savalli-Lestrade 2003b: 27 n. 46, suggest that the embassy should be dated to 253, immediately after the war ended.

⁶ See, for example, Schede 1919: 28; Beloch 1927: 344; Habicht 1957: 210, 220; Migeotte 1984: 233; Bagnall 1976: 81; Transier 1985: 28. Other scholars (see Sherwin-White 1978: 109 n. 138-139 and Shipley 1987: 187-89), on the basis of a doubtful dating of *IG XII 6, 150* to the mid-third century (see p. 388 n. 4, above), believe that Samos was under the influence of Antigonos Gonatas in that period.

that the decree refers exclusively to the *peraia* and that no other source attests to the presence of Seleukid forces or even to Seleukid influence on the island itself, nor is there any source which would allow us to assume that Samos had distanced itself from the Ptolemaic alliance.¹ Besides, had Antiochos taken over this strategic naval base, it would have been frivolous of him to alienate the Samians by depriving them of their estates in the *peraia*. Consequently, it is probably wiser to follow Hallof and Mileta² in assuming that Samos remained under Ptolemaic influence for the entire period between 280-220, although it would be reasonable to claim that this influence was somewhat weakened during the 250's, a decade which proved temporarily detrimental to Ptolemaic rule over the Aegean.

If Samos did not belong to the Seleukid sphere of influence, Boulagoras' mission would have been even more difficult. It is reasonable to assume that when a leading citizen led an embassy to the king who ruled over his city, he approached the king through the local representatives of royal power, whether the latter were fellow citizens of his or royal officers. Boulagoras, on the contrary, seems to have appealed to a king with whom his city was on hostile terms, or, at least, to a king whom the city had every reason to blame –and to fear. Nevertheless, he not only undertook the embassy, but persistently followed Antiochos from Ephesos to Sardeis and finally succeeded in his mission, overriding the interests of powerful courtiers. The decree does not inform us on the real causes of the king's favourable decision. Antiochos may have thought that it would be wiser to grant the Samian request so as not to complicate things in the area and so as to preserve the fragile peace with Philadelphos.³ But this does not seem a sufficient motive for the king to have risked displeasing his powerful friends. A plausible hypothesis would then be that the reason why Boulagoras managed to circumvent the interests of Seleukid *philoï* was that he himself had some influence at the court.⁴ The fact that

¹ Robert, *OMS* II 780-81 n. 10 (followed by Migeotte 1984: 233) claims that the sum lent by Boulagoras to the Samians to cover for the expenses of the *theoria* in 242 (?) –ca. 6,000 drachmas (ll. 35-36)– is too large in comparison with the attested cost of other *theoriai*, and considers this as an indication of the Samians' long absence from the Ptolemaia. The premises of Robert's reasoning, however, are uncertain: the cost of a *theoria* to a Greek sanctuary cannot be compared to the cost of a *theoria* to a royal court; the various costs of the latter often amounted to a form of indirect taxation. Moreover, the cost of the Athenian *theoria* to the first Ptolemaia of 279 (?) (*SEG* 28 [1978] 60, ll. 60-61: 5,000 drachmas; of course, Robert could not have known of this inscription) is absolutely comparable to the cost of the Samian *theoria*.

² Hallof / Mileta 1997: 278-83; Carusi 2003: 172-79 also believes that the Boulagoras decree cannot be used as evidence for the incorporation of Samos into the Seleukid realm.

³ On the possible motives of Antiochos for ending the war in 253, see Will 1979: 239-40.

⁴ Perhaps the short period of the rule of Timarchos of Miletos over Samos (see p. 393 n. 2, above) led to contacts between leading Samians and the Seleukids, an obvious guarantor of law and order in this troubled period for the area. Savalli-Lestrade 2003b: 27-28 has an alternative explanation for Antiochos' decision: she suggests that Antiochos had to conform to the princi-

the decree does not imply contacts of his with the Seleukid court cannot be used as a counter-argument, for it would be an evident political blunder for Boulagoras to emphasize his relationship with the Seleukids at a time when the Ptolemaic rule over Samos had been reestablished.

In any case, Boulagoras had no difficulty in adjusting to the new situation arising from the reconfirmation of Ptolemaic power over Samos early in the reign of Euergetes.¹ As again the decree informs us (ll. 25-36), when Boulagoras was told that the people could not afford the travel cost of the Samian *theoria* to the Ptolemaia of 242, nor the crowns and the sacrifices which the Samian *theoroi* would have to offer there, he lent the Samians a sum of ca. 6,000 drachmas, “wishing that nothing be lacking from the honours previously voted for the king, the queen and their parents and forefathers” (ll. 32-34). In a sense, this benefaction belongs to the traditional context of *euergesiai* to one’s home city: the city was unable to meet demands and a leading citizen relieved the city from its predicament. Nonetheless, the rhetorical justification of this particular benefaction in the decree had another addressee besides the Samians: Boulagoras wisely emphasized his respect for the Ptolemaia, therefore also his loyalty to the Ptolemaic rule.

During his term of office in 306/5 Alexes, Boulagoras’ father, must have been in contact with representatives of Antigonos the One-Eyed and Poliorketes; thus, Boulagoras’ family possibly entertained relations with three out of the four royal courts with which Samos had contacts during the entire period covered by this study. This flexibility should not be seen as political opportunism. In a sense it was a virtue complementing the traditional virtues of patriotism and euergetism, which are so eloquently highlighted in the decree. Good relations with the kings to the sphere of influence of whom a city belonged formed an indispensable tool of foreign policy and, thus, an indispensable virtue for statesmen of Hellenistic *poleis*. Nevertheless, we should not forget that, as we have repeatedly seen in this study, cultivating such relations with the courts –even when these relations seem to have been used exclusively for the benefit of the city– was also an important asset for the prestige and career of the statesman himself.

D38. Thyon

— IG XII 6, 4

Thyon was the proposer of the *probouleuma* which resulted in a Samian decree ratified sometime between 243 and 221, regarding “the festivals” (l. 4: τὰς πανηγύρεις) held in honour of the royal couple of Ptolemy III Euergetes and Berenike (IG

ples of royal ideology, which required the king to present himself as an impartial judge. I do not think, however, that abstract ideological constraints could have weighed more heavily than the real political danger of alienating his closest collaborators.

¹ For other sources on the relations between Samos and Euergetes, see the following entry.

XII 6, 4).¹ This is the earliest piece of evidence for the cult of living Ptolemaic kings in Samos, otherwise attested to only during the reign of Ptolemy V Epiphanes (see the two following entries).²

The strong Ptolemaic presence in Samos during the reign of Euergetes is in accordance with the overall picture of the first years of Euergetes' rule throughout the Aegean and the coast of Asia Minor. The new king energetically sought to restore the damaged Ptolemaic status in the area. At least in the case of Samos, religion appears to have been a privileged field of this new Ptolemaic policy: Euergetes and the general of Karia (?) Hagesarchos recognized the inviolability of the Heraion of Samos and of the slaves seeking refuge there (*IG* XII 6, 156, ca. 246-243); the Samians duly participated in the Ptolemaia of Alexandria in 242 (?) (*IG* XII 6, 11; see the preceding entry); from this decree we learn that they also instituted the cult of the living king.³ It would be misleading, however, to suggest that Ptolemaic influence was confined to the religious sphere: these are religious issues with clear political connotations and Polybios' reference to Samos as an important naval base early in the reign of Philopator (5.35.11) makes it clear that Euergetes' interest in the island had a very mundane side as well.

The councillor Thyon who proposed the *probouleuma* is otherwise unknown. Herodotos son of Thyon, a contributor to the rebuilding of the Heraion in ca. 285 (*IG* XII 6, 1, l. 49) could be his ancestor, as Hallof suggests.

Between the Ptolemies, Rhodes and Rome (ca. 221 - 197)

D39. Thales, adopted son of Euelthon and natural son of Herakleides

— [Θ]αλῆς Εὐέλ[θο]ντος, φύ[σε]ι δὲ Ἡρακ[λείδου]: *IG* XII 6, 179

Thales was a gymnasiarch who dedicated a catalogue of victors in the games of the gymnasium to *eutaxia*, Ptolemy, Hermes and Herakles (*IG* XII 6, 179).⁴ The Ptolemy in question, assimilated here to the regular deities of the gymnasium, is

¹ On the upper limit, see Hallof 1997: 108-109. The definite article before the noun πανηγύρεις and Hallof's highly probable restoration κα[θώς ὁ δῆμος πρότερον ἐψηφίσατο βα]σιλεῖ Πτολε[μαίω] in ll. 5-6 of the decree mean that this is not the decree by which the festivals were inaugurated. Hallof 1997: 110 (as well as in his comments in the *IG* entry) rightly dismisses Dunst's suggestion that the eponymous god in whose year the decree is dated is Ptolemy.

² Cf. Hallof 1997: 109.

³ The Samian cult of the Egyptian gods was also introduced in the third century (see Robert 1938: 115-17; Dunand 1973: III 61-65), but a precise dating is impossible to achieve.

⁴ In the case of a similar and contemporary dedication of a catalogue of victors to Hermes and Herakles (*IG* XII 6, 181), Hallof prefers to suppose that the lost left part of the last line was left blank; in my opinion, king Ptolemy was probably here again included in the deities of the gymnasium.

most probably Ptolemy V Epiphanes,¹ which means that the catalogue dates to the period between the Ptolemaic recovery of the island from Philip V (199 or 198) and its liberation by the Rhodians in 197.² For the Ptolemaic ruler cult in Samos, see the preceding and the following entry entry. The cult of Epiphanes in the gymnasium should probably be connected with financial help offered by the king for its rebuilding after the earthquakes of 199/8.³

The only other securely attested member of the gymnasiarch's family is a homonymous descendant of his who was honoured by the people.⁴

D40. Timotheos son of Demainetos

— *IG XII 6*, 593

Timotheos was a *paidotribes* of the gymnasium, who dedicated an *ex-voto* to Ptolemy V Epiphanes, Hermes and Herakles (*IG XII 6*, 593). To the ruler cult of the Ptolemies in Samos, having the gymnasium as its epicentre, and the dating of the relevant sources between 199 and 197, we have already referred in the two preceding entries. The dedicant is also attested as a victor in gymnasium games slightly earlier than 199 (*IG XII 6*, 180, l. 11).

CHIOS

D41. Nikostratos son of Demetrios

— *SEG 15* (1958) 856

Nikostratos, otherwise unknown, was a Chian ambassador to Alexandria, who died during his mission, probably in March 209 (*SEG 15* [1958] 856). His mission was undoubtedly related to the concerted efforts of Ptolemy IV Philopator, Rhodes, Chios and Athens, precisely in 209, to reconcile the Aitolians with Philip V

¹ Prosopography and paleography make a date under Epiphanes preferable to a date under Philopator (see the comments of Hallof).

² For the history of Samos in 221-197, see, succinctly, Shipley 1987: 190-94. From the reign of Philopator no epigraphical source and only one literary source (Polyb. 5.35.11, the well-known passage on Samos as a Ptolemaic naval base) bear testimony to the continuity of the Ptolemaic possession of the island. Despite the growing importance of Rhodes in the Aegean, Samos remained in the hands of the Ptolemies until its conquest by Philip V in 201 (App., *Mac.* 4.1; Polyb. 16.2.4 and 9; cf. Habicht 1957: 237-41; Walbank 1967: 503-505). Ptolemaic forces recaptured the island almost immediately: the decree in honour of the doctor Diodoros son of Dioskourides (*IG XII 6*, 12), honoured for his services during the earthquakes of 199/8 and during the struggle “for the restoration of the city to king Ptolemy’s realm” (ἐν... τῇ ἀποκαταστάσει τῆς πόλεως εἰς τὰ τοῦ βασιλέως Πτολεμαίου πράγματα), places this restoration in 199 or, rather, in 198. The Rhodians in their turn ‘liberated’ the island in the summer of 197, along with Kaunos, Myndos and Halikarnassos, in order to protect these cities from Antiochos III (Livy 33.20.12).

³ On the earthquakes, see the bibliography cited in the comments of Hallof in *IG XII 6*, 12 and Sonnabend 1999.

⁴ *IG XII 6*, 289.

in order to bring the First Macedonian War to an end.¹ Chios had also participated in a similar effort of mediation during the Social War.² The main objective of the Chians (who enjoyed good relations with the Ptolemies and were close allies of the Aitolians throughout the second half of the third century), as well as of many of the states involved in these mediation efforts, seems to have been to end a war which was harmful to their trade economy.³

LESBOS - ERESOS

D42. Damon son of Polyarchos

— Labarre 1996: 333-36 n° 68 (*IG XII 2*, 527 + *IG XII Suppl.* p. 33)

The history of Ptolemaic presence on Lesbos is obscure.⁴ A dedicatory plaque in honour of Arsinoe II Philadelphos (*IG XII 2*, 513), of uncertain date, is the only relevant source that could point to Ptolemaic rule during the second and third quarters of the third century.⁵ It is only from the reign of Philopator, however,

¹ Livy 27.30.4-15. The Chians also participated in a later similar effort, in 207 (Polyb. 11.4.1; App., *Mac.* 3.1); see mainly Ager 1996: n° 57 and Magnetto 1997: n° 56, with the sources and full bibliography.

² Polyb. 5.24.11, 28.1-3 and 100.9-11; cf. Ager 1996: n° 52; Magnetto 1997: n° 52.

³ Cf. Magnetto 1997: 356-57. For the history of Chios in the third century, see Errington 2006, with earlier bibliography.

⁴ For the relations of Lesbos with Alexander, the Antigonids and, perhaps, Lysimachos, see mainly Labarre 1996: 25-53. The main source on the Early Hellenistic history of Lesbos is the epigraphic dossier on the tyrants Eurysilaos and Agonippos and their descendants (*IG XII 2*, 526; see Heisserrer 1980: 27-78 and Labarre 1996: 25-42, 52-53, with earlier bibliography).

⁵ For the possibility that the Ptolemies ruled Lesbos during the reign of Philadelphos, see Huß 1976: 229, Bagnall 1976: 159, 162 and Labarre 1996: 54, who emphasizes the strategic importance which Lesbos would have had for the fleet of Philadelphos. It cannot be ruled out that the Ptolemies ruled Lesbos for a short period of time during the reign of Philadelphos, but the private cult of the highly popular queen is certainly insufficient evidence on which to found this otherwise plausible assumption. It should be stressed, moreover, that the plaques bearing the name of Arsinoe Philadelphos do not necessarily date to the reign of Philadelphos. Almost invariably poorly inscribed, these private dedications (on which see the exemplary analysis of Robert, *OMS VII* 626-34) are notoriously difficult to date; in Cyprus, at least, the cult of Arsinoe survived for a long time after the death of the queen (see, for example, Anastasiades 1998: 131, 135). The Lesbos plaque (*IG XII 2*, 513) is known only from a sketch by Kiepert; Boeckh (*CIG* 2168c) notes that the letters are "Egyptian" (so termed probably because of the lunar-shaped sigmas), and accordingly assumes that the dedicant was an Alexandrian. The alpha with a broken middle bar undoubtedly dates the inscription long after the death of the queen; Brun's attempt (1991: 107) to use this inscription in order to date Labarre 1996: 311-12 n° 54 (*IG XII Suppl.* 115), which also has alphas with broken middle bars, under Philadelphos is thus a circular argument. The "king Ptolemy and his son Ptolemy" whose priesthood is attested at Methymna by the latter decree should therefore be identified with Philopator and his son, the future Epiphanes (which means that this text is dated to 209-205), and not Philadelphos and Ptolemy as had been previously assumed: see Habicht 1970: 109 n. 1; Bagnall 1976: 162; Brun 1991: 106-108; Gauthier, *BullEpigr* 1992, 343; Labarre 1996:

that we have reliable evidence for Ptolemaic presence on the island.¹ Already by 219, Ptolemaic taxes were levied from Lesbos.² Several sources from the last decade of the third century attest to the celebration of the Ptolemaia of Lesbos, a festival which was instituted during Philopator's reign and which survived until the end of the second century.³ It should be stressed that the Ptolemaic presence at Lesbos was not evenly distributed among the three largest cities of the island:⁴ Ptolemaic rule over Methymna was apparently direct; although evidence for Ptolemaic overlordship over Eresos is not lacking, the city seems to have maintained its –nominal– autonomy and the integrity of its constitution; finally, not the slightest trace of Ptolemaic presence in Mytilene survives and this is probably not by accident.⁵

A long honorific decree of the Eresians honours their fellow citizen Damon son of Polyarchos (Labarre 1996: n° 68). Only the end of the apparently long motivation clause has been preserved; it informs us that, having undertaken a strenuous, dangerous, costly but, unfortunately, unspecified mission (ll. 1-5), Damon managed to achieve the restoration of goods that had been legally seized by an unknown third party (ll. 3-4: τὸ κατὰ τὰς πόλιος σῶλον).⁶ Damon also took part in many

54-55; Huß 1998: 240 (the latter following Brun). Hodot 1976: 57-58, apparently ignoring Habicht, takes it for granted that Labarre 1996: 311-12 n° 54 dates to the reign of Philadelphos, although he notes with some surprise that the letters bear pronounced serifs. Although Lesbos is not mentioned among Euergetes' conquests during the Third Syrian War, Ptolemaic rule over Lesbos during his reign is, once again, plausible –especially if one considers the Ptolemaic settlements in Thrace and the Hellespont established during his reign (see **D50**, below)–, albeit unattested.

¹ See Huß 1976: 229-30; Bagnall 1976: 159-68; Labarre 1996: 53-68 with the sources.

² *PTebt* 8.6-11; see Bagnall 1976: 166-68, with earlier bibliography; Brun 1991: 104 (who correctly points out that this text does not necessarily suggest that Lesbos was a direct Ptolemaic possession); Labarre 1996: 58-59.

³ See Labarre 1996: 57-58, with the sources and earlier bibliography.

⁴ We know very little about political life in Antissa, and practically nothing about Pyrrha, which may not even have been an independent *polis* at the time (cf. Labarre 1996: 161 and 196-98 respectively).

⁵ On Methymna, the conclusive source is Labarre 1996: 308-309 n° 52 (*IG XII 2*, 498; *OGIS* 48), dated βασιλεύοντος Πτολεμαίου τῷ Πτολεμαίῳ καὶ Βερενίκας θεῶν Εὐεργέταν, a clear indication that the city was directly administered by the Ptolemies (Bagnall 1976: 161-62; Labarre 1996: 55-56). On Eresos, see in the text, below and the following two entries. The lack of evidence for Ptolemaic presence in Mytilene, the independent mediation of Mytilene between the Aitolians and Philip V (Magnetto 1997: n° 57) and the city's multifarious relations with the Aitolians, precisely during the reign of Philopator (Labarre 1996: 266-67 n° 8-9 [*IG XII 2*, 15-16]; cf. Gauthier 1972: 253-55, 259-60, 266 n. 159; Brun 1991: 109-111; Labarre 1996: 61-68) make it clear that the Ptolemies never controlled Mytilene, although this does not mean that the city's relationship with the Ptolemies was hostile (as Brun correctly points out). Labarre's position that Ptolemaic presence at Lesbos subsided soon after 219 (that is, precisely when it is attested for the first time) is problematic.

⁶ On the meaning of the phrase, see the comments of Gauthier, *BullEpigr* 1992, 343.

embassies, including an embassy to Ptolemy (IV?)¹ about a matter that was obviously crucial to the city but remains difficult to determine on account of the poor state of the decree's preservation (ll. 5-8):

[καὶ τὰ πρὸς Πτολεῖ]-
 [μα]ιον πρεσβεία τὰ περὶ ἐπιστατείας γενομέ[να ----- ca. 15 ---]
 ὀρμάμενος, κρίσιός τε ἐ[πι]στατείας καὶ [φι]λί[ας --- ca. 15 ---]
 [. . .]ς ἀνέφερε τὰ πόλει ἐπιπλέων περι[-----]²

From the decree's enactment formula it is worth noting the reminder that Damon always spoke and acted in accordance with the interests of the people and of king Ptolemy (ll. 22-23). The honours for Damon were extravagant; the text describes them in minute detail (ll. 21-61),³ offering us another clear indication of the importance of Damon's benefactions.

Obviously, most interesting among these benefactions is Damon's embassy *περὶ ἐπιστατείας*. Unfortunately, the preserved part of the text is riddled with uncertainties. Bagnall, with many reservations, suggests: "It is quite possible that Damon was trying to limit Ptolemaic control to 'friendship' ".⁴ In other words, through Damon's embassy Eresos may have achieved to maintain its full autonomy, without distancing itself from the alliance with the Ptolemies. This would be a reasonable scenario, compatible both with all other pieces of information on late third-century Eresos and with the unusually high honours for Damon. Nonetheless, the syntax of the decree's language does not favour it: *κρίσις*, *ἐπιστατεία* and the king's *φιλία* are mentioned in a co-ordinate construction in l. 7, all three terms depending on the missing noun that was the object of *ἀνέφερε*; this means that there is no

¹ The name of Ptolemy is almost wholly restored both in ll. 5-6 and in l. 23, and so is the reference to the Ptolemaia in ll. 33-34. The restorations, however, are perfectly safe, a) because of the reference to a king Ptolemy, in whose honour games were held at the gymnasium (l. 26); b) because the decree is securely dated to the late third century (see Labarre 1996: 56, with earlier bibliography) and c) owing to the information provided by the other available sources on the history of Lesbos in the late third century.

² I calculated the number of missing letters on the basis of l. 5. At the end of l. 6, reference must have been made to the causes of the honourand's zeal (cf. *ID 1501*: ὀρμώμενος ἀπὸ παιδείας): [ἀπὸ φιλοπατρίας] | ὀρμάμενος would fit the probable number of missing letters perfectly. The remains of ll. 9-13 allow neither plausible restorations nor even an approximate understanding of the general meaning of the text. It is unclear whether the decree went on to record the honourand's activities at the Ptolemaic court in the service of "the interests of the people" (l. 13: τὰ συμφέροντα τῷ [δάμω]).

³ Public praise, crowns awarded at the Dionysia, at the games of the gymnasium (Herakleia and Ptolemaia), and at the penteteric festival held in the month Agerrhanios (Dionysia?), proclamation of the honours at the Dionysia and the Ptolemaia, *proedria* at the games, invitation to the *prytaneion* for the sacrifices, two sacrificial animals and the sum of two staters annually provided to Damon by the city for the sacrifices he would perform to the god whom he served as a priest in the months of Homoloios and Agerrhanios, and a bronze statue in the *agora*.

⁴ Bagnall 1976: 163.

contrast between ἐπιστατεία and φιλία nor a transition from the former to the latter. Moreover, the syntax would make more sense if κρίσις depended on ἐπιστατεία, if, in other words, the term copulatively combined with φιλία was ἐπιστατεία τῆς κρίσεως, an otherwise unattested term, not necessarily referring to the office of the *epistates* or to overlordship by a king.¹ Finally, the meaning of κρίσις remains unclear. Does it refer to a royal decision, as the context seems to imply, or to a judicial decision, which is the standard meaning of the word?² The wisest choice would be to admit that, in the present state of our knowledge, we cannot be certain about the content of Damon's embassy.

The honourand is otherwise unknown. If we accept Charitonides' restoration, [Πολύαρ]χος (?) Δάμωνος, an Eresian who supported an honorific decree in the late first century, could have been a descendant of his.³

D43. Aglanor son of Periandros

— Labarre 1996: 338-39 n° 70 (*IG XII Suppl.* 122)

Aglanor was honoured by decree of the people of Eresos for his tenure of the office of gymnasiarch at the Ptolemaion gymnasium of the city, for the proper carrying out of games in honour of the king, for the sacrifices he offered to the king, the queen, and their son, as well as for other activities related to the gymnasium (Labarre 1996: n° 70); his προάρεσις to the people and the king is duly emphasized (ll. 6-7). The royal triad in question undoubtedly consisted of Ptolemy IV Philopator, Arsinoe III and the future Ptolemy V Epiphanes; the decree should accordingly be dated to 209-205.⁴

The honourand, who bears a rare name, is otherwise unknown, but may have belonged to a leading family of Eresos.⁵

¹ I know of only one case where the term ἐπιστατεία denotes the office of the *epistates* (*I. Prusa ad Olympum* 1, l. 8); on the other hand, I admittedly know of no parallel for the phrase ἐπιστατεία τῆς κρίσεως.

² Another alternative would be to take the term ἐπιστατεία in its literal sense of "procurator, supervision", and to presume that the objective of Damon's embassy was (for the king?) to clarify someone's (whose?) jurisdiction over some judicial or arbitral decision.

³ Labarre 1996: 353-54 n° 79 (Charitonides 1968: n° 122), l. 8 (Labarre fails to mention Charitonides' proposal). On the identity of the persons mentioned in the catalogue preceding the motivation formula, see Labarre 1996: 187-88, with the various suggestions made so far.

⁴ See already Hiller *apud IG XII Suppl.* 122.

⁵ His patronym is attested in a later Lesbian inscription (Labarre 1996: 353-54 n° 79 [Charitonides 1968: n° 122], l. 16: Periandros son of Archias [Phainias son of Archias, mentioned in the same line, was obviously Periandros' brother]). It is interesting that, as we saw in the preceding entry, a possible descendant of Damon son of Polyarchos, ambassador to Philopator, is attested in the same inscription. If Periandros son of Archias (first century), belonged to the same family as the gymnasiarch Aglanor son of Periandros (late third century), then another possible member of the same family is Archias son of Eurysilaos, who was sent as a judge to Parion, towards the end of the third century or slightly earlier (Labarre 1996: 336-38 n° 69 [*IG XII Suppl.* 121], ll. 9-10,

D44-48. Hermos son of Damonikos, Bakchios son of Hermodikos, Euphanes son of Damarchos, Glaukon son of Menon, Eurylochos son of Bakchios

— Labarre 1996: 338-39 n° 70 (*IG XII Suppl.* 122)

Hermos was the proposer of the honorific decree for the gymnasiarch Aglanor, while Bakchios, Euphanes, Glaukon and Eurylochos “approached” (ἔπηλθον) the assembly and supported the decree (Labarre 1996: n° 70; see the preceding entry).¹ Hermos and Euphanes are only attested by this decree, but Euphanes may have belonged to an important Eresian family.² Glaukon is to be identified with the proposer of the decree by which the *koinon* of the Lesbians was constituted in the first quarter of the second century.³ Eurylochos son of Bakchios was obviously the son of Bakchios son of Hermodikos; Bakchios is attested in two more sources: he was one of the three judges whom the Eresians sent to Parion in Troas, probably before 209,⁴ while he also supported another honorific decree of the late third century.⁵

The honouring of the gymnasiarch Aglanor was not an episode of central importance in the relations between Eresos and the Ptolemies; it was a customary

28); he was sent along with Bakchios son of Hermodikos (on whom see the following entry), who was one of the sponsors of the honouring of the gymnasiarch Aglanor. Finally, it should be noted that the patronym of this Archias (Eursyilaos) is also borne by the well-known tyrant of fourth-century Eresos (*IG XII 2*, 526; see Heisserr 1980: 27-78 and Labarre 1996: 25-42, 52-53, with earlier bibliography). If all these connections are not mere coincidences of onomastics, they allow us to trace an important family of Eresos; this family numbered among its members a fourth-century civic leader (Eursyilaos), a late third-century gymnasiarch (Aglanor son of Periandros), a man who served as a judge in a foreign city (Archias son of Eursyilaos) –the latter two with Ptolemaic ties–, and leading citizens (Periandros and Phainias sons of Archias) of the first century.

¹ On this procedure, which was fairly common at Lesbos, see Labarre 1996: 187; Rhodes 1997: 258.

² Euphanes son of Damarchos may be an ancestor of Leon son of Damarchos, who was a *prytanis* and the proposer of a first-century decree (Labarre 1996: 353-54 n° 79 [Charitonides 1968: n° 122]; on Leon’s son, Tiberius Claudius Demarchos, see Labarre 1996: 126-27 and n°s 80-84). If Euphanes did belong to this family, this would be the second case in which members of one and the same family held prominent positions in Eresian public life both in the late third century and in the age of Augustus (cf. p. 406 n. 5, above); this would in turn suggest that the same families dominated political life in Eresos over more than two centuries.

³ Labarre 1996: n° 89 (*IG XI 4*, 1064; *IG XII Suppl.* 136). The name of the proposer is preserved as Γλαύκωνος [.]νῶνε[.]ω (l. 12). The patronymic adjective is usually restored as [Αγ]νῶνε[.]ω or [Ξε]νῶνε[.]ω (see Labarre’s apparatus), but the editors of *LGPN I* have plausibly suggested that the two Glaukons might have been one and the same person (a suggestion which is not mentioned by Labarre); in that case the patronymic adjective should be restored as [Με]νῶνε[.]ω.

⁴ Labarre 1996: n° 69 (*IG XII Suppl.* 121). According to Hodot 1976: 59, the letter forms point to a date in the second century, but since the Ptolemaia are not mentioned in the text, an earlier date is more likely. For the first celebration of the local Ptolemaia (209-205 at the latest), see Labarre 1996: 57.

⁵ Labarre 1996: n° 71 (*IG XII Suppl.* 125).

honouring of a civic official, typical of the Late Hellenistic period, when a number of civic offices required their holder to spend a lot of their own money.¹ Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that so many members of prominent Eresian families were involved in the honouring of a civic official whose activity *ex officio* represented the bond between the city and the Ptolemaic court.

NESOS

D49. Thersippos

— *I. Adramytteion* 34 (IG XII 2, 645; OGIS 4); see also Arr., *Anab.* 2.14.4; Curt. 4.1.14

One of the most eloquent testimonies of the importance which their citizens' contacts with the royal courts had for Hellenistic cities comes not from a major city but from the insignificant city of Nesos (an islet in the entrance of the Gulf of Adramyttion).²

The testimony in question is the long decree of the people of Nesos in honour of their fellow citizen Thersippos (*I. Adramytteion* 34).³ As we can infer from the, poorly preserved, first three lines of the decree, Thersippos probably participated in Alexander's Asian campaign, or, at the very least, had become familiar with the Macedonian administration already by the time of Alexander.⁴ This makes the identification of Thersippos of Nesos with the homonymous envoy of Alexander to Darius III in early 332 very probable (Arr., *Anab.* 2.14.4; Curt. 4.1.14);⁵ this identification, in turn, would mean that Thersippos was high in the hierarchy of the Macedonian administration already by the early stages of the Asian campaign. During the reign of the next two Temenid kings, namely Philip III and Alexander IV,

¹ See, for example, Quaß 1993: 286-91.

² On the complex problem of the geographical names associated with the island and the neighbouring mainland (Nesos, Pordoselene, Poroselene, Hekatonnesoi), see Stauber, *I. Adramytteion* I, p. 198-213.

³ Apart from the editions and the bibliography cited by Stauber in *I. Adramytteion*, see also Poddighe 2001, especially 95 n. 4, with further bibliography, and Paschidis 2008. Dittenberger's comments in the OGIS remain essential for the understanding of the text. The fact that Thersippos was a citizen of Nesos is not explicitly stated in the decree; nonetheless, the number and importance of his benefactions, the absence of naturalization from the honours awarded to him and the prohibition of future cancellation of the honours bestowed upon him and his offspring make this assumption practically certain.

⁴ As Dittenberger points out in his comments on l. 2 ([.....¹⁷..... χ]ώρας τᾷ πόλει καὶ | [---]), Thersippos may have had already secured some benefits for his city during Alexander's reign. Ameling (Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: 250 n° 223) reasonably assumes that Nesos received former royal estates on the Asian coast.

⁵ The identification is unanimously accepted (see the comments at OGIS, as well as Berve 1926: 179 n° 368; Briant 1973: 208 n. 6; Habicht 1977: 514 n. 18; Bosworth 1980: 231; Migeotte 1984: 198 n. 195; Briant 1994: 77 n. 6).

Thersippos remained a *philos* of the kings, of the generals and the other Macedonians (ll. A 7-8);¹ thus, many of the benefits his city enjoyed were owed to him (ll. A 8-9).

The first of his benefactions was that, when Antipatros imposed on the cities a mandatory contribution “to the war” (εἰς [τὸν πόλε]μον), Thersippos managed to

¹ This terminology is particularly interesting, as the term φίλος normally denotes a personal relationship with a Macedonian king (with one justifiable exception: SEG 42 [1992] 91 with A1, above, where Antipatros, former viceroy and, at the time, plenipotentiary general of Macedonia, is also said to have *philo*). The parallel technical term διατρίβων can also be used to describe someone’s relationship with a high-ranking Macedonian, who has not (yet) received the royal title (IG XII 6, 25 [cf. D23, above], 20 [cf. D24, above] and 21). In any case, the phrase ἕνω τοῖς βασιλῆεσσι φίλος καὶ τοῖς στρατάγοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Μακεδόννεσι in the Thersippos decree is surprising, at least in its third leg. Calling Thersippos “a friend of the other Macedonians” seems to negate the technical sense of the term φίλος. The decree itself provides us with a partial parallel, as Thersippos is said to have made Polyperchon, Arrhabaios and other powerful Macedonians φίλους τᾷ πόλει (ll. A 24-28); but here the meaning is merely that Thersippos turned his (personal) relationship with individual Macedonians into a relationship of the latter with the city. Hatzopoulos 1996: I 283 (cf. BullEpigr 1998, 233) believes that the generals of ll. A 7-8 were the leaders of the four Macedonian *merides*, as were the generals who took part in the oath of the treaty between Polyperchon and the Messenians in 317 (SEG 43 [1993] 135); he also believes that “the other Macedonians” of the Thersippos decree were the Macedonian assembly, as in IG II² 401, and that the triad kings – generals – other Macedonians constituted the legal representatives of the Macedonian state. Bosworth 1993: 422 n. 17 has a similar theory, namely that the phrase “the other Macedonians” in the Thersippos decree and in IG II² 401 denotes the royal council. Although these ‘constitutional’ interpretations are possible in the case of Messene (where the triad consists of the kings, the generals and the *hipparches*) and Athens (where Hatzopoulos’s theory seems preferable to Bosworth’s), and despite the fact that the term “the other Macedonians” is a constitutional technical term in an older interstate treaty (IG I³ 89), I do not believe that a constitutional interpretation of the terminology is possible in the case of the Thersippos decree. A phrase reading “*philos* of the kings, the generals and the royal council”, or “*philos* of the kings, the generals and the Macedonian assembly” simply does not make sense. Political *φιλία* in antiquity was, primarily, a relationship between two individuals (cf. Mitchell 1997: 51-55) – be they of unequal status. If the kings, the generals and the other Macedonians whom Thersippos counted among his ‘friends’ were, in effect, the Macedonian state, the personal character of the relationship would be negated. If that were the case, Thersippos would simply be a φιλομακεδών, a term which –certainly not by accident– is never attested in epigraphic texts (in contrast to the later terms φιλέλλην or φιλωρώμαιος) and is practically unattested in literary sources, at least in the Hellenistic period (I know of only one much later example [Themistios 10.132b], where, in fact, the term seems to have been coined in order to serve the rhetoric of the author). We should not forget that the decree belongs to an age when ‘courts’, that is, the entourages of aspiring Successors, had not yet been formed, and therefore we should not look for a rigid and precise terminology. The generals whom Thersippos counted among his ‘friends’ must have been Antipatros, Kleitos, Polyperchon and Arrhabaios, mentioned by name later in the text; “the other Macedonians” were simply other Macedonians, that is, other high-ranking officers of the Macedonian army whom Thersippos was in contact with, and who are referred to, again collectively, later in the text (ll. A 26-27: καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς ἐπὶ τινων τεταγμένοις ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλῆων).

have Nesos exempted, while all other cities duly contributed (ll. A 9-14).¹ He then secured a significant cut for Nesos in a similar contribution imposed by Kleitos in order to finance a campaign of his to Cyprus (ll. A 14-16). Later, in a time of dearth, he secured the right to import grain from the satraps of the Asian mainland (ll. A 17-19),² and, more than once, lent his city the sum required for the purchase of grain, on a lower than usual interest rate (ll. A 19-23).³ Finally, when Polyperchon crossed over to Asia (ll. A 23-24),⁴ Thersippos “made him a friend of the city, and he also made friends of the city Arrhabaios and the others who had been appointed to various positions by the kings” (ll. A 24-28).

The honours for Thersippos were extensive: general tax exemption for him and his descendants, a bronze statue, *sitesis* at the *prytaneion*, a share of the sacrifices for him and his descendants, *proedria*, a crown awarded to him annually, and annual proclamation of the decree at the games; a stele inscribed with the decree (even the provenance of the marble which was to be used –from Therme in neighbouring Lesbos– was specified) was to be erected wherever Thersippos wanted, even within the precinct of one of the city’s sanctuaries,⁵ while the honourand was offered the possibility to choose whether he would have any other benefactions recorded in the decree before it was finally inscribed on the stone (ll. A 29-38 and A 44-52). The disclosure formula is also of particular interest: it informs us that the people, after its salvation, celebrated for three days with sacrifices and state-funded festivals (ll. A 39-44). If this salvation of the people was related to the food shortage mentioned in l. 20 and not to some earlier incident in Alexander’s age, recorded in the –now lost– beginning of the decree, then the food crisis of Nesos had been so severe, that its alleviation owing to Thersippos’ loans should be counted among his major benefactions. Two complimentary decrees were appended to the text and inscribed on the left side of the stele: the first specified the offerings to be made to Thersippos and his family during the sacrifices (ll. B 1-16), while the second reconfirmed the honours of the main decree “forever” (εἰς τὸν πάντα χρόνον), and, under the threat of a heavy fine, curses and loss of civic

¹ The phraseology of the decree (ἐκο[ύφισσε τ]ὰμ πόλιν) does not make this very clear. Nonetheless, had Thersippos merely managed to lower the sum which Nesos payed, this would have been recorded by the decree (as it is done for a similar case immediately afterwards in the text); nor is it likely that he payed the due amount himself, because in that case the decree would have again not failed to praise him for such a significant donation.

² See the comments of Briant 1994, especially 70-73.

³ On these lines, see Migeotte 1984: 198-99 n° 57.

⁴ For a new restoration of these lines (καὶ Πολυπέρχοντος εἰς τὰν Ἀσί[αν] | [διάβα]ντος instead of the generally accepted καὶ Πολυπέρχοντος εἰς τὰν Ἀσί[αν] | [στάλε]ντος), and its implications, see Paschidis 2008.

⁵ Gauthier 1985: 127 n. 154 notes that this is one of the very few cases where no restrictions are imposed regarding the place where an honorific decree was to be set up.

rights, strictly forbade that the honours awarded to Thersippos and his family be ever cancelled or amended (ll. B 17-66).

The description of Thersippos' benefactions poses a number of chronological and interpretative problems. The war during which Antipatros imposed the *eisphora* from which Nesos was exempted was most probably the war against Eumenes, decided at the conference of Triparadeisos (320).¹ The –otherwise unknown– campaign of Kleitos in Cyprus (ll. A 14-16), can only be dated between the conference of Triparadeisos in 320 and late 319.² As I have argued in detail elsewhere,³ Polyperchon's campaign in Asia was most probably a short campaign in the first half of 317, otherwise unattested but required by the literary sources anyway. Given that the reference to the kings in l. 27 can only mean that Philip III was alive at the time when the decree was issued, the decree should predate the autumn of 317. These two chronological indications combined, allow us to date the decree precisely to the summer or early autumn of 317, immediately after the departure of Polyperchon from Asia. Finally, the Arrhabaios mentioned in ll. A 25-26, whose identity has been the subject of some discussion, was most probably an offspring of the former royal family of Lynkos and, from his mother's side, a grandson of Antipatros.⁴ Arrhabaios' kinship with Antipatros explains his being mentioned by name next to Polyperchon, in contrast to the unnamed "other Macedonians" that follow.

¹ See Dittenberger *ad OGIS* 4 and Briant 1973: 215 n. 9, with earlier bibliography. The main positive argument usually put forward in support of this interpretation is that Thersippos is said to be a φίλος both of the kings and of Antipatros; it then follows that, since until 320 the kings were in the custody of Perdikkas, the decree should date after that year. It should be noted, however, that the decree does not imply that Thersippos was a φίλος of the kings at the same time that he was a φίλος of Antipatros. The reference to Thersippos' friendship with the kings follows the description of his relationship with Alexander and is part of a phrase which, in a sense, summarizes in hierarchical order (kings, generals, other individual Macedonians) and not in chronological order Thersippos' ties with several Macedonians, described in more detail later in the decree. Nevertheless, the war against Eumenes remains the likeliest context in which Antipatros would have levied such a contribution.

² Briant 1973: 215 n. 9, with earlier bibliography; Billows 1990: 67 n. 29; Poddighe 2001: 97; on Kleitos, cf. also Heckel 1992: 185-87, with no mention of the decree of Nesos.

³ Paschidis 2008, with earlier bibliography.

⁴ Habicht 1977; see also Dittenberger *ad OGIS* 4 and Poddighe 2001: 97 n. 19, with earlier bibliography. Droysen had suggested that this is a mistake or a corrupt form of the name of Arrhidaios, satrap of Hellenistic Phrygia after the conference of Triparadeisos. *Prima facie*, this is an appealing suggestion, since it would mean that both satraps whom Antigonos chased from their satrapies in the winter of 319/8 (Arrhidaios and Kleitos) and who later joined Antipatros and Polyperchon were named in the decree. But, as Droysen's theory requires that we made a drastic emendation to an otherwise carefully inscribed decree it is rendered considerably less plausible. Poddighe 2001: 99-100 attempts to strengthen Droysen's argument by (unnecessarily)

It is now possible to form a coherent and concrete picture of Thersippos' career. A high-ranking officer of Alexander already by the beginning of the king's Asian campaign, Thersippos remained faithful to the camp of 'Macedonian loyalists' in the troubled aftermath of Alexander's death: by 320, if not earlier, he was on good terms with Antipatros and afterwards remained in the camp of Antipatros' successor Polyperchon. Several details of the decree suggest that he did not actively participate in the wars of the Successors and that he had already retired to his homeland: he "went over" (l. A 12: *παργενόμενος*) to the kings to discuss the issue of the mandatory contribution, turned to the -neighbouring- satraps of Asia to secure the import of grain (ll. 18-19), and is said to have won Polyperchon's favour only when the latter found himself in Asia. In any case, by the time the decree was enacted (317), Thersippos, by then a veteran, had certainly settled in Nesos. This is evident from the two complimentary decrees inscribed on the stele's left side. The first decree was probably instigated by further demands of the great benefactor, while the prohibition of cancellation of the honours in the second decree seems to suggest that there was some negative reaction to the high status which Thersippos and his family achieved at Nesos through these honours.

This leading position was the direct result of Thersippos' Macedonian contacts. The honourand may have secured additional land for his city, while he relieved it from taxation, facilitated its provisioning with foods at difficult times, won the favour of the protagonists of the period, and lent money to the city. These are the most significant non military services recorded in the series of honorific decrees of Hellenistic cities. Making a long series of benefactions of vital importance to one's home city, as well as being awarded extravagant honours as a consequence, taken together, constitute an early example of what was to become a pattern at a much later phase in the history of euergetism, namely in the age of the "grands évergètes citoyens" who emerge after the middle of the second century -an age which has been magisterially analysed by Gauthier.¹ Thersippos single-handedly took upon himself the foreign policy and the state economy of Nesos. In that respect, it is noteworthy that, with no exception, all of his benefactions were directly or indirectly made possible owing to his earlier position in the Macedonian administration and to the contacts with powerful individuals which he had developed while in position; even his monetary benefactions would have been impossible to make without the wealth he had amassed while in the service of the Macedonians. Thus, Nesos may serve as a prime example of how, even in the case of a small and relatively unimportant city (or, perhaps, *precisely* in the case of a

assuming that the *τεταγμένοι ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων* of the decree were satraps appointed at Triparadeisos, like Arrhidaios.

¹ Gauthier 1985: 53-75.

small and relatively unimportant city), and already at the very beginning of the Hellenistic period, a citizen's personal network of contacts with the appropriate *Machthaber* – a chance phenomenon, unrelated to the city's political life *per se* – could prove the key factor in the city's survival and well-being.

SAMOTHRAKE

D50. Hegesistratos

– [Ἡγ]ησίστρατος Φι[. . .]: *Samothrace* 2, 1, pp. 39-40, App. 1 (*IG XII* 8, 156; *Syll*³ 502; Kotsidu 2000: n° 188)

Hegesistratos¹ was a *basileus* (eponymous archon) and the proposer² of the decree of the Samothrakians (*Samothrace* 2, 1, App. 1) in honour of Hippomedon son of Agesilaos of Sparta, general “of the Hellespont and of the places in Thrace” (l. A 4: [τοῦ Ἑλ]λησπόντου καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκιης τόπων)³ on behalf of Ptolemy III Euergetes.

I have already referred to Hippomedon's possible role in the conclusion of the alliance between Sparta and Euergetes (see **B19**, above). Let me simply repeat here that Hippomedon self-exiled in the autumn of 241 and took refuge in Alexandria,⁴ where he soon became a close collaborator of Euergetes.⁵ The dates of the establishment of the Ptolemaic generalship of Thrace, of Samothrake's inclusion in the Ptolemaic sphere of influence (was it during the Third Syrian War [246-241] or, as is more likely, later in the reign of Euergetes?), as well as the date of Hippomedon's appointment as general of Thrace and the Hellespont are all uncertain; equally uncertain is whether he was the first general of the area or not.⁶ We only know

¹ I found no name in the onomasticon of Samothrake which may be restored as the patronym of Hegesistratos (Φι[. . .] in the genitive).

² For the *basileus* as the proposer of Samothrakian decrees, at least in the Hellenistic period, see Habicht 1994c: 72 n. 16 (with the sources) and Rhodes 1997: 288.

³ In the often quoted passage of Teles, *Περὶ φυγῆς* 23 (Hense), Hippomedon is described as ἐπὶ Θράκιης καθεσταμένος.

⁴ Plut., *Agis* 6.5 and 16.4-5; on the date, see Marasco 1981: 656-57.

⁵ Teles, *Περὶ φυγῆς* 23 (Hense).

⁶ The question of the cities and other strategic points in Thrace which Euergetes conquered remains open. On the earlier Hellenistic history of Samothrake in general, see Fraser, *Samothrace* 2,1, pp. 3-37. For the reign of Euergetes, the main sources are: Polyb. 5.34.7-8; *OGIS* 54 (the Adoulis inscription); Rigsby 1996: n° 28-29 (*SEG* 12 [1955] 375-376); Gauthier 1979b: 88-89 and the decree under discussion. The bibliography is extensive: see, for example, Bengtson 1952: 178-83; Bagnall 1976: 159-62; Gauthier 1979b: 77; Will 1979: 254-57, 261. Despite the propaganda of the Adoulis inscription, there is no solid evidence for Ptolemaic conquests in the area during the Third Syrian War, apart from Ainos (Rigsby 1996: n° 28 and, perhaps, *P.Haun.* 6). Any Ptolemaic conquests in the area were most probably achieved gradually and over time, as Bengtson and Will have proposed (*op. cit.*; cf. also p. 415 n. 2, below). The phrase τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκιης τόπων makes it clear that, even at the time when the decree under discussion was enacted, Ptolemaic presence in Thrace was limited to a few strongholds. If the person described as a commander of a powerful

for certain that Hippomedon remained general at least until 219, early in the reign of Philopator.¹

Hippomedon is praised by the decree for his piety and his donations to the *temenos* of the Great Gods in the Thracian Peraia (ll. A 4-7),² for dispatching a military contingent that would ensure the *temenos*' safety (ll. A 8-11), for a loan that he offered to the city so that it could pay off the mercenaries it had hired (ll. A 11-12) and, in general, for always granting the city's requests, in accordance with the royal disposition towards Samothrake (ll. A 13-17). Ambassadors from the island, who would probably announce the decree to Hippomedon, would further request that the general would allow grain to be exported from Chersonesos and purchased by the Samothrakians (ll. B 15-17), and would contribute to the fortification, undoubtedly of the peraia (ll. B 17-18), as well as to the settlement of citizens of Samothrake on royal estates in the peraia;³ those citizens would then offer part of their harvest to the *temenos*, so that regular sacrifices for the royal couple be performed (ll. B 18-23).

The exemplary analysis of side B of the stele by Gauthier 1979b renders detailed treatment of the text here redundant. Three main points need to be made here: 1) The permission granted by the general was not a permission for the Samothrakians to import grain, as was previously thought, but only a permission for a quantity of grain to be exported from royal land in Thrace; this quantity of grain was then purchased by the Samothrakians, as it could be by any other buyer. 2) Samothrake and the Ptolemaic Thracian district were two completely distinct statal entities; in no way did Samothrake constitute a direct Ptolemaic possession. 3) No part of the text allows us to suppose that Ptolemaic troops were present on the island.

On the other hand, the fact that Samothrake appears –formally– to have enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy than previously thought, does not mean that it was –in essence– less dependent on the Ptolemies. The Samothrakians appear to have been completely dependent on the Ptolemaic army for the protection of their peraia, which was in permanent danger of invasions despite the fact that it was surrounded by Ptolemaic possessions (cf. the following entry). Apart from defence,

fleet, with full authority and financial autarky, by the second leg of the aforementioned passage of Teles (*Περὶ φωνγῆς* 23 [Hense]) is Hippomedon, as I claimed earlier (see p. 164 n. 7, above), then we may assume that Hippomedon was responsible for a significant part of these Ptolemaic conquests, perhaps even for the establishment of the generalship (in the 230's?).

¹ See *PTebt* 8, col. 2, with Bagnall 1976: 160-61, 167-68.

² On this *temenos* and the adjoining royal land donated to Samothrake under Philip III and Alexander IV, see McCredie 1968: 220-21; on the Samothrakian Peraia, see also Carusi 2003: 190-95. It is clearly this *temenos* which is referred to here, and not the great sanctuary of Samothrake (Gauthier 1979b: 80-83).

³ Cf. Robert, *OMS* VI 596 n. 1.

the Ptolemaic administration also contributed to two other sectors, which belonged to the core of an autonomous city's jurisdiction –but also were the two main sources of problems for Hellenistic cities: food supplies and state finance. In other words, the fact that the Samothrakians were a formally autonomous people and were acute enough to take advantage of the prestige of the sanctuary of the Great Gods in order to attract royal benefactions should not make us overlook the fact that they were thoroughly dependent on the Ptolemaic state –*de facto*, not *de iure*.¹

D51. Polychares son of Leochares — D52. Epinikos

— Gauthier 1979b: 88-89

Epinikos, who had been “appointed over Maroneia by king Ptolemy [*scil.* III Euergetes]”, was honoured by a decree of the Samothrakians (Gauthier 1979b: 88-89) enacted slightly earlier than the decree for Hippomedon,² on the proposal of the eponymous archon, the otherwise unknown Polychares son of Leochares. The honourend, a citizen of Samothrake (l. 6) either by descent or by prior naturalization,³ dispatched a military force to save the Samothrakian Peraia from a barbarian invasion (ll. 14-23), and lent the city money to pay the wages of Trallian mercenaries (ll. 23-27).⁴ Ambassadors from the city also convinced him to lend the city money without interest, so that a special fund for the provisions of grain would be created (ll. 31-34).⁵

As Robert noted long ago,⁶ the content of the decree is almost identical to that of the decree in honour of Hippomedon, and thus corroborates the picture of Samothrake, as drawn in the preceding entry: a city with nominal autonomy, but actually dependent on the Ptolemaic generalship of Thrace.

AMORGOS - MINOA

D53. Iasidemos son of Mnesis

— IG XII 7, 221b

Iasidemos, otherwise unknown, was the proposer of the decree of Minoa in Amorgos in honour of Diokleidas son of Pyrrhos of Megara, an envoy of a king

¹ Cf. Buraselis 1993: 256.

² The fact that no reference is made to Hippomedon must mean that the generalship of Thrace had not yet been created. Had Hippomedon already served as general, he would have been Epinikos' superior, and thus he would have been mentioned in the decree, even if he had not contributed to the benefaction (cf. the parallel of the decree of Ios in honour of Zenon, a subordinate of the nesiarch Bakchon [D56, below]).

³ The citizenship could have been offered to Epinikos as part of the previous honours awarded to him, mentioned in ll. 29-31.

⁴ On the Trallian mercenaries, see Robert, OMS I 425-27.

⁵ On this passage, see Robert, OMS VI 308-310 and Gauthier 1979b: 87.

⁶ OMS VI 617.

Antigonos (*IG XII 7, 221b*). The honourand had conveyed royal letters to Minoa and had himself discussions with local officials; the issue was “the disentanglement of the people from the turmoil that had ensued” (ll. 8-10: τὸν δῆμον ἀπολυθῆναι τῆς κατεστῶσης παραχῆς). Then follow the standard reference to the honourand’s goodwill towards Minoa (ll. 10-12), the resolution setting out the honours (crown, *proxenia*, the honorific title of benefactor, the right to attend the assembly and the council, and tax exemption; ll. 12-22), and the disclosure formula (ll. 22-24).

The identity of king Antigonos in this and two other decrees of Minoa¹ has been the subject of much discussion. Unfortunately, dating the decrees has to be based mainly on letter forms. Unsafe a dating criterion as letter forms may be, I believe that in this case they strongly favour a date during the reign of Antigonos Doson rather than during the reign of Antigonos Gonatas.² Such a date conforms better with the only chronological indication other than letter forms offered by the decree under discussion: the honourand is most probably the son of Pyrrhos son of Diokleidas, a general of Megara attested in two inscriptions probably dating a little earlier than 235 –for reasons already examined above.³

It is obvious that Doson’s intervention regarded matters which were deemed crucial for the future of the city. The royal envoys of *IG XII 7, 222* (judges or arbiters) and Sosistratos, another envoy of a king Antigonos (*IG XII 7, 223*), may have been involved in the same matter. The παραχῆ of Minoa may have been some interstate dispute (between Minoa and the other two cities of Amorgos?) or some other dangerous ‘international’ incident rather than a purely domestic crisis. Such an assumption would perhaps explain why the Minoans turned to the Macedonians, a foreign power with sufficient force to impose a solution.⁴ A noteworthy detail of the decree illustrates the importance of Diokleidas’ mission for the Minoans: the honourand was to be awarded fifty drachmas as ξένια; the city, however, found itself in such dire straits that the treasurers could not even afford this insignificant

¹ *IG XII 7, 222* (proxeny decree for Kottas of Demetrias, at the request of royal envoys; these envoys were not Naxians as previously thought: see Reger 1994b: 56) and 223 (proxeny decree for Sosistratos, a διατρίβων by king Antigonos).

² See Olshausen 1974: 108-110 n° 80 and Buraselis 1982: 168 n. 195, with bibliography up to then; Migeotte 1984: 195; Le Bohec 1993: 223 n. 3; Étienne 1990: 98; Reger 1994b: 55-56; Gauthier 1994: 173; Knoepfler 2001: 413. Étienne and Reger argue convincingly in favour of the lower date.

³ Heath 1913: n°s I-II (on the date, see **C1-6**, above). If the decrees of Amorgos were dated under Gonatas, we would have to accept that the general of Megara was the son and not the father of the royal envoy. Given that even those who date the Cycladic decrees under Gonatas concur that the earliest possible date is in the 240’s, such an identification is rendered difficult to accept, for it would mean that father and son simultaneously occupied high positions (in the Macedonian administration and at Megara respectively).

⁴ Up to this point I follow Reger 1994b: 57-58. Obviously, παραχῆ may very well point to a domestic strife as well (see, for example, *IG IX 2, 1230*; *I. Ephesos 215*).

sum and were obliged to borrow it; the loan would be paid for by the tithe collected by the city.¹

The other side of the coin is more complex: Why did Doson hasten to respond to the Minoan request? There is no indication that the king had any jurisdiction over Amorgos; setting Delian sources aside –from which it is always unsafe to draw any conclusions regarding political domination in the Aegean–,² the three Minoan decrees provide us with the only reliable evidence regarding Macedonian presence on Amorgos and the Cyclades in general during Doson’s reign.³ On the

¹ On the terminology and the whole procedure, see Migeotte 1984: 194-96. It should be noted that the honourand himself had not made a major benefaction to the Minoans (cf. Gauthier 1985: 141-42; Gygax 2006: 17-18); he simply conveyed the king’s letters to them, held discussions with local authorities, and promised to continue to do whatever he could for the city. This does not mean, however, that his mission was not important. His honouring does not only reflect the future expectations of the Minoans from him, but also the importance of the king’s intervention for the Minoans.

² The only epigraphical evidence from Delos that could point to Macedonian influence over the Aegean during the reign of Doson is the dedication by Doson, the Macedonians and the other allies after the battle of Sellasia (*IG XI 4 1097* [Hatzopoulos 1996: II n° 24]). A perusal of the catalogue of royal donations at Delos (Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 117-193), where all Hellenistic dynasties are attested as benefactors, sometimes simultaneously, should suffice to make it clear that no firm conclusions regarding the question of any king’s dominance over the Aegean can be drawn based on Delian evidence alone.

³ See Reger 1994b: 48-62 (cf. 34-35, 46, 64), with the sources and earlier bibliography. Regarding the dating of certain inscriptions under Doson or Gonatas on the basis of letter forms, I should point out that, in some cases (for example, *IG XII 5, 570* [Poiessa in Keos], *SEG 44* [1994] 710 [Kimolos; see **D64**, below], *IG XI 4, 1052* [Syros]), this criterion does not allow the high degree of certainty occasionally expressed by Reger (cf. the reservations of Gauthier, *BullEpigr* 1995, 435). The only sources from another city in Amorgos (Arkesine) which have been associated with the Macedonian presence on the island, again under Doson, are *IG XII 7, 15-16*. Contrary to Delamarre’s original theory, it is clear that n° 16, an honorific decree for Nikias of Hermione, is not related to n° 15, nor does it presuppose a royal interference (cf. Reger 1994b: 58; his argument is convincing but mainly valid for n° 16, not for n° 15 as well, as he claims). N° 15 is a decree in honour of two foreign judges or *diallaktai*, citizens of Akanthos and of an unknown city respectively. The fact that at least one of the judges was Macedonian and that the two did not come from the same city led Delamarre to believe that they were royal envoys. Accordingly, he restored: [ἐ]παινέ[σαι μὲν τοὺς πρεσβευ][τὰς] τοὺς παρ[ὰ βασιλέως ---^{ca.8} ---] | Εὐθυκράτην ΚΑ[--- ἐκ ---]νίας καὶ Πεδίαρχ[ον ---] | Ἀκάνθιον (*IG XII 7, 15*, ll. 3-6). The phrase πρεσβευτὰς τοὺς παρὰ βασιλέως, without a participle of a verb meaning “to send” is somewhat awkward, but has parallels (see *I. Cret.* II xxvi [Sybrita] 1); nevertheless, we should not forget that assuming that the sender of the ambassadors was a king is only one of the restorations possible in this case. Another problem with Delamarre’s restoration is that, if the second envoy was a Macedonian, the construction [---]νίας for the ethnic should be restored either as Εὐθυκράτην ΚΑ[--- Μακεδὸνα ἐκ --- (city name)-]νίας or as Εὐθυκράτην ΚΑ[--- (ethnic) ἀπὸ Μακεδο]νίας, if he came from a city with a common name, the Macedonian location of which was not self-evident. In both cases, however, there would be practically no space left to restore Euthykrates’ patronym: the average number of letters per line in the main body of the text is twenty-six to twenty-eight (only the penultimate l. 13 has 30), and the

other hand, the request of the Minoans certainly testifies to some kind of Macedonian influence over the island; the main question is what sort of influence. Some scholars believe that the decrees from Amorgos bear testimony to actual Macedonian presence in the Aegean. Even Reger, who otherwise rejects the notion of organized Macedonian presence in central Aegean (outside the Saronic Gulf) after 245, suggests (not very convincingly) that Doson's motives were of a geostrategic nature, and that there may have been a Macedonian garrison stationed at Minoa.¹ I believe that Macedonian military presence on Amorgos, although plausible, is hardly necessary to assume. *Pace* Reger, Amorgos' position was not of strategic importance; moreover, Reger's main thesis that the Macedonians did not wholly dominate the Aegean during the second half of the third century remains valid, at least for the reign of Doson. Perhaps then the answer to our question should be exactly the opposite than the answer usually taken for granted. The Minoans may have appealed to the king of the Macedonians as an arbiter, not only recognizing his growing power over Greek matters, but also *precisely* because he did not rule over the Cyclades, leading them to hope he would thus be impartial in his judgement. For the founder and supreme leader of yet another reincarnation of the fourth-century *koinon* of the Greeks, namely the Greek Alliance of 224, there were obvious advantages in establishing his role as an arbiter of international disputes even outside his sphere of direct influence;² Doson would thus re-establish the status of his throne in an area where the formerly strong Macedonian presence had for a long time subsided. If this interpretation is valid, the Minoan request

shortest possible restoration (Εὐθυκράτην ΚΑ[– Μακεδόνα ἐξ Ἄρκυ]νίας [on Arkynia, see *Gonnoi* II 12]) allows for only one or two letters for the rest of the patronym. Yet another problem regarding the text is its date. Delamarre described the letters in his *IG* entry as “prima tertii a. Chr. n. saeculi parte vix recentiores”, but commented that it is “haud incredibile” that the decree dates under Doson. Some scholars take a date under Philadelphos for granted and, in fact, see the inscription as bearing testimony to Ptolemaic influence over Amorgos in 287–265 (Bagnall 1976: 149 n. 115; Reger 1994b: 40 n. 23; on the Ptolemaic past of Amorgos, see Nigdelis 1990: 13 n. 9). Olshausen 1973: 112 believes that the king mentioned in this decree is the king of the Macedonians, but hesitates over a date under Gonatas, Demetrios II or Doson; he is followed by Nigdelis 1990: 14 n. 10. I believe that the general character of the letter forms does not favour a date under Doson, and that it suggests a date in the second third of the third century –it should be noted that Delamarre uses the same description, “prima tertii a. Chr. n. saeculi parte vix recentiores”, for the letter forms of *IG* XII 7, 13, an inscription which certainly belongs to the age of Philadelphos. Given the many uncertainties (date, reference to royal envoys, identity of the king, ethnic of the envoys), I believe that the text cannot be used in *any* historical reconstruction before it has been more thoroughly studied.

¹ See Reger 1994b: 58–59, who claims that Amorgos was of strategic importance as a station on the sea route linking Crete with mainland Greece –a route of vital importance to Doson, who wanted to assure a steady flow of Cretan mercenaries.

² We should not forget that Doson claimed at least an advisory role even in domestic disputes between members of the alliance (Polyb. 4.24.4).

should be considered as the foundation (or refoundation) act of the bond between Amorgos and Macedonia, rather than as attesting to an already existing bond between them.

D54. [---o]n

— [. . .]η[. ω]v: *IG XII 7, 223*

Proposer¹ of one of the three proxeny decrees of Minoa referring to a king Antigonos, most probably Antigonos Doson (*IG XII 7, 223*; cf. the preceding entry); this particular decree honours Sosistratos, undoubtedly a διατρίβων (*vel sim.*) by Doson.

NAXOS

D55. [Kalli]as

— *Syll*³ 390 (*IG XII 7, 506*), l. 62; *IG XI 4, 1037*

According to the famous Nikouria decree (*Syll*³ 390, l. 62), one of the three *theoroi* sent by the League of the Islanders to Alexandria for the celebration of the first Ptolemaia in 280 or 279,² was [. . .]ας of Naxos. Roussel's suggestion that the *theoros* in question was Kallias of Naxos, attested once again as a *theoros* of the Islanders to Alexandria in roughly the same period (*IG XI 4, 1037*) is practically certain.

The League of the Islanders, founded by Antigonos I,³ passed into the hands of the Ptolemies in the 280's,⁴ and remained a powerful tool of Ptolemaic predominance in the Aegean until the end of the Chremonidean War.⁵ Naxos' relationship with Philadelphos is also attested in the same period by the dispatch of Koan judges to Naxos, at the request of the nesiarch Bakchon.⁶

¹ Among the very few names which can be restored as the proposer's name (for example, Ἀσκληπίων, Θαργηλίων, Προμηθίων), none is attested at Amorgos.

² On the date, see p. 393 n. 1, above.

³ On the Macedonian past of the *koinon*, see mainly Buraselis 1982: 76-82 and Billows 1990: 220-25.

⁴ 288 is a safe *terminus ante quem* for the emergence of the Ptolemies as the dominant power in the Aegean (as we can infer from the combined evidence of Plut., *Demetr.* 44.3 and *SEG 28 [1978] 60*, ll. 18-20), but only the Ptolemaic garrison of Andros is attested for that year. Ios came under the domination of the Ptolemies relatively early as well, in 286 at the latest (*IG XII 5, 1004*; for the date, cf. *IG II² 650*). Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the Nikouria decree is the earliest piece of evidence securely attesting to full Ptolemaic control of the League of the Islanders (on the nesiarch Apollodoros, who is often considered to date before 280, and to have been the first Ptolemaic nesiarch, see **D59** and Appendix 6, below).

⁵ On the Ptolemaic phase of the *koinon*, see Merker 1970; Bagnall 1976: 136-41; Nigdelis 1990: 210-11. The sources are collected by Buraselis 1982: 180-88.

⁶ *SEG 49 (1999) 1106* ((*OGIS 43 + Holleaux, Études III 33-34*; Crowther 1999: 257-66 n° 2); on the date, see p. 378 n. 5, above.

The fact that Echestratos, the other *theoros* recorded in the Delian inscription (IG XI 4, 1037), is not mentioned in the Nikouria decree, probably means that the Delian text refers to later Ptolemaia (perhaps the second Ptolemaia of 276 or 275),¹ which, in turn, means that Kallias maintained his role as a representative of the *koinon* in Alexandria for several years.

IOS

D56. Archagathos

— IG XII 5, 1004 (OGIS 773)

Otherwise unknown,² Archagathos was the proposer of the decree in honour of Zenon, the well-known subordinate of nesiarch Bakchon in the early years of the Ptolemaic phase of the League of the Islanders (IG XII 5, 1004).³ Ambassadors from Ios had requested Zenon's help for the repatriation of fugitive slaves,⁴ who had escaped aboard transport ships⁵ of the Ptolemaic fleet. Zenon immediately called upon the trierarchs⁶ to make sure that the slaves were returned to Ios. He was honoured with proxeny, the right to attend the council and the assembly, and *xenia* of fifty drachmas.

The slaves had probably taken advantage of a temporary stop of Zenon's fleet at Ios, and attempted to escape;⁷ Zenon had no reason not to grant the request of the ambassadors. This is more of an administrative procedure reflecting the degree of Ptolemaic control over the islands, rather than a true benefaction reflecting political ties between the two sides. It would be interesting to know whether the slaves' attempt to escape was related to the *ταραχή* in Ios, on account of which the city once again turned to the Ptolemaic authorities for help.⁸

¹ Roussel, based on letter forms, dates IG XI 4, 1037 to the first third of the third century, and also assumes that the honours voted in ca. 274/3 for a certain Aristandros, who appears to have assisted *theoroi* of the Islanders at Alexandria (IG XI 4, 1041) may be connected with the *theoria* of Kallias and Echestratos.

² Two of the presidents of the assembly which enacted the decree are known from other sources: Aischron (IG XII 5, 1005) and Poseidios (IG XII 5, 1001, I; cf. p. 421 n. 1, below).

³ On Zenon's presence in Athens, see IG II² 650 (summer 286). On Bakchon, see also SEG 49 (1999) 1106; IG XII 5, 1065; IG XI 2, 161 B 12; 162 B 10; 164 A 55; 199 B 38; IG XI 4, 551 (Syll³ 381, Durrbach, *Choix* 15); 1125; 1126; 1039; ID 298 A 171; 300 B 19; on his career, cf. Bagnall 1976: 136-38 and 156-57; Rigsby 1980; Hennig 1989: 177-79, with earlier bibliography. On the Ptolemaic phase of the *koinon*, see the works cited in the preceding entry.

⁴ On similar cases, see Bielman 1994: 292 n. 131.

⁵ On the *ἄφρακτοι* as light transport vessels, usually not used in combat, cf. Heinen 1981: 190. Zenon is also mentioned as commander of the *ἄφρακτοι* in the Athenian decree (IG II² 650).

⁶ The trierarchs were probably Ptolemaic officers; see Hauben 1990b.

⁷ Cf. Bagnall 1976: 147.

⁸ IG XII 5, 7 + IG XII Suppl. p. 96. For another attestation of the relationship of Ios with Philadelphos, see IG XII Suppl. 169: honours awarded to Thrasykles (?), a Ptolemaic officer and

D57. [---] son of [---]damas — D58. [---] son of Alkimedon (?)

— [---] δάμαντος; *IG XII Suppl.* 168 (Kotsidu 2000: n° 170)

— [--- Ἀλκι(?)]μέδοντος; *IG XII* 5, 1008B

A son of [---]damas¹ proposed a poorly preserved decree of Ios in honour of a king Antigonos (*IG XII Suppl.* 168). The king was praised for restoring freedom and the ancestral laws to the people (ll. 2-3), who, accordingly, decided to perform sacrifices and processions with crowns to celebrate the joyous news (l. 5), to perform further sacrifices [τῶι βασιλ]εῖ Ἀντιγόνωι Σωτήρι (l. 7), and to offer the king a crown of 2,000 drachmas (l. 11). The remainder of the text appears to deal with domestic affairs: the necessity of concord and of avoiding civil strife, and perhaps a cancellation of debts (ll. 12-13).

As Hiller von Gaertringen, the first editor of the text, pointed out, certain features of the decree seem to favour the identification of the king with Antigonos the One-Eyed and a date immediately after 306: namely, letter forms, the wording of the decree, which finds parallels in a Delian inscription referring to Antigonos I, and, mainly, the title Soter, a known title of Antigonos the One-Eyed.² Habicht, however, pointed out an important difficulty regarding this theory. The phrase νῦν τε Ἀντίγονος ὁ βα[σιλεύς] (l. 2) must mean that the person “responsible for great benefactions” (μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν αἴτιος) mentioned in the beginning of the same line was a different person, who cannot have been Poliorketes (whose

the superior of another Thrasykles (*IG XI* 4, 1043), who was an οἰκονόμος τῶν νήσων at Delos (cf. Bagnall 1976: 146-47; Buraselis 1982: 181 n° 9 and 186-87 n° 36).

¹ Klaffenbach and Hiller (in the *IG*) restored the patronym as [Ἀρχε]δάμαντος, which was the name of the eponymous archon of an inscription dating to the fourth century, according to Hiller (*IG XII* 5, 1001, I). Hiller's dating, however, obviously stems from his assumption that Lysippos son of Alkimachos – a Macedonian honoured by the second decree of the same stele (*IG XII* 5, 1001, II) –, was the son of an Alkimachos who was naturalized in Athens along with Antipatros in 338 (Hyp. fr. 77, *apud* Harp., s.v. Ἀλκίμαχος). But the Alkimachos honoured in Athens is most probably Alkimachos son of Agathokles of Pella (see Osborne 1983: 71, T71 n. 217); thus, there is no obvious reason for us to suppose that the two Alkimachoi were one and the same person. If Poseidios, an *eklogeus* in the inscription where the archon Archedamas is mentioned (*IG XII* 5, 1001, I), is to be identified with Poseidios, president of the assembly which enacted the honours for Zenon in ca. 285 (*IG XII* 5, 1004; cf. the preceding entry), then *IG XII* 5, 1001, I is more likely to belong to the 280's. In other words, the restoration [Ἀρχε]δάμαντος in *IG XII Suppl.* 168 (and even more so the kinship between the proposer of *IG XII Suppl.* 168 and the archon of *IG XII* 5, 1001, I) is hardly secure. Among the many names ending in –damas, the name Tlesidamas is also attested in the onomasticon of Ios (*IG XII* 5, 10, l. 10, Hellenistic).

² Even Habicht 1970: 65, who favours a lower date, concedes that the letter forms are more consistent with a date in the late fourth century; cf., however, Reger 1994b: 37-38 who insists on the conservatism of the letter-cutters of Ios throughout the third century. For the parallel wording of *IG XI* 4, 566, see Billows 1990: 223-24; for the title Soter of Antigonos I at Athens, see Diod. Sic. 20.46.2, Plut., *Demetr.* 10.4 and the epigraphic sources gathered by Kotsidu 2000: 38-45 and discussed by Habicht 1970: 44-48 and Mikalson 1998: 80, 83-85; for a possible attestation of the same title in the Cyclades, see *IG XI* 4, 1036, l. 46, with Buraselis 1982: 68.

name Klaffenbach restored), for $\nu\bar{\nu}\nu\ \tau\epsilon$ in the second part of the phrase requires a $\pi\rho\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$ in the first part, and Poliorketes had not been active in the Aegean before 307.¹ Another difficulty, not observed by Habicht, is that Antigonos appears to have been the only honourand of the decree.² It is hard to imagine that after 306 a city of the Aegean or the League of the Islanders would have honoured Antigonos alone, without honouring Poliorketes at the same time. In this regard, it is important to note that the only source certainly dating to the Macedonian phase of the League of the Islanders is a decree ratifying the addition of honours for Poliorketes to honours voted for Antigonos.³ A third obstacle to Hiller's theory is that it presupposes that Antigonos I (who already bore the royal title) only 'freed' Ios in 306 and not, as one would expect, in 314, when the *koinon* was founded, or in 307, when Poliorketes was active in the area. Finally, from whom could have Antigonos I freed Ios? Ptolemy I may have been present in the Aegean in 308,⁴ but it is rather unlikely that he had the resources or the will to occupy any of the islands, even temporarily.⁵ All these obstacles to the higher date –which is, *prima facie*, preferable– seem to favour a date under Antigonos Gonatas for the decree.⁶

If we accept a date under Gonatas, then it is reasonable to connect this decree with the two other decrees inscribed on the same plaque (*IG XII 5, 1008 A [LSCG 106; Kotsidu 2000: n° 171]* and B).⁷ The first of these may refer to the sacrifice of

¹ See in detail Habicht 1970: 65-73, who, in the second edition of his work (pp. 256-57) expressed doubts about his own theory, but later (1996: 134) reaffirmed it, adding the observation that divine honours for Gonatas should no longer surprise us (cf. **A68**, above). Billows 1990: 224 n. 98, who favours the higher date (as does Reger 1985: 169, without comments), has an alternative theory: in the first line of the decree he restores the name of the admiral Dioskourides, a nephew of Antigonos, known for his actions during the foundation of the League of the Islanders. There are two reasons to reject this alternative. Firstly, as Habicht 1970: 66 pointed out, a man referred to before the king must have been his equal; secondly, the only honourand in the decree appears to have been Antigonos (see the following note). If one wanted to preserve the higher dating, the only solution would be to assume that the person referred to in ll. 1-2 is again Antigonos, albeit without his royal title, mentioned on account of his benefactions during the foundation of the *koinon* –a solution perhaps not so improbable as Habicht 1970: 66 n. 32 thought.

² The name of Demetrios could perhaps be restored as the object of $\epsilon\pi\alpha\iota\nu\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\alpha\iota$ in l. 4, but not in ll. 7 and 10, where Antigonos figures as the sole honourand.

³ *IG XI 4, 1036*, with Buraselis 1982: 60-75.

⁴ Diod. Sic. 20.37.1-2. Ptolemy freed Andros, received Sikyon and Corinth from Kratesipolis, attempted to win over the alliance of Peloponnesian cities but failed, and hastily returned to Alexandria, maintaining only two garrisons in the Peloponnese (at Sikyon and Corinth). It was the Peloponnese that was the main focus of his campaign, not the Cyclades.

⁵ Cf. Buraselis 1982: 66.

⁶ Apart from Habicht, a date under Gonatas –or even Doson– is preferred, without further argumentation, by Fraser 1958: 154; Buraselis 1982: 63 n. 105 and 168 n. 195; Piejko 1991: 137 n. 24 (with a number of unsafe restorations); Le Bohec 1993: 47-48; Kotsidu 2000: n° 170.

⁷ Cf. Habicht 1970: 71-72.

oxen to a king (?) who, on paleographical criteria, could be either Gonatas or Doso.¹ The second decree honours the son of a certain [Alki(?)]medon.² If the Antigonos mentioned in the very poorly preserved text is Antigonos the king, the honourand was probably honoured for his ties with the Macedonian court or for performing the sacrifices mentioned in the first decree. In the former case, the honourand could either have been a citizen of Ios or a foreigner; in the latter case, he certainly was a citizen of Ios.

All in all, however, the many uncertainties surrounding these decrees make it unsafe for us to multiply our assumptions and to link them with any third-century events in central Aegean.

PAROS

D59. Kydias son of Amiantos — D60. Archephylos son of Leontios

— Michel, *Recueil* 534 (CIG 3655)

According to a decree of Kyzikos, two Parian ambassadors, Kydias and Archephylos, conveyed to Kyzikos a Parian decree in honour of Apollodoros son of Apollonios, a nesiarch and, apparently, a citizen of Kyzikos (Michel, *Recueil* 534). They were allowed to read the decree publicly before the council, the assembly, and at the theatre during the Dionysia, as well as to offer Apollodoros a crown and have his statue erected in the *agora*. The Kyzikenes also honoured Apollodoros for his benefactions to Paros (ll. 18-19).

Apollodoros is usually considered to be the first nesiarch of the League of the Islanders, either under the Antigonids or under Philadelphos; in my opinion, it is more likely that he was the successor to Bakchon, and that he served as nesiarch on behalf of Ptolemy II in 279-268.³ The reasons for which he was honoured by the Parians remain unclear. Despite the island's rich epigraphic harvest, there are almost no testimonies to its ties with the Ptolemies.⁴

Kydias son of Amiantos does not seem to be otherwise attested;⁵ Archephylos son of Leontios was certainly a relative of Leontios son of Archepulos (?), attested in an undated and now lost catalogue.⁶ Kydias and Archephylos may have been

¹ Reference to an Antigonos (not necessarily a king) is certain only for decree B (l. 12: [---'Av]τιγόνωι ME[---]). The king referred to in decree A, l. 4, may either be a local official responsible for the sacrifice (in which case we should restore: βοῦ[v] θύειν βασιλέα) or Antigonos (in which case the restoration would be (βοῦ[v] θύειν βασιλέϊ 'Α[ντιγόνωι]). For the extensive bibliography on the two decrees, see Buraselis 1982: 168 n. 195; Nigdelis 1990: 242 n. 205; Kotsidu 2000: n° 171.

² The name is otherwise unattested at Ios.

³ See Appendix 6, below.

⁴ See Bagnall 1976: 150.

⁵ Another Kydias attested in Paros was a dedicant to Aphrodite (*IG* XII 5, 224, probably later than the decree under discussion).

⁶ *IG* XII 5, 136.

responsible for the honours for the nesiarch as well; it was not uncommon for the proposers of such honours to become involved in the announcement of the honours to the honourand, at the latter's homeland or elsewhere.

TENOS

D61. Kallistagoras son of Isandros (?) — D62. Pantainos son of Sphodrias

— Καλλισταγό[ρας Ἰ]σ[άνδρ]ου (vel [Ἰ]σ[αγόρ]ου)¹ — Πάντ[αινος Σ]φοδρίου: *IG II² 466*

Kallistagoras and Pantainos are the –otherwise unknown– Tenian ambassadors, who were honoured by the Athenian people with proxeny and *enktesis* (*IG II² 466*); the Tenian people were also honoured with a crown of 1,000 drachmas; finally, a judicial agreement (σύμβολα, ll. 32-35)² was concluded between the two cities. As we can deduce from the poorly preserved motivation clause, the decree was probably enacted in 307: reference is made to Μουν[ιχία] (l. 5), Antigonos and Demetrios (ll. 7 and 12-13), to benefactions (most probably by Poliorketes) “to the city of Athens and the other Greeks” (ll. 9-10), and to the expulsion of an enemy garrison (ll. 13-14: [τὴν φρουρ]ᾶν ἐξαγ[άγη]). There is no doubt that all these references point to the liberation of Athens by Poliorketes in the summer of 307.³

The reasons for which Tenos was honoured are not known. Reger assumed that Tenos was used as a naval base by Poliorketes during his campaign in 307.⁴ This does not seem likely;⁵ even if true, however, it would not constitute a sufficient reason for the honours awarded to the Tenians by the Athenians, nor – even more so– for the Tenian embassy to be sent to Athens in the first place. The reason for the honours may very well have been the judicial agreement itself;⁶ the extensive reference to the king's activities in the first part of the motivation clause must mean that the Tenian ambassadors took the opportunity of their visit to congratulate the Athenians on their liberation.⁷

¹ [Ἰ]σ[άνδρ]ου is perhaps preferable to [Ἰ]σ[αγόρ]ου, since the former name is attested in contemporary Tenian inscriptions (*IG XII 5, 872*, ll. 15, 22-24, 63-64 [cf. Étienne 1990: 78]), whereas the latter is not.

² Cf. Gauthier 1972: 171-72 n° XXII.

³ See **A19** (i), above.

⁴ Reger 1992: 367-68.

⁵ Poliorketes' main asset in the 307 campaign was surprise (Plut., *Demetr.* 8.5); I fail to see how that would have been possible if he had been stationed at Tenos for a long period of time.

⁶ Hiller (*IG XII 5, 1*, p. xvi n° 1302) seems to believe so, as well. On the past relationship between Tenos and Athens, see Nigdelis 1990: 155-56. Étienne 1990: 177-78 also insists that the friendly terms between the two states are best explained by their long-term relationship rather than by their inclusion in the Antigonid sphere of influence.

⁷ Tarn 1911: 418 (cf. Dinsmoor 1931: 69 n. 3; Étienne 1990: 176). This should not lead us to the assumption that the main aim of the embassy was to convey the Tenian people's congratulations, as Tarn and others suggest (cf. the reservations of Buraselis 1982: 53 n. 58; see also Nigdelis 1990: 156 n. 9, with further bibliography).

It would be a mistake to regard such congratulations as an act of mere diplomatic courtesy devoid of political importance. The reference to the benefactions towards Athens *and* the other Greeks (ll. 13-14) echoes the explicit propaganda of Poliorketes' Greek mission.¹ Moreover, if we accept Buraselis' attractive hypothesis that the Demetrieia of Delos were founded by the League of the Islanders not in 306 but in 307,² it is worth reminding ourselves that the foundation act of that festival also included a reference to the king's benevolence towards all Greeks (*IG XI 4*, 1036, l. 1). The fact that the Tenian ambassadors adopted the rhetoric of royal discourse has a twofold meaning – as most facets of the relationship between Hellenistic cities and monarchies do. On the one hand, it signifies that the Tenians and the League of the Islanders accepted the king's propaganda and incorporated it into their own public discourse;³ on the other hand, it also signifies that the Tenians and the League of the Islanders emphasized precisely the elements of royal public discourse which corresponded to their true political intent: freedom and the king's favourable policy “to all Greeks”.⁴

ANDROS

D63. Kleokritos

– *Syll*³ 390 (*IG XII 7*, 506), l. 62

Kleokritos was one of the three *theoroi* sent by the League of the Islanders to Alexandria for the celebration of the first Ptolemaia in 280 or 279 (*Syll*³ 390, l. 62).⁵ Reference has already been made to the date and the context of this *theoria* (D55, above). Kleokritos is otherwise unknown.

Andros' strategic importance for the control not only of the Aegean but also of the Greek mainland⁶ should suffice to explain why it is one of the very few islands of the Cyclades for which all the changes of overlordship over the League of the

¹ See Diod. Sic. 20.45.2 and Plut., *Demetr.* 8.2-3, along with Buraselis 1982: 52-53.

² Buraselis 1982: 67-75. One of the arguments which Buraselis does not consider of decisive value (69 n. 126), actually lends considerable weight to his theory: in the only passage of *IG XI 4*, 1036 in which reference to Poliorketes may have been made (l. 3), the royal title cannot be restored. Especially in this case, the absence of the royal title is significant: if the foundation of the Demetrieia dated to 306 and was related to the assumption of the royal title by Poliorketes, it would be a paradox if the Delians had failed to observe etiquette and did not use Poliorketes' newly assumed royal title.

³ Characteristically, the 'liberation' of the League of the Islanders may have been accompanied by an issue of coins of the Alexander type (Étienne 1990: 90, 227).

⁴ Cf. Buraselis 1982: 72-73, who notes that the Islanders' insistence on the freedom of *all* Greeks may reflect their concerns about the autonomy of Athens, a city whose power always posed a potential threat to the Cyclades.

⁵ Kallias of Naxos (D55) and Glaukon of Kythnos (D65) were the other two *theoroi*.

⁶ See especially Buraselis 1982: 94 n. 229. Reger 1994b: 48-51, while acknowledging Andros' importance for the Saronic Gulf, downplays its strategic importance for the Cyclades.

Islanders in the Early Hellenistic period are attested.¹ The island was a Ptolemaic naval base already by the time of the Athenian revolt against Poliorketes in 287.²

KIMOLOS

D64. Teles[--- ca. 13 ---]

— SEG 44 (1994) 710

Proposer³ of an honorific decree for Charianthos son of Aristagoras of Karystos, a judge sent to Kimolos “in accordance with the letter of king Antigonos and the people’s decree” (SEG 44 [1994] 710, ll. 21-22); the decree in question was probably a decree of Kimolos requesting Karystos to send a judge, at the encouragement of the king, rather than a decree of Karystos authorizing the mission at the king’s request.⁴ Charianthos was not sent by the king, as previously thought. His judicial activity at Kimolos was successful: he resolved cases pending for a long time, most of them extra-judicially, and the result was that concord ruled once again over the city (ll. 22-24). The honours he was awarded included proxeny, right to attend the council and the assembly, exemption from import and export duties, *enktesis*, and a crown of 300 drachmas (ll. 24-39). A Kimolian ambassador was ordered to go to Karystos and ensure that the decree be publicized there as well (ll. 39-45).

As in many similar cases in the Aegean,⁵ the identity of the king Antigonos referred to in the decree is disputed: based on letter forms –the only available dating criterion in this case–, the decree could be dated either late in Gonatas’ reign or during Doson’s reign.⁶ If the former is the case, the decree should definitely be dated after the death of the contender for the Macedonian throne and overlord of Euboea Alexandros son of Krateros in 245; this is precisely the period when Ptolemaic influence in the Aegean subsided, partly as a result of the sea battle of Andros.⁷ If, on the other hand, the decree is dated under Doson, it is to be added to the list of sources attesting to foreign judges sent to cities in the Aegean by Doson himself or at his request.⁸

¹ For an outline, see Reger 1994b: 50-51.

² SEG 28 (1978) 60, l. 20.

³ Apart from the restoration Τελέσ[ων] of the *editio princeps*, Gauthier 1994: 170 offers a number of alternatives (Τελεσίλας, Τελεσαγόρας, Τελεσίβωλος); none of these names is attested in the onomasticon of Kimolos.

⁴ See mainly the serried arguments of Gauthier 1994: 169-78 (cf. Knoepfler 2001: 412-13, with further bibliography). Reger 1994b: 52-53 seems to confuse Karystos with the temple of Poseidon at Geraistos (administratively a part of Karystos) and the city sending the judges (which was Karystos and not Kimolos) with the city receiving them (which was Kimolos and not Gairestos [sic]).

⁵ See D53, above, with the notes.

⁶ Gauthier 1994: 173 and Knoepfler 2001: 412 tentatively favour a date under Doson, without, however, excluding a date under Gonatas. Reger 1994b: 52-53 considers a date under Gonatas certain.

⁷ See Buraselis 1982: 174-75; Reger 1994b: 47.

⁸ See D53, above.

KYTHNOS

D65. Glaukon (son of Simos?)

— *Syll*³ 390 (*IG XII* 7, 506), l. 61; *FD III* 3, 207, l. 5

Glaukon was one of the three *theoroi* sent by the League of the Islanders to Alexandria for the celebration of the first Ptolemaia, in 280 or 279 (*Syll*³ 390, l. 61).¹ He is probably to be identified with Glaukon son of Simos, honoured with proxeny by Delphi in 276/5 (*FD III* 3, 207, l. 5, archon Charixenos).² The reasons for which he was honoured at Delphi are not stated. Given the minimal international importance of Kythnos –reflected in the dearth of sources on the history of the island throughout antiquity–,³ a reasonable suggestion would be that Glaukon's mission to Delphi was also undertaken on behalf of the League of the Islanders.

KEOS

KARTHAIA

D66. Aristopeithes (son of Erasikles?)

— *IG XII* 5, 1061 (for other possible sources, see p. 428 n. 3, below)

Aristopeithes proposed the decree in honour of Hieron son of Timokrates of Syracuse, initially a subordinate of the well-known Ptolemaic admiral Patroklos, and later an *epistates* of Arsinoe (*IG XII* 5, 1061). The honouree received various honours as well as the Karthaian citizenship for helping Epiteles, a Karthaian citizen who fell victim to robbery at his estate; Hieron even managed to restore to Epiteles part of the stolen goods and had him reimbursed for the rest in cash.

Arsinoe was the new name given to Korhesia, the island's best port and a Ptolemaic naval base during the Chremonidean War.⁴ Hieron was the first –and probably the only known–⁵ Ptolemaic *epistates* of the city. His jurisdiction does not seem to

¹ Kallias of Naxos (**D55**) and Kleokritos of Andros (**D63**) were the other two *theoroi*; on the date and the context of the *theoria*, see **D55**, above.

² On the date of Charixenos, see *CID IV*, p. 26–28, with earlier bibliography; 276/5 is likelier than 275/4. The identification of Glaukon the *theoros* of the Nikouria decree with Glaukon the *proxenos* of the Delphic decree seems to have been first proposed by the editors of *LGPNI*.

³ The sources are collected by Hiller (*IG XII* 5, 1, p. xxviii) and Mazarakis-Ainian 1998b: 363–66; for the archaeological evidence prior to the beginning of the promising recent excavations, see Mazarakis-Ainian 1998.

⁴ Robert, *Hellenica* 11–12 (1960) 146–60, with earlier bibliography. For other Ptolemaic foundations in the Aegean named (or renamed to) Arsinoe, see also Cohen 1995: 137–38 and Mueller 2006: 157–58. For the archaeological evidence and Korhesia's fate after the Chremonidean War, see Davis / Cherry 1990 and Reger 1998. The sources on Ptolemaic presence on Keos during the reign of Philadelphos are collected and discussed by Bagnall 1976: 141–45; Nigdelis 1990: 211 n. 54; Davis / Cherry 1991: 11–19. The only source certainly predating the Chremonidean War is *IG XII* 5, 1065.

⁵ It has been suggested that Kleinias, known from an epigram of Kallimachos (*Epigr.* 5), written on an ostrakon possibly coming from Ioulis, was also an *epistates* of Korhesia (see Bagnall 1976: 142–43 and Nigdelis 1990: 212 n. 59), but this is far from certain.

have extended beyond the boundaries of the base; moreover, no Ptolemaic official was stationed at Karthaia or any other city of the island.¹ The fact that reference to Epiteles' wrongdoers was discreetly omitted seems to imply that these were citizens of a neighbouring city,² perhaps of Korhesia/Arsinoe itself; this would explain Hieron's involvement in the affair. In other words, the Karthaians may have turned to the Ptolemaic authorities regarding a clearly procedural matter, on which we need not dwell any further. On the other hand, the honours for the Ptolemaic *epistates* seem to have been exaggerated in relation to the his actions, thus giving the impression that the whole affair served as a pretext for the Karthaians to win the favour of the representative of royal power.

The name Aristopeithes is frequently attested in third-century Karthaia. If all relevant sources regard the same person, which is likely but not certain, then Aristopeithes son of Erasikles held the offices of general and *agoranomos*, financed games at Delos, and proposed an appendix to a probouleumatic decree concerning public works.³ In other words, the decree honouring the Ptolemaic *epistates* of Korhesia/Arsinoe may have been the work of one of the leading citizens of Karthaia. Once again, a leading figure of the local society is seen acting as an intermediary in the relationship of the local community with the royal administration.

D67. Sosinikos son of Isonikos

— *IG XII 5*, 533/1066 (cf. *IG XII Suppl.* p. 113)

Sosinikos is the otherwise unknown proposer of a Karthaian decree for Philo-theros son of Antiphanes of Malis, an officer of king Ptolemy (Philadelphos?),⁴ who frequently visited the city ἐπὶ τὴν κομιδὴν τῶν [χρημᾶ]των, and always treated the citizens benevolently.

The precise nature of these χρήματα has been the subject of considerable debate. Some scholars believe that the χρήματα were debts owed to the Karthaians, which Philo-theros collected and repaid to the city; others believe that the χρήματα were taxes due by the Karthaians to the Ptolemaic administration. Migeotte

¹ Bagnall 1976: 143.

² I follow Nigdelis 1990: 226 n. 120.

³ *IG XII 5*, 544 A2, ll. 12 (general) and 35-48 (*choregos*); 544 C2, ll. 9-10 and 1077, l. 20 (*agoranomos*); *IG XII Suppl.* 232 (decree). An Aristopeithes who in the end of the third century had an unpaid fine (*IG XII 5*, 610, l. 38; for the provenance from Karthaia, see *ibid.*, p. 334) was probably a descendant of his.

⁴ The brief description of the letters in the *IG* entry (sigmas with diverging horizontal strokes) does not allow much precision on the dating of the inscription, but the fact that all other extant sources on Ptolemaic presence on the island date to the reign of Philadelphos favours this generally accepted dating.

convincingly argued in favour of the latter choice.¹ If that is the case, the honours for Philothenos should probably be explained by his leniency in collecting the taxes. It is unfortunate that the decree does not provide further information about the taxation of Ptolemaic possessions abroad, an issue we have poor information about.²

KARTHAIA (?)

D68. Kriton son of Adeimantos — D69-70. Adeimantos and Menippos sons of Kriton — D71. Archelas — D72. Theotelides — D73. Archestratos

— SEG 48 (1998) 1130

Two decrees of Karthaia, discovered in Ioulis,³ award honours to three members of the same family (SEG 48 [1998] 1130). The first honours Adeimantos and Menippos sons of Kriton (ll. 1-15), while the second honours Kriton son of Adeimantos (ll. 16-31). All three were Karthaian citizens,⁴ who were τεταγμένοι ὑπὸ τὸν βασιλέα Ἀντίοχον (ll. 3-4 and 18-19). The motivation clauses contain the usual uninformative, run-of-the-mill banalities, although it should be noted that the decree in honour of Kriton praises him for one specific benefaction: the honourand did his best to promote his city's interests and to assist the citizens who visited him. The honours which Adeimantos, Menippos and Kriton received were modest, consisting in the award of an olive crown, the announcement of the honours during the Dionysia, and the erection of the stele carrying the decrees at the sanctuary of Apollo.

According to the first editor, the stemma of the family should be reconstructed as follows: Kriton (I), father of the two honourands of the first decree > Adeimantos and Menippos sons of Kriton (I) > Kriton (II) son of Adeimantos, honourand of the second decree.⁵ In fact, this is a probable, albeit not the only possible reconstruction. The fact that the decree in honour of Kriton followed the decree for Adeimantos and Menippos on the stone does not necessarily mean that Kriton was younger than the honourands of the first decree. Thus, we cannot exclude a simpler stemma: Kriton, honourand of the second decree > Adeimantos and Menippos sons of Kriton. Should this stemma be correct, Kriton would have been the first to join the Seleukid army, and would have been joined by his sons later in his career.

¹ See Migeotte 1984: 220-21 (with all earlier bibliography), followed by Nigdelis 1990: 211 n. 54.

² See Bagnall 1976: 227-29.

³ The stele was discovered reused in the castle of Ioulis (Kalligas 1998: 626 n. 1). Despite the first editor's certainty that the state issuing these decrees was Ioulis, Gauthier, *BullEpigr* 1999, 423 decisively argued in favour of their provenance from Karthaia, followed by all scholars who have dealt with the texts since.

⁴ See l. 10: τῆμ πόλιν τὴν ἑαυτῶν; l. 18: πολίτης ὢν; l. 21: τῆι τε πατρίδι.

⁵ Kalligas 1998: 627; he is followed by Knoepfler 2005: 302.

The date and the context of these honours have been the subject of several revisions. The first editor identified Menippos with the homonymous envoy of Antiochos III to Greece and the Aegean in 193,¹ but, as Gauthier has already pointed out, this identification is impossible to maintain.² Recently, Knoepfler confuted both the assumption that the three honourands were representatives of royal power at Karthaia, as either *epistatai* or phourarchs –which was previously taken for granted by all scholars commenting on the decrees–, and the identification of king Antiochos with Antiochos III. His main argument is that the second decree’s reference to Kriton’s assistance to “citizens visiting him” (l. 22: τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν αὐτῶι τῶν πολιτῶν), as well as the fact that it was not the proposer himself but other citizens who “reported” on the honourands (ll. 2 and 17), both imply that the three honourands were not residents of Karthaia. He has also pointed out that the honourands do not bear the title of *epistates*, and that it would be remarkable if three consecutive Karthaian *epistatai*, representatives of a foreign power, were citizens of Karthaia.³ In my opinion, only the first of Knoepfler’s arguments is decisive.⁴ There is, however, a more important reason why I believe Knoepfler is undoubtedly right in rejecting the possibility that the honourands were stationed at Keos. Gauthier assumed that so they were, because the area over which they had jurisdiction was not mentioned in the decrees. Even if we overlook the fact that this would mean that Antiochos III had a garrison stationed at Keos –something which no source on the well-documented Antiochic War allows us to assume–,⁵ Gauthier’s hypothesis is confuted by the very language of the decree: τεταγμένος ὑπὸ τὸμ βασιλέα (“king” being in the accusative) is certainly not a synonym of τεταγμένος (for example, ἐπὶ τῆς Καρθαίας or ἐπὶ τῆς Κέω) ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως (“king” being in the genitive). While in the latter phrase the king is the agent of the appointment, and the real emphasis is on the officer’s specified jurisdiction, the first

¹ Kalligas 1998: 628. On this Menippos, see p. 335 and n. 5, above.

² *BullEpigr* 1999, 423: Antiochos’ envoy was a Macedonian and his father was called Phantias (*JG* XI 4, 1111).

³ Knoepfler 2005: 291-95.

⁴ As in the case of other Greek cities, the fact that citizens other than the proposer himself reported on the honourands’ virtues may be explained by restrictions regarding who was allowed to bring a decree to a vote: it was common practice for the actual instigator of a decree, who may not have had the right to put the decree to a vote, to use the services of a surrogate proposer who did have such a right. As for the peculiarity of having a citizen acting as an *epistates* on behalf of a foreign power, the Athenian examples show that both a Hellenistic city and a king could find ways to present the appointment of a royal overseer in a manner which did not offend the sensibilities of local societies. This means that, at least in theory, the members of Kriton’s family could very well have been –in essence– royal *epistatai* without actually holding the title.

⁵ Antiochos’ course is known in detail, and the small force he brought to Greece (100 war ships, 10,000 infantry, 500 cavalry, six elephants; see Livy 35.43) did not allow the scattering of forces to areas which were not certain war fronts.

phrase, the one actually used in the decree, merely denotes that the three honourands were royal officers. There happen to be three exact parallels from Karthaia itself: in all three cases, the τεταγμένοι ὑπὸ τὸν βασιλέα were royal officials who clearly *did not* have jurisdiction over Karthaia.¹ In other words, there is no reason to assume that the three honourands had any official jurisdiction over their homeland as *royal officials*. Besides, if that was the case, the motivation clauses should have included a reference to the manner in which they performed their duties.

The second leg of Knoepfler's re-evaluation of the decrees' interpretation is equally convincing: the letter forms point to a much earlier date than the latter part of Antiochos III's reign, most probably during the reign of Antiochos II Theos (261-246).²

Redating the decrees also affects the prosopography of the Karthaians involved in the proposal of the decrees.³ Both decrees were proposed by one Archelas; given that earlier in the third century an Archelas served as an ambassador to Karystos and then proposed a decree in honour of four Karystians,⁴ it is very likely that this

¹ Hieron son of Timokrates of Syracuse (*IG XII 5*, 1061; see **D66**, above), τεταγμένος ὑπὸ τὸν βασιλέα Πτολεμαῖον (II), came to Keos (which means that he was not appointed there earlier) along with Patroklos, and then became an *epistates* of Korhesia/Arsinoe. An Athenian [τεταγμένος (?) ὑπὸ τὸν βασιλέα Πτολεμαῖον (II?)] tried a case at Karthaia (*SEG 14* [1957] 543); even if this restoration is correct (see the reservations of Bagnall 1976: 144), the fact that no other Ptolemaic officials were stationed at Karthaia (Bagnall 1976: 143) means that the honourand was a foreign judge who came to Karthaia to try the case. Finally, Philothenos son of Antiphanes (*IG XII 5*, 533/1066), τεταγμένος ὑπὸ τὸν βασιλέα Πτολεμαῖον (II), often came to Karthaia for a κομιδὴ χρημάτων; even if these monies were taxes (see **D67**, above), it is clear that Philothenos was not τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῆς Καρθαίας, but simply a financial officer with a wider jurisdiction. For other examples of τεταγμένος ὑπὸ + accusative denoting a subordinate officer, see, for example, *IG II² 1286*, l. 2; *IG XII 9*, 1259. Thus, τεταγμένος ὑπὸ τὸν βασιλέα is an exact synonym of τεταγμένος παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ, which also clearly denotes that someone belongs to the royal administrative personnel, without specifying their jurisdiction (see, for example, *IG II² 1225*, l. 3; *SEG 39* [1989] 595 and 596; *SEG 48* [1998] 1092).

² Knoepfler 2005: 297-302 and fig. 1. Gauthier, *BullEpigr* 1999, 423, had also hinted that the letter forms would be consistent with a date earlier than 200, but did not question the first editor's dating of the decrees to the reign of Antiochos III.

³ Cf. Knoepfler 2005: 299-300.

⁴ *IG XII 5*, 537 (embassy to Karystos and honorific decree) and 1075, l. 17 (Archelas, ambassador to an unknown destination). The latter text is a temple account (on its nature cf. R. Osborne 1988: 319-23, with Gauthier's reservations in *BullEpigr* 1989, 261) originally dated to the late fourth century, but perhaps belonging to the second quarter of the third (R. Osborne 1988: 319 and 1991: 320). The former decree has been dated to the last quarter of the fourth century by Brun 1989: 127-28 (without argumentation), whereas to the third century by Nigdelis 1990: 227-28 n. 137 (whom *LGPNI* follows), and Knoepfler 2005: 300, mainly on the basis of the wording and the letter forms (as these are shown in Brönsted's transcript). The preserved part of the motivation clause of *IG XII 5*, 537 does not help clarify the context of Archelas' embassy. He may have

is the same Archelas who (later) proposed the honours for the family of Kriton. The goodwill of Adeimantos and Menippos sons of Kriton towards the city was declared before the assembly by Theotelides, who should be identified with the homonymous dedicant of a statue of Apollo.¹ Finally, Kriton's goodwill towards the city was declared before the assembly by Archestratos, who is otherwise unknown.²

In the light of these new interpretations, the decrees in honour of Kriton's family become much less informative than before: they do not reflect a Seleukid king's control over Karthaia (or Keos in general), nor do they belong to the reign of a king with a well-documented interest in the Greek mainland and the Aegean. Moreover, the modesty of the honours, the lack of specific benefactions on the part of the honourands, and the fact that there is no *a priori* reason to suppose that Antiochos II showed any interest in areas so far away from the coast of Asia Minor (the area which became the major bone of contention between the Seleukids and the Ptolemies during the Second Syrian War, a war which kept Antiochos occupied during most of his reign)³ do not favour the assumption that the honourands had mediated in any way between their city and the king. If all that is correct, however, the decrees become even more interesting for the purposes of this study: it seems that Kriton, Adeimantos and Menippos were honoured precisely because they belonged to the Seleukid administration, and for no other reason.⁴ The Karthaians may not have had a very precise agenda for their relations with the Seleukid court, relations which, in fact, never materialized; at the time, securing the possibility of future contacts with the king through the mediation of Kriton's family was a satisfactory objective for the city's foreign policy.⁵

accompanied judges from Karystos back to their home city (for the δικασταγωγοί, see Crowther *et al.* 1998). If that is the case, it may not be irrelevant that, later in the third century, at the intervention of an Antigonid king Karystian judges were active in Kimolos (see **D64**, above). Given the extremely close attachment of Karystos to the Antigonid dynasty (cf. p. 197, above) and given that it is possible that the Karthaians had needed the help of Karystian judges earlier in the third century, it is not far-fetched to suggest that an Antigonid king (Gonatas?) was involved in the Karthaian affair as well.

¹ SEG 14 (1957) 546; for the date of the statue base (roughly contemporary with our decree), see Knoepfler 2005: 299.

² The name is attested in a catalogue of citizens which probably comes from Keos (*IG XII Suppl.* 235, l. II 14). I do not know on what grounds the editors of *LGPV* I, s.v. Ἀρχέστρατος, attribute this catalogue to Ioulis.

³ On the Second Syrian War, see the bibliography in p. 164 n. 7, above.

⁴ Cf. Knoepfler 2005: 302, who points out that the decrees merely attest to “de bonnes relations – mais rien de plus – avec les Séleucides”.

⁵ I would further suggest that the decrees belong to the last years of Antiochos II's reign, when the balance of power in the Aegean between the Antigonids and the Ptolemies was unsettled, thus making preliminary contacts with a third king – a king, moreover, who had been successful in

IOULIS

D74-78. M[. 5. . .]s — Timostratos — Phrasikydes — Somenes — Kallidamos

— IG XII 3, 320 (OGIS 44)

These five citizens of Ioulis were sent by the well-known (even from Keos itself) Ptolemaic admiral Patroklos to Thera, where they successfully tried a number of cases (IG XII 3, 320). The affair belongs to the period of the Chremonidean War, when all extant evidence on Ptolemaic presence on Keos dates.¹ It should be noted that this is the only surviving piece of evidence for the relation of Ioulis with the Ptolemies. This is not surprising; the interest of the Ptolemaic administration was principally focused on Korhesia, Ioulis' port, which, as we have already seen, was renamed Arsinoe, became an important Ptolemaic naval base and was administered by a Ptolemaic *epistates* appointed by Patroklos himself.² The inscription under discussion also informs us that Patroklos appointed an *epistates* to Thera as well, namely one Apollodotos. The appointment of *epistatai* in territories under direct Ptolemaic control was the result of the reorganization of Ptolemaic power during the ongoing stand-off against Antigonos Gonatas.

The fact that the appointment of an *epistates* to Thera and the dispatch of foreign judges there are simultaneous does not necessarily mean that the two affairs were interconnected, as Bagnall seems to believe, assuming as he does that the new *epistates* brought the judges to Thera with him.³ According to the explicit wording of the decree (ll. 8-9), it was Patroklos himself, the sole honourand (ll. 3-4), who appointed the judges. Accordingly, the dispatch of the judges should be seen as part of the overall settlement of affairs at Thera (subordination of Thera to the direct control of the Ptolemaic administration and judicial settlement of unresolved cases), under the supervision of Patroklos himself and no other.

According to the generally accepted restoration of ll. 14-15 of the Theraian decree, the Theraians also decided that an ambassador would announce the honours at Ioulis (ἀναγέτω [*scil.* the decree and the crown] ὁ πρεσβευτὰς ὁ αἰρεθὲς [ἐς Ἴου]||[λίδα εὐθύ]ς). Given that Patroklos was the sole honourand, however, this would have us faced with a paradox: why would the decree be announced to a state which was not honoured nor were any of its citizens? It may be preferable to simply restore ἀναγέτω ὁ πρεσβευτὰς ὁ αἰρεθὲς [Πατρό]||[κλωι εὐθύ]ς. The fact that Ioulis (and, even more so, the judges themselves) were not honoured can

maintaining his territories during the Second Syrian War—, a worthy goal for the foreign policy of an Aegean city.

¹ See the sources and bibliography in p. 427 n. 4, above.

² IG XII 5, 1061 (see **D66**, above).

³ Bagnall 1976: 124; cf. p. 232, where he associates the dispatch of judges to Karthaiia with the appointment of the *epistates* of Korhesia/Arsinoe, despite the different dates and settings of the two cases.

only be explained by assuming that there was a corresponding Theraian decree honouring the judges (perhaps, but not necessarily, also honouring Ioulis).¹

Two of the judges' names are also attested in other contemporary inscriptions from Ioulis, but no certain identifications are possible.²

DELOS

D79. Aristolochos son of Nikodromos

— *IG XI 4*, 542 (*Syll³* 381; Durrbach, *Choix* 15) and 551; for other sources, see n. 3, below

During the first third of the third century, at least ten honorific decrees for foreigners were proposed to the Delian assembly by Aristolochos son of Nikodromos,³ who thus appears to have been one of the most prolific statesmen of third-century Delos.⁴ Eight of them will not be discussed here, as the honourands are unknown outside Delos; two of his decrees, however, are interesting for the purposes of the present study.

By *IG XI 4*, 542 honours were awarded to Demaratos son of Gorgion of Lakedaïmon, ἀ διατρίβων παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ Λυσιμάχῳ. The decree puts particular emphasis

¹ As a rule, honorific decrees for foreign judges honoured the judges' city of origin as well, even in cases, such as this one, in which the whole procedure was the work of a king or a royal official (see the examples cited by Crowther 1993: 70-74). The only exception to this rule I know of, whereby the judges' city of origin (Kos) was not actually honoured, is *IG XII 6*, 150. In this particular case, however, the dispatch of the judges seems to have been the work of Koan *proxenoi* of Samos (Crowther 1999: 257). Incidentally, even in this case, an appendix to the original decree stipulated that the honours be announced at Kos.

² A Timostratos and a Phrasikydes are attested in the long catalogue of citizens of Ioulis, dated by Hiller to the end of the fourth century (*IG XII 5*, 609 [+ pp. 333-34], l. 19 and 241 respectively). While the name Timostratos is far too common to allow further assumptions as to his identity, the rarity of the name of Phrasikydes allows the suggestion that he was a kinsman of the homonymous judge, or even that he should be identified with the judge himself.

³ *IG XI 4*, 542-551. Although his name and patronym do not survive intact in each and every one of these decrees, it is practically certain that he proposed all of them. Roussel expresses some reservations about n^{os} 549-551 (see his comments on n^o 542), but the identity of the proposer is certain at least for n^o 551, one of the two decrees relevant to this study: the proposer's name survives intact, a vertical stroke survives at the beginning of the patronym, and the restoration Ν[ικοδόμου] matches the number of missing letters perfectly. The name Aristolochos is otherwise fairly frequently attested in Delian catalogues. It is highly probable that the Aristolochos under discussion is again referred to in *IG XI 2*, 199 B, l. 96, where a certain Aristolochos serves as guarantor for a debtor named Nikodromos. For other possible sources, see *LGPN I*, s.v. Ἀριστόλοχος n^{os} 4-8.

⁴ Aristolochos is one out of only eight Delians to have proposed more than one decree (Rhodes 1997: 242; cf. Vial 1984: 133-35 for honorific decrees), and one out of only three to have proposed more than two (Vial 1984: 137). The only Delian to have been more prolific than Aristolochos in proposing decrees was Telemnestos (II) son of Aristeides (III), who within twenty years (190-170) proposed at least forty decrees, while other members of his family, "seule grande famille de politiciens qu'ait eue Délos" (Vial 1984: 137), proposed another fourteen (see Vial 1984: 99).

on the goodwill of Demaratos, Gorgion and their Lakedaimonian ancestors towards the sanctuary of Apollo (ll. 9-17), but the main reason for the honours was undoubtedly the fact that Demaratos conveyed the εὔνοια of the king towards the sanctuary to the Delians, and would convey the εὔνοια of the Delians to Lysimachos and queen Arsinoe (ll. 17-22). By IG XI 4, 551 honours were awarded to a certain Demetrios, probably an officer of Philadelphos and a subordinate of the nesiarch Bakchon.¹

Théophile Homolle, the first publisher of the first decree's fragments, advanced a bold but brilliant theory regarding the identity of the first honourand.² According to Homolle, Demaratos was a descendant of the homonymous king of Sparta, who medized during the Persian Wars, was exiled in 491, sought refuge at the Persian court and received land in Troas from Xerxes.³ Members of Demaratos' family, which intermarried with another important family of an exile to the Persian court, namely the family of Goggylos of Eretria,⁴ can be traced down to the Early Hellenistic period (when the daughter of Aristotle married into the family), and perhaps even as late as the early second century: the father of Nabis was called Demaratos,⁵ a fact which has led to the assumption that he was a descendant of the Demaratos of our inscription.⁶ If we accept Homolle's theory, the courtier of Lysimachos was a descendant of an illustrious, rich and powerful Greek family of Troas.

The latter part of Homolle's analysis of this decree was less fortunate. He suggested that the honouring of Demaratos should be dated to ca. 295, and that Demaratos mediated between Lysimachos and the Spartans, who were alarmed by the return of Poliorketes to the Peloponnese in 295-294; Lysimachos, in turn, mediated between Sparta and the Demaratids, who had set their eye on the Spartan throne.⁷ It should be stressed that none of the above is corroborated by the text of the decree itself; Aristolochos and the Delians appear to have been exclusively interested in Demaratos' ties with Lysimachos.⁸ Moreover, although sources which Homolle could not have known of now show that Lysimachos'

¹ For the sources and bibliography on Bakchon, see p. 420 n. 3, above.

² Homolle 1896: 505-512.

³ See Hofstetter 1978: 45-46 n° 77, with the sources.

⁴ Hofstetter 1978: 70-71 n° 123.

⁵ IG XI 4, 716 (Durrbach, *Choix* 58).

⁶ I follow Homolle's careful wording (1896: 505): "Entre le petits-fils d'Aristote [also named Demaratos] et le père de Nabis, il ne manquerait au plus que deux générations". The Demaratos of the Delian decree cannot have been the great-grandfather of Nabis, as Durrbach claims (*Choix*, p. 75); he could have been his grandfather, as Bradford 1977: 132 suggests, only if Nabis' father was named Demaratos son of Demaratos.

⁷ Homolle 1896: 509-512, followed by Cartledge 1989: 31. Durrbach (in his comments in *Choix* 15), Hiller / Dittenberger (*Syll*³ 381) and Roussel (*IG*) express reservations.

⁸ This is also pointed out by Lund 1992: 93.

interest in southern Greece was more substantial than previously thought, no source testifies to any contacts of his with Sparta, either in 295-294 or at any time during his reign.¹ Homolle's only argument in favour of this second leg of his theory is the emphasis placed by Aristolochos on the Spartan past of Demaratos' family. This emphasis, however, need not imply that Demaratos had already returned, or meant to return, to Sparta; he was simply described as διατρίβων παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ Λυσιμάχῳ. The emphasis on his Lakedaimonian identity may be explained if we assume that Demaratos had a wider agenda, of which any aspirations for the Spartan throne (for himself or for his descendants), were merely a part.²

Other scholars have drawn even more far-reaching conclusions from this decree. According to Longega, the reference to queen Arsinoe is another indication of the queen's active role in Greek affairs after 300.³ As we have already seen (A55-56, above), an unbiased examination of the relevant sources does not favour such an interpretation. The Delian decree, in particular, explicitly disproves it: the reference to Arsinoe is not made in the context of Lysimachos' εὔνοια to Delos, but only in the context of the Delians' εὔνοια to the royal couple; Aristolochos merely observes the rules of addressing the members of a royal court.⁴ The reference to Arsinoe is explained by the language of euergetism and the associated expectations of the Delians, not by the political ties between Delos and the queen –ties which anyway remain to be proven. While refuting Longega's theory, Burstein goes even further: following a suggestion made by I. Merker in his

¹ In relation to Lysimachos' intervention in the Peloponnese, see the treaty between the king and the Messenians (SEG 51 [2001] 457; on its date, cf. p. 269 n. 7, above). The sources on Poliorketes' attack on Sparta in 294 (Plut., *Demetr.* 35.1-2; Polyainos 4.7.9-10) do not mention Lysimachos nor do they allow the assumption that he was somehow involved: although in 295 Poliorketes failed to capture Messene –probably because Lysimachos' army was at the time stationed at Ithome–, Plutarch's report gives the clear impression that, after his victory at Mantinea in 294, Poliorketes would have captured Sparta, had not the opportunity for him to go after the Macedonian throne arisen.

² It was to Demaratos' own interest to emphasize his Lakedaimonian identity. We should not forget that he was a courtier of Lysimachos and an estate-holder in Asia, whose family had been away from mainland Greece for almost two centuries. Now that Demaratos came into contact with one of the most illustrious centres of Hellenism, he had every interest to re-register himself, so to speak, into the tradition of the world of mainland Greece, by presenting himself as the offspring of an illustrious 'Old Greek' family. This self-representation is perfectly compatible with any possible aspirations of his for the Spartan throne (cf. the parallel of Leonidas II, who returned to the Spartan throne in 262, after a stay at the court of Seleukos II or Antiochos I [Plut., *Agis* 3.9; 10.4; 11.2; 11.6, with Marasco 1981: 194-95]), which may have materialized two generations later. The 'Hellenistic' ambitions of Demaratos, however, were not necessarily confined to Sparta: enhancing his status in the world of the *poleis* was also a very useful asset for his ongoing career in the royal court.

³ Longega 1968: 27-30.

⁴ Cf. Burstein 1982: 208-209.

unpublished work, he dates the decree to the 280's and suggests that the reference to Arsinoe is a discreet reference to the dominance of the Ptolemies over the Aegean.¹ Finally, Franco reads the two decrees proposed by Aristolochos –one for an officer of Lysimachos, and one for an officer of Philadelphos– in the light of Vial's view² that these decrees show an interest of the Delians in general and of Aristolochos in particular in international affairs, and suggests that the decrees testify to the mediation of Delos between Lysimachos and Philadelphos.³

Once again, I need to stress that none of these theories is corroborated by the language of the decree. Dating the decree to the 280's can only be achieved through a circular argument: only if it is taken for granted that the reference to Arsinoe attests to *political* ties between Delos and both Lysimachos and Philadelphos can the decree be dated in the 280's; but such ties remain to be proven. The reference to Arsinoe need not have the slightest connotation of *grande histoire*. From the very beginning of the Hellenistic period Delos had been the arena of royal euergetic competition *par excellence* –and such it remained throughout the period of its independence.⁴ Royal benefactions to the renowned sanctuary of Apollo (and the inevitable rhetorical exploitation which accompanied such benefactions) in no way signify political predominance of any king in central Aegean.⁵ Moreover, there is no reason to consider the decree in honour of the Ptolemaic officer contemporary with the decree for Demaratos. It would certainly not be the first time that a citizen of a city is attested as having contacts *consecutively* with two royal courts. As for the interests of Aristolochos, and of the Delians in general, they do not seem to have focused so much on international politics in general, as, more specifically, on the international politics of euergetism.

No further conclusions should be drawn from the two decrees proposed by Aristolochos. The decree in honour of Demaratos was merely a first, tentative contact with the court of Lysimachos; judging from the total absence from Delos of any other evidence related to Lysimachos,⁶ this first contact had no future: the εὔνοια of one side towards the other does not seem to have materialized. When

¹ *Ibid.*

² Vial 1984: 137-38.

³ Franco 1993: 195-96. That the decrees proposed by Aristolochos bear testimony to the relations between Lysimachos and Philadelphos has met with general acceptance, even by Bagnall, despite his apt and careful description of Aristolochos' role (1976: 153: "It would be pushing things too far to designate him simply as a member of the Ptolemaic party, but friendship with these monarchs was at least an important part of the stance of this prominent Delian.").

⁴ See, for example, Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n^{os} 117-193.

⁵ See, for example, Bruneau 1970: 579-83, with earlier bibliography; Will 1979: 231; Reger 1994b: 55; cf. Buraselis 1982: 141-47, who places greater weight on the political implications of royal donations.

⁶ On the donations of Lysimachos' son Ptolemaios, see Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n^{os} 120-124.

(later?) the Ptolemies took over the leadership of the League of the Islanders,¹ Aristolochos had every reason to become involved in the dealings with the new powerful overlord of the Aegean; the fact that Lysimachos and Philadelphos were on hostile terms was irrelevant. The two decrees were the products of Aristolochos' and the Delians' effort to gain short-term benefits (political and, with any luck, material) within the framework of euergetism, rather than of an effort of theirs to forge long-term diplomatic bonds with Lysimachos or the Ptolemies.

D80. Tharsynon son of Choirylos

— *IG XI 4*, 585; cf. *IG XI 4*, 584 and 613-614

Tharsynon was the proposer of a, now mutilated, decree in honour of Thraseas son of Balagros of Macedonia (*IG XI 4*, 585). The decree itself is uninformative, as only the banal beginning of the motivation clause has survived; it is prosopography which provides us with useful information in this particular case. The honouree's father, Balagros son of Nikanor, was Alexander III's companion and Antipatros' son-in-law.² All three sons of Balagros, namely Thraseas, Antipatros and Balakros, are attested in third-century Delos; at least one of them, Antipatros son of Balakros, and most probably the other two as well, probably belonged to the staff of Poliorketes.³

The reason why Thraseas was honoured need not have been political; nevertheless, the honouring of a high-ranking officer of Poliorketes certainly had political repercussions. In this respect, it is interesting to note that, once again, the proposer of the decree was a prominent Delian. Later, Tharsynon served as *hieropoios* in 268 and as archon in 261.⁴ The decree in honour of Thraseas probably marked the

¹ On the Ptolemaic period of the League of the Islanders (from 288, or slightly later, to the end of the Chremonidean War), see the bibliography cited in p. 419 n. 5, above.

² Heckel 1992: 260-61 n° 1.2, with the sources and earlier bibliography; I retain the epigraphically attested form of his name Balagros; the form Balakros is attested by the majority of the literary sources.

³ See Reger 1991b. Antipatros son of Balagros is recorded as the dedicant of a golden crown (see Tréheux, *ID Index I*, s.v. Ἀντίπατρος Βαλάγρου Μακεδών, with the long list of attestations of this dedication) before 279; for his identification with the son of Alexander's companion, see Heckel 1987. Balagros, most probably another son of Balagros son of Nikanor (Reger 1991b: 151), is also attested as a dedicant, during a brief stay of his at Delos in 296 (*IG XI 2*, 154 A 41). Reger 1991b suggests that this Balagros may have been on his way back to Asia after a diplomatic mission to assess the situation in Athens; as he himself admits, this is a highly speculative scenario. Tréheux *ID Index I*, s.v. Βάλαγρος Μακεδών, considers this Balagros a son of Antipatros son of Balagros; this cannot be correct, as it would effect that, less than three decades after his grandfather's death in 324, the grandson of Alexander's companion would have been old enough to make a dedication to the sanctuary of Apollo. On the affiliation of Antipatros son of Balagros to Poliorketes, see Heckel 1987; Reger 1991b: 151-52 reasonably extends this assumption to the other two brothers, as well.

⁴ *IG XI 2*, 203 B 92, 94-95, 103; 204, l. 2; 205 Ba 33 (*hieropoios*); 114, l. 1 (archon).

beginning of his long career; both his son and his grandson are also attested as proposers of decrees.¹

D81. Achaios son of Phanodikos

— *IG XI 4, 527*; cf. 528

Achaios was the proposer of a Delian proxeny decree (*IG XI 4, 527*) in honour of the well-known Ptolemaic officer Kallias son of Thymochares of Athens –on whose actions from 287 to the eve of the Chremonidean War see **A47**, above. Nonetheless, in the decree no reference is made to Kallias' ties with the Ptolemies. It is unclear whether this is because at the time when the decree was enacted Kallias did not yet belong to the Ptolemaic administrative staff, or, simply, because of the summary character of the text.

Achaios, who may have proposed another, earlier proxeny decree (*IG XI 4, 528*), belonged to a rich and eminent Delian family.²

D82. Mnesalkos son of Telesarchides

— *IG XI 4, 559* (Durrbach, *Choix* 19; Migeotte 1984: n° 47; Kotsidu 2000: n° 148); other sources: *IG XI 4, 558; 560; 1049* (Migeotte 1984: n° 117); *IG XI 2, 161 A 29-30; 162 A 22-23; 203 A 77-78*; perhaps 162 A 19 and 199 A 2.

Mnesalkos proposed the honorific decree (*IG XI 4, 559*) for Philokles, king of Sidon, a Ptolemaic high-ranking officer from 310 until 279 and, in effect, the admiral of the Ptolemaic fleet in the 280's.³ The Delians had lent money to the League of the Islanders, the loan had not been repayed, and the Delians turned to Philokles (ll. 4-6),⁴ who, at the order of Philadelphos (ll. 7-8), instructed the nesiarch Bakchon (l. 11) to make sure that the loan would be repayed without further delay (ll. 6-9).⁵ The lavish honours which were awarded to Philokles included a crown of 1,000 drachmas, the public announcement of the honours in the theatre, and a special sacrifice, the *Soteria*, ὑπὲρ Φιλοκλέους (ll. 14-25). The loans in question may have been contracted by the *koinon* in order to satisfy the demands of Poliorketes.⁶ The lavish honours for Philokles reflect the importance of this case to the

¹ See Vial 1984: 134 n. 32.

² See Vial 1984: 263, with the stemma of the family.

³ For the sources on Philokles (*ProsPtol VI 15085*), the discussion of his career and secondary literature on the matter, see Merker 1970: 143-50; Seibert 1970; Hauben 1987.

⁴ Despite the impression to the contrary given by the decree's wording (ὄφειλον οἱ Νησιῶται Δηλίοις), it is very probable that Delos was a regular member of the *koinon*; see Merker 1970: 158-59 (with earlier bibliography); Marek 1984: 279-80; Nigdelis 1990: 313; *contra* Huß 1976: 223-24 and Bagnall 1976: 154; the latter prefers to see Delos as the creditor and as the seat of the *koinon*'s archive.

⁵ On Bakchon, see the sources and bibliography cited in p. 420 n. 3, above.

⁶ See the well-documented analysis of Migeotte 1984: 164-65, with earlier bibliography.

Delians, for whom the smooth functioning of the sanctuary's banking activities depended on the due repayment of loans.¹

Mnesalkos is otherwise known from his multifarious financial dealings with the sanctuary,² while he might have held the offices of treasurer and secretary of the sanctuary.³ He is also known from two more honorific decrees which he proposed for foreigners,⁴ and, finally, from a decree of an unknown city in his honour.⁵ This last decree informs us that his father Telesarchides had already been a *proxenos* of that city, that Mnesalkos and his brothers also carried the title of *proxenos*, and that Mnesalkos was honoured for a second time after he had lent this unknown city money in a time of dearth, and convinced other Delian creditors to allow the transport of wheat which had been confiscated due to the city's unpaid debts.⁶ Once again, it is a powerful and influential citizen of considerable wealth⁷ that undertook to handle the city's relations with the higher levels of the royal administration.

D83. [Kynthiades (?)] son of Teleson

— *IG XI 4*, 666 (Durrbach, *Choix* 48); for other possible sources, see p. 441 n. 8, below.

IG XI 4, 666 is a Delian decree in honour of Aristoboulos son of Athenaios of Thessalonike, already a *proxenos* and benefactor of the people (ll. 4-5), who had been sent to Delos by king Demetrios as a *sitones* (ll. 5-7). Aristoboulos comported himself well and worthily of the sanctuary, the king and the Delians during his long stay on the island (ll. 7-8), and promoted the interests of all three sides (ll. 8-16). He was honoured only with a laurel crown, the award of which was to be proclaimed in the theatre (ll. 18-28).

The relations of Delos with the Macedonian king belong to a tradition of euergetism which began in 253 at the latest, with the foundation of the Antigoneia by

¹ Cf. Migeotte 1984: 163.

² *IG XI 2*, 161 A 29-30; 162 A 22-23; 203 A 77-78. For the interpretation of these sources, see mainly Migeotte 1984: 346, with further bibliography. Μνήσαλκος [. . . .] ἄνδρ[ο]ς in *IG XI 2*, 199 A 12 does not seem to have been related to this family, and is certainly not to be identified with our Mnesalkos, as Durrbach (*IG*) writes, followed by Vial 1984: 136.

³ *IG XI 2*, 162 A 19 and 199 A 2. The Mnesalkos of these two sources is mentioned without patronym; hence, his identification with our Mnesalkos is not as certain as Vial 1984: 136 claims. The same is true for the creditor Mnesalkos, referred to again without patronym in *IG XI 2*, 158 A 33, an inscription which Vial fails to mention.

⁴ *IG XI 4*, 558 and 560. Mnesalkos proposed three decrees in total, which makes him one of the three Delians to have proposed more than two decrees (see p. 434 n. 4, above).

⁵ The city most probably belonged to an island of the Cyclades (Reger 1994: 118).

⁶ *IG XI 4*, 1049 (Migeotte 1984: n° 117). As recorded in this inscription, Mnesalkos' activity does not necessarily qualify him as a banker (Reger 1994: 100 n. 18, with further bibliography).

⁷ Mnesalkos' family (see Vial 1984: 136-37, stemma XVI) was one of the families dominating the economy of independent Delos.

Gonatas –most probably a festival commemorative of his victory in the sea battle of Kos (ca. 255)–, and lasted until the very end of the Antigonid dynasty.¹ As I claimed earlier, it is very doubtful that royal donations to Delos reflect real Macedonian political domination in the Aegean.² Nevertheless, it is likely that the close relations of Demetrios II with Delos reflect the king's interest in the Aegean, a secondary arena of conflict with his powerful enemies, the Aitolians.³ Following in his father's footsteps, in 238, immediately after his rise to the throne, Demetrios founded the Demetriaia,⁴ while his wife Phthia offered dedications to the temple of Artemis.⁵ The honours for Aristoboulos –who was, more or less, a commission agent of the Macedonian kingdom,⁶ and does not seem to have offered any particular service or benefactions to the Delians, at least not in his capacity as *sitones*– should probably be seen as a gesture of diplomatic courtesy to the king on account of the latter's past benefactions. Nevertheless, it is interesting that Aristoboulos had been previously honoured by the Delians as a *proxenos* and benefactor; it would be even more interesting to know whether this former honouring of his was related to his ties with the Macedonian throne or whether it preceded the forging of these ties (as it did in the case of Autokles, discussed in the following entry).

Although the editors of the decree avoided any suggestions as to the identity of the proposer, I consider it very likely that the proposer was Kynthiades son of Teleson,⁷ who was the president of the assembly which ratified the two honorific decrees for another Thessalonikan, namely Admetos son of Bokros, in the same period.⁸ Admetos had also been previously honoured by the Delians as a *proxenos*

¹ For the donations of Gonatas and his successors, and the festivals which they founded on the island, see the sources collected by Bruneau 1970: 550-64 and Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n^{os} 128-142.

² See p. 479 above, with accompanying notes.

³ Reger 1994: 119-21.

⁴ See Bruneau 1970: 563-64, with the sources and analysis.

⁵ The sources are collected and discussed by Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n^o 134 and Tréheux, *ID Index I*, s.v. Φθία (this index also includes inscriptions where the queen was mistakenly called Phila).

⁶ For the *sitonai* in the Classical and Hellenistic periods, see the overview of Strubbe 1987: 45-46. For the *sitonai* active on Delos, cf. *IG XI 4*, 1055 and 1025 (Durrbach, *Choix* 50). Aristoboulos' mission was to procure grain not only for the Macedonian realm but also for areas of mainland Greece controlled by the Macedonian king (Marasco 1988: 144-46).

⁷ Judging from l. 2, the proposer's name should have ca. nine letters, thus matching the number of letters of the name [Κυνθιάδης].

⁸ *IG XI 4*, 664-665; cf. the corresponding decree of the Thessalonikans, inscribed on the same stele (*IG XI 4*, 1053 [*IG X 2*, 1, 1028; Hatzopoulos 1996: II n^o 50]) and Admetos' statue base (*IG XI 4*, 1076). For the date, see the comments of Roussel and Durrbach (*Choix* 49). For Kynthiades' financial dealings with the sanctuary until his death in 218, see *IG XI 2*, 287 A 26 and 153; *ID 338 Aa 7*; 353 A 50; 354, l. 55; 372 A 37. For the stemma of this important family, see Vial 1984: 302-304.

and a benefactor of the sanctuary. The reasons for his second honouring by the decree under discussion are not recorded in detail, and no reference is made to the Macedonian throne. Thus, we can neither affirm nor exclude the possibility that the cases of Aristoboulos and Admetos were related.¹ If my restoration is accepted, however, there is now more than one source connecting Kynthiades with Thessalonike and Macedonia.

D84. *Synonymos son of Theaios*

— *IG XI 4, 680* (Durrbach, *Choix* 47 II); other sources: *IG XI 2, 287 A 148*; *298 A 195*; *ID 342 A 5*

Synonymos proposed the second honorific decree for Autokles son of Aine-sidemos of Chalkis, a φίλος of Demetrios II (*IG XI 4, 680*).² As is often the case with Delian decrees, the neutral and uninformative motivation clause does not clarify the context of the honours. In any case, Autokles was yet another officer of Demetrios II who was honoured by the Delians (cf. the preceding entry).³ The homonymous son of Autokles was also honoured twice by the Delians.⁴

The most interesting element of this case for the purposes of the present study is that the older decree in honour of Autokles, inscribed on the same stone (*IG XI 4, 679*), does not report any ties of the honourand with the Macedonian king. This can only mean two things: when honoured for the first time, Autokles was either already a member of the Macedonian administration (perhaps even before the rise of Demetrios II to the throne), in which case the lack of reference to his position was simply due to bureaucratic brevity,⁵ or did not yet belong to the Macedonian administrative personnel. If the latter is accepted, Autokles' case offers an insight into an overlooked facet of the use of the civic honours bestowed upon benefactors. Owing to the growing social mobility of the Hellenistic period,

¹ Assuming that Admetos was in some way involved in the trade of grain on behalf of the Macedonian state would explain his insistence on having the honours which he received by the Delians widely publicized at his home city as well: a bronze statue of his was to be erected not only at Delos but also at Thessalonike, the city to which the proposer of the Delian decree, Boulon son of Tynnnon, led an embassy in order to ensure that Admetos' statue would be erected at a proper location. If Admetos was, even indirectly, acting on behalf of the Macedonian king, he would have had every reason to wish for his honours to be publicized at his homeland: enhancing his status in the eyes of the local, Thessalonikan, society would be an asset for any aspirations he may have had for a court career. Reger 1994: 120 and 1994b: 54 also considers it very likely that Admetos was related to the royal court, mainly because of the extravagance of the honours which he received.

² Autokles was also honoured at Oropos (*I. Orop.* 57 with **C8**, above).

³ Durrbach, *Choix*, p. 59 assumes that Autokles was also involved in trade transactions.

⁴ *IG XI 4, 681-682*. No relationship of Autokles (II) with the Macedonian throne is attested nor is there any reason for us to assume that such a relationship existed.

⁵ Perhaps it was when Autokles was honoured for the second time that it was decided to include in the text of the decree a shortened version of the older decree in his honour.

there was always a chance that an individual could, at some point in his career, become attached to a royal court; in that case, cities which had already been connected with them by bonds of euergetism readily acquired a channel of communication with the court. And vice-versa: the individual's high esteem in the city or cities by which they had been honoured, was an asset for their career at court.

Synonymos is also known from catalogues of the sanctuary, dating to 250 and 240.¹ The decree under discussion is the only extant piece of evidence for the political activity of a member of this family.²

D85. Amphikleides son of Amphikleides

— IG XI 4, 1177 (Durrbach, *Choix* 62)

Amphikleides –otherwise unknown and most probably a citizen of Delos, as he bears no ethnic– offered a dedication to Polykrates son of Mnasiadas of Argos, a well-known courtier of Ptolemies IV and V.³ The dedication probably dates to the reign of Epiphanes,⁴ that is, to a period when the Ptolemaic administration struggled to maintain its prestige as the benefactor of the Greek world *par excellence*, despite the fact that mainland Greece and the Aegean had long ceased to be strategically relevant to the throne.

LEAGUE OF THE ISLANDERS (UNKNOWN CITY)

D86. Echestratos

— IG XI 4, 1037

Echestratos was a *theoros* of the League of the Islanders to one of the first Ptolemaia of Alexandria (IG XI 4, 1037; on the date, see **D55**, above). His ethnic has not been preserved; the name is attested in Delos, Tenos and Thera –to confine ourselves to possible or certain members of the League.⁵

¹ IG XI 2, 287 A 148; 298 A 195; ID 342 A 5.

² For Synonymos' family, see Vial 1984: 376-77.

³ The omission of the ethnic does not necessarily mean that the dedicant was a Delian (see, for example, IG XI 4, 1111). The name is attested in Delos (see LGPN I s.v. Ἀμφικλείδης n^{os} 1-3), but also in many other areas of the Greek world. In the mid-third century, an Amphikleides son of Amphikleides is attested in Athens (*I. Eleusis* 183), a city with which Polykrates –the honourend of the Delian dedication Polykrates– had close ties (on Polykrates, see **B7**, above, with the bibliography cited in p. 226 n. 1).

⁴ See Durrbach's comments.

⁵ See the relevant entry of LGPN I. On the question whether Delos and Thera were regular members of the League or not, see p. 439 n. 4, above (Delos) and Huß 1976: 236-37; Nigdelis 1990: 74-75 n. 8-9 (Thera).

EUBOIA

CHALKIS

D87. Kleoptolemos

— Polyb. 20.8 (Ath. 10.439e-f); Livy 36.11.1-2; Plut., *Fam.* 16.1-3.

The great strategic importance of Chalkis for the control of the Greek mainland¹ is reflected in the almost total lack of sources on the city's domestic political life for almost the entire period covered by this study: the main carrier of political power in Chalkis was undoubtedly the Macedonian garrison stationed at Euripos, dominating the city until the end of the third century –with two short intervals, in 313-311 and 273-271–, thus making Chalkis an important stronghold for the kings of Macedonia (and for the contender for the throne, Alexandros son of Krateros). During the Second Macedonian War, Chalkis was twice captured by the Romans, recaptured by Philip V, and was 'liberated' after the battle at Kynos Kephalaï, only to receive a Roman garrison from 196 until 194.²

In 192, Chalkis, Sparta and Demetrias became the target of a concerted Aitolian effort to secure advance bases for Antiochos III before he crossed over to Europe.³ The leader of the anti-Roman faction in Chalkis was Euthymides,⁴ already a *proxenos* of the Aitolians since 208/7.⁵ We need not dwell on the details of Euthymides', the Aitolians' and, later, Antiochos' efforts to capture Chalkis throughout 192; suffice it to say that their goal was finally achieved in the early winter of the same year.⁶ Literary sources cease to refer to Euthymides already before Antiochos' arrival in Greece in October, which must mean that by then he had already lost his life. The king spent almost the entire winter of 192/1 in Chalkis, and it was again to Chalkis that he hastened after his defeat at Thermopylai in April / May 191 from where he sailed back to Asia. Immediately after the king's departure the city surrendered to the Romans.⁷

The central event of Antiochos' stay in Chalkis was his grandiose wedding to the daughter of Kleoptolemos –the real name of the new queen, who was renamed Euboia by the king, is not reported. This marriage is reported or commented upon

¹ Apart from the famous phrase attributed to Philip V, that Demetrias, Chalkis and Corinth were the "fetters of Greece" (Polyb. 18.11.5 and 45.6; cf. Strab. 9.428; App., *Mac.* 8), see the acute observations of Picard 1979: 257-58.

² On the Hellenistic history of Chalkis up to 200, see mainly Picard 1979: 256-80; on the years which followed, see *ibid.* 280-83.

³ See **C37-38**, above.

⁴ Livy 35.37.5 speaks of Euthymides' *factio*.

⁵ *IG IX 1²* 1, 31, ll. 67-68.

⁶ Livy 35.37.4-39.2, 46.2-13, 50.6-51.10. Cf. the detailed account of Deininger 1971: 80-86, with earlier bibliography, and Grainger 2002: 182-84, 194, 197-99.

⁷ Livy 36.21.2.

by a number of sources, not always reliable.¹ Most detailed is the account offered by Livy, according to whom Kleoptolemos was the offspring of an inglorious family, who did not wish for this dangerous marriage to take place, but was finally convinced by the insistence of the king, who was madly in love with the future queen. This is a thoroughly fabricated account: Polybios, Livy's primary source, mentions no reservations of the future queen's father, and explicitly ranks Kleoptolemos among pre-eminent Chalkidians. Livy undoubtedly drew a distorted picture of Kleoptolemos' social standing, so as to serve the needs of Roman propaganda: Antiochos needed to be belittled as a frivolous monarch who neglected his military duties and cared only for romance, festivals and celebrations. In reality, and despite the fact the Antiochos' European campaign was not the finest hour of his long reign, his marriage to the daughter of Kleoptolemos proved a very successful propagandistic move.² Plutarch recognizes that, by his marriage, Antiochos won the affection of the Chalkidians, who willingly offered their city as a base for his military operations.³ Even if we disregard Plutarch's exaggerated account, the fact remains that the king's aim in marrying Kleoptolemos' daughter was to please the Chalkidians – the new name he gave his bride makes this clear.

For Kleoptolemos, this marriage, by which he would become the father-in-law of the powerful king of Asia, was a unique opportunity; it goes without saying that he would not deny it, regardless of his assessment of international affairs. It should be noted, however, that, in contrast to his daughter⁴ and to other prominent Chalkidian supporters of Antiochos (see the following entry), Kleoptolemos does not seem to have followed the king to Asia.

D88. Euboulidas — D89. Philon

— Polyb. 21.17.7 and 42.11; Livy 37.45.17

After the collapse of Antiochos' European campaign, a number of leaders of the anti-Roman factions in Greek cities sought refuge at the king's court. After the treaty of Apameia in 188, the Romans demanded their surrender. Among them we find two Chalkidians, namely Philon and Euboulidas.⁵ Apparently, they were leading members of the pro-Antiochic faction of Chalkis (on which see the preceding entry), and perhaps already collaborators of Euthymides,⁶ who hastened to follow Antiochos to Ephesos in 191. Their fate at Rome is not known.

¹ Polyb. 20.8 (Ath. 10.439e-f); Livy 36.11.1-2, 15.1, 17.7; Diod. Sic. 29.2; Plut., *Flam.* 16.1-3 and *Philop.* 17.1 (simple mention); Just. 31.6.3 (simple mention); App., *Syr.* 69 and 91; Cass. Dio 19.62 and Zonaras 9.19; Flor. 1.24.9; *De viris illustribus* 54.1.

² Seibert 1967: 61; Deininger 1971: 85; Picard 1979: 284; Briscoe 1981: 235; Grainger 2002: 219-20.

³ Plut., *Flam.* 16.2.

⁴ Polyb. 20.8; Plut., *Flam.* 16.3; App., *Syr.* 91.

⁵ Polyb. 21.17.7 and 42.11; Livy 37.45.17.

⁶ Deininger 1971: 84 n. 32 suggests that Philon and Euboulidas were the instigators of the surrender of the city to Antiochos in late 192.

ERETRIA

D90. Elpinikos son of Stilbos

— *IG XII 9, 196-197* (Knoepfler 2001: 170-84 n^{os} VII and VI, without the text)

During the Lamian War, Eretria undoubtedly followed the majority of Euboians, who sided with the Macedonians.¹ Two of the first decrees to have been enacted after the end of the war were proposed by the otherwise unknown Elpinikos son of Stilbos.² By the first (*IG XII 9, 196*; cf. Knoepfler 2001: n^o VII) Timotheos son of Lysanias of Macedonia was awarded the highest possible honours (a crown of 1,000 drachmas, a bronze statue of his shown on horseback, tax exemption, *sitesis*); by an appendix to the original decree he was also offered any of the exiles' houses he himself desired. By the second decree (*IG XII 9, 197*; cf. Knoepfler 2001: n^o VI) Myllenas son of Asandros and Tauron son of Machatas, both Macedonians, were honoured as *proxenoi* and benefactors.

The motivation clauses of Eretrian decrees are usually concise and uninformative, and the two decrees proposed by Elpinikos are no exception. Nevertheless, a number of indications allow us to assume that the honourands were important Macedonian officers. Myllenas son of Asandros is almost certainly to be identified with the secretary of Alexander III, whose name is reported as *Mullinus* in Curtius' manuscripts (8.11.5).³ The city of origin of this important officer of the Macedonian army⁴ may have been Beroia.⁵ Tauron son of Machatas should be identified

¹ Hyp., *Epit.* 5; the only exception was Karystos (Paus. 1.25.4). For the reasons behind the Eretrians' choice, see Knoepfler 1999: 599-600. For the history of Eretria from 323 to 198, apart from Knoepfler's unpublished thesis (*La cité de Ménédème*, 1984), see the outline in Knoepfler 1999: 599-601. The exhaustive publication of and commentary on the honorific decrees of Eretria by Knoepfler 2001 relieves me of the need to dwell on details of chronology or prosopography. In the following entries I follow and cite Knoepfler (who gives all earlier bibliography); I only discuss in detail those facets of the evidence to which my approach is different than Knoepfler's, and add a few further remarks to his detailed account.

² As *IG XII 9, 197* was proposed by [. . .]ίνικος Στίλβου and *IG XII 9, 196* by Ἐλπίνικος (no patronym), one could argue that it is not certain whether the two decrees were proposed by the same individual. Nevertheless, the temporal proximity and the similar subjects of the two decrees make this generally accepted identification of the proposer practically certain (see Knoepfler 2001: 173-74). The name Elpinikos is often attested in Early Hellenistic Eretria, but no other identification is certain.

³ Berve 1925: n^o 542; Tatakis 1998: 81 n^o 39; Knoepfler 2001: 172-73.

⁴ His office is described by Curtius as *scriba regis*; he seems, however, to have had jurisdiction primarily over military issues, as Berve, *ibid.* and Bosworth 1995: 186-87 point out. In my opinion, he may have been in charge of the army commissariat (cf. Hatzopoulos 2001: 78-79).

⁵ Tatakis assumes that Myllenas is related to two citizens of Beroia – Alexandros son of Mylle[as] or Mylle[nas], honoured by Athens, and Mylleas son of Zoilos, attested during the Asian campaign (Tatakis 1998: 74 n^o 7 and 80 n^o 38 respectively). Her assumption seems to me to be more probable than Knoepfler 2001: 172 believes, despite the fact that, as he correctly points out, for neither of the two Beroians is the name Myllenas certain. The following observations seem to favour

with another officer of Alexander, namely Tauron the *toxarches*;¹ in fact, there is even a small possibility that he was the brother of Harpalos, the well-known treasurer of the king.² The simultaneous presence of two officers of Alexander in Eretria is certainly not accidental: the two seasoned officers probably belonged to the staff of a Successor. The name and patronym of Timotheos son of Lysanias does not allow certain suggestions regarding his identity,³ but the fact that, he alone of all the Macedonians honoured at Eretria, received the highest honours can only mean that he also belonged to the staff of a Successor.

Both decrees are dated to the last quarter of the fourth century. Several turning points in Eretria's Early Hellenistic history could be proposed as the context of the honours proposed by Elpinikos: the immediate aftermath of the Lamian War (322); 318, after Polyperchon's *diagramma*; 309/8 (?), following the death of general Polemaios and the removal of the Macedonian garrison; 304, following the expulsion of the forces of Kassandros by Poliorketes. In my opinion, none is entirely convincing.⁴ In any case, and according to our present state of

Tataki's suggestion: 1) Alexandros' father may very well have been called Myllenas –Kirchner's (*IG II² 710*) and Osborne's (1981: D81, apparatus, l. 8) objections rest on weak foundations. 2) Mylleas son of Zoilos is only known from Arr., *Ind.* 18.6; the manuscripts of Arrian may record the name erroneously, as do the manuscripts of Curtius. 3) In contrast to the name Myllenas, which is attested by epigraphic sources (see Knoepfler 2001: 172 n. 407) –always more reliable than literary sources regarding onomastic issues–, the name Mylleas is attested only in Arrian; this lends further support to my previous argument that Alexander's trierarch was actually called *Myllenas* son of Zoilos. 4) Asandros, the patronym of the Myllenas who was honoured by the Eretrians, was the name of two more Macedonians in the age of Alexander. One of them was Asandros son of Philotas, of unknown origin (see Berve 1926: n° 182; Tataki 1998: 273–74 n° 322), and the other was the well-known Asandros son of Agathon, who may also have been a citizen of Beroia (see Tataki 1998: 76 n° 16).

¹ Berve 1926: 741; Heckel 1992: 338 n° 5.7; Tataki 1998: 197 n° 20.

² The basic bibliography on Harpalos is given by Heckel 1992: 213–21, Worthington 1992: 41–77 and Tataki 1998: 194 n° 3. Given the rarity of the name Tauron, the identification of the honouree of the Eretrian decree with the *toxarches* should be considered certain. His connection with the family of Harpalos, however, is anything but certain (Bosworth 1995: 286; Knoepfler 2001: 173).

³ See Knoepfler 2001: 184 n. 497, with sources and discussion.

⁴ See in detail Knoepfler 2001: 171–73 (decree for Myllenas and Tauron) and mainly 181–84 (decree for Timotheos). To begin with, the end of the Lamian War was no turning point for Eretria, a loyal ally of the Macedonians throughout the war. The removal of the garrison, the 'liberation' of the city and its inclusion in the *koinon* of the Boiotians (as the presence of the *polemarchoi* makes clear) is attested by *IG XII 9 192*. Even if Holleaux's dating of these events to 309/8 (*Études I 41–73*) –a dating which Knoepfler promises to disprove elsewhere– was accepted, the decree for Timotheos, where the *probouloi* are still recorded as the supreme archons of Eretria, could not refer to these events. Knoepfler opts for a date in the aftermath of Polyperchon's *diagramma* for the two decrees proposed by Elpinikos. It is an attractive theory, and to Knoepfler's arguments one could add that Myllenas had served with Polyperchon during the Indian campaign (Curt. 8.11.5, with the comments of Heckel 1992: 191–92 and Bosworth 1995: 177), which would

knowledge, Elpinikos seems to have been one of the central figures of the city's leadership: he was associated with the honours accorded to three high-ranking Macedonians, one of whom (Timotheos) must have sojourned in the city for a long time.¹

D91. Antiphilos son of Hipparchos of Ptechai

— IG XII 9, 221 (see Knoepfler 2001: 185-95 n° VIII, without the text)

Antiphilos proposed another Early Hellenistic² Eretrian decree (IG XII 9, 221), by which Aristonous (no patronym or ethnic) was honoured as *proxenos* and benefactor. As Knoepfler has convincingly argued,³ the honourand should probably be identified with Aristonous son of P(e)isaios of Pella (who came from Eordaia), who served as Alexander III's Bodyguard since at least 326, as an officer initially of Perdikkas and later of Polyperchon, as commander of the garrison of Amphipolis in 317-316, and as *theorodokos* for the Nemaia between 321 and 317, representing

make it even more probable that in 318 he belonged to Polyperchon's staff. Nevertheless, Knoepfler's theory is equally problematic. As he himself points out, since the Eretrians cooperated with Antipatros during the Lamian War, the Macedonians had no reason to impose on Eretria a strict oligarchy controlled by Macedonian arms (Knoepfler 2001: 183; cf. 483 n. 491, where he points out that Eretria's constitution after 335 must have been "modérément démocratique"). In other words, if democracy was restored in 318, we would still need to find a plausible date for the disruption which should have preceded its restoration. Moreover, the offer of one of the houses of the fugitives to Timotheos (IG XII 9, 196, ll. 24-25), comes in sharp contrast to the provisions for the return of the exiles, which was the main focus of Polyperchon's *diagramma*. In an earlier work (Knoepfler 1999: 604) the Swiss scholar had claimed that the φυγαδικαὶ οἰκίαι of this decree belonged to the oligarchs who were banished according to the rules of the *diagramma*; but the *diagramma* explicitly stipulated (Diod. Sic. 18.57.1) that only the leaders of oligarchic regimes instituted by Antipatros were to be banished; as we just saw, no reason for the imposition of such an oligarchic regime on Eretria existed. Finally, a date in 304 seems unlikely for two reasons (the third reason adduced by Knoepfler 2001: 183, namely letter forms, cannot be considered decisive: letter forms in no way help dating an inscription with precision within a period of two decades). Firstly (Knoepfler 2001: 183 n. 488, with bibliography), erection of a statue (even more so, with the honourand shown on horseback) was reserved for the kings in the years immediately after they had assumed the royal title. Secondly (cf. Knoepfler 2001: 173 n. 420 and 184 n. 499), 304 seems too late a date for Mylles and Tauron to have been still alive: both were seasoned high-ranking officers already during the Asian campaign.

¹ The offer of a house of one of the fugitives indicates that Timotheos' sojourn in the city was considered a likely or desirable event (Knoepfler 2001: 180-81).

² Knoepfler 2001: 185-87 argues in detail against Ziebarth's dating (in the IG) of the decree in the late third century. Although his arguments regarding the language of the decree are convincing, the general character of the letter forms, especially the sigmas with the parallel horizontal strokes, seems to point to the third rather than to the fourth century, as Knoepfler himself admits (cf. his fig. 39).

³ Knoepfler 2001: 187-90.

no state but only himself.¹ The honours which Aristonous received by Eretria obviously belong to the period 319-317, when he was mostly active. Given his high position on Polyperchon's staff, a date immediately after the latter's *diagramma* in autumn 319 seems plausible for the decree, but the uninformative motivation clause once again allows no certainty.

Antiphilos, bearer of a common Eretrian name, is otherwise unknown. Knoepfler raises the possibility that he might have been the son of Hipparchos, the tyrant whom Philip II had set up in Eretria in 342.² As Knoepfler correctly points out, the fact that Antiphilos appears as a 'democrat', proposing honours for an ally of Polyperchon, is not an indication to the contrary; nevertheless, the fact that the –generally very common– name Hipparchos is not otherwise attested in the onomasticon of Eretria does not as such render the identification certain.

D92. Archelaos son of Rhe[ximachos of Oinoe]

– *IG XII 9, 200 + Add.*, p. 176 (Knoepfler 2001: 206-209 n° X, without the text); see also *IG XII 9, 245 A*, l. 49

Archelaos is the proposer of another Eretrian proxeny decree of the last quarter of the fourth century in honour of a Macedonian. Archelaos is also attested in a later catalogue of Eretrian citizens.³ The partial preservation of the honourand's patronym and ethnic ([A---^{ca. 11} --- π]όλεως, Μακε[δών ἐγ Βερούας (?)]),⁴ and the

¹ For the sources and discussion, apart from Knoepfler, see mainly Berve 1926: n° 133; Miller 1988: 158; Heckel 1992: 275-76; Hatzopoulos 1996: I 474-75; Tataki 1998: 151-52 n° 20; Perlman 2000: 251-52 n° 49. Perlman dated the *theorodokia* of Aristonous in 315-313; this is clearly wrong, for Aristonous had already been killed by Kassandros by then. Her dating is based on two assumptions: that the Argives took over the Nemaia between 315 and 313 (Perlman 2000: 138-49), and that the *theorodokoi* list of Nemea was an appendix to the *theorodokoi* list of Argos (149-52). Regardless of whether the latter theory is correct, the former is certainly not. Perlman herself (2000: 144-45) concedes that the earliest reference to an Argive takeover of the festival is the well-known Pallantion inscription (Bielman 1994: n° 14 [SEG 11 (1954) 1084; ISE 52; SVA III 419; Perlman 2000: 208-210 n°s A 2-3], which can only be dated, *pace* Perlman, to 318-316 (see, for example, Moretti's comments in the *ISE*).

² Knoepfler 2001: 190-91; on the tyrant, see Dem. 9.58 and 18.295; Harp., s.v. Ἴππαρχος; *Suda*, s.v. Ἴππαρχος n° 5.

³ *IG XII 9, 245 A*, l. 49. For the identification, see already Ziebarth, *IG XII 9, Add.*, p. 176 and Knoepfler 2001: 207. The latter dates the catalogue of citizens shortly after 285, citing his unpublished thesis.

⁴ For the restoration, cf. Knoepfler 2001: 208-209, who hesitantly restores the patronym as [Ἀρχεπ]όλεως instead of Ziebarth's [Ἠγησιπ]όλεως, because the former name is attested in Macedonia, while the latter is not. He also points out that an Archepolis served as Alexander's *hieromnemon* at Delphi (*CID II* 86, l. 8; 69, l. 20; 89, l. 7; 71, l. 42; 94, l. 3; 96, l. 4; 72, l. 5; 97, l. 57; 32, l. 43; 99B, l. 13; 100 I, ll. 2-3; the order of the inscriptions follows the chronology established by Lefèvre 1998: 299) and, with many reservations, suggests that the honourand of the Eretrian decree may have been his son. Obviously, none of the above is certain. Moreover, Archepolis is

loss of the motivation clause preclude any meaningful assumptions as to the reasons behind the honours. Knoepfler suggested that the honourand belonged to the staff of Poliorketes, who expelled Kassandros' forces in 304,¹ but his theory is based on his somewhat arbitrary dating of the decree to the last decade of the fourth century.²

D93. Timippos

— Knoepfler 2001: 142-50 n° 10 (IG XII 9, 199 + 230)

Timippos,³ otherwise unknown, proposed a proxeny decree (Knoepfler 2001: 142-50 n° 10) in honour of the, also otherwise unknown, Kleochares son of Pytheas of Amphipolis, who is described as a “friend of the kings and well-disposed towards them, and having proven his usefulness to the generals of the allies and to the people of Eretria” (ll. 3-6: τῶν βασιλέων φίλος ὢν καὶ εὖνους καὶ τοῖς στρατηγῶσι τοῖς τῶν συμμάχων] καὶ τῶι δήμῳ τῶι Ἐρετρ[ι]έων χρήσιμος γεγυ- νώς (ll. 3-6).⁴ The honourand's “usefulness” probably means that he fulfilled the city's requests (ll. 6-9). Knoepfler has demonstrated that the reference to the kings in plural and to the allies –obviously the members of the League of Corinth, refounded by Antigonos and Poliorketes in 303 or 302)–,⁵ the letter forms and some details of the wording, all date the decree with relative certainty between 304 and 301 (or, perhaps, even slightly later).⁶

If the honourand was a member of Poliorketes' staff, he was not the only such official who received honours by the Eretrians. Adeimantos son of Androstenes of Lampsakos, one of the highest-ranking collaborators of Poliorketes throughout his first ‘European’ period who had also served as president of the Alliance of Corinth, was naturalized in Eretria, soon before or soon after the refoundation of

not the only name ending in -πολις in the Macedonian onomasticon (see for example SEG 39 [1989] 610: Sosipolis, to limit myself to an example before the age of Augustus).

¹ Diod. Sic. 20.100.6-7 only mentions Chalkis among the cities which Poliorketes ‘liberated’, but Eretria and Karystos should be added to the list (cf. Knoepfler 2001: 146-48).

² Knoepfler himself (2001: 206-207) concedes that the wording of the decree would suggest a date in the 310's. The lower date which he finally opts for rests on his prosopographical identifications, none of which dictates a date after 305.

³ On the extremely rare name of the proposer, see the interesting remarks of Knoepfler 2001: 149.

⁴ I follow Knoepfler's text. The crucial word for the understanding of the text is σ[υμμάχων], which depends on Knoepfler's (2001: 147 n. 242) reading of the only visible letter as a sigma rather than as an epsilon.

⁵ On the date, see **A19** (III), above.

⁶ See Knoepfler 2001: 143-47. In my opinion, the vague reference to the kings (without a name) and, mainly, the reference to the generals of the allies, do not preclude a date after Ipsos. The fact that not the allies as *statal* entities but only their military leadership is mentioned may

the Alliance.¹ Three more Antigonid officers, namely Glaukippos, Hippodamas and Apollonios of Antigoneia in Troas, were also honoured as *proxenoi* and benefactors of the Eretrians, probably in 302, as we shall see in the following entry.²

D94. Damasias son of Phanokles of Aphareus

— Δαμασίας Φανοκλείου Ἀφαιρεῦθεν: *IG XII 9, 210* (*Syll*³ 348; Knoepfler 2001: 232-41 n° XIV, without the text)

IG XII 9, 210 is the best preserved of the Eretrian honorific decrees of 304-301 (or shortly afterwards) for Poliorketes' officials. It honours as *proxenoi* and benefactors three brothers, namely Glaukippos (apparently the highest-ranking officer of the three, ll. 2-3), Hippodamas and Apollonios sons of Dionysios of Antigoneia in Troas, for proving their goodwill towards king Demetrios and the Eretrian people (ll. 4-7), and, mainly, for offering assistance "to the citizens serving aboard the ships" (ll. 8-11: *περὶ τοὺς στρατευομένους τῶν πολιτῶν ἐν ταῖς ναυσίν*). Apparently, an Eretrian contingent formed part of Poliorketes' army, which crossed over to Asia in 302 and occupied north-western Asia Minor in the fall of the same year.³ The precise circumstances under which the three citizens of Antigoneia assisted the Eretrians remain unclear;⁴ in any case, the decree should be dated shortly after Poliorketes' expedition.⁵

well indicate that the decree refers to a great battle, such as the one of Ipsos, rather than to Poliorketes' campaign in the Greek mainland in 304-303, as Knoepfler assumes.

¹ Knoepfler 2001: 219-31 n° XIII (*IG XII 9, 198* + *IG XII Suppl. p. 178*), with the extensive earlier bibliography. Other sources on Adeimantos: Strab. 13.589; Demochares, *FGrHist* 75 F 1 (Ath. 6.253a); Ath. 6.255c (citing the grammarian Dionysios son of Tryphon); *CID IV 11*; *Agora* 16.122; unpublished inscription from Rhamnous (Petraikos 1999: I 32-33, 430; cf. p. 89 n. 2, above). Knoepfler does not accept that the last inscription refers to the same individual.

² The honours for three more Macedonians may also date from the same period, although this is far from certain: see Knoepfler 2001: n° 5 (*IG XII 9, 205* + 226) and *IG XII 9, 206* (cf. Knoepfler 2001: n° XI), honours for Apollodoros son of Anaxidotos and Anaxidotos son of Apollodoros (the latter being either the father or the son of the former), and *IG XII 9, 200* + *Add.*, p. 176 (Knoepfler 2001: 206-209 n° X, without the text), on which see the preceding entry.

³ Diod. Sic. 20.111; cf. Billows 1990: 179.

⁴ Billows 1990: 370 prefers to assume that the three brothers assisted the Eretrians in Greece, before the departure of Poliorketes' army for Asia. It is not certain that the three honourees belonged to Poliorketes' army; they may have assisted the Eretrians after some unattested battle near Antigoneia (cf. Knoepfler 2001: 233 n. 831). Nevertheless, as no such battle is referred to in the text, it is preferable to explain their actions by assuming that they operated as Antigonid officers.

⁵ For the date and the context of the decree, see the detailed analysis of Knoepfler 2001: 232-33, with earlier bibliography. The fact that the refoundation of Antigoneia as Alexandria is dated immediately after the battle of Ipsos is usually used as an argument in favour of dating this decree precisely to 302. In my opinion, even if the three citizens of Antigoneia were honoured *after* 301, it would still be very likely that the Eretrians used the old name of the city, out of respect for the dead king, the father of Poliorketes, of whom they remained loyal allies even after the great battle.

The proposer of the decree was Damasias son of Phanokles, of the deme of Aphareus. Both the name and the patronym are rarely attested in Hellenistic Euboea.¹ Among the few Euboians bearing that name, our Damasias could perhaps be identified with a homonymous citizen attested in the famous law of the Euboian cities on the artists of Dionysos.² The text begins with a catalogue of persons commemorated by personal name in the nominative, without patronym or ethnic, among whom a Damasias is attested. The capacity of these persons is difficult to establish; it is fairly certain, however, that they came from all four Euboian cities jointly enacting the law (Chalkis, Histiaia, Eretria, Oreos);³ in other words, this Damasias may well have been an Eretrian. Furthermore, given that the law is securely dated to the second period of Poliorketes' rule over Euboea (294-287),⁴ this Damasias may be identified with the proposer of our decree –as it has already been suggested.⁵ This would mean that a supporter of Poliorketes in 304-301 remained (or resurfaced) in political prominence during the king's second period of rule over Euboea.⁶

D95. Menedemos son of Kleisthenes

— Diog. Laert. 2.125-144; other sources: Giannantoni 1983: I 164-78; detailed commentary on Diogenes' biography: Knoepfler 1991

The philosopher and statesman Menedemos was undoubtedly the most famous Eretrian of the third century. The main source on his life and on his contacts with Hellenistic rulers is the biographical sketch of Diogenes Laertios (2.125-144). The detailed commentary on this biography by Knoepfler 1991 allows me to focus exclusively on Menedemos' dealings with the kings.

Perhaps already during the Lamian War, Menedemos served in the Eretrian army, as a member of a garrison sent to Megara. His philosophical interests

¹ See the corresponding entries in *LGN I*.

² *IG XII 9*, 207, l. 2. On this inscription, see the outstanding analysis of Stephanis 1984; also, Le Guen 2001: I 41-56 n° 1 and *BullEpigr* 2006, 210, with further bibliography.

³ The law's first editor, K. Kourouniotis (1911: 4), assumed that the persons in question were city envoys to Chalkis, where they would supervise the auction for several contracts, as specified in ll. 57-58 (and also in ll. 3-4, something which does not become clear by the text as given by Kourouniotis). Knoepfler 2001: 237 and n. 867 (with a mistaken citation of Kourouniotis) disagrees, as there seems to be no syntactical connection between the catalogue of names and the infinitive ἀρπείσθαι, and claims that the individuals commemorated in the catalogue were the members of the synarchy of the *koinon* of the Euboians responsible for the ratification of the law. As Stephanis 1984: 512 points out, however (followed by Le Guen 2001: I 48), it is not at all certain that this was a federal law: the *koinon* is not referred to anywhere in the ratified text.

⁴ Stephanis 1984: 512 and Habicht 1970: 77, with earlier bibliography. The time limits are defined as 297 and 286 by Knoepfler 2001: 236, who cites his unpublished thesis.

⁵ See Ziebarth in the index of *IG XII 9*, with reservations, and Knoepfler 2001: 236, with greater certainty.

⁶ For similar cases in Athens, see **A19**, **A44**, and perhaps **A42**, above.

initially led him to the Academy, but he later became a student of Stilpon of Megara (2.126; cf. 134). He travelled extensively, to Elis, Cyprus, other places in eastern Mediterranean, and finally, during the rule of Demetrios of Phaleron, to Athens, whence he was banished in 307 and returned to Eretria.

His first contact with Hellenistic rulers was not on behalf of Eretria but on behalf of Oropos, the homeland of his second wife (2.138). In 304 (or 303) rather than in 295,¹ he led an Oropian embassy to Demetrios Poliorketes (2.141). The context of this embassy is unclear; Diogenes seems to have been interested only in the philosopher's dignified conduct (ἐμβριθέστατα πρεσβεῦσαι). It is perhaps with this embassy that his bond with the Antigonids was first forged, a bond which would remain unbroken to the end of the philosopher's life. As Gonatas is said to have known the philosopher personally already before he rose to the Macedonian throne (2.128), to have loved him (2.141), to have listened to his advice (2.128) and to have considered himself his student (2.141), we are able to place the beginnings of this relationship early in the king's life, perhaps already in 304, when Poliorketes (possibly accompanied by his sixteen-year-old son) liberated Eretria from Kassandros' garrison.² Stilpon, Menedemos' teacher and a philosopher for whom Poliorketes had great respect already before 307 (2.115), may have been instrumental in forging the relationship of Menedemos with the king and his son.

It is precisely in that period (ca. 304-290) that Menedemos is first attested as a politician; his activities led him to the supreme offices of the city, and, correspondingly, earned him the animosity of many fellow citizens of his.³ Although Diogenes' chronologically confusing narrative does not allow any certainty, it seems that Menedemos' Macedonian connections were his key asset for assuming political leadership. 2.143, a passage reflecting the later biographical tradition attempting to exonerate Menedemos from the charges of treason during the Chremonidean War (see below), enlightens us about the earlier period of his activity as well. According to the traditional restoration of the text –in my opinion, still the most plausible one, despite Knoepfler's alternative suggestion–, Menedemos, then serving as *proboulos*, repeatedly asked Poliorketes to assist him in suppressing

¹ See Robert, *Hellenica* 11-12 (1960) 201; Knoepfler 1991: 197 n. 74 (who prefers 295 to 287, considering 287 a possible but not preferable alternative); Petrakos, *I. Orop.*, p. 502. Knoepfler emphatically denies (without further argumentation) the plausibility of Robert's dating of the embassy to 304. In my opinion, this remains the more plausible date. The fact that in 303, rather than in 304, Oropos was restored to the Athenians (see **A19** [III], above), is not an indication to the contrary; Diogenes neither states nor implies that Menedemos' embassy proved successful.

² Knoepfler 1991: 177 n. 17.

³ 2.125: γράψαντος... ψήφισμα; 2.137: ὅταν προῦσθη τῆς πολιτείας; 2.140: καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐγχειρίσασθαι [*scil.* the Eretrians to Menedemos]; 2.141: Menedemos as general (see Knoepfler 2001: 392-93); 2.143: Menedemos as *proboulos*.

aspiring tyrants, who wished to abolish the constitution.¹ In other words, when Menedemos assumed the city's leadership, not only was he on excellent terms with Poliorketes, but also defended his ties with the king publicly, claiming that it was the Macedonians who helped Eretria avoid a tyrannid.²

The embassies led by Menedemos also testify to his relationship with Poliorketes, although they modify the picture drawn of Menedemos as having relied exclusively on Poliorketes' support. According to Diogenes (2.140), the philosopher led embassies to Lysimachos (most probably after 287, perhaps even after 285), and to Ptolemy (I rather than II, most probably after 288).³ His most important embassy, however, again according to Diogenes, was the embassy which he had earlier led to Poliorketes, during which he convinced the king to reduce Eretria's contribution to the war effort from 200 to fifty talents.⁴ It would be mistaken for us to deduce from these three embassies that Menedemos observed a position of strict neutrality towards the protagonists of the period. If the dates of his embassies as

¹ Diog. Laert. 2.143: πρόβουλον γενόμενον τῶν Ἐρετριέων πολλάκις ἐλευθερῶσαι τὴν πατρίδα ἀπὸ τῶν τυράννων ἐπαγόμενον Δημήτριον. Knoepfler replaces ἐπαγόμενον with ἐπαγομένον (with the tyrants as the subject of the verb) and claims that the older reading does not serve the passage's rhetorical purpose, that is, the attempt to show that Menedemos did not plan to become a tyrant with the help of Macedonian arms. I do not understand the argument. The main aim of this later tradition was to exonerate Menedemos from the possible charge that he aspired to become a tyrant, not to deny his relations with the Macedonians, relations that no source denies. Following Knoepfler's restoration presupposes that Herakleides Lembos, the primary source for this passage (*FHG* III 171, fr. 15b), was simultaneously a eulogist of a pro-Macedonian statesman and an accuser of the Macedonian king, who befriended aspiring tyrants. This would be paradoxical, to say the least, especially if we consider the past and the future of Menedemos' Antigonid ties. It is much more reasonable to assume that Menedemos' line of defence was that neither he personally nor his ally, king Demetrios, ever sought to institute a tyrannid at Eretria; and the traditional reading of the passage is in perfect accordance with this line of defence.

² Even by Knoepfler's reading (see the preceding note), the passage would not imply that Menedemos had lost the favour of Poliorketes. The assumption that other Eretrian politicians strove to institute a tyrannid with Macedonian help does not necessarily effect that Menedemos was temporarily opposed to the alliance with the Antigonid court. In other words, even if accepted, Knoepfler's restoration would only bear upon the domestic political situation in Eretria, not upon the city's (or Menedemos') foreign policy orientation.

³ On the date of the embassy to Lysimachos, see Knoepfler 1991: 197 n. 70. As for the embassy to Ptolemy, Knoepfler (*ibid.* n. 69) claims that it should be dated to 279/8 and be connected with the first Ptolemaia, during which Menedemos served as an *architheoros*. Later sources seem to confirm Menedemos' presence in Alexandria early in Philadelphos' reign (fr. 24 Giannantoni). But this does not necessarily date the embassy then as well. Of the two enemies of Poliorketes to whom Menedemos led an embassy, king Ptolemy is referred to first, which makes a date of the embassy under Soter more plausible. Besides, as the same passage of Laertios attests, Menedemos was in contact with Soter already by 288.

⁴ Knoepfler 1991: 197 n. 171 assumes that the contribution was part of the military preparations of Poliorketes in 289-288. In my opinion, even a slightly higher date (for example during the confrontation with the Aitolians in 290) cannot be excluded.

defined above are correct, Menedemos seems to have turned to Poliorketes' enemies only when the latter was on the verge of finally losing –or even after he had lost– any influence over the Greek mainland; during the period of Poliorketes' uncontested rule, the Macedonian king must have remained Menedemos' preferred ally. When Aischylos, his chief political enemy, accused the philosopher to Poliorketes of planning to hand the city over to the Ptolemies (288?),¹ Menedemos hastened to send a letter to Poliorketes by which he denied the charges. Despite Menedemos' contacts with Soter, it is clear that the alliance between Eretria and Poliorketes was taken for granted by all interested parties: Menedemos himself, his political enemies and the king. It is accordingly preferable to suggest that Menedemos did not change Eretria's pro-Macedonian orientation, and that it was only when the Macedonian throne became the apple of discord between the successors that he proceeded to a widening of Eretria's diplomatic horizons, as the unstable international balance of power would have dictated to any sensible civic leader.

That Menedemos' pro-Antigonid stance remained firm until it became absolutely necessary for him to seek for alternatives becomes obvious by his next known diplomatic undertaking. In 278/7, immediately after Gonatas' victory over the Gauls –a victory which marked the king's final prevalence in Macedonia–, Menedemos hastened to propose a decree by which the Eretrians praised the king, and possibly also offered him a crown (2.141).² The decree hardly proves that Gonatas exercised any real power over Eretria, but is of great political significance nonetheless: as soon as the conflict over the Macedonian throne was settled, Menedemos hastened to recognize the victory of his former student and thus, indirectly, reconfirm his city's allegiance to the king.³

After this development, Eretria's relationship with the Antigonid court remained close. The philosopher's personal bond with the king cemented his political dominance and, expectedly, caused the aversion of his political enemies. In the early years of the Chremonidean War, this domestic political struggle, combined with the need of Gonatas to secure his bases in the Greek mainland, led Eretria into a period of crisis: a certain Aristodemos publicly charged Menedemos with plotting to surrender the city to Gonatas; the philosopher was forced to flee the city (2.142). Whether the charge of betrayal was well grounded or not is irrelevant; what is certain is that, owing to his personal and political friendship with Gonatas, Menedemos had become an insurmountable obstacle to his political

¹ Knoepfler 1991: 197 n. 72, with earlier bibliography.

² On this decree, see mainly Knoepfler 2001: 391-97; cf p. 178-79, above.

³ Knoepfler 1991: 209 dates the formal renewal of the friendship between Gonatas and Menedemos slightly earlier, in ca. 280, when Gonatas sought refuge in Boiotia after his defeat by Ptolemaios Keraunos (Memnon, *FGrHist* 434 F 8.6).

enemies, who may have found in the aspirations of the anti-Macedonian coalition the means of securing domestic power.

The first stop of Menedemos' self-exile was Oropos, where he abided his time, waiting for Hierokles, the Macedonian army's general of the Piraeus to recapture Eretria (2.127), as eventually happened shortly afterwards.¹ On the pretext of financial improprieties, however, he was banished from Oropos too (2.142), and finally had to seek refuge at Gonatas' court at Pella (2.142), where he enjoyed the hospitality and financial support not only of the king but of his powerful Macedonian friends as well (cf. 2.138). According to a later tradition, friendly to the philosopher, Menedemos tried to convince the king to free Eretria and, when his efforts proved fruitless, committed suicide by refusing to eat, perhaps in 261/0 (2.143). We need not dwell on the probable exaggerations of this story; it is interesting to note, however, that Menedemos did not return to Eretria even after Gonatas had captured the city. Theoretically, this choice could have been the king's, who would have seen no profit in reinstalling a leader who had lost local support. But the Macedonian garrison could very well have secured Menedemos' power: for the king this would have certainly been politically preferable to direct rule by Macedonian army officers. It thus seems more plausible that it was Menedemos himself who preferred to remain at Pella. Is this choice to be explained by the philosopher's reluctance to return as an implanted leader to a city which was in effect ruled by a Macedonian phrourarch? Or was this simply a fitting conclusion to a career so intricately tied to the royal court?

Menedemos' career reflects many of the fundamental motifs of the relationship of civic leaders with Hellenistic rulers. To begin with, it is a prime example of the political advantage which philosophers and scholars had, being very well placed as they were to take advantage of the real or pretended interest of the kings in their work, so as to forge personal bonds with the kings; these bonds could later prove an essential political asset to them. Moreover, it confirms the repercussions which interpersonal relationships had on the political relationship between city and king. Such relationships provided the kings with trusted allies within the cities, allies on whom they could count even in difficult times; leading citizens, on the other hand, gained a powerful foreign ally, who often not only offered them the opportunity to go after a political career, but also secured them in power. Finally, the end of Menedemos' career –an exile at Pella, enjoying the support of Macedonian nobles– serves to demonstrate that the alliance of a civic leader with a royal court could provide the former with a refuge –either voluntary or not– from the vicissitudes of civic strife.

¹ On the date, see Knoepfler 1991: 175 n. 15; 1995: 144; 2001: 405.

KARYSTOS

D96. Aristonikos son of Aristomedes

— Ath. 1.19a; Osborne 1981: D49 (*IG II*² 385b, *SEG* 21 [1965] 341); *IG XII* 9, 207.41

None of our three¹ sources on Aristonikos son of Aristomedes of Karystos explicitly attests to him having been active as a political intermediary; nonetheless, and even if precise details elude us, evidence exists to suggest that, apart from being an athlete, Aristonikos was also politically active.

Athenaios (1.19a) informs us that the Athenians honoured Aristonikos of Karystos, a ball player² at the court of Alexander, with the Athenian citizenship and a statue, “because of his skills” (διὰ τὴν τέχνην). Aristonikos’ case is in fact used by Athenaios as proof of his point that “the later Greeks held the vulgar arts in higher esteem than achievements of the intellect”.³ It so happens that the naturalization decree for Aristonikos has been preserved; it probably belongs to 307-301.⁴ The motivation clause has not been preserved, but the fact that Aristonikos received the highest honours awarded by Athens,⁵ must mean that Athenaios is wrong about the reasons behind the honours. Aristonikos must have been honoured for concrete benefactions of his; most probably, he mediated in favour of the Athenian envoys to the Macedonian court, either under Alexander, or, more probably, under Poliorketes and/or Antigonos.⁶

¹ Ziebarth (*IG XII* 9, *Testimonia* p. 159), followed by Habicht (1970: 105 n. 10), tentatively suggested that the ball player Aristonikos of Karystos, here under discussion, could be identified with Aristonikos the cithara player mentioned by Arr., *Anab.* 4.16.4, 7, Polyainos 5.44.1, Plut., *Mor.* 334F and Athenaios himself (10.435, citing Theop., *FGrHist* 115 F 236). According to the explicit testimony of Polyainos, however, the latter was a citizen of Olynth.

² Ball-playing seems to have been particularly popular in the Macedonian court; see the incident reported by Plutarch (*Alex.* 39.5) involving another ball player of Alexander’s court, namely Serapion (the name may be corrupted).

³ Ath. 1.19a-20b; the passage in question is 19b: τὰς γὰρ βαναύσους τέχνας Ἕλληνας ὕστερον περὶ πλείστου μᾶλλον ἐποιοῦντο ἢ τὰς κατὰ παιδείαν γιγνομένας ἐπινοίας.

⁴ Osborne 1981: D49 (*IG II*² 385b; *SEG* 21 [1965] 341). *IG II*² 385a does not belong to the same decree (Dow 1963: 78-79; Osborne 1981: 121); hence, the date given in the *IG* (319/8) is not correct. Osborne 1982: 128-29 convincingly dates the decree to 307-301. Dow 1963: 87-88 prefers a wider timespan, between 318/7 and 300, but the epigraphical testimony from Karystos on Aristonikos (*IG XII* 9, 207, l. 41), of which Dow seems to be unaware, renders a date under Kassandros improbable (provided that the Aristonikos honoured in Karystos is identified with the Aristonikos honoured in Athens; cf. in the text, below): if Aristonikos was a friend of Kassandros, he would not have been honoured by the Karystians in conjunction with Poliorketes.

⁵ Osborne 1981: D49, ll. 9-19 and Ath. 1.19a (citizenship, golden crown, *proedria*, *sitesis* at the prytaneion for the honourand and his descendants, statue). That the preserved part of the inscribed decree fails to mention the statue does not mean that Athenaios is mistaken, since the decision has not been wholly preserved; cf. Osborne 1982: 127. On the greatest honours accorded to foreigners, cf. Osborne 1981b and Gauthier 1985: 77-89.

⁶ See in detail Osborne 1982: 128-29 (followed by Knoepfler 2001: 87), convincingly confuting Dow 1963, who accepts Athenaios’ argument.

A testimony from Karystos, Aristonikos' home city, would suffice to confirm beyond doubt that Aristonikos was much more than a gifted athlete, was it certain that it referred to the Aristonikos in question. The Euboian law on the artists of Dionysos, already referred to in the preceding entry,¹ records a Karystian festival called Aristonikeia (*IG XII 9*, 207, l. 41). The first editor of the inscription had already suggested that this was a festival in honour of Alexander's ball player; his theory has been unanimously accepted ever since.² An apparent difficulty with this theory is that Athenaios seems to have been unaware of any heroic honours awarded to the ball player: had he known of such honours, he would not have failed to mention them, as they would have lent further support to his point. We should not forget, however, that the compiler from Naukratis wrote more than five centuries after Aristonikos' lifetime, and such an omission may have been due to an incomplete digestion of his sources. Moreover, the first two books of Athenaios have been preserved in a later epitome,³ and, therefore, the argument *e silentio* becomes even weaker. If we accept that the Aristonikeia of Karystos were held in honour of the ball player of Alexander, then Aristonikos appears to have received not only the highest possible honours from the Athenians but also heroic honours from his fellow countrymen: such honours would certainly not have been accorded to him, if, besides being an accomplished entertainer, he was not involved in politics, as well.⁴

Unfortunately, we have no way of knowing what kind of benefactions he made to Athens and Karystos. It is probable that his benefactions to Karystos and the corresponding honours he received from the Karystians were contemporary with the honours he received from the Athenians. Given that he was still alive when he was honoured by the Athenians, and that the festival in his honour had already been instituted by the time of Poliorketes' second rule, it seems reasonable to place his death and the honours which he received at Karystos soon before 301. If so, Aristonikos may have been involved in the expulsion of the forces of Kassandros in 304, an episode which marked the beginning of the close ties of Euboia, and the even closest ties of Karystos, with the House of the Antigonids.⁵

¹ See p. 452 n. 2-4, above.

² Kourouniotis 1911: 7; Ziebarth, *IG XII, Testimonia* p. 159; Ringwood 1929: 389; Habicht 1970: 77; Osborne 1982: 129; Stephanis 1984: 526 n. 26; Knoepfler 2001: 87 and n. 382-383.

³ See, for example, Irigoin 1967.

⁴ Ringood 1929: 389 pushes Athenaios' argument to the extremes when she claims that the festival in honour of Aristonikos was instituted owing to his illustrious athletic career. To support her argument she uses precisely Athenaios' examples; there is, however, a huge difference between simple honours (as in Athenaios' examples) and heroization, as in Aristonikos' case at Karystos.

⁵ For the events of 304 in Euboia, cf. p. 450 n. 1, above. For the unusually great number of Karystians associated with the Macedonian throne, see p. 197 and **D64**, above.

CRETE

ITANOS

D97. Aigon

— *I. Cret.* III iv 3 (cf. 2)

Aigon was the leader of the synarchy of Itanos that proposed honours for Patroklos son of Patron, the well-known Ptolemaic officer,¹ during the Chremonidean War (*I. Cret.* III iv 3).² The motivation clause highlights Patroklos' provisions for the security of Itanos and its countryside (ll. 9-15). This means that Philadelphos' general was not honoured simply because he stopped over at Itanos on his way to or back from Attica or the central Aegean –his main area of action;³ he was honoured for providing his assistance in one of the numerous disputes that afflicted the cities of Hellenistic Crete.

The threat to Itanos' security may have been external –a local war or even a raid by a neighbouring city; most probably, however, it was domestic. The reference to the safety of the countryside (ll. 14-15) by itself would point to an external attack, but the connotations of ἀσφαλῶς πολιτεύεσθαι (and especially the complement κατὰ τοὺς νόμους) point to civil strife rather than to external danger.⁴

¹ *ProsPtol* 15063. Sources and bibliography are gathered by Tataki 1998: 398-99 n° 25.

² A second copy of the decree, with an identical text, but for the reference to the erection of the stele, has been preserved (*I. Cret.* III iv 2). In other Cretan cities the term πρωτόκοσμος is used for the leader of the synarchy; in Itanos itself, the term is not attested before the early third century AD (*I. Cret.* III iv 20), while the κόσμοι were usually called κοσμητῆρες and the synarchy κόσμος (singular collective). Since τοὶ κοσμητῆρες τοὶ σὺν Αἴγωνι were assigned to supervise the erection of the stele (*I. Cret.* III iv 3, ll. 22-23), Aigon must have been the leader of the synarchy.

³ The comparison with the honours which Patroklos received at Olous (*I. Cret.* I xxii 4A, ll. 35-42), along with other Ptolemaic officers, including his brothers Aristonikos and Perigenes, is revealing: at Olous Patroklos only received the honorific titles of *proxenos* and benefactor, whereas at Itanos he was also naturalized. Apart from Itanos and Olous, Patroklos may also have been present at Gaudos (Hegesandros, *FHG* IV 416, fr. 12; cf. Launey 1945 and Heinen 1972: 143). According to Launey, all the places where Patroklos is known to have visited (Crete, Thera, Keos), were stopovers on his way to Attica. Regarding Itanos, in particular, he claims (1945: 39) that this is confirmed by the wording of the decree, and that Patroklos cannot have been on his way back to Alexandria. Heinen 1972: 146 has understandable reservations: none of the 'Aegean' sources on Patroklos can be dated with precision, nor can the amount of time he spent in any of these places be reckoned. Launey's specific argument concerning Itanos is not valid either: the phrase ἀποσταλείς ὑπὸ βασιλέως Πτολεμαίου στραταγὸς ἐς Κρήταν (ll. 5-7) offers no chronological indications. Finally, had Patroklos been on his way to Attica, I see no reason for him to have stayed at Itanos long enough to supervise the city's defence.

⁴ In Cretan inscriptions the verb πολιτεύομαι usually means "to have political rights (in another city)" (Chaniotis 1996: 101). Since this is not the meaning here, we have to assume that the verb has its regular sense of "to participate in political life", also attested in Cretan inscriptions (cf. *I. Cret.* IV 176, l. 13: ἐν δαμοκρατίαι πολιτεύεσθαι [on this case, see Ager 1996: 350-55 n° 127; Chaniotis 1996: 281-85 n° 40; Magnetto 1996: n° 43]) and, of course, in inscriptions from many other areas (a roughly contemporary example is the Chremonidean decree itself, *SVA* III 476, ll.

Moreover, we know from the famous political oath of Itanos (*IC III iv 8*) that civil strife did in fact afflict Itanos, either earlier in the third century or precisely in the period when Patroklos was honoured.¹ One cannot exclude the possibility that tension in domestic affairs and external danger were interconnected: it would have been expected that neighbouring cities would choose sides during civil strife at Itanos.²

Aigon's political convictions are impossible to determine. He may have belonged to the moderate oligarchs, who seem to have maintained power –after resorting to some concessions to their adversaries– in the period before the oath was taken; alternatively, he could very well have belonged to a more oligarchic or more democratic faction which, conceivably, prevailed after the oath. What is certain is that the leading faction of the city under Aigon hastened to secure its dominance, with the help of the Ptolemaic general.

It would be interesting to know when Itanos had its first contact with the Ptolemaic court. Unfortunately, the decree in honour of Patroklos is the first securely dated relevant source; older contacts cannot be excluded but are not securely attested.³ What is certain is that Itanos evolved into the most important

73-74: πολιτείαν πολιτευομένους κατὰ τὰ πάτρια). The reference to “the laws”, according to which the Itanians would be able to lead their political life in the future, strongly suggests that Patroklos' intervention had a legislative facet as well.

¹ On this important text, see the bibliography cited by Chaniotis 1996: 14 n. 41. Whether the law dates from the early third century, as Guarducci (followed by many scholars) argued in the *I. Cret.*, or during the Chremonidean War, as Mikroyannakis 1967: 85-87 and, more hesitantly, van Effenterre 1948: 248 and Heinen 1972: 144 proposed, is of little consequence to my argument that the two cases are connected. Even if the law was earlier than Patroklos' intervention, it would still constitute an explicit testimony to a domestic crisis which is highly unlikely to have been resolved by the temporary truce to which the oath attests.

² This is how van Effenterre 1948: 248, Spyridakis 1970: 71-76, and Bagnall 1976: 120-21 understand the situation at Itanos. It should be noted that the oath explicitly mentions foreign powers (*I. Cret. III iv 8*, ll. 11-12).

³ On Itanos and the Ptolemies in general, see Spyridakis 1970: 69-103; Heinen 1972: 145-46; Bagnall 1976: 120-23; Kreuter 1992: 18-34; Chaniotis 1996: 31, with further bibliography in n. 140. Spyridakis 1970: 76 proposed that the decree by which the Itanians decided to found a *temenos* of Euergetes and Berenike (*I. Cret. III iv 4*) attests to contacts of Itanos with Soter as well, because it says that not only Euergetes' father Philadelphos, but also his ancestors wielded control over Itanos: ll. 1-4: ἐπειδὴ βασιλεὺς Πτολεμαῖος παραλαβὼν τὰν τῶν Ἰτωνίων πόλιν καὶ πολίτας παρὰ τῷ πατρὸς βασιλέως Πτολεμαίου καὶ τῶν προγόνων... Heinen 1972: 146 and (with some reservations) Kreuter 1992: 21 prefer to see the reference to the ancestors as rhetorical, but the phrase is too strong to have been a mere rhetorical allusion to an unspecified past, with no reference to reality. It thus seems likely that Soter and Philadelphos had some sort of control over the city. On the other hand, it is fairly certain that there was no Ptolemaic garrison at Itanos at the time of the Chremonidean War, otherwise Patroklos' assistance would not have proven so crucial. Another source which has been used as proof that Philadelphos exerted influence over Crete is the Chremonidean decree itself, according to which (*SVA III 476*, ll. 25-26, 39-40) some members

Ptolemaic stronghold in Crete. The Ptolemaic garrison set up by Patroklos remained there –but for a short interval between 195 and 165– until the mid-second century, at a time when the Ptolemies had actually lost any strategic interest in the Aegean.

LYTTOS

D98. Amnatos

— SVA III 486 (*I. Cret.* I xviii 8)

In late spring 250, the Lyttians and their allies¹ renewed their old alliance with Antiochos I and allied themselves with his successor, Antiochos II (SVA III 486). The renewal seems to have taken place at the request of the royal ambassador Apollonios (ll. 1-4).² The text of the decree is not particularly informative regarding the terms of the agreement, as it is only stated that the terms of the first alliance treaty –which are unknown to us– remained in effect.³ The main purpose of the alliance for both sides seems to have been to secure the steady flow of Cretan soldiers into the Seleukid army. Any strategic interests of the Seleukids in Crete –otherwise unattested and not very likely– probably only played a minor role.⁴

of the *koinon* of the Kretaieis participated in the anti-Macedonian coalition. But that does not mean that the *koinon* was founded under the aegis of the Ptolemies: the Kretaieis participating in the coalition were allies of Areus and the Lakedaimonians, not of Philadelphos. The foundation (or renaming) of two cities named Arsinoe in Crete could also be roughly contemporary with Patroklos' intervention (Chaniotis 1996: 31 n. 140, with all relevant bibliography).

¹ The composition and organization of the Lyttos Alliance, which is only known from this inscription, are unknown (Chaniotis 1996: 449-50 n° 80).

² Apollonios (Olshausen 1973: 183 n° 131) is otherwise unattested.

³ Ll. 8-9: κατὰ τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ καὶ τῷ πατρὶ καὶ <κα>τὰ τὰς στήλας <τὰς> προὔπαρχούσας.

⁴ I follow the interpretation of van Effenterre 1948: 252. Launey [1987]: 253 overlooks the fact that the terms were recorded on the stelai on which the older treaty was inscribed, and claims that the (new) treaty “ne contient aucune clause militaire”; he also claims that the presence of a Cretan in the army of Antiochos Hierax confirms the relations between the Seleukids and Crete. But Cretans, the main export commodity of Crete, were traditionally used in all Hellenistic armies: at the battle of Raphia 5,500 Cretans fought, on both sides (Polyb. 5.65.7 and 79.10). Schmitt (SVA III p. 158; apparently followed by Chaniotis 1996: 32) also interpretes the alliances of the Lyttians with the Seleukids in the light of international diplomacy: he suggests that the alliance with Antiochos I was forged during the First Syrian War, ca. 274-271 (which is plausible), and that, in conjunction with a possible alliance of the *koinon* of the Oreioi (on which see Chaniotis 1996: 421-22 n° 70) and the Gortynians with Magas of Kyrene, who was an ally of Antiochos (SVA III 468 [*I. Cret.* II xvii 1]), constitutes proof of Antiochos' aim to counter the influence of the Ptolemies on Crete. There are several counter-arguments to Schmitt's theory: 1) The Ptolemaic influence on Crete in the 270's is not securely attested and, even if it existed, it was certainly not extended (see p. 460 n. 3, above). 2) Even if we accept that Lyttos, a member of the Gortynian Alliance, was included in the alliance with Magas (which is not certain, since the alliance with Magas may have been forged by Gortyn and the Oreioi alone, and not by the Gortynian Alliance in general;

The renewal of the alliance was ratified by the *kosmoi* and the assembly of Lyttos (ll. 4-5), as was customary in Cretan cities,¹ obviously on the proposal of the *kosmoi*.² The otherwise unattested Amnatos was the leader of the *kosmoi* and eponymous for the year (l. 13).

GORTYN

D99. [---] son of Aristonymos — D100. Paithemidas — D101. [Damasilas ?] son of Eurybotas

— [--- ^{ca. 7 (dat.)} ---] τῷ Ἀριστωνύμου — Παιθεμίδα[s] [---] — [Δαμασίλας ?] Εὐρυβώτα: SVA III 498 (*I. Cret.* IV 167; cf. SEG 13 [1956] 465)

In 237/6, after an embassy of the Gortynians and their allies (who probably included the Lyttians, the Arkadians, the Ariaioi and the Hyrtaioi)³ to Demetrios II and the corresponding royal embassy, the two sides concluded a treaty of friendship and alliance (SVA III 498). The few recognizable words of the text of the treaty make it clear that the main aim of the alliance was the recruitment of Cretans to the Macedonian army, a welcome addition for the king, in view of the coming war in the Greek mainland, which lasted almost throughout his reign.

In contrast to the aforementioned alliance between Lyttos and Antiochos II, in this case the initiative came from the Cretan side, for it was the Gortynians who sent the initial embassy. There are some indications in the often labyrinthine

see Chaniotis 1996: 447), this alliance would prove nothing regarding the aims of the Seleukids in Crete: in Hellenistic Crete, with its endlessly changing alliances, the postulate “the friend of my friend is my friend” was certainly not valid. 3) With the exception of the sporadic presence of Cretans in the Seleukid army (see van Effenterre 1948: 295-96 n^{os} 8-9 and Petropoulou 1985: 148-50, table 2) –which means nothing by itself–, there is no other attestation of any sort of relations between Cretan cities and the Seleukids until 204 (Rigsby 1996: n^{os} 136-152 and 154-161). 4) Schmitt’s theory could only be valid for the rule of Antiochos II, when Ptolemaic influence on Crete was well-established. But the relations between the Seleukids and the Ptolemies between 253 and 246 appear to have been peaceful (see, for example, Will 1979: 243) and the little we know about the end of Antiochos II’s reign seems to show that the king’s interest was principally oriented towards western Asia Minor (Will 1979: 246-47). There is no evidence that Crete and the central Aegean were an area which particularly concerned him (cf. p. 432, above). 5) Given the importance which war had for the economy and the society of Hellenistic Crete (Petropoulou 1985: 15-45), the various military treaties forged by Cretan cities with a number of Hellenistic states (see Petropoulou 1985: 15-27 and 139-43), can be considered as proof of Crete’s political and diplomatic relations with these states only when concurring evidence exists (cf. the following entry), which is not the case here.

¹ Rhodes 1997: 310-11.

² It is possible that the proposal of the Lyttian *kosmoi* was also put to the vote in the assemblies of the allied cities (Chaniotis 1996: 449).

³ On the Gortynian Alliance, see Chaniotis 1996: 445-48 n^o 78. The catalogue of allies is set out in the military agreement with Miletos (SVA III 482, ll. 50-51), dated to the 250’s (perhaps 253-250; see Chaniotis 1996: 33-35).

meanders of Hellenistic Cretan history¹ that the objective of the Gortynians should be explained by the developments in the balance of power between Cretan cities in the second half of the third century. Already in the early years of that period, the preponderance of Knosos began to be questioned, mainly by the Gortynian Alliance, a strong pole in Cretan politics.² Whether the reason was the pro-Ptolemaic tendency of Knosos (often assumed, but not explicitly attested),³ the Gortynians' need to secure a powerful ally in view of the inevitable confrontation with Knosos (which finally broke out violently in the last quarter of the century), or a combination of the two, the fact remains that, in their quest for allies, the enemies of Knosos turned to the Macedonian king. The alliance with Demetrios II is the first testimony to that policy; there followed similar treaties of Eleutherna and Hierapytna with Antigonos Doson,⁴ and, finally, the catalytic involvement of Philip V in Cretan politics, from his rise to the throne to ca. 200.⁵

The son of a certain Aristonymos was most probably the leader of the *kosmoi* of Gortyn and eponymous for 237/6.⁶ The Gortynian ambassadors were Paithemidas and the son of one Eurybotas, both undoubtedly Gortynian citizens. Aristonymos and Paithemidas are otherwise unknown.⁷ The leading *kosmos* of Gortyn recorded

¹ The vague and often contradictory sources on Hellenistic Crete render a concise historical account highly speculative. Apart from the admirable for its time but now largely obsolete synthetic work of van Effenterre 1948: 107-312, suffice it to cite Chaniotis 1996: 29-42, a balanced synthesis based on more recently discovered evidence and citing earlier bibliography.

² Strab. 10.4.7 may be referring to this period (van Effenterre 1948: 237-39).

³ In order to prove his argument that Knosos was part of the anti-Macedonian coalition during the Chremonidean War, van Effenterre 1948: 204 relied only on the fact that Olous and Itanos (both clearly pro-Ptolemaic cities, as we have seen) joined the Alliance of Knosos in the late 250's (SVA III 482.36-39); this is clearly insufficient evidence.

⁴ SVA III 501-502; see Buraselis 1981 (with earlier bibliography); Walbank 1988: 352; Kreuter 1992: 49-55; Le Bohec 1993: 387-88; Reger 1994b: 59; Hatzopoulos 1996: I 312-15.

⁵ On the war of Lyttos (ca. 221-218), see Chaniotis 1996: 36-38, with extensive bibliography in n. 174; on the *koinon* of the Kretaieis, re-established under the patronage of Philip V in ca. 217 (Polyb. 7.11.9), see Chaniotis 1996: 38 and 441-42 n° 76; on the Cretan War (ca. 206-204), see mainly Brulé 1978: 29-56 and Wiemer 2002: 143-176, with further bibliography.

⁶ The proposer is never recorded in Gortynian decrees. The assembly is usually considered to be the enacting body, but the *kosmoi* were obviously in charge of the legislative procedure (see, for example, *I. Cret.* IV 168, ca. 218), as in all Cretan cities (cf. the preceding entry).

⁷ Aristonymos was also the name of a mercenary from an unknown Cretan city, who was active at Hermione some time in the third century (*IG* IV 729, l. 3; see *BullEpigr* 1960, 163, with bibliography). The adolescent son of Sokydes, a new citizen of Miletos in 234/3 or 229/8, coming from an unknown Cretan city, was called Paithemidas (*Milet* I 3, 38r.7; on this inscription, see mainly Petropoulou 1985: 128-30 and 177-99; Brulé 1990: 238-42, 246; on the date, cf. the works cited by Chaniotis 1996: 14 n. 42). It should be noted that Guarducci's reading Παίθεμιδα in our inscription (SVA III 498) is not absolutely certain. Earlier editors read Πα[.]θε[.]ίδα and restored Πα[ρ]θε[ν]ίδα (see Schmitt's apparatus). In this regard, it is interesting that a Παρθεμιδας is attested in the catalogue of Cretan mercenaries from Hermione mentioned above (*IG* IV 729, l. 12).

in an inscription dated to 240-222 was called Eurybotas son of Damasilas;¹ it is very likely that the ambassador of 237/6 was either Eurybotas' father –his personal name obviously being Damasilas– or his son –in which case his personal name might again have been Damasilas.²

APOLLONIA

D102. [---] son of Tharsyphas

– [.]α[.]αρ[.] Θαρσυφα (?): SEG 24 (1969) 1175 (Braunert 1951: 235 n° 10; SB I 1643; Cook 1966: n° 1)

A *theoros* of Appollonia in Crete, who died during his mission at Alexandria, in ca. November 233. Braunert and Cook thought that the name of the *theoros* was Θαρσύφα[ς] (SEG 24 [1969] 1175, l. 2);³ it was Bingen who first recognized that this line records the patronym of the *theoros* and not his name,⁴ and, without comments, placed the accent on the last syllable (Θαρσυφᾶ), to the disagreement of Masson.⁵ I believe that Bingen was right, and that the name Θαρσυφᾶς should be considered a shortened form of the name Θαρσυφάνης, often attested in Crete.⁶ None of the many names of the Cretan onomasticon consistent with the preserved traces of the name of the *theoros*⁷ is attested for the poorly documented city of Appollonia. Among them, most interesting are the names Δάμαρις, which was the

The names Aristonymos and Paithemidas are also attested in first-century Gortyn (*I. Cret.* I xvii 21 and IV 253 respectively).

¹ Chaniotis 1996: n° 71 (*I. Cret.* IV 165).

² The prosopographical link between the ambassador of 237/6 and the *kosmos* of 240-222 was first proposed by Guarducci (in the *I. Cret.*) and (independently) by Wilhelm 1951: 36. Schmitt (*SVA* III p. 190) considers the restoration [Δαμασίλ]α in the beginning of l. 8 of our text “etwas zu kurz” and, judging from Guarducci’s transcription and the number of missing letters in the previous line, he is probably correct. That, however, does not mean that the restoration of the name Damasilas is incorrect; the beginning of l. 8 may have also carried the ending of the unknown patronym of Paithemidas.

³ Braunert 1951: 235 n° 10.

⁴ Bingen 1968: 390, followed by Huß 1976: 137 and *LGPN* I.

⁵ Masson, *OMS* I 62.

⁶ Masson (*ibid.*) explains his accentuation of the name (Θαρσύφας) by an original ending -φαντς (see the parallel of the Cretan name Ἀντίφας < Ἀντίφαντς). Nevertheless, the presence of the ending -φας in many names which can also derive from names ending in -φάνης (Διοφας, Θεοφας, Ἰσιφας and Ἀντιφας, Masson’s parallel) seems to favour the theory I propose here. It should be noted that Masson himself (*OMS* III 17) stresses Διοφᾶς, and considers that name an early example of the diminutive names in -ᾶς, often attested in the Roman period. For the name Θαρσυφάνης in Crete, see, for example, *I. Cret.* I xiv 2; I xvi 34; for other Cretan names with the stem Θαρσυ-, see Masson, *OMS* I 62. Given that in the end of the other lines of our inscription there undoubtedly were letters now extinct, one could suppose that the patronym of the *theoros* was, in fact, Θαρσυφά[νους]; nonetheless, Cook’s remarks about the surface of the vase at that particular point (see Bingen 1968: 390) seem to exclude this possibility.

⁷ [Δ]α[μ]άρ[ι]ς, [Δ]ά[μ]αρ[ι]ς, [Λ]α[χ]άρ[ι]ς, [Π]α[ν]άρ[ι]ς, [Φ]ά[λ]αρ[ι]ς, [Φ]ά[λ]αρ[ο]ς.

patronym of a new citizen of Miletos in 234/3 or 229/8, who came from an unknown Cretan city, and Λαχάρης, which was the patronym of two Cretan soldiers active at Hermione some time in the third century.¹

The Apollonia in question is most probably the better known Cretan Apollonia,² that is, the northern coastal neighbour of Knosos and its ally in the 250's.³ If we accept van Effenterre's theory, discussed in the preceding entry, that Gortyn's alliance with the Macedonians in the 230's was due to Knosos' pro-Ptolemaic affiliation, then the mission of the unknown Apollonian *theoros* in 233 may be explained by the ties of the Alliance of Knosos with the Ptolemies.⁴ Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the dispatch of a *theoros* to Alexandria hardly constitutes sufficient evidence of diplomatic dealings of Apollonia with the Alexandrian court.

POLYRRHENIA

D103. [---] son of Menon

— [. . .] ρ[. . .] Μένωνος; SEG 24 (1969) 1185 (SB I 1676; Cook 1966: n° 8 n. 7)

A Polyrrhenian ambassador who died at Alexandria in 229. The aim of the embassy to Euergetes is unclear. Polyrrhenia belonged to Sparta's allies during the Chremonidean War;⁵ it, thus, was an indirect ally of the Ptolemies. Since in the summer of 228, that is, soon after the embassy, Polyrrhenia was still an ally of Knosos,⁶ its ties with the Ptolemaic court are not surprising.⁷

By a late third-century decree of Troizen, Menon son of Menedamos of Polyrrhenia and his brother were honoured as *proxenoi* and benefactors, for ransoming Troizenian citizens during the Cretan War;⁸ his kinship with the father of the ambassador to Alexandria, however, cannot be ascertained.

¹ Milet I 3, 38u, l. 1 and IG IV 729, ll. 9 and 22 respectively; cf. p. 463 n. 7, above.

² On other Cretan cities of that name, see Guarducci 1933: 363-70. On the Apollonia of north-western Crete, see GGM I 507, l. 328, Steph. Byz., *Ethn.*, s.v. Ἀπολλωνία (κγ') and Chaniotis 1996: 382.

³ SVA III 482; on the date, see Chaniotis 1996: 33-35. On Apollonia's turbulent second-century history, see Chaniotis 1996: n°s 41, 43, 45.

⁴ On the relations of Cretan cities with Euergetes, see Huß 1976: 136-39.

⁵ Soon before the outbreak of the war, king Areus of Sparta was honoured at Polyrrhenia (*I. Cret.* II xxiii 12A), hence the city's inclusion in the Kretaiéis who were allied with Sparta during the war is unanimously accepted (see Chaniotis 1996: 32-33, with extensive bibliography). The alliance of Polyrrhenia with Sparta goes back to the early third century (Chaniotis 1996: n° 1 [*I. Cret.* II xi 1]).

⁶ IG II² 844; cf. van Effenterre 1948: 133-34.

⁷ Another Polyrrhenian was present at Alexandria during the reign of Philopator (SB 1.3999); this led Huß 1976: 157-58 to conclude that Polyrrhenia's relations with the Ptolemies were maintained until the 220's. It should be pointed out, however, that the latter Polyrrhenian is not attested as dying at Alexandria during an official mission on behalf of his country (see the justified reservations of Kreuter 1992: 40). Besides, by the beginning of Philopator's reign, Polyrrhenia seems to have distanced itself from the alliance with Knosos (Polyb. 4.53.6) and to have joined the camp of Philip V and the Achaians (4.55.1-5; cf. Chaniotis 1996: 450-51 n°s 81-82).

⁸ Bielman 1994: n° 43 (IG IV 756).

II. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In order to draw overall conclusions regarding the role of the individuals on whom this study has focused, we need to assume three distinct points of view: that of the city, that of the royal administration and that of the intermediaries themselves. In other words, it is necessary to co-examine the manner in which the intermediaries were chosen and used both by the city and by the king, as well as the objectives and the benefits of the intermediaries as individuals. In the first section of this concluding chapter, I shall examine the issues from the perspective of both the individuals and the royal authorities; namely, I shall deal with some common features regarding civic intermediaries: their social standing, the circumstances under which their first contact with the court took place, the ways in which this relationship evolved, the intermediaries' benefits from it, their institutional position vis-à-vis both the city and the court. The second section deals with the city's point of view: the importance of civic honours for royal officials, the criteria by which the city chose particular intermediaries, and the degree to which the intermediaries' activities corresponded with the express wishes of the city. Finally, in the third section I shall return to the intermediaries, in order to attempt an overall evaluation of their role in the balance of power and in the political practice of the relations between city and king, as well as in Hellenistic society in general.

1. INTERMEDIARIES AND ROYAL ADMINISTRATION

1.1. Ancestry, social standing and political experience of the intermediaries

A first, more or less self-evident, observation that needs to be made is that the citizens who became involved in the relationship between a city and a king were the offspring of illustrious families and/or had financial ease and/or were previously heavily involved in politics, both domestic and international. The examples are numerous, and there is no point in providing a list here; in fact, there is practically no exception to the rule: in almost all cases where we have some evidence on the intermediaries' social background, it is clear that they belonged to the highest strata of their respective societies. Even Demades (**A2**), reviled by the hostile to him literary tradition for his humble background, may have been a *homo novus* in politics, but, in reality, was the offspring of a relatively well-off family – as was Stratokles (**A19**), the other *homo novus* of Early Hellenistic Athenian politics, also a target of literary libel himself. The civic leaders of Greek cities and *koina*

normally handled diplomatic contacts with the kings personally.¹ As in the Classical period, taking part in an embassy continued to be viewed as the culmination of a prominent citizen's career in public service, even when this citizen had not been previously involved in international diplomacy.² The fact that intermediaries belonged to the higher strata of their city's society should come as no surprise. Given the crucial importance of the relationship between city and king for all aspects of civic life, it should be expected that the relationship materialized through the city's social, political and financial elite. This was an important phenomenon already before the Hellenistic age, and it would later become one of the defining features of the relations between Greek cities and Rome.³

1.2. Initiating the relationship with the court

Taking the intermediaries' high social standing and political experience for granted, we can now turn to the circumstances under which they first came into contact with the royal administration. Obviously, the details of their acquaintance with the royal administration most often elude us. Nevertheless, some observations are possible to make. Firstly, 'acquaintance' is used here as a generic term, which does not presuppose actual personal proximity to the king in person or to his representatives. Aratos' (B13) political enemies hastened to "compete with one another in sending letters" to Ptolemy III, by which they informed him that Aratos had (temporarily) allied himself with Gonatas in 245.⁴ Nothing obliges us to

¹ Typical examples are Demochares (A49) –who, as soon as he returned to Athens in 286/5, hastened to lead or instigate four embassies to kings or aspiring kings–, Aratos (B13) –whose career set off when he requested help from two kings–, and Thoas (C37) –who advanced his anti-Roman political agenda with successive embassies to Antiochos III. Eurykleides and Mikion (A71-72) may form a partial exception to this rule, as –if my analysis is correct– they apparently pulled the strings of Athenian diplomacy and planned the Athenian post-229 foreign policy of neutrality –a policy accompanied by contacts with all important kings of the period–, but did not become personally involved in the diplomatic process itself.

² See, for example, the case of Xenokles (A31).

³ For the Classical period, see, for example, Mosley 1973: 43 and Adcock / Mosley 1975: 158, who point out that all major civic leaders of the period dealt with diplomatic contacts in person, with the exception of Perikles and Ephialtes. For the Late Hellenistic period, see the example of Priene, studied by Fröhlich 2005. For the Roman Republican and Imperial periods, see the material gathered by Canali de Rossi 1997 and Ziethen 1994, respectively. The long decrees in honour of Polemaios and Menippos of Klaros (SEG 39 [1989] 1243-1244) provide us with the archetypical example of Greek ambassadors to Rome, in more than one respect.

⁴ Plut., *Arat.* 15.4. Cf. the ἐπιστόλια sent by Athenian scholars and statesmen to Gonatas in order to congratulate him on his naval victory at Kos (Diog. Laert. 4.39), or, conversely, the successive letters by Antipatros to a fictional character in Theophr., *Char.* 23.3-4, and the famous archive of Kallipolis (Pantos 1985), with copies of letters sent from at least three monarchies (Ptolemies, Seleukids, Attalids) to Aitolian authorities. As the editor points out (Pantos 1985: 434), one cannot rule out the possibility that some of these letters were not official documents but private letters of kings to members of the illustrious family of Kallipolis, to which the archive belonged.

assume that these statesmen had been in contact with the Ptolemaic court already before these letters were sent, especially if we take into account that Aratos alone seems to have handled all dealings of the Achaian *koinon* with the throne of Alexandria.¹

On the other hand, there are several cases in which the first contact occurred in the context of actual physical proximity. The occasion was sometimes provided by a king's visit to the city: Kleoptolemos of Chalkis (**D87**), for example, probably orchestrated his daughter's acquaintance and subsequent marriage to Antiochos III, taking advantage of the king's sojourn in Chalkis throughout the winter of 192/1. Another type of social event in the context of the king's presence in the city was the meeting of the king with philosophers and scholars. Such must have been, for example, the circumstances of the first contact of Menedemos (**D95**) with Poliorketes and the young Antigonos Gonatas. More ordinary must have been the acquaintance of citizens with royal officials having some jurisdiction over the city or parts of it: an illustrating example is the bond forged between the local society of Rhamnous with the Athenian phrourarchs who, in essence, belonged to the Macedonian army (see **A68-70**). Official diplomatic contacts were another occasion which must have marked the beginning of a citizen's relationship with a royal court in a number of cases – Aristolochos son of Zmendron of Kos (**D10**) is probably a characteristic example. War was also a privileged circumstance for a citizen to become acquainted with a king, whether the citizen in question fought alongside royal forces, against them, or simply happened to live in an area of military operations. Demades (**A2**) owed his acquaintance with the Macedonians to his participation in the battle of Chaironeia; Olympiodoros (**A44**) owed his (tumultuous) relationship with Poliorketes to his military collaboration with Macedonian forces during the Four-Year War; Aristreas (**B2**) took advantage of Pyrrhos' presence in the Peloponnese during the latter's war against Gonatas in order to invite Pyrrhos to Argos; Aratos' grandfather (?) (**B12**) probably forged a relationship of hospitality and friendship with Ptolemy I and Poliorketes when the two kings were present in the Peloponnese in 308 and 303 respectively. Interestingly, the most illuminating description of such a first contact concerns a relationship which does not seem to have materialized, after all: literary sources describe in detail the acquaintance of Philopoimen with Antigonos Doson during the battle of Sellasia in 222, the king's appreciation for the young Achaian officer, and his invitation to Philopoimen to enlist in the Macedonian army, an invitation which Philopoimen declined.²

¹ On the contrary, Demades' (**A2**) correspondence with Perdikkas seems to presuppose the acquaintance of the two men.

² Doson's praise of Philopoimen: Polyb. 2.68.1-2; Plut. *Philop.* 6.13; invitation: Plut., *Philop.* 7.1-2; Paus. 8.49.6-7; *Suda*, s.v. Φιλοποίμην). On Philopoimen's subsequent career, cf. p. 29 n. 2, above.

Although available evidence usually does not allow us to confirm this, we may assume that honouring the king and his officials, especially in a city under the direct or indirect rule of a king, formed an excellent opportunity for entering into contact with the royal administration, and, accordingly, for social advancement. We have no reason, for example, to suppose prior contacts with the Macedonians on the part of the dedicants of the epigram to the Saviours Antigonos and Demetrios (**A20-30**), soon after the ‘liberation’ of Athens by Poliorketes. More characteristically, nothing in the past of Stratokles (**A19**) suggests any contacts of his with Poliorketes or the Macedonians before 307. His total absence from the sources from 322 to 307, in conjunction with his meteoric rise to power in 307, allows the assumption that it was precisely the extravagant honouring of Poliorketes and Antigonos in 307 that led both to his close relationship with the Macedonian administration and to his role as the undisputed leader of the regime of 307-301.

Often, the first contact was mediated by a third party.¹ When Amphidamos (**B38**), the captive general of the Eleians, tried to negotiate for his freedom, offering in exchange to convince the Eleians to enter the king’s alliance, “he begged through certain persons for an audition with the king” (Polyb. 4.84.2: ἔσπευσε διά τινων εἰς λόγους ἐλθεῖν τῷ βασιλεῖ). Ambassadors and *theoroi* to the royal courts routinely used the services of fellow citizens of theirs, or the services of other persons who were in various ways connected with the city and members of the royal administration at the same time, or were otherwise in a position to influence the king’s decisions (see **2.3**, below). In general, it cannot have been particularly difficult for any citizen to find someone who could put him in contact with representatives of the royal administration, especially if the king in question was actively involved in the area.²

Finally, it should be noted that the initiative for this first contact could come from the royal side. The aforementioned example of Philopoimen is an illustration of the recruitment of citizens to the royal army or administration by the king himself or by his officers (cf. **1.7**, below). In other cases, royal interest was focused on persons who would not leave their country but would remain in place as official or unofficial representatives of royal power. When Apelles wished to vitiate

¹ Mediation by a third party, often a common *xenos*, was the norm in the initiation of a ‘ritualized friendship’ (Herman 1987: 46-47). Herman’s useful analysis of this sort of relationship (1987: 41-72) is, in my opinion, somewhat enfeebled by the fact that he has not included examples from the post-Classical period, whereas he has included many mythological examples (for criticism of Herman’s analysis from a different angle, see Mitchell 1997, especially 22-51). In the Attalid court the introduction to the king (σύστασις) seems to have taken the form of a particular ceremonial procedure: see *SEG* 37 (1987) 1006, with the observations of Savalli-Lestrade 1996: 168.

² Cf. the probably exaggerated picture of mid-third-century Peloponnese drawn by Plutarch (*Arat.* 25.6), with collaborators and spies of the Macedonian throne active “almost everywhere”.

Aratos' close bond with Philip V, he summoned Aratos' political enemies, discussed with them, entertained them and asked for their friendship (Polyb. 4.82.4); he then promoted Eperatos (**B41**) to the leadership of the Achaian *koinon*. Demetrios, grandson of Demetrios of Phaleron (**A59**), owed his office of *thesmothetes* to the appreciation of his bravado by Gonatas; if we are to trust our sources, he does not seem to have actively elicited the king's esteem himself. Whether the royal side detached individuals from the civic context to enlist them in the royal administration, or used them within the city as allies and supporters (a distinction which, as we shall see, was not always clear), the kings showed an active interest in forging a personal relationship with civic leaders; this is another indication of how important the personal aspect of the relationship was for both sides.

1.3. Prior contacts with the court

A feature shared by many intermediaries catalogued in this study is that they were (or can be reasonably assumed to have been) in contact with the royal court already before they undertook a mediating role on behalf of their home city: they could have inherited the relationship with the court from their ancestors (see **1.4**, below), they could have already formally belonged to the royal administration (see **1.8**, below), or, more simply, they could have been in contact with the royal court in an earlier phase in their career.¹ What is of particular interest is the ways in which all three sides involved (the city, the king, and the intermediary) took advantage of these prior contacts.

In a number of cases an intermediary's prior contacts with a royal court proved instrumental in his mission's success –which explains why such prior contacts formed an important criterion for the selection of intermediaries by the cities (cf. **2.3**, below). Boulagoras' (**D37**) embassy to Antiochos II, would probably not have been so fruitful, if the ambassador did not already have access to the Seleukid court; Thersippos (**D49**) would not have reaped so many benefits for Nesos from the Successors, had he not forged personal bonds with many of the protagonists of the period during his service in Alexander's army.²

In other cases, however, the city's benefit from such prior contacts –if any– is not discernible; in these cases, the past of the intermediary's relationship with the royal court worked in favour of the royal side and/or to the intermediary's personal benefit. Hegemon (**A10**) did not exploit his pre-322 Macedonian contacts for the city's benefit: the only visible results of his 'Macedonian' past were his rise to political leadership, and, for Antipatros, the existence of an unquestionably

¹ Examples –certain, probable or possible– are numerous: **A1, A2, A3, A5, A6, A10, A38** (?), **A39** (?), **A44, A45, A46** (?), **A48** (?), **A75** (?), **A76, B7** (?), **B32** (?), **C35, C36, D21** (?), **D37, D49, D71-73** (?), **D95**.

² See also **A2, A39, A46** (?), **A48** (?), **A75** (?), **A76, B13**.

loyal ally who could help the viceroy restrain the unruly Athenians. The propagandistic display of Ptolemy III's (?) royal authority through the dedications of Sosippos and Lamios (**C35-36**) at Thermon did not necessarily reflect royal benefactions to the Aitolians in general, nor did it necessarily reflect official Aitolian policy: it was merely a reflection of the dedicants' bond with the king –not necessarily in their capacity as Aitolians, but as individuals, who had also probably served in the Ptolemaic army– and, rather than the interests of the Aitolian state, these dedications mostly served the enhancement of the dedicants' own social status.¹

Regardless of who benefited from the intermediaries' prior contacts with the court, however, a common denominator exists: the past of the intermediaries' relationship with the king mattered, for it inevitably influenced how the relationship evolved.

1.4. A durable relationship: intermediaries and the courts

This brings us to the question of the duration of the relationship between intermediaries and the courts. Having access to the royal administration could be a constant in a Hellenistic statesman's career. From 338 to 319, Athenians consistently employed the services of Demades (**A2**) whenever they needed someone to conduct difficult negotiations with the Macedonians. Stratokles (**A19**) was in the limelight of Athenian politics only while Poliorketes was holding sway over Athens, and only because of that sway: he owed his leading position in 307-301 to the profuse honours which he proposed or instigated for the king and his officials, he lost all his political capital after the king's defeat at Ipsos, and (unsuccessfully) attempted to re-enter the stage only when Poliorketes was once again in control of Athens. Peisis of Thespiiai (**C15**) collaborated with the forces of Antigonos and Poliorketes in 313 and 304-302; even after his relationship with the Antigonid court was disrupted by the first Boiotian revolt against the king in 293 or 292, it was precisely the past of the relationship which facilitated its re-establishment immediately afterwards. The alliance of Menedemos (**D95**) with Poliorketes and Gonatas was a constant in his policies and in his career, despite his temporary pursuit of alternative alliances in *ca.* 287.

Of greater interest is the bequest of the relationship to the next generations. Demades (**A2**) introduced his son Demeas (**A7**) to high politics, international diplomacy and to the relationship with the Macedonian viceroy, when he took Demeas with him in the embassy of 319 to Antipatros –which, nonetheless, proved fatal for both father and son. Kallimedon (**A6**) owed his Macedonian contacts to his father Kallikrates. Damoteles (**C3**), general of Megara in *ca.* 235-232 –most

¹ See also **A3, A4, A6, A44, A45, B3-6, B32 (?)**, **D95**; cf. also 2.5, below.

probably appointed to his office by Demetrios II– appointed his son Dameas to a public office during the year of his generalship.¹

The longevity of the relationship, however, is best illustrated in the case of four important third-century families: the families of Aristippos of Argos (**B1**, **B3-6**), of Aratos of Sikyon (**B12-14**), of Askondas of Thebes (**C20-22**), and of Aristolochos of Kos (**D10** and **D17**). Aristippos' family ruled over Argos from 303 to 224; not only did it owe its pre-eminence to the collaboration of its first attested member with Poliorketes (**B1**), but all its leading members had a close bond with the Antigonid house over four generations. Aratos would not have been catapulted to the leadership of the city at such a young age, if it were not for his inherited contacts with the courts of Pella and Alexandria; in turn, he also bequeathed his relationship with the Macedonian throne to his homonymous son (**B14**). Members of Askondas' family served as the Antigonids' most loyal allies and supporters in Boiotia for more than four generations. Finally, the family of Aristolochos –if I have reconstructed its stemma accurately– seems to have been solely responsible for dealing with the Macedonian court on behalf of Kos again over four generations.

The importance which these long-lasting bonds with the royal courts had for the city (cf. **2.2**, below), the kings (cf. **1.7-8**, below) and for the intermediaries themselves (cf. **1.6**, below) cannot be overemphasized. Had these bonds been truly stable, they would have formed the first step for the gradual incorporation of the world of the *poleis* into the royal realm, then still in the making. The king would have been able to count on loyal allies and supporters within the city, who would ensure that the city promptly conformed to royal wishes. As we shall see presently, however, these bonds may have been characterized by longevity, but not by stability.

1.5. An unstable relationship: the incomplete subjugation of civic elites to royal power

A careful examination of the activity of the members of the families referred to in the preceding paragraphs reveals that their compliance with the royal agenda was anything but self-evident. Aristomachos I (**B4**) chose to end the war with Alexandros son of Krateros, effectively facilitating the contender's defense against Gonatas' attack. Despite being funded by Demetrios II, Aristomachos II (**B6**) did

¹ The networks of interpersonal relationships could often be much more intricate than the straightforward 'bequest' of useful contacts by one generation to the next, which is implied by the simplified picture drawn above. To give but one example, Phaidros' (**A46**) and Kallias' (**A47**) ties with the Ptolemaic court may have been facilitated by the presence of Demetrios of Phaleron in Alexandria (**A4**), with whom Phaidros' and Kallias' father Thymochares (**A17**) had collaborated. In that case, however, we cannot speak of a bequest, for, as far as we know, Thymochares was not in contact with the Ptolemaic court. Nevertheless, Phaidros and Kallias were able to take advantage of their family surrounding's contacts.

not hesitate to take advantage of the king's death, the confusion over his succession and of the Achaian's bribe, in order to incorporate his city in the Achaian *koinon*, then the chief enemy of the Macedonians; in 225, when the Achaian *koinon* had become an ally of the Macedonians, Aristomachos again allied himself (willingly or not) with an enemy of the Macedonians, namely Kleomenes III. Aratos (**B13**), a family *xenos* both of the Ptolemies and of the Antigonids, switched alliances from one king to the other more than once, according to his estimation of where Achaian interest lay –viewed through the prism of his personal agenda. Neon I (**C21**), although having chosen to ally the Boiotians with Doso in 227, in a juncture particularly difficult for the Macedonian king, later promoted a policy of neutrality (without distancing himself from the king), rather than a policy of an unconditional alliance with Pella.

The backbone of the political predominance of these important families was their connection with the courts; if, then, the fulfilment of royal wishes was anything but self-evident for the members of these families, we can understand how negotiable the subjugation to royal authority was for the rest of the intermediaries, even for those most reviled in our sources for their supposed servility towards the kings. Demetrios of Phaleron (**A4**), a man saved from a pending death penalty by Kassandros and put in charge of Athens, may have participated in Kassandros' wars, but did not hesitate to approach Kassandros' enemies, be it in order to relieve the tension of domestic unrest. Thymochares (**A17**), the admiral of Demetrios' regime, did not hesitate to forcefully promote Athenian interests by making demands to the Macedonian overlord. Kykliadas (**B43**), the last representative of the pro-Macedonian leadership of the Achaian *koinon*, did not hesitate to promote a policy of neutrality, which cannot have been to Philip V's liking. Peisis (**C15**) was not the only Greek statesman who oscillated between serving Poliorketes' interests and revolting against him; Phaidros son of Thymochares (**A46**) apparently followed a similar course, siding with Poliorketes and Gonatas or leading revolts against them, depending on the political current prevailing in Athens. In the majority of cases, the defining criterion for these statesmen's choices was first and foremost their personal interest. This interest may have coincided with the interests of the king, of the city, or both, or, even, neither. Given that they usually remained bound by the limitations of domestic politics, they had to avoid unnecessarily provoking the sentiments of the majority; accordingly, the unconditional fulfilment of their obligations to their royal patrons often came as the distant third choice of political course; what weighed in more heavily in their choices was their personal interest in the context of the domestic balance of power.

Even worse for royal authority, the individuals whose career we have been examining often had contacts with more than one king, either successively or simultaneously. This automatically reduced the structural benefit which a personal bond with civic leaders had for a king. A number of civic leaders –among

whom none perhaps was more adventurous than Demades (**A2**)– consciously tried to take advantage of the antagonism between the protagonists of the period, turning one against the other, so as to promote their city’s interests. Others give the impression that their approaching more than one king was due more to the need of political survival: Phokion (**A3**), Demetrios of Phaleron (**A4**), Lachares (**A41**), Phaidros (**A46**), an ancestor of Aratos (**B12**), and Nikodemos of Messene (**B29**) approached more than one king, or other Macedonian leaders, in their continued effort to improve their position and remain in power –or even, as in the case of Phokion, to save their own lives. Finally, for others the motive appears to have been nobler: by contacting more than one king, they strove to attain the financial, diplomatic or military strengthening of their city, or even –as paradoxical as it may seem– their city’s full autonomy. The archetypical example for this subcategory is undoubtedly provided by Eurykleides and Mikion (**A71-72**), whose policy is epigrammatically described by the unjustly scathing words of Polybios: “they bestowed effusive flattery upon all kings” (5.106.8: εἰς πάντας τοὺς βασιλεῖς ἐξεκέχυντο).¹ Regardless of the motives, however, for the royal court the result was the same. When cities and their civic leaders did not limit their contacts to one king, the attachment of the city to royal authority was by definition weakened.² From the royal point of view, the personal bond of a civic leader with a king or his officials did not even secure the future loyalty of the civic leader himself, let alone the loyalty of the city which he represented.

1.6. Benefits for the intermediaries

An interesting facet of the intermediaries’ role is their subsequent career and whether they benefited from their mediating activity, either in the context of their home city’s political life or abroad. In describing their possible benefits we need to proceed with caution, so as to avoid confusion between cause and effect. Without supporting evidence, there is no reason to assume that a civic leader with a prominent role in his home city’s relationship with a king owed his leading position to his mediating activity. Under normal circumstances, the opposite should be expected to be true: the individual handling diplomatic contacts with a king already belonged to the city’s leadership, which is why he became involved in diplomatic relations in the first place. Thoas (**C37**), for example, may have sought to reap personal benefits from his role as the main agent of communication between the Aitolians and Antiochos III, but certainly did not owe his

¹ See also the cases of Demochares (**A49**), Theophrastos (**A77**), Kephisodoros (**A80**), Aratos (**B13**) initially, Xanthippos (**C24**), Charops (**C46**), Timasitheos (**D4**), Boulagoras (**D37**), Aristolochos (**D79**) and (for a few years around 287) Menedemos (**D95**).

² Hellenistic rulers gradually came to realize the problem: in the last quarter of the third century, the kings occasionally forbade contacts of cities under their –even indirect– rule with other kings without their prior explicit consent (see p. 245 n. 4, above).

position in the *koinon*'s leadership to his Seleukid contacts. Even when contacts with a royal court seem to predate the intermediary's rise to civic leadership, his political prominence need not have been the result of his royal contacts. We need not suspect, for example, that Philippides son of Philomelos (**A38**) owed his political status after Ipsos to his contacts with Kassandros; Philippides was a prominent oligarch, born to an important and wealthy family, and it was only natural that a man of such social and political background would be in a position to exploit the implosion of the 307-301 regime. Finally, a third distinction is necessary: only the benefits which postdate a leader's mediating activity are useful to the purposes of this study. Thersippos (**D49**) undoubtedly earned money and social status from his career in Alexander's army, but it is only the benefits he reaped after his successive contacts with the Macedonian generals which are illuminating for the importance which his role as an intermediary to the Macedonians had for his home city. How Philippides son of Philokles (**A40**) ended up as a high-ranking courtier of Lysimachos is of minor importance compared to how he later made use of his position in order to establish himself as the main channel of communication between the court and his home city, and to how he was viewed by his fellow citizens on account of that role.

These cautionary remarks aside, there are still numerous and important cases where the inescapable conclusion is that the intermediaries gained specific benefits from their mediating activities; even more importantly, these benefits sometimes involved a career path transcending the boundaries of the city.

To begin with a tangible benefit, a personal relationship with the king was a prime source of material wealth. It is always difficult to ascertain the degree to which the unsubstantiated charge of bribery by the king –so frequent in the literary sources– corresponds to reality; nevertheless, it is clear that many city representatives occasionally or systematically received money or land from the king as individuals,¹ or that they received monetary donations on behalf of the city, which they subsequently either embezzled or, at the very least, used in order to advance their personal status in city politics.²

Most often, however, it was owing to royal support that intermediaries were able to rise to civic leadership, consolidate their power or maintain their leading position despite popular opposition. Some of them –like Demetrios of Phaleron (**A4**), Olympiodoros (**A44**), the Megarian generals in ca. 235 (**C1-6**), Peisis of Thespiai (**C15**) after the first Boiotian revolt, perhaps Kaios and Douris (**D33-34**)– were implanted as Head of State by the king, either formally and directly or informally

¹ Cf. **A2**, **A6** and **A10** (although the granting of money and land to Kallimedon and Hegemon may have predated the Lamian War), **A83** (although Livy's contention that Apollodoros was bribed by Livy may simply be part of the systematic defamation of all supporters of Antiochos III by Roman propaganda), **C20-22**.

² **B13**, **B19**, **C24**, **C39**.

and indirectly.¹ Others consolidated their position in civic leadership in a more legitimate manner or relying on their own political and military forces; nevertheless, it must have been perfectly clear to any observer, both in the city and at the royal court, that they were in fact exploiting their royal contacts. Among numerous examples, one may single out Phokion (**A3**), Stratokles (**A19**), Lachares (**A41**), Dromokleides (**A42**), the families of Aristippos (**B1**, **B3-6**), Aratos (**B13-14**) and Askondas (**C20-22**), Damis (**B32**), Aristotimos of Elis (**B37**), Xanthippos of Elateia (**C24**), Nikandros in Aitolia (**C39**), Menedemos (**D95**) and Aigon of Itanos (**D97**). In many of these cases, one wonders if these statesmen would have succeeded in rising to power or in maintaining their leading position, despite the growing discontent of their political rivals or the people, were it not for royal support or for the realization by both their friends and their enemies that they possessed a powerful royal ally. One should also take into consideration those who were unsuccessful in their attempt to rise to power or to regain power with royal support: men like Aristreas of Argos (**B2**), Cheilon of Sparta (**B28**), Thrasyboulos (**B36**) and Amphidamos of Elis (**B38**) apparently bet on the wrong royal patron.

Even when civic intermediaries did not rise to the leadership of the city, their status within local societies was enhanced in ways which undoubtedly had an impact on the balance of power. We often have unambiguous evidence on their enhanced status, but no direct evidence that they were also members of the leadership of the city.² This should not be taken to mean that the social capital they obtained from their mediating activities was politically irrelevant: even if we ignore the fact that lack of reference to their belonging to the civic leadership may simply be due to the deficiencies of our source material, we should not forget that, by ancient standards, enhanced social status by definition had political repercussions.³

All this, however, should be more or less expected in the Greek world, with its multitude of statal entities and their web of intricate interstate relationships. In the Classical period too, the personal contacts of a leading citizen with representatives

¹ The case of Demetrios son of Phanostratos (**A59**), appointed to an insignificant Athenian office at the king's whim, serves as a useful reminder that royal intervention should not be perceived as limited to the city's leadership. The tighter the dependence of the city on royal authority was, the greater the part of civic hierarchy manned according to the king's instructions must have been.

² See, for example, **C35-36**, **D49**, **D96**.

³ This may be illustrated by the evidence on Nikomedes' (**D8**) family at Kos (see p. 363 n. 6, above): while we have no evidence that Nikomedes himself was –or even wished to be– politically active at Kos, the high regard he enjoyed by his fellow citizens on account of his role as the main intermediary to Antigonos' court undoubtedly enhanced his family's social standing: at least two, and possibly many more, of his descendants are attested as belonging to the Koan civic elite in later generations.

of one of the Great Powers of the time were also a valuable political asset. What is more significant in the cases examined in this study is that, often, the benefits for intermediaries were not limited within the political boundaries of the city. An ambitious statesman, who actively developed his connections with a royal court, often cast his net over a wider political arena in his quest for personal power and status. This arena could simply be the world of the *poleis* in general, as in the cases of Areus I of Sparta (**B17**) and Glaukon of Athens (**A55**).¹ As a rule, however, the arena targeted by the intermediary was precisely the royal court with which he came into contact. The royal administration was targeted in a number of ways. To begin with, the court could provide a safe haven when the correlation of power in the city or the international juncture became dangerous for the statesman's power, or even for his life. Glaukon and Chremonides (**A55-56**) sought refuge at the Ptolemaic court after the Athenian defeat in the Chremonidean War, and their success in their new career became proverbial.² Kleomenes III of Sparta (**B19**) was also forced to seek refuge in Alexandria after the battle of Sellasia, even if he continued, unrealistically, to consider this a temporary refuge. After the anti-Macedonian Spartan faction prevailed in 220, Polyphontas, the pro-Macedonian ephor of Sparta (**B21**), turned to Philip V. Most of the major Greek allies of Antiochos III – men like Thoas (**C37**), Mnasilochos (**C43**), Euboulidas (**D88**) or Philon (**D89**) – had to flee to the Seleukid realm when their anti-Roman policy collapsed in 191; eventually, none of them avoided extradition to Rome. Menedemos (**D95**) had to seek refuge at Pella when his pro-Macedonian policy led to his overthrow by the anti-Macedonians of Eretria. All leaders just mentioned expectedly turned to the court of the king with whom they had forged close political ties, shared common strategic interests, or, simply, with whom they had developed a personal relationship. In other cases, the 'court as a haven' motif was less straightforward. Phokion (**A3**) attempted to switch Macedonian patrons, but was unsuccessful, as his secret negotiations with Polyperchon came too late. Demetrios of Phaleron (**A4**), originally sought refuge at Thebes, the military stronghold of his patron Kassandros, but finally chose a safer or more promising retreat to the distant court of Ptolemy I. After successive contacts with Kassandros and, perhaps, Ptolemy I, Lachares (**A41**) finally settled at the court of Lysimachos. Kykliadas (**B43**) had to turn to Philip's court, despite the fact that his policy was a middle course between

¹ See also the cases of Peisis of Thespiai, in the early stages of his career (p. 313 n. 6, above) and Demaratos of Sparta (p. 436 with n. 2, above). It is no accident that Areus and Glaukon were the leaders of the anti-Macedonian coalition of the Chremonidean War. In both cases, the prestige arising from their alliance with Ptolemy II and their personal role in that alliance were put to the service of the propagandistic needs both of the anti-Macedonian coalition (the rally of all Greeks against the common enemy) and of personal ambition (especially in the case of Areus).

² Teles, *Περὶ φυγῆς* 23 (Hense).

the pro-Macedonian orientation of his Achaian predecessors and the anti-Macedonian orientation of his successors.

The circumstances under which a civic leader or his offspring became formally attached to the royal administration towards which they had represented their home city were usually less dramatic than in the cases enumerated above. Aratos (**B13**) did not become a member of the Macedonian administration in a quasi-institutional sense because he had lost a war, like Glaukon and Chremonides, but in order to win one; the price he was more than willing to pay for the Macedonians' alliance, without which he would not have been able to defeat Kleomenes III, was to become a representative of Macedonian rule in the Peloponnese, while continuing to serve in the highest offices of the Achaian *koinon*. His homonymous son (**B14**) found himself between the two worlds from the very beginning of his short career: he was both an official of the *koinon* and a courtier, playing his part in court intrigues. Pyrrhos, the father of Diokleidas, Doso's envoy to Amorgos, had served as general of Megara shortly before 235; although Pyrrhos was not part of the synarchy instituted by Demetrios II in ca. 235, it is clear that Diokleidas' Macedonian career had its origins in the inevitable contact of his father with the Macedonian administration.¹ Brachylles son of Neon (**C22**) did not start his career as a Boiotian leader as his father had done, but as an *epistates* of Sparta on behalf of the Macedonian throne.

The example of the philosopher Prytanis of Karystos (**A75**) sums up most of the motifs of the intermediaries' role, successes and benefits discussed so far. He was chosen by his second homeland, Athens, as an ambassador to Antigonos Doso either because he was already acquainted with the Macedonian court or because the Athenians considered it likely that he would be well received at Pella as a man of letters. Apparently he did make a good impression at court, the result being that the Athenians continued to use his services in their effort to maintain a working relationship with the Macedonian king. On a personal level, the result was even more beneficial; the king engaged Prytanis' services and sent him as a law-maker to Megalopolis. Few cases highlight the tripartite nature of the intermediaries' role and benefits as well as that of Prytanis: the philosopher forged a relationship with a king, successfully meeting the expectations of the city which sent him to the king as its representative; the king acquired a useful addition to his staff; the philosopher rose from a metic scholar to a law-giver on the king's payroll, while continuing to offer his services to Athens, the city which provided him with the opportunity to enter the royal administration in the first place.

¹ Diokleidas son of Pyrrhos: IG XII 7, 221b; Pyrrhos son of Diokleidas: Heath 1913: n^{os} I-II; see p. 302 n. 3 and **D53**, above.

1.7. The use of citizen intermediaries by the royal administration

Whatever an intermediary's past involvement with the royal administration may have been, and regardless of which side took the initiative for the relationship (the city, the intermediary or the king), the royal side was in a position to exploit these individuals in three ways: by incorporating them into the royal administrative machine, by using them as allies and supporters in the political life of the city, or by a combination of the two. As already explained in the Introduction, cases of citizens who, while employed by a royal administration, ceased (or, are not known to have continued) to be involved in their home city's political life present no interest for the purposes of this study. The other two uses of citizen intermediaries, on the contrary, are particularly interesting; before dealing with the third, which is a phenomenon important enough to deserve separate treatment (1.8, below), I should briefly discuss some aspects of the second.

As far as the attachment of the city to royal power is concerned, we must assume that a statesman friendly to the king was, at least initially, useful to the king precisely as long as he remained an intrinsic part of his home city's political structures. The only other way the king could ensure that the city would conform to royal orders or would, at the very least, follow a policy not detrimental to royal interests, was by using military force (or by threatening to do so). Since army mobilization and the establishment of garrisons were costly and politically problematic, the existence of civic leaders friendly to the king in the city's leadership constituted a precious and cost-effective alternative, requiring less money, energy, and human resources. Accordingly, the fact that friendly statesmen could secure a given city's compliance with royal interests –be it temporarily or under terms– was a huge benefit for the king. On certain occasions, such as the incident at Larymna (see C20-21), the presence of friendly civic leaders could literally save a king's life. Moreover, next to examples of unstable or temporary alliances (1.5), there are numerous examples of alliances which proved stable over time (1.4) –some times despite the express will of the city to the contrary (2.5), or in the face of imminent military pressure by the king's opponent. The latter case is highlighted by the case of Damis (B32), who remained loyal to his allegiance to Kassandros, even when Polyperchon besieged the city, or by the case of the Argive leaders of 198, who remained loyal to the Argives' traditional alliance with Philip V, despite Roman pressure.¹ In a cost-benefit analysis, local statesmen likely to serve the king's interests were the king's best choice in the –by definition– problematic relations between autonomous cities and Hellenistic monarchies.

It would, however, be a grave omission to think of the personal bond between a citizen and a royal administration only in terms of decision-making in the strict sense of the term. The citizen intermediaries facilitated the incorporation of the

¹ See below, p. 499 n. 2 and p. 222 n. 4, above.

king's presence in civic life in a great variety of ways. They could bring into effect royal wishes and commands, often translating them into the city's institutional terminology;¹ they could incorporate royal propaganda into the city's public discourse;² they could facilitate royal intervention in the city's judicial procedures;³ they could act –whether as representatives of the city or as individuals– as the agents of a relationship of euergetism,⁴ they could bestow godlike honours upon the king.⁵ Citizen intermediaries were instrumental in embedding the king's presence in all aspects of local social, political and religious life.

1.8. Between city and king: “the human hinges of Hellenism”

In many respects, the third category of intermediaries referred to in the beginning of the preceding section, namely the intermediaries who belonged simultaneously to the political structures of their city of origin and to the royal administration, highlight the complexity and the novel features of the relationship between cities and kings in the Hellenistic period. Archedikos (**A1**), a friend (in the political sense) of Antipatros in Athens, proposed honours for Antipatros' Macedonian friends (in the technical sense of the term). Demetrios of Phaleron (**A4**) was an Athenian statesman until 317, a civic leader appointed by Kassandros in 317-307 and an influential courtier of Ptolemy I, who maintained his Athenian contacts after 301. Kallimedon (**A6**) and Deinarchos (**A12**) belonged to the staff of Antipatros, and returned to Athens accompanied by Macedonian arms; one is entitled to suppose that they served in Phokion's regime primarily as royal representatives, rather than as Athenian citizens. Philippides son of Philokles (**A40**) was –and remained until the end of his career– a powerful courtier of Lysimachos, but consistently tried to help Athens as the principal intermediary between Athens and Lysimachos, not only from a distance, but also while serving in public office –even if only for a short period of time. Kallias (**A47**) freely and frequently switched between the roles of a Ptolemaic officer who served Athenian interests

¹ Royal requests could be explicitly recognized as such (see, for example, **A15**, **A19** (IV), **D15**) or concealed (see, for example, **A42**, **A58**).

² See, for example, **A62**, **D61-62**, **D95**.

³ See, for example, **A13**, as well as the many cases of foreign judges acting at the king's request (see **D22**, **D42** [?], **D53**, **D64**, **D74-78**, and the bibliography there cited).

⁴ Among the many examples examined (see **A19** [I-II], **A40**, **A42**, **A47**, **B13**, **C16-18**, **C24**, **C32-34**, **D18-19**), the special importance of the Panathenaic *peplos* in relation to Athenian foreign policy should be singled out: with the exception of Kassandros, all major monarchs with whom the Athenians came into contact from 307 to the Chremonidean War (Antigonos and Poliorketes, Lysimachos, Ptolemy II) donated the *peplos*, the symbol of the city's self-image *par excellence* (see the details in **A40** and **A47**). On the honouring of royal officials as benefactors, see also **2.1**, below.

⁵ See, for example, **A19** (I-III), **A20-30**, **A42**, **A68**, **A77**, **B13** (V), **C35-36**, **D3**, **D7**, **D17**, **D38-40**, **D43-48**, **D57-58**, **D95** and Appendix 4. On the political significance of godlike honours accorded to the kings, see Habicht 1970: 222-42; Price 1984: 25-40; Ma 1999: 219-26.

and of an Athenian statesman who represented Athens at the Ptolemaic court and, reversely, Ptolemaic interests in Athenian politics. Aristo[---] (**A57**) was a royal officer of Athenian origin who later became an elected general of the Athenian state. Apollodoros (**A61**), jointly “appointed as general by king Antigonos and the people and elected to the coastal district”, was explicitly and officially recognized as belonging to both sides simultaneously. Herakleitos (**A62**) helped diffuse Gonatas’ royal propaganda, acting as an Athenian citizen making benefactions to his homeland, but also as a royal officer serving the interests of royal image-making. I insisted on these examples on purpose, because all these intermediaries came from Athens, a city which, far from being a direct royal possession and far from passively accepting the reality of royal overlordship, energetically tried to shake off royal control and systematically cultivated a proud tradition of constitutional integrity and political autonomy, throughout the period under study.

There are several examples from other cities as well,¹ none perhaps more significant than that of Aratos (**B13**), who originally represented one of the greatest threats to Macedonian interests in the Peloponnese in the latter half of the third century: from the moment that Aratos decided to become an ally of the Macedonians, he was transformed, gradually but irrevocably, into a close confidant and *philos* of Doson and Philip V, to the point that, in 220, his participation in the king’s council –an established institution of the Macedonian state– surprised no one, despite the fact that he was still an active leader of the Achaian *koinon*.

The same phenomenon of belonging to two worlds simultaneously is illustrated by royal officers and *philoï* with jurisdiction over a given city who, without coming from that city –which is why they have been left outside the scope of this study–, were integrated into civic life, either because their administrative duties led them to become part of the local society or because they were otherwise “implanted” into local life, often on the initiative of the king;² it is also illustrated

¹ See p. 485 n. 1-7, below.

² The latter category also includes the recipients of royal donations who chose to attach their domains to the *chora* of a polis (as in the famous case of Aristodikides [*I. Ilion* 33 (RC 10-13)]) or, simply, recipients of former royal domains in the proximity of a city. These men were sometimes heavily involved in local affairs, whether they belonged to the body politic or not. Kassandros, a subordinate of Onomastos (general of Thrace on behalf of Philip V), was considered responsible for the massacres at Maroneia in 184 (Polyb. 22.13.1-7). He resided “for most of the time” (τὸν πλείονα χρόνον) in the area, obviously because he had received royal land in the vicinity. Polybios (22.13.5) points out that it was not uncommon for Philip V to establish courtiers in the cities of the area. In a sense, to this category also belong royal officials who were naturalized by various cities at the king’s request (see, for example, **A15**, **A19** (IV), **A58**, **D15**). The incorporation of these officials into local life remained in most cases theoretical (for Athens, see Osborne 1983: 187-92), but, nevertheless, naturalizations of this kind constituted a useful tool for the king in influencing civic politics, even symbolically –otherwise he would not have requested them.

by citizens for whom the attachment to the royal administration was a prospective possibility (cf. above, **1.6**).

No doubt, each case is different. Some of these individuals who belonged to both sides were primarily (or initially) royal officials who happened to be appointed by the king to an office which included their city of origin in its area of jurisdiction – persons, in other words, who were first and foremost royal officials and simply happened to become attached to local politics at a later stage.¹ By contrast, others were primarily (or initially) civic leaders who became gradually incorporated into the royal administration, without losing their capacity as active or potential statesmen at home.² Finally, others followed a more complicated course: from local political life to the court and then back to local political life;³ from local political life to civic leadership by royal appointment;⁴ from the court to acting as intermediaries between the city and the court, which consequently led to their becoming increasingly involved in the affairs of the city, whether they actively participated in local politics⁵ or not;⁶ from royal administration to retirement to the city, where the intermediaries' royal contacts were put to use in order to achieve benefits for the city or simply to enhance their own status.⁷

Differences in the details are not so important, however. Whatever the particulars of their career, all intermediaries who simultaneously belonged to the city and to the royal administration performed the same function with one another in the political system of the Hellenistic world. Using the insightful 'topographic' sketch of Hellenistic political structure drawn by J. K. Davies (2002), we may place these individuals at the very centre of the picture: they were the agents making the vertical bonds connecting the city with the court possible and functional and they slid along this vertical line freely, without exclusively belonging to either fixed point. At the same time, they formed a broad horizontal layer, with shared

¹ For example, Deinarchos (**A12**); perhaps Apollonios (**A37**), if he was an Athenian and if Askepiades, the general who appointed Apollonios as phrourarch, was appointed by Poliorketes; Aristo[---] (**A57**); Apollodoros (**A61**); Herakleitos (**A62**); Brachylles (**C22**), who, despite his origins from the civic elite, seems to have begun his career in the royal administration and is only later attested as a Boiotian leader; Alexandros of Akarnania (**C44**); in a sense, Kallikrates (**D35**), although Samos was only part of his jurisdiction as a Ptolemaic admiral; Epinikos (**D52**), if he was a Samothrakian by origin and not by naturalization.

² Aratos (**B13**); Aratos son of Aratos (**B14**); Mnasilochos (**C43**); cf. the case of Nikomachos (**D6**), a Rhodian statesman who was involved in Rhodian foreign policy in Asia, and, at the same time, was a close collaborator of Achaios, the contender for the Seleukid throne.

³ Kallimedon (**A6**).

⁴ See **1.6**, above.

⁵ Philippides son of Philokles (**A40**); Kallias (**A47**).

⁶ Dionysodoros and Deinokrates (**B15-16**); Hippomedon (**B18**); Alexandros of Akarnania (**C44**); Nikomedes (**D8**); Kaphisophon (**D15**), perhaps Philinos (**D18**).

⁷ Sossippos and Lamios (**C35-36**) (?); Thersippos (**D49**).

characteristics: coming from a Greek *polis*; military, administrative, scholarly or artistic skills; professional mobility. Their belonging to more than one group –to the city as an entity of primary political activity, to the subset of local supporters of one or more kings, to royal administrators with local jurisdiction, to representatives of royal power who could be employed in another city–, and the fact that their role was precisely to represent all these different groups and connect them with one another, or, in Davies’ apt description, to serve as “the human hinges of Hellenism”,¹ are, in my opinion, defining phenomena for the political realities of the period. The personal interests of these intermediaries, and, accordingly, their personal choices, lay on the intersection between the aspirations of the city and the aspirations of the king² –a combination most often resembling an explosive mixture rather than a harmonized blend. We have already seen how civic leaders who owed their leadership to royal support sometimes led a policy which did not meet the king’s expectations (see 1.5, above); on the other hand, it can be argued that the structural effect of some members of the civic elite belonging organically to both sides was, in the long run, more important: the realization of the royal agenda formed an intrinsic part of the political horizon of the civic elite.

2. INTERMEDIARIES AND THE *POLIS*

2.1. Honouring royal officials: the lasting bond of euergetism, seen from the city’s point of view

As the scope of this investigation includes only intermediaries coming from the city, royal representatives honoured by the city have been only dealt with circumstantially; obviously, there are numerous other examples of this important

¹ Davies 2002: 11-12: “These men are absolutely fundamental: they were the human hinges of Hellenism, not just channels of communication but basic load-bearing components of the system. That their status was ambiguous was the whole point. It allowed the sources of power to have very fuzzy and indeterminate edges; it allowed powers to overlap and to merge on the ground while remaining formally distinct; it gentled the dominance and ruthlessness of the monarchic regimes while not subverting their authority.”

² It is no accident that these men sought to have their role advertised both in the city and at court. The public honours awarded to Philippides son of Philokles (A40), to Kallias (A47), Nikomedes (D8), Kaphisophon (D15), and to Kallikrates (D35) by their home cities were not a mere reflection of these powerful courtiers’ vanity nor only a collateral benefit irrelevant to their career at court. Such honours functioned in a number of ways to the benefit of the intermediaries: they were honoured by their city –and thus enhanced their status back home– precisely because they were influential *παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ*, from whom the city expected military, financial and political support; they also enhanced their status at court, however, because they had tangible proof of how important their role as intermediaries was to their city, thus becoming useful to the king for the implementation of royal policy in the city in question.

category of agents of the relationship between city and king.¹ Nevertheless, it would have been a grave omission not to treat the issue at all here; if for no other reason, then at least because the role of royal officials helps explain the city's point of view, and adds to our understanding of the personal character of the relationship between city and king –this time from the royal side of the coin.

The city honoured royal officials within whose jurisdiction the city, its vicinity or its wider area fell,² royal envoys on a military, diplomatic, religious or judicial mission,³ courtiers promoting the city's interests at court and helping its ambassadors diplomatically or materially,⁴ or royal officials for other, unspecified or unattested reasons.⁵

The honouring of members of the royal administration is a key phenomenon for our understanding of how the cities viewed the relationship between city and king. One of its most important facets was the cities' conscious effort⁶ to forge bonds with officials in key positions of the royal administration, in order to prospectively exploit such bonds. It is no accident that in the decree with which this catalogue begins (A1), a phrase which remains emblematic of the way in which the cities perceived such honours is attested: “so that as many of the king's friends and Antipatros' friends as possible, having been honoured by the Athenian people, bestow benefactions upon the city of the Athenians...” (ὅπως ἂν ὡς πλεῖστοι τῶν τοῦ βασιλέως φίλων καὶ Ἀντιπάτρου, τετιμημένοι ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τῶν Ἀθηναίων, εὐεργετῶσιν τὴν πόλιν τῶν Ἀθηναίων...). Already from the very beginning of the period under study, relations between city and king (or royal officials) were consciously framed within the context of euergetism. This was more or less an obligatory choice for the *poleis*. If the new reality of royal power was to be translated into the established institutional framework of the city,

¹ The majority of such cases can be found in the various prosopographies of members of the royal administration (see the bibliography in p. 26 n. 3-4, above).

² See, for example, A36-37, A61, A62, A68-70, D21 (?), D32, D35, D36, D50-51, D56, D59-60, D66, D80, D82.

³ See, for example, A15, A18, A19 (II: IG II² 469), A35, A47, A50, A51, A73-74, C1-6, C7, C9, C10, C13, C14, D9 (?), D22, D26, D30-31, D53, D64, D67, D79, D83, D90, D97.

⁴ See, for example, A19 (II: SEG 31 [1981] 80 and IG II² 471), A33, A40, A43, A47, A63, A64, A66, A81, A82, D15-16, D23, D24, D27, D28, D29 (?), D67, D68-73, D96.

⁵ See, for example, A1, A19 (IV), A16, A35, B7, C8, C11, C12, D25, D54, D85, D91, D92, D93, D94.

⁶ I should repeat that this section deals with the city's point of view, that is, with how the city viewed these honours and what it hoped to gain from them. It would have been naïve to assume that the honouring of 'the king's men' was the explicit policy of the city alone, or that it was always aimed to bring benefits to the city alone. The royal side had an interest invested in these honours equal to that of the cities –occasionally, even greater. As we have had the chance to observe more than once, the honours were sometimes awarded at the explicit request of the king (see A15, A19 [IV], A58, D15).

without appearing to infringe on civic autonomy and the city's sense of freedom, then euergetism appeared as the only option.

Euergetism had two useful features for the world of the *poleis*: resilience and reciprocity. The relationship between benefactor and the recipient of benefactions was never a one-time event; the honourand was morally obliged to continue to prove himself beneficial to the city which honoured him, and the city was then obliged to bestow further honours upon him. The unknown Pergamene scholar who was honoured by the Athenians in early 192 (see **A82**) had apparently been helping Athens in a number of ways, practically throughout his adult life. Autokles of Chalkis (see **D84**) had perhaps been honoured by the Delians before he became a *philos* of Demetrios II; naturally, the Delians valued his (new?) position and honoured him for a second time.¹ Sometimes, the connection of the royal official with the honouring city was bequeathed to his offspring, in the same way the relationship of a citizen with a royal court could pass from one generation to the next. The goodwill of an unknown officer of Antigonos Gonatas (see **A64**) to the Athenian ambassadors in the 250's was described by the Athenians as natural and expected, because of the pro-Athenian feelings (and the subsequent honouring) of the officer's father, who had served under Poliorketes –or at least this is the official Athenian side of the story. Apollonios and Dikaiarchos (**A69-70**) –officers of the Macedonian army, at least for part of their career–, were not expected to satisfy the requests of the residents of the Athenian countryside merely because they were Athenians themselves or merely because they may have served the Athenian state for part of their career, but also because they had forged a long and lasting relationship with the citizens near the forts within their jurisdiction. It is noteworthy in that respect that the family's bond with the local society of Rhamnous may have lasted for at least another two generations, which would effect that the expulsion of the Macedonians from Attica did not affect the relationship.

This longevity of the bond between benefactor / royal official and a given city was an intrinsic feature of the public discourse of euergetism; proposers of honorific decrees never failed to mention the goodwill and the deeds of the honourand's ancestors. Medon (see **A19** (III) and **A34**), an officer of Poliorketes, was honoured in the spring of 303 for conveying to the Athenians the king's favourable decision about the forts of Attica. The proposer of the decree in Medon's honour did not fail to stress the fact that the honourand's father had also been honoured by the people.

What is of particular interest in this case is that Athenian rhetoric probably did not correspond to reality. Medon did not necessarily have any friendly feelings for the Athenians, nor is it necessary to assume that he was involved in any way

¹ The case of Kallias of Athens and the honours which he received from the Delians (**D81**) may have been similar.

in the royal decision; he merely followed his king to Attica and the Peloponnese, and he was honoured simply because he followed his king's orders. Nevertheless, the Athenians considered it useful to remind the honourand, the city and the king of the relationship's past and of the honourand's lasting εὐνοία for Athens, even if the latter did not exist; the subtext is that the honourand *should* continue to favour Athenian interests. The structure and language of these honorific decrees were consistent and rigid: next to the real reasons behind the honours, the fact that the honourand was by the city's side, so to speak, was an indispensable formulaic element – a self-fulfilling prophecy? The audience of the language of euergetism was twofold. To domestic public opinion the representative of royal power was presented as someone for whom it was almost natural to show such zeal in defending the city's interests, and who was thus not all that different from a traditional citizen benefactor; the harsh reality of royal power over the city was embellished and presented in familiar terms. To the honourand himself, as well as to the court which he represented, the transaction was also presented as a natural activity, embedded in the honoured tradition of euergetism, thus 'obliging' the benefactor – and his king – to continue to favour the city in the future.

The same purposes were served by another structural element of these decrees, namely the part of the disclosure formula known as the hortatory intention formula, that is, the city's public declaration that all those bestowing similar benefactions upon the city would be accordingly honoured.¹ By the hortatory intention formula, the discourse of euergetism was addressed to other potential benefactors as well, offering to all potential royal representatives the city's version of the desired *modus operandi* towards the world of the *poleis*. Characteristically, the most explicit wording of this formula belongs to Stratokles, the most prolific proposer of Attic honorific decrees, and a statesman most reviled for his pro-Macedonian policies: ὅπως ἂν οἱ διατρίβοντες παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ ἅπαντες ἐνδεικνύωνται τὴν εὐνοίαν τῷ δήμῳ εἰδότες ὅτι τιμηθήσονται ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἀξίως τῆς εὐνοίας (“so that all those by the king's side show their goodwill towards the people, knowing that they will be honoured by the people in a manner worthy of that goodwill”).² It is tellingly ironic that this most eloquent example of the hortatory intention formula again regards an honourand who had probably done nothing to deserve the honours (see **A19** [IV]). The rhetoric strategy of the public discourse of euergetism may have been – theoretically – ingenuous, but occasionally it stumbled upon the realities of the way in which the royal side viewed its relationship with the particular city: as far as Athens in 303–302 was concerned, Poliorketes knew too well that his wishes should be and would be followed to the letter, no matter how Stratokles devised to dress them up.

¹ See p. 38 n. 2, above.

² Osborne 1981: D61, ll. 32–36.

Overall, euergetism –and its complex set of negotiable moral constraints– seems to have been the preferred –perhaps by both sides– structure through which the relationship between city and king materialized. In a sense, it served as a melting pot: if I may turn, yet again, to a topographical metaphor, euergetism was the structure where the outside (the royal power and ideology) and the inside (the civic institutions and ideology), the traditional notions of autonomy, patriotism and civic euergetism, and the new realities of foreign intervention, of autonomy as a privilege bestowed by the king, and of benefaction as a favour granted by the all-powerful ruler and his representatives were amalgamated.¹ The complexity of the status of individuals such as Herakleitos (A62) –a general who was Athenian in origin but led the occupation forces of a foreign state in Athens, a civic benefactor embellishing the city’s public buildings, and a royal officer propagating the image of his victorious king– could be thus circumvented and presented in an acceptable light.

2.2. Honouring royal officials: local variations in the general picture

A general picture of the honours accorded to royal officials would have been impossible to draw, even if this had been among the stated purposes of this study, as there are too many differences from one city to the other. These differences may reflect real differences regarding each city’s foreign and domestic affairs, may be due to the different epigraphic habits of each city, or may simply be the result of the differing source material preserved for each city. Nevertheless, there are some states which provide us with interesting variations of the phenomenon.

The period of Antigonid domination over Samos (*ca.* 320 – *ca.* 295) provides us with a useful test-case, as its epigraphic harvest is rich enough to allow a statistical approach. In total, eighty-one Samian honorific decrees have been preserved from that period; of these, at least fourteen (17,3%) –and probably many more– are related to officials of Antigonos and Demetrios.² If we take into consideration the fact that precisely in that period the Samians were obliged to honour all those individuals who had helped them during their long exile, the percentage of honourands who belonged to the royal administration should be considered rather high. The reason should undoubtedly be sought in the fragility of the new Samian state (*cf.* 2.4, below), which must have resulted in the closer dependence of Samos on Antigonid power and, consequently, on the goodwill of Antigonid officers.

¹ Cf. Ma 2003c: 249-52: “... les cités se créent une marge d’action par le discours, tout comme le roi construit son espace par le langage” (249); “... la socialisation des administrateurs et des officiers vise à ancrer localement les éléments du pouvoir central, et ainsi à en affecter les formes concrètes” (251).

² See *IG XII 6*, 20; 21; 23; 25; 26; 27; 28; 29; 30; 31; 48 (?); 52; 57; 148. Given that several of the many Samian decrees which have been poorly preserved may have involved Antigonid officials, the actual number of ‘Antigonid’ honorific decrees was probably much higher.

Another observable motif of the honours for royal officials is the high concentration of relevant decrees in periods of transition for the city. The first period of Antigonid rule in Athens (307-301) was not only a period of unprecedented honours for Antigonos and Demetrios, but also a period when at least twenty-six royal officials were honoured.¹ As we saw when examining the role of Stratokles (**A19**) in that period, this concentration of honours reflects the relief and gratitude of the majority of Athenians for the overthrow of the oligarchic regimes imposed by Kassandros, but also the permutations in the city's civic elite: the domestic power struggle did not only involve the democrats' rise to power, but also the rivalry within this –hardly homogeneous– political faction, and the final prevalence of Stratokles and his circle.

Rhodes, on the other hand, is a city where honours for royal officers are almost entirely absent.² This should not be taken to imply that Rhodes had no use for the services of members of the royal administration, or that the Rhodians felt they did not need to flatter the kings or serve the kings' propagandistic needs. On the contrary, many other motifs of the relationship between cities and kings, such as ruler cult (see **D1-2**), private dedications of the king's statues (**D7**), and royal donations, are sufficiently attested in Rhodes. It could mean, however, that the Rhodians –who were stronger politically, financially and militarily than the average Hellenistic city, and were becoming even stronger in the course of the third century, as their naval power increased– were confident enough of their strength, so as to impose their own terms in their dealings with the kings, and thus rely less on the

¹ Apart from at least fifteen royal *philoï* and officials who were honoured at the proposal of Stratokles (**A19**), and at least two who were honoured at the proposal of other known Athenians (see **A35** and **A36**), the rest of the Antigonid officials who were honoured in that period were: (perhaps) Alkimos of Epeiros, towards the end of 306 (*IG II² 773*, with Habicht 1977b); Neaios, probably in 305 (Osborne 1981: D44 [*IG II² 553*]; on the date, see p. 95 n. 3, above); Asklepiades of Byzantion, probably in 304/3 (*IG II² 555*; cf. Billows 1990: 375-76 n° 19); Oxythemis of Larisa, probably in the first half of 303 (Osborne 1981: D47 [*IG II² 558*]; on the date, see p. 96 n. 1, above); Adeimantos of Lampsakos, probably in 302 (*Agora* 16.122), and perhaps two unknown Chalkidians, whose relationship with Antigonos and/or Demetrios is uncertain (*IG II² 563*; a precise date within the period 307-301 is not possible to determine). On the heroic honours for Adeimantos, Oxythemis and Bourichos (on whom see Diod. Sic. 20.52.4), see the well-known passage of Demochares, *FGrHist* 75 F 1, with Habicht 1970: 55-58. Already in the nineteenth century (see Koehler *ad IG II* 241, and, for example, Habicht 1977b: 37 n. 3; Billows 1990: 373), many scholars confidently assumed that Ἀριστ[---], honoured by a decree of 306, of the body of which almost nothing is preserved (*IG II² 459*; cf. *SEG* 21 [1965] 330 and 25 [1971] 77), should be identified with Aristodemos of Miletos, one of the highest-ranking officers of Poliorketes (Billows 1990: 371-74 n° 16); in my opinion, this identification is far from certain.

² The only exception I know of, namely the proxeny awarded to Eudamos of Seleukeia, a courtier of Antiochos IV (*Syll³* 644-45; on the date, see p. 364 n. 1, above), falls outside the chronological scope of this study.

mediation of royal officials and other intermediaries.¹ An extreme illustration of this is offered by the Rhodian embassies to Philip V and Olympichos (**D4-5**); in essence, the aim of these embassies was to threaten the king and his semi-independent representative in Karia; even more characteristically, the threats were not even intended to serve Rhodian interests, but the interests of Rhodes' ally Iasos. Even in the framework of royal euergetism, the case of Rhodes presents distinct singularities. When Polybios describes the multitude of donations by royal courts and Greek cities to Rhodes after the devastating earthquake of ca. 227 (5.88-90), he presents the benefactors as almost feeling grateful towards the Rhodians for allowing them to make these donations;² Diodoros expresses the same idea even more vividly: "The Rhodians, applying a better foreign policy than all Greeks, led many rulers to compete with one another in bestowing benefactions upon the city".³ Obviously, rather than more competent diplomats, Rhodes possessed greater comparative power than other Greek cities; one of the results of that power may have been Rhodes' lesser dependence on networks of personal contacts with the royal courts.

An apparent lack of honours for royal officials is observable in the case of another strong non-monarchical state of the period, namely Aitolia.⁴ Once again, this may be due to the state of preservation of our sources. We do possess long catalogues of recipients of proxeny and naturalization from Thermon,⁵ but these are in the form of summary lists; the fact that we are missing the motivation clause of the corresponding decrees prevents us from identifying possible royal officials among the honourands. This being said, there are two other reasons which can explain the apparent absence of honours for royal officials by the Aitolians. The first reason is the orientation of Aitolian foreign policy. In its relations with the other states, the Aitolian *koinon* appears to have been the state less dependent on the goodwill of Hellenistic kings: for the greatest part of the period under study (322-190), Aitolia was at war or at strenuous peace with Macedonia; Aitolian contacts with the Seleukid court were sparse before 193; even the contacts with the Aitolians' chief ally, the Ptolemaic kingdom, were anything

¹ On Rhodian diplomacy, see Berthold 1984 and Wiemer 2002, with earlier bibliography. Another characteristic feature of Rhodian diplomacy was the frequent participation of the Rhodians in diplomatic efforts to bring several wars to an end (see, for example, Magnetto 1997: n^{os} 51, 52, 56, 59), especially if the war affected the Aegean, the main area of activity of the Rhodian commercial fleet.

² Polyb. 5.88.4: ... ἀλλὰ καὶ χάριν προσοφείλειν αὐτοῖς τοὺς διδόντας.

³ Diod. Sic. 31.36 (in a later context but probably commenting on Rhodian foreign policy in general): Ῥόδιοι μὲν οὖν κάλλιστα τῶν Ἑλλήνων πολιτευόμενοι πολλοὺς ἔσχον ἀμιλλωμένους τῶν δυναστῶν εἰς τὰς τῆς πόλεως εὐεργεσίας.

⁴ It is also observable in the case of the Achaian *koinon*, but for different reasons: see 2.4, below.

⁵ IG IX 1² 1, 5-50.

but dense before the Demetrian War;¹ finally, the only royal donation to the Aitolians came from the Attalid kingdom,² but the interest of one party in the other was in this case as well marginal at best. The second reason may have been the cause of the Aitolians' international position, namely their relative strength, and their eagerness to put that strength to aggressive use. As was the case with Rhodes, this strength reduced the need to turn to third parties or royal officials as intermediaries to the king. It is no accident that, like the Rhodians, the Aitolians were themselves used as intermediaries between weak cities and royal courts.³

2.3. Εύφουεις πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολήν:⁴ choosing the proper channels of communication with the royal court

If there was one defining criterion by which a city chose the citizens who would represent it to a royal court this was whether a citizen had prior contacts with that court.⁵ Two examples from Athens, the city overall better documented, should suffice to illustrate my point. After 301, when the Athenians embarked on a careful policy of close contacts with all enemies of Poliorketes, they made excellent choices of representatives. Philippides son of Philomelos (**A38**), ambassador to Kassandros in 299, was a pro-Macedonian oligarch for more than four decades, and must have been well-connected with the Antipatrid regime, which was known for its penchant for oligarchies imposed on Greek cities. His mission was facilitated by an otherwise unknown citizen, named Poseidippos (**A39**); there is good reason to assume that he was also chosen to accompany the embassy on account of his Macedonian contacts. Another Philippides, the son of Philokles (**A40**), was an obvious choice as an intermediary to king Lysimachos, as he was already a high-ranking courtier of the king. Finally, we cannot rule out the possibility that a similar role was played by Demetrios of Phaleron (**A4**), then at the court of Ptolemy I. In other words, the Athenians did not hesitate to use as intermediaries to three different kings four individuals of widely diverging backgrounds: an old oligarch (Philippides son of Philomelos), a fervent democrat, now at a king's court (Philippides son of Philokles), a private citizen with no discernible assets other than his presumed Macedonian contacts (Poseidippos), and an ex-'tyrant', imposed by one king and now serving another (Demetrios of Phaleron). The only thing which these four intermediaries had in common was that they were reasonably expected to facilitate the city's position vis-à-vis the king to whom they mediated.

¹ See **C35**, with accompanying notes.

² Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: n° 103.

³ Herakleia (at Latmos or in Pontos) turned to the Aitolians in the 250's, in order to achieve a favourable response to its requests from Ptolemy II (*IG IX 1*² 1, 173).

⁴ Polyb. 2.48.4; see the details in **B33-34**.

⁵ This was hardly a novelty; in the Classical period, ambassadors were also chosen on the same reasoning (Mosley 1973: 44-45; Mitchell 1997: 75-79, 90-95).

The situation was very similar in Athens in 226. The Athenians were justifiably worried over the alliance between the Achaians and Doson –not yet formally concluded but evidently in the works– and, in general, over the strength of the Macedonian throne and its expansionist policies. Only three years after the Athenians had finally managed to rid themselves of the Macedonian garrison, the leadership of the city, controlled by Eurykleides and Mikion, hastened to secure the king’s respect for the Athenians’ fragile freedom. Rather than by one of the prominent statesmen of the regime, contacts with the Macedonian court were undertaken by Prytanis (**A75**), a philosopher who, despite his diplomatic inexperience, was the ideal man for the job: his being a scholar, his city of origin and his biographical background ensured that he would be favourably received at Pella, whether he had already been in contact with the Antigonid house –a very plausible assumption– or not. The decree in honour of the philosopher was proposed by Thoukritos (**A76**), a prominent Athenian general of the 250’s, having held office both before and after the liberation of ca. 255, hence undoubtedly an Athenian who had closely collaborated with Gonatas’ administration. The motif described above is again evident: the city’s pro-independent political elite did not hesitate to make use –precisely in order to secure that independence– of a former collaborator of the Macedonians and of a philosopher who was possibly already in contact with Pella.

If choosing representatives to the royal courts on the basis of the candidates’ prior contacts with a given court was a recurring policy for Athens, we may reasonably suppose that it was an absolute necessity for smaller, less powerful, and culturally less important cities. The opportunity offered to the policy makers of Nesos, for example, by the fact that one of their fellow citizens had been an officer of Alexander’s army, and thus had access to most Macedonian generals active in the area, could not be missed: it was perfectly understandable that Thersippos (**D49**) took upon himself the exclusive handling of Nesos’ foreign policy.

Apparently, scholarly activity was another important asset for someone chosen as the city’s diplomatic representative to the kings.¹ Theoretically, one should set aside the intermediaries who were already highly active in politics and simply had scholarly pursuits as well;² in reality, however, these intermediaries should not be treated any differently. As a scholar, a statesman had a comparative advantage in his role as an intermediary to a king: had Menedemos (**D95**) not met the young Antigonos Gonatas in his philosophical capacity early on in his political career, it is doubtful whether he would have had the unwavering support of the king later,

¹ The subject has been comprehensively treated by Sonnabend 1996 and Haake 2007; I limit myself here to a few comments and some examples from my catalogue.

² See **A1, A4, A40, A49, B2-3** (?), **B13, B15** (?), **B35** (if Kerkidas the statesman is identified with Kerkidas the scholar), **D34, D95**.

or even if he would have enjoyed such political success at all. Nevertheless, it is true that the popularity of scholars used as intermediaries does not manifest itself as clearly in the hybrid cases of statesmen / scholars, as it does in the cases of scholars who were asked by the city to intervene to a king, or even offered themselves to do so, without having had significant prior political or diplomatic experience. A word of caution is required, however. Almost all scholars in the prosopographical catalogue of this study either had attested prior contacts with the courts to which they mediated, or were part of personal networks of friendship, which were almost as important as their scholarly activity –if not more so– for the success of their mission. Xenokrates (**A5**) appears to have been chosen for the crucial embassy of 322 as an uncompromisingly impartial philosopher; it is probable, however, that his personal and political friendship with Phokion and the oligarchs was, in reality, more important. Theophrastos (**A45**) made his first clear intervention in political life in 292, when he asked Poliorketes to allow the return of the oligarch exiles, but it is clear that he did not only exploit his philosophical prestige, but also the fact that the king's agenda and the oligarchs' interests converged at the time. In order to have Poliorketes convinced to leave the city in 287, the Athenians decided to use the services of Krates (**A48**), because the latter was an esteemed philosopher and a man of attested conciliatory abilities; nonetheless, the possibility that Krates might have been acquainted with the king already before 287 cannot be ruled out. The same is true for Prytanis (**A75**). In fact, the only cases in which the main criterion for the city's choice of a scholar as its representative seems to have been the latter's scholarly capacity are those of diplomatic missions which required special historical knowledge and rhetorical skill on the part of the ambassadors: the complex, nuanced and highly effective rhetoric of the Kytanian embassy in 205 (**C32-34**) allows the assumption that at least some of the ambassadors were local scholars. If the examples cited above have been correctly interpreted, it seems that the choice of philosophers or other scholars as intermediaries to a royal court by the city was not based on their scholarly activity *per se*. Their scholarly activity undoubtedly weighed in heavily in their selection, since it facilitated their favourable welcome at court by kings who had to project themselves as the Maecenas of Greek civilization. Most often, however, their scholarly capacity was, in effect, the cause of their prior contacts with the courts, which may have been the true underlying criterion for their selection.

There were other types of intermediaries who were used because they were thought to have the ear of the king. Prominent among them were citizens who institutionally belonged to the royal administration. The cases of Philippides son of Philokles (**A40**) and Kallias (**A47**) are perhaps the best known, but they were

certainly not the only ones.¹ Nonetheless, in their diplomatic dealings, cities did not only make use of their own citizens. Often, the intermediaries were foreigners, who had been previously honoured by the cities, and were now members of the royal administration,² or citizens of another city which was connected with the city seeking the king's favour through bonds of friendship and kinship,³ or, naturally, royal officials honoured in the past (2.1, above). Finally, the search for the most appropriate channels of communication with royal authorities often reached as far as to the members of the royal family, other than the king himself. We repeatedly had the chance to observe the queens' important role in the relationship between city and king. Although the involvement of a queen often appears to have been the result of diplomatic courtesy and proper royal etiquette, we should not underestimate the importance of the queens' networks of euergetism –often distinct from those of the kings–, networks which inevitably had repercussions on the relationship between city and king and increased the city's leverage at court. Contact with a queen could be brought by chance, as perhaps happened in the case of Phila, Poliorketes' wife (D9 [?], D30-31). In other cases, however, it was due to the city's conscious diplomatic efforts to exploit the queen's important public role as a symbol of royal authority –this may have been the case of Arsinoe II and her possible ties with Athenian statesmen (A55-56). There are cases in which turning to the queen could even be seen as a mandatory choice for the city, because, for a number of reasons, the queen was the only person at court who could favourably influence the king's decision. The most illuminating example is the attempt of the Troizenians (B8-9) to have captive fellow citizens of theirs freed by the Seleukids, against whom they had fought at the side of Poliorketes. The only course available to them was a complex chain of intermediaries: first they turned to a citizen of a Troizenian colony (Myndos), who, in turn, invoked the compassion of Stratonike, the wife of the Seleukid heir but also the daughter of the Seleukid enemy and overlord of Troizen, Demetrios Poliorketes.

2.4. Local variations regarding the number of interlocutors with the royal authorities

An interesting parameter of this interminable quest for the most effective channels of communication with a royal court concerns the differences from one city to the other as to the number of citizens involved in the process. More than once, we examined cases where a single citizen (who could belong either to the civic leadership or to the royal administration) became the privileged –or even unique– interlocutor with the royal authority. This was, for example, the case with

¹ See B7, B15-16, B18, C43, D8, D15, D18, D35, D52, D68-69, D96.

² See D84.

³ See B8-9.

Stratokles (**A19**) in Athens from 307 to 301, perhaps also with Nikomedes (**D8**) in Kos from 305 to 301, or with Aratos (**B13**) in the Achaian *koinon*, at least in the period 227-213.

Aratos is, once again, an instructive example. During the period of its expansion in 243-227, the Achaian *koinon* does not seem to have developed particularly dense networks of personal contacts with its main ally, that is, the Ptolemies. Although this period of Achaian history is not as well documented as Achaian politics of the last quarter of the third century, we should bear in mind that the relations between Achaia and the Ptolemies need not have involved many representatives of either the *koinon* or the court. Firstly, the relationship between the two sides was mostly focused on the financial support of the Ptolemies for the Achaian cause, which served the Ptolemaic interests in the Peloponnese well. From the Achaian point of view, such a relationship meant that the royal goodwill was easy to obtain: the Achaians only needed to count on the convergence of interests, and, accordingly, had less use for the services of royal officers who could intervene on their behalf. More importantly perhaps, Aratos was well placed to handle the alliance with the Ptolemaic court personally and exclusively; he was the one to have initiated the relationship, he had been personally acquainted with the king, and was the one to have secured the Ptolemaic donation. The next period –which is better documented–, when the royal ally of the Achaians was Macedonia, can be split into two different phases, one preceding and one following the μεταβολή of Philip V. During the reign of Doson and early in the reign of Philip, Aratos remained the main Achaian interlocutor of the king, even more so than with the Ptolemies (see **B13** [IV-V]); even if his influence at the Macedonian court has been exaggerated in his *Memoirs* and in the friendly to the Sikyonian literary tradition, the fact remains that Aratos was perceived as an intrinsic member of the royal staff –mostly unofficially, but occasionally even officially. In that sense, it is understandable that no other Achaian was able to develop parallel channels of communication with the Macedonian court. It is only after Aratos lost Philip's favour, that other Achaian leaders are attested as having the ear of influential Macedonians (see **B41**); interestingly, this seems to be the result of court intrigues and Apelles' need of a parallel network of contacts with the Achaian elite after the influence of the privileged Achaian interlocutor with the king had been curbed.¹

In other cases, however, contacts with the royal administration were carried out by a wider circle of citizens. Once again, the example of Antigonid Samos (*ca.* 320 – *ca.* 295) is illuminating: not a single citizen is attested as having proposed more than one decree in honour of royal officials,² nor is there any indication in

¹ It is no accident that Apelles is attested as having received a multitude of honours from Greek cities, almost on a par with honours to the king himself (Polyb. 5.26.5).

² On the Samian honorific decrees for Antigonid officials, see p. 490 n. 2, above.

our sources that one or more citizens had any sort of political pre-eminence in Samos' dealings with Antigonid officials. As far as Samian domestic political life is concerned, this is clearly an indication of a large number of politically active citizens.¹ As far as the nature and intensity of Antigonid overlordship is concerned, however, this is not an indication of greater 'freedom', but actually of greater dependence of the city on royal authority. In cases like Athens in 307-301 –when the king's rule was a target to be attained in the face of an anti-Macedonian political mentality and of growing popular discontent–, it was of vital importance for a civic leader to consolidate his position as the privileged interlocutor with the royal authority, a position in turn entrenching his own leadership in view of domestic political conflict; it was also of vital importance for the king to have a limited number of dependent –and thus dependable– interlocutors, who would be able to ensure the city's compliance with royal demands. On the contrary, in a city like Samos, set free in the immediate past, with a fragile and precarious statal entity and a number of social problems caused by the return of exiles after forty years, and still coveted by the Athenians who wished to re-establish their cleruchy, royal rule was probably undisputed. With the overlordship going unchallenged, communication with the royal authorities was inevitably handled by a wider set of citizens, precisely because the city's foreign policy primarily revolved around its effort to establish good relations with the court. The next stage of the close weave between domestic political life and 'vertical' communication with the royal administration is represented by direct royal possessions. A good example is Ptolemaic Cyprus, where public political discourse revolved almost exclusively around the island's relationship with the Ptolemaic administration, as local elites could only obtain power and recognition by acknowledging royal authority and by forging ties with the local representatives of that royal authority.²

Finally, we should not forget that all this resourcefulness in seeking the appropriate channels of communication with a royal court was not only meant to benefit the city's objectives, but was also part of the domestic power struggle. When a limited number of civic leaders became privileged interlocutors with the royal power, their political enemies had three options: a) they could attempt to discredit the chief intermediary in the eyes of his royal patron;³ b) they could attempt to change the city's orientation by establishing an alliance with an enemy

¹ Cf. Rhodes 1997: 283.

² On the institutions and the political climate in Ptolemaic Cyprus, see, for example, Bagnall 1976: 66-73, who points out (67) that the activities and the area of jurisdiction of Cypriot civic archons are practically unattested, with the exception of various dedications to the kings, the generals and other royal officials. See also Mehl 2000: 692-712, especially 708-712, on the intertwinement of local aristocracy and royal administration.

³ See, for example, the letters sent to Ptolemy III by the political enemies of Aratos (referred to in p. 470, above).

king;¹ and c) they could seek out alternative channels of communication with the same royal court, so as to obtain a share of the benefits of interaction with royal authority. This was certainly the case of Eperatos (**B41**), even if the initiative, as we just saw, belonged to Apelles. Even more interesting, however, is the case of Philostratos (**A35**), during the first Antigonid period of Athens (307-301): Philostratos may have tried to exploit tensions within the Antigonid power mechanism by honouring an officer of Antigonos and using a language almost defamatory for Poliorketes, the honours and flatteries for whom were almost exclusively undertaken by Stratokles.

2.5. Cities and intermediaries: a tale of conflicting interests

A final central issue which we need to address is the degree to which the intermediaries' role was played out according to the wishes and the objectives of the city in general, or, on the contrary, reflected the personal agenda and interests of the intermediaries themselves. Due to the nature of our sources, the distinction is seldom possible to make. An honorific decree or a dedication to a king almost never reveals the underlying political dynamics or any possible underlying political friction. Literary sources –covering only a few of the periods and areas under study– are equally uninformative, with rare exceptions. Ancient historians of the period were mostly interested in royal actions and the main body of events related to them; they speak of “the Athenians”, “some Argives”,² “the Epirotes” in generic terms, either presupposing unity of opinion, of viewpoint and agenda within the city or *koinon* –unity which, nonetheless, their own descriptions make it clear that never existed–, or simply remaining silent as to the existence and identity of opposing political factions.

Even so, discrepancy between the actions of the intermediaries (and the results of these actions) and the express wishes, or even the strict orders, of the majority of the body politic is attested surprisingly often. Phokion (**A3**) and the Athenian oligarchs prevailed in the crucial embassy of 322; the result was a censitary regime, which represented the realization of the oligarchs' political agenda almost as much as it was a punishment inflicted upon the Athenians by Antipatros and the victorious Macedonians. Phokion's continued machinations, in collusion with the Macedonian occupation forces, were a constant attempt to delay, stifle and subvert the efforts of the majority of the Athenians left in the city to remove the Macedonian garrison from Athens. In 317, history repeated itself: the embassy to Kassandros resulted in another censitary regime and in Demetrios of Phaleron taking control of

¹ See, for example, **B2** and **B36**.

² See Livy's (32.22.9) unnamed *quidam Argivorum*, who opposed the alliance of the Achaian *koinon* with Rome in 198, invoking the descent of the kings of Macedonia from Argos, as well as personal bonds of friendship and hospitality with the Antigonid house (cf. p. 222 n. 4, above).

the city on behalf of the Macedonians (**A4**), a result which cannot have been wished for by the democratic majority until then in control; in fact, the outcome of the embassy of 317 could not even be presented to the Athenians as inevitable –as had the outcome of the embassy of 322 been presented–, as no crushing defeat had been inflicted upon Athens. The increasingly closer attachment of Athenian politics to the will of Poliorketes, instigated by Stratokles, met with the clear indignation and the active opposition of the majority of Athenians in the first half of 303; as we saw (**A19** [III]), this reaction was simultaneously the result of Stratokles' policies and the cause of Stratokles' decision to lead these policies to their extremes. Later, the previously popular democrat Olympiodoros (**A44**) represented the highly unpopular hybrid oligarchy established by Poliorketes soon after 295. Despite the embellishments of the literary tradition friendly to him, Aratos' secret diplomacy (**B13** [IV]), which resulted in the alliance between the Achaians and Doson, brought about such a radical change of Achaian policy, that it would have met with far more potent resistance, had not the Sikyonian statesman handled diplomatic transactions so skillfully. Most of the pro-Macedonian Spartans of 220–218 (see **B20–B28**) paid with their lives their policy's non-conformity with the wishes of the majority of their fellow citizens. Amphidamos (**B38**) tried in vain to secure for Philip V the alliance of the extremely unwilling Eleians. Peisis of Thespiai (**C15**) retained his leadership, but lost his political stature, when he (most probably) betrayed the Boiotian revolt against Poliorketes. Neon (**C21**) supported Doson in the face of the justified fears –if not clear anti-Macedonian feelings– of great numbers of Boiotians. Mnasilochos (**C43**) attempted to enforce an alliance of the Akarnanians with Antiochos III, despite the clear unwillingness of the majority of Akarnanians to do so. Members of the family of Aristolochos (see **D10, D17**), in close contact with the Macedonian throne over four generations, were, in certain periods, the only Koans willing to reverse the established pro-Ptolemaic orientation of the city. Menedemos (**D95**) struggled to keep Eretria in the sphere of influence of his student and royal patron Gonatas, against the will of the anti-Macedonian majority, which finally succeeded in banishing him from the city.

The number of such examples may seem limited, but, given the aforementioned problems in our source material, it is, in my opinion, impressively high.¹ In practically every city or *koinon* for which enough literary and epigraphic sources exist to allow even a glimpse of domestic political dynamics, we come across cases in which the relationship with a royal court promoted by a leading citizen or a group of citizens met with opposition by a smaller or larger part of the body politic. The

¹ And would become even higher if we included those cases in which a citizen was appointed Head of State by the Macedonians (see above, **1.6**): in such cases discrepancy between the appointed civic leader's actions and the will of the majority arose already from the procedure which had been followed –not only from its outcome.

most extreme (and, accordingly, perhaps most illuminating) relevant example is the embassy of Selge in Pisidia to the general of Achaïos Garsyeris, who had laid siege to the city in 218 (Polyb. 5.74-76). Fearing that the conquest of their city was imminent, the Selgians chose Logbasis as the most appropriate (εὐφυνέστατος) ambassador, since Logbasis was a friend and *xenos* of Antiochos Hierax and a guardian of Laodike, Achaïos' wife. Instead of securing Selge's salvation from the final attack of Achaïos, as he had been instructed to do, Logbasis attempted to betray the city and hand it over to the contender for the Seleukid throne. The Selgians learnt an important lesson the hard way: the cities were obliged to choose an intermediary as close as possible to the king, but this proximity could easily backfire.

3. INTERMEDIARIES AND HELLENISTIC SOCIETY

According to a Stoic parable, a dog tied behind a moving cart has two options: it may not want to follow, without this having any effect on its condition, or it may want to follow, "exercising free will and obeying necessity at the same time" (ποιῶν καὶ τὸ ἀτεξούσιον μετὰ τῆς ἀνάγκης).¹ For the world of Greek *poleis* royal power constituted an ἀνάγκη that had to be taken into serious consideration. Accordingly, relations with the powerful kings of the period consistently occupied the greatest part of foreign policy considerations for most civic leaderships. In designing and carrying out their policy towards the kings, these leaderships showed outstanding resourcefulness and followed several different lines of approach, in order to counterbalance the shortcomings of the *poleis* in terms of real power. On the level of actual political and military strength, they attempted to forge coalitions against the kings, they expanded federal designs and other forms of 'horizontal' interconnection,² and they energetically strove to exploit the antagonism between the kings. On the level of the institutional relationship between city and royal authority, they tried with all their forces to maintain the cities' autonomy of institutional structures, even when the royal court was undoubtedly the real centre of decision-making, and, mainly, attempted to smoothly incorporate the realities of royal power into the institutional framework of the city, through relationships of euergetism, or through the framework of ruler cult. On the level of public discourse, they missed no opportunity to stress the obligations of the king, as those stemmed from his role as the benefactor of the city *par excellence*, as the Saviour of the city, the champion of the freedom of the cities and of Greek institutions in general.

¹ SVF II 975 (Hippolytos, *Κατὰ πασῶν αἰρέσεων ἔλεγχος* 1.21.2). The same idea is expressed already by Kleanthes (SVF I 527) and is, of course, the origin of Seneca's well-known saying (*Epist.* 107.11): *ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt*.

² See Davies 2002: 8-9; Ma 2003. Obviously, these horizontal ties between cities lost their bargaining effectiveness when they were established on the initiative and under the aegis of a king.

On all three levels, personal networks of contacts with the royal court and administration forged by civic leaders or simple citizens played a defining role. Regardless of the institutional details and the historical junctures of the relations between a particular city and a particular king, this relationship always materialized through the agency of specific individuals and was often influenced by dense networks of interpersonal relationships. The cities consciously tried to exploit these networks. They used statesmen who had a deep understanding of the international correlation of power and knew how to exploit the antagonism between the kings; they used citizens who already had access to the royal administration; they used –existing or projected– bonds of kinship with citizens of other cities, who were in a position to mediate to the court; they successfully involved in the relationship other members of the royal family and a multitude of members of the royal administration, all well-placed to help them achieve their objectives; they employed philosophers, scholars, athletes and actors as intermediaries; they honoured the king and his officials on every occasion, expecting –and formally declaring that they were expecting– the present and prospective goodwill of the honourands.

Regardless of the intentions of those who practiced it, however, this diplomatic resourcefulness unavoidably transferred the centre of political gravity from the city to the court. This shift had two facets. The first was that the city depended more and more on royal authority, either because it had been conquered (whether by military force or politically) by the king, or because it expected diplomatic support, military help or the fulfilment of material needs from the king. Even when the civic leadership promoted a policy of independence from the kings, it could only apply such a policy through contacts with other kings.¹ The dependence of the city on royal authority inevitably developed an ideological side as well. The pursuit, public acceptance and rhetorical exploitation of royal benefaction inevitably entailed the acceptance of royal authority over the city, despite the continuous retreat battles fought by the cities for corresponding obligations to be recognized by the king.

The second facet, the one most relevant to this study, was that the growing density of the (willing or not) contacts with the courts increased the political capital of citizens who already had –or now became interested in gaining– access to the courts, as well as the political capital of citizens who were already members

¹ The examples of some Athenian anti-Macedonian democrats of the period 322-280 are illuminating. The main objective of statesmen like Hagnonides (**A13**), perhaps Polyeuktos (**A16**), Xenokles (**A31**) or Demochares (**A49**) was to throw off the Macedonian yoke (of Kassandros in the case of the three first, of Poliorketes in the case of Demochares); yet all four of them attempted to achieve their goal through contacts with other Macedonian generals, kings and queens. In the case of Hagnonides, and regardless of his pro-independent intentions, these contacts led to an incorporation of royal authority into the institutional structures of the city which was as intense as that of Kassandros' authority, against which the democrats were struggling.

of the royal administration. In other words, the diplomatic vitality showed by the cities in their relationship with the courts was owed to persons whose political horizon was already, or was inevitably becoming, much wider than the city boundaries.

This is probably the distinctive difference of the relationship between cities and kings in the Hellenistic period in comparison with similar relations between states of unequal power in earlier periods. The strong players of the fifth and fourth centuries –Sparta, Athens, or Thebes– also had a number of supporters in other cities, who drew their power from external factors, precisely as Hellenistic civic leaders did.¹ Civic leaders who were treacherous or, at least, disloyal to the expressed will of the majority naturally existed in the Classical period as well. The money of the Persian king or of Philip II could influence decision-making just as much as the money of the Ptolemies did. An Alkibiades could seek personal power between Athens, Sparta and the Persian satrapies, with mobility just as intense as that of any aspiring Hellenistic statesman. But Alkibiades was the exception that proved the rule. Although the political friends of the Athenians or of Philip II or of Darius in a given Greek city were in a position to influence –often decisively– the outcome of interstate relations, the structures of the *polis* remained intact, even when that outcome was its full subjugation to the powerful state of the moment. The leader of a small Greek Classical *polis* could cement his rule through his affiliation to a strong city or to the Persian or Macedonian throne, to which he could occasionally also seek refuge, if inadvertent developments occurred; but he could almost never hope to organically belong to both sides simultaneously.² The result was that, even in such bilateral relations where one pole was indisputably stronger than the other, the Classical *polis* remained, more or less, a structure closed upon itself, an all-inclusive field of political cohesion.

¹ See, for example, Mitchell 1997: 55-72.

² There are few exceptions, such as Charidemos, a naturalized Athenian who was elected as general while at the same time maintaining his contacts with the Thracian court (see Davies 1971: 570-72 n° 15380, and Osborne 1983: 56-58, T51, with earlier bibliography). Another important difference between the Classical and the Hellenistic periods should be pointed out here: in contrast with the many Hellenistic examples (see above, 2.5), I know of no Classical example of a diplomatic envoy of a city to have arbitrarily gone against the explicit wishes of the body politic and its leadership; an embassy of the Classical period was always a reflection of the domestic correlation of power (cf. Mosley 1973: 22-37; Adcock / Mosley 1975: 157-58). Even in the most famous incident in which the ambassadors' integrity and the degree to which they followed the city's instructions were seriously questioned, that is, in the case of the peace of Philokrates in 346 (see SVA II 329 with the sources), the differences between the ambassadors reflected real differences between large factions of the body politic, and the charges against the personal conduct of some ambassadors reflected the changing mood of the body politic. The comparison with the context and the result of Demetrios of Phaleron's embassy to Kassandros in 317 (A4 [II]) is telling.

The Hellenistic *polis*, on the contrary, suffered from a double destabilizing effect on the nucleus of its political *modus vivendi*. Firstly, from the outside to the inside: the kings became more and more present in civic life –as conquerors, as the real decision-makers, as financial sponsors, as benefactors of vital importance in most activities normally belonging to the city’s competence, through visual art, with their statues dominating the urban centre,¹ as defenders of freedom (which usually meant freedom from other kings, not from themselves), as real saviours or as supposed Saviours. But also from the inside to the outside; the various mechanisms of royal power exercised a multiform attraction for a great number of citizens, or at least for a much greater number of citizens than the few leaders of the Classical period who sought refuge at Pella or at the court of the Persian king: for simple mercenaries, for scholars and artists, for aspiring leaders with military, political, administrative, or diplomatic skills, who were now not only interested in leading their city supported by a foreign power, but also in ultimately pursuing a career in the administration of that foreign power. In a sense, the Hellenistic kingdoms may have failed to structurally incorporate the Greek *poleis*, which remained the main matrices of political identity in that period; but in another sense, they met with greater success in incorporating –even partially– the civic elites.

In that respect, Lehmann’s view that the kings of Hellenistic Macedonia took no steps to transform their *de facto* rule over Old Greece into a constructive political programme which would aim at gradual federalization² is not entirely accurate. No Hellenistic ruler wished to proceed to a *de jure* incorporation of a formerly independent statal entity as a constituent part of a single unitary state. Such incorporation would have required resources and administrative manpower that the correlation of power in the Hellenistic world made unaffordable. Besides, and as far as the world of the *poleis* is concerned, even if it had been attempted, it would certainly have met with unwavering opposition. More importantly perhaps, such a step would have also entailed participatory rights for these new constituent parts of the state, which the kings did not wish to concede, for such rights would conflict with personal rule, which was a central feature of Hellenistic monarchy. Accordingly, the only *de jure* incorporation possible for the political mentality of the period was conquest and then attachment to the king *personally*. Failing that, the kings chose a solution which was politically more advantageous, and militarily and administratively less demanding: they chose to transform their *de facto* rule into an –also *de facto*– gradual incorporation of the political leadership of the city or the *koinon* into the royal administration, an hierarchical network of individuals

¹ See, for example, Brogan 2003: 203 and 204, fig. 11: an illustration of how the gaze of an Athenian walking alongside the Panathenaic Way in ca. 302 was captured by multiple depictions of Antigonid power.

² Lehmann 1997: 127-28; cf. the similar critique of Will 1988: 335, quoted in p. 24 n. 4, above.

again personally attached to the king.¹ This was a slow, but not necessarily ineffective solution in order to gradually achieve incorporation of local structures into the king's realm; it was a solution tried by Macedonian kings with success in the past. The only problem was that, in order to be successful, such an approach demanded time –time that the Hellenistic kingdoms never managed to get.

All three methods employed by royal authorities in order to attract and make use of civic leaders (see above, 1.7) were a blow to the political culture of the *polis*: the broadening of the political horizons of their leadership was only a step away from the breach of the *polis* as the main field of political activity. Tarn's classic formulation of the issue ("Man as a political animal, a fraction of the *polis* or self-governing city state, had ended with Aristotle; with Alexander begins man as an individual")² is certainly exaggerated and rather inaccurate, as, for the great majority of people, the traditional structures of the *polis* remained the dominant context of social life. Nevertheless, we should not underestimate³ the importance of mobility, as this is portrayed by all those citizens employed in the royal administration or serving as diplomatic representatives of the city at court, by civic leaders, philosophers and artists who apparently belonged to both worlds –in other words by all those individuals who moved along the line connecting the city with the court. Their number may have been limited, but these were the individuals who put things in motion and controlled the making of decisions and the shaping of mentalities. In that respect, the fact that for these individuals the frame of political belonging had already transcended the city walls was a defining feature of Hellenistic society. In Zenon's abstract construct of the κοσμόπολις, the second component of the word had already atrophied; the κοσμόπολις was a depoliticized community of individuals, rather than the expansion of *polis* structures to the whole oikoumene.⁴ The actual Hellenistic πόλις never reached that point; nonetheless, the mechanisms corroding its –until then all-inclusive– political structure had already been set in motion.

¹ In the period under study, this incorporation was facilitated by the invocation of the city's (or the *koinon*'s) alliance with the king, whether this alliance had an institutional facet, (as the Greek Alliances of 303 or 302 under Poliorketes or of 224 under Doson did), or not (as the συμμαχία of Seleukid kings, to which the 'autonomous' cities of their realm belonged; cf., for example, *I. Iliou* 33, ll. 45-46). In that sense both Aratos (B13) and Philip V, for example, could adduce the needs of the Greek Alliance of 224 to explain their close collaboration to their respective political audiences.

² Tarn / Griffith 1952: 79.

³ As perhaps Davies 1984: 310 does.

⁴ See Schofield 1999: 768: "[in Stoic political terminology], the political vocabulary is depoliticized".

Appendix 1

The context of the honours accorded to Asandros by the Athenians in February 313 (Osborne 1981: D42)

Asandros, satrap of Karia since 323, had allied himself with Ptolemy against Antigonos in 315 (Diod. Sic. 19.62.2).¹ Antigonos immediately sent forces to the area. Kassandros hastened to provide assistance, in order to help his ally Asandros and hinder his enemy Antigonos from crossing over to Europe (19.68.2); in the campaigning season of 314, he sent Prepelaos to Karia and asked Demetrios of Phaleron and the phourarch of Mounychia Dionysios to send a naval force against Lemnos, then under Antigonos' control (19.68.2-3). Both missions failed: Dioskourides and Polemaios, Antigonos' generals, practically destroyed the Athenian squadron sent to Lemnos (19.68.4) and defeated the forces of Asandros, Prepelaos and Eupolemos in Karia (19.68.5-7). Both Antigonid victories are dated to early winter 314 (19.68.2; cf. 69.2). Asandros was forced to enter Antigonos' alliance temporarily, only to switch camps again and urgently ask for help from Ptolemy and Seleukos (19.75.1-3). Antigonid forces conquered Miletos (part of Asandros' realm) and the cities of Karia with great ease (19.75.3-5), without meeting any resistance from Asandros, who disappears from our sources ever since. These last events are recorded by Diodoros in the context of the campaigning season of 313, and should probably be placed early in this season, as they are the first events in Asia mentioned by Diodoros after the defeat of Kassandros' forces.² This is perfectly compatible with the generally accepted dates for the Milesian list of *stephanephoroi*, in which Asandros is recorded as *stephanephoros* for the Milesian year *ca.* March / April 314 to *ca.* February / March 313, and the 'liberation' of the city by Antigonos is duly recorded at the beginning of the second part of the same list, which presumably began with the *stephanephoros* of the following year; it is less compatible –but still possible– with the alternative dates for the Milesian list of *stephanephoroi*, according to which the *stephanephoros* of Asandros belongs to 313/2.³

¹ The correction of the manuscripts of Diodoros in 19.57.2 from *Κασάνδρω* to *Ἀσάνδρω*, which would mean that Asandros was a member of the coalition against Antigonos already from the start, is uncalled for (Buraselis 1982: 6, with earlier literature). As usual, I follow the 'high' chronology for the period winter 319/8 - 313 (see p. 30 n. 2, above).

² For the chronology of these events, see Wheatley 1998: 273-76.

³ *Milet* I 3, 122 II, l. 101 (Asandros as *stephanephoros*) and 123, ll. 2-4 (Antigonos liberates the city). On the beginning of the Milesian year, see Trümper 1997: 92-93. On the dating of the list, see

As we saw (A18, above), Asandros received the highest honours awarded to foreigners by the Athenian people, in ca. February 313.¹ The phrase of the decree with which we shall deal here belongs to the motivation clause of the first part of the decree,² and comes after the standard mention of the honourand's goodwill: παραγενόμενος εἰς τὴν πόλιν τὰς τε ναῦς τὰς ἰδίας καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας ΠΑΡ[. . .] Ἀθηναίοις εἰς τὰς χ[ρ]εῖας ---] (ll. 18-22). Michael Osborne discerned the traces of the upper part of a vertical stroke, which belongs to the first visible letter of l. 21, thus invalidating the common restoration παρ[έσχετο] and rendering the restoration παρ[έχεται] (with a slight anomaly of the *stoichedon* layout) highly probable and, until recently, generally accepted. Stephen Lambert recently suggested the restoration παρ[έσχε]ν or παρ[εἶχε]ν, which is epigraphically preferable and grammatically possible.³ His restoration effects that there is no need for us to assume that Asandros was present in Athens in Gamelion 313 or soon before.

The precise context of the Attic decree depends on the restoration of l. 21. If we restore παρ[έσχε]ν or παρ[εἶχε]ν, Asandros' military help should belong to an earlier period, and his presence in Athens could be dated to autumn 314, when he visited Macedonia in order to organize with Kassandros the attack on Antigonos.⁴ A significant difficulty remains: such a scenario requires the assumption that Asandros, while under great pressure from Antigonid forces, came to Athens and negotiated offering his help for the takeover of Lemnos, a project dear to the Athenians and Kassandros, but of clearly secondary importance to him personally.⁵

If one accepted Osborne's restoration (παρ[έχεται]), an interesting solution would be that proposed by O'Sullivan:⁶ Asandros was present in Athens in February 313, but his help was irrelevant to the Lemnos expedition; it involved his participation in the other failed Athenian expedition in the Aegean, namely the

Herrman, *Milet* VI 1, p. 166 and Rhodes 2006, with earlier bibliography. Rhodes proposes to return to Cavaignac's theory, who dated the catalogue one year later; even if accepted, Cavaignac's dating does not necessarily invalidate the chronology of these events as this results from Diodoros' narrative. There would still have been time for Asandros to be named *stephanephoros* in early spring 313, and for Antigonos to conquer the city immediately afterwards. The fact that the 'liberation' of the city marks the beginning of a new list allows the assumption that the first *stephanephoros* of *Milet* I 3, 123 could be placed in the same year as Asandros –who is the last *stephanephoros* of *Milet* I 3, 122–, but after the change of regime.

¹ Osborne 1981: D42 (*IG* II² 450; *Syll*³ 320), *Pryt.* VI 26 of 314/3, an intercalary year.

² For the second part, see A18, above.

³ Lambert 1999 (cf. Lambert 2000: n° E1), with parallels for the use of the active form instead of the middle normally expected.

⁴ *Diod. Sic.* 19.68.5: Ἀσανδρος δὲ καὶ Πρεπέλαος ἀφηγούντο μὲν τῆς ὑπὸ Κασάνδρου πεμφθείσης δυνάμεως εἰς τὴν Καρίαν. Cf. Ferguson 1911: 49 n. 44; Hauben 1978: 47; Lambert 2000: 488; but see the objections of Billows 1990: 119 n. 48.

⁵ See the pertinent remarks of O'Sullivan 1997: 112 n. 29.

⁶ O'Sullivan 1997; Wheatley 1998: 273 n. 82 apparently concurs.

attempt to regain Samos. This expedition is not mentioned by Diodoros, but it is attested by an inscription from Samos, and apparently belongs to 315-311;¹ in theory, there is no reason why this campaign should not be placed in the beginning of the campaigning season of 313.² Unlike Lemnos, Samos was of great strategic importance for Asandros, the master of Miletos; this would explain why the satrap deemed the Athenian expedition worthy of his assistance. O'Sullivan's suggestion is equally problematic, however. Despite the indubitable importance of Samos for Asandros, Antigonos' anticipated final assault should have led him to the maximum concentration of his forces and not to their scattering on secondary fronts. Equally doubtful is the assumption that the Athenians were ready to undertake such a campaign in 313, so soon after the disaster at Lemnos.

Combining Lambert's restoration with O'Sullivan's assumption appears as the most plausible solution. By restoring $\text{παρ}[\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\chi\epsilon]\nu$ or $\text{παρ}[\acute{\epsilon}\iota\chi\epsilon]\nu$, Asandros' sojourn in Athens could be dated some time before February 313. He may have visited Athens between his entering the alliance against Antigonos in 315 and autumn 314, when hostilities with the forces of Antigonos on Lemnos and in Karia began. His military assistance to the Athenians would then belong to the campaign against Samos –as O'Sullivan proposed–, which, according to the majority of scholars, was earlier than the campaign against Lemnos; at this juncture, offering military assistance to the Athenians would have served Asandros' personal interests better. This failed campaign (315 or early in 314) would have been a first attempt of the anti-Antigonid alliance to create difficulties for the enemy: for Kassandros it would have been a first-class opportunity to wrest a possession of great strategic importance from Antigonos; for Asandros, until then not directly involved in the war, it would have been a first attempt to secure his rear at Miletos and Karia, in view of the inevitable Antigonid attack; for the Athenians, hardly interested in the war against Antigonos, it would have been yet another attempt to recover Samos. The fact that the honours for Asandros were enacted several months later poses no difficulties. If the verb παρέχω in l. 21 is in a past tense, Asandros' military assistance was not his most recent benefaction; undoubtedly, later benefactions of his would have been reported in the missing part of the decree.³

¹ IG XII 6, 51-52; cf. O'Sullivan 1997: 111 n. 24-25 and p. 385 n. 5, above.

² O'Sullivan 1997: 110-14. She suggests (p. 113) that Diodoros indirectly refers to this campaign when he reports that the admiral Medeios, then in Phoinike, was called in by Antigonos, and promptly defeated a squadron of Pydnaian ships (Diod. Sic. 19.69.3). *Pace* O'Sullivan, however, this episode cannot be dated to early 313. Hauben 1978 is surely correct in dating this event to 314: Antigonos' movements are narrated by Diodoros after the movements of Kassandros and his generals (19.68), but they must be contemporaneous (19.68.2 and 69.2). The Pydnaian squadron must have been part of the forces of Kassandros that were sent to Karia.

³ His naturalization must have also been recorded there (Osborne 1982: 115; O'Sullivan 1997: 108; Lambert 2000: 489).

Appendix 2

The *agonothesia* of Glaukon son of Eteokles (IG II² 3079), and the Panathenaia of 286/5 (SEG 28 [1978] 60, ll. 64-66)

IG II² 3079 (Syll³ 365) is a choregic monument dedicated by the *agonothetes* Glaukon son of Eteokles (A55), which also records –on the two lateral sides of the monument– the crowns offered by the Athenians to Glaukon on account of the various offices he held (ll. 7-9: phylarch; ll. 13-15: general ἐπὶ τῶν ὄπλων; ll. 16-18: *agonothetes*; ll. 19-21: again general ἐπὶ τῶν ὄπλων), as well as on account of his victories at the Olympieia and the Great Panathenaia (ll. 5-6 and 10-12 respectively). The disposition of the text –with three crowns recorded on the right side and four on the left–¹ gives the distinct impression that the offices which Glaukon held were recorded in chronological order: phylarch, general ἐπὶ τῶν ὄπλων, *agonothetes*, again general ἐπὶ τῶν ὄπλων, and then again *agonothetes*, at the time when the monument was erected, during the archonship of Nikias.² Of the three eponymous archons of that name (296/5, 282/1, 266/5), the latter two have been proposed for this decree.³

Nikias I (296/5) has been rightfully rejected: dating Glaukon's second *agonothesia* in 296 would effect that he was well over forty by then, that he subsequently disappeared from public record for a period of thirty years, in order to resurface in 266/5, when he is again recorded as general ἐπὶ τῶν ὄπλων,⁴ and that he eventually became a priest of Alexander in Alexandria in 255/4,⁵ at an age of well over eighty-five. Moreover, a man obviously having no sympathy for tyrannids and the Macedonians is unlikely to have been honoured in 296/5, either during the

¹ In IG II² 3079, Kirchner allows for another, now missing, crown, carved on the right side of the monument, although the disposition of the text in IG II 1291 does not seem to allow it; in any case, Koehler assumed that the fourth crown of the left side (as well as the fourth crown of the right side, if it existed) were not accompanied by mentions of another office.

² Étienne / Piérart 1975: 57 mention only one *agonothesia*, obviously identifying the *agonothesia* for which Glaukon was honoured with a crown (ll. 16-18, on the left side) with the *agonothesia* of the year in which the monument was erected (ll. 2-3, on the frontal side of the monument). Glaukon's offices, however, must have been recorded in chronological order, otherwise his two generalships would have been recorded together; accordingly, since the *agonothesia* of ll. 16-18 is followed by a generalship ἐπὶ τῶν ὄπλων, it cannot be identified with the *agonothesia* of the preamble.

³ See, for example, Meritt 1968: 284-85 (Nikias II); Étienne / Piérart 1975: 57 (Nikias III, but with a mistaken quotation of Meritt 1961 and a misunderstanding of Heinen 1972: 125-26, who refers to the other inscription for Glaukon: SEG 25 [1971] 186, on which see also Habicht 2003b); Pouilloux 1975 (Nikias III, tentatively); Dreyer 1996: 55 n. 68 and 1998: 209 n. 62 (Nikias II); Humphreys 2007: 70-72 (Nikias III); earlier literature is of no use, as it ignored the second inscription on Glaukon.

⁴ SEG 25 (1971) 186, with Habicht 2003b.

⁵ PCairZen 2.59173 (Ijsewijn 1961: 70-71 n° 31).

tyrannid of Lachares or after the takeover of Athens by Poliorketes, nor is he likely to have occupied all these offices during the tyrannid.

Nikias III (266/5), on the other hand, was always recorded as Nikias of Otryne in official texts,¹ among others in SEG 25 (1971) 186, where Glaukon is again mentioned as general ἐπὶ τῶν ὅπλων. Besides, in 266/5, in the midst of war, it would have been difficult for Glaukon to reconcile his duties as general with his duties as *agonothetes* for the same year.²

Therefore, Nikias II (282/1) seems to be the likeliest candidate. This has repercussions regarding another crux of the period, for it can prove that the Panathenaia for which Kallias of Sphettos secured a Ptolemaic donation (SEG 28 [1978] 60, ll. 64-66) were the third Panathenaia celebrated after the liberation of the city, as Osborne and Dreyer have proposed (see p. 149 n. 2, above), that is, the Panathenaia of 278: if IG II² 3079 records Glaukon's offices and victories in chronological order, and if the offices Glaukon held are all dated in the 280's –after the oligarchic regime imposed by Poliorketes–, as is most probable, then the Great Panathenaia at which Glaukon won a victory (ll. 16-18) should postdate his tenure of the office of phylarch (ll. 7-9) in the early 280's and predate his tenure of the office of *agonothetes* in 282/1 (ll. 1-2). It seems, therefore, that the Panathenaia in question were those of 286, which, under any other restoration or interpretation of the Kallias decree, could not have been celebrated.

Recently, Humphreys advanced a number of arguments against dating IG II² 3079 to 282/1, none of which are convincing, in my opinion.³ First of all, she hesitantly claims that Glaukon cannot have been forty years old by 282/1, and that he was thus ineligible for the office of *agonothetes* for that year; by her own admission, however, this is far from certain.⁴ Besides, her argument overlooks the fact

¹ Cf. Osborne 2006: 73.

² Humphreys 2007: 72, who dates the (second) *agonothesia* of Glaukon under Nikias III in 266/5, thinks that such a double appointment may have been thought “good for morale”. The generalship of the hoplites at time of war, however, was of far more crucial importance than a dubious effort to boost the citizens' morale.

³ Humphreys 2007: 70-72. She also suggests that Glaukon and Chremonides are not mentioned in the inscriptions recording other members of the family (IG II² 3458, 3845 and 3459) because before the eve of the Chremonidean War they did not reside in Athens, but in Alexandria. Even if we dated IG II² 3079 to 266/5, there would still be no need for such an assumption. In none of the above inscriptions (a dedication of Pheidostrate to her father Eteokles, and the inscribed bases of the statues of Eteokles and Pheidostrate) should we *expect* a mention of Glaukon or Chremonides, in the first place; hence it is far-fetched to make any inferences based on the fact that they are not mentioned.

⁴ She claims (p. 70) that “Glaukon was perhaps still under forty at that date”, but in p. 71 admits that the two brothers “can scarcely have been born much (if at all) before 320”. A date of birth in, for example, 324 is perfectly compatible both with all biographical data on Glaukon and with the assumption that he served as *agonothetes* in (for example) 284/3 and 282/1.

that, as we saw above, Glaukon's *agonothesia* under Nikias was most probably his second *agonothesia*; if Glaukon was eligible for *agonothetes* already *before* the archonship of Nikias, he was certainly eligible under Nikias as well.

Humphreys then restates an older argument against such a date, namely that Phaidros son of Thymochares was also *agonothetes* in 282/1,¹ and that more than one *agonothetai* jointly holding the office appeared only towards the end of the third century (or, according to Humphreys, in the second century), while the officials responsible for the Panathenaic festival were the *athlothetai*. Nonetheless, *SEG* 25 (1971) 186 (+ Habicht 2003b) of 266/5 records an "*agonothetes* of the Panathenaia" (the word ἀγωνοθέτης is restored, but, *pace* Humphreys, quite safely so),² which means that, by 266/5 at the latest, it was perfectly possible for two *agonothetai* to serve during the same year. Meritt plausibly suggested that for the years in which the Great Panathenaia were held two *agonothetai* were appointed, in order for them to share the financial burden which the office brought with it.³ This is compatible with the assumption that Glaukon was *agonothetes* of the Dionysia in 282/1 –IG II² 3079 was found in the theatre of Dionysos– and Phaidros *agonothetes* of the Panathenaia of the same year.⁴

¹ IG II² 682, l. 53; there is no doubt that this is also Nikias II: see T. L. Shear 1978: 65–66; Henry 1988: 216 n. 7.

² L. 3: [ἀγωνοθέτης Παν]αθηναίων Δεινίας Ἐρχιεύς. An ἀθλοθέτης would have had no place in a list of the chief magistrates of the city (the other identifiable offices are those of generals and military treasurers). For the same reason, the restoration [ἀγωνοθέτης] Παναθηναίων in IG II² 1705 + *SEG* 32 (1982) 169 (probably dated to 226/5; see p. 188 n. 2, above) is also safe.

³ Meritt 1968: 285. Lambert 2003 has even proposed that the *agonothetes* of 307/6, attested in IG II² 3073, was not Xenokles, as in other inscriptions of that year, but his brother Androkles; this would mean that already by the time when the office was created it was possible for two *agonothetai* to serve during the same year. Humphreys (2007: 71 n. 44) dismisses the importance of Lambert's suggestion, claiming that the two *agonothetai* were brothers, and that they both dealt with the Dionysia; but both Lambert's restoration and the (unambiguous) testimony of two *agonothetai* in 266/5 invalidate her claim that there cannot have been two *agonothetai* in the same year before the second century.

⁴ Humphreys posits two additional arguments in favour of the traditional view that in the third century the office was to be held by one person only: 1) In the early 230's, the *athlothetai* and an individual who helped them were honoured for the proper celebration of the Panathenaia (IG II² 784), a fact which, according to Humphreys, means that there is no place for an *agonothetes* to have been specifically in charge of the Panathenaia. 2) Known dedications by *agonothetai* (in which only one *agonothetes* is recorded as the dedicator until 175/4), show that, during that period, the office was held by one person only. I find neither argument convincing. 1) IG II² 784 is irrelevant to our question. The fact that the *athlothetai* were honoured in no way precludes the existence of an *agonothetes*, for the two offices had distinct areas of competence. The *agonothetes* was primarily a wealthy and respected citizen, expected to spend of his own fortune for the celebration, while the *athlothetai* were primarily responsible for supervising the actual procedure of the festivals. Thus, an honorific decree for *athlothetai* of the Panathenaia in no way precludes the existence of a separate honorific decree for an *agonothetes* of the Panathenaia. 2) I fail to understand Humphreys' second

Her third argument is circular: she claims that Glaukon cannot have been an *agonothetes* in 282/1, for his victories would then belong to the Great Panathenaia of 286/5, which were never celebrated. As we have already seen (p. 149 n. 2, above), however, it is perfectly possible that –independently of the date of Glaukon’s *agonothesia*– the Panathenaia were celebrated in 286/5.

Humphreys’ final argument¹ in favour of dating Glaukon’s *agonothesia* under Nikias III in 266/5 rests on the combination of an uncertain and a wrong assumption. She claims that the tribe Leontis, whose victory is recorded on the frontal side of IG II² 3079 (ll. 3-4), should be the *agonothetes*’ own tribe, as in the other cases where only one victorious team is recorded; since Glaukon’s deme, Aithalidai, had been moved from Leontis to Antigonis in 307/6, the recording of the victorious team Leontis points, according to Humphreys, to the period of the Chremonidean War, and therefore to the archonship of Nikias III, when the Athenians may have reverted to the ten-tribe system, abolishing the two additional Antigonid tribes. The notion that Glaukon should only record his own tribe as victorious rests on only two parallels; most importantly, there is unambiguous evidence that the two Antigonid tribes were not abolished during the Chremonidean War.²

Appendix 3

The Athenian generalships of the countryside, and the forts of Attica from 255 to 229

The classic treatment of the status of the forts of Attica and the two generalships of the Attic countryside (the generalship of the *paralia* –the coastal district– to the south, east and northeast, including Sounion and Rhamnous, and the generalship of the Eleusinian countryside to the west and northwest, including Eleusis, Panakton and Phyle), from the time of the ‘liberation’ of the city in ca. 255 to the expulsion of the Macedonian garrisons from Attica in 229, is that of Christian Habicht.³ Here is a brief summary of his conclusions: 1) Piraeus and Salamis remained in Macedonian hands throughout the period under discussion. 2) The important forts of both districts remained under direct Macedonian control: their phourarchs belonged to the Macedonian administration, even when they were

argument: I see no reason why a dedication by one *agonothetes* should preclude the existence of another.

¹ Humphreys 2007: 72.

² IG II² 664 was enacted during the twelfth prytany of 267/6; in other words, there were still twelve tribes in a year when the hostilities of the Chremonidean War had already broken out (see IG II² 665; it should be noted that this is accepted even in Dreyer’s [1999: ch. 4] alternative chronology of the war). Besides, the two Antigonid tribes had been abolished neither when the Athenians distanced themselves from Poliorketes himself in 301 nor when they took up arms against him in 287 (cf. Habicht [2006]: 200).

³ Habicht 1982: 43-59.

Athenian citizens. In 235, however, Eleusis was handed over to the Athenians. 3) The Athenian generals of the *paralia* and of the Eleusinian countryside were elected by, and served, the Athenian state; the joint appointment of Apollodoros son of Apollodoros of Otryne (**A61**) by both the Athenians and the king was the exception rather than the rule. The king did not interfere in the appointment of lower-grade officers, such as taxiarchs, phylarchs and hipparchs. 4) Athenian generals were expected to collaborate with phrourarchs of the Macedonian administration, but little evidence of such collaboration exists.

More than two decades later, Habicht¹ was convinced by an M.A. thesis of his then student Roland Oetjen² that he was wrong in his second and fourth conclusions, and that the accounts of Plutarch (*Arat.* 34.6) and Pausanias (2.8.6) were correct: Diogenes, the Macedonian commander of the Piraeus, handed over to the Athenians only the forts of the Piraeus, Mounychia, Salamis and Sounion in 229, as the rest were already in Athenian hands by then. According to Oetjen, Apollonios' (**A69**) appointment by Gonatas as phrourarch of Rhamnous belonged to the period 262-255, that is, before the 'liberation', while Dikaiarchos' (**A70**) later appointment as phrourarch of Panakton was not made by the Macedonian king; thus, Oetjen concluded that no evidence existed to suggest that the Macedonian kings appointed the phrourarchs in Attica after 255.³

What we know about the method of appointment to the two generalships under discussion can be tabulated as follows:

I. *Generals of the paralia*

1. Apollodoros son of Apollodoros of Otryne (**A61**) was "appointed as general by king Antigonos and the people and elected to the coastal district" ([κ]ατασταθεις στρατηγός ὑπό τε τοῦ βασιλέως Ἀντιγόνου καὶ | [ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου καὶ] χειροτονηθεις ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν παραλίαν),⁴ probably in 256/5,⁵ in other words, either immediately before or in the very year of the 'liberation' of the city by Gonatas, for which literary tradition has preserved two possible dates: 256/5 and 255/4.⁶

¹ Habicht 2003: 52-53; cf. Habicht [2006]: 452 n. 56.

² R. Oetjen, *Die Garnison der Festung Rhamnus in Attika im dritten Jahrhundert v. Chr.*, M.A. thesis, Hamburg 1998 [*non vidi*].

³ Tracy 2003: 20 n. 19 agrees with that assessment. Oetjen also believes that Dikaiarchos son of Apollonios of Thria in *I. Rhamn.* 19 is not the Dikaiarchos of *I. Rhamn.* 17, but his grandson; as we saw (**A69-70**, above), his belief is probably justified.

⁴ *I. Rhamn.* 8, ll. 7-8. The second καὶ in l. 8 is syntactically required by the τε before the king's name, as Angelos Matthaiou pointed out to Stephen Tracy (see Tracy 2003b: 56 n. 6).

⁵ The date depends on the restoration of the name of the archon under whom Apollodoros served as general (l. 9), most probably in the year before he was honoured. If Euboulos II belongs to 265/4 (Osborne 2000: 514-15) and not to 258/7, the restoration of his name in l. 9 of *I. Rhamn.* 8, which had met with general agreement (see already Pouilloux 1954: 120), is no longer possible. Osborne (2000: 519 n. 41) suggests restoring the name of Antimachos (256/5).

⁶ See p. 176 n. 4, above.

2. Thoukritos son of Alkimachos of Myrrhinous (**A76**) was “elected by the people” as general for the archonship of Kallimedes in 253/2.¹ We know from another inscription from Rhamnous that Thoukritos was consecutively general under an archon whose name has not been preserved, and then under Kleomachos (255/4), Kallimedes (253/2) and Thersilochos (251/0).² If the pattern of serving every other year was already followed at the beginning of his career as a general, as is most likely, his first year of service must have been that of Thymochares’ archonship (257/6); in any case, it cannot have been later than 257/6, since, as we just saw, the general for 256/5 was most probably Apollodoros.³ Another decree informs us that Thoukritos was twice “elected by the people” as general; the names of the archons are missing, but the text clearly implies that the two years in question were his first two generalships.⁴ This means that Thymochares is recorded to have been “elected by the people” as general both before and after the liberation of 255: in 257/6 (?), 255/4 and 253/2 (presumably also in 251/0).

3. Kallisthenes son of Kleoboulos of Prospalta was “elected” in 254/3 (archon Phanostratos) and 252/1 (archon Pheidostratos).⁵

4. Philokedes was “elected” general for an unspecified year,⁶ which may have been 235/4 (archon Ekphantos), when we know that he was general of the *paralia*.⁷

5. Philotheos son of Philion of Phrearoi was “elected” for the year of the archonship of Mneseides (between 233/2 and 229/8).⁸

6. Diomedes son of Diodoros of Ptelea was “elected by the Athenian people” for an unspecified year, probably belonging to the period under discussion.⁹

7. Although the text is extensively (and not safely) restored, there may be another mention of a general who was “appointed as general and elected over the coastal district”, most probably in the period under discussion.¹⁰

¹ *I. Rhamn.* 10, ll. 3-5.

² *I. Rhamn.* 129.

³ See Osborne 2000: 511-12.

⁴ *I. Rhamn.* 11, ll. 4-6: ἐπειδὴ Θούκριτος πρό[τ]ερόν τε [χειροτονηθεὶς] ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου στρατ[η]λλ[γ]ός [ἐπὶ *nomen* -ο]ν ἄρχοντος κα[ὶ] | [πάλιν ἐπὶ *nomen* ἄρχοντ]ος. Then follow the usual descriptions of the honouree’s activities. If the decree belonged to a period later than his second generalship, then his other generalships should also have been mentioned.

⁵ *I. Rhamn.* 136 and 137.

⁶ *I. Rhamn.* 18, ll. 2-4.

⁷ *I. Rhamn.* 17, ll. 21-22.

⁸ *I. Rhamn.* 20, ll. 2-3; it is perhaps noteworthy that the Macedonian king is not mentioned at all in the forty-two long lines of the decree.

⁹ *I. Rhamn.* 14, ll. 3-5.

¹⁰ *I. Rhamn.* 16, ll. 2-3, restored by Petrakos as [ἐπειδὴ *nomen* κατασταθεὶς] | [στρ]ατηγός καὶ χειροτο[νηθεὶς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν παραλίαν]. In his apparatus, Petrakos himself admits that the restorations are too long; moreover, if we are dealing with another case of a joint appointment

— There is no record of the method of appointment of Archandros son of Kallippos of Eleusis, general of the *paralia* in 248/7,¹ nor of Kallippos son of Theodotos of Melite, general of the *paralia* for an unspecified year, perhaps belonging to this period.²

II. Generals of the Eleusinian district

1. Aristo[---] (**A57**), a former royal officer, was “elected by the people” as general of the Eleusinian district; the date is difficult to establish, but one of the three possible choices falls within the period under discussion.³

2. An unknown general may have been “appointed” ([κατασταθείς]) either before 255 or in the period under discussion.⁴

3. An unknown general of Eleusis in 256/5 had a career typical of an Athenian statesman.⁵

4. For at least two of his three generalships, Demetrios son of Phanostratos of Phaleron (**A59**) was “elected” to his office, in unspecified years after 256/5.⁶

5. An unknown general of Eleusis in the period under discussion was “elected” to his office.⁷

6. Aristophanes son of Aristomenes of Leukonoion was “appointed” as general in 236/5, and “elected for the second time” in 235/4. The hortatory intention formula is also of interest: “so that all elected (αἰρεθέντες) generals of Eleusis show zeal...”⁸

Contrary to the general consensus, I think that few certainties arise from the above evidence. There is no doubt that the generals both of the *paralia* and of

by the king and the people, it is striking that neither side is named. Nonetheless, I see no other way of accommodating the (certain) sequence [στρα]τηγός καὶ χειροτο[νηθείς] in l. 3.

¹ *Ergon* 1993: 7-8 and Petrakos 1999: I 36-37; *I. Rhmn.* 27-28 and 131.

² *I. Rhmn.* 15.

³ *I. Eleusis* 180; for the date, see **A57**, above: the general may have been either a former officer of Ptolemy II, who served as an Athenian general soon after the democratic uprising of 287 or soon before the Chremonidean War, or a former officer of Gonatas, who served as an Athenian general during the war with Alexandros son of Krateros (ca. 251- soon after 248/7).

⁴ *I. Eleusis* 187 (*IG II²* 1287). The inscription is the work of a cutter who was active from 286/5 to ca. 239 (see Clinton’s epigraphic commentary, and Tracy 2003: 85), and belongs to the mature period of the cutter, after 270 (Tracy 2003: 96). Clinton restores [κατασταθείς] and not [χειροτονηθείς], probably because the latter restoration would only allow for four letters for the honourand’s name.

⁵ *IG II²* 3460.

⁶ *I. Eleusis* 194 (*IG II²* 1285); cf. 195 (*IG II²* 2971).

⁷ *I. Eleusis* 191 (*IG II²* 1288 + 1219).

⁸ *I. Eleusis* 196 (*IG II²* 1299), ll. 59-60: κατασταθείς [τε στρατηγός ἐπ’ Ἐλ][ε]υσίνος εἰς τὸν ἐπὶ Κίμωνος ἔνιαυτόν, ll. 64-65: χειροτονηθείς τε τὸ δεύτερον στρατηγός ἐπ’ Ἐλευσίνος εἰς τὸν ἐπὶ Ἐκφάντου ἐνιαυτόν, and ll. 69-70: ὅπως ἂν οὖν πάντες οἱ αἰρεθέντες] | ἐπ’ Ἐλευσίνος στρατηγ[οἶ φιλοτ]ιμῶνται...

Eleusis (in contrast to the general of the Piraeus, on whom see below) were generals of the Athenian state. They were Athenian citizens, had a career typical of Athenian officials and were elected to their office by the appropriate civic body. Apollodoros is the only unambiguous case of a joint appointment, both by the king and by the Athenians; moreover, his appointment may date to the period immediately *prior* to the liberation. The only other possible case of a joint appointment (I.7 in the above list) is far from certain; in II.2 the restoration [κατασταθεῖς] is equally uncertain; Aristophanes (II.6) was “appointed” in 236/5, but “elected” in 235/4. All this seems perfectly compatible with Habicht’s original theory on the generals.

Nonetheless, we should not forget that this sort of evidence is a product of Athenian public discourse, not necessarily to be taken at face value. The new restoration of *I. Rhamn.* 8 (I.1 above) is important in that respect, because it allows new insight into the procedure which was followed. This was not an appointment by the king, later ratified by the people in a (bogus) election, as previously thought;¹ according to the precise wording of the decree, this was a joint appointment of a general by the king and the people, followed by an election, the subject matter of which was only to specify the precise area of *jurisdiction* of the general.² Of course, this double procedure, the details of which elude us, may predate the ‘liberation’ and need not have been followed after 255. It is, however, significant for present discussion, for it shows that a χειροτονία did not *a priori* preclude royal intervention –at an earlier stage. In other words, there is no reason for us to ascertain that the “election” of generals, attested by the overwhelming majority of epigraphic sources, is an expression accurately recording facts, rather than an expression manipulating reality. In cases where no compelling evidence exists to prove that we are dealing with a free election by the Athenian people, the rhetorical needs of the Athenian state –which was on a gradual and cautious, but determined path to real independence throughout the period under discussion– may suffice to explain why only the election of a general is mentioned –reference to generals having previously been appointed by the king being omitted.

In fact, there are some indications that the election of generals after 255 was not exactly a free election without royal interference. The case of Aristo[---] (II.1 in the above list) is illuminating: Aristo[---] was “elected by the people” as general

¹ Even Tracy 2003: 18 analyses the wording in this fashion.

² The awkwardness of the phrase, with the separation of στρατηγός and ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν παραλίαν (participle 1 – στρατηγός – agent 1 – agent 2 – participle 2 – ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν παραλίαν), should have already alerted scholars. If both the “appointment” and the “election” referred to the combination of office (general) and jurisdiction (coastal district) as a whole, then the full title of the office should have been recorded either in the beginning or in the end of the phrase. The fact that there may be another such case (*I. Rhamn.* 16) reinforces the impression of two distinct procedures.

of the Eleusinian district; yet the decree in his honour makes it clear that –if not at the time of his ‘election’, then certainly earlier in his career– Aristo[---] was a royal officer. Are we to assume that the king did not interfere in his “election”?

Moreover, if the above reconstruction of the career of Thoukritos (I.2) is correct, the general is recorded (in ca. 254) to have been “elected by the people” (with no mention of the king) both before and after the ‘liberation’ of ca. 255. There are only two options. The first is to assume that the king allowed Athenian generals to be freely elected by the Athenians even before the ‘liberation’ of the city; but this assumption is flatly contradicted by the well-known statement of Apollodoros that, after the Chremonidean War, the “constitution was abolished”,¹ and conflicts with the general consensus that in the first post-war years the king exercised tight control on Athenian institutions. The second option is to assume that only a few things actually changed in the ‘election’ of generals in 255. The abundantly documented ‘election’ of the post-255 period would, in that case, be only half the truth; it would consist merely in ratifying the appointment of generals who had been preselected by the king, and in assigning them to a specific area of jurisdiction.

Finally, if κατασταθείς and χειροτονηθείς pointed to two fundamentally different methods of selection, involving the king and the city respectively, then it would be difficult to understand the phrasing of the decree for Aristophanes (II.6 in the list above), who was “appointed” (κατασταθείς) as general in 236/5, and then “elected for the second time” in 235/4. The supplement “for the second time” seems to contradict the suggestion that κατασταθείς and χειροτονηθείς point to a clear change of procedure.²

It is against the backdrop of these observations that we can now turn to the status of the forts. The first decree for Aristophanes, issued by the “citizens serving at Eleusis and Panakton and the soldiers serving on behalf of the city and stationed at Eleusis” (*I. Eleusis* 196, ll. 20-22), praises the general for the sacrifices which he performed “for the Athenian *demos*, king Demetrios and queen Phthia”, which he co-financed and to which he invited all citizens; the honourand’s εὔνοια is said to have been directed towards “the people of Athens, the king and his offspring” (ll. 10-14 and 35-36). The second decree, enacted by the deme of Eleusis, does not name the king even once in its thirty long lines and the honourand’s εὔνοια is said to have been directed exclusively towards “the people of Athens and the people of Eleusis”. Habicht claimed that the change of tone in the second decree is

¹ *FGrHist* 244 F 44; cf. p. 174 n. 2, above for the text and the meaning.

² It should be added that later evidence does not allow any firm conclusions to be drawn from the use of κατασταθείς either. Theophrastos (A77) is described as κατασταθείς δὲ στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν ἐπ’ Ἐλευσίνος (*I. Eleusis* 207) in 218/7, that is, at a time when any royal intervention is unimaginable; κατασταθείς does not necessarily mean “appointed by the king”.

indicative of a change of status; his assumption, however, is hampered by the fact that the first decree was, in all likelihood, also enacted after Aristophanes' second year of office.¹ Once again, it may be the different rhetorical purposes of the two decrees which account for the difference in terminology. The deme of Eleusis had no interest in publicly underlining any connection with the royal administration. This was now the Athens of Eurykleides and Mikion, whose pace towards real independence was picking up speed; if the king had intervened in the selection of generals, for example, the Eleusinians would have had every interest not to divulge that information. On the contrary, the fact that the citizen and mercenary forces stationed at the forts seem to have maintained closer ties with the royal administration, may be seen as an argument in favour of the assumption that the royal administration continued to maintain some sort of hold over the forts.

The key document for understanding the status of the phrourarchs is undoubtedly the decree in honour of Dikaiarchos (*I. Rhamn.* 17). Dikaiarchos first served under his father Apollonios, who had been appointed as phrourarch of Rhamnous by Gonatas (ll. 5-12); later, his father became phrourarch of Eleusis (ll. 12-14), and Dikaiarchos was appointed to the command of the fort of Panakton (ll. 14-17); at the time when the decree was enacted (235/4), Dikaiarchos commanded Eretria, having been appointed by king Demetrios II (ll. 17-25). According to Oetjen, the decree's wording is to be taken at face value: only the appointment of Apollonios to Rhamnous and of Dikaiarchos to Eretria were made by the Macedonian kings: the former may well date from before the 'liberation' of 255 and the latter is irrelevant to the question of the Attic forts; there is, therefore, no reason not to assume that, after the 'liberation', the phrourarchs were elected by the Athenians. Technically, Oetjen's theory may be correct; still it does not change our basic understanding of the correlation of power in the Attic countryside. Even if the command of the forts officially fell within the Athenians' jurisdiction, the fact remains that Apollonios and Dikaiarchos were closely tied to the Macedonian army, both before and after the 'liberation' of 255: Apollonios began his service at the forts of the Attic countryside by royal appointment; Dikaiarchos began his career under his father's command; both continued to serve at the forts, perhaps 'elected' by the Athenian state; as his later appointment at Eretria by another king clearly shows, however, Dikaiarchos also continued to serve in the Macedonian army. From the point of view of the Macedonian high command, I doubt if Dikaiarchos was ever considered as having left the royal service. This does not mean that the forts officially fell within the jurisdiction of the Macedonian army; it only

¹ Pace Hammond 1988: 324, who believes that the second decree is "slightly later", the only reason for us to suppose that the first decree is earlier than the second would be the assumption that the second decree marks a clear change in the status of the forts. The argument thus becomes circular.

means that the phourarchs probably continued to owe their appointment to the royal *fiat* –officially (until 255) or unofficially (afterwards). If able to secure the loyalty of the garrison and its commander, the king had no reservations about delegating nominal authority over a garrison to the interested city.

Let me attempt to sum up the main points of an argumentation which is mainly based on doubts rather than certainties. Throughout the period under discussion (255-229), and perhaps even earlier, the generals of the Attic countryside were officers of the Athenian state. Athenian public discourse treats them as such: no royal intervention in their selection is recorded, but for one exception dated to the very beginning of the period and perhaps reflecting the special circumstances of the ‘liberation’. Nonetheless, there is sufficient reason for us to doubt that this presentation of Athenian generalships is factually accurate; it remains highly probable that the king continued to exercise his influence on the selection of generals, either officially or not. Finally, the commanders of the forts of the coastal district, and, in all likelihood, the commanders of the forts of the Eleusinian district probably continued to be –in essence, if not formally– appointed by the king, although the forts technically fell under Athenian jurisdiction.

The idea of two clearly distinct periods as far as jurisdiction over the Attic countryside is concerned –an early period (262-255), in which the whole countryside, including the forts, belonged to Macedonian sovereignty, and a later period (255-229), in which it fell under the sole jurisdiction of the Athenian state– is probably an oversimplification of the intricate weave of royal power and civic autonomy during the third century. Although both the generalships and the command of the forts were perhaps officially seen as part of Athenian institutions, at least after 255, there still remained a whole gamut of ways, from institutional right to unofficial pressure, by which the king could ensure the appointment / election of generals who would not create problems in the military balance of the Greek mainland. Rather than the institutional niceties of popular election versus royal appointment, or Athenian generalship versus Macedonian administration, what mattered most to the king was the unimpeded collaboration between the Macedonian army, the local garrisons and the allied forces. In that respect, it should be noted that, after the revolt of Alexandros son of Krateros in the late 250’s and/or early 240’s, and especially after the loss of Corinth to the expanding Achaian *koinon* in 243, the task of coordinating Macedonian interests in southern Greece, in the absence of the king, fell on the general of the Piraeus,¹ which firmly remained

¹ See Habicht 1982: 51-52; Bengtson 1964: 349-50 and 380. This is clearly attested for Diogenes, the last Macedonian general of the Piraeus (Plut., *Arat.* 34.2, with events dated to 233); in the case of his predecessor, Herakleitos, the phrase καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ταπτομένων μετὰ τοῦ Πειραιέως, describing the general’s jurisdiction (IG II² 1225), probably refers only to Mounychia, Sounion and Salamis, as in Plut., *Arat.* 34.6, and not to the whole of southern Greece.

in Macedonian hands throughout the period.¹ The general of the Piraeus, a general of the Macedonian army, would not be in a position to coordinate military action if he had to collaborate with Athenian generals and phrourarchs of the Attic countryside who were hostile to Macedonian interests. Having secured (one way or another) that trustworthy individuals commanded the Attic countryside and its forts, the king had no reason not to leave nominal institutional jurisdiction, and its rhetorical exploitation, to the Athenians.

Appendix 4

Sacrifices performed by the Athenians for kings Antigonos Gonatas and Demetrios II (?), and in honour of the Soteres (Antigonos I and Demetrios Poliorketes), 262-229

A number of Attic inscriptions dated between 262 and 229, most of them being honorific decrees for religious officials of the Athenian state, record sacrifices *for* a living Antigonid king or to the deified Saviours Antigonos I and Demetrios Poliorketes.² I did not include these officials in my prosopographical catalogue; sacrifices offered to the Macedonian kings during the period of Macedonian occupation formed part of religious routine, and they are always mentioned incidentally, among the rest of the officials' religious duties. The only thing which the sacrifices prove concerning these officials is that they belonged to the Athenian political, religious and social elite.

Although the relevant sources have already been gathered and sufficiently commented upon by other scholars,³ I cite them here once more, as the constant reshuffling of the list of Athenian archons⁴ has repercussions on the understanding of the historical context of these sacrifices. Sources are cited in chronological order:

1. *IG II² 780 (Syll³ 466; Kotsidu 2000: 13 E 3)*: In early spring 252, Neoptolemos son of Phileas of Deiradai proposed that the people accept the account of the *agonothetes* of the Dionysia Agathaios son of Autokles of Prospalta, and praise the official. A similar decree of 251/0, inscribed on the same stone, apparently relates to Agathaios' *agonothesia* in that year. Among other sacrifices successfully performed by Agathaios, sacrifices *ὑπὲρ τοῦ βασιλέως Ἀντιγόνου* (l. 11, in a *rasura*) are mentioned.

2. *SEG 33 (1983) 115 (Kotsidu 2000: 13 E 2)*: Early in 250/49, the priestess of Aglauros,⁵ Timokrite daughter of Polynikos of Aphidnai, was honoured, among

¹ See p. 134 and n. 3, above.

² For the distinction between sacrifices *for* the king and sacrifices *to* the king, see Mikalson 1998: 160-61.

³ See Mikalson 1998: 160-61, with earlier literature.

⁴ See Osborne 2000, 2003, 2004 and 2006; Tracy 2003: 165-68.

⁵ For the variety of problems posed by this inscription regarding the Athenian religion and topography, see the bibliography cited in *SEG* 46 (1996) 137.

other things, for the sacrifices ἐφ' ὑγείαι καὶ σωτηρίαι τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων καὶ παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ βασιλέως Ἀντιγόνου καὶ Φίλας τῆς βασιλίσσης καὶ τῶν ἐγγόνων αὐτῶν (ll. 21-25). The proposer was Demostros of Paiania, perhaps the husband of the honourand.

3. *IG II² 683* (Kotsidu 2000: 13 E 1): In the winter of 249/8, Thrasymphon son of Hierokleides of Xypete proposed honours for the superintendents of the Eleusinian mysteries of the previous year, who offered the appropriate sacrifices to Demeter, Kore and the other gods, as well as in honour of the council, the people and king Antigonos (ll. 16-17).

4. *SEG 18* (1962) 19 (*IG II² 775 + 803*): In three consecutive years of the 240's, Kranaos son of Ktesiphon of Besa proposed the approval of the accounts of the priests of Asklepios, and praised the priests, among other things, for performing sacrifices "for the health and salvation of the council and the city and in honour of king Antigonos (ll. 15-16; the king's name is in a *rasura*).

5. *I. Eleusis 196* (*IG II² 1299*; *Syll³ 485*): The general of the Eleusinian district, Aristophanes son of Aristomenes of Leukonoion, was honoured in 235/4 or slightly later by soldiers serving in the forts of the Attic countryside, among other things for sacrifices in honour of the Athenian people, king Demetrios and queen Phthia (ll. 10-11; the royal couple's name is in a *rasura*).

6. *IG II² 790* (*Syll³ 487*; *Agora 15.115*; Kotsidu 2000: 9 E 5): Early in the summer of 233, Demophanes son of Epizelos of Halai proposed honours for the *prytaneis* of Pandionis for, among other things, offering sacrifices on the customary days to the *Soteres* (l. 12), that is, to Antigonos I and Demetrios Poliorketes.

7. *IG II² 776* (Kotsidu 2000: 13 E 4): During the archonship of Alkibiades, the priestess of Athena Polias, Lysistrate daughter of Polyeuktos of Bate, was honoured, among other things, for performing sacrifices for the health and the salvation of the council, the people, the king, the queen and their offspring (ll. 9-10, the royal couple's name is in a *rasura*); the archonship of Alkibiades may belong to the years 233/2-230/29,¹ in which case the royal couple is not Antigonos Gonatas and Phila, as previously thought, but Demetrios II and Phthia.² Besides the priestess, her husband Archestratos son of Euthykrates of Amphitrope was also honoured (l. 27).

8. *Agora 15.111* (Kotsidu 2000: 9 E 4): In an unspecified year, the *prytaneis* of a tribe were honoured for the same reason as in n° 6, above.

It is to be noted that all individuals mentioned above, or at least some of the members of their families, are known from other sources as well, and that they were the offspring of prominent Athenian families. Neoptolemos son of Phileas proposed another honorific decree for *prytaneis* of the Antiochis, probably in the

¹ See Osborne 1999 and 2000, especially 2000: 518 n. 35.

² Consequently, ll. 9-10 would have to be restored as follows: [καὶ τοῦ βασιλέως Δημητρίου καὶ τῆς βασιλίσσης] [Φθίας καὶ τῶν ἐγγόνων αὐτῶν].

250's (*Agora* 15.100), and served as secretary under Euboulos II, probably in 265/4 (*Agora* 15.85, l. 103 and 15.86, ll. 110-111).¹ Agathaios son of Autokles contributed to the *athlothesia* of the Panathenaia in 239/8 or 238/7 (*IG* II² 784, l. 8), and is probably to be identified with Agathaios of Prospalta, phylarch in the 280's (*SEG* 21 [1965] 357, l. 26). The husband (?) of the priestess Timokrite, Demonstratos son of Aristophanes of Paiania, had served as taxiarch in 272/1 (*Agora* 16.187, l. 42), and was the son or the father of a councillor (*Agora* 15.106, l. 8); for other possible members of the family, see Davies 1971: 105. Thrasysphon son of Hierokleides may have proposed an honorific decree for ephebes in the 230's (*SEG* 29 [1979] 114), and another honorific decree for a hierophant of the Eleusinian mysteries (*IG* II² 1235). Kranaos son of Ktesiphon came from a family attested already from the fourth century (Isaios 4.9; Anaxilas, *PCG* II 293, fr. 29 [*apud* Ath. 10.416e-f]). Lysistrate, priestess of Athena, belonged to one of the most prominent families of the Eteoboutadai (see Davies 1971: 169-73), while her husband Archestratos son of Euthykrates was the offspring of a rich fourth-century family (Davies 1971: 70-72). Equally prominent was the family of the general Aristophanes (Davies 1971: 63-64). Finally, Demophanes son of Epizelos had been councillor in 259/8 (*Agora* 15.89, l. 46).

Appendix 5

Aratos' trip to Egypt and his choice of allegiance between the courts of Pella and Alexandria in the period 250-245

Discussing the problems posed by Aratos' (B13) trip to Alexandria (Plut., *Arat.* 12) requires a detailed analysis of Plutarch's account of events before, during and after Aratos' trip. According to Plutarch, Aratos' first action after the liberation of Sikyon in 251 was to repatriate ca. 600 Sikyonian political refugees, some of whom had been away from their home city for almost fifty years (9.4). He then tried to resolve the social and economic problems which surfaced in consequence of the exiles' return (9.5) and, afterwards, incorporated Sikyon into the *koinon* of the Achaians (9.6; there follows a digression on Aratos' character [10]). After that, Aratos served in the Achaian cavalry and soon won general esteem, because he always followed the generals' orders (11.1). Then, "he came by a monetary donation by the king" (ἦκε δ' αὐτῷ καὶ χρημάτων δωρεὰ παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως) –we shall have to come back to the question of the identity of this king– of twenty-five talents, which Aratos used to ransom prisoners (11.2). As the political, financial and social problems remained acute, to the point of civil strife becoming inevitable, Aratos, "seeing Ptolemy's philanthropy as his only hope, hastened to sail to the king and implore him for money that could be used for the settlement of the disputes" (12.1: μίαν ὀρῶν ἐλπίδα τὴν τοῦ Πτολεμαίου φιλανθρωπίαν ὥρμησε ἐκπλεῦσαι καὶ

¹ For the archonship of Euboulos II, see p. 140 n. 6, above.

δεηθῆναι τοῦ βασιλέως ὅπως αὐτῷ χρήματα συμβάληται πρὸς τὰς διαλύσεις). Aratos' journey was adventurous: he probably set forth from Methana, ran into bad weather and ran aground at Hydra or, rather, Andros,¹ where a garrison of Antigonos Gonatas was stationed. The phrourarch attempted to arrest Aratos, but the Sikyonian's company convinced the phrourarch that Aratos had escaped to Euboia. A passing Roman vessel finally brought Aratos to Karia, whence, after a long while, he finally managed to reach Egypt (12.2-6). There, Ptolemy treated Aratos kindly, because of the works of art that the Sikyonian had been sending to Alexandria (12.6); the king offered Aratos 150 talents, forty of them immediately and the rest in annual instalments (13.6). Aratos did not embezzle the money but used it to bring calm and concord to the city of Sikyon; he was elected "plenipotentiary arbitrator and sole responsible for the financial issues of the exiles" (14.2: αὐτοκράτωρ διαλλακτῆς καὶ κύριος ὄλως ἐπὶ τὰς φυγαδικὰς οἰκονομίας). The Plutarchean account continues with a problematic incident, concerning Gonatas' stance towards Aratos (15). According to Plutarch, the king treated Aratos in a friendly manner, either because he was seeking to earn Aratos' alliance or in order to compromise him in the eyes of Ptolemy. At a dinner held during an official celebration at Corinth, Gonatas claimed that Aratos now knew the royal affairs very well, and, while earlier he disregarded the Macedonian king and placed all his hopes on the Ptolemaic court, admiring the wealth, the luxury, the elephants and the fleets, now that he realized that all that was nothing more than a theatrical smokescreen, he fully joined in friendship with the Macedonian throne. The result of this speech was that Aratos' political enemies rushed to slander him to Ptolemy. The next event mentioned by Plutarch (16.1) is Aratos' first Achaian generalship, in 245/4. The only useful relevant information provided by Cicero, our only other source on Aratos' journey, is that the journey took place during the reign of Ptolemy II (*Off.* 2.82: ... *ad Ptolomaeum, suum hospitem, venit, qui tum regnabat alter post Alexandream conditam*).

¹ The manuscripts are problematic at this point (παραφερόμενος μόλις ἤψατο τῆς Ἀδρίας πολεμίας οὔσης); for the long discussion of possible corrections, see Knoepfler 2001: 290-93. I do not share the confidence with which Knoepfler defends the correction of Ἀδρίας to Ὑδρίας, instead of the generally accepted Ἀνδρίας. From a philological point of view, both corrections are acceptable (ΑΔΡΙΑΣ < Ὑδρίας = Ὑδρέας or ΑΔΡΙΑΣ < Ἀνδρίας). From a geographical point of view, Hydra may seem preferable because of its proximity to Methana, but Andros is preferable because of its proximity to Euboia, mentioned immediately afterwards. Finally, from a historical point of view, Andros is certainly to be preferred as an island where a garrison of Gonatas could be stationed. Hydra was a Ptolemaic base by the last quarter of the third century at the latest, and probably part of the Ptolemaic bases in the Saronic Gulf already by the time of the Chremonidean War (Habicht 1992: 89-90 = 1994: 162-63). Knoepfler's counter-argument that the Ptolemies could have captured Hydra in the 230's after expelling Gonatas' garrison merely multiplies unsupported hypotheses. In any case, either choice hardly affects the sequence of the events under discussion or their interpretation.

To the best of my knowledge, almost all scholars place Aratos' trip immediately after the liberation of Sikyon, that is, in 251 or 250.¹ Given that this trip is a key event in the discussion concerning the date of the revolt of Alexandros son of Krateros, it is surprising that no attempt has been made to justify such a date for Aratos' trip. One is left with the impression that this date is taken for granted precisely because in Plutarch's account the trip follows the liberation of Sikyon. A careful examination of the whole sequence of events, however, reveals that dating Aratos' trip to 251 or 250 is highly problematic.

The next incident reported by Plutarch is the episode with Gonatas at Corinth. It clearly has a rhetorical function, hence it is unsafe to date it based merely on its place in the Plutarchean narrative;² nevertheless, there remains the problem of dating the historical nucleus of Plutarch's narrative of this incident, that is, Gonatas' presence at Corinth. Even if we date Alexandros' revolt after 250,³ no source attests to Gonatas' presence in the Peloponnese in 250, nor is there a historical context which would make his presence there in that period seem plausible. In the years after 250, Corinth was certainly in the hands of Alexandros. On the other hand, only two chapters later (17), Plutarch reports Corinth's capture by Gonatas in 245, vividly describing how overjoyed the king was at the turn of events. The importance of the capture of Corinth, almost simultaneous with the king's victory at Andros, is reflected in Gonatas' numismatic and religious propaganda,⁴ and fits perfectly the climate of Plut., *Arat.* 15, where sacrifices to the gods (15.1), official receptions (15.2), and the king's pompous bragging (15.3) are recorded. It is, therefore, practically obligatory for us to place the Gonatas episode during Gonatas' celebrations at Corinth in 245.⁵ Consequently, if Aratos' trip is dated to ca. 250, we would have to assume that Plutarch (a) skips five whole years in his narration of

¹ Only Tarn 1911: 368 and 374 dates the journey somewhat later (249 or 248), for no apparent reason. For examples of dating the journey immediately after the liberation of Sikyon, see Ferrabino 1921: 294 (autumn 250); Beloch 1927: 521 (250); F. W. Walbank 1933: 39 (summer 250); Theunissen 1935: 141-42, 288 (251/0); Koster 1937: lix (autumn 251); Porter 1937: xlviii (251/0); Treves 1955: 87 (250); Will 1979: 320 (250); Flacelière / Chambry 1979: 227 (251/0); Urban 1979: 28 n. 118; 215 (winter 251/0); Buraselis 1982: 173 (soon after the liberation, which he places in 250/49); F. W. Walbank 1988: 301 (winter 250/49); Hölbl 1994: 43 (250/49); Bringmann, in Bringmann / von Steuben 1995: 121 (winter 251/0); Hazzard 2000: 39 n. 59, 58 n. 49, 184, and *passim* (winter 251/0); Knoepfler 2001: 290, 291 (250).

² See already F. W. Walbank 1933: 178; cf. Urban 1979: 31 n. 131.

³ On the date of the revolt and of Corinth's recapture by Gonatas, see p. 216 n. 2-3, above.

⁴ Cf. Paschidis 1996: 54-55.

⁵ So Walbank 1933: 178-79 and 1988: 306; Habicht 1982: 61-62 n. 114; Orsi 1991: 108-112; Knoepfler 2001: 293 n. 153. Those who place the Gonatas episode in 250 (Porter 1937: xlvii; Urban 1979: 31, with earlier bibliography in n. 13), do so precisely in order to avoid assuming a five-year gap in the Plutarchean narrative between Aratos' trip to Egypt and Gonatas' speech.

Aratos' life, and (b) that in 245 Gonatas speaks of events dated five years earlier in the present tense (15.3: *vuví*).¹

Even if we disregard this difficulty, there remains a problem of essence. Aratos' mission seems to have been perfectly successful: he brought with him an important amount of money and, most of all, the king's promise to provide Sikyon with further financial support. Why then Gonatas' reference to a "tragedy" and to a "theatrical smokescreen"? In other words, why would Gonatas claim that Aratos now realized the weaknesses of a court which had just offered him alliance and 150 talents?

Another major difficulty in dating Aratos' trip to 250 arises from the events reported before it. After the liberation of Sikyon in 251, the sequence of events is as follows: return of the exiles, incorporation of Sikyon into the Achaian *koinon*, the donation of money by a king, ransoming of prisoners with the king's money, Aratos' service in the Achaian cavalry, aggravation of social problems, Aratos' trip to Egypt. Dating the whole sequence to spring 251 - late 250 is self-evidently impossible, even if we accept that Sikyon's incorporation into the Achaian *koinon* was sanctioned by the autumn assembly of 251, as Polybios seems to imply.² In 251 Aratos was twenty years old;³ no matter how successful his mission to Alexandria had been, it is rather unlikely that he would have earned the high regard of his superiors within a few months, or that he would have been appointed "plenipotentiary arbitrator and sole responsible for the financial issues of the exiles" at twenty-one years of age.⁴

Another problem is posed by the donation of twenty-five talents *παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως*. As Holleaux convincingly demonstrated more than a century ago, this

¹ One way to circumvent the second difficulty would be to assume that with the phrase *vuví* δ' ὑπὸ σκηνῆς ἑωρακῶς πάντα τὰ ἐκεῖ πράγματα τραγωδίαν ὄντα καὶ σκηνογραφίαν Gonatas does not refer to Aratos' actual presence at the Alexandrian court, but speaks metaphorically of the turnabout of the Sikyonian statesman. Such an interpretation, however, would nullify the rhetorical function of the passage in Plutarch's work: the passage is placed immediately after Aratos' trip, precisely to enhance the force of the king's words and the narrative effect of changing fortunes, which is so dear to Plutarch.

² Polybios (2.43.3) seems to imply that the incorporation of Sikyon into the Achaian *koinon* took place in the same year as the liberation of the city (F. W. Walbank 1957: 236). It should be noted, however, that Polybios mentions these events in passing, and that, thus, such an interpretation is not obligatory. Plutarch's description favours the assumption that a significant amount of time passed between Sikyon's liberation and its incorporation into the Achaian *koinon*: it is difficult to imagine that the repatriation of 600 exiles was concluded within a few months.

³ Polyb. 2.43.3.

⁴ The fact that Gonatas calls Aratos a *μειράκιον* (Plut., *Arat.* 15.3) is of no chronological consequence. In Plutarch's preceding phrase, Aratos is called a *νεανίσκος* (15.2), while the pejorative term *μειράκιον* can be used (again by a Macedonian king) even for the thirty-year-old Philopoimen (Plut., *Philop.* 6.13; Polyb. 2.68.2).

king can only be Gonatas, the king last mentioned by Plutarch and the king chiefly interested in the Peloponnese in the 250's.¹ During Aratos' trip to Egypt, however, only months after the donation, according to the traditional dating, relations between Aratos and Gonatas were clearly hostile, for no apparent reason.

A final obstacle to the traditional dating of the trip is posed by the fact that in 252 the Sikyonian statesman is said to have thought that his chances of receiving help from Philadelphos were minimal (4.3), while two years later he obviously considered the king of Alexandria his home city's only hope (12.1).

In the light of the remarks made above, dating Aratos' trip in 250 is rather problematic. If we followed Cicero we would have to place it later in Philadelphos' reign, that is, not later than January 246.² It has been assumed that Alexandros' revolt was already under way by the time Aratos set forth from Methana;³ even if accepted, however, this assumption would be of no particular help as to the date of Aratos' trip, anyway; the only certainty regarding the date of Alexandros' revolt is that it had broken out sometime before 248/7.⁴

There is, however, another possibility, namely to date Aratos' journey immediately before the next event in Plutarch's account, that is, Gonatas' presence at Corinth in 245. Philadelphos died in January 246, and, after January 28, the royal title was assumed by Ptolemy III Euergetes. During the summer of the same year, Antiochos II died and, already by September,⁵ the Third Syrian War had broken

¹ Holleaux, *Études* III 43-46; cf. Urban 1979: 25-29, with earlier bibliography in n. 107 of p. 26; Will 1979: 321; F. W. Walbank 1988: 300; Orsi 1991: 120 n. 63; Knoepfler 2001: 290. Characteristically, even those who do not accept Holleaux's identification, are obliged to concede that his arguments are strong, and that Plutarch did have Gonatas in mind, but was mistaken (see, for example, Porter 1937: xli-xlii and Urban, *op. cit.*). Walbank has two arguments in favour of identifying the king with Philadelphos, none of which can stand. Firstly, *pace* Walbank, Gonatas' stance towards Aratos is *not* reported by Plutarch as being hostile immediately before the donation: the relevant passage (9.5, according to which Aratos saw "his city being coveted by outsiders and envied by Antigonos", ἐπιβουλεωμένην μὲν ἔξωθεν καὶ φθονουμένην ὑπ' Ἀντιγόνου τὴν πόλιν) is explicitly a political estimate of Aratos himself, clearly influenced by the Sikyonian's later anti-Macedonian actions and rhetoric. Gonatas may have wished to add Sikyon to the cities in his sphere of influence, but this is precisely what he tried to achieve by his donation (see again Holleaux, *Études* III 45-46). Secondly, the fact that later (but not "immediately afterwards", if Aratos' journey is dated much later than 250, as I shall maintain in what follows), Aratos, "seeing as his only hope Ptolemy's philanthropy, hastened to sail to the king and implore him for money that could be used for the settlement of the disputes" (12.1) is hardly a paradox, as Walbank claims. Aratos surely realized Gonatas' intentions and wisely sought donations by a king who did not wish to attach the city to his realm.

² On the date of Philadelphos' death and of his succession by Euergetes, see Hölbl 1994: 290 n. 71, with the sources.

³ Knoepfler 2001: 291-93; but see p. 529 with n. 2, below.

⁴ See p. 216 n. 2, above.

⁵ On the dates, see Hauben 1990: 29-30.

out, temporarily bringing the new Ptolemaic king extended territories, which formerly belonged to the Seleukids. As the famous Adoulis inscription demonstrates, Euergetes' activity extended to other fronts as well.¹ Nevertheless, already in the first half of 245, and certainly before July 11,² Euergetes was forced to return to Alexandria, due to massive unrest in the Egyptian countryside, and/or a counter-attack by Seleukos II, and/or dynastic troubles;³ during the same summer, the situation in the Aegean (where, between 250 and 246, the balance had been tipped in favour of the Ptolemies)⁴ was also dramatically reversed, with the recapture of Corinth and Chalkis by Gonatas, and, mainly, with the Macedonian king's victory over the Ptolemaic fleet off Andros. The analogy with Plutarch's account of Gonatas' speech at Corinth is evident:⁵

<p>Aratos "admired the Egyptian wealth, hearing stories of elephants and fleets and courts";</p> <p>"now, however, that he has seen with his own eyes things lying behind the scenes, and has found out that they were nothing but a theatrical smokescreen..."</p>	<p>Preparations for war and first Ptolemaic successes in the second half of 246;</p> <p>dramatic worsening of the situation for the Ptolemies, both at home and abroad.</p>
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If Aratos landed at Alexandria in 245, he had every opportunity to ascertain that, despite the financial support which Euergetes had offered him, behind the façade of the new king's vitality, his first victories and the glory of his supposedly unbeatable navy, the Ptolemaic throne was faced with domestic and external dangers. Since his adventurous journey was obviously a matter of months and not weeks, there is every chance that he set off bearing in mind that he travelled towards the master of the Mediterranean, only to return to an Aegean that was, unexpectedly, again under Macedonian dominance.

Dating Aratos' journey to 246/5 resolves all the difficulties posed by the traditional date of 250:

1) The episode is placed in its natural position, immediately before Aratos' first generalship in 245/4. The gap in Plutarch's narrative does not concern the events after Aratos' success to return with Ptolemaic money, but events between 251 and 245, a period during which young Aratos acquired military experience in the Achaian cavalry, consolidated his rule in Sikyon, and dealt with the multifarious social, political and financial problems of the city, problems which were aggravated by Alexandros' war against Gonatas.

¹ OGIS 54. The picture of the realm which Euergetes inherited from Philadelphos as drawn from this inscription is, of course, to a large extent fictitious; its exaggerations, however, show precisely how far-reaching the ambitions of the new king were.

² Hauben 1990: 32 n. 26.

³ Porph., *FGrHist* 260 F 43; Just. 27.1; P. Haun. 6.14-17, with Huß 1978 and Bülow-Jacobsen 1979.

⁴ Buraselis 1982: 165-67; F. W. Walbank 1988: 295.

⁵ This has already been observed by others: for example, F. W. Walbank 1933: 43 and 178-79.

2) Given that between 251 and 246 Aratos had sought to wrest Corinth from Alexandros' hands, but finally had to strike a deal between the Achaians and the renegade Macedonian (Plut., *Arat.* 18.2) – a deal which was certainly harmful for the interests of the Macedonian throne –,¹ it becomes quite understandable why Aratos' relationship with Gonatas was hostile early in 245.

3) Even if we follow Knoepfler in his assumption that Aratos' supposed flight to Euboea signifies that the revolt of Alexandros was still raging (an assumption which is anything but obligatory),² nothing hinders us from placing the *start* of Aratos' journey in 246, when Alexandros was undoubtedly still alive.³

4) If the Ptolemy whom Aratos met was Euergetes, it is easier to explain why in 243, after the capture of Corinth by Aratos, the *koinon* officially entered into an alliance with Euergetes, giving him the honorary title of the *hegemon* of the alliance.⁴ If we dated Aratos' journey during the reign of Philadelphos, there would be no prior contact between the Achaians and Euergetes; with the new date it becomes clear that Aratos merely honoured the sponsor of the conquest of Corinth.⁵

5) With the sequence of events proposed above, a number of consecutive seeming contradictions in Plutarch's account are lifted, without us being obliged to assume that a number of completely unattested alliances between the protagonists of the period existed.

There may even be positive evidence in favour of dating the journey to 246/5. As we saw above, Plutarch claims that Aratos was promised 150 talents, of which he received forty immediately, and the rest in later instalments (Plut., *Arat.* 13.6). The first such instalment must have been made in the following year, that is, in 244. Some chapters later (41.5; cf. *Cleom.* 19.8), in a context belonging to the autumn of 227, Plutarch informs us that Euergetes "was sending Aratos six talents a year" but, as Polybios (2.51.2) explicitly states and the two aforementioned Plutarchean passages imply, discontinued the grant, most probably in the winter of 226/5.⁶ If

¹ Some scholars claim that Alexandros had not yet revolted when this attempt against Aratos took place (Urban 1979: 37-38; F. W. Walbank 1988: 302; Knoepfler 2001: 290, with earlier bibliography). If, however, we examine these events without presupposing unattested alliances, it seems rather unlikely that the twenty-year-old Aratos attacked the garrison of the Macedonian king, stationed at a practically impregnable fortress, thus risking a counter-attack by the Macedonians in a period of social unrest for his homeland.

² Knoepfler 2001: 291-93. The subterfuge of Aratos' supposed escape to Euboea could be interpreted more simply as an argument put forward by Aratos' companions to assure the phrourarch of Andros that it would be vain for him to try to find Aratos.

³ On the date of Alexandros' death, see 216 n. 3, above.

⁴ Plut., *Arat.* 24.4; Paus. 2.8.5; cf. the reservations put forward by Urban 1979: 53-54 as to whether the title was merely honorary or not.

⁵ Aratos bribed members of the Macedonian garrison with sixty talents (Plut., *Arat.* 19.2).

⁶ For the date of the cessation of the grant to Aratos, see Polyb. 2.51.2, with F. W. Walbank 1957: 250 (with earlier bibliography); SVA III 209 n° 505; Oliva 1971: 254-55; Gruen 1972: 620;

Aratos received six talents annually from 244 to 226, then he received 114 talents in annual instalments, plus the forty talents of the original donation, that is, a grand total of 154 talents, a figure which is very close to the –rounded and retrospective–¹ amount of 150 talents specified by the first passage.²

The only obstacle to dating the journey to 246/5 is that Plutarch –implicitly– and Cicero –explicitly– claim that the king in question was Philadelphos, not Euergetes. Plutarch informs us that Aratos found the king very well disposed towards him, owing to the paintings of the famous art school of Sikyon that Aratos had been sending him for a long time (Plut., *Arat.* 12.6). Cicero, on the other hand, writes that the Ptolemy in question was “the second after the foundation of Alexandria”. At first glance, Plutarch’s account seems to identify the Ptolemy in question with Philadelphos: Aratos cannot have been sending paintings to Euergetes, the successor to the throne. Nonetheless, even this account renders upholding the traditional dating of the journey to 250 problematic. Aratos is said to have been sending to Alexandria works of art which “he had been gathering and purchasing” (συνάγων καὶ κτώμενος). But these multiple (as the imperfect tense –ἀπέστειλεν– makes clear) dispatches can hardly have been made in the short period of time between the spring of 251³ and 250, a period, moreover, when Aratos had much more urgent business to attend to at Sikyon. It seems likelier that these dispatches were spread over a longer period, between 251 and 245, and that both the –biographer

Marasco 1981: 404-405; Orsi 1991: 46 n. 35. The grant ceased to be offered to Aratos certainly before the summer of 225; the victory of Kleomenes at Hekatombaion (autumn of 226) and the news of the rapprochement between Aratos and Dason at roughly the same time are most likely the events that led Euergetes to change his alliances in the Peloponnese.

¹ The fact that the donation was to be made in instalments is obviously to be explained by Euergetes’ intention to continue to control Aratos in the future (cf. Urban 1979: 30); it is, therefore, more likely that the figure of 150 talents is a rough *a posteriori* calculation by Aratos himself.

² Even those who date Aratos’ journey to 250 are obliged to consider the donation as a grant which was originally offered by Philadelphos, and subsequently renewed by Euergetes (see, for example, F. W. Walbank 1957: 245). Hazzard 2001: 71 thinks that in 250 Aratos received 150 talents for the city and an additional six talents a year for himself, a sum which he continued to receive by Euergetes. This is certainly not what Plutarch says: δωρεὰν ἔλαβεν (*scil.* Aratos) τῇ πόλει clearly refers to a single donation, which was made to Aratos, but was meant for Sikyon. If the official receiver of the donation had been Sikyon, the passage which immediately follows (Plut., *Arat.* 14.1), where Aratos is praised for offering the sum to his fellow citizens instead of embezzling it, would be meaningless.

³ Aratos cannot have begun sending the paintings earlier, firstly because it would be irrational for us to assume that the teenager Aratos, exiled at Argos and under the supervision of the tyrant of Sikyon, collected works of art and sent them to Philadelphos, and secondly because the dispatches to Alexandria were clearly connected with the removal from the city of visual reminders of its tyrannical past (see Plut., *Arat.* 13.1-5).

and not historian- Plutarch¹ and the orator Cicero² are mistaken about the identity of the Ptolemy whom Aratos met in Alexandria. Given that we are dealing precisely with the period of transition between the two reigns, their mistake would be perfectly understandable.

Assuming that Aratos' journey is dated to 245, the sequence of events from 252 to 245 is as follows: Aratos enjoyed friendly, although not particularly warm, personal relationships with Gonatas and Philadelphos, who were both family friends of his. In the spring of 251 he liberated his homeland, without any outside support. He incorporated his city into the Achaian *koinon*, served in the Achaian cavalry and attempted to bring peace back to Sikyon. Later, Gonatas offered the successful young statesman twenty-five talents, probably in an attempt to secure Aratos' alliance against the contender for the Macedonian throne, Alexandros. Aratos was not convinced by the royal generosity, and, seeing that the turn of events in southern Greece and the Aegean was particularly unfavourable for Gonatas, came to terms with Alexandros and turned to the other powerful family friend of his, that is, Philadelphos (the gifts of works of art to Alexandria are an indication of such a turnabout). When Euergetes rose to the throne, and after the new king's striking initial performance on all fronts of the war, he decided to visit Alexandria, most probably during the winter of 246/5.³ After many adventures, including his attempted arrest by the garrison of Gonatas, who was by then understandably hostile both to the Sikyonian and to Euergetes, Aratos finally landed at Alexandria, roughly in the spring of 245, when Euergetes must have already returned to Alexandria. The Sikyonian managed to secure a financial donation by the king, but realized the fragile nature of the Ptolemaic success; upon his return to

¹ The Plutarchean *Life of Aratos* is full of chronological inconsistencies and of *hysteron proteron* narratives. This is clear in chapters 25-34 (cf. Flacelière / Chambry 1979: 58), and I see no reason why earlier chapters should be considered more trustworthy. A similar (although reverse) confusion between two consecutive kings is observable in another Plutarchean *Life*, namely *Agis* 3.9; cf. 10.4, 11.2 and 6: Plutarch there claims that Leonidas II, the father of Kleomenes III and opponent of Agis IV, had spent time at Seleukos' court; Marasco 1981: 194-95, however, convincingly argues that Leonidas, along with his father Kleonymos, must have been exiled from Sparta in 272, that is, during the reign of Antiochos I, and that the Seleukos to whom Plutarch refers must be Seleukos II, whose reign was contemporary with the reign of Agis, with whom Plutarch mainly deals in this work.

² For Cicero, in particular, a possible confusion between the two Ptolemies would be perfectly understandable: the sole source of the first two books of the *De officiis* is Panaitios (see *Ad Att.* 16.11.4), which means that Cicero's narrative is at third hand, at best.

³ The counter-argument that Aratos would not have set off for such a long journey during winter is not valid: winter sailing towards Alexandria was fairly common and usually uneventful (see Morton 2001: 259-60); besides, the Ptolemaia, with a great number of visitors from the Greek mainland and the Aegean, were celebrated towards the end of January, at least in this period (Hazard 2000: 53).

Sikyon, or immediately afterwards, the situation in southern Greece and the Aegean was the exact opposite of what it had been when he had departed for Alexandria: Gonatas had recaptured Corinth and Chalkis, and had inflicted a crushing defeat on the Ptolemaic fleet near Andros. Aratos was accordingly forced to offer his allegiance to Gonatas.¹ As soon as the latter left the Peloponnese, however, Aratos set again his anti-Macedonian plans in motion;² in 243, when the first opportunity to do so presented itself, he conquered Corinth with the help of Ptolemaic money. The anti-Macedonian agenda of the Achaian *koinon* was now officially unfolded; the leader of the alliance between the Achaians and the Ptolemies was now Ptolemy III Euergetes.

Appendix 6

The date of the nesiarch Apollodoros

The nesiarch Apollodoros son of Apollonios of Kyzikos is usually considered to have been the first ever nesiarch of the League of the Islanders, either under the Antigonids or under Philadelphos.³ In my opinion, this consensus is based on a series of insecure identifications.

The nesiarch is known from a number of inscriptions from Kyzikos (Michel, *Recueil* 534; cf. **D59-60**, above) and Delos. The Delian evidence, consisting of several inscriptions, can be tabulated as follows:

1. A proxy decree in honour of Apollodoros son of Apollonios of Kyzikos, dated in the first two decades of the third century (*IG XI* 4, 562). The honourand bears no title and no reference to any king is made.

2. A series of references to a donor (in 279 at the latest) named Apollodoros, who, in at least one case (*ID* 338 Bb 24), is Apollodoros the nesiarch (*IG XI* 2, 161 B 15; 162 B 12; 188.3; 199 B 41; *ID* 296 B 44; 338 Bb 24; perhaps also *ID* 300 B 20).

3. A reference to an Apollodoros son of Apollonios of Kyzikos, lessee of a sacred estate in ca. 284 (*IG XI* 2, 156 A 6).

¹ Cf. Plut., *Arat.* 15.3: νυνί... ὄλος (or ὄλωσ) ἡμῖν προσκεχώρηκεν is an obvious exaggeration, as Plutarch himself states, and the events which followed show.

² In 245, the first actions of Aratos as a general of the Achaian *koinon* were an attack on Aitolian Lokris and a failed attempt to send military help to the Boiotians (Polyb. 20.4.4; Plut., *Arat.* 16.1; cf. F. W. Walbank 1979: 68); both actions were not perhaps of an explicit anti-Macedonian character, but clearly reflected an expansionist policy which would inevitably bring Achaia and Macedonia in opposing camps.

³ See Durrbach 1921: 29-30 (under Poliorketes); Merker 1970: 152-53 (under Macedonian rule); Bagnall 1976: 137-38 (under Philadelphos); Buraselis 1982: 81 n. 182 (under Philadelphos, with reservations); Vial 1984: 133 (where he is considered a Ptolemaic official in the table; but in n. 33 he is considered an Antigonid official); Nigdelis 1990: 115 (under Philadelphos); Reger 1991 (under the Macedonians).

4. A long series of references to Apollodoros son of Apollonios of Kyzikos, debtor to the sanctuary, who had borrowed money already in 308-306 and ceased due payments in 274 (*IG XI 2*, 142.14; 161 A 31; 162 A 24; 199 C 88 [?]; 204.25 [?]; 223 A 57; 274.23; 287 A 191; 289.12; *ID 291 f 6*; 353 B 28; 363.61; 366 A 116; 369 A 24; 372 A 176; 403.71; 457.32; 463 B 5).

Bagnall 1976: 137-38 believes that all these sources concern one and the same person and that Apollodoros cannot have been a nesiarch after Bakchon (who held office at least in the period 286-280),¹ for he could not have been an active nesiarch in the 270's and, simultaneously, a debtor to the sanctuary with long overdue repayments. His argument is weakened by the fact that he is mistaken about the date the debtor's repayments ceased (which he reckons as 279, instead of the correct 274): theoretically, Apollodoros could have been a nesiarch between 280 and 275 and have ceased payments by 274. Moreover, the fact that the debtor had already borrowed money long before the Ptolemaic takeover of the Cyclades (which postdates 288)² makes the identification of the debtor with the nesiarch highly insecure, unless he was a nesiarch serving during the very first years of the League's existence: it is highly unlikely that Antigonos, Poliorketes or Ptolemy would have appointed a person who already owed money to the most important sanctuary of the Aegean as the representative of their power in the area.³ In other words, if the nesiarch is identified with the debtor, the only solution is to assume that he served as a nesiarch from 314 to 307. There is an alternative, however, which I consider preferable, namely that the nesiarch and the debtor were not the same person.

The honorific decree does not seem to be relevant. Bagnall (who dates the nesiarch Apollodoros under the Ptolemaic rule) draws attention to the fact that the proposer of the decree, Hierarchos son of Prokles, had also proposed honours for Demetrios son of Potamon (*IG XI 4*, 561), who *could* be identified with a Ptolemaic officer (*OGIS 724*). It should be noted, however, that none of the decrees proposed by Hierarchos include the slightest mention of the kings; if the honourend of the first decree was the nesiarch, that is, the governor of the League and the most powerful representative of royal power in the Aegean, it is really striking that no reference was made either to his title and functions or to his relationship

¹ On Bakchon, see *SEG 49* (1999) 1106 (*OGIS 43* with Holleaux, *Études III* 33; Crowther 1999: 257-66 n° 2); *IG XII 5*, 1065; *IG XI 2*, 161 B 12; 162 B 10; 164 A 55; 199 B 38; *IG XI 4*, 551 (*Syll³* 381, Durrbach, *Choix* 15); 1125; 1126; 1039; *ID 298 A 171*; 300 B 19; on his career, cf. Bagnall 1976: 136-38 and 156-57; Rigsby 1980; Hennig 1989: 177-79, with earlier bibliography.

² See above, **D56**, with accompanying notes.

³ The same argument is valid against the theory of Reger 1991 that Apollodoros was appointed in 307 by Poliorketes: it is difficult to imagine the newly appointed representative of royal power borrowing money from the sanctuary.

with the king.¹ If the honourand is not the nesiarch, we have proof that there were at least two homonymous citizens of Kyzikos present in Delos in approximately the same period;² given that Apollodoros and Apollonios are two of the most frequently attested names in the Greek world, this would hardly come as a surprise.³

In conclusion, I believe that the debtor and lessee is a different person than the nesiarch,⁴ and that the *proxenos* is to be identified with the debtor rather than with the nesiarch. If this is accepted, there is no reason not to accept that the nesiarch Apollodoros (the donor of 279) was the successor to Bakchon, who served as nesiarch in the preceding decade.⁵ Hermias, the last known nesiarch in the reign of Philadelphos (after 268), may have been the immediate successor to Apollodoros.⁶

¹ Incidentally, the same argument is valid in the case of Hermias of Halikarnassos (*IG XI 4*, 565), who is often (Roussel; Merker 1970: 153; Bagnall 1976: 138; Buraselis 1982: 182) identified with the nesiarch Hermias, none of the sources on whom mentions Halikarnassos as his city of origin (see Tréheux, *ID Index I*).

² One could argue that the lack of reference to Apollodoros' position was due to bureaucratic brevity (as, perhaps, in the Delian decrees in honour of Kallias [see **D82**] and Autokles [see **D85**]). Nonetheless, even if we accept that the Delians neglected to include descriptions of the jurisdiction of lesser royal officials in the text to be inscribed, it is still implausible that they also neglected to include the title of the governor of the League.

³ For Kyzikene examples, see the indexes of *I. Kyzikos I*. The published volumes of *LGPN* and the forthcoming vol. VA include at least 1,315 examples of the name Apollodoros, and at least 3,080 examples of the name Apollonios.

⁴ It should be noted that Durrbach had already suspected such a solution; see his comments on *ID 338 Bb 24*.

⁵ Apollodoros' donation is perhaps dated to precisely 279, on the occasion of his assumption of office.

⁶ On Hermias, see n. 1, above.

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INDEXES

1. PERSONAL NAMES

- Abantidas, tyrant of Sikyon: 230, 232
Achaïos, pretender to the Seleukid throne: 279, 358-59, 359-61, 485n, 501
Achaïos son of Phanodikos of Delos: 439
Manius Acilius Glabrio, Roman consul: 353n
Adeimantos of Sparta: 263-65, 266, 268
Adeimantos (son of Androsthenes?) of Lampsakos, officer of Poliorketes: 89n, 107n, 112n, 140, 366n, 450-51, 491
Adeimantos son of Kriton of Karthaia, Seleukid officer: 429-32
Adeimantos f. of Kriton of Karthaia: 429
Admetos son of Bokros of Thessalonike: 441-42
Aeropos, Epirote archon: 349n
Agathaios son of Autokles of Athens: 521, 523
Agathenor f. of Xenokrates of Chalkedon: 65
Agathokles, courtier of Ptolemy IV Philopator: 309
Agathokles son of king Lysimachos: 228n
Agathon f. of Asandros (of Beroia?): 76, 447
Agathon f. of Timon of Megara: 296, 302
Agelaos, Aitolian general: 328n
Agen of Epidamnos: 73
Agesilaos f. of Hippomedon of Sparta: 259, 413
Agesipolis III, king of Sparta: 267
Agis IV, king of Sparta: 236n, 259, 269, 531n
Aglanor son of Periandros of Eresos: 406, 407
Agonippos, tyrant of Eresos: 403n
Agyrrhios son of Kallimedon of Athens: 67
Aigon of Itanos: 459-61, 479
Ainesidemos f. of Autokles of Chalkis: 304, 441, 442
Ainetos son of Polytas of Kytenion: 331-32
Ainiselas, archon of Delphi: 299n
Aischines, Athenian orator: 69
Aischylos of Argos: 218
Aischylos of Eretria: 455
Alexamenos, Aitolian general: 322
Alexander III: 31, 46n, 47, 48n, 63, 68, 74, 83, 151-52, 362, 412, 505; army and officers: 26n, 80n, 111, 197, 275, 384n, 408, 411n, 438, 446-48, 449n, 457-58, 473, 478, 494; titulature: 37-38; donations: 65; exiles decree: 43, 67, 384n; divine honours: 40; posthumous cult: 164-65, 224, 510; posthumous coinage: 425n; and Athens: 40; and Lesbos: 403n
Alexander IV: 37-38, 382n, 408; *somatophylakes*: 80n, 83
Alexander V: 156-57n
Alexandros, hipparch of Epirus: 349
Alexandros son of Alexon of Aitolia: 334n
Alexandros son of Antiochos of Akarnania, courtier of Philip V and Antiochos III: 335, 346, 347, 485n
Alexandros son of Krateros, pretender to the Macedonian throne: 171n, 177-78, 183n, 184n, 187, 197, 216-17, 233-34, 426, 444, 475, 516n, 520, 525-31
Alexandros son of Myllenas of Beroia, Macedonian officer: 446-47n
Alexandros son of Polyperchon: 55-58, 70, 229-31, 276
Alexandros son of Thoas of Aitolia: 334n
Alexandros f. of Thoas and Dikaiarchos of Aitolia (son of Alexon?): 334n
Alexes f. of Boulagoras of Samos: 397, 400
Alexineides of Elis: 281n
Alexion of Sikyon: 229-30
Alexos of Megaris: 300n
Alkaïos son of Heraïos of Ainos: 99
Alkamenos of Sparta: 264-65
Alkanor son of Arkesilaos, Macedonian officer: 303
Alkemachos son of Charops of Epirus: 350
Alkibiades, Athenian archon: 179n, 522
Alkimachos son of Agathokles of Pella: 421n

- Alkimachos son of Alkimachos of Apollonia: 73n
 Alkimachos f. of Lysippos, Macedonian officer: 421n
 Alkimachos f. of Thoukritos of Athens: 198, 515
 Alkimedon (?) of Ios (?): 421-23
 Alkimos of Epirus: 491n
 Alkyoneus, son of king Antigonos Gonatas: 185n, 197n, 213n
 Ameinias of Abai: 326-27
 Ameinias, Athenian general: 126n
 Ameinokles son of Tachyllos of Athens: 183
 Amiantos f. of Kydias of Paros: 423
 Amnatos of Lyttos: 461-62
 Ampharetos f. of Xanthippos of Elateia: 323
 Amphidamos of Elis: 249n, 283-84, 472, 479, 500
 Amphidemos son of Amphimedes of Oropos: 303-304
 Amphidokos son of Skythos of Samos: 387-89
 Amphikleides son of Amphikleides of Athens: 443n
 Amphikleides son of Amphikleides of Delos: 443
 Amphikleides son of Sophokles of Athens: 139
 Amphilochos son of Lokros of Samos: 396-97
 Amphimedes f. of Amphidemos of Oropos: 303
 Amynandros, king of Athamania: 349n
 Amyntas of Rhodes: 357
 Anaxidotos son of Apollodoros, Macedonian officer: 451n
 Anaxilaos son of Aristetas of Dyme: 287-88
 Anaxipolis son of Timaratos of Rhodes: 355-56
 Androkles of Akarnania: 342-44
 Androkles, Macedonian officer: 344n
 Androkles son of Xeinis of Sphettos: 107n, 108n
 Andromachos f. of Achaïos: 360
 Antigonos I Monophthalmos: 45n, 368, 373n;
 Egyptian campaign: 86n, 384-85; Tyre declaration: 23n; Second Diadochi War: 74n, 411; Third Diadochi War: 61, 75-76, 229-30, 270, 276, 303-304, 312-13, 324n, 422, 507-509; Fourth Diadochi War: 103-104, 121, 161, 450; royal title: 106-107n, 357n; army, officers and court: 26n, 62, 63n, 75, 80n, 83-89, 95-97, 110-12, 131, 152n, 182, 229-30, 270, 276, 303-304, 312, 324n, 361-68, 381-86, 387n, 389-90, 422n, 457-58, 479n, 484, 490, 491n, 499, 507; divine honours: 78-81, 82, 119, 191, 366-67n, 421n, 491, 513, 521-22 (Athens), 421-23 (Delos [and Ios?]), 388 (Samos); donations: 79, 88-89, 107-109, 161 (Athens); arbitration: 365; dispatch of foreign judges: 370n; and the Aegean: 81-82, 89, 362n, 389, 419, 421-25, 532; and Asia Minor: 361-62n, 382n, 389-90, 507; and Athens: 62, 76, 78-90, 103-104, 106-109, 119-22, 362n, 366-67n, 421n, 457-58, 472, 483n, 484; and Boiotia: 312-13, 474; and Chios: 362n; and Ephesos: 362n; and Ios (?): 421-23; and Kos: 361-65, 367; and Kalymna: 381; and Lemnos: 160-61, 362n; and Lesbos: 400; and Miletos: 507; and Samos: 362n, 382-90, 391n, 400, 490; and Skepsis: 387n
 Antigonos II Gonatas: 88n, 121, 471, 494; against the Gauls: 177-78, 455; against Pyrrhos: 169, 212-15, 257n, 280-81, 471; Chremonidean War: 164n, 171, 180, 296n, 516n; sea battle of Kos: 197n, 440-41; against Alexandros son of Krateros: 183n, 216-18, 233-34, 475, 525-29; royal title: 88n, 257n; archive: 46n; arbitration and dispatch of foreign judges: 426, 431-32n; army, officers and court: 26n, 28n, 113n, 157-58, 170-73, 177-79, 181, 184, 194n, 197n, 283, 302n, 455-56, 488, 513-21; donations: 234-35, 441, 526-27, 531; divine honours: 181, 183-84 (Athens), 421-23 (Ios?); and the Achaian *koinon*: 232-35, 470, 523-32; and the Aegean: 216, 234, 302n, 417-18n, 433, 524-32; and Amorgos: 416; and Argos: 209, 212-20, 236n; and Asia Minor: 164n, 388n; and Athens: 28n, 88n, 113n, 121, 140n, 144n, 145, 154n, 157-58, 164n, 170-86, 197n, 198, 211, 216, 394n, 470n, 473, 475, 484, 488, 494, 513-22; and Boiotia: 313; and Corinth: 216, 234, 524-28, 532; and Delos: 216, 440-41; and Elis: 280-82; and Eretria: 178, 453-56, 474, 500; and Ios: 421-23; and Karystos: 197; and Kaunos: 388n; and Keos: 431-32n; and Kimolos: 426; and Kos: 368-70; and Lemnos: 88n; and Megara: 296n, 300n, 416n; and the Peloponnese: 217-18, 281-82, 525; and Phokis: 325; and Samos: 366, 388, 398n; and Sikyon: 219; and Sparta: 257n
 Antigonos III Doseon: campaign in central Greece (228): 320n, 328, 332, 333n; Karian campaign: 195, 260, 358, 374-75, 390n; Kleo-

- menic War: 198, 222-24, 236-45, 260-61, 320;
 army, officers and court: 26n, 29n, 195-98,
 249-50, 302n, 304, 418n, 471, 481, 484, 494,
 497, 500; divine honours: 245 (Achaian
koinon), 370n (Kos), 373; arbitration and
 dispatch of foreign judges: 416-19, 426;
 donations: 321, 417n; and the Achaian
koinon: 195, 198, 222-24, 236-51, 260, 276,
 484, 529-30n; and the Aegean: 417-18; and
 Akarnania: 342; and Amorgos: 302n, 416-19,
 481; and Argos: 222-24, 245; and Athens:
 190-92, 194-98, 481; and Boiotia: 304-307,
 320-22, 476, 500; and Crete: 463; and Delos:
 417n; and Doris: 328; and Epirus: 349n; and
 the Greek Alliance: 191, 249, 263, 272,
 284n, 306n, 326n, 342, 349n, 505; and Ios:
 420-23; and Kimolos: 426; and Kos: 364-
 65n, 370n, 373-75, 380; and Megalopolis:
 198, 236-37, 242, 276-79; and Megara (?):
 300n; and Phokis: 326n; and Sparta: 261n,
 263, 266
- Antigonos son of Alexandros of Akarnania: 335n
- Antiochos I Soter: army, officers and court:
 372-73n, 436n, 531n; marriage: 227, 229;
 and Crete: 461; and Sparta (?): 257
- Antiochos II Theos: 527; Second Syrian War:
 397n, 399, 432; army, officers and court:
 398-400, 431-32, 461-62; and Crete: 461-62;
 and Samos: 396-400, 473
- Antiochos III: 42-43n, 316; army, officers and
 court: 334n, 335, 346-47, 360n, 363-64n,
 371n, 372-73n, 430; against Achaios: 359-
 61; Antiochic War: 31, 32n, 207n, 284-85,
 334-41, 345-48, 351-53, 402, 444-45, 478,
 480, 500; and Aitolia: 206, 284-85, 334-41,
 345-48, 470n, 477; and Akarnania: 345-47,
 500; and Athens: 192, 203, 205-208; and
 Chalkis: 444-45, 471; and Doris: 328-32; and
 Elis: 284-85; and Epirus: 350-53; and Karia:
 245n, 329n, 402n; and Kos: 371n, 372-73n;
 and the Ptolemies: 310, 350-51n, 360n; and
 Rhodes: 350-51n, 402n; and Rome: 32n,
 338; and Thessaly: 30n, 347-48
- Antiochos IV Epiphanes: army, officers and
 court: 364n, 491n; donations: 208n; and
 Athens: 208n
- Antiochos Hierax: 461, 501
- Antiochos f. of Alexandros of Akarnania: 347
- Antipatros Etesias: 122, 156
- Antipatros, Macedonian general: 64n, 367n, 438;
 Lamian War: 31, 37-38, 447-48n; against
 Perdikkas and Eumenes: 46n, 47, 409-412;
 army and officers: 37-39, 44, 53n, 67, 69-70,
 101, 409n, 411n, 483, 487; and Athens: 31,
 37-58, 60, 65-70, 77, 86n, 101, 153, 314n,
 421n, 470n, 473, 474, 483, 487, 499; and
 Eretria: 447-48n; and the Peloponnese: 69-
 70, 275
- Antipatros II son of Kassandros, king of Mace-
 donia: 156
- Antipatros, Athenian archon: 172n, 174
- Antipatros son of Balagros of Macedonia: 438
- Antiphanes f. of Philothenos of Malis: 428
- Antiphilos, Boiotian archon: 322n
- Antiphilos son of Hipparchos of Eretria: 448-49
- Apelles, officer of Philip V: 200, 244n, 245n,
 246, 249, 250, 271, 284n, 285, 286-87, 341n
- Aphroditos f. of Meilion of Tanagra: 311
- Apia, wife of Nabis of Sparta: 221n
- Apollodoros, Athenian archon: 45n
- Apollodoros of Athens: 206-208, 478n
- Apollodoros of Kassandreia: 282n
- Apollodoros son of Anaxidotos, Macedonian
 officer: 451n
- Apollodoros son of Apollodoros of Athens: 113n,
 171n, 175-76, 178n, 484, 485n, 514, 515, 517
- Apollodoros son of Apollonios of Kyzikos,
 Ptolemaic nesiarh: 419n, 423-24, 532-34
- Apollodoros son of Apollonios of Kyzikos: 532-
 34
- Apollodoros son of Sogenes of Athens: 176n
- Apollodoros f. of Apollodoros of Athens: 175,
 514
- Apollodotos, epistates in Thera: 433
- Apollonides son of Charops of Kyzikos (?): 99-
 100
- Apollonios of Athens: 28n, 112-13, 485n, 514
- Apollonios, officer of Antiochos II: 461
- Apollonios son of Dionysios of Antigoneia
 Troas, Antigoniid officer: 451
- Apollonios f. of Apollodoros of Kyzikos: 423,
 532-34
- Apollonios f. of Dikaiarchos of Athens: 171n,
 184, 185-86, 488, 519
- Apollophanes of Seleukeia, doctor at the Se-
 leukid court: 371n, 372n, 373n

- Apollothemis son of Prasadidas of Byzantion: 305n
 Aratos son of Aratos of Sikyon: 239-41, 251-53, 321n, 475, 479, 485n
 Aratos (III) son of Aratos: 248n
 Aratos son of Kleinias of Sikyon: 188, 195, 215n, 216-24, 230, 231-32, 233-51, 251-53, 260-62, 265, 271, 274, 277, 278n, 279, 284n, 285-86, 286-87, 321n, 340n, 341, 359n, 470-71, 472-73, 475-77, 479, 481, 484, 485n, 497, 498n, 500, 505n, 523-32
 Aratos son of Makareus of Kos: 369n
 Aratos f. of Makareus of Kos: 368
 Archagathos of Ios: 420
 Archandros son of Kallippos, Athenian general: 178n, 516
 Archandros f. of Aristippos of Argos: 209n, 210, 213n
 Archedamos of Ios: 421n
 Archedamos of Abai: 326-27
 Archedemos son of Euphron of Athens: 112-13
 Archedikos son of Naukritos of Athens: 37-39, 77, 153, 483
 Archelaos of Akarnania: 343
 Archelaos son of Rheximachos of Eretria: 449-50
 Archelas of Karthaiia: 429-32
 Archenax f. of Leonidas of Rhodes: 361
 Archeneos f. of Chaireas of Athens: 194
 Archephylos son of Leontios of Paros: 423-24
 Archepolis of Kos: 370-71
 Archepolis, Alexander's hieromnemon at Delphi: 449n
 Archestratos of Athens: 72
 Archestratos of Karthaiia: 429-32
 Archestratos son of Euthykrates of Athens: 72, 522, 523
 Archias of Abai: 326-27
 Archias son of Eurysilaos of Eresos: 406n, 407n
 Archias f. of Periandros and Phainias of Eresos: 406n
 Archidamos of Sparta: 259
 Areus I, king of Sparta: 33n, 166, 169, 256-59, 260-61, 461n, 465n, 480
 Aristagoras f. of Charianthos of Karystos: 426
 Aristagoras f. of Pasias of Kos: 376
 Aristainos, Achaian general: 274, 291-92
 Aristandros of Alexandria: 420n
 Aristandros f. of Nikomedes of Kos: 361
 Aristetas of Argos: 212-15, 281, 471, 479
 Aristetides of Athens: 164
 Aristetus f. of Anaxilaos of Dyme: 287
 Aristippos son of Archandros of Argos: 209n, 213n
 Aristippos (I) son of Aristomachos or Archandros of Argos: 209-212, 212-15, 226, 475, 479
 Aristippos (II) son of Aristomachos (I) of Argos: 219-20, 223n, 226, 236n, 475, 479
 Aristo[---] of Athens: 170-72, 516, 517-18
 Aristoboulos son of Athenaios of Thessalonike: 440-42
 Aristodemos of Eretria: 455
 Aristodemos, tyrant of Megalopolis: 278n
 Aristodemos of Miletos, Antigonid officer: 63, 491n
 Aristodemos, general of king Antigonos I: 229
 Aristodemos f. of Kephisodoros of Athens: 201
 Aristodikides: 484n
 Aristogeiton son of Meilichos of Megara: 305, 307n
 Aristogeiton f. of Meilichos of Megara: 305
 Aristokreon of Soli or Seleukeia: 192n
 Aristolaos son of Ameinias of Macedonia, general of Karia: 396-97
 Aristolochos son of Nikodromos of Delos: 434-38, 477n
 Aristolochos son of Zmendron (I) of Kos: 368-70, 375, 471, 475, 500
 Aristomachos (I) son of Aristippos (I) of Argos: 209, 212, 215-19, 223n, 226, 475-76, 479
 Aristomachos (II) son of Aristomachos (I) of Argos: 214, 218n, 219n, 220-24, 226, 475, 479
 Aristomedes f. of Aristonikos of Karystos: 457
 Aristomenes son of Meilichos of Oropos: 304-307
 Aristonikos of Athens: 43
 Aristonikos of Olynthos, *kitharodos*: 457n
 Aristonikos son of Aristomedes of Karystos, *sphairistes* of Alexander III: 197, 457-58
 Aristonikos son of Patron, Ptolemaic officer: 459n
 Aristonous son of Neandrides of Oropos: 308
 Aristonous son of P(e)isaios of Pella, Macedonian officer: 448-49
 Aristonymos of Gortyn: 462-63
 Aristopeithes (son of Erasikles?) of Karthaiia: 427-28
 Aristophanes of Troas: 362n

- Aristophanes son of Aristomenes, Athenian general: 516-19, 522-23
- Aristophanes f. of Demostratos of Athens: 523
- Aristophantos of Akarnania: 341-42, 344
- Aristoteles of Argos: 222, 244n
- Aristoteles, Athenian general: 74-75
- Aristotimos son of Damaretos, tyrant of Elis: 280, 281-83, 479
- Aristotimos son of Menekrates of Megara: 295-302
- Arkesilaos of Pitane: 192n, 197n, 205n
- Arkesilaos f. of Alkanor: 303
- Arkesilaos (f. of Alkanor?), satrap of Babylonia: 303
- Arrhabaios, grandson of Antipatros, Macedonian officer: 409n, 410-11
- Arrhidaios, satrap of Hellespontic Phrygia: 411n, 412n
- Arsinoe II: 393n, 396n; cult: 168, 170, 257n, 371n, 394, 397n, 403; entourage and contacts: 169-70, 394; Chremonidean War: 167-70; and Athens: 166-70; and Delos: 435-37
- Arsinoe III: divine honours: 406 (Lesbos); donations for the Mouseia of Thespiiai: 309, 315-18
- Artemidoros son of Apollodoros of Perinthos, officer of king Lysimachos: 122, 155, 159-60
- Artemidoros son of Artemidoros of Perge, officer of Ptolemy III: 308n
- Asandros son of Agathon (of Beroia?), Macedonian general: 61n, 76-78, 447n, 507-509
- Asandros son of Philotas, Macedonian officer: 447n
- Asklepiades, Athenian (?) general: 112
- Asklepiades of Byzantion, Antigonid officer: 113n, 491n
- Asklepiades of Troizen: 226, 228n
- Asklepiades son of Zenon of Athens: 113n, 201
- Asklepiades f. of Herakleitos of Athens: 177, 182
- Askondas f. of Krates of Thebes: 150, 319
- Askondas f. of Neon of Thebes: 319-23, 475, 479
- Aspasios son of Theupropos of Samos: 389-90
- Astykleides f. of Prytanis of Karystos: 195
- Attalids (in general): 26n, 32n, 84n, 191-92
- Attalos I: 350-51n, 359, 360n; army, officers and court: 204-205, 253-56, 305, 307-308; donations: 205-206 (Athens), 254-56 (Sikyon), 329-30 (Aitolia); divine honours: 204n (Athens); and the Achaian *koinon*: 253-56, 292; and Athens: 192n, 202-206; and Boiotia: 305, 307-308; and Doris: 329
- Attalos II: 205
- Audoleon, king of Paionia: 32n, 122
- Autokles son of Ainesidemos of Chalkis, officer of Demetrios II: 304, 441, 442, 488, 534n
- Autokles son of Autokles: 304n, 488
- Autokles f. of Agathaïos of Athens: 521, 523
- Bakchios son of Hermodikos of Eresos: 407-408
- Bakchios f. of Melesippos of Plataiai: 366
- Bakchios f. of Poseidippos of Athens: 115
- Bakchon, Ptolemaic nesiarch: 159n, 378, 393n, 415n, 419, 420, 423, 435, 439, 533
- Balagros son of Balagros of Macedonia: 438-39
- Balagros son of Nikanor, Macedonian officer: 438-39
- Berenike I: 168, 258
- Berenike II: 193n, 397n, 400-401, 460n
- Berenike, daughter of Ptolemy II Philadelphos: 397n
- Bianor (?), Antigonid officer: 99-101
- Bianor (son of Thalon of Leukas?): 343
- Bionidas of Sparta: 264-65
- Bithys of Lysimacheia, courtier of Lysimachos: 122, 155
- Bithys, officer of Demetrios II: 122n
- Bittos f. of Nikandros of Aitolia: 339
- Boiskos, Ptolemaic officer (son of Kallikrates of Samos?): 396n
- Boiskos f. of Kallikrates of Samos: 393
- Bolis of Crete: 359
- Boulagoras son of Alexes of Samos: 386n, 397-400, 473, 477n
- Boulon son of Tynnnon of Delos: 442n
- Bourichos, Antigonid officer: 491n
- Brachylles son of Neon of Thebes: 263, 266n, 292n, 319-23, 475, 479, 481, 485n
- Chaireas son of Archeneos of Athens: 194
- Chaireas f. of Archonides of Athens: 194
- Chaireas f. of Komeas of Athens: 160
- Chairedemos son of Epicharinos of Athens: 182
- Chairephon of Athens: 108
- Charianthos son of Aristagoras of Karystos: 426
- Charias, Athenian general: 126
- Charias f. of P(e)isis of Thespiiai: 312
- Charidamos, Boiotian archon: 304n
- Charikles of Athens: 52n, 55n, 58, 67n

- Charilaos, Boiotian archon: 298n
 Chariteles of Kyparissia: 246n, 274-75
 Charixenos archon of Delphi: 427
 Charops son of Charops of Epirus: 350n
 Charops son of Machatas of Epirus: 349-53, 477n
 Charops f. of Apollonides of Kyzikos: 99
 Cheilon of Sparta: 267-69, 479
 Chionides of Athens: 72n, 87, 88, 109, 153
 Chionides f. of Ktesias of Athens: 72, 109n
 Choirylos f. of Tharsynon of Delos: 438
 Chremonides son of Eteokles of Athens: 162-70, 187, 481, 511n; decree of: 172, 252, 459n, 460n
 Damarchos f. of Euphanes of Eresos: 407
 Damaretos of Thespiai: 315-19
 Damaretos f. of Kykliadas of Pharai: 288
 Damasias son of Phanokles of Eretria: 451-52
 Damasilas (?) son of Eurybotas of Gortyn: 462-64
 Dameas son of Damoteles of Megara: 301, 474-75
 Dameas son of Matrokles of Megara: 301
 Dameas f. of Damoteles of Megara: 295
 Damis of Megalopolis: 275-76, 479, 482
 Damokles (?) son of Nearchos of Boiotia: 323
 Damokritos, Aitolian general: 335, 338
 Damon son of Polyarchos of Eresos: 403-406
 Damonikos f. of Hermos of Eresos: 407
 Damophilos of Rhodes: 357
 Damoteles of Sparta: 261n
 Damoteles son of Dameas of Megara: 295-302, 474-75
 Damoteles son of Matrokles of Megara: 301n
 Darius III: 38n, 408, 503
 Deidameia, wife of Demetrios I: 104
 Deinarchos, Athenian orator: 69-70
 Deinarchos of Corinth or Athens: 44, 45, 46n, 53, 56, 69-70, 483, 485n
 Deinokrates son of Deinokrates of Sikyon: 253-56
 Deinokrates f. of Deinokrates and Dionysodoros of Sikyon: 253, 254
 Demades son of Demeas of Athens: 40-49, 51n, 52, 53n, 63, 66, 68, 69, 70, 80n, 157, 190, 269, 469, 471, 474, 477
 Demainetos son of Hermokles of Athens: 200
 Demainetos f. of Timotheos of Samos: 402
 Demaratos son of Gorgion of Sparta: 434-38, 480n
 Demarchos, satrap of Hellespontic Phrygia: 387n
 Demarchos son of Taron of Lykia, Antigonid officer: 366, 387-90
 Demarchos, Tiberius Claudius f. of Leon of Eresos: 407
 Demaretos f. of Aristotimos of Elis: 281
 Demeas son of Demades of Athens: 44-45, 68, 474
 Demeas f. of Demades of Athens: 40
 Demetrios I Poliorketes: 'liberation' of Athens (307): 62-63, 78, 87n, 89, 363n, 424-25; Cyprus campaign: 133n; siege of Rhodes: 301n, 335-38; counteroffensive against Kassandros (304): 90-91, 93, 95-96n, 110, 133, 210-12, 323-25, 447, 450; Peloponnesian campaign (303): 91-95, 210-12, 232, 269-70, 276; battle of Ipsos: 91-92, 102n, 103-104, 120-22, 451; after the battle of Ipsos: 128, 313, 367-68, 381, 382n, 387-90; reconquest of Athens (295): 104-105, 127-30, 135, 141, 210-12, 313n, 510-11; Peloponnesian campaign (295-294): 269-70, 435-36; Boiotian revolts (293-292): 312-15; Athenian revolt (287): 122, 137-38, 140n, 141-48, 150-52, 154, 175, 319, 426; Asian campaign (286-285): 99n, 137n, 154-55, 227-28; royal title: 101n, 106-107n, 111, 357n, 384n, 425n; army, officers and court: 26n, 28n, 80n, 83-103, 108-113, 131-32, 137, 140, 169n, 181-82, 197, 301n, 362, 365-68, 381, 383-84, 386-90, 438, 446-53, 457-58, 488, 490, 491n; divine honours: 78-81, 82, 90, 107n, 119-22, 130-31, 191, 356n, 366-67n, 381, 383-84, 386, 513, 521-22 (Athens), 388 (Samos), 425 (Delos); donations: 79, 89n (Athens); arbitration: 367n; and the Aegean: 421-22, 424-25, 439, 532-33; and Argos: 210-12, 475; and Athens: 28n, 62-63, 64n, 78-113, 118-20, 122, 127, 129-52, 154, 175, 210-12, 303, 363n, 424-25, 453, 457-58, 471, 472, 474, 476, 483n, 485n, 488, 489, 491, 493, 495, 496, 499, 500, 510-11, 521-22; and Boiotia: 312-15, 319, 474, 476, 500; and Elis: 284n; and Ephesos: 99n; and Eretria: 446-55, 471, 474; and Ionia: 382n; and Kalyrna: 367n, 381; and Karia: 389-90; and Karystos: 457; and Kilikia: 389-90; and Kos: 365-68; and Megara: 295-96; and Messene: 269-70, 436n; and Oropos: 453; and Phokis: 323-25; and Samos: 383-90, 391n, 400, 490; and Sikyon: 232, 471; and Tenos: 424-25; and Thebes: 152, 313,

- 319; and Thespiiai: 312-15; and Troizen: 227-28, 496
- Demetrios II: Demetrian war: 184, 236, 297-99, 306, 319-20, 332; royal title: 182; army, officers and court: 122-23n, 298n, 300, 304, 440-43, 488, 519; and the Aegean: 417-18n, 440-43, 488; and Argos: 222, 475-76; and Athens: 113n, 518-19, 522; and Boiotia: 297n, 306, 319-20; and Crete: 462-64; and Eretria: 519; and Megara: 295-302, 474-75, 481; and Oropos: 304; and the Peloponnese: 220
- Demetrios of Phaleron: 45n, 51, 55, 58-65, 67n, 70n, 71, 76-79, 98, 108, 118n, 128, 139, 144-46, 148n, 151n, 152-53, 173, 187n, 276, 453, 473, 475n, 476-78, 480, 483, 493, 499-500, 503n, 507
- Demetrios of Pharos, officer of Philip V: 250, 273
- Demetrios, Ptolemaic officer: 435
- Demetrios son of Machatas of Epirus: 350
- Demetrios son of Phanostratos of Athens: 173-75, 473, 479n, 516
- Demetrios son of Potamon, Ptolemaic officer (?): 533
- Demetrios son of [. . .]phanes of Boiotia: 224
- Demetrios f. of Nikostratos of Chios: 402
- Demochares son of Laches of Athens: 39, 50n, 81n, 85n, 97, 98n, 105n, 117, 120n, 123, 124, 127n, 136n, 139, 143, 145n, 148, 153-59, 160, 166n, 192, 470n, 477n, 491n, 502n
- Demokles, Athenian archon: 179n
- Demokles of Athens: 204
- Demophanes of Megalopolis: 278n, 279n
- Demophanes son of Epizelos of Athens: 522, 523
- Demophanes f. of Timosthenes of Karystos: 197
- Demophilos son of Demophilos of Athens: 56, 71
- Demosthenes, Athenian orator: 43, 48n, 67, 69, 70, 73, 114, 123, 153, 158
- Demostratos son of Aristophanes of Athens: 521, 523
- Derdas, Epirote archon: 349n
- Derkiadas of Megaris: 300n
- Derkyllidas of Sparta: 30n
- Derkyllios, Athenian general: 54
- Dikaiarchos of Athens: 322n
- Dikaiarchos son of Alexandros, Aitolian general: 334-38
- Dikaiarchos son of Apollonios of Athens: 28n, 113n, 171n, 184-85, 185-86, 488, 519
- Dikaiarchos (II) son of Apollonios of Athens: 186, 514n
- Diochares f. of Lykomedes of Athens: 181
- Diodoros son of Dioskourides of Samos: 402n
- Diodoros son of Dorotheos of Delphi: 364n
- Diodotos f. of Diomedon of Kos: 373
- Diogenes, Macedonian general of the Piraeus: 178, 188-89, 193n, 194n, 514, 520n
- Diokleidas son of Pyrrhos of Megara, officer of Antigonos Doson: 302n, 415-16, 481
- Diokleidas f. of Pyrrhos of Megara: 302n, 416
- Diokles of Aitolia: 348
- Diokles, Athenian archon: 154
- Diomedes son of Diodoros of Athens: 515
- Diomedon, Athenian archon: 145n, 178n, 187
- Diomedon (I) son of Diodotos of Kos: 373-76
- Diomedon (II) son of Zmendron (II) of Kos: 374-76
- Dionysios, Athenian archon: 204n
- Dionysios, Boiotian archon: 305n, 306n, 308
- Dionysios of Sinope, Antigonid officer: 80n, 365-66
- Dionysios, Antigonid officer: 80n, 365-66
- Dionysios, officer of Antipatros: 63, 507
- Dionysios son of Herakleitos of Kassandreia (?): 305-306n
- Dionysios son of Herodoros of Megara: 298n
- Dionysios f. of Glaukippos, Hippodamas and Apollonios of Antigoneia Troas: 451
- Dionysios f. of Timasitheos of Rhodes: 358
- Dionysodoros, flute player: 151
- Dionysodoros son of Deinokrates of Sikyon: 253-56
- Dionysodoros son of Soter of Oropos: 307-308
- Dionysodoros f. of Tinnis of Samos: 395
- Dioppeithes son of Orthagores of Argos: 225n
- Dioskourides, Antigonid officer: 422n, 507
- Dorymenes of Aitolia, Ptolemaic officer: 333n
- Dositheos f. of Sotimos of Kyrene: 99
- Douris son of Kaios, tyrant of Samos: 384n, 391-92, 478
- Drakon son of Straton of Kos, Antigonid officer: 385n, 386
- Dromichaites, ruler of the Getai: 312n
- Dromokleides of Athens: 105, 129-31, 479

- Echedamos son of Mnasilochos of Leukas: 342-44
- Echedamos f. of Mnasilochos of Leukas: 345
- Echestratos, *theoros* of the *koinon* of the Islanders: 420, 443
- Ekdemos of Megalopolis: 278n, 279n
- Ekphantos, Athenian archon: 515
- Ekphantos, Athenian general: 201n
- Elpinikos son of Mnesippos of Athens: 183-85
- Elpinikos son of Stilbos of Eretria: 446-48
- Epameinondas, Theban general: 270n
- Eperatos of Pharai, Achaian general: 245n, 285, 286-87, 473, 499
- Epicharinos f. of Chairedemos of Athens: 182
- Epicharmos son of Kallistratides of Athens: 159
- Epigenes f. of Naniskos of Samos: 382
- Epikouros of Athens: 56, 71
- Epikouros of Samos, philosopher: 133n, 134n
- Epikouros son of Alkithos of Samos: 384n
- Epikouros son of Drakon of Samos: 384n
- Epikouros son of Zoilos of Samos: 384-85
- Epikrates son of Timasistratos of Rhodes: 358-59
- Epinikos of Samothrake, Ptolemaic officer: 415
- Epiteles of Karthaia: 427, 428
- Epizelos f. of Demophanes of Athens: 522, 523
- Erasikles (f. of Aristopeithes?) of Karthaia: 427-28
- Erasistratos, doctor at the Mouseion of Alexandria: 379
- Eteokles f. of Glaukon, Chremonides and Pheidistrate of Athens: 162, 163n, 510, 511n
- Eualkes son of Phokinos of Athens: 301n
- Eualkes f. of Phokinos of Megara: 295, 301n
- Euandros, director of the Academy: 204
- Euandros f. of Herakleitos of Kassandreia: 305
- Euanor of Abai: 326-27
- Euarchos f. of Eucharos of Athens: 97, 146, 162
- Euboia, daughter of Kleoptolemos, wife of Antiochos III: 444-45
- Euboulidas of Chalkis: 348, 445, 480
- Euboulos II, Athenian archon: 140n, 514n, 523n
- Euboulos son of Archedamos of Phokis: 327
- Eucharos son of Euarchos of Athens: 97, 146, 162
- Eudamos son of Nikon of Seleukeia, courtier of Antiochos IV: 364n, 491n
- Eudikos son of Thion of Orchomenos: 311
- Eudikos f. of Euthymachos of Athens: 183
- Euelthon f. of Thales of Samos: 401
- Eukles of Rhodes, officer of Antiochos III: 360n
- Eukles (?), officer of Polyperchon: 72
- Eukletos son of Eukleides of Messene: 271n
- Eukletos f. of Gorgos (?) of Messene: 271
- Eumenes, brother of Philetairos of Tieion: 307
- Eumenes II: 350-51n, 352n, 380n; Antiochic War: 32n, 205-207
- Eumenes, Macedonian general: 45, 46n, 384, 411
- Euphanes of Crete, officer of Antiochos III: 284, 285n
- Euphanes son of Damarchos of Eresos: 407-408
- Euphranor son of Euphron of Athens: 112n
- Euphron of Sikyon: 71
- Euphron f. of Archedemos of Athens: 112
- Euphronios of Thespiai: 315-19
- Eupolemos, Macedonian general: 64n, 228n, 390n, 507
- Eupolis, Antigonid officer: 99-101
- Eurybotas son of Damasilas, *kosmos* of Gortyn: 463-64
- Eurybotas f. of Damasilas (?) of Gortyn: 462-63
- Eurydike, daughter of Antipatros: 64n
- Eurykleides son of Mikion of Athens: 176, 187-94, 196, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203n, 470n, 477, 494, 519
- Eurylochos of Demetrias: 347-48
- Eurylochos son of Bakchios of Eresos: 407-408
- Eursyilaos, tyrant of Eresos: 403n, 406-407n
- Euthippos f. of Euthymachos of Athens: 183
- Euthydemos of Sikyon: 230, 231n
- Euthydemos f. of Stratokles of Athens: 78
- Eythyrates, Macedonian officer: 417-18n
- Euthykrates f. of Archestratos of Athens: 72, 522, 523
- Euthymachos son of Eudikos of Athens: 183
- Euthymachos son of Euthippos of Athens: 183
- Euthymides of Chalkis: 207, 444, 445
- Flamininus, Titus Quinctius: 206-207, 222n, 254, 321-22, 334, 336, 342, 347-48, 417
- Garsyeris, general of Achaioi: 501
- Gennaioi of Elateia: 306n
- Glaukippos son of Dionysios of Antigoneia Troas, Antigonid officer: 451
- Glaukon son of Eteokles of Athens: 162-70, 187, 480-81, 510-13
- Glaukon son of Menon of Eresos: 407-408
- Glaukon (son of Simos?) of Kythnos: 425n, 427

- Goggylos of Eretria: 435
 Gorgion f. of Demaratos of Sparta: 434-35
 Gorgos (son of Eukletos?) of Messene: 271-74, 275
 Gorgos son of Phrynichos (?) of Athens: 131-32
 Gorgos son of Theodotos of Iasos, Macedonian officer: 384n
 Gyridas of Sparta: 266-68
 Hagesarchos, Ptolemaic officer: 401
 Hagnonides son of Nikoxenos of Athens: 56, 70-72, 139, 502n
 Hannibal: 305n
 Harpalos, treasurer of Alexander's army: 40, 52n, 58, 67, 70, 74, 78, 152, 447
 Hegemon of Athens: 56, 69, 70, 473, 478n
 Hegesandros of Athens: 364n
 Hegesinous of Pergamon, Academic philosopher: 204-205
 Hegesion of Samos: 386
 Hegesistratos of Samothrake: 413-15
 Hekataios, tyrant of Kardia: 383-84n
 Herakleidas, archon of Delphi: 302n
 Herakleides of Taras, officer of Philip V: 327n
 Herakleides, officer of Philip V: 327
 Herakleides f. of Thales of Samos: 401
 Herakleitos, Athenian archon: 179n
 Heraklei[*tos vel -des*] of Erythrai, Antigonid officer: 89
 Herakleitos son of Asklepiades of Athens, officer of Antigonos Gonatas: 171n, 177-79, 182, 484, 485n, 490, 520n
 Herakleitos son of Euandros of Kassandreia: 305
 Herakleitos son of Timaitchos of Kos: 368-69
 Herakleitos f. of Dionysios of Kassandreia: 306n
 Hermias of Halikarnassos, Ptolemaic nesiarach: 534n
 Hermodikos f. of Bakchios of Eresos: 407
 Hermokles f. of Demainetos of Athens: 200
 Hermos son of Damonikos of Eresos: 407-408
 Herodoros of Kyzikos or Lampsakos, Antigonid officer: 97n, 131-32
 Herodoros son of Dionysios of Megara: 298n
 Herodotos son of Thyon of Samos: 401
 Hierarchos son of Prokles: 533
 Hierokleides f. of Thrasyphos of Athens: 522-23
 Hierokles of Karia, officer of Antigonos Gonatas: 178n, 197n, 456
 Hieron son of Timokrates of Syracuse: 427-28, 431n
 Hieronymos of Kardia: 45-46, 313-14, 383-84, 391n
 Himeraios son of Phanostratos of Athens: 43, 59n
 Hipparchia, wife of Krates: 319n
 Hipparchos, Boiotian archon: 308n
 Hipparchos, tyrant of Eretria: 449
 Hipparchos son of Heniochos of Kyrene: 387n, 389-90
 Hipparchos f. of Antiphilos of Eretria: 448
 Hippodamas son of Dionysios of Antigoneia Troas, Antigonid officer: 451
 Hippokritos son of Zmendron (II): 374-76
 Hippomedon son of Agesilaos of Sparta, Ptolemaic general: 164-65n, 259-60, 413-15
 Hippostratos f. of Oxythemis of Larisa: 111
 Horismos son of Damasistratos of Elaia: 386
 Hyblesios f. of Theodektes (?) of Samos: 386
 Hypereides, Athenian orator: 43, 68-69, 72, 83n, 114
 Iasidemos son of Mnesis of Minoa in Amorgos: 415-19
 Iolaos, Macedonian officer: 83
 Ion of Samos: 383
 Isandros f. of Kallistagoras of Tenos: 424
 Isonikos f. of Sosinikos of Karthaia: 428
 Ka[---] of Kos: 365-68
 Kaios (son of Douris?) and f. of Douris of Samos: 391-92, 478
 Kalaidas son of Kalaidas of Athens: 110
 Kalaidas son of Lytides of Athens: 109-110
 Kallias of Naxos: 419-20, 425n, 427n
 Kallias son of Hippias of Megara: 299n
 Kallias son of Thymochares of Athens, Ptolemaic officer: 28n, 74n, 124n, 136n, 137, 138, 141-45, 145-50, 162, 166, 168n, 171, 187, 439, 475n, 483, 485n, 486, 488n, 495, 511, 534n
 Kallidamos of Ioulis: 433-34
 Kallidemos son of Thrasykles of Athens: 77n
 Kalligeiton of Oropos: 311
 Kalligeitos of Megaris: 300n
 Kallikles, archon of Delphi: 283n
 Kallikles son of Teison of Rhodes: 355-56
 Kallikrates son of Boiskos of Samos: 167n, 258, 393-96, 474, 485n, 486n
 Kallikrates son of Kallibios of Samos: 396n
 Kallikrates son of Kallikrates of Samos: 396n
 Kallikrates f. of Kallimedon of Athens: 67

- Kallimedes, Athenian archon: 515
 Kallimedon, politarch of Beroia: 67n
 Kallimedon son of Kallikrates of Athens: 50, 53n, 55n, 58, 67-68, 69, 70, 474, 478n, 483, 485n
 Kallippos son of Moirokles of Athens: 164
 Kallippos son of Theodotos, Athenian general: 516
 Kallirhoos of Megaris: 300n
 Kallistagoras son of Isandros (?) of Tenos: 424-25
 Kallisthenes son of Kleoboulos: 515
 Kallistratides f. of Epicharmos of Athens: 159
 Kallistratos of Elis: 284-85
 Kaphisophon son of Philippos of Kos, Ptolemaic officer: 371-72, 373
 Kassandros: Third Diadochi War: 61-62, 75-77, 160-61, 229-30, 276, 303-304, 312-13, 507-509; Four-Year War: 81, 82n, 85, 86n, 89-93, 95-96n, 99-100n, 103n, 110, 112-13n, 133-34, 197, 209-211, 269-70, 324-25, 447, 450, 453, 458; royal title: 115; family: 153n, 156-57, 367, 388, 390; army, officers and court: 53, 59, 85, 139n, 229-30, 390; and Athens: 45-46, 53, 55, 59-65, 75-78, 104, 115-16, 126-29, 133-34, 160-61, 476, 478, 480, 483, 491, 493, 499, 502n, 503n, 507-509; and Argos: 210, 218n; and Megalopolis: 275-76, 482; and Messene: 269-70; and Rhodes: 355, 356n; and Thebes: 270, 480
 Kassandros, officer of Philip V: 484n
 Kastor, Ptolemaic official: 191n, 194
 Kephisodoros son of Aristodemos of Athens: 201-203, 477n
 Kerkidas of Megalopolis: 237, 276-79, 494n
 Kleainetos of Athens: 87-88, 109
 Kleainetos son of Kleomedon of Athens: 96, 109n
 Klearchos son of Nausikles of Athens: 54, 68-69
 Kleinias, Ptolemaic *epistates* of Korhësia: 427n
 Kleinias f. of Aratos of Sikyon: 230, 231-32, 233
 Kleisthenes f. of Menedemos of Eretria: 452
 Kleitophon son of Alexes or Alexos of Samos: 397
 Kleitos, Macedonian general: 409n, 410-11, 411n
 Kleitos, officer of Polyperchon: 73
 Kleochares son of Kleodorides of Athens: 29n
 Kleochares son of Pytheas of Amphipolis, Antigoniid officer: 450
 Kleokritos of Andros: 425-26, 427n
 Kleomachos, Athenian archon: 515
 Kleomachos son of Meilichos of Oropos: 305-306
 Kleomenes III of Sparta: 33n, 189, 195, 198, 221-24, 236-43, 251, 252, 259-60, 260-62, 263-64, 266, 269, 277, 280, 476, 480-81, 530n, 531n
 Kleon, tyrant of Sikyon: 230-31
 Kleon son of Kleon of Erythrai, officer of Demetrios II: 300
 Kleon f. of Kleon and Philon of Erythrai: 300
 Kleonikos of Naupaktos: 248n
 Kleonymos of Sparta: 212, 313, 531n
 Kleonymos, tyrant of Phlious: 221
 Kleoptolemos of Chalkis: 444-45, 471
 Kleumachos son of Aristandros, brother of Nikomedes of Kos: 363
 Kleumachos son of Nikomedes of Kos: 363n
 Klytos, Akarnanian general: 345-46
 Komeas son of Chaireas of Athens: 160-61
 Konon of Athens: 68n
 Konon son of Timotheos of Athens: 54, 58, 68
 Kottas of Demetrias: 416
 Kranaos son of Ktesiphon of Athens: 522, 523
 Krateros, Macedonian general: 44n, 50, 58
 Krateros f. of Alexandros: 283; see also Alexandros son of Krateros
 Krates of Mallos in Kilikia: 150n
 Krates son of Antigenes of Athens, Academic philosopher: 150-52
 Krates son of Askondas of Thebes, Cynic philosopher: 138, 150-52, 319, 322n, 495
 Krates son of Krates of Thebes: 319n
 Kratesikleia, mother of Kleomenes: 260n
 Kratesipolis, wife of Alexandros son of Polyperchon: 229-30, 422n
 Kratippos f. of Menippos of Pergamon: 305, 307
 Kratyllos son of Amphidamos of Oropos: 303n
 Kriton of Boiotia, officer of Philip V: 305n
 Kriton son of Adeimantos of Karthaia: 429-32
 Kriton f. of Adeimantos and Menippos of Karthaia: 429-32
 Ktesias of Athens: 194
 Ktesias son of Chionides of Athens: 72-73, 109n, 173
 Ktesiphon f. of Kranaos of Athens: 522, 523
 Kydias son of Amiantos of Paros: 423-24
 Kykliadas son of Damaretos of Pharai, Achain general: 288-92, 293n, 321n, 476, 480

- Kyllon of Elis: 282n, 283
 Kynthiades (?) son of Teleson of Delos: 440-42
 Lachares, tyrant of Athens: 104, 122, 125-29, 135, 141, 142n, 145, 146n, 211, 313n, 477, 479, 480, 511
 Lachares of Crete: 465
 Laches son of Demochares of Athens: 154
 Laches f. of Demochares of Athens: 153
 Lamios of Aitolia: 333, 474, 485n
 Lamprias son of Pankles of Kytenion: 328-32
 Laodike, wife of Achaïos: 279, 501
 Leochares f. of Polychares of Samothrake: 415
 Leon son of Damarchos of Eresos: 407n
 Leon (II) son of Kichesias of Athens: 207
 Leonidas of Sparta: 259
 Leonidas II of Sparta: 436n, 531n
 Leonidas son of Archenax of Rhodes: 361
 Leontios, officer of Philip V: 247, 271, 341
 Leontios son of Archepulos of Paros: 423
 Leontios f. of Archepulos of Paros: 423
 Lichas son of Exakestos of Barka in Cyrenaica: 224-26
 Logbasis of Selge: 279, 501
 Lokros f. of Amphilochos of Samos: 396
 Lucius, brother of Flamininus: 342-43
 Lyandros son of Apollodoros of Athens: 175
 Lydiadas, tyrant of Megalopolis: 280n, 221, 278n
 Lykiskos, Antigonid officer: 86-87
 Lykomedes son of Diochares of Konthyle: 181
 Lykon of Alexandria Troas, philosopher: 192n, 205n
 Lykophron f. of Stasilas of Kos: 380
 Lykourgos, king of Sparta: 259, 267-68, 271, 341
 Lykourgos son of Lykophron of Athens: 47n, 57, 82, 83n, 107, 108, 114, 124n, 154, 166n
 Lynkeus son of Kaios of Samos: 391
 Lysagoras son of Kaios of Samos: 391n
 Lysandros son of Kalliphon, Athenian general: 126n
 Lysandros son of Meilichos of Oropos: 305n, 306, 309n
 Lysanias f. of Timotheos of Macedonia: 446
 Lysias son of Nothippos of Athens: 78n
 Lysimachos: 312n; after Ipsos: 120-21; against Poliorketes (287-285): 137, 150, 152, 155-57, 227-28; family: 167n; royal title: 227n; arbitration: 391n; army, officers and court: 26n, 117-25, 127, 133n, 154-57, 159-60, 256n, 435-38, 478, 483; donations: 118-20, 122-23, 149 (Athens), 324n; and Athens: 104, 115, 117-25, 154-60, 478, 483, 493; and Delos: 435-38; and Eretria: 454; and Lemnos: 123n, 161; and Lesbos: 403n; and Messene: 269-70n, 436n; and the Peloponnese: 435-36; and Phokis: 324-25; and Rhodes: 355, 356n; and Samos: 382, 391-92; and Troizen: 227-28
 Lysippos son of Alkimachos, Macedonian officer: 421n
 Lysistrate, daughter of Polyeuktos of Athens: 522, 523
 Lyson son of Kai[---] of Kalymna: 381-82
 Lytides f. of Kalaidēs of Athens: 109
 Machanidas of Sparta: 255n
 Machatas of Aitolia: 266
 Machatas f. of Charops of Epirus: 349
 Machatas f. of Tauron, Antigonid officer: 446
 Magas of Kyrene: 461n
 Makareus of Kos: 369n
 Makareus son of Aratos of Kos: 368-70
 Mandrokleidas of Sparta: 30n
 Matreas of Megaris: 300n
 Matrokles son of Damoteles: 301
 Medeios son of Oxythemis of Larisa, officer of Antigonos I: 75, 110-12, 509n
 Medon, officer of Demetrios I: 93, 109, 488-89
 Megakles, archon of Delphi: 270
 Megaleas, officer of Philip V: 200
 Meidias of Athens: 114
 Meilichos son of Aristogeiton and f. of Aristomenes, Aristogeiton, Kleomachos and Lysandros: 304-306
 Meilion son of Aphroditos of Tanagra: 311
 Melankomas of Ephesos: 359
 Melanopos: 269
 Melesippos son of Bakchios of Plataiai, Antigonid officer: 366
 Melouchos son of Myon of Samos: 386
 Memnon son of Memnon (?) of Athens: 159-60
 Memnon son of Peisias of Pellene: 292-93
 Menedemos of Rhodes: 357-58
 Menedemos son of Kleisthenes of Eretria: 152, 178-79, 452-56, 471, 474, 477n, 479, 480, 494, 500
 Menekrates son of Zenon of Athens: 206
 Menekrates f. of Aristorimos of Megara: 295

- Menekrates f. of Timokles of Athens: 204, 206
 Menippos of Klaros: 470n
 Menippos, officer of Antiochos III: 335, 430n
 Menippos son of Kratippos of Pergamon: 305, 307
 Menippos son of Kriton (I) of Karthaia, officer of Antiochos III: 429-32
 Menon of Polyrrhenia: 465
 Menon son of Menedamos of Polyrrhenia: 465
 Menon f. of Glaukon of Eresos: 407
 Menyillos, officer of Kassandros: 52-53, 57
 Metrodoros of Amphipolis, court doctor of Antiochos III: 373n
 Mikion son of Eurykleides of Athens: 188
 Mikion son of Mikion of Athens: 176, 187-94, 196, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203n, 470n, 477, 494, 519
 Mikion f. of Eurykleides and Mikion of Athens: 187
 Minnion son of Theodotos: 384n
 Mnasiadas f. of Polykrates of Argos: 225, 226n, 443
 Mnasilochos son of Echedamos of Leukas: 345-46, 348, 480, 485n, 500
 Mnasilochos f. of Echedamos of Leukas: 342
 Mnasiochos of Megaris: 300n
 Mnesalkos son of Telesarchides of Delos: 439-40
 Mnesalkos son of [---]andros of Delos: 440n
 Mnesippos f. of Elpinikos of Athens: 183
 Mnesis f. of Iasedemos of Minoa in Amorgos: 415
 Molpos son of Pythagoras of Samos: 387-89, 390
 Moschion son of Moirichos of Thera, Antigonid officer: 381
 Moschion f. of Pleistias of Kos, Antigonid officer: 368n, 384
 Mylleas or Myllenas son of Zoilos, officer of Alexander III: 446-47n
 Myllenas son of Asandros, officer of Alexander III: 446-47n, 447-48n
 Myon f. of Melouchos of Samos: 386
 M[. . .]s of Ioulis: 433-34
 Nabis, king of Sparta: 221n, 254, 289, 335, 435
 Naniskos son of Epigenes of Samos: 382
 Naukritos f. of Archedikos of Athens: 37
 Nausias of Athens: 77n
 Nausikles f. of Klearchos of Athens: 68
 Nausikrates f. of Thrasykles of Athens: 76
 Nausistratos: 397n
 Neaios, Antigonid officer: 95-96n, 97, 129n, 133n, 491n
 Neandrides f. of Neandros of Oropos: 308
 Neandros son of Neandrides of Oropos: 308-310
 Nearchos f. of Damokles (?) of Boiotia: 323
 Neon son of Askondas of Thebes: 263, 319-23, 475, 476, 479, 481, 500
 Neon II son of Brachylles of Thebes: 322-23
 Neoptolemos son of Phileas of Athens: 521, 522
 Nikagoras of Messene: 262n
 Nikaia, daughter of Antipatros: 46n
 Nikaia, wife of Alexandros son of Krateros: 216
 Nikandros son of Bittos of Trichonion: 334-38, 339-41, 479
 Nikanor, Antipatrid officer: 52-55, 57, 59, 67n, 68-69, 73, 77
 Nikanor, son-in-law of Antipatros: 438
 Nikarchides f. of Nikodemos of Messene: 269-70
 Nikeratos son of Phileas of Athens: 117, 160
 Nikias I, Athenian archon: 134n, 510-11
 Nikias II, Athenian archon: 134n, 510-13
 Nikias III of Otryne, Athenian archon: 510-13
 Nikias of Hermione: 417n
 Nikippos, ephor of Messene: 272
 Nikoboulos of Abai: 326-27
 Nikodemos (son of Nikarchides?) of Messene: 269-70, 477
 Nikodromos f. of Aristolochos of Delos: 434
 Nikokles, tyrant of Sikyon: 232, 233-34
 Nikolaos of Aitolia, Ptolemaic officer: 333n
 Nikomachos of Rhodes: 359-61, 485
 Nikomedes son of Aristandros of Kos: 72n, 87-88, 109, 110, 361-65, 367-68, 376, 385n, 479n, 485n, 486n, 497
 Nikophanes of Megalopolis: 237, 271, 276-79
 Nikophantos f. of Nikostratos of Kalymna: 381
 Nikostratos, Achaian general: 254, 292n
 Nikostratos of Philippi: 48n
 Nikostratos son of Demetrios of Chios: 402-403
 Nikostratos son of Nikophantos of Kalymna: 381
 Nikoxenos f. of Hagnonides of Athens: 70
 Oinis, ephor of Messene: 272
 Olympias, wife of Philip II: 55, 59, 73
 Olympias, mother of Nikomedes of Kos: 363
 Olympichos, general of Karia: 358-59, 492
 Olympichos of Oropos: 307n

- Olympiodoros of Athens: 95-96n, 105, 133-39, 143, 144n, 313n, 324n, 325, 471, 478, 500
 Olympiodoros son of Diotimos of Athens: 133n
 Omias of Sparta: 30n, 265-67
 Onomastos, Macedonian officer: 484n
 Opheltas of Boiotia: 321
 Orthagoras son of Pythilas of Argos: 224-26
 Ouliades son of Semokles of Samos: 385
 Oxythemis son of Hippostratos of Larisa, Antigonal officer: 96n, 111, 491n
 Oxythemis f. of Medeios of Larisa: 111
 Paithemidas of Gortyn: 462-64
 Paithemidas son of Sokydes of Crete: 463n
 Pampeirichos, Boiotian archon: 306
 Panaitolos of Aitolia, Ptolemaic officer: 333n
 Panamyas son of Theudotos of Kos: 373n
 Pancharidas of Abai: 326-27
 Panchares f. of Theodoros of Megara: 295, 302
 Pankles f. of Lamprias of Kytenion: 328
 Pantainos son of Sphodrios of Tenos: 424-25
 Pasiias son of Aristagoras of Kos: 376-80
 Pasikles, brother of the Cynic philosopher Krates: 319n
 Patroklos son of Patron, Ptolemaic officer: 397n, 427, 431n, 433, 459-61
 Patron f. of Patroklos: 397n, 427, 431n, 433, 459-61
 Paulus, Lucius Aemilius, Roman consul: 322
 Peisias f. of Memnon of Pellene: 292-93
 Peisis son of Charias of Thespiiai: 304n, 312-15, 324n, 474, 476, 478, 480n, 500
 Peithias, Athenian general: 126n
 Perdikkas, Macedonian general: 43-47, 111, 411n, 448, 471n
 Periandros son of Archias of Eresos: 406n
 Periandros f. of Aglanor of Eresos: 406
 Perigenes son of Patron, Ptolemaic officer: 459n
 Perseus, king of Macedonia: 339; Third Macedonian War: 322, 374-76; army, officers and court: 26n, 322-23; family: 252n; and Boiotia: 322-23; and Kos: 374-76
 Petraios, officer of Philip V: 265-67
 Phaidrias son of Teisis: 369
 Phaidros son of Kallias and f. of Thymochares of Athens: 74, 140n
 Phaidros son of Thymochares of Athens: 74-75, 105, 118n, 124n, 137-39, 140-45, 145-49, 159n, 175, 187, 475n, 476-77, 512
 Phaineas, Aitolian general: 336, 338n, 339, 341
 Phainias son of Archias of Eresos: 406n
 Phainis of Kos: 370-71
 Phaniias f. of Menippos of Macedonia: 430n
 Phanodemos or Phanodikos: 362n
 Phanodikos of Prokonnesos: 362n
 Phanodikos f. of Achaioi of Delos: 439
 Phanokles f. of Damasias of Eretria: 451-52
 Phanostratos (son of Demetrios?), Athenian archon: 173n, 179-80n, 515
 Phanostratos f. of Demetrios of Athens: 58, 173, 174
 Phegeus son of Sotion of Kytenion: 328-32
 Pheidostrate, daughter of Eteokles, priestess of Aglauros: 163n, 511n
 Pheidostratos, Athenian archon: 515
 Phila (I), wife of Poliorketes: 357, 441n; royal title and entourage: 80n, 169n, 366, 387-89; divine honours: 366-67n (Athens), 388 (Samos); and Kos: 80n, 365-68, 496; and Samos: 387-89, 496
 Phila (II), wife of Antigonos Gonatas: 388, 522
 Phila, daughter of Antipatros and wife of Krateros: 44n
 Philainetos of Thespiiai: 315-19
 Phileas f. of Nikeratos of Athens: 117, 160
 Philetairos of Tieion, founder of the Attalid dynasty: 307
 Philinos, founder of the empiricist medical school: 379
 Philinos of Kos (?): 376-80
 Philinos son of Aratidas of Kos (doctor?): 379-80
 Philinos son of Python of Kos: 380n
 Philip II: 31, 67, 152n, 153n, 503; army, officers and court: 23n; and Athens: 37, 40, 65; and Eretria: 449
 Philip III: 56, 71, 83n, 153n, 265n, 385n, 408, 411, 414n
 Philip IV: 153n, 156n
 Philip V: 316-17, 330; Social War: 244-45, 248, 271, 283-84, 287-88, 310, 326, 334n, 341-42; First Macedonian War: 201n, 328, 329-30n, 342n; war against Athens: 191n, 200, 202, 204-205; Second Macedonian War: 253-56, 321-22, 342-44, 349, 444; Antiochic War: 341; army, officers and court: 26n, 222n, 245-50, 252, 265-66, 286-87, 292, 304, 305n, 321-22, 327, 335, 358-59, 484n; and the

- Achaian *koinon*: 29n, 222n, 244-56, 285-93, 472-73, 476, 480, 482, 484, 497, 505n; and the Aegean: 380, 394n, 402; and Aitolia: 335, 339; and Akarnania: 341-44; and Athens: 188, 191-92; and Boiotia: 304-306, 310, 321-22; and Chios: 402-403; and Crete: 29n, 288-89, 463; and Elis: 249-50n, 283-84, 500; and Epirus: 30n, 349-50; and Karia: 358-59, 492; and Kos: 375, 376n; and Kyparissia: 246n, 274-75; and Messene: 246, 252, 271-74; and Mytilene: 404n; and Phokis: 326-27; and the Ptolemies: 310; and Rhodes: 358-59; and Sparta: 264-68, 480; and Thessaly: 347-48; and Thrace: 484n
- Philippides son of Philokles of Athens, comedy writer and courtier of king Lysimachos: 95, 97, 115, 116-25, 154, 155, 160, 256n, 478, 483, 485n, 486n, 493, 495
- Philippides son of Philomelos of Athens: 105, 113-15, 115-16, 118n, 128, 478, 493
- Philippos, Epirote general: 349n
- Philippos, *somatophylax* of Alexander IV (?): 80n, 83-84
- Philippos son of Alexandros of Akarnania: 335n
- Philippos (?) son of Menelaos, Antigonid officer: 80n, 84n
- Philippos son of Philippos of Kos, doctor: 371n
- Philippos f. of Kaphisophon of Kos, court doctor of Ptolemy III: 371, 372n
- Philokedes, Athenian general: 184, 515
- Philokles, king of Sidon, Ptolemaic officer: 225, 393n, 439
- Philokles, officer of Philip V: 222n
- Philokles f. of Philippides of Athens: 116
- Philokles, brother of Zenon, Ptolemaic officer: 143-44
- Philokrates, peace of: 503n
- Philomelos f. of Philippides of Athens: 113
- Philon I, Boiotian archon: 305n, 315n
- Philon II, Boiotian archon: 315n
- Philon of Chalkis: 445, 480
- Philon, archon of Thespiiai: 315n
- Philon son of Kastor, officer of Ptolemy V: 194n
- Philon son of Kleon of Erythrai, officer of Demetrios II (?): 300
- Philonautes (?) of Oropos: 310-11
- Philonautes son of Hermogenes of Oropos: 311
- Philonides of Laodikaia: 208n
- Philophron of Kos: 370-71
- Philophron son of Dardanos of Kos: 370n
- Philopoimen: 29n, 255n, 288-89n, 289-90, 291n, 350-51n, 471, 472, 526n
- Philostratos, Athenian archon: 179
- Philostratos son of Philostratos of Athens: 109, 110-12, 499
- Philostratos f. of Philostratos of Athens: 110
- Philotheos son of Philion, Athenian general: 515
- Philotheros son of Antiphanes of Malis, Ptolemaic officer: 428-29, 431n
- Philton of Arkadia: 279-80
- Phokinios of Megara: 301n
- Phokinios son of Eualkes of Megara: 295-302
- Phokion son of Phokos of Athens: 39n, 40n, 41-42, 44, 48, 48-49, 49-57, 58, 59n, 63, 66, 67n, 68-70, 71, 74, 77, 106, 146n, 314, 477, 479, 480, 483, 495, 499
- Phokos son of Phokion of Athens: 52
- Phokos f. of Phokion of Athens: 49
- Phormion son of Nymphaios of Byzantion, Ptolemaic officer: 308-309
- Phrasikydes of Ioulis: 433-34
- Phrynichos f. of Gorgos of Athens: 131
- Phthia, wife of Demetrios II: 441, 518, 522
- Pisis: see Peisis
- Pisis son of Kanas of Thespiiai: 315n
- Pleistarchos son of Antipatros, Macedonian general: 64n, 93, 211, 390, 393
- Pleistias son of Moschion of Kos: 368n, 384-85
- Podilos, officer of Olympichos: 358
- Polemaios of Klaros: 470n
- Polemaios, general of Antigonos I and of Kassandros: 62, 84, 85, 303-304, 312, 324n, 447, 507
- Polemon, Academic philosopher: 150-51
- Polos, actor: 388-89n
- Polyainetos of Megalopolis: 275
- Polyarchos f. of Damon of Eresos: 403
- Polychares son of Leochares of Samothrake: 415
- Polyeuktos son of Sostratos of Athens: 73-74, 502n
- Polyeuktos f. of Lysistrate of Athens: 522
- Polykleitos of Athens, Antigonid officer: 89
- Polykrateia of Argos, wife of Philip V: 222n, 252
- Polykrates son of Mnasiadas of Argos, Ptolemaic official: 191n, 225-26, 443
- Polynikos f. of Timokrite of Athens: 521

- Polyperchon, Macedonian general: 448-49; campaign in Asia (317?): 409-410; Third Diadochi War: 229-31; *diagramma*: 23n, 53n, 54, 303, 385n, 447; arbitration: 56, 71, 153n, 265n; and Athens: 53-60, 65, 69-72, 153n, 265n, 480; and Nesos: 410-12; and the Peloponnese: 229-31, 270, 275-76, 482
- Polyphontas of Sparta: 264-65, 267, 480
- Polytas son of Polyxenos of Kyttenion: 332n
- Polytas f. of Ainetos of Kyttenion: 328
- Poseidios of Ios: 420n, 421n
- Poseidippos son of Bakchios of Athens: 115-16, 493
- Poseidippos son of Kyniskos of Kassandreia, comedy writer: 116n
- Pratinas of Phlious, creator of satyric drama: 253, 254n
- Prepelaos, officer of Kassandros: 507
- Proteas f. of Mys of Eresos, officer of Demetrios II: 300
- Prothymos son of Zeuxis of Megara: 295-302
- Prytanis son of Astykleides of Karystos, Peripatetic philosopher: 194, 195-98, 278n, 481, 494, 495
- Ptolemaios Keraunos: 455n
- Ptolemaios son of king Lysimachos: 167n, 437n
- Ptolemaios son of king Pyrrhos: 212-13
- Ptolemies (in general): 19n, 23n, 25n, 26n, 32, 33, 83n, 84n, 169, 330, 371n; and Aitolia: 470n, 492-93; and Amorgos: 417-18n; and Argos: 225, 226n; and Crete: 460n, 461-62n; and Delos: 434-38; and Hydra: 524n; and Karia: 224-35; and Lesbos: 403-404; and Samos: 102n
- Ptolemy I Soter: Aegean campaign (308): 422; Peloponnesian campaign (308): 63, 232, 284n; royal title: 357-58; army, officers and court: 63-64, 85, 128, 137-38, 143, 146-50, 159, 420, 439, 480, 483, 507; divine honours: 168 (Athens), 166 (Olympia), 355-56 (Rhodes), 395 (Samos); donations: 143, 154-56 (Athens), 355-58 (Rhodes); and Andros: 425-26; and Athens: 62, 115, 122, 128-29, 137-39, 143-48, 150, 154, 159, 480, 493; and Delos: 439-40; and Eretria: 454-55; and the League of the Islanders: 378n, 419-20; and Kos: 361; and Rhodes: 355-58; and Sikyon: 232, 471
- Ptolemy II Philadelphos: 23n, 493; sea battle of: 370; army, officers and court: 64, 156, 162, 164, 165, 167n, 169-70, 171-72 (?), 393-96, 397n, 423, 427-29, 433-35, 437, 439, 454, 459, 534; donations: 149-50, 511 (Athens); and Andros: 425-26; and Athens: 120, 139n, 148-50, 162, 165-70, 171-72 (?), 480n, 483-84, 511, 516n; and Crete: 459-61; and Delos: 437-38; and the League of the Islanders: 378-79, 393n, 419-20, 423, 425, 427, 443, 532-33; and Kalymna: 381-82; and Keos: 427-29, 431n, 433-34; and Kos: 371n; and Kythnos: 427; and Lesbos: 403n; and Naxos: 419-20; and Samos: 392-400; and Sikyon: 232-33; and Sparta: 166, 257-59, 261, 480n
- Ptolemy III Euergetes: Third Syrian War: 527-28; assumption of royal title: 427; army, officers and court: 191n, 194, 259-62, 308n, 332-33, 371-73, 396n, 413-15; divine honours: 191-93, 199 (Athens), 400-401 (Samos); donations: 235, 236n, 243n, 260n, 524, 529-30 (Achaian *koinon*), 199 (Athens), 377 (?) (Kos), 238-40, 252n, 260 (Sparta); and the Achaian *koinon*: 234-36, 238-39, 470, 497, 523-32; and Aitolia: 332-33, 474; and Arkadia: 279-80; and Athens: 165-66, 189-94, 199; and Crete: 460n, 464-65; and Kalymna: 381-82; and Kos: 370-73, 376-80 (?); and Samos: 393, 399-401; and Samothrake: 413-15; and Sparta: 238-39, 252n, 259-62, 280; and Thespiiai: 317; and Thrace: 403-404n, 413-15
- Ptolemy IV Philopator: mediation to end the Social War: 200n, 287-88, 309-310; mediation to end the First Macedonian War: 310, 402-403; army, officers and court: 225-26, 261-62, 308-309, 311, 317, 333, 337, 347n, 359, 443; divine honours: 406-408 (Lesbos); donations: 309-310, 315-19 (Boiotia), 328-32 (Doris), 377 (?) (Kos); and the Achaian *koinon*: 287-88; and Athens: 201 (?), 202-204; and Boiotia: 307n, 308-309, 311, 315-19, 323; and Chios: 402-403; and Doris: 329-32; and Kos: 376-80 (?); and Lesbos: 403-408; and Rhodes: 358-61; and Samos: 393n, 401, 402n; and Sparta: 261; and Xanthos: 331-32
- Ptolemy V Epiphanes: army, officers and court: 194n, 204, 350, 356n, 443; divine honours:

- 406-408 (Lesbos), 361 (Rhodes), 401-402 (Samos); donations: 401-402 (Samos); and Athens: 201 (?), 208n; and Boiotia: 307n; and Delos: 443; and Epirus: 350-51; and Kalymna: 380-81; and Kos: 380; and Lesbos: 406-408; and Rhodes: 361; and Samos: 393-94n, 401-402
- Ptolemy the Son: 396, 397n
- Pyrrhos, king of the Epirotes: against Poliorketes: 137-38, 143, 148, 152, 471; king of the Macedonians: 157; against Antigonos Gonatas: 169, 212-15, 257; and Argos: 212-15, 471; and Athens: 122, 147; and Elis: 280-81; and Sparta: 30n
- Pyrrhos son of Diokleidas, general of Megara: 302n, 415-16, 481
- Pythagoras f. of Molpos of Samos: 387
- Pytheas of Athens: 67
- Pytheas f. of Kleochares of Amphipolis: 450
- Pythilas son of Orthagoras of Athens: 225
- Pythilas f. of Orthagoras of Argos: 224
- Rheximachos f. of Archelaos of Athens: 449
- Seleukos I: Third Diadochi War: 507; against Poliorketes: 122, 227-29; army, officers and court: 99n; and Athens: 123n, 161; and Kos: 364; and Troizen: 227-29
- Seleukos II: 531n; Third Syrian War: 528; army, officers and court: 358-59, 372n, 436n; and Karia: 358; and Smyrna: 22n
- Seleukos III: 372n
- Seleukos IV: and Phokaia: 42-43n
- Semokles f. of Ouliades of Samos: 385
- Sempronius, Roman proconsul: 349n
- Simos of Kos: 384n
- Simos f. of Glaukon of Kythnos: 427
- Skopas, Aitolian general and Ptolemaic officer: 337
- Skyron, Messenian ephor: 272n
- Skythos f. of Amphidokos of Samos: 387
- Smendron of Kos: see Zmendron
- Soandros son of Sokrates of Oropos: 310-11n
- Sokrates (?) son of Soandros of Oropos: 310-11n
- Solon of Plataia: 56, 58, 69, 70
- Solon son of Straton of Bargylia, Antigonid officer: 99, 102
- Somenes of Ioulis: 433-34
- Sonikos, officer of Polyperchon: 72
- Sophokles son of Amphikleides: 139, 153
- Sosibios son of Dioskourides, Ptolemaic officer: 308-309, 311, 359
- Sosinikos son of Isonikos of Karthaia: 428-29
- Sosippos of Aitolia: 332-33, 474
- Sosistratos, Athenian archon: 179n
- Sosistratos, officer of Antigonos Doson: 416, 419
- Sostratos son of Dexiphanes of Knidos, Ptolemaic officer: 138, 147, 150
- Sostratos f. of Polyeuktos of Athens: 73
- Soter f. of Dionysodoros of Oropos: 307
- Sotimos of Abai: 326-27
- Sotimos son of Dositheos of Kyrene, Antigonid officer: 99-101
- Sotion f. of Phegeus of Kytenion: 328
- Spartokos, king of Bosphoros: 32n, 122
- Sphodrias f. of Pantainos of Tenos: 424
- Spintharos of Oropos, priest of Amphiaraios: 304, 304-305n, 307n
- Spintharos, Macedonian officer: 157n
- Stasilas son of Lykophron of Kos: 380
- Sthenelaos of Sparta: 264-65
- Stilbos f. of Elpinikos of Eretria: 446
- Stilpon of Megara, philosopher: 152, 453
- Stratokles, Athenian general: 78n
- Stratokles, Athenian orator: 78n
- Stratokles son of Euthydemos of Athens: 48n, 78-106, 107-114, 116-21, 125-26n, 129, 153-54, 162, 173, 301n, 366, 469, 472, 474, 479, 489, 491, 497, 499, 500
- Straton, Delphic archon: 281n
- Straton, Oropian archon: 306n
- Straton, Peripatetic philosopher: 139n, 169
- Straton son of Straton, Ptolemaic officer: 397n
- Straton f. of Drakon of Kos: 386
- Straton f. of Solon of Bargylia: 99
- Stratonike I, wife of Antigonos I: 368
- Stratonike II, daughter of Demetrios I, wife of Seleukos I and Antiochos I: 227-29, 368n, 496
- Strombichos, Macedonian officer: 137
- Synonymos son of Theaios of Delos: 442-43
- Tachyllos f. of Ameinokles of Athens: 183
- Taurion, general of Philip V: 248, 250, 285
- Tauron son of Machatas, Macedonian officer: 446
- Teison f. of Kallikles of Rhodes: 355
- Telemnestos (II) son of Aristeides (III) of Delos: 434n

- Telesarchides f. of Mnesalkos of Delos: 439-40
 Teleson f. of Kynthiades (?) of Delos: 440
 Telesphoros, Antigonid general: 75, 270, 276
 Thales, adopted son of Euelthon, natural son of Herakleides, of Samos: 401-402
 Tharsynon son of Choirylos of Delos: 438-39
 Tharsyphas of Apollonia in Crete: 464
 Theaios f. of Synonymos of Delos: 442
 Theodoros son of Panchares of Megara: 295-302
 Theodektes (?) son of Hyblesios of Samos: 386
 Theodotos of Aitolia, Ptolemaic officer: 333n
 Theogenes son of Theokles of Myndos, Ptolemaic officer (?): 224-26
 Theognetos son of Theoxenos of Troizen: 226-29
 Theokles son of Theogenes of Myndos: 224-25
 Theokles f. of Theogenes of Myndos: 224
 Theophilos son of Theotimides, Antigonid officer: 382
 Theophrastos of Athens: 199-200, 477n, 518n
 Theophrastos of Eresos, Peripatetic philosopher: 70n, 105, 136, 139-40, 153, 391, 495
 Theotelides of Karthaia (?): 429-32
 Theotimides son of Theophilos: 382
 Theoxenos f. of Theognetos of Troizen: 226
 Thersilochos, Athenian archon: 110n, 515
 Thersippos of Nesos, officer of Alexander III: 408-413, 473, 478, 485n, 494
 Theudotos son of Panamyas of Kos: 373n
 Theupropos f. of Aspasios of Samos: 389
 Thion f. of Eudikos of Orchomenos: 311
 Thoas son of Alexandros of Trichonion, Aitolian general: 207, 334-38, 339, 340, 348, 470n, 477, 480
 Thoinias of Sikyon, sculptor: 253, 254n
 Thoukritos son of Alkimachos, Athenian general: 195, 198-99, 494, 515, 518
 Thraseas son of Aetos of Aspendos, Ptolemaic officer: 191n
 Thraseas son of Balagros, Macedonian officer: 438-39
 Thrason son of Thrason of Athens: 172-73
 Thrason son of Thrasonides of Athens: 173n
 Thrason f. of Thrason of Athens: 172
 Thrasyboulos of Elis: 280-81, 282n, 479
 Thrasyboulos son of Aineias of Elis: 280, 281n
 Thrasyboulos f. of Agathinos: 280
 Thrasykles, Ptolemaic officer: 420-21n
 Thrasykles son of Nausikrates of Athens: 76-78
 Thrasyllus, Cynic philosopher: 152n
 Thrasyphon son of Hierokleides of Athens: 522, 523
 Thyestes of Sparta: 264-65
 Thymochares son of Demochares of Athens: 145n
 Thymochares son of Kallias: 74n, 145n,
 Thymochares I son of Phaidros of Athens: 74-76, 140, 144n, 145, 439, 475n, 476, 511-12
 Thymochares II son of Phaidros, Athenian archon: 141n, 145n, 515
 Thyon of Samos: 400-401
 Timaratos f. of Anaxipolis of Rhodes: 355
 Timarchos, tyrant of Miletos: 393n, 396, 397n, 399n
 Timasistratos f. of Epikrates of Rhodes: 358
 Timasitheos son of Dionysios of Rhodes: 358-59, 477
 Timippos of Eretria: 450-51
 Timokleidas of Sikyon: 230-31, 231-32
 Timokleidas son of Theutimos of Sikyon: 231n
 Timokles son of Menekrates of Athens: 204-206
 Timokrates f. of Hieron of Syracuse: 427, 431n
 Timokrite, daughter of Polynikos of Athens: 521
 Timon son of Agathon of Megara: 295-302
 Timosthenes son of Demophanes of Karystos: 197, 201n
 Timostratos of Ioulis: 433-34
 Timotheos son of Demainetos of Samos: 402
 Timotheos son of Lysanias of Macedonia, Antigonid officer: 446-48
 Timotheos f. of Konon of Athens: 54, 58, 68
 Timoxenos, Achaian general: 223n, 244n, 285-86
 Tinnis of Samos, daughter of Dionysodoros: 395
 Tlesidamas of Ios: 421n
 Tragiskos: 220
 Triax, Boiotian archon: 303n
 Xa[nthippos?] of Kos: 373
 Xanthippos son of Ampharetos of Elateia: 323-26, 477n, 479
 Xeinis f. of Xenokles of Athens: 107
 Xenokles son of Xeinis of Sphettos: 87, 88, 107-109, 118n, 124n, 470n, 502n
 Xenokrates son of Agathenor of Chalkedon: 41, 50, 65-67, 495
 Xenon, tyrant of Hermione: 221
 Xerxes I: 435

- Zenon of Demetrias: 348
 Zenon of Kition, Stoic philosopher: 152, 157-58, 163, 166n, 172-73
 Zenon, Ptolemaic officer: 143, 159, 415n, 420, 421n
 Zenon son of Menekrates of Athens: 206
 Zenon f. of Asklepiades of Athens: 201
 Zeuxis, Akarnanian general: 343
 Zeuxis, officer of Antiochos III: 330
 Zeuxis f. of Prothymos of Megara: 295
 Ziailas, king of Bithynia: 32n
 Zmendron (I) f. of Aristolochos of Kos: 368, 374-75, 471
 Zmendron (II) son of Diomedon (I) of Kos: 374-75, 376n
 Zoilos of Cyprus, craftsman in the Antigonid army: 301n
 Zoilos son of Kelainos: 300, 301n
 Zoilos f. of Epikouros of Samos: 384
 Zoilos f. of Myllesas (?), officer of Alexander III: 446-47n
 Teles[---] of Kimolos: 426
 [---]damas f. of [---] of Ios: 421
 [---]elochos of Apollonia: 73
 [---]machos of Xypete (Athens): 182-83
 [---]mnestos of Oinoe (Athens): 107n
 [. . .]otimos, Antigonid officer: 84-85
 [---]tratos, officer of Antigonos Gonatas: 181

2. INDEX OF TOPONYMS AND ETHNICS

Demes are indexed only if discussed in detail, or in the case of a deme decree

- Abydos: 196n, 290n; sea battle of: 39n
 Achaia, Achaians, Achaian *koinon*: 22n, 29n, 91n, 94n, 178n, 189-90, 192, 195, 207, 217-24, 233-56, 260-62, 268, 272-73, 274-75, 280, 284-85, 285-93, 297-99, 305-307, 321n, 342, 350-51n, 353n, 369n, 465n, 520, 523-32
 Acrocorinth: 91n, 236n, 238-41, 244, 251
 Adramyttion: 408
 Aigeira: 369n
 Aigina: 128, 203, 236n, 256n
 Aigosthena: 296, 300, 300n, 301n
 Ainos: 99, 413n
 Aiolis: 361-62n, 363, 386
 Aitolia, Aitolians, Aitolian *koinon*: 22n, 31, 32-33n, 130, 133, 192, 200, 201-203, 206-207, 223, 236-38, 241n, 244, 247n, 248, 249-50n, 251n, 256, 262n, 264-68, 271-74, 283-85, 286n, 288-89, 310, 313n, 320n, 322, 324n, 326n, 328-47, 347-53, 359n, 402-403, 404n, 441, 444, 454n, 470n, 474, 477-78, 492-93
 Aixone (Attic deme): 60
 Akanthos: 417n
 Akarnania, Akarnanians: 271, 335, 341-47
 Alabanda: 208n, 329n
 Alexandria Troas: 192n, 205n, 361-62n, 451n
 Alexandria, Alexandrians: 64, 144, 148, 166, 191n, 201, 233-35, 240n, 257n, 261-62, 266n, 279, 287, 308, 309, 311, 316n, 323, 329, 332n, 333n, 357, 358, 360n, 370, 372, 379-80, 396, 401, 402, 403n, 413, 419-20, 425, 427, 443, 454n, 459n, 464-65, 480, 510, 523-34
 Alipheira (Arkadia): 280n
 Amaxitos (Troas): 361-62n
 Amorgos: 302n, 415-19, 481
 Amphipolis: 322, 326n, 369, 373n, 448, 450
 Andros: 146, 419n, 425-26, 427n, 524, 529n; sea battle of: 216n, 525, 528, 532
 Antigoneia Troas: 451; see also *Alexandria Troas*
 Antigoneia, new name of Mantinea: 245
 Antiocheia (Karia): see *Alabanta*
 Antissa (Lesbos): 404n
 Apameia, treaty of: 346, 445
 Apollonia (Crete): 464-65
 Apollonia (Illyria): 73, 203, 351
 Argos, Argives: 91n, 94n, 191n, 209-226, 236n, 238, 244n, 245, 276, 282, 285n, 327n, 364n, 443, 449n, 471, 475, 479, 482, 499n, 530n
 Arkadia: 91n, 163, 214, 223, 258, 275-80, 386
 Arkesine (Amorgos): 415-19
 Arsinoe (Keos): see *Korhesia*
 Aspendos: 191n
 Assos: 361-62n
 Astakos: 345n
 Astypalaia: 370n
 Athamania: 349n
 Athenaion (Arkadia): 268-69

- Athens, Athenians, Attica: 27-28n, 29, 31, 32n, 37-208, 209-212, 215-17, 225-26, 233n, 236n, 238, 241n, 256n, 257n, 258, 265n, 269, 276, 292, 296n, 297, 301, 303, 308, 310, 312n, 313n, 314, 319, 324n, 336, 356n, 361n, 362, 363n, 364n, 366, 379n, 382, 384n, 385, 389n, 394n, 397-98, 402, 409n, 420n, 421n, 424-26, 431n, 438n, 439, 443n, 446n, 453, 457-59, 469-505 (*passim*), 507-523
- Babylon: 330; settlement of: 303
- Babylonia: 330
- Bargylia: 99
- Barka (Cyrenaica): 224
- Beroia: 67, 76, 182n, 369n, 446, 446-47n
- Bithynia: 32n
- Boiotia, Boiotians, Boiotian *koinon*: 29, 64n, 85n, 127, 130, 133n, 152, 154, 165, 166n, 189n, 192, 195, 224, 263, 270n, 292n, 296-301, 303-323, 324n, 325, 326n, 328, 343, 344n, 364n, 447n, 455n
- Bosporos: 32n, 122
- Byzantion: 106-107n, 112-13n, 248, 305n, 308, 364n, 491n
- Carthage: 240n
- Chaironeia: 219; battle of: 37-38, 40, 49, 52n, 78n, 95n, 114n, 471
- Chalkedon: 41, 65
- Chalkis: 85, 207-207, 284, 290, 304, 324n, 336, 348, 351, 442, 444-45, 450n, 452, 471, 488, 491n, 528, 532
- Chersonesos: 414
- Chios, Chians: 200n, 248, 362n, 363, 402-403; sea battle of: 253, 361-62n
- Corinth, Corinthians: 56, 63n, 69-70, 91n, 92, 94n, 183n, 200n, 215-18, 234, 236n, 238, 239, 241, 246, 250, 276, 290, 292, 296, 422n, 444n, 520n, 524-25, 527-29, 532; League of: 23n, 91-95, 100, 450; battle of: 321-22n, 344
- Crete, Cretans: 29n, 173n, 202, 203, 284, 288-89n, 290, 327n, 359, 418n, 459-65; Cretan War: 377n
- Cyclades: 104, 415-34, 440n, 533
- Cyprus, Cypriots: 33n, 74, 133n, 148, 226, 301n, 350, 377, 403n, 410-11, 453, 498
- Delos, Delians: 62, 74n, 145, 216n, 231n, 304, 308, 329n, 368n, 371n, 374-75, 417, 420-21, 425, 428, 434-43, 532-34
- Delphi, Delphic Amphictiony: 32-33n, 130, 163, 208n, 210n, 213n, 230-31, 270, 271n, 281n, 283, 299n, 301-302, 308, 312, 317n, 324, 328-29, 332-33, 334-35, 364n, 427, 449n
- Demetrias: 206, 336, 347-48, 369n, 416n, 444
- Diomeia (Attic deme): 78, 301n
- Dodona: 349n, 350
- Doris, Dorians, Dorian *koinon*: 283, 320n, 328-32
- Dyme, Dymaians: 222n, 229, 284, 287
- Egypt: 20, 86n, 216-17n, 225n, 234, 248n, 262n, 360n
- Elaia (Aiolis): 386
- Elateia: 56n, 306, 310n, 323-26, 479
- Eleusis (Attic deme), Eleusinians, Eleusinian district: 95-96n, 108n, 113n, 124, 133, 135, 154, 155, 156-57n, 164n, 170, 174, 176, 183, 184, 186, 199, 200, 201, 297, 513-23
- Eleutherna: 463
- Elis, Eleia, Eleians: 91n, 94n, 249-50n, 258, 280-85, 286n, 288, 289n, 369n, 453, 472, 479, 500
- Eordaia: 448
- Ephesos, Ephesians: 99n, 104, 191n, 359, 361-62n, 362n, 366, 398, 399, 445; sea battle of: 164
- Epidamnos: 73
- Epidauros: 91n, 94n, 99, 236n, 238, 320n
- Epirus, Epirotes, Epirote *koinon*: 30n, 33, 73, 342, 349-53
- Eresos, Eresians: 139, 298n, 300, 403-408
- Eretria, Eretrians: 28n, 62, 85n, 178, 180n, 184-85, 435, 446-56, 480, 500, 519
- Erythrai, Erythraians: 89, 298n, 300, 361-62n, 363
- Euboea, Euboians, Euboian *koinon*: 75, 85n, 183n, 185-86, 347, 426, 444-58, 524, 529
- Euripos: 84, 444
- Euromos (Karia): 245n
- Gaudos: 459n
- Geraistos in Karystos: 426n
- Gonnoi: 369n
- Gortyn: 29n, 256, 461n, 462-64, 465; Alliance of: 461n, 462
- Gryneion (Aiolis): 361-62n, 362n
- Gyrton (Perrhaibia): 327n
- Halasarna (Kos): 363n, 376
- Haliartos: 504
- Halikarnassos: 145n, 149, 227, 397n, 402n, 534n
- Hekatombaion (Achaia), battle of: 238, 239, 242n

- Helikon: 316
 Hellespont: 103n, 259-60, 387n, 403-404n, 411n,
 413; sea battle of (Lamian War): 100n
 Heraia: 291
 Heraion: 236n
 Herakleia (Aitolia): 336, 338, 339
 Herakleia (Lesbos): 161
 Herakleia (Pontos): 39n
 Herakleia (at Latmos or in Pontos): 493n
 Hermione: 221, 236n, 238, 293n, 417n, 463n, 465
 Hiera Nesos (Arsinoites): 370
 Hierapytna: 463
 Histiaia: 452
 Homolion: 369n
 Hydra: 524
 Hypata: 339
 Iasos, Iasians: 145n, 358-59, 384n
 Illyria: 246n, 248, 349
 Imbros: 79, 88-89, 153
 Ionia, Ionians: 82, 361-62n, 363, 382n, 387
 Ios: 159n, 415n, 419n, 420-23
 Ioulis (Keos): 427n, 429, 432n, 433-34
 Ipsos, battle of: 64n, 102, 103, 105, 106, 111,
 114n, 115, 117, 118, 119n, 120, 121-22, 125-
 26n, 128, 137, 161, 210n, 211, 231n, 296n,
 312-13, 367, 381, 386, 389, 390, 391, 450n,
 451n, 474, 478
 Islanders, League of: 23n, 62n, 350-51n, 361n,
 393n, 419-27, 438, 439, 443, 532, 534
 Itanos: 459-61, 479
 Ithome: 436n
 Kalchedon: 364n
 Kallipolis (Aitolia): 332n, 470n
 Kalymna, Kalymnians: 367n, 374, 380, 381-82
 Kaphyai (Arkadia): 280; battle of: 244
 Kardia: 313, 383-84n, 384n
 Karia: 145n, 150, 178n, 195, 208n, 224, 227-28,
 229n, 245n, 260, 320, 329, 356n, 358, 374-75,
 388n, 390, 396-97, 401, 492, 507-509, 524
 Karthaia (Keos): 427-32, 433n
 Karystos: 62, 195, 197, 198, 201n, 278n, 426,
 431, 446n, 450n, 457-58
 Kassandreia, Kassandreians: 116n, 282n, 305,
 369
 Kaunos (Karia): 388n, 402n
 Kenchreai: 222
 Keos: 335n, 417n, 427-34, 459n
 Kephallenia: 271, 341, 345
 Kephisia (Attic deme): 187n
 Kerkyra: 343
 Kilikia: 150n, 364n, 367, 387-88, 390
 Kimolos: 417n, 426, 431-32n
 Klaros: 470n
 Klazomenai: 361-62n
 Kleonai: 220, 236n, 238
 Knidos, Knidians: 147, 367n
 Knosos: 463, 465; Alliance of: 463n
 Korhesia/Arsinoe (Keos): 427-28, 431n, 433
 Kos, Koans: 32n, 72n, 80n, 87-88, 109, 110, 361-
 80, 381, 384, 385n, 386, 388-89, 419, 434n,
 471, 475, 479n, 497, 500; battle of: 197n,
 441, 470
 Kouroupedion, battle of: 123n, 161, 225
 Krannon, battle of: 37, 38, 41
 Kretaieis, *koinon* of: 23n, 460-61n, 463, 465n
 Kynos Kephalai, battle of: 292, 321, 323, 326n,
 327n, 335n, 343, 344n, 444
 Kyparissia: 246n, 274-75
 Kyrene: 214n, 225, 278n, 389, 461n
 Kytenion, Kytenians: 328-32, 334n, 350-51n
 Kythnos: 61, 74-75, 425n, 427
 Kyzikos: 99, 100n, 131, 364n, 423, 532-34
 Lakonia: 244n, 257, 264n, 265, 266, 268
 Lamia: 336, 339, 340n; Lamian War: 31, 39n, 43,
 46, 48n, 49, 57, 66, 67, 74, 77n, 78, 95n,
 100n, 270, 275, 446-48, 452
 Lampsakos, Lampsakenes: 89n, 107n, 112n,
 131, 140, 364n, 366n, 397n, 450, 491n
 Lamptraia (Attic deme): 164n
 Laodikeia: 208n
 Larisa: 96n, 111, 326n
 Larymna: 320-23, 328n, 482
 Lebedos: 365
 Lechaion: 236n
 Lemnos: 61-62, 74, 76, 79n, 88-89, 107, 123, 153,
 160-61, 361n, 362n, 507-509
 Lesbos, Lesbians: 403-408, 410
 Leukas: 246n, 342, 343, 345
 Leukonoion (Attic deme): 145n
 Lilaia (Phokis): 329n
 Lindos: 355-56
 Lokris: 180, 320, 532n
 Lydia: 150, 228
 Lykia: 328, 357, 366, 387
 Lynkos: 411
 Lysimacheia: 122, 155; battle of: 177

- Lyttos: 340n, 461-62, 463n
 Macedonia (only references pertaining to domestic issues of the Macedonian state or to the Macedonian Wars are indexed): 19n, 25n, 26n, 31, 32-33, 37n, 38n 52n, 111-12, 156-57, 200, 369n, 409n, 484, 504-505; First Macedonian War: 30n, 31, 255, 288-89n, 310, 326-27, 329n, 342n, 349, 350-51n, 352, 402-403; Second Macedonian War: 30n, 202-203, 244-50, 289-93, 310, 334, 342, 348, 349-52, 444; Third Macedonian War: 31, 321-22, 323, 339n, 374-75
 Magnesia by Sipylon, battle of: 32, 338
 Magnesia on the Meander: 317n, 330n
 Magnesia, Magnetes (Thessaly): 347-48
 Malis: 428
 Mantinea, Mantineians: 219, 236n, 245, 280, 281n, 436n
 Maroneia: 415, 484n
 Medeon (Akarnania): 345-46
 Megalopolis: 198, 221, 222n, 236n, 237, 240, 242, 243, 244, 245n, 268, 272n, 275-79, 280, 481
 Megara, Megarians, Megaris: 67, 78n, 152, 236, 244n, 295-302, 321n, 369n, 415-16, 452-53, 474-75, 478, 481
 Mesopotamia: 303
 Messene, Messenia, Messenians: 91n, 94n, 245, 246, 252, 262n, 269-74, 275, 276, 288-89n, 341, 369n, 409n, 436n, 477
 Methana: 524
 Methymna: 33, 403n, 404
 Miletos: 63, 308n, 317n, 361-62n, 393n, 396, 397n, 399n, 462n, 463n, 465, 491n, 507, 509
 Minoa (Amorgos): 415-19
 Mogla (Kalymnian fort?): 381n
 Mounychia, fort of: 41, 44, 50, 52, 54, 55, 59, 63, 71, 78, 130, 132, 134, 138, 177n, 507, 514, 520n
 Mycenae: 215, 254
 Mylasa (Karia): 356n
 Myndos (Karia): 224, 227, 402n, 496
 Myrina (Lemnos): 161
 Mytilene: 404
 Naupaktos: 248, 334
 Nauplia: 213
 Naxos: 378, 416n, 419-20, 427n
 Nemea: 224, 449n
 Nesos: 408-413
 Nikaia (Lokris): 180, 253, 292, 321
 Nisyros: 379-80
 Olous: 459n, 463n
 Olympia: 163n, 165, 166, 169, 258, 260, 271, 280, 283, 391, 396n
 Opous (Lokris): 312, 320, 324n, 328
 Orchomenos (Arkadia): 91n, 163, 236n, 245, 258, 276, 280, 291, 309
 Orchomenos (Boiotia): 309, 311, 323, 327
 Oreos (Euboia): 61, 62, 74-75, 290, 452
 Oropos, Oropians: 62, 90, 93, 95, 303-311, 312, 313n, 442n, 453, 456
 Otryne, Attic deme: 176
 Pagai: 296n, 298n
 Paionia: 32n, 122
 Pallantion: 327n, 449n
 Panakton, fort of: 28n, 90, 93, 95, 170n, 184, 199, 200n, 513-14, 518-19
 Panormos (Achaia): 248n
 Parion (Troas): 406n, 407
 Paros: 423-24; Parian Chronicle: 91n, 103n, 120n
 Parthenion, Mt: 265
 Patara (Lykia): 357
 Pella: 46n, 369n, 421n, 448, 456, 480, 504
 Pellene: 221, 236, 238, 292-93
 Peloponnese: 63, 70n, 91, 93, 97, 127, 129, 132n, 166, 180n, 209-293, 350-51n, 369, 422n, 435, 436n, 471, 472n, 481, 484, 489, 497, 525, 527, 530n, 532
 Penteleion: 221, 238
 Pergamon: 204-206, 305, 307, 317n
 Perge: 308n
 Perinthos: 122, 155, 159
 Perrhaibia: 327n
 Persis: 330
 Phalara: 310n, 339
 Pharai (Achaia): 286, 288
 Pheneos: 221, 238
 Philippi: 48n, 369
 Phlious, Phliasians: 221, 236n, 238, 253
 Phoinike (Epirus): 349n; treaty of: 306-307n, 310, 326, 342n, 349n
 Phokaia: 42-43n, 361-62n, 362n
 Phokis, Phokians, Phokian *koinon*: 56, 70, 305-307, 320n, 323-27, 328, 329n
 Phrygia: 387n, 411n
 Phylakia, battle of: 178n

- Phyle (Attic deme), fort of: 90, 93, 95, 170n, 199, 200n, 513
- Piraeus: 48n, 54-63, 67, 71n, 73, 78, 85n, 122-30, 133-35, 147n, 153, 155-58, 177-79, 182, 188, 192n, 197n, 207, 211, 456, 513-14, 517, 520-21
- Pitane: 192n, 205n
- Plataiai: 56, 69, 165-66, 366
- Pogla (Pisidia): 381n
- Polyrrhenia: 465
- Praisos (Crete): 173n
- Priene: 82, 361-62n, 391-92n
- Prokonnesos: 361-62n
- Propontis: 59
- Pteleos (Thessaly): 348
- Pydna: 369n, 509n; battle of: 322
- Pyrgos (Eleia): 288
- Pyrrha (Lesbos): 404n
- Raphia, battle of: 225-26, 347n, 461n
- Rhamnous, Attic deme: 28n, 29n, 85n, 89n, 112, 113n, 170n, 176, 178, 181, 183-86, 187, 451n, 471, 488, 513-21
- Rhodes, Rhodians: 22n, 32n, 90, 133, 163, 164, 181, 200n, 202, 203, 205, 248, 290, 292, 301n, 327n, 328n, 329, 350-51n, 352n, 355-61, 364n, 374n, 375, 380, 381, 387, 402, 485n, 491-93
- Rome, Romans: 26n, 31-32, 42-43n, 79n, 191, 196, 202-208, 222, 228, 240n, 253, 255, 274, 277, 285, 289-93, 307, 321-22, 327n, 328n, 334-53, 376, 444-45, 470, 480, 482, 499
- Salamis (Cyprus), sea battle of: 59n, 79n, 89n, 90, 111n, 357, 384
- Salamis, Salaminians (Saronic Gulf): 90, 177-79, 182, 513-14, 520n
- Samos, Samians: 43-44, 46, 48, 54n, 61, 74-76, 102, 110n, 167n, 225, 258, 361-62n, 363, 365n, 366, 367n, 370n, 382-402, 434n, 485n, 490, 497-98, 509
- Samothrake: 413-15
- Sardeis: 228n, 359, 398-99
- Saronic Gulf: 418, 425n
- Seleukeia (Kilikia): 192n, 364n, 372n, 491n
- Selge (Pisidia): 279, 500-501
- Sellasia, battle of: 29n, 198n, 244n, 246n, 260-61, 263-64, 276-77, 306n, 321, 417n
- Sicily: 103, 257
- Sidon: 439, 225
- Sikyon: 63n, 71, 91n, 94n, 188, 215n, 216, 219, 229-56, 278n, 285, 292, 422n, 475, 497, 500, 523-32
- Sinope: 80n, 365
- Smyrna: 22n, 32n
- Sounion, Attic deme: 170n, 177n, 513-14, 520n
- Sparta, Spartans: 30n, 33n, 114n, 132n, 163n, 164n, 166, 168-69, 206, 212, 213, 221, 223, 236-38, 242, 247n, 254, 255n, 256-69, 271-74, 279-80, 288-90, 313, 321, 335-36, 341, 348, 369n, 413, 435-36, 444, 465, 479-81, 500, 503, 531n
- Stratos (Aitolia): 345
- Syracuse: 431n, 427
- Syria: 86; First Syrian War: 461n; Second Syrian War: 164n, 361n, 398, 432, 432-33n; Third Syrian War: 22n, 403-404n, 413, 527-28
- Tanagra: 308-309n, 311, 323
- Taras: 327n
- Tegea: 214n, 212n, 247, 265, 280, 350-51n
- Tenos, Tenians: 82n, 308, 424-25, 443
- Teos, Teians: 196n, 228, 365
- Thebes (Phthiotic): 310n, 369
- Thebes, Thebans: 41, 63, 64n, 67, 150-52, 270, 304n, 312-13, 315, 319-23, 475, 480, 503
- Thelphousa: 369n
- Thera: 33, 308-309n, 381, 433-34, 443, 459n
- Therme (Lesbos): 410
- Thermon (Aitolia): 332-33, 334n, 341, 474, 492
- Thermopylai: 324n; battle of (Antiochic War): 285n, 336, 347-48, 444
- Thespiiai, Thespians: 304, 307, 309, 312-19, 323, 324n, 474, 478, 480n, 500
- Thessalonike: 440-42
- Thessaly, Thessalians: 19, 33, 91, 94n, 266n, 271, 320n, 325, 327n, 328, 336, 347-48, 369, 370n
- Thrace: 52, 164-65n, 259-60, 313, 404n, 413-15, 484
- Thria, Attic deme: 366-67n, 77n, 107n
- Thyrraeion (Akarnania): 345-46
- Trichonion (Aitolia): 334, 339
- Triparadeisos, conference of: 46n, 74n, 382, 411
- Triphylia: 268, 291
- Troas: 192n, 205n, 361-62n, 363, 407, 435, 451
- Troizen, Troizenians: 91n, 94n, 226-29, 236n, 238, 465, 496
- Tyre, declaration of: 62
- Xanthos (Lykia), Xanthians: 328-31

3. GREEK AND LATIN INDEX

Only terms discussed are indexed.

- ἀγών: ἱερὸς ἀγών / καθιερωμένος ἀγών: 318n
 ἀκροῶμαι: 269n
 ἀνασφάζω: 100n, 134-35, 378n
 ἀρχαί: 130n, 132n, 174n
 αὐλικός: 25-26n
 δεῖπνον: 195n
 διατρίβων: 409n
 δικαστήριον: 377
 δωρεάν: 366n, 530n
 ἔκκλητος: ἔκκλητον δικαστήριον (?), ἔκκλητος
 δίκη, ἔκκλητος πόλις, ἔκκλητοι δικασταί
 (?): 377
 ἐμβιβάζω (εἰς τὸν πόλεμον): 352n
 ἐπιμελητής: 276
 ἐπιστατεία: 405-406
 ἐταῖρος: 38n
 εὐνοια: 102, 109, 113n, 116n, 165, 169-70, 191n,
 204n, 210n, 258, 317-19, 340, 359, 435-37,
 488-89
 ἱερός: see ἀγών
 καθιερωμένος: see ἀγών
 καθίστημι: 515-16, 518
 καταχωρίζω: 122-23n
 κοσμητήρες: 459n
 κόσμος: 459n
 κρίσις: 405-406
 μειράκιον: 526n
 νεανίσκος: 526n
 ξένια: 195n
 πάππος: 209-210
 πατήρ: 209-210; court title: 246n, 359n
 πατρικός: πατρική εὐνοια, πατρική φιλοτιμία:
 210n; πατρικός ξένος: 232, 237n, 279n
 πατρῶος ξένος: 232
 πίστις: 240n
 πολιτεία: 378
 πολιτεύομαι: 459-60
 προβούλευσις: 300n
 προγονικός: 210n
 προεμβιβάζω (εἰς τὸν πόλεμον): 352n
 προθυμία: 340
 πρωτόκοσμος: 459n
 συγγενής: court title: 246, 359n
 συμπρεσβεύω: 227n
 συμπρεσβευτής: 227n
 συναποδημῶ: 115-16
 συναπόδημος: 115n
 συντίθημι (συνθήσει): 147
 σωματοφύλαξ: 83-84, 366
 ταγός: 325n
 τεταγμένος: 381n, 387n, 411-12n; τεταγμένος ἐν:
 389-90; τεταγμένος ὑπό + accusative / τε-
 ταγμένος παρά + genitive: 430-31; τεταγ-
 μένος παρά τῷ βασιλεῖ, 431n
 ὑπόθεσις: 241n
 φημί: 158
 φθάνω: 213, 219
 φιλία: 246n, 405-406, 409n
 φιλοδημῶδης: 151
 φίλος: 25-26n, 26n, 38n, 39, 232, 409n, 411n
 φιλομακεδών: 409n
 φυλακή: 387n
 χειροτονῶ, χειροτονία: 515-18
 deduco: 352n
 privatum decretum: 343

4. INDEX LOCORUM

Only passages discussed or important for the purposes of this study are cited; no differentiation between the text and the footnotes of a page is indicated.

4.1 Inscriptions

- Ager 1996
 n° 15: see *I. di Cos* ED 173-174
 n° 21: see *TitCal* 79
 n° 26: see Magnetto 1997: n° 20
 n° 90: 377
 n° 169: 228

Agora

15.42: 49
 15.61: 110, 183
 15.78: 183
 15.85: 523
 15.86: 523
 15.89: 175, 181, 523
 15.91: 159
 15.100: 523
 15.106: 523
 15.111: 522
 15.115: see *IG II²* 790
 15.129: 201-202
 15.130: 198
 15.137: 206
 16.72: 37
 16.95: 48
 16.97: 77
 16.100: 39, 48
 16.104: 39, 98
 16.107: 78, 81
 16.109: 85, 153
 16.110: 80
 16.113: 85
 16.114: 93, 96
 16.117: 99, 101-102
 16.122: 92, 451, 491
 16.123: 95, 160
 16.126: 104
 16.129: 126
 16.160: 127, 135
 16.167: 135
 16.172: 86, 122, 155, 159-60
 16.173: 122, 144, 156
 16.176: 123, 134
 16.181: 67, 123, 134
 16.187: 523
 16.213: 145, 176, 178, 187
 16.224: 160, 192, 195-98
 16.225: 191
 16.261: 201-202
 17.151: 186

Aleshire 1989:

cat. V 73: 145

cat. V 96: see *Agora* 15.89

AM

85 (1970) 208 n° 70: 201
 85 (1970) 216 n°^{os} 232-233: 145

BCH

19 (1895) 328-30 n° 4: see *IThesp* 152-154
 73 (1949) 258-60 n° 4: 37
 99 (1975) 52-75: 165-66

Bielman 1994:

n° 6: see *IG II²* 399

n° 9: see *IG II²* 398a

n° 10: see *Hesperia* 40 (1971) 174-78 n° 25

n° 13: see *IG II²* 492

n° 14: 327, 449

n° 19: 226-29

n° 20: see *IG II²* 657

n° 25: see *IG II²* 1225

n° 30: see *I. Rhamn.* 17

n° 40: 229

n° 43: 229, 465

Braunert, *Jdl* 65/66 (1950-1951)

235 n° 10: see *SEG* 24 (1969) 1175

235 n° 12: see *SB* 1677

236 n° 23: see *SEG* 24 (1969) 1179

236 n° 24: see *SEG* 24 (1969) 1180

237 n° 25: see *SB* 1642

Bringmann / von Steuben 1995

6: see *IG II²* 657

10: see *SEG* 34 (1984) 72

14: see *IG II²* 650

15: see *IG II²* 682

16: see *SEG* 28 (1978) 60

17: see *IG II²* 836

39: see *Agora* 16.261

59: see *IvO* 309

85: see *IThesp* 62

86-89: 307

102: see *FD III* 4, 220 and 221

BullEpigr

1969, 347: 349

CEG

II 789: 312, 324

- CID*
 IV 15: 209-210, 213
 IV 25: 231, 281
 IV 77: 316
 IV 99: 208, 329
- CIG*
 3655: see Michel, *Recueil* 534
- Cook 1966
 n° 1: see *SEG* 24 (1969) 1175
 n° 7: see *SEG* 24 (1969) 1179
 n° 8: see *SEG* 24 (1969) 1185
 n° 8, n. 7: see *SEG* 24 (1969) 1180
 n° 9: see *SB* 1642
- Curty 1995
 n° 63: see Meadows, *Chiron* 26 (1996) 252-54
 n° 75: see *SEG* 38 (1988) 1476
- Dinsmoor 1931
 7-8: see *SEG* 45 (1995) 101
- Durrbach, *Choix*
 15: see *IG* XI 4, 542
 19: see *IG* XI 4, 559
 47 II: see *IG* XI 4, 680
 48: see *IG* XI 4, 666
 62: see *IG* XI 4, 1177
- EKM* I
 4: 326
 45: 182
 392: 325
- Ergon*
 1968, 51-53: see *BullEpigr* 1969, 347
 1993, 7-8: 178, 516
- FD*
 III 1, 88: see *CID* IV 15
 III 1, 169: 299, 301-302
 III 1, 487-496: 364
 III 2, 72: 163
 III 2, 135: 364
 III 3, 185: see *CID* IV 25
 III 3, 187: 281
 III 3, 207: 427
- III 3, 215: 317
 III 3, 240: 317
 III 4, 7: 270
 III 4, 8: 271
 III 4, 163: see *CID* IV 99
 III 4, 218-221: 323-26
 III 4, 233: 333
 III 4, 234: 332-33
 III 4, 463: see *CEG* II 789
 III 4, 464: 230-31
- Feyel 1942b
 91 n° 2B: see *IThesp* 157
 93 n° 2A: see *IThesp* 156bis
 101 n° 4: see *IThesp* 155
 103-111 n° 5: see *IThesp* 152-154
- Gauthier, *Historia* 28 (1979)
 88-89: 415
- Graindor, *RA* 6 (1917)
 49-54 n° 30 [31]: 300
- Hatzopoulos 1996: II
 n° 50: see *IG* XI 4, 1053
- Heath, *BSA* 19 (1912-1913) 82-88
 n°s I-III: 295, 298, 302, 416
 n° III: 295-302
- Herzog 1928
 30: 373-76
- Hesperia*
 1 (1932) 46 n° 4: 80, 103
 7 (1938) 307-308 n° 32: 160
 15 (1946) 192 n° 37: 206
 40 (1971) 174-78 n° 25: 39, 86
 40 (1971) 187-89 n° 34: 82
- Holleaux, *Études*
 I, 101-102: see *IThesp* 62
 III, 33: see *SEG* 49 (1999) 1106
 III, 34: see *SEG* 49 (1999) 1106
- I. Adramytteion*
 34: 38, 408-413

- I. Apollonia*
 513: see Osborne 1981: D39
- I. di Cos*
 ED 17+130+26+194: 376-80
 ED 20: 80, 365-68
 ED 26: see *I. di Cos* ED 17
 ED 48: see Segre, *RivFil* 62 (1934) 169-79
 ED 49: 377
 ED 61+89: 371
 ED 71[abce] I A: see Osborne 1981: D51
 ED 71a-g: 361-62, 363
 ED 78: 371-73
 ED 85: 373
 ED 89: see *I. di Cos* ED 61
 ED 110: 376
 ED 130: see *I. di Cos* ED 17
 ED 132a: 368-69
 ED 136: 371-72
 ED 162: 361-62
 ED 173-174: 365
 ED 190: 372-73
 ED 193: 379
 ED 194: see *I. di Cos* ED 17
 ED 203: 361-62
 ED 216: 364, 373
 ED 230: 363
 ED 234: 375
 ED 235: 380
- I. Cret.*
 I xviii 8: see SVA III 486
 I xxii 4: 459
 II xi 12: 256-57
 II xvii 1: see SVA III 468
 III iv 2: 459
 III iv 3: 459-61
 III iv 4: 460
 III iv 20: 459
 III vi 9: 173
 IV 167: see SVA III 498
 IV 176: 459
- ID*
 291: 533
 296: 532
 300: 532
 338: 441, 532
- 342: 442
 353: 441, 533
 354: 441
 363: 533
 366: 533
 369: 533
 372: 441, 533
 403: 533
 421: 368-69
 439: 368-69, 374
 442: 368-69, 374
 443: 374
 457: 533
 461: 368-69, 374
 463: 533
 465: 368-69
 1413: 368-69
 1432: 368-69
- I. Eleusis*
 95: 108
 97: 108
 98: 108
 180: 172, 516
 183: 198, 443
 187: 516
 191: 516
 193: 183
 194: 174, 516
 195: 173-75
 196: 516, 518, 522
 200: 201
 207: 192, 199-200, 518
 210: 201-202
 211: 200
- I. Ephesos*
 2003: 366
- IG*
 I³ 89: 37, 409
 III 3, p. ii-iii, fr. A: 77
 III 3, 67a: 39
 II² 231: 301
 II² 350: see Osborne 1981: D39
 II² 372: 48
 II² 378: see Osborne 1981: D70
 II² 380: 38, 39, 48

- II² 381: 39
 II² 382: 39
 II² 383a: 39
 II² 383b: see *SEG* 21 (1965) 305
 II² 384: see *SEG* 21 (1965): 309
 II² 385a: see *SEG* 21 (1965): 355
 II² 385b: see Osborne 1981: D49
 II² 387: see Osborne 1981: D35
 II² 389: 135
 II² 391: see Osborne 1981: D37
 II² 398a: 48
 II² 399: 48, 210
 II² 400: 48
 II² 401: 409
 II² 402: see *SEG* 42 (1992) 91
 II² 441: see *IG* II² 769
 II² 443: 196-97
 II² 448: see Osborne 1981: D38
 II² 450: see Osborne 1981: D42
 II² 455: 80, 81, 82
 II² 456: 80, 81
 II² 457: 80, 82-83
 II² 459: 491
 II² 460: 80
 II² 461: 80
 II² 463: 38, 85, 98, 153
 II² 466: 424-25
 II² 467: see Osborne 1981: D43
 II² 469: 80, 84-85, 115
 II² 470: 80, 82, 85, 95-96, 115
 II² 471: 80, 86-87
 II² 477: see *SEG* 3 (1927) 89
 II² 479-480: 79, 90
 II² 486: see Osborne 1981: D45
 II² 487: 97-98, 162
 II² 488: 95
 II² 492: 80, 94, 99-100
 II² 493: 95
 II² 495: see Osborne 1981: D60
 II² 496+507: see Osborne 1981: D61
 II² 498: 110-12, 182
 II² 499: 103
 II² 500: 103, 160
 II² 501: 103
 II² 502: 103
 II² 503: 103-104
 II² 504: 103
 II² 505: 85, 99-100, 103
 II² 513: 82
 II² 525: see *SEG* 34 (1984) 72
 II² 546: 77
 II² 550: see *SEG* 45 (1995) 92
 II² 553: see Osborne 1981: D44
 II² 555: 112-13, 491
 II² 558: see Osborne 1981: D47
 II² 559+568: 80, 84, 111
 II² 560: 80
 II² 561: see *SEG* 31 (1981) 80
 II² 562: 103, 182-83
 II² 563: 491
 II² 568: see *IG* II² 559+568
 II² 640: 80, 103-104, 125-26
 II² 641: 113-16
 II² 646: see Osborne 1981: D68
 II² 649: see *SEG* 45 (1995) 101
 II² 650: 122, 143, 155-56, 159, 419, 420
 II² 653: 67, 122
 II² 654: see Osborne 1981: D76
 II² 655: 32, 86
 II² 657: 116-25, 134, 149, 154, 155, 160, 256
 II² 659: 38
 II² 660: 82
 II² 662: see *Agora* 16.172
 II² 663: see *Agora* 16.172
 II² 664: 441, 513
 II² 665: 441, 513
 II² 666: 137
 II² 667: 137
 II² 672: 160-61
 II² 675: see *SEG* 34 (1984) 72
 II² 677: 177-79, 180
 II² 682: 61, 74-76, 118, 122, 137, 138, 140-45,
 155-56, 175, 512
 II² 683: 522
 II² 685: 95, 159
 II² 686: see *SVA* III 476
 II² 687: see *SVA* III 476
 II² 710: 446-47
 II² 713: 38
 II² 739: 80, 99, 101
 II² 766: 301
 II² 769: 181
 II² 773: 491
 II² 774: see *ISE* 23
 II² 775: see *SEG* 18 (1962) 19
 II² 776: 522

- II² 777: 181
 II² 778: 110
 II² 779: 110
 II² 780: 521
 II² 784: 512, 523
 II² 785: 192
 II² 786: 192
 II² 790: 522
 II² 791: see *Agora* 16.213
 II² 803: see *SEG* 18 (1962) 19
 II² 808: see Osborne 1981: D87
 II² 818: 115
 II² 832: see Osborne 1981: D90
 II² 833: 194
 II² 834: 188-90, 203
 II² 836: 191
 II² 838: 190-91, 193
 II² 844: 188, 465
 II² 886: 204
 II² 888: 191, 204
 II² 913: see *Agora* 15.137
 II² 971: see Osborne 1981: D102
 II² 1191: see *I. Eleusis* 95
 II² 1201: 60
 II² 1219: see *I. Eleusis* 191
 II² 1225: 177-79, 182, 431, 520
 II² 1235: 523
 II² 1279: see *I. Eleusis* 183
 II² 1280: see *I. Eleusis* 193
 II² 1285: see *I. Eleusis* 194
 II² 1286: 431
 II² 1287: see *I. Eleusis* 187
 II² 1288: see *I. Eleusis* 191
 II² 1299: see *I. Eleusis* 196
 II² 1300: 188
 II² 1303: see *I. Eleusis* 207
 II² 1304: see *I. Eleusis* 211
 II² 1311: see *I. Rhamn.* 19
 II² 1479A: 68
 II² 1485A: 118
 II² 1492B: 72, 86-89, 107-109, 153-54, 161
 II² 1534B: see Aleshire 1989: cat. V 73, V 96
 II² 1557: see *SEG* 18 (1962) 36
 II² 1629: 133
 II² 1705: 188, 512
 II² 1706: 179, 193
 II² 1954: 85, 126
 II² 1958: see *I. Eleusis* 210
 II² 2313: 191, 225, 350
 II² 2318: 187
 II² 2323a: 108, 116
 II² 2325: 116
 II² 2429: 133
 II² 2840: see *I. Eleusis* 98
 II² 2841: see *I. Eleusis* 97
 II² 2971: see *I. Eleusis* 195
 II² 2978: see *I. Eleusis* 200
 II² 2980a: 206
 II² 3073: 108, 512
 II² 3077: 108
 II² 3079: 149, 163, 510-13
 II² 3424: 106-107
 II² 3425: 144
 II² 3458: 163, 511
 II² 3459: 163, 511
 II² 3460: 516
 II² 3510: 199
 II² 3845: 163, 511
 II² 4610: 110
 II² 4676: 189, 193
 II² 5029a: 193
 II² 6250: 186
 IV 727A: see Perlman 2000: 244 n° H1
 IV 729: 463, 465
 IV 750: see Bielman 1994: n° 19
 IV 752: 229
 IV 756: see Bielman 1994: n° 43
 IV² 1, 58: 99
 IV² 1, 621: see *ISE* 45
 V 2, 1, 9: 221
 VII 1-7: 295-302
 VII 1: 296, 300
 VII 4: 300
 VII 5: 300
 VII 6: 300
 VII 8-11: 295, 299, 301-302
 VII 12-13: 295
 VII 14: 295
 VII 41: 296, 298
 VII 298: see *I. Orop.* 175
 VII 387: see *I. Orop.* 107
 VII 427: see *I. Orop.* 366
 VII 507: 308-309, 311
 VII 1722: see *IThesp* 19
 VII 1735b: see *IThesp* 157
 VII 2410: see *IThesp* 155

- VII 2433: 304
 VII 3091: 320
 VII 3166: 311
 VII 3167: 311
 VII 3171: 327
 VII 3473: 295, 301-302
 VII 4136: see Rigsby 1996: n° 2
 VII 4256: see *I. Orop.* 4
 VII 4257: see *I. Orop.* 5
 IX 1, 78: 326-27
 IX 1, 100: 306
 IX 1² 1, 31: 444
 IX 1² 1, 34: 334
 IX 1² 1, 56: 332-33
 IX 1² 1, 68: 334
 IX 1² 1, 76: 334
 IX 1² 1, 173: 493
 IX 1² 1, 187: 339
 IX 1² 1, 202: 333
 IX 1² 1, 203: see *FD III 4*, 234
 IX 1² 2, 583: 342-44
 X 2, 1, 1028: see *IG XI 4*, 1053
 XI 2, 114: 438
 XI 2, 142: 533
 XI 2, 154: 438
 XI 2, 156: 532
 XI 2, 161: 420, 440, 532, 533
 XI 2, 162: 420, 440, 532, 533
 XI 2, 164: 74, 420
 XI 2, 188: 532
 XI 2, 199: 420, 434, 440, 532, 533
 XI 2, 203: 438, 440
 XI 2, 204: 438, 533
 XI 2, 205: 438
 XI 2, 223: 533
 XI 2, 274: 533
 XI 2, 287: 441, 442-43, 533
 XI 2, 289: 533
 XI 2, 298: 216, 442-43
 XI 4, 514: see *IG XII Suppl.* 311
 XI 4, 527: 439
 XI 4, 528: 439
 XI 4, 542-551: 434
 XI 4, 542: 434-38
 XI 4, 551: 420, 434-38, 533
 XI 4, 558: 439-40
 XI 4, 559: 439-40
 XI 4, 560: 439-40
 XI 4, 561: 533
 XI 4, 562: 532-33
 XI 4, 565: 533-34
 XI 4, 584: 438-39
 XI 4, 585: 438-39
 XI 4, 613: 438-39
 XI 4, 614: 438-39
 XI 4, 664: 441
 XI 4, 665: 441
 XI 4, 666: 440-42
 XI 4, 679: 442
 XI 4, 680: 442-43
 XI 4, 681: 442
 XI 4, 682: 442
 XI 4, 704: 231
 XI 4, 1036: 421, 422, 425
 XI 4, 1037: 419-20, 443
 XI 4, 1043: 420-21
 XI 4, 1049: 439-40
 XI 4, 1052: 417
 XI 4, 1053: 441
 XI 4, 1064: see Labarre 1996: 361-63 n° 89
 XI 4, 1076: 441
 XI 4, 1177: 443
 XII 2, 15: see Labarre 1996: 264-66 n° 8
 XII 2, 16: see Labarre 1996: 266-67 n° 9
 XII 2, 498: see Labarre 1996: 308-309 n° 52
 XII 2, 513: 403
 XII 2, 527: see Labarre 1996: 333-36 n° 68
 XII 2, 645: see *I. Adramytteion* 34
 XII 3, 320: 433-34
 XII 5, 7: 420
 XII 5, 10: 421
 XII 5, 136: 423-24
 XII 5, 533/1066: 428-29, 431
 XII 5, 537: 431-32
 XII 5, 544: 428
 XII 5, 570: 417
 XII 5, 609: 434
 XII 5, 802: 308
 XII 5, 1001: 420-21
 XII 5, 1004: 419-20, 421
 XII 5, 1005: 420
 XII 5, 1008 A: 422-23
 XII 5, 1008 B: 421-23
 XII 5, 1061: 427-28, 431, 433
 XII 5, 1065: 420, 427, 533
 XII 5, 1066: see *IG XII 5*, 533

- XII 5, 1075: 431-32
 XII 5, 1077: 428
 XII 6, 1: 401
 XII 6, 4: 400-401
 XII 6, 10: 397
 XII 6, 11: 386, 397-400, 401
 XII 6, 12: 102, 393-94, 402
 XII 6, 17: 384
 XII 6, 20: 383-84
 XII 6, 23: 386
 XII 6, 25: 382, 409
 XII 6, 26: 386
 XII 6, 29: 386
 XII 6, 30: 366, 387-90
 XII 6, 31: 387, 389-90
 XII 6, 32: 387
 XII 6, 38: 391
 XII 6, 48: 368, 384-85
 XII 6, 51: 61, 74, 385, 509
 XII 6, 52: 61, 74, 385, 509
 XII 6, 56: 388
 XII 6, 75: 385
 XII 6, 95: 225, 393
 XII 6, 96: 384
 XII 6, 118: 397
 XII 6, 120: 396-97
 XII 6, 121: 397
 XII 6, 122: 387, 397
 XII 6, 148: 361-62
 XII 6, 149: 384
 XII 6, 150: 365, 366, 370, 387, 388, 434
 XII 6, 156: 401
 XII 6, 172: 397
 XII 6, 179: 401-402
 XII 6, 180: 402
 XII 6, 181: 401
 XII 6, 261: 110
 XII 6, 282: 394-96
 XII 6, 283: 394-96
 XII 6, 289: 402
 XII 6, 316: 394
 XII 6, 343: 397
 XII 6, 346: 382, 391-92
 XII 6, 347: 397
 XII 6, 446: 394-96
 XII 6, 496: 397
 XII 6, 588: 394-96
 XII 6, 593: 402
- XII 7, 15: 417-18
 XII 7, 16: 417-18
 XII 7, 221b: 302, 415-19
 XII 7, 222: 416
 XII 7, 223: 416, 419
 XII 7, 506: see *Syll*³ 390
 XII 8, 156: see *Samothrace* 2, 1, pp. 39-40, App. 1
 XII 9, 192: 447
 XII 9, 196: 446-48
 XII 9, 197: 446-48
 XII 9, 198: 451
 XII 9, 199: see Knoepfler 2001: 142-50 n° 10
 XII 9, 200: 449-50, 451
 XII 9, 205: see Knoepfler 2001: 109-117 n° 5
 XII 9, 206: 451
 XII 9, 207: 197, 452, 457-58
 XII 9, 210: 451-52
 XII 9, 212: 216
 XII 9, 221: 448-49
 XII 9, 226: see Knoepfler 2001: 109-117 n° 5
 XII 9, 230: see Knoepfler 2001: 142-50 n° 10
 XII 9, 245: 449-50
 XII 9, 1259: 431
 XII *Suppl.* p. 33: see Labarre 1996: 333-36 n° 68
 XII *Suppl.* 115: see Labarre 1996: 311-12 n° 54
 XII *Suppl.* 121: see Labarre 1996: 336-38 n° 69
 XII *Suppl.* 122: see Labarre 1996: 338-39 n° 70
 XII *Suppl.* 125: see Labarre 1996: 340-41 n° 71
 XII *Suppl.* 136: see Labarre 1996: 361-63 n° 89
 XII *Suppl.* 168: 421-23
 XII *Suppl.* 169: 420-21
 XII *Suppl.* 232: 428
 XII *Suppl.* 311: 368
- I. Iasos*
 46: 145
 150: see Meadows, *Chiron* 26 (1996) 252-54
- I. Ilion*
 33: 484, 505
- I. Kaunos*
 4: 388
- I. Kourion*
 42: 350

- I. Lampsakos*
6: 364
- I. Magnesia*
16: 317
18: 330
- I. Mylasa*
126: 356
- IvO*
178: 163, 169
296: 166, 169
306: 258
307: 258
308: 166, 257-58
309: 260
- I. Orop.*
4: 303-304
5: 303-304
6: 303-304
14: 304
35: 306
36: 306
37: 306
49: 306
52: 306
57: 304-307, 442
59: 305
71: 305
75: 305-306
76: 305-306
77: 305-306
83: 305
107: 305, 307-308
125: 308
148: 308-309
162: 304
163: 304
175: 308
176: 306
177: 305
186: 306
187: 306
199: 310-11
239: 311
303: 306
- 325: 306, 309
366: 304, 312-15
388: 307
427: 309
506: 306, 309
688: 310-11
- I. Priene*
37: see Magonetto 1997: n° 20
500: see Magonetto 1997: n° 20
- I. Prusa ad Olympum*
1: 406
- I. Rhamn.*
2: 112-13
6: 29
7: 183-85
8: 175-76, 514, 517
10: 198-99, 515
11: 198-99, 515
14: 515
15: 516
16: 176, 515, 517
17: 183-86, 210, 514, 515, 519
18: 515
19: 185-86, 514
20: 515
27-28: 516
129: 198-99, 515
130: 198-99
131: 516
136: 515
137: 515
- ISE*
6: see Osborne 1981: D60
8: 88, 90, 161, 303
21: see SEG 25 (1971) 207
22: see *I. Rhamn.* 8
23: 127, 135, 209-212, 215, 216-18
25: see *I. Rhamn.* 17
27: see IG II² 4676
28: see *Agora* 16.224
30: see *Agora* 16.225
31: see *I. Eleusis* 207
33: see *Agora* 16.261
37a: 215

41: 218
 45: 219, 221
 52: see Bielman 1994: n° 14
 53: see SEG 25 (1971) 443
 54: 258
 71: see CEG II 789
 86: IG IX 1² 1, 56

I. Smyrna

573: 22

IThesp

19: 316
 62: 315-16, 318
 84: 319
 152: 315-19
 153: 315-19
 154: 315-19
 155: 318
 156bis: 317
 157: 317
 161: 315-16

Kaloyéropoulou, AAA 1974: 295, 298-99, 302

Klee 1918

10 IIB: 375

Knoepfler 2001

109-117 n° 5: 451
 142-50 n° 10: 450-51
 210-11 n° XI: see IG XII 9, 206
 219-31 n° XIII: see IG XII 9, 198

Kotsidu 2000

9 E 3: see Osborne 1981: D68
 9 E 4: see *Agora* 15.111
 9 E 5: see IG II² 790
 12: see SEG 45 (1995) 101
 13 E 1: see IG II² 683
 13 E 2: see SEG 33 (1983) 115
 13 E 3: see IG II² 780
 13 E 4: see IG II² 776
 13 E 5: see *I. Eleusis* 196
 15 E: see *I. Eleusis* 193
 18 E 3: see IG II² 4676
 41: see Osborne 1981: D42
 48: see *Agora* 16.173

50 E: see *I. Rhamn.* 7

82 E: see *I. Orop.* 175

123: see IG XII *Suppl.* 311

148: see IG XI 4, 559

170: see IG XII *Suppl.* 168

171: see IG XII 5, 1008 A

188: see *Samothrace* 2, 1, pp. 39-40, App. 1

Labarre 1996

264-66 n° 8: 404
 266-67 n° 9: 404
 308-309 n° 52: 404
 311-12 n° 54: 403-404
 333-36 n° 68: 403-406
 336-38 n° 69: 406-407
 338-39 n° 70: 406, 407-408
 340-41 n° 71: 407
 353-54 n° 79: 406, 407
 361-63 n° 89: 407

Lindos II

1: 356
 2: 164-65, 355-56
 145: 361
 161: 361
 696: 356

LSCG

106: see IG XII 5, 1008 A

Maier 1959

n° 24: see IG II² 1225

Magnetto 1997

n° 13: see *I. di Cos* ED 173-174
 n° 14: see *TitCal* 79 and 7
 n° 20: 382, 391-92

Meadows, *Chiron* 26 (1996)

252-54: 358-59

Michel, *Recueil*

452: 91
 534: 423-24, 532

Migeotte 1984

n° 12: see IG VII 3171
 n° 47: see IG XI 4, 559

n° 117: see *IG XI 4*, 1049

Milet

I 3, 38: 463-64, 465

I 3, 122-123: 507-508

I 3, 184: 380

OGIS

4: see *I. Adramytteion* 34

5: see *RC 1*

20: 396

42: see *I. di Cos* ED 136

43: see *SEG 49* (1999) 1106

44: see *IG XII 3*, 320

54: 413, 528

78: see Labarre 1996: 308-309 n° 52

80: see *IG VII 507*

81: see *I. Orop.* 175

231: see *I. Magnesia* 18

724: 533

773: see *IG XII 5*, 1004

Osborne 1981

D35: 72-73, 109

D37: 73

D38: 59, 71, 98

D39: 59, 73-74

D42: 61, 76-78, 507-509

D43: 85, 96, 115, 197

D44: 85, 95, 97, 129, 133, 491

D45: 80, 99, 100, 111

D47: 86, 96, 111, 491

D49: 197, 457-58

D51: 72, 87, 109, 161, 361-62

D60: 80, 99, 101-102

D61: 80, 96, 99, 101-102

D62: see *Agora* 16.117

D68: 86, 131-32

D70: 135

D74: see *Agora* 16.172

D76: 122, 123, 134

D77: see *Agora* 16.173

D81: 446-47

D87: 122-23, 155

D90: 197, 201-203, 210

D95: see Rigsby 1996: n° 162

D102: 80

Parian Chronicle (*FGrHist* 239)

B 20: 78

B 25: 120

B 26: 91, 103

Paton / Hicks

7: 363, 376-77

10: 363-64, 368-69, 375, 380

11: 375

18: 362

19: 362

44: 373

221: 363

227: 363

Perlman 2000

A2-3: see Bielman 1994: n° 14

A17: 224-26

A18: 224-26

A20: 224-26

E5: see *SEG 11* (1954) 414

H1: 293

Poddighe 2002

147-49 n° 2: see *IG II²* 372

157-58 n° 9: see *SEG 21* (1965) 305

159-60 n° 10: *Agora* 16.100

161-63 n° 11: see *IG II²* 380

195-96 n° 2: see Osborne 1981: D39

Pouilloux 1954

n° 7: see *I. Rhamn.* 8

n° 13: see *I. Rhamn.* 19

n° 15: see *I. Rhamn.* 17

Pritchett, *CSCA* 5 (1972)

170: see *IG II²* 739

RC

1: 387

3-4: 365

7: see *I. Priene* 500

10-13: see *I. Ilion* 33

31: see *I. Magnesia* 18

Reinmuth 1971

n° 15: 145

- Rigsby 1996
 2: 318
 8: 370-71
 11: 32
 12: 32
 14-18: 369
 23: 368-70, 375
 24: 368-70, 375
 25: 368-70, 375
 26: 368-70, 375
 27: 368-70, 375
 28: 413
 29: 413
 46: 370
 47: 370
 66: see *I. Magnesia* 16
 69: see *I. Magnesia* 18
 70: 317
 162: 208
 163: see *CID* IV 99
 178: see *FD* III 3, 240
- Rizakis, *Achaïe*
 I 753: see *SEG* 24 (1969) 1179
- Robert 1936
 n° 53: see Bielman 1994: n° 40
- Samothrace*
 2, 1, pp. 39-40, App. 1: 259, 413-15
- SB
 1640: see *SEG* 24 (1969) 1179
 1641: see *SEG* 24 (1969) 1180
 1642: 358
 1643: see *SEG* 24 (1969) 1175
 1676: see *SEG* 24 (1969) 1185
 1677: 279-80
 9418: see *SEG* 20 (1964) 505
- SEG
 2 (1924) 9: 188
 2 (1924) 184: 364
 2 (1924) 255: 301
 3 (1927) 86: 80, 82
 3 (1927) 89: 179-80
 3 (1927) 117: see *ISE* 8
 11 (1954) 414: 320
 11 (1954) 1084: see Bielman 1994: n° 14
 12 (1955) 369: see Rigsby 1996: n° 8
 12 (1955) 375: see Rigsby 1996: n° 28
 12 (1955) 376: see Rigsby 1996: n° 29
 13 (1956) 243: 209, 210
 14 (1957) 543: 431
 14 (1957) 546: 432
 15 (1958) 264: see *I. Orop.* 6
 15 (1958) 856: 402-403
 16 (1959) 58: 38, 80, 88, 99-100,
 16 (1959) 60: 86
 17 (1960) 144: see Perlman 2000: A20
 18 (1962) 19: 522
 18 (1962) 36: 183, 194
 18 (1962) 117: see *FD* III 4, 218 and 220
 19 (1963) 78: 188
 20 (1964) 505: 191, 201
 21 (1965) 303: see *Agora* 16.97
 21 (1965) 305: 39, 45
 21 (1965) 309: 39
 21 (1965) 318: see *Agora* 16.104
 21 (1965) 330: 491
 21 (1965) 341: see Osborne 1981: D49
 21 (1965) 353: see Osborne 1981: D70
 21 (1965) 354: 135
 21 (1965) 355: 135, 457
 21 (1965) 357: 523
 21 (1965) 392: see *IG* II² 766
 22 (1967) 125: see *I. Eleusis* 183
 23 (1968) 271: see *IThesp* 84
 24 (1969) 1175: 464-65
 24 (1969) 1179: 287-88
 24 (1969) 1180: 309, 323
 24 (1969) 1185: 465
 25 (1971) 77: 491
 25 (1971) 106: see *Agora* 16.224
 25 (1971) 155: see *I. Rhamn.* 17
 25 (1971) 157: see *I. Eleusis* 207
 25 (1971) 186: 163, 510-12
 25 (1971) 207: 164
 25 (1971) 443: 163
 25 (1971) 444: see *ISE* 54
 28 (1978) 60: 60, 86, 120, 122, 124, 136-38, 142-
 50, 162, 168, 399, 419, 426
 28 (1978) 63: 173, 174, 511
 28 (1978) 75: see Rigsby 1996: n° 162
 28 (1978) 453: 304
 29 (1979) 114: 523

- 30 (1980) 69: see *Agora* 16.114
 30 (1980) 325: 90, 115
 31 (1981) 80: 80, 83, 84
 32 (1982) 118: see *Agora* 16.213
 32 (1982) 131: 208
 32 (1982) 169: 188, 512
 32 (1982) 415: see *IvO* 296
 32 (1982) 434: see *IThesp* 161
 33 (1983) 115: 521
 33 (1983) 671: see *I. di Cos* ED 136
 33 (1983) 672: see *I. di Cos* ED 78
 33 (1983) 673: 372-73
 34 (1984) 72: 87
 36 (1986) 164: 80, 86, 99, 101
 36 (1986) 165: 90, 92-93, 109-110, 303, 324
 36 (1986) 397: 288
 37 (1987) 1006: 472n
 38 (1988) 71: see *Agora* 16.172
 38 (1988) 74: 160
 38 (1988) 619: 122-23
 38 (1988) 1476: 328-32
 39 (1989) 103: see *Agora* 16.117
 39 (1989) 107: see *Agora* 16.126
 39 (1989) 131: see *ISE* 23
 39 (1989) 595: 431
 39 (1989) 596: 431
 39 (1989) 1334: 253-54
 40 (1990) 440: 332
 40 (1990) 445: 332
 40 (1990) 690: 349-53
 41 (1991) 75: see *I. Rhamn.* 7
 41 (1991) 115: 206, 225
 41 (1991) 279: 226
 42 (1992) 91: 37-39, 409
 43 (1993) 135: 270, 409
 43 (1993) 143: 271
 43 (1993) 707: 245
 44 (1994) 710: 417, 426
 45 (1995) 92: 88, 366
 45 (1995) 101: 80, 104-105, 113-16, 135, 210
 46 (1996) 716: 326
 47 (1997) 151: 209
 47 (1997) 490: see *I. Orop.* 148
 48 (1998) 1098: 368-69
 48 (1998) 1101: 379
 48 (1998) 1130: 429-32
 49 (1999) 1106: 377, 378, 419, 420, 533
 51 (2001) 457: 269-70, 436
 53 (2003) 850: 369
 53 (2003) 851: 369
- Segre, *RivFil* 62 (1934)
 169-79: 370
- Segre, *BSRAA* 34 (1941) 29-39
 29-30: 356
- Shear 1978
 92-93, T9: see *IG II²* 650
 94-95, T11: see *IG II²* 657
- Sherwin-White 1978
 116 n. 175: see Herzog 1928: 30
- SVA II
 329: 503
- SVA III
 446: 91, 92
 468: 461
 476: 163-70, 257-58, 459-61
 486: 461
 492: see *I. Smyrna* 573
 498: 462-64
 501-502: 245, 463
 523: see *IG IX 1²* 2, 583
 545: 380
- Syll^B*
 313: see *IG II²* 380
 315: see Osborne 1981: D35
 318: see *IG II²* 1201
 320: see Osborne 1981: D42
 325: see *FD III* 4, 7
 328: see *IG II²* 469
 334: see *IG II²* 1492
 342: see *IG II²* 498
 344: see *RC* 3-4
 347: see Osborne 1981: D61
 348: see *IG XII* 9, 210
 361: see *FD III* 4, 218-221
 362: see *IG II²* 641
 365: see *IG II²* 3079
 367: see *IG II²* 650
 374: see *IG II²* 657
 381: see *IG XI* 4, 542

- 390: 378, 393, 419, 425, 427
 401: see *IG II²* 677
 406: see *CID IV* 15
 409: see *IG II²* 682
 418A: see *CID IV* 25
 418C: see *FD III* 3, 187
 433: see *IvO* 308
 454: see *IG II²* 1225
 462: see *IvO* 296
 466: see *IG II²* 780
 485: see *I. Eleusis* 196
 487: see *IG II²* 790
 491: see *SEG* 32 (1982) 118
 502: see *Samothrace* 2, 1, pp. 39-40, App. 1
 510: see *IG V* 2, 1, 9
 519: 305, 326
 547: see *I. Eleusis* 211
 552: see *IG IX* 1, 78
 585: 334, 335, 347
 590: 317
 635: see Rigsby 1996: n° 2
 644: 364
 645: 364
 656: see Ager 1996: n° 169
- TitCal*
 test. XII: see *SVA III* 545
 7: 367, 381
 8: 381
 17: 381-82
 74: 374
 79: 367, 381
 88: 375
- Vollgraff, *Mnemosyne* 43 (1915) 365-84
 A: see Perlman 2000: A17
 B: see Perlman 2000: A18
- Wilhelm, *Öjh* 11 (1908) 53-75
 70-72: 228-29
- Wilhelm 1909
 76-78 n° 64: see *IG II²* 4676

4.2. Papyri

- Ijsewijn 1961
 70-71 n° 31: see *PCairZen* 59173
 83-84 n° 68: 308
- PCairZen*
 59019: 156
 59036: 397
 59173: 165, 510
- P. Köln*
 6.247: 357
- PMichZen*
 55: 371
- P.Oxy.*
 2082: see *FGrHist* 257a F 1-4
- P. Herc.*
 163 xxxvi: 134-35

4.3. Literary sources

- [Aischines], *Epist.*
 12.8: 67, 69
- Agatharchides, *FGrHist* 86
 F 9: 217
- Alexis, *PCG* II
 fr. 116: 107
 fr. 246: 166-67

- Anthologia Palatina*
 9.147: 108
 9.519: 246, 274
 12.150: see Kallimachos, *Epigr.* 46 Pfeiffer
- Apollodoros, *FGrHist* 244
 F 44: 134, 174, 518
- Appian, *Mac.*
 4.1: 402
 5: 30, 350
 7: 292-93
- Appian, *Syr.*
 69: 445
 91: 445
- Apuleius, *Flor.*
 22: see Krates, fr. 18 Giannantoni
- Aristeas, *FGrHist* 317
 F 1: 214
- Aristippos, *FGrHist* 317
 T 1: see Diog. Laert. 2.83
- Arrian, *Anab.*
 2.14.4: 408
 4.16.4: 457
 4.16.7: 457
- Arrian, *Ind.*
 18.6: 447
- Arrian, *FGrHist* 156
 F 1.31: 387
 F 9.13: 43, 51
 F 9.14-15: 44-45, 69-70
- Athenaios
 1.19a-b: 197, 457-58
 4.167e-f: see Hegesandros, *FHG* IV 415, fr. 8
 6.246e: see Agatharchides, *FGrHist* 86 F 9
 6.253a: see Demochares, *FGrHist* 75 F 1
 6.253b-f: 131
 6.254a: see Alexis, *PCG* II fr. 116
 6.254f-255a: see Phylarchos, *FGrHist* 81 F 29
- 6.255c: 107, 366, 451
 6.262a: see Philippides, *PCG* VII fr. 22
 8.337d: see Douris, *FGrHist* 76 T 2
 9.400d: see Hegesandros, *FHG* IV 421
 9.405f: see Demetrios, *PCG* V 11
 10.435: see Theop., *FGrHist* 115 F 236
 10.439e-f: see Polyb. 20.8
 11.477e: see Hegesandros, *FHG* IV 417, fr. 21
 11.502b-c: see Alexis, *PCG* II fr. 246
 12.542e: 55, 59
 15.696f: see Gorgon, *FGrHist* 515 F 19
- Caelius Aurelianus, *De morbis chronicis*
 2.34: 371
- Cassius Dio
 19.62: 445
- Chrysispos
SVF III 691: 23
- Cicero, *Fin.*
 5.19.53: 64
- Cicero, *Off.*
 2.81: 231
 2.82: 234, 524, 527, 530, 531
- Curtius
 4.1.14: 408
 8.11.5: 447-48
- De viris illustribus*
 54.1: 445
- Demosthenes
 18.91: 75
 21.209: 114
- [Demosthenes], *Epist.*
 6: 69-70
- Demades (De Falco)
 fr. 5: 47
 frs. 6-7: 48
 frs. 11-14: 48
 fr. 15: 48
 fr. 49: 48

fr. 53: 48	18.74.1-3: 59-61, 73
fr. 55: 40	19.16.4-5: 368
fr. 58: 45	19.57.2: 507
fr. 91: 44-46, 69-70	19.57.4: 381
fr. 134: 47	19.64.1: 270, 275-76
	19.67.1-2: 229-30
Demetr.	19.68.2-4: 61, 74, 161, 507, 509
fr. 131A-C (Stork <i>et al.</i> [Fortenbaugh / Schüttrumpf 2000]): 41, 66	19.68.5-7: 508
	19.69.2-3: 509
	19.75.1-5: 507
[Demetrios], <i>Eloc.</i>	19.75.7-8: 61, 74-75
289 (= fr. 183 Wehrli = fr. 12 Stork <i>et al.</i> [Fortenbaugh / Schüttrumpf 2000]): 41, 58	19.77.6: 303
	19.78.3: 303
	19.78.4: 62, 76
Demetrios	19.78.5: 312
PCG V 11: 126	20.37.1-2: 62-63, 232, 422
	20.45.1-46.1: 78
Demochares, <i>FGrHist</i> 75	20.45.2: 61, 425
T 1: see [Plut.], <i>Mor.</i> 847C-D	20.45.4: 63
T 2: see Polyb. 12.13	20.46: 79, 88-89, 105, 119, 296, 421
F 1: 451, 491	20.50.3: 79, 111
F 2: 131	20.50.4: 368, 385
F 4: see Polyb. 12.13.8	20.52.4: 491
	20.84.1: 355
Dexippos, <i>FGrHist</i> 100	20.93.2-4: 357-58, 387
F 8: 303	20.100.3-4: 356
F 33: 41	20.102-103: 91, 94, 231, 232
	20.106.1: 91
Diodoros	20.107.1: 91
18.3.3: 303	20.110-111: 103
18.18.1-6: 41-43, 49-51	20.110.1: 90-91
18.18.2: 40, 41, 43	21.14.1-2: 314
18.18.4: 42, 52, 314	28.11: 30, 349-50
18.18.5: 52, 58	29.2: 445
18.18.6: 43-44	30.5: 349
18.42.1: 46	31.36: 492
18.44.1: 45	
18.48.1-4: 44-47	Diogenes Laertios
18.48.1: 41, 44	2.83: 214
18.56: 54, 275, 303	2.101: 187
18.57.1: 275, 448	2.115: 152, 296, 453
18.64-65: 54-57, 68-69	2.125-144: 452-56
18.65.6: 53, 56, 57	2.140: 454
18.66-67: 57	2.141-142: 178, 453, 455, 456
18.66.2: 55, 56, 71, 153	2.143: 453-54, 456
18.66.5: 57	4.8-9: 65
18.69.4: 275	4.9: 41
18.70.1-72.1: 275-76	4.14: 65

- 4.21-23: 150-51
 4.39: 197
 5.60: 169
 5.78: 64, 148
 6.23: 135
 6.76: 49
 6.87: 151
 6.98: 151
 7.6: see Zenon, *SVF I* 3
 7.10-12: see Zenon, *SVF I* 7-8
 7.14-15: see Zenon, *SVF I* 4
 7.17: see Zenon, *SVF I* 286
 7.24: 166
 7.168-169: see Kleanthes, *SVF I* 463
- Dionysios Halikarnasseus, *Din.*
 3: 135-36, 139-40
 9: 135-36, 139-40
- Douris, *FGrHist* 76
 T 2: 391
 T 4: 384, 391
 F 10: 63
 F 13: 131
- Epikouros, *Epist.*
 49: 133
 fr. 105: 135
- Eusebios, *Chron.*
 II 120 (Schoene): 132, 176, 180, 216
- FGrHist* 257a
 F 1-4: 126-27, 135
- Florus
 1.24.9: 445
- Frontinus, *Strat.*
 3.2.11: 393
- Gellius, *NA*
 3.15.2: 116
- Gorgon, *FGrHist* 515
 F 19: 356
- Hegesandros, *FHG IV*
 415, fr. 8: 173-74
 415, fr. 9: 164
 416, fr. 12: 459
 417, fr. 21: 197
 421: 370
- Hippolytos, *Refutatio omnium haeresium*
 1.21.2 (= *SVF II* 975): 501
- Hypereides
 2 (*Κατὰ Φιλίππιδου*): 114
 fr. 77: 421
- Justin
 13.4.23: 303
 26.1: 281-83
 28.1.1-2: 182
 28.1.2: 342
 28.4: 262
 29.4.11: 289
 31.6.3: 445
- Kallimachos
Epigr. 5: 427
Epigr. 46: 371
- Karystios, *FHG IV*
 358: see Ath. 12.542e
- Kleanthes, *SVF I*
 463: 172
 527: 501
 597: 172
- Krates (Giannantoni)
 fr. 11: 152
 fr. 18: 151-52
 fr. 31: 152
 fr. 33: 152
 fr. 34: 152
 frs. 37-39: 152
- Livy
 23.39.3: 305
 27.30.4-15: 402-403
 27.31.8: 252
 27.31.10: 288
 27.33.5: 288-89

- 29.12: 30, 349
 31.1.9: 202-203
 31.5.5-9: 202-203
 31.9.1: 203
 31.9.18: 191
 31.14.3: 203
 31.15.6: 205
 31.25: 290
 31.25.10: 290, 291
 31.52.3: 288-89
 32.5.4-5: 291
 32.6.1: 349
 32.6.11: 349
 32.10.2: 30
 32.11: 253
 32.14.5: 349
 32.19.2: 291
 32.19.5-23.4: 253, 255, 292-93
 32.21.23: 246, 274-75
 32.22.5-8: 292-93
 32.22.9-12: 222
 32.25: 222
 32.32.10: 292
 32.32.11: 253
 32.40.7: 342
 32.40.8-9: 254-55
 33.7.11: 327
 33.14.1: 344
 33.14.5: 321-22, 344
 33.16.1-4: 342-43
 33.20.12: 402
 33.27.8: 321-22
 35.12.6: 335, 339
 35.12.10-14: 339
 35.18: 335, 347
 35.18.1: 335
 35.18.2: 335
 35.27.11: 350-51
 35.31.3-32.1: 347-48
 35.31.4-7: 347
 35.32.2: 334, 335
 35.33.7: 334
 35.34.6-11: 347-48
 35.39.3-7: 347-48
 35.42.4-14: 336
 35.43.5: 347-48
 35.45.5-9: 336
 35.50.4: 206-208
- 36.5.1-8: 284-85, 351-52
 36.5.4: 352
 36.6.6-7.21: 336
 36.9.5-7: 30
 36.11.1-2: 444-45
 36.11.6: 347
 36.11.7-8: 345
 36.11.8-12.11: 345
 36.15.1: 444-45
 36.17.7: 444-45
 36.20.5: 347
 36.26: 337-38
 36.28.3: 338
 36.29.3-11: 339
 36.33.6: 347-48
 37.45.17: 338, 346, 445
 38.10.6: 334-35
 38.38.18: 338, 346
 44.32.7: 344
- Menandros, *Periochae* (PCG VI 2, 140 n° 189)
 105-112: 126
- Nepos, *Phocion*
 2.2-3: 41-43, 51
 2.4-5: 54
 3.2: 56
 3.3-4: 56, 70-71, 153
 4: 57
- Pausanias
 1.8.6: 166, 356
 1.9.4: 118, 123, 155
 1.9.8: 392
 1.10.3: 392
 1.16.1: 161
 1.25.6: 127-28
 1.25.7-8: 126-27
 1.25.8: 313
 1.26.1-3: 133-39
 1.26.1: 138
 1.26.3: 85, 96, 135
 1.29.10: 125
 1.29.13: 137
 1.29.16: 125
 1.36.5-6: 202-203
 1.37.7: 367
 2.8.1-2: 230-32

- 2.8.6: 236, 514
 2.9.2: 263
 2.9.3: 262
 2.9.4: 188, 246
 3.6.6: 132, 134-35, 176, 180
 5.5.1: 281-82
 5.12.4: 208
 6.2.4: 280
 6.12.5: 258
 6.13.5: see Douris, *FGrHist* 76 T 4
 6.13.11: 280
 6.14.9: 280
 6.14.11: 271, 283
 6.15.9: 258, 271
 6.16.3: 284
 6.16.9: 163
 6.17.3: 396
 7.10.4: 41, 47, 51
 8.3.5: 285
 8.10.5: 280
 8.49.6-7: 471
 8.50.4: 289
 9.31.1: 316
 10.4.10: 323-24, 326
 10.18.7: 133, 324
 10.34.2-3: 133, 324
- Philippides, *PCG* VII 333-52
 T3: see *IG* II² 657
 fr. 22: 116-17
 fr. 25: 80, 90, 97, 116-17
 fr. 26: 116-17
 fr. 30: 116-17
- Philochoros, *FGrHist* 328
 F 48: 79
 F 66: 78, 296
 F 67: 120
 F 69-70: 91
 F 165: 79
 F 166: 79
 F 167: 105, 136, 140
- Philodemos, *Ind. Acad.*
 VII 22-VIII 17: 41, 66
- Phylarchos, *FGrHist* 81
 F 29: 123, 151
- F 54: see Polyb. 2.59
 F 58: see Polyb. 2.63.1
- Plut., *Agis*
 2.4: 49
 6.5: 259, 413
 16.4-5: 259, 413
 38.5: 223
- Plut., *Arat.*
 2: 230-32
 4.2: 232
 4.3: 233, 527
 9.4: 231, 523
 11.2: 234-35, 523
 12-14: 234-35, 521-32
 12.1: 523-24, 527
 12.6: 530-31
 13.6: 235, 524, 529
 14.1: 235, 340
 14.2: 235, 524
 15: 234, 524-26
 15.4: 287
 17: 216, 525
 17.2: 217
 18.2: 217, 234, 529
 19.1: 236
 24.2: 247, 262
 24.4: 234, 236, 529
 24.5: 236
 25-29: 219-20
 25: 215-19
 29.6: 220
 34.2: 178, 520
 34.6: 177, 236, 514, 520
 35.1-6: 221, 236
 38-42: 238-44
 38.2-4: 285-86
 38.11: 237-38, 242, 243
 39.5: 221
 41.3: 188-89, 241, 285
 41.5: 238, 260, 529
 42.2: 239
 44.3: 244
 44.5-6: 222, 245
 45.2: 245, 256
 46.3: 249
 47.3: 285

- 48: 246, 286-87
 49.1-2: 252
 49.4: 272
 49.5: 273
 50.1-3: 252
 52.4: 262
 53.5: 233
 54.1-3: 252
- Plut., *Cleom.*
 3.4: 251
 16-19: 238-44
 17.2: 238, 241
 17.5-8: 221-23
 19.8: 238, 260, 529
 20.8: 285
 22.4-9: 252, 260, 261
 28.4-5: 261
 32: 261-62
 35: 262
 41.7: 244
- Plut., *Dem.*
 4: 42
 13.4: 269
 28.2: 43, 51
 31.4-6: 45-46, 70
- Plut., *Demetr.*
 8.1-10.2: 78
 8.5: 62, 78, 424
 9.1: 63
 10.1: 63, 79, 89
 10.2: 79
 10.3-7: 79, 80, 90, 106-107, 119, 191, 356, 421
 11.1: 79
 12.1: 79
 12.2: 119
 12.7: see also Philippides, PCG VII fr. 25
 12.8-9: 118
 12.9: see also Philippides, PCG VII fr. 25
 13: 130
 13.1-3: 79
 15.1-2: 89
 21.5: 301
 22.1: 357, 387
 23.1-2: 90, 211, 324
 23.4-24.12: 91
- 23.5-24.1: 80, 90
 24.6-12: 96-97, 109
 24.9: 80
 24.11: 90, 154
 25.1-2: 91
 25.4: 91
 25.6-9: 392
 26: 80, 91, 95
 26.5: see also Philippides, PCG VII fr. 25
 32.4: 367, 388
 33.7-8: 126-28
 34.1: 132
 34.4-5: 130, 132, 174
 34.6-7: 104, 130
 39.1-5: 312-14, 325
 39.1: 296
 39.6-40.6: 313-14
 40.5-6: 314
 42.2: 132
 44.3: 419
 46.1: 152, 319
 46.2-4: 122, 136-37, 147, 150
 46.4: 228
- Plut., *Flam.*
 4.5: 349
 6.1: 319
 16.1-3: 444-45
- Plut., *Philop.*
 6.13: 471
 7.1-2: 471
 12.2: 289
 17.1: 444-45
- Plut., *Phoc.*
 10.4: 49
 26-27: 41-43, 49-51
 26.3: 40-41
 27.1-6: 55, 66
 27.6: 42, 314
 27.8: 50
 28.2: 42, 52
 29.5: 53, 57
 29.6: 66
 30.1-2: 52
 30.5-10: 42, 44-47
 30.5: 52

- 30.8: 52
 30.9: 45
 31.1-3: 53
 32: 54-55
 32.1-3: 53
 32.9: 54
 33.4-12: 56, 69-72
 33.4: 55-56, 58-59, 67
 33.8-12: 56, 153, 265
 34.2: 73
 34.4: 71
 35.5: 55, 59, 67
 43.3: 55
- Plut., Pyrrh.*
 12.6-8: 122, 137, 147
 26.2: 257
 26.24: 30
 29.11: 257
 30.2: 209, 212-14
 32.1: 212-14, 220
- Plut., Mor.*
 69C-D: 64; see also Krates, fr. 34
 179A: see Krates, fr. 34
 219F: 30
 233E: 257
 251A-253F: 280-83
 334F: 457
 338A: 80, 90
 379C: 126
 533C: 65
 601F: 64
 612D: 195
 750E: see Philippiades, PCG VII fr. 26
 781E: 220
 798A: 105
 798E: 129
 830C: see Kleantes, SVF I 463 and 597
 846E: 43
 846F: 43, 51
 847C-D: 153-54
 850C-D: 70, 105, 136, 140
 850E: 143
 850F-851C: 158
 851D-E: 85, 117, 153-54
 851E-F: 122-24, 136, 153-54, 158
 852A-E: 80, 82-83
- 1090C: 126
- Polemon
 fr. 8: 79
- Polyainos
 3.7.1-3: 127-28, 313
 4.7.5: 126-28, 135
 4.7.11: 312, 325
 5.17: 134
 5.18: 164
 5.44.1: 457
 8.68: 213
- Polybios
 2.41.10: 218
 2.43.3-4: 234, 526
 2.43.8: 236
 2.44.3: 221
 2.47.9: 236-37
 2.48-49: 276-77
 2.48.4-8: 237, 241, 279, 493
 2.50.1-5: 237
 2.50.1-11: 234, 237
 2.51-52: 238-44
 2.51.2: 260, 529-30
 2.51.3: 278
 2.51.7: 240
 2.52.6: 241
 2.53.2: 244, 285
 2.55.3: 272
 2.59-60: 219, 221-22
 2.59.5: 215
 2.59.9: 219, 223
 2.63.1: 261
 2.65.3-4: 277, 306
 2.68.1-2: 471, 526
 4.2.1-3: 242, 246-47
 4.6.4-7: 248, 285
 4.9.6: 264
 4.10.12: 244
 4.22.3-12: 263-65
 4.23-24: 247, 265-67
 4.24.4-6: 263, 418
 4.30.6-8: 349
 4.34.1: 267
 4.34.3-11: 266-67
 4.34.5: 263

4.35.1-6: 266	7.12.9: 252
4.35.9-15: 259, 268	8.8: 273-74
4.36.8: 349	8.8a: 273-74
4.37.1: 252	8.15.9-10: 359-61
4.48.1-4: 360	8.17.4-8: 359-61
4.51.1-6: 360	12.13.7: 39
4.75.2-6: 283-84	12.13.8: 153
4.81: 268, 467-69	13.4-7: 327
4.82.2-8: 286-87, 473	16.2.4-9: 402
4.82.8: 285-86	16.3.7-14: 253
4.84-86: 249-50	16.6.11: 253
4.84.2-9: 283-84, 472	16.8.4-5: 253
4.86.3-7: 283-84	16.25.1: 203
5.1.2: 286-87	16.25.9: 205
5.1.6-12: 245, 287	16.38: 290
5.1.7: 286-87	18.1.2: 291-92, 321
5.5.4-5: 271	18.1.3: 253
5.5.11: 286-87	18.2.2: 253
5.6.1-2: 341-42	18.10.9: 334
5.9.9: 263-64	18.10.11: 203
5.13.3: 334	18.13.8-11: 291
5.23.7: 244	18.16.1-2: 254-55
5.26.5: 497	18.22.2: 327
5.27.1: 200	18.34.1: 334
5.30.1: 286-87	18.34.4: 292
5.30.7: 286-87	18.43: 321-22
5.35-39: 260-62	18.45.6: 444
5.35.11: 393, 401-402	20.3: 284-85, 350-52
5.39.6: 262	20.3.2: 352
5.63.12: 347	20.5.3: 306, 320
5.65.2: 347	20.5.5-6: 320-21
5.74-76: 501	20.5.7-11: 320-21, 328
5.74.6: 279	20.5.12: 263, 321
5.88-90: 328	20.8: 444-45
5.88.4: 492	20.10.5: 338
5.91-92: 244	20.10.15-17: 336-37, 339-41
5.91.4: 286-87	20.11: 339-41
5.93.8: 198, 278	21.6: 42-43
5.96.4-8: 326	21.17.7: 338, 345-46, 445
5.100.9: 310, 403	21.17.12: 32
5.102-103: 248	21.31.13: 334-35
5.102.2: 247, 248	21.42.11: 338, 345-46, 445
5.106.1: 285	22.13.1-7: 484
5.106.7-8: 188-89	27.7.8: 352
7.10.1: 273-74	27.15.2-5: 349-50
7.10.2-5: 271, 273-74	28.4.10-13: 338
7.11: 273, 463	29.10.4: 356
7.12-14: 273-74	30.7.10: 374

- Ptolemaios
5.6.6: 381
- Seneca, *Ep.*
107.11: 501
- Seneca (Υ), *De ira*
3.23: 153
- Stephanos Byzantios
s.v. Μεγάλη Πόλις: 277
- Stobaios
3.2.8: see Philippides, *PCG* VII fr. 30
7.60: 30
- Suda*
s.v. Ἀντίπατρος: 41, 74
s.v. Γόργος: 271, 273-74
s.v. Δείναρχος: 69-70
s.v. Δημάδης: 40-41, 45, 68
s.v. Εὐφορίων: 197
s.v. Ξενοκράτης: 65
s.v. Φιλιππίδης: 116
s.v. Φιλοποίμην: 471
- Teles, *Περὶ φυγῆς*
23: 164-65, 259, 413
- Theokritos, *Id.*
14: 23
- Theopompos, *FGrHist* 115
F 224: 23
F 236: 457
- Theophrastos, *Char.*
23.3-4: 470
- Zenon, *SVF* I
3: 172-73
4: 157, 173
7-8: 172
286: 163
- Zonaras
9.19: 336, 338, 445

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