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PERSIAN RULE IN CYPRUS

SOURCES, PROBLEMS, PERSPECTIVES

ΚΕΝΤΡΟΝ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΡΩΜΑΪΚΗΣ ΑΡΧΑΙΟΤΗΤΟΣ
ΕΘΝΙΚΟΝ ΙΔΡΥΜΑ ΕΡΕΥΝΩΝ

RESEARCH CENTRE FOR GREEK AND ROMAN ANTIQUITY
NATIONAL HELLENIC RESEARCH FOUNDATION

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ATHENS 2005

PREFACE

This book provides a brief summary of research into the relations of the Achaemenid Persians with their vassal city-kingdoms in the island of Cyprus. The aim has been to outline the biases (ancient and modern) that have influenced scholarly discussion and to propose new directions along broader lines.

Cyprus enters into the historical annals of the Persian period chiefly in the tale of Evagoras I of Salamis, a Greek king involved in an epic struggle between Greeks and Persians. The story behind the myth is likely to be less romantic and more complex. It is increasingly apparent that the case of Cyprus must be discussed in the broader context of the eastern Mediterranean. Within this larger environment, Cyprus existed as a constituent of the Achaemenid Persian Empire, as an independent culture with deep historical ties with the neighboring territories of Western Asia, Egypt and the Aegean, as a pawn in larger frictions between Greece and Persia, but also as the domain of divided parochial interests of several, separate city-kingdoms that must be assigned their own importance.

Confounding the problem is an overall paucity of direct evidence concerning Cyprus' relations with the empire. Extant literary sources only offer ambiguous clues about the mode(s) of Persian control of the island. The practice of using parchment rather than clay tablets for record keeping in the eastern Mediterranean, undoubtedly an improvement from the perspective of those handling the documents, has been an especially great loss to modern investigations of political and administrative connections. Persian presence and impact are equally difficult to detect in the testimony of archaeology. Subject to these limitations, however, useful insights into the character of Persian rule in Cyprus may still emerge from an approach that takes into account the larger picture of Persian imperial practices and, not least, the progress of the Great Kings' aims and concerns in the West.

Research into Cypriot and Achaemenid history over the past three years was undertaken under the Operational Programme "Competitiveness" 2000-2006 (Action 3.3.1.2) of the Third European Community Support Programme, which also made possible the publication of the present, initial contribution to the wide-ranging subject of Cypro-Persian

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GREEK SOURCES
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THE GREEK TESTIMONY

Modern accounts of the history of Cypro-Persian relations during the two centuries of Persian domination of the island must struggle with a notoriously lacunose and problematic record. Known references to Cyprus are difficult to identify in the surviving Achaemenid documents. At the same time, the more extensive Greek sources are only marginally interested in Cypriot activities, referring to them as a rule when they have an incidental bearing on narratives of Aegean and mainland Greek affairs. Between the two emerges a sketchy and uneven outline of the fortunes of the island under the Persian regime.

In the span of a single reign, that of Cyrus II (the Great), the founder of the Persian empire, the Persians rose from tribal obscurity to rulers of a vast empire, whose holdings surpassed in size the combined territories of the former Neo-Assyrian state and Egypt. The Cypriot kingdoms, previously under Neo-Assyrian and then Egyptian domination, reportedly offered no resistance to the Persian camp during Cyrus' westward expansion. According to Xenophon (*Cyrop.* 7.4.2, 8.6.21), their kings willingly submitted to the new eastern conqueror and offered military assistance to Persian expeditions against Caria and against Babylon in 539 BC.

Direct information about the island's administrative relationship with the empire is rare, consisting of brief and seemingly inconsistent references in Xenophon and Herodotus. Xenophon (*Cyrop.* 7.4.2, 8.6.21) asserts twice that, because the Cypriots willingly submitted and offered military assistance, Cyrus the Great did not send an Iranian satrap to the island but was satisfied with their local kings, requiring from them only tribute and troops. Herodotus (3.91.1) reports, on the other hand, in a much discussed account of the administrative reforms undertaken by Darius I (522-486 BC) following his enthronement, that Cyprus was incorporated with Syria-Palestine and Phoenicia into the fifth of the twenty *nomoi* into which the Achaemenid monarch had divided the empire, and was responsible for a portion of that *nomos'* 350-talent tribute. Herodotus also indicates that each of these subdivisions (which he variously calls *nomoi*, satrapies, or *archai* in his account) was ruled by a royally appointed *archon*. Taken at face value, his account would argue for a substantial modification of Cyprus' status starting in the reign

of Darius. While the island, though tributary, ostensibly "enjoyed a kind of undefined independence"[1] under Cyrus II and apparently under Cambyses, it would have subsequently been formally incorporated by Darius into the satrapal structure of the empire and, hence, directly placed under the authority of an imperial governor.

Cyprus' military relations with Persia are somewhat better attested. The military theme, set by Xenophon's references to the island's dealings with Cyrus II, remains the focus of Greek historical accounts of Cypriot affairs under subsequent Persian monarchs. Herodotus' *Histories*, the only extant, connected narrative of historical developments down to the reign of Xerxes, illustrates the tendency of our sources to inform us of Cypriot activities almost exclusively when they intersect with Greek affairs.[2] Testimony about the island's relations with Cyrus' son and successor, Cambyses, consists of a single passing remark in Book 3 (19.3) that reiterates Cyprus' willing submission to the empire and notes Cypriot participation in Cambyses' expedition against Egypt c. 525 BC.[3] The relatively detailed comment concerning the Cypriot uprising against Darius' regime in the early 490's (5.104-105, 108-116), which offers precious detail about the political situation on the island and its dealings with Persia at the time, subscribes to the historian's primary interest in the Ionian, especially Milesian, struggles with Persia.[4] Herodotus' subsequent references and asides[5] to Cyprus are incidental to

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1. Hill 1940, 112; cf. Gjerstad 1979, 250: "The rather undefined relations between Persia and Cyprus during the reigns of Cyrus and Cambyses were regulated by Darius I ... in a more systematic way...., and the tribute, which before had the character of presents, was now fixed at an exact sum".

2. References to the Cyprian temple of Aphrodite Ourania built by the Phoenicians (1.105.3, cf. 1.199.5) and to the celebration of 'Linus' (2.79.1) are notable exceptions to the usual military references.

3. A connection between Cypriot activities and Aegean Greek affairs is not readily apparent in Herodotus' reference to the Cypriots' participation in Cambyses' expedition against Egypt. However, the Persian conquest of Egypt had repercussions for Greeks settled at Naucratis, who were in all probability among Herodotus' sources on Perso-Egyptian affairs.

4. Cf. Hdt. 5.31.3 (the Milesian Aristagoras' comparison of Euboea's size and prosperity with the size and wealth of Cyprus) and Hdt. 5.49.6 (Cyprus on Aristagoras' bronze map).

5. E.g., Hdt. 7.90, where comments about the attire and equipment the Cypriot princes and sailors who served in Xerxes' fleet and about the different *ethne* of

the tale of Xerxes' great expedition against mainland Greece in 480 and bring forward above all the importance of Cypriot naval skills to Persia.[6]

The same narrow focus characterizes the sporadic references to Cyprus in later Greek historians and orators. We can infer the importance of the island as a Persian naval base in operations in the Aegean in 480/79 from Thucydides' emphasis in the 'Pentakontaetia' (1.94.2; cf. Diod. 11.44.1-2, Nepos *Paus.* 2.1) on the priority that the reconvened confederate Greek fleet assigned to raiding Cyprus after Mycale. Further references to Cyprus in the first half of the fifth century, during the latter years of Xerxes' reign and the reign of Artaxerxes I, all occur in the context of comments concerned with Athenian inroads into the southeastern Mediterranean under Cimon's leadership. These include references to Cyprus as a base for Phoenician ships during the Eurymedon campaign (*FGrHist* 124 [Kallisthenes] F 15 = Plut. *Cim.* 12.5; cf. Diod. 11.60.7) as well as a theater of Graeco-Persian competition at the time of Athenian collaboration with King Inarus of Egypt (Thuc. 1.104.1-2, Plato *Menex.* 241e-2a)[7] and during Cimon's last expedition (c. 450 B.C., Thuc. 1.112.1-4 [cf. Plut. *Cim.* 18-19.2], Diod. 12.3-4, Suda *Kimon*), on which occasion a Persian garrison is stated to have defended Cypriot Salamis against Athenian interventions (Diod. 12.4.1).

The Athenian literary tradition's considerably closer interest in the ruler of Salamis, Evagoras I—the only Cypriot king whose career is extensively documented in our sources—can be attributed to important intersections of Athenian and Cypriot activities in the late fifth century and the early decades of the fourth. Cyprus, featured earlier primarily in Graeco-Persian naval affairs, took on renewed significance when Graeco-Persian confrontations resumed during the reigns of Darius II and Artaxerxes II. The earliest references to Evagoras of Salamis are

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the Cypriots arise in the context of Herodotus' enumeration of the different contingents in Xerxes' armada.

6. The stated Cypriot contribution of 150 ships to Xerxes' fleet (Hdt. 7.90) is inferior in size only to the contingents of 300 and 200 ships contributed, respectively, by the Phoenicians/Syro-Palestinians and Egyptians. See also the reference (Hdt. 8.11.2) to Philaon, a brother of the king of Cypriot Salamis, Gorgos, as "a person of repute" in the Persian force.

7. See also *IG* I³ 1147 (= Meiggs and Lewis 1988, no. 33), a casualty list of the Erechtheid tribe, usually assigned to 460 or 459, in which Cyprus heads the list of geographical places.

arguably found in Euripides' *Helen*,[8] a play which, like the first Athenian decree in honor of Evagoras (*IG* I[3] 113), dates to the last phase of the Peloponnesian war—a period marked by Athens' desperate and ultimately unsuccessful effort to save her maritime empire against Spartan and Persian interventions. The nautical theme resurfaces in references to Evagoras' collaboration with Conon and Athens (Isoc. 9.53-57, 67-68; *IG* II[2] 20 [Lewis and Stroud 1979]) and arguably frames Evagoras' ten-year long conflict with Artaxerxes II (c. 390 – c. 380 BC).[9] The last phase of Cyprus' affiliation with the Persian regime is mentioned in passing in historical accounts of the expedition of Alexander of Macedon against the Persian empire. Following Alexander's victory over the last Achaemenid monarch Darius III at Issus (333 BC) the Cypriot kingdoms, which had been claimed as Persian possessions by a long succession of Persian rulers since the second half of the sixth century, are stated to have transferred their allegiance to the Macedonian conqueror and assisted in his siege of Tyre (Arrian *Anab.* 2.20.3, 2.20.6, 2.20.10, 2.21.1, 2.22.2; Plut. *Alex.* 24.4).

Herodotus' account of Darius' reforms creates the impression that, starting in the reign of Darius I, the Persians ran the island's affairs with a heavier hand. This impression is reinforced by Herodotus' account of the Cypriot revolt of the 490's and by later Greek references and allusions to the impact of Persian dominion on the political life and culture of the island. The revolt, we are told, invited two Persian expeditions against the island, one by the Persians' Phoenician fleet and the other by land. These quelled the uprising with remarkable rapidity. In the duration of a single year (Hdt. 5.116) the Persians restored their dominion over the island by defeating the combined armies of the rebellious Cypriot kings on the plain of Salamis (after having incited the defection of Curium and the chariotry of Salamis), and then by besieging

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8. See Grégoire and Goossens 1940, Zournatzi 1993.

9. See, e.g., Isoc. 9 [*Evag.*] 57-64, 4 [*Paneg.*] 134-135, 141; passing remarks in Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.24, 5.1.10, cf. 5.1.10; Diod. 14.98 and 110, 15.2-4, 8-9.2; Ctesias (Phot. *Bibl.* 72 [44b]); Ephorus (*FGrHist* 70 F 76; cf. Polyb. *Hist.* 12.25.1-2); Theopompus *Philippica* (*FGrHist* 115 F 103). For ultimate reliance upon the Athenian tradition of the narrative of Diodorus concerning Evagoras' conflict with Artaxerxes II, see Zournatzi 1991, 165-185. The chronology of the Cypriot war has been more recently discussed by Stylianou 1998, 143-154, with detailed references to earlier arguments.

and capturing one by one those cities that defied Persian authority, sparing only Salamis (Hdt.5.115). The determination of subsequent Achaemenid rulers to keep the island under control is implied by the extant records of the terms of the elusive Peace of Callias[10] in the reign of Artaxerxes I, which in all likelihood left the entire island within the Persian sphere, and made explicit by the terms of the Peace of Artaxerxes II with the Greeks in 387/6 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31, Isoc. 4.141, cf. Diod. 14.110).

The selective emphasis of our Greek sources upon military incidents involving Cyprus would tend to imply that the island was first and foremost a theater of warfare throughout the Persian period.[11] Our sources also force us to look at Cyprus with 'Greek eyes': Cypriot fortunes are closely intertwined in our texts with Hellenic struggles against Persia. The Cypriot uprising of the 490's—synchronized and causally connected in Herodotus with the Ionian revolt—is depicted as an integral part of an Ionian Greek struggle for *eleutherie* (Hdt. 5.109.2). The island's dire fate under Persian rule, alluded to as early as Aeschylus (*Pers.* 891-892), is echoed by Herodotus' description of Cypriot 'enslavement' in the 490's (Hdt. 5.116). The Cypriots' fateful struggle for liberation from the Persian yoke and the island's alienation from the rest of Hellas are detailed in Isocrates' account of the affairs of Cypriot Salamis and her ruler Evagoras, which also sets forward unambiguously the theme of the role of the Phoenicians in promulgating Persian authority on the island.

Isocrates (9.19-20) remarks that the Teucrid dynasty, which originally (κατὰ μὲν ἀρχάς) ruled Salamis, and from which Evagoras was descended, was displaced sometime afterwards (χρόνῳ δὲ ὕστερον) by a fugitive from Phoenicia who reduced the city to 'barbarism' and enslaved the entire island to the Great King. Evagoras, who was born

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10. On the ancient sources and the modern debate on the Peace of Callias, see conveniently Meiggs 1972, 487-495 (Appendix 8); the reality of the Peace has been convincingly defended by Badian 1987.

11. See, e.g., Karageorghis 2002, 216: "The whole of the fifth and a large portion of the fourth century B.C. constituted a period of antagonism and war against the Persians, but at the same time it was a period of strife among the various kingdoms of Cyprus, a phenomenon that was not uncommon in the history of the Greek world."

during the reign of one of the Phoenician usurper's descendants[12] and who gained the throne of his ancestors "by the favor of the god" (9.25), found a city "which was reduced to a state of barbarism and, because it was ruled by Phoenicians, was neither hospitable to the Greeks nor acquainted with the arts, nor possessing of a trading-port or harbor" (9.47). He was to remedy these defects and to undertake, in addition, construction of a new wall, the building of triremes, and the conquest of territory both on Cyprus and the adjacent Levant, making Salamis powerful and feared by many (9.47). Furthermore, while the Phoenician usurper of the Salaminian throne had made the entire island slave to the Great King, and the line of Evagoras' Phoenician predecessors had discouraged contacts with the rest of Hellas, Evagoras caused the inhabitants of Cyprus, formerly "so hostile to strangers and fierce that they considered the best rulers to be those who treated the Greeks in the most cruel fashion", to instead strive with one another to see who shall be regarded as more friendly to the Greeks, to take Greek wives, and to immerse themselves in Greek culture (9.49-50, cf. 66: τοὺς πολίτας ἐκ βαρβάρων... Ἕλληνας ἐποίησεν...). His attempts to remedy Cyprus' alienation from the Hellenic world also took the form of a keen collaboration with the Athenian general Conon, intended in Isocrates' description to free Salamis' motherland from Spartan over lordship (9.53-57, 68). Evagoras' subsequent embroilment with Artaxerxes II and his revolt were to further strengthen his reputation as a champion of the Greek cause (9.57-67, cf. 4.141). At the end of a decade of warfare, Evagoras was forced to submit, and Salamis, with her economic and military resources drained by the long war and with most of her territorial holdings lost, was reduced (from the viewpoint of our Greek texts) to her former status as an obscure vassal state within the Achaemenid empire.

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12. Diodorus (14.98.2) calls him 'Abdemon of Tyre'; Theopompus (*FGrHist* 115 F 103) 'Abdymon of Citium'.

THE *EVAGORAS* AND EARLY INTERPRETATIONS
OF THE CHARACTER OF PERSIAN RULE IN CYPRUS

A ncient Greek pronouncements have had a profound impact upon early assessments of the circumstances of Persian rule on the island. Isocrates' description of the demise of Salamis in Phoenician/Persian hands and his portrait of Evagoras as a champion of the Hellenic cause were largely accepted and provided the larger framework for the interpretation of both the details of local Cypriot history and the larger processes that affected the island's fortunes under Persian dominion.

There is no shortage of indications that the basic form of political organization of the island into city kingdoms—which is securely attested since the Neo-Assyrian period[13]—was preserved throughout the Persian period. However, the history of the Cypriot kingdoms in the Persian era remains largely obscure since in most instances information about their existence is confined to a few dynasts' names in Greek texts and Cypriot inscriptions and coins.[14] Details of the interaction of those kingdoms with Persian authorities are poorly documented. Greek testimony continued to draw an unsatisfactory picture of the state of affairs on the island.

The Cypriot uprising of 498/7 and the emphasis of our Greek sources upon the repeated Aegean Greek efforts to liberate the island until c. 450 suggested a continuum of Cypriot-Greek opposition to Persian rule that spanned the fifth century and became more dynamic during the conflict between Evagoras and Artaxerxes. Simmering Cypriot opposition to Persia in the interim was inferred from Isocrates' account of Evagoras' activities upon his accession to the throne. His construction of a new fortification wall at Salamis, his building of a fleet, and the expansion of his domain in the earlier part of his reign, were all

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13. For the relevant Neo-Assyrian texts, dating from the reign of Sargon II to the reign of Ashurbanipal, see conveniently Saporetti 1976, 83-88. The evidence is discussed in detail by Stylianou 1989, 382-395, Reyes 1994, 50-60.

14. The relevant Greek literary references may be consulted in Hadjiioannou 1985, 45-85.3 *passim*; Antoniades 1981 includes the testimony of coins and Cypriot inscriptions. On the history in general of the kingdoms and their institutions, see Stylianou 1989 (esp. 511-525), Zournatzi 1996, Iacovou 2002.

viewed as military "preparations for the conflict to come" with Persia.[15] His collaboration with Conon and Athens was presumed to have been part of the same scheme.[16]

At the same time, while Herodotus' definition of the fifth *nomos* presented the island as a formal part of the Persian domain,[17] sporadic references in our sources were also thought to confirm the Persian rulers' determination—perhaps motivated by the island's strategic location (cf. Diod. 14.98.3.)—to hold on to Cyprus by military means. In addition to the attested dispatches of Persian troops against Cypriot rebels in 498/7 and the 380's, the establishment of a military occupation in the island seemed probable from references to the Persian garrisons from which Pausanias sailed to liberate the Cypriot cities in 478 (Diod. 11.44.2; cf. Nepos *Paus*. 2.1) and which Cimon found defending Salamis in 450 (Diod. 12.4.1).[18]

The Phoenician takeover of Salamis, the reported collaboration of the usurper with the Persian king, and the unanimous hostility of Evagoras' Phoenician predecessors against the Greeks further seemed to offer sound indications of a Persian policy favoring the Phoenician

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15. See notably Gjerstad 1948, 491. However, Spyridakis 1941[1945], 46-56, had recognized that Evagoras' mediation between Tissaphernes and Athens in *IG* I³ 113, dated to the last decade of the Peloponnesian war, and the Salaminian's mediation to Artaxerxes II on behalf of Conon in the 390's implied friendly relations with the Persian regime at the outset.

16. According to Gjerstad 1948, 492, the plan of Conon and Evagoras "was to crush Sparta and to raise Athens with the help of Persia, and then to beat Persia with the help of Athens"; a similar plan is insinuated by the comments of Spyridakis 1963, 38.

17. See Leuze 1935, 27, Hill 1940, 112, Spyridakis 1941[1945], 104-105.

18. E.g., Gjerstad 1948, 483: "...the system [was] probably introduced after the revolt of 499/8 B.C." and 479 n.2: "we do not know on which occasion these garrisons were stationed in Cypriot cities. It may have been after the failure of the revolt in 498 B.C. or after the battle of Salamis, in order to check the expected attacks of Greeks. However, the existence of these garrisons confirms that the Persian domination of Cyprus was much firmer than before and also based on military bases of support." See also Schäfer 1960, 174, and the comment of Maier and Karageorghis 1984, 203, that "[t]he Persian grip on the island tightened perceptibly [after the Cypriot revolt]. Rulers were exchanged or strong garrisons established where it seemed necessary to ensure the loyalty of the kingdoms".

elements of the island against its Cypriot-Greek dynasts and inhabitants. The date(s) of the Phoenician takeover, which is not well-defined in Isocrates (9.19-20),[19] and of the related submission of the island to the Persian king and alienation from the Greek world, were tentatively set to shortly after the Cypriot revolt,[20] after Pausanias' expedition to the island in 478 or were associated with the reported Athenian campaigns in the Cypriot domain in the 460's and c. 450 BC.[21]

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19. The difficulty in dating the Phoenician usurpation of the throne of Salamis is perhaps most clearly illustrated by earlier discussion of the coins attributed to Salamis between the Cypriot revolt (i.e, the reign of Gorgos) and the accession of Evagoras. As Hill 1940, 125 n. 4, notes (cf. *BMC, Cyprus...*, xcii-c), issues ascribed to the city's mint during that period bear the names of Nicodamus, Lacharidas and Evanthes, and there "are no coins which can be attributed to the Phoenician usurpers until we come to Abdemon". The tendency (as indicated not least by Hill's statements) was to consider that issues bearing Greek names "may have been issued in some other place by the Teucrids in exile". At the same time, the absence of coinage that could be ascribed to Abdemon's Phoenician predecessors was thought not to be surprising "[i]f the city was really reduced to such a state as Isocrates describes".

20. Initially, it seemed possible to advance on the basis of early archaeological discoveries at Marium a general case for the island's isolation from the Greek world throughout the first half of the fifth century. In particular, the lack of Attic imports in contemporary graves excavated in the latter city in the late nineteenth century was thought to indicate a withdrawal of Greek influence from the island after the Cypriot revolt (Hermann 1888, 24-34 esp. 25-26; cf. Busolt 1897, 344 n.2). Hermann also posited that a revival of Attic imports "just after the failure of Cimon's expedition" could be attributed to the state of peace achieved between Athens and Persia by the Peace of Callias. Current evidence about Marium's and Cyprus' foreign contacts during the fifth century does not lend itself to such neat conclusions. For Marium, in particular, see the recent summary of the relevant archaeological evidence by Childs 1997; see also in general below.

21. According to Spyridakis 1941[1945], 42-43 (cf. 1963, 62), for instance, the Phoenician usurpation of the throne of Salamis and the enslavement of the entire island to Persia would have taken place shortly before 450, and the Persian/Phoenician policy of Cyprus' barbarization and isolation from Greece would have begun to be rigorously pursued after the Peace of Callias. For Hill 1940, 125-126: "If we may believe Isocrates, the reaction against all things Greek, which must have begun after the Egyptian disaster, was greatly encouraged." Karageorghis 1982, 163, suggests that the take over of Idalium (which he sets to 470 in agreement with Gjerstad 1948, 479-480 and *ICS*[2] p. 238)

Isocrates' references to the situation in Salamis and Cyprus before Evagoras' accession were also thought to allow more general inferences about the disastrous consequences of Perso-Phoenician rule upon the economic and cultural fabric of the island. The deterioration of economic conditions was inferred from Salamis' reported lack of a harbor and port of trade before Evagoras.[22] The anti-Greek policies that were presumably pursued by the Persians provided the backdrop for general contentions about the island's cultural isolation from Greece[23] and, as a consequence, for the "deep abasement" and "helpless and desperate degeneration of Cypriot art" during the fifth century.[24]

The notion that the "Phoenician dynasties combined with the Persians, leading to a political and cultural dominance of the Phoenician element in Cyprus and to the repression of the Greeks and their civilization",[25] which surfaces in a number of early discussions of fifth-century Cypriot history,[26] was most expansively formulated by Einar Gjerstad. As he states in his 1948 summary of the history of Cyprus during the Classical period:

> We know very little of the history of Cyprus during that period, but the Cypro-Greek cities were reduced to a state of political nullity, and Persia was determined to eradicate the last survival of philhellene mentality. In Salamis, the Cypro-Greek dynasty was dethroned, and a Phoenician intruder from Tyre made himself dynast of the city, evidently in

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represented a success that "strengthened the alliance between the Persians and the Phoenicians. From now on a new factor appears in Cypriot politics—the open hostility of the Phoenicians against the Greek population and their complete alignment with Persian policies." According to Tatton-Brown 1982, 92, the Cypriot kingdoms were "divided in their loyalties" by the time of Cimon's expedition to Cyprus in c. 450.

22. E.g., Spyridakis 1941[1945], 115 (cf. 1963, 71).

23. E.g., Spyridakis 1941[1945], 43 (cf. 1963, 76-77).

24. Gjerstad 1948, 488, and in general 476-477, 485-489; cf. Dikaios 1961, 94.

25. Expression borrowed from Maier 1985, 32, whose discussion, however, strongly criticizes this view, see below pp. 37-42.

26. Among earlier discussions, see Busolt 1897, 344, Meyer 1902, 198, Oberhummer 1924, 93 and 102, Spyridakis 1941[1945], 43 (cf. 1963, 29-31, 76-77), Hill 1940, 125-126. For more recent pronouncements along the same lines, see, e.g., Tatton-Brown 1982, 92-94, 96-97, and Karageorghis 1982, 163.

secret understanding with Persia…The alliance of Persians
and Phoenicians against the Cypro-Greek cities…was
intensified and developed into a systematic action intended
to turn Cyprus into a Persian country administered by
Phoenicians.[27]

According to the same scholar, it was the further intent of the Perso-
Phoenician alliance to make Cyprus a "cultural bastion of Asia against
Greece" while Evagoras aspired "to make the island a united state, a
Greek state, a cultural bulwark against Asia".[28]

The early thesis of a close collaboration between Persians and
Phoenicians against the Cypriot-Greek elements of the island also came
to color perceptions of the material record.[29] An inscription on a bronze
tablet, reportedly found in the western acropolis of Idalium before 1850
and published by H. de Luynes in 1852, records rewards given by King
Stasikypros and the Idalians to a Greek doctor and his brothers for
helping the wounded "when the Medes and Citians were besieging
Idalium".[30] Citium was Cyprus' Phoenician center par excellence. The
date of the apparently unsuccessful siege of Idalium could not be
established.[31] However, it would have had to antedate the documented

27. Gjerstad 1948, 484-485, cf. *idem* 1979, 252-253. For criticisms against
Gjerstad's thesis, see Costa 1974 and Maier 1985, whose arguments are sum-
marized below.

28. Gjerstad 1948, 502. Here, Gjerstad may be seen to transpose upon Persia's
cultural policy towards Cyprus the essentials of a Persian strategic concern
expressed in Diodorus. In accounting for Artaxerxes' resolution to join the cities
of Amathus, Soli, and Citium in opposing Evagoras, Diodorus (14.98.3) asserts
that the Persian King not only did not wish Evagoras to "grow any stronger, but
also…appreciated the strategic position of Cyprus and its great naval strength
whereby it [*sic*!] would be able to protect Asia in front" (Loeb trans.); cf. also
Spyridakis 1941[1945], 61 (cf. 1963, 62).

29. Cf. Maier 1985 for a similar, earlier approach to the history of modern
interpretation.

30. See *ICS*[2] no. 217, l. 1.

31. For a summary of earlier opinions (dating the tablet from the early fifth to
the fourth century), see the lengthy 'Note' of Hill 1940, 153-155, and *ICS*[2] p.
238. Though a date in the fourth century may be now confidently dismissed, the
tablet is still variously dated to the time of the Cypriot revolt (initially put by
Meyer 1901, 305, and supported by Gjerstad *et al.* 1935, 625-626; thought
possible by Stylianou 1989, 403-404 and Petit 1991, 163 [who argues in favour

annexation of the city by king Azbaal, whose reign (usually dated after 450 BC) marked the beginning of Citium's classical period territorial expansion in the island.[32] Further testimony of Citium's political aggrandizement was provided by evidence that the fourth-century king Pumiathon had incorporated the kingdom of Tamassus into his own territory.[33] The Idalium tablet's reference to the joint attack of "Medes and Citians" against Idalium could be (and was) readily perceived as confirmation that Citium's expansion at the expense of its neighboring Cypriot-Greek kingdoms in the fifth and fourth centuries was accomplished with Persian backing.[34]

Gjerstad felt initially that archaeological evidence from Idalium allowed to date the siege mentioned on the tablet, and, hence, the beginning of Persian and Citian collaboration, to the time of the Cypriot revolt.[35] His discoveries at the fortified hilltop settlement at Vouni, some 4 km to the west of the city of Soli on the north-western coast of

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of Gjerstad *et al.* 1935, 625-626]), in the 470's (Gjerstad 1948, 479-480 n. 5 [cf. Gjerstad 1979, 240 n.1], followed by *ICS²* p. 238, Karageorghis 1982, 163, Yon 1992, 244-245 n. 4, and seemingly Tuplin 1996, 45), around 450-445 BC (Hill 1940, 153-5; Spyridakis 1941[1945], 43) or possibly even in the third quarter of the fifth century (Meiggs 1972, 484-485).

32. The annexation of Idalium in the reign of Azbaal is attested by inscriptions of Azbaal's son and successor, Baalmelek II, who ruled in the second half of the fifth century (Honeyman 1939, nos. 3 and 7). For the conventional chronology of the fifth- and fourth-century kings of Citium, see *BMC, Cyprus...* xxx-xlii. On the inability of the archaeological record of Idalium to elucidate the moment of the city's annexation by Citium, see esp. the comments of Tuplin 1996, 45 and n. 92. Phoenician presence at Idalium in the fourth century is now also attested by two Phoenician economic archives found at the site, see Hadjicosti 1997, 57-60.

33. Athen. *Deipn.* 4. 167 c, d (=*FGrHist* 76 [Duris] F 4); *CIS* I, 10 l. 2 (dated to the 21st year, 342 BC, of Pumiathon, "king of Citium, Idalium and Tamassus, son of Melekiathon, king of Citium and Idalium").

34. This common perception is attested as early as Meyer 1902, 198-200. Cf. more recently Stylianou 1989, 425: "When, therefore, the Persians and the Kitians attacked Idalion, as the bronze Idalian tablet recounts..., either in 498 or in the 470s, it was not a question of an unwilling Cypriot city being compelled to attack another, but of a Phoenician city loyal to Persia helping to subdue a rebellious Greek Cypriot city, and hoping that it might be allowed to take it over, as indeed it finally did."

35. Gjerstad *et al.* 1935, 625-626, but cf. also n. 31 above.

the island, further supplemented the picture of an island-wide conflict fostered by Persia between Greek and Phoenician elements. There, excavations conducted by the *Swedish Cyprus Expedition* between 1928 and 1930 uncovered the remains of a monumental complex, some 0.5 ha in area, whose lifetime was dated by the associated pottery from c. 500 to c. 380 BC.[36] The complex, identified as a palace owing to its monumental character, currently represents the most conspicuous testimony of the political importance of the territory of Soli in this period. Gjerstad, however, thought it unlikely to have belonged to native Solian rulers.

In Herodotus' account of the Cypriot revolt, the city of Soli is stated to have been the last of the rebellious Cypriot cities to hold out against the Persians. It was captured after a five-month siege and the mining of its fortifications, with the last Solian king Aristokypros falling earlier in battle (Hdt. 5.113.2). No explicit evidence exists about the repercussions of the revolt on the local kings. There are no references to any rulers of Soli from the time of the revolt until the fourth century. Fifth-century coinage—which by default could supply evidence for the preservation of the city's sovereign status following its capture by the Persians—has so far been impossible to ascribe to Soli in anything but a tentative manner.[37] For Gjerstad the emergence of the fortified settlement of Vouni provided additional testimony about the suppression of Solian independence.

Gjerstad's dating of the construction of the palace to c. 500 and the simultaneous lack of traces of destruction in its earlier levels, which might be associated with the Persian assault on Soli in the early 490's,[38] pointed to its association with post-revolt circumstances. Located at

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36. The results of the Swedish excavations at the palace of Vouni are presented in detail in Gjerstad *et al.* 1937, 111-290; a summary appears in Gjerstad 1948, 23-29.

37. On the coins of Soli, see Gesche 1970, 167, 176-177, 204. Concerning the possible attribution of a fifth-century numismatic series to Soli, see Destrooper-Georgiades 1985, 98-100. An overview of the evidence on the history of the kingdom of Soli is offered, among others, by Stylianou 1989, 138-9.

38. Although the Archaic period layers at the site proper of Soli have only begun to be explored, traces of an important destruction layer that might be attributed to the Persian assault of 498/7 were reportedly identified in the 'lower' city by the excavators, see des Gagniers 1985, esp. 256-257.

some distance from the site of Soli, Vouni could be perceived as being unconnected to the tradition of Cypriot city planning evidenced by the contiguous locations of palace and city at Amathus,[39] Paphos[40] and Idalium.[41] Taking into account the choice of a naturally defensible hilltop location overlooking the plain of rebellious Soli, Gjerstad suggested that it functioned as a control point in a politically sensitive area of the island following the Cypriot revolt.[42] Gjerstad interpreted the material evidence from the palace as offering corroboration for the hypothesis of suppression implied by the testimony of the Idalium tablet and the *Evagoras*. Complementary testimony was putatively provided by the contents of an important coin hoard buried within the building before its early-fourth-century destruction and by the architectural history of the palace.

The coin hoard, part of a larger treasure that included silver vessels and gold and silver jewelry,[43] consisted in the majority (150 out of 252 specimens, or 60%) of coins of Marium.[44] As shown by legends in Cypriot syllabic, the latter coins were all issues of kings Stasioikos and Timochares, known from earlier examples of the same types and dated to the latter half of the fifth century, perhaps "as early as the third quarter".[45] The preponderance of Marium coins in the treasure testified, in Gjerstad's opinion, to the control of Vouni by the neighboring city of Marium. Supplementary numismatic evidence about the earlier fifth-century sequence of Marium's kings indicated to Gjerstad the establishment of a Phoenician medophile dynasty following the revolt of 498/7.[46] J. P. Six[47] had argued since the 1880's for the attribution to

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39. See, e.g., Petit 1996, fold out plan of Amathus no. 7.

40. See, e.g., Maier and Karageorghis 1984, 121 plan of Paphos: KB.

41. Stager and Walker 1989, 4 fig. 2 (Areas C and D), and 5-13.

42. E.g., Gjerstad *et al.* 1937, 287-288, Gjerstad 1946 and 1948, 477; cf. Hill 1940, 119, Meiggs 1972, 481.

43. See Gjerstad *et al.* 1937, 238-249 no. 292, with a detailed catalogue of the contents of the hoard.

44. See Schwabacher 1946, 30. The sum of the coins contained in the hoard were subsequently studied by Schwabacher 1947 [1949].

45. *BMC, Cyprus...* lvii, lix, 71 nos. 1 and 2, and pl. 13 nos. 11, 12. The possible chronological range of these issues is now held possible to descend into the early fourth century, see n. 107 below.

46. Gjerstad 1946 and 1948, 453, 477.

47. Six 1883, 342 f.

Marium of another, earlier numismatic series, which was only attested at the time by rare, worn examples, and whose connection with Marium long remained disputed because the legends could not be securely read on the coins.[48] Fourteen additional, better preserved specimens of those issues, some located by E. S. G. Robinson and others acquired independently by Gjerstad during his work at Vouni, confirmed Six's attribution. On the reverse of the specimens located by Robinson the legend μα-ρι-ε-υ-σε (Μαριεύς, or '(stater) of Marium') in Cypriot syllabic was clearly legible, and one could finally read with certainty on the obverse a patronymic, Doxandros.[49] The coins obtained by Gjerstad, on the other hand, allowed a secure reading of the name of Doxandros' son as Sasmas.[50] Though written in the syllabic script uniformly employed on all Marium coins down to the late fifth/early fourth century, Sasmas' name was readily recognizable as Phoenician.[51] Further allusions to his Phoenician background were afforded by rare specimens of the series which bore on the reverse the Phoenician letters *ML* in lieu of the ethnic, possibly an abbreviation of the Phoenician royal title *MLK*.[52]

Sasmas' reign, dated by Gjerstad's stylistic comparison of his coin types with local reliefs from c. 470/60 to c. 450 BC,[53] was seen as supplying unambiguous testimony for a 'Phoenician episode' in Marium's dynastic history in the second quarter of the fifth century. Gjerstad synchronized the beginning of that episode with the immediate

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48. See the reservations expressed by Hill, *BMC, Cyprus...* lvii.

49. Robinson 1932, 209-212.

50. Gjerstad 1946, 21-22.

51. See Masson Sznycer 1972, 80-81, and *ICS*[2] pp. 182-183, with further attestations of the name in Cyprus.

52. For different suggestions concerning the significance of *ML* (i.e., as an abbreviation of the Phoenician royal title *MLK* or an abbreviation of the city name [Μάριον-Μάλιον] or even as initial and final letter of an anthroponym), see Masson and Sznycer 1972, 80-81. Today five such specimens are known in total. Two earlier known specimens, a siglos and a siglos third were each conserved, respectively, in the American Numismatic Society and in the British Museum (*BMC Cyprus* 71 no. 2 and pl. 13 no. 12) and are discussed in Robinson 1932, 210. Two more specimens (isolated finds from Polis, now in private hands) are recorded in Destrooper-Georgiades 2001, 179; a fifth one appears to be cited on her Table A (p. 182).

53. Gjerstad 1946, 22 n. 9; but see also p. 38 below.

aftermath of the Cypriot revolt through a further assumption that, despite his Greek name, Sasmas' father Doxandros may have been a Phoenician placed in power by the Persians after the revolt of 498/7.[54] In his view, this Phoenician interlude would have come to an end as a consequence of Cimon's capture of Marium in 450/49—a date that could be correlated with the lower chronological limit of Sasmas' reign. In Gjerstad's scheme, the later kings Stasioikos and Timochares, whose coinages are generally dated after the middle of the fifth century and display no Phoenician symbols, represented the re-establishment of a 'hellenophile' order.[55]

This state of affairs had, according to Gjerstad, direct implications for the political history and architectural definition of Vouni. The predominance of coins of Marium in the Vouni hoard ought to allude to political control by Marium dynasts over Vouni. Political developments at Marium could also be seen as shaping both the initial form and subsequent changes to the architectural layout of the Vouni palace.

Following his excavations of the palace, Gjerstad thought he could identify two main phases (designated 'first' and 'second' palace, respectively), each characterized by a different plan.[56] The nucleus of the 'first palace',[57] constructed around 500 B.C. would have been entered from the south-west, through a tripartite complex of rooms (Rms. 48-56) that served as a monumental entrance and reception area. Doorways at the north-eastern ends of both the dominant central and the two lateral parts of the latter complex led to a broad staircase of seven steps down to a courtyard, which was opened on its other three sides to single rooms.

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54. As Gjerstad 1946, 23, stated, "Doxandros is the Greek name of the king, whose Phoenician name is unknown to us". Cf. Schwabacher 1946. The hypothesis that a Phoenician dynasty of Persian sympathies was probably established at Marium in the wake of the Cypriot revolt was also put by Hill 1940, 119, who followed Robinson's (1932, 210) secure identification of Phoenician letters on Marium's fifth-century coins (mentioned in Hill 1940, 100 n.).

55. Gjerstad 1946, cf. 1948, 485-486.

56. The form and stylistic affinities of the palace were discussed in Gjerstad 1932, 1933a, 1933b, 1948, 231-238, 485-486, Gjerstad *et al.* 1937, 205-229.

57. See Gjerstad 1948, 26 fig. 6, and Gjerstad *et al.* 1937, 188-189 fig. 119 (periods 1 and 2).

The 'second palace' (c. 450 BC) was larger than the earlier structure.[58] Gjerstad also proposed that at that time the south-western end of the central suite of rooms (Rms. 51-53) of the tripartite complex, which had presumably served as entrance of the first palace, was blocked by a transverse wall and that a new, winding entrance leading to the peristyle courtyard was constructed in the north-western corner of the building. The latter alterations were seen as effecting a radical change in the plan of the palace.

Gjerstad associated the first palace with eastern *liwan*-houses.[59] According to Gjerstad, the second palace converted the main room of the earlier entrance to "'a megaron' [i.e., a long room with a porch entered from the short side] incorporated in a tripartite room-complex".[60] In that manner, while "the first palace at Vouni [was] a representative of the Old Cypriot ['Eteo-Cypriot'] architecture related to Anatolian and Syrian house types, the second palace [marked] a combination of Cypriot and Greek elements with two originally separate types completely combined: the Syro-Anatolian central-court house and the Greek megaron",[61] which was presumably brought to the island by Mycenaean colonists.[62] To Gjerstad the palace would have preserved its 'Cypro-Hellenic' outlook down to about 380 BC, when its violent destruction was brought about by an uprising of the natives of Soli, and the settlement on the hilltop was forever abandoned.[63]

While attesting to the relative affluence of the occupants, movable objects recovered from the palace were generally of types common on the island and offered no obvious clues to the particular ethnic or cultural affiliation of the occupants. A significant difference between the respective builders of the 'first' and 'second' palaces could still be surmised following Gjerstad's interpretation of the Vouni coin hoard and his reconstruction of two distinct palace plans. The two main phases of the Vouni palace, an eastern 'first palace' dating before c. 450 BC and a

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58. Gjerstad *et al.* 1937, 188-189 fig. 119 (periods 3 and 4).

59. For Gjerstad's description of the *liwan*-house, which is properly defined with reference to modern houses in Syria and adjacent regions, see Gjerstad 1932, 160, and pl. IV, fig. 5.

60. Gjerstad 1933a, 591.

61. Gjerstad 1933a, 593.

62. Gjerstad 1933a, 598.

63. See, e.g., Gjerstad 1933a, 595-6.

more Hellenic 'second palace' dated after c. 450 BC, and his attendant assumption that Vouni was controlled by Marium, allowed him to attribute the 'first palace' of Vouni and control over the city of Soli to the 'medophile' ruler Doxandros, and the mid-fifth-century reconstruction to a 'hellenophile' dynast presumably installed by Cimon.[64]

In the wake of Gjerstad's important excavations at Vouni and his reconstruction of the political fortunes of Marium and Soli, evidence about the rulers of Lapethus and excavations at Paphos seemed to offer further testimony of the suppression of the island's freedom after the Cypriot revolt. The sequence of Lapethus' kings (Demonikos I, Sidqmelek, Andr…, Demonikos II, …ippos?, Berekshemesh, Praxippos) reconstructed from numismatic, epigraphic and literary evidence,[65] revealed a prominent Phoenician affiliation. Not only did Greek and Phoenician names alternate in the list, but the legends on the city's coinage were rendered in Phoenician down to the time of Praxippos, the last ruler of Lapethus deposed by Ptolemy in 312 BC (Diod. 19.79.4). The coins of Demonikos I, the earliest attested king of Lapethus and presumably immediate predecessor of Sidqmelek, were dated by Robinson on stylistic grounds to the time of the Cypriot revolt.[66] The latter scholar further conjectured that Demonikos would have lost his throne at the time of the revolt to Sidqmelek, presumably a medophile dynast.[67]

In due course, it also became possible to propose that the monumental complex at Vouni was not the only edifice that could be linked with changed circumstances of Persian rule on the island after the revolt. While the findings of the Swedish excavators at Vouni were held

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64. See, e.g., Gjerstad *et al.* 1937, 286-8, Gjerstad 1946. The thesis is echoed, among others, in Dikaios 1960, 15. For objections to Gjerstad's political arguments, see Maier 1985, 36-7, and pp. 40-41 below.

65. See Schwabacher 1947, 79-84, Robinson 1948: 45-47 and 60-65, Masson-Sznycer 1972, 97-100. Cf. Maier 1985, 35.

66. Robinson 1948, 45-47, 60-65.

67. As Robinson 1948, 61, stated. "[i]t is a tempting conjecture that Demonikos I took part with his fellow Greeks in the Ionian Revolt in 499 and that on its collapse he lost his throne to the Semite [i.e., Sidqmelek]". A reference (p. 63 n. 13) to Schwabacher 1946, reveals Robinson's familiarity with Gjerstad's analogous hypothesis about the contemporary installation of a Phoenician medophile ruler at Marium mentioned with approval in Schwabacher's article.

to provide a manifestation of the imposition of tighter (although indirect) imperial control in the area of Soli following the Cypriot revolt, a similar inference was made in the case of another monumental edifice that was partially exposed in 1952 and 1953 at Palaepaphos, the seat of the important kingdom of Paphos on the south-western coast of the island. The edifice, which dominates the Hadji Abdullah plateau, rested against the inner face of the city wall overlooking residential quarters.[68] Archaeological finds only indicated an approximate date for the construction of the building in the course of the Cypro-Archaic II period (600-475 BC).[69] A closer dating was thought possible by Jörg Schäfer on the basis of salient architectural features. The palace's ashlar masonry construction[70] and its unusual plan of "many small rooms and narrow corridors arranged on symmetrical axes"[71] were comparable, he thought, to late-sixth- and early-fifth-century architecture at Persepolis.[72] These features allowed an interpretation of the building as a *Perserbau* constructed after the revolt. Though Schäfer broached this identification somewhat tentatively,[73] the function of the building as "headquarter of a Persian garrison"[74] or a "Persian commander's residence"[75] was more confidently advanced in the 1970's and early 1980's due to a further discovery at the same site.

Paphos is not listed as a member of the Cypriot coalition that opposed Persia in the 490's; its participation in the revolt had been inferred from Herodotus' general remark that all Cypriots joined the uprising with the exception of the Amathusians (Hdt. 5.104). Excavation established beyond doubt that the city not only joined the revolt but was

68. See the plan of the site shown in Maier and Karageorghis 1984, 121; the monumental edifice is marked as KB 'Palace'.

69. Schäfer 1960, 169-70.

70. Different views of the surviving ashlar walls of the building are illustrated in Schäfer 1960, 159 fig. 5, 161 fig. 6, 166 fig. 12, 168 fig. 14.

71. Maier and Wartburg 1985, 155. For the recovered ground plan of the building, see Schäfer 1960, foldout plans I and II after p. 158.

72. Schäfer 1960, 174, referring in particular to the affinity of the Hadji Abdullah building with the Treasury at Persepolis (Schmidt 1953, 138f. fig. 65, 152 fig. 78).

73. Note the quotation marks of "*Perserbau*" and the question mark in the title of Schäfer's (1960) article.

74. Meiggs 1972, 481.

75. Tatton-Brown 1982, 96; cf. Karageorghis 1982, 156.

also one of the targets of the siege operations conducted by the Persian army in 498/7. Just outside the Northeast Gate of the city, on the *Marcello* hill, excavations conducted by the University of St. Andrews and the Liverpool Museums in the early 1950's and since 1966 under the auspices of the German Archaeological Institute, brought to light remains of a siege ramp[76] hastily erected from earth and the rubble of monuments inscribed in Cypriot syllabic and sculptures from a nearby archaic sanctuary destroyed at the time of the siege.[77] A passage and four tunnels dug through the natural rock underneath the wall showed that attempts were made by the besieged to undermine the ramp to prevent siege engines from assaulting the higher points of the wall in the manner depicted on earlier Assyrian reliefs.[78] Further evidence of determined resistance materialized in the form of many round stone projectiles, presumably for stone-throwing catapults,[79] as well as nearly 500 bronze and iron arrowheads, spearheads, and javelin points from the mound.[80] Such dramatic testimony reinforced the impression of the Cypriots' harsh treatment at the time of the revolt and provided additional justification for the thesis that "the Persians, influenced by the uprising…tightened their hold on the island when the fighting was over".[81] In this light, the Hadji Abdullah building could be viewed as a 'typical measure' of the imposition of tighter control.

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76. For a general presentation of the excavation results in the area of the Northeast Gate, see esp. Maier and Karageorghis 1984, 192-203, and 219 n. 14, with references to earlier preliminary reports on the progress of excavations. Cf. Maier and Wartburg 1985, 157 and the plan of the Northeast Gate and siege mound on 154 fig. 6, and Karageorghis 2002, 215-216.

77. See in general Maier and Karageorghis 1984, 186-192. The inscriptions from the siege mound were published in Masson and Mitford 1986, 19-98; for a preliminary presentation of the sculptures, see Wilson 1974.

78. See, e.g., a representation of Sennacherib's siege of Lachish (701 BC) on an Assyrian relief now in the British Museum in Reade 1983, 47 fig. 66 (A. H. Layard's drawing) and 48 fig.67 (A. Sorrell's reconstruction). For a dramatic (literary) reconstruction of the siege of Paphus, see Burn 1962, 203-205. Analogous Persian siege tactics are implied in Hdt. 1.162 and 1.168.

79. See, e.g., Maier and Karageorghis 1984, 198, 200, and 196 fig. 185

80. See the final publication by Erdmann 1977.

81. Meiggs 1972, 481; cf. Maier and Karageorghis 1984, 203.

In summary, Isocrates' description of the treatment of Salamis and the rest of Cyprus[82] at the hands of the Persians and Phoenicians was not only largely accepted initially but coexisted happily with epigraphic, numismatic and archaeological evidence of the fifth-century fortunes of Idalium, Soli, Marium, Lapethus and Paphos. The result was an incomplete but coherent picture of an island torn by Graeco-Phoenician antagonism and virtually cut off from the Greek world by Persian oppression after the Ionian revolt or by c. 450 at the latest.

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82. Maier 1985, 33, objected that Isocrates only refers these conditions to Salamis. However, at least Isoc. 9.20 would imply that the entire island is meant.

SOURCES AND PROBLEMS

THE *EVAGORAS* REVISITED

O bjections against the thesis that Cyprus was virtually cut off from the Greek world after the Cypriot revolt and that Greeks suffered grievously under Persian rule began to be expressed since the early 1970's. In an Appendix to his treatise on the Athenian empire, Russel Meiggs[83] reviewed the available evidence for the commercial and political relations between Cyprus and the Aegean, and in particular Athens, from the late sixth to the mid fifth century. Meiggs' succinct overview indicated that the island had close contacts with eastern Greek centers in the late archaic period.[84] It also highlighted the general lack of archaeological materials from important Cypriot centers that could be used to chart contacts between the island and the Greek world during the first half of the fifth century. Meiggs largely accepted Gjerstad's thesis that hostility between Greeks and Phoenicians was created by the Persians' use of the Phoenician minority as "a counter against the Greeks after the Ionian revolt". He noted, however, that although published Attic imports from fifth-century Marium, Salamis, Idalium, and Soli, for instance, were not definitive as to the frequency or fluctuations of Athens' commercial contacts with the island from the late sixth to the mid fifth century, the evidence still did not readily yield a picture of disrupted contacts after the Cypriot revolt.[85] A similar impression emerged, he argued, from the relevant textual testimony. For Meiggs, the Ionians' naval expedition to Cyprus at the time of the Cypriot revolt[86]

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83. Meiggs 1972, 477-486 (Appendix 7).

84. Meiggs 1972, 480.

85. Meiggs 1972, 478-484. Though rarely acknowledged as such (Pouilloux 1975, 117 n. 1, is a notable exception), Meiggs' discussion in this instance can be seen as defining a line of reasoning that was further pursued in subsequent years. See, in particular the conclusion of an analogous, more detailed investigation by Collombier 1985, 84: "Au Ve siècle av. J.-C. il n'y a pas de rupture dans les relations avec le monde grec mais des lacunes dans notre documentation." See also the findings along the same lines by, among others, Maier 1985, 37-38, Stylianou 1989, 430-431, and Raptou 1999.

86. See, e.g., Meiggs 1972, 480: "The archaeological evidence gives point to the role of Cypriots in the Ionian revolt. The east Greeks were sufficiently closely associated with Cyprus to try to make Cyprus an active member of their league and to send their fleet to aid the Greek cause in Cyprus."

and subsequent Greek expeditions under Pausanias in 478 and Cimon in the 460's and 450's provided ample indications of a continuous Aegean Greek policy of protecting Greek interests in Cyprus through the first half of the fifth century. He further indicated that a short period, during which the Cypriot cities would have been members of the Athenian alliance, was reasonable to postulate during the fifties (before the Egyptian disaster) when Athens was at the height of her naval influence and when "Dorus, Celenderis, and other Greek foundations on the eastern Mediterranean coast [were attested as] tribute-paying allies of Athens".[87]

Grounds for questioning earlier inferences concerning the impact of Persian rule on the island during the fifth century did not rest solely on Meiggs' reinterpretation of Athenian imperialist pursuits in the south-eastern Mediterranean in the crucial half century following the Cypriot revolt. As it happens, details in the *Evagoras*, which had long framed discussions of the cultural and political realities that prevailed in the island during the era of Persian rule, were in need of critical rethinking. And in this respect, new assessments of the relevant textual and archaeological evidence were provided by two separate, far-reaching studies published by Eugene Costa and Franz Georg Maier in 1974 and 1985 respectively.

Though also largely accepting of a Perso-Phoenician collaboration against the Cypriot-Greek cities after the Cypriot revolt,[88] George Hill, sensitized to the exaggerations of Isocratic rhetoric, had indicated that Isocrates' picture of Salamis' decay under Evagoras' Phoenician predecessors and of the severing of the island's ties with the greater Greek world was "probably overdrawn, and it is not possible to maintain that it is reflected in Cypriot art at the time".[89] He also pointed out that "Evagoras is the pattern of all that is good and Hellenic, and that the shadows on the Persian side are consequently painted very black".[90]

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87. Meiggs 1972, 485-486; cf. Stylianou 1989, 443-452, who argues that the Cypriot cities became members of the Delian League since its foundation and that the affiliation lasted until the late 440's (*contra* Tuplin 1996, 45).

88. See, e.g., Hill 1940, 119.

89. Hill 1940, 126.

90. Hill 1940, 126 n. 1.

Little archaeological evidence from Salamis was available to check the city's alleged cultural decay under Evagoras' predecessors.[91] Costa, writing after the publication of Gjerstad's monumental synthesis of the evidence concerning the material culture of the island during the Geometric, Archaic and Classical periods, and too late to be of assistance to Spyridakis and Hill, was able to point to a significant incongruity between Gjerstad's general pronouncements and the more detailed testimony of archaeology. Gjerstad concluded in the fourth volume of the *Swedish Cyprus Expedition* that after the Cypriot revolt and especially after the middle of the fifth century Cypriot art "helplessly degenerated and reached a state of abasement".[92] Yet within the same volume, his overview of the Cypriot archaeological record indicated cultural continuity before and after 450. Gjerstad's own statement that during the fifth century "the Archaic legacy [was] drawn upon, and the already existing types [were] repeated",[93] argues in effect, as Costa pointed out, for the absence of a "discernible cultural break in the art and crafts of the...island which can be connected with a process of 'barbarization'"[94] at any point before or around the middle of the fifth century.

Costa was also the first to advance cogent arguments against the presumed anti-Persian sentiments and plans of Evagoras. Evagoras' pronounced 'philhellenic' leanings (an odd description since he himself was Greek), his well attested collaboration with Athens, and his ultimate protracted conflict with Persia signified to Isocrates' ancient and modern audiences alike the anti-Persian tenor of each and every recorded activity of the Salaminian ruler. As Costa suggested, however, the sum of those activities can be interpreted in more than one way.[95]

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91. See, however, the judicious remarks of Pouilloux 1975, 116-117: "A aucun moment l'importation des vases attiques à figures rouges ne s'arrête au long du Vème siècle; Isocrate cédait assurément à une exagération de rheteur quand il affirmait que la cité de Salamine était retombée en totale barbarie avant l'arivée d'Evagoras".

92. Gjerstad 1948, 488.

93. Gjerstad 1948, 488.

94. Costa 1974, 40-41 n. 3.

95. A number of the details of Costa's account of Evagoras' 'local' and 'personal' motives were anticipated by Spyridakis' (1941[1945]) comments. Costa was also able to explain systematically Evagoras' actions without making

Thus, Evagoras' 'reconstructions' at Salamis, and in particular the construction of a new fortification wall, a port of trade, a harbor and triremes, and the expansion of his domain could represent instead a ruler's natural efforts to enhance the beauty, wealth and power of his city.[96] They need not allude to a secret plan to liberate Cyprus as a Greek island, a notion made less likely by the fact that they were implemented long before his actual conflict with Artaxerxes. Indeed, according to Isocrates (9.47), Evagoras' newly gained strength was not directed against the King but "against πολλοί".[97] At the same time, in as much as Evagoras' friendly relations with Athens and especially his collaboration with Conon in the 390's promoted Persian as well as Athenian interests, the Salaminian king could hardly be said to have acted as anything but a loyal vassal of the Persian regime until c. 391.[98] Finally, Costa suggested, Evagoras' revolt could have sprung not from Evagoras' anti-Persian sentiments but from his erroneous assessment of Persian policy, brought on more by the actions of the Persian king than by those of the Salaminian dynast. Having dutifully served Persia's interests in the Aegean in the 390's, Evagoras could have miscalculated that the Great King would turn a blind eye to his expansion in the island. However, "[w]ith the Spartan threat almost, though not completely, shattered, Artaxerxes decided to forestall any potential threat to his domination by attacking his...ally, Evagoras", considering that "a united Cyprus, even if ostensibly friendly, was too great a threat to the western seaboard of the Empire to be tolerated".[99]

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appeal to notions of ethnic–ideological conflict that pervaded earlier interpretations of the Salaminian ruler's activities.

96. Costa 1974, 43-44; cf. Spyridakis 1941[1945], 115.

97. Costa 1974, 44.

98. Costa 1974, 46-51. The friendly nature of Evagoras' relations with Persia until the late 390's also emerges clearly from the investigations of Spyridakis 1941[1945]. Lewis and Stroud 1979 were to subsequently expound on the political expediencies that recommended, from both an Athenian and a Persian viewpoint, the Salaminian ruler's close collaboration with Athens in the 390's.

99. Costa 1974, 55. Although the exact reason(s) of Artaxerxes for attacking Evagoras are still subject to discussion (see, e.g., Weiskopf 1982, 154-156, Zournatzi 1991, 122-161), Costa's plea against the emphasis that was placed upon Evagoras' ethnic motives in earlier interpretations of the causes of the Cypriot war is now widely accepted.

Costa, noting the absence of material evidence for the presumed barbarization of the island in the fifth century, implied that the Phoenician usurpation of the throne of Salamis ought to be viewed perhaps as "an event of local political significance only".[100] Costa's case for Evagoras' basic loyalty to, and initial good relations with, the Persians, combined with his inclination to find local rather than hellenocentric motives for Evagoras' activities presents a more complex and less antagonistic relationship between Greeks, Persians, and Phoenicians on Cyprus. Gjerstad's archaeological arguments in support of a Graeco-Phoenician *Kulturkampf* in Cyprus exploited and further aggravated by Persian interference—an interpretation already weakened by Costa's observations and arguments about the affairs of Evagoras— came to be challenged on a more systematic basis in the following decade.

In 1976 J. Seibert argued that there was evidence for "a considerable degree of peaceful symbiosis, mutual cultural exchange and even intermarriage" between the Greek and Phoenician speaking populations of Cyprus opposing the earlier tendency to project upon the past the current concepts of nationality and, as Maier put it, "ethnocultural difference and enmity".[101] Maier was subsequently to expose one by one the inherent ambiguities of the archaeological and numismatic testimony cited earlier by Gjerstad in support of a Persian-aided Phoenician political aggrandizement on the island after the revolt of 498/7.

As we have seen, the testimony of the *Evagoras* (which after all does not offer any specific chronology of the alleged fifth-century Phoenician takeover of Salamis and the collaborative Persian-Phoenician control of Cyprus) and the reported joint attack of Medes and Citians against Idalium[102] are the only well-established instances of Persian-Phoenician political and military co-operation against Cypriot Greek cities. In arguing the general case for a Persian-Phoenician collaboration dating since the time of the Cypriot revolt, Gjerstad[103] had made appeal to the appearance of Phoenician names in the early fifth-century king-lists of Marium and Lapethus; to the lack of evidence for the continuation of Soli as an independent kingdom after its siege and conquest by Persian

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100. Costa 1974, 41.
101. Maier 1985, 33.
102. See pp. 21-22 above.
103. See Gjerstad 1979.

troops in 498/7; and to archaeological evidence from Vouni and Idalium. This archaeological evidence pointed simultaneously, in his opinion, to the construction and control of the palace of Vouni by a medophile Phoenician ruler of Marium; and to the dating of the combined Median-Citian attack mentioned on the Idalium tablet to the early fifth century.[104] As Maier argued, each and every link in Gjerstad's "plausibly sounding" hypothesis was methodologically fragile.

As Maier pointed out, the appearance of Phoenician names in the Marium and Lapethus king lists notwithstanding, there are no explicit indications of the respective dynasts' medophile leanings, or grounds for positing that they were established or supported by the Persians.[105] For example, in the case of Marium, the only argument that Gjerstad was able to present for King Sasmas' medophile attitude was the coincidence of the end of his reign (as estimated by Gjerstad) with Cimon's expedition. The latter postulate, however, would be extremely difficult to prove since there is no independent evidence for any long term effects of Cimon's operations on Marium politics, and especially since Sasmas' and Sasioikos I's reigns (hinging on the far from precise stylistic testimony of their respective coinages) cannot be neatly placed to immediately before and after Cimon's expedition, respectively.[106] For all we know, Sasmas' coinage, loosely dated by Gjerstad between 470/60 and 450 BC, would allow the possibility that Sasmas' reign could have ended even after Cimon's campaign.[107]

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104. Cf. Maier 1985, 33.

105. Maier 1985, 34-35.

106. Maier 1985, 35-36.

107. Cf. Maier 1985, 35 n. 19: "…the stylistic comparison with a number of reliefs [in Gjerstad 1946, 21-22 n. 9] seems hardly sufficient to establish the precise date 470/60 for the Sasmas coins."   Current opinion (Destrooper-Georgiades 2001, 174, 176) would further allow that the rules of Sasmas, Stasioikos and Timochares were more broadly spaced in time. Sasmas' coins are still dated today on stylistic grounds to c. 450 (Destrooper-Georgiades 2001, 174). Those of Stasioikos and Timocharis (for which a *taq* is still provided by the suggested date, c. 380, of destruction of the Vouni palace) are now assigned a chronological range in the late fifth and the early decades of the fourth century on the basis that some of the extant specimens are over struck on sigloi of Aspendos in Pamphylia that are dated to the late fifth/early fourth centuries. Destrooper-Georgiades further notes (p. 176) that the known Stasioikos issues could belong to more than one king (see, e.g., Diod. 19.62.6, 79.4, referring to a

The dangers of going too far in positing an anti-Greek movement supported by Persia following the Cypriot revolt can be even more pronounced. In the case of Lapethus, the regnal dates of the earliest attested king, Demonikos I, suggested by Robinson to have ruled at the time of the Cypriot revolt and to have been deposed in consequence of its failure, and his successor Sidqmelek, rested on a stylistic assessment of their respective coin types, which as Robinson himself admitted is not accurate for developing precise historical chronology.[108] Furthermore, the coinage of the city not only testifies to rulers with Phoenician names but also consistently displays legends in the Phoenician script down to the late fourth century. Lapethus' fifth- and fourth-century king list, in which Greek and Phoenician names are featured side by side, and the parallel use of the Phoenician script for official purposes locally could reflect, according to Seibert and Maier, the very nature of a city whose close connections with both the Greek and the Phoenician spheres are hinted at widely both by literary testimony and by archaeological discoveries hitherto made at the site.[109] Lapethus might well lend itself to a definition as a city with a "griechish-phönikischer Mischbe-völkerung".[110] Though this situation seems to be peculiar to Lapethus, given the long history of contacts and symbiosis of Greek and Phoenician elements in the Cypriot domain, it would seem impossible to exclude the existence of mixed Greek-Phoenician dynasties in other Cypriot centers. And a well known example of this possibility is provided by the genealogy of the ringleader of the Cypriot revolt, Onesilos of Salamis, who traced his genealogy to the sixth-century king

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king of Marium by the same name at the time of the conflict with Alexander's successors, in 315 and 312 BC) and that the abbreviations βα[σιλέως] σα(-τα)[σιοίκου] might permit reading different royal names, e.g., those of the fourth-century kings Stasikrates and Stasias of Soli (see *ICS*² 217-220 nos. 211 and 212).

108. Robinson 1948, 61-64; cf. Maier 1985, 35. See, however, also Kagan's (1994, esp. 48) discussion of new hoard evidence that would support Robinson's stylistic dating of the early issues of Lapethus.

109. Seibert 1976, 21-23, and Maier 1985, 35, with references to the relevant literary, epigraphic and onomastic evidence. In Bikai 1987, 70 and no. 59, Lapethus is also featured among the find places of the earliest ('Kouklia horizon', c. 1050–c. 850 BC) Phoenician pottery imports recorded so far on the island.

110. Seibert 1976, 19.

Evelthon through Chersis and Siromos (Phoen. *Ahiram/Hiram*; Hdt. 5.104.1).

Maier criticizes Gjerstad's hypothesis that Vouni was established after the revolt as a control point over rebellious Soli as resting on inadequate evidence and tendentious methodological grounds. Strictly speaking, given that the local histories of the Cypriot kingdoms are poorly documented and we are still far from possessing a reliable picture of the different mints that were active on the island in the Archaic and Classical periods, the loss of Soli's independence in the fifth century could only be described at present as being largely unproven.[111] More importantly, in as much as finds of silver coins of a given mint, unlike hoards of bronze issues, do not normally constitute a secure index of local circulation, the preponderance of Marium coins in the Vouni hoard could hardly be held to offer undisputable leads to Marium's control of Vouni.[112] Serious methodological flaws were equally possible to discern in Gjerstad's political inferences based on the architectural history of the Vouni palace.

Despite the ongoing debate on the actual origins of the Vouni palace plan, the basic perception of the core design of the 'first palace' (dated c. 500 - c. 450/40 BC) as reflecting oriental models has been largely accepted.[113] However the hazards of drawing political inferences from palace plans are obvious. One could always assume that "[t]o adapt such models... [was] reasonably natural for a Persian vassal king and does not in itself imply political leanings".[114] Incongruity with Gjerstad's political

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111. Maier 1985, 36-37; cf. Wiesehöfer 1990, 244-245, Collombier 1991a, 31. However, see also p. 69 below.

112. As Maier 1985, 37, states: "The inhabitant of the palace who dumped this hoard under a staircase could well have amassed Marion coins for reasons in no way connected with the person of the then ruler of the palace." 'Hoarding' rather than everyday circulation is also indicated by the precious vessels and jewelry found together with the coins in the Vouni treasure. But note also the observation of Destrooper-Georgiades 2001, 179, that coins of Marium are rarely found outside the territory of that kingdom and that not a single specimen of the city's classical coinage is reported to have been found outside Cyprus.

113. See, Müller 1932 and 1933; Seibert 1976, 10 n. 30; Maier 1985, 37 and n. 28, Maier 1989, 17; Nielsen 1994, 59-60; Zournatzi (in print).

114. Maier 1985: 37. See also the objections of Müller 1932, 409 n. 2 (cf. Müller 1933, 599), and Maier, 37 and n. 28, to the notion that the design of the

reasoning could also arise from the dating of the complex. Gjerstad's chronological scheme was insufficiently rigorous to support the rather precise chronology needed for his theory: the complex's construction by a 'medophile' ruler supposedly installed at Marium by the Persians in the first half of the fifth century, and its subsequent destruction by an uprising of the local inhabitants of Soli. The dating of the 'first palace' to sometime between c. 500 and c. 450/40 BC could allow, as Maier pointed out, a suggestion that the initial oriental design could have even been (in Gjerstad's frame of reasoning) the work of the anti-Persian king Stasioikos I.[115] At the same time, there is no hint in our sources about Gjerstad's hypothesized internal political upheaval in the territory of Soli resulting in the destruction of Vouni in the early fourth century. Indeed, as Maier pointed out,[116] if one must seek political reasons for the destruction of the palace, an equally likely context might be provided by Evagoras I's contemporary wars of expansion against Amathus, Soli and Citium reported in Diodorus (14.98.2-3; *FGrHist* 70 [Ephoros] F 76).

The attack reported on the Idalium tablet appears to remain the only securely attested incident of Persian-Phoenician military cooperation against a Greek-Cypriot city. This isolated testimony would hardly permit, as Maier stressed, any generalized statements to be made about Persia's anti-Greek policy and the auxiliary role of the Phoenicians in this regard. With the continuing difficulty in dating the Idalium tablet, the role of Phoenician Citium at the time of the revolt must remain in question. A reasonable inference from Herodotus' statement that "all Cypriots, except for the Amathusians" joined the revolt of 498 would be that Citium also fought against the Persians at the time.[117]

Subject to Costa's, Seibert's, and Maier's analyses, concrete evidence for Persian-Phoenician collaboration against Greek-Cypriot cities would be confined to this single instance—namely, the combined attack of Medes and Citians upon Idalium—which in itself is insufficient to support a long term role for the Phoenicians in promulgating Persian

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'second' palace was based on "Greek architectural principles" (Gjerstad 1933a, 598).

115. Maier 1985, 36.

116. Maier 1985, 37, but the basic connection of the destruction of Vouni with events at the time of Evagoras' expansion against Soli was previously suggested at least by Karageorghis 1982, 164.

117. Cf. Maier 1985, 34, 38-39.

authority on the island. According to Maier, even though "Phoenician kings may indeed have been more amenable at times", there is no lack of evidence that "Persian policy [on Cyprus] was not anti-Greek on principle", or that Phoenicians could take a stand against Persia. "What can reasonably be inferred from a fairly small number of isolated facts is the existence of conflicting aims and divided interests amongst the Cypriot kingdoms, apparent already during the Ionian Revolt" which facilitated Persian rule. "Achaemenid rule pragmatically resorted to a well-tried instrument of politics when it exploited the divided interests of the kingdoms in the island."[118]

Once earlier arguments of Persian reliance on Phoenicians for local support were systematically questioned, there was very little in the Cypriot material record that could be cited as evidence for the imposition of a tighter Persian control on Cyprus in consequence of the Cypriot revolt. The account of Herodotus and the Palaepaphos siege mound remain powerful reminders of the harshness with which the Persians dealt with the Cypriot rebels in 498/7, but nothing seemed to support an on-going Persian administrative or military presence following the island's conquest.

Following Maier's demonstration of the series of weak assumptions underlying Gjerstad's conclusion about the construction and control of the complex at Vouni by Phoenician 'medophile' rulers of Marium, there has generally seemed to exist no overriding reason for positing the complex's function as an imperial control point. In Stylianou's discussion of the circumstances prevailing in the island after the revolt, for instance, the Vouni palace is evasively referred to in passing in a footnote as a "puzzle".[119] In Josef Wiesehöfer's summary overview of the evidence bearing on the history of Cyprus under Persian rule, Vouni is mentioned as an example of dubitable scholarly reasoning.[120] Outright dismissal is conveyed by A.-M. Collombier's flat statement that

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118. Maier 1985, 38-39.

119. Stylianou 1989, 432 n. 297: "The superb fortified palace at Vouni is an even greater puzzle. Gjerstad's well-known theory concerning its purpose and history is highly questionable", specifically citing Maier 1985, 36f., to that effect.

120. Wiesehöfer 1990, 244-245, who merely lists (following Maier 1985) the uncertainties concerning the possible connection of Vouni with medophile, Phoenician rulers of Marium and the date of the palace's construction.

"[q]uelles que soient les fonctions politiques, religieuses, militaires de Vouni on ne peut associer la construction de cette résidence palatiale à la révolte de 499/497".[121] References to Vouni are finally conspicuously absent in both Thierry Petit's and Christopher Tuplin's discussions of the archaeological evidence for Persian control of the island.[122] Indeed, with very rare exceptions,[123] since the late 1980's Vouni has been mainly held to merit discussion merely as a typical example of Cypriot palace architecture,[124] whose affiliations with the Persian regime would only seem legitimate to discuss (if at all) in terms of remote echoes of imperial palace design in the architectural layout of residences of provincial vassal rulers.[125]

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121. Collombier 1991a, 32. See, however, her comment (p. 31) "[l]e soulèvement des années 499/97, maté par les Perses, n'entraîne pas de remaniement notable dans l'organisation des royaumes, à l'exception peut-être de Soli", which might be taken to imply less than full conviction in the legitimacy of dismissing the relevance of Vouni to Cypro-Persian relations in consequence of the revolt.

122. Petit 1991, 171 and n. 29, merely alludes to Vouni with reference to the 'Achaemenid' silver bowls, gold and silver jewellery, and darics found in the treasure. The same is true of Tuplin 1996, 53, whose only additional reference to Vouni concerns the palace's lack of Persian architectural affinities; cf. Reyes 1994, 91-94. For Reyes (p. 92), "[t]he use of architectural ground plans as a basis for reconstructing political history is precarious at best, particularly since the style of the initial structure at Vouni is not at all typical of Persian palaces at Pasargadae, Persepolis, Susa, or Babylon." This was, however, never an issue in Gjerstad's argument.

123. Wright 1992, 127, 129 (reiterating Gjerstad's political interpretations; but historical reconstruction was decidedly of secondary importance to Wright's monumental architectural commentary on Cypriot architecture), Ballandier 2000, 183 (noting the similarities of the building of Vouni with Persian period strongholds excavated in Jordan and Israel [Hoglund 1997, 328]), and Zournatzi (in print) (insisting on the importance of Vouni not only as a control point over Soli but also as being essential to the strategic defence of the island as a whole against Aegean incursions).

124. E.g., Wright 1992, 127 and 129.

125. See e.g., Nielsen 1994, 54-61, positing an affinity of the layout of the palace with Persepolitan architecture. The lack of any clear affinity with Achaemenid architecture in the homeland of the empire was argued earlier by Stern 1982, 58-60, and subsequently noted by Reyes 1994, 92 (n. 122 above), Tuplin 1996, 53 and Zournatzi (in print). Stern and Zournatzi also draw

In this general atmosphere of rigorous questioning of earlier assumptions, attention was also drawn to the uncertainties pertaining to the actual historical and architectural background of the so-called 'Persian commander's residence' on the Hadji Abdullah plateau at Palaepaphos—the only other edifice that has ever been associated with a formal imperial presence on the island after the revolt. Ceramic finds only allowed dating the building in question within wide chronological margins, between c. 600 and c. 475 BC.[126] Even accepting Schäfer's comparisons with Achaemenid architecture, the building could still be proposed to have been constructed prior to the Cypriot revolt. And in that case, rather than offering testimony about a strong Persian administrative control, "it could...just as well have been the residence of a Paphian king who used the palaces of his overlord as a model for his own".[127]

Persepolitan architectural influence, initially proposed by Schäfer and taken for granted by Maier, could also be discounted on a number of grounds. In Schäfer's analysis emphasis was placed specifically on the fine stonework of the Hadji Abdullah building and on the symmetry of its ground plan, which he felt allowed comparison in particular with that

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attention, however, on one hand, to the general lack of 'pure' Achaemenid architectural style in the subject provinces and, on the other, to the conceivably intentional adaptation of Achamenid tastes in monumental architecture in the provinces to traditional, native styles.

126. Schäfer 1960,169-170.

127. Maier 1985, 33 n. 7, characterizing, simultaneously, the identification of the structure as a 'Persian commander's residence' as "another minor factoid" (for the meaning of 'factoid' in this context, see his definition on p. 32). The view has been forcefully reiterated in a number of works, see, e.g., Maier and Karageorghis 1984, 208, Maier and Wartburg 1985, 155 and n. 31, Maier 1989, 17, and 1996, 121, Wiesehöfer 1990, 245, and Stylianou 1989, 432 n. 297. At least Karageorghis 2002, 213-214, however, would appear not to be entirely convinced that the Palaepaphos building was a residence of a late-sixth-century local ruler: "Unfortunately, none of the palaces of the Cypriote kings of the sixth century B.C....has yet been found." A hint of doubt concerning Maier's inclination to disassociate the Paphian structure from the consequences of the Cypriot revolt is perhaps also discernible in the speculation of Collombier 1991a, 32, that a Persian garrison might have been established temporarily at Paphos. Lately, Balandier 2000, 182-183, has again raised the possibility that the building might have a military function.

of the Treasury at Persepolis.[128] Fine ashlar masonry was not exclusive to Achaemenid architecture in the late Archaic period, however, and even though the stonework of the building finds no close parallels in late Archaic and Classical period monumental structures excavated so far on the island of Cyprus, the techniques are attested locally as early as the Late Bronze Age.[129] Schäfer's comparison with the Persepolis Treasury was also deemed to be misleading for a number of reasons. A complete plan of the Cypriot edifice, which could be used for close comparison with Achaemenid structures, has never been recovered, making a complete comparison impossible. At the same time, while the Treasury lacks the symmetry believed to be a characteristic of the Hadji Abdullah residence, the latter residence also does not appear to include a columned hall, the hallmark of the Treasury and of Achaemenid architectural plans in the Iranian homeland in general.[130] Finally, the possibility of a Persian connection can also be questioned on chronological grounds. As Petit[131] indicated, the Late Archaic date of the Hadji Abdullah building is too contemporary to the construction at Persepolis for the Persepolitan plans to have been transmitted to the distant territory of Cyprus. A more likely alternative, according to Reyes, is that this large (over 40 meters long) structure was "part of what seems to have been a general upsurge in the construction of large-scale buildings throughout the Levant in Neo-Babylonian and early Achaemenid times".[132] With the Vouni and Hadji Abdullah monumental structures removed as convincing evidence of a Persian administrative presence, there remained little else in the Cypriot archaeological record that could offer safe measure of the scale and character of Persian interference in local affairs.

Diodorus' references (11.44.2 and 12.4.1) to Persian garrisons that existed in the cities of Cyprus in 478 and to "an important Persian garrison" at Salamis at the time of Cimon's second campaign in 450 leave open the possibility of a Persian military presence. The impli-

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128. See p. 29 and n. 72 above.

129. See, e.g., Wright 1997/1998, Boardman 2000, 26 and 231 n. 15.

130. Petit 1991, 174; Reyes 1994, 95. Cf. the comment of Stern 1982, 60, that "[v]ery little can be learned from the fragmentary palace excavated at Paphos…"

131. Petit 1991, 174. For the date of the beginning of construction at Persepolis, see, in particular, Roaf 1983, esp. 138-139.

132. Reyes 1994, 95 and n. 64 (citing Dunant 1966).

cations of these two references could be variously interpreted, however. Meiggs thought that Diodorus' sources might not be reliable and stated that Diodorus' claim "may be no more than Ephoran rationalism".[133] Even recent discussants disinclined to set aside the testimony of Diodorus minimize its significance in view of the lack of any clearly identifiable markers of Persian presence in the local material culture.[134] Petit argued that the establishment of garrisons could well have taken place after the revolt, and may have represented a temporary presence, since it is impossible to ascertain their existence on the island either before the revolt or after 450.[135] Tuplin reasons that the garrisons, being mentioned on only two occasions, "clearly did not represent a military occupation able to stem rebellion or resist Athenian aggression..." and "can hardly be regarded as a significant element of Persian rule" at any time.[136] Mentioned only twice, garrisons have also been relatively easy to disregard altogether from the history of Cyprus under Persian rule, as shown, for example, by A.-M. Collombier's absolute silence about their possible existence.[137]

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133. Meiggs 1972, 482.

134. The most detailed presentation of the relevant archaeological testimony to-date is offered by Tuplin 1996, 48-59. Judging by his conclusions, and those of Petit (1991, 170-177) and Reyes (1994, 96) before him, although a Persian cultural imprint is not entirely lacking in Persian period Cyprus, there is little in the archaeological record that may be said to reflect direct Persian influence.

135. Petit 1991, esp. 162-163. Following Petit, Reyes 1994, 96, who does not consider likely a formal Persian presence on the island before the Cypriot revolt, leaves open the possibility that the 'political landscape' changed after the revolt. According to Stylianou 1989, 434, on the other hand, "[i]t is to be doubt-ed...that Persian garrisons were installed in the island before the 470s".

136. Tuplin 1996, 47. See also his discussion (p. 48) and that of Petit 1991, 166-168, illustrating the general lack of archaeological and onomastic evidence (Iranian type 'cist graves', Iranian names, traces of Iranian cult[s]) that might be diagnostic, in particular, of Iranian military, and in general official, presence in the island.

137. Collombier 1991a.

CYPRUS, HERODOTUS' FIFTH *NOMOS*,
AND THE LANDS 'ACROSS-THE-RIVER'

The limited archaeological evidence is supplemented by literary and epigraphic evidence that hinted at a relatively privileged political status of the Cypriot kingdoms and their rulers throughout the Persian Period. Current approaches to the significance of Herodotus' list of Persian *nomoi*, which remains to-date the only direct reference to the place of Cyprus in the imperial system, are particularly critical

In his much discussed account of the administrative policies of Darius I, the Greek historian indicates (3.89ff.) that the Achaemenid monarch, following his accession to the throne, created "twenty *archas*, which [the Persians] called *satrapies* (σατραπηίας), appointing to them *archontes*, and fixed the tributes (φόρους) to come in to him, nation by nation; and, in so doing, he joined their neighbors with each nation, and, as he got further from the centre...he distributed the more remote nations in various groups".[138] In 3.90-96 he proceeds to offer a more detailed description of twenty mandates (which, in this part of his narrative, are consistently designated *nomoi*), stating their ethnic composition and geographical boundaries as well as the total of the tribute, in weights of precious metal, due from each to the Persian authorities. Cyprus is stated (3.91.1) to have been included, together with "the whole of Phoenicia and the part of Syria called Palestine," in the fifth *nomos*, which extended from Posidium in the north to the borders of Egypt (excluding Arabia) in the south, and which was assessed to pay annually a total of 350 talents (presumably of silver). No separate assessment for Cyprus is listed.

Taken at face value, Herodotus 3.91.1 would imply that Darius' 'reforms' were the occasion when the island—tributary but reportedly self-governed under Cyrus and presumably also under Cambyses—was established as an integral part of the satrapal organization of the empire, notably, as a formal extension of Persia's continental possessions in the Levant. As studies of Herodotus' account have shown, however, there are uncertainties about the implications of his testimony.[139]

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138. Transl. How and Wells 1967, 281.

139. For recent approaches to the much discussed problems arising from Herodotus' report on Darius' reforms and references to earlier discussions, see,

Herodotus' report concentrates on the administrative undertakings of Darius following his accession to the throne and only comments in passing on the policies of his predecessors, Cyrus and Cambyses, to highlight Darius' departure from earlier custom and practice (Hdt. 3.89.3). In doing so, it appears to imply nothing short of Darius' full responsibility for the establishment of an imperial administrative system, whose main supports (satrapal authority and regular revenues), constituted the hallmarks of Persian dominion in the subject territories. Yet, despite our overall poor understanding of the administrative organization of the empire under Cyrus and Cambyses, indications that the office of the 'satrap' predated the accession of Darius[140] make it difficult to accept that the imperial order described in Herodotus was entirely the work of the latter monarch. Herodotus' mention of 20 *archas* that the Persians called *satrapies*, each ruled by a royally appointed archon, and his subsequent itemization of 20 *nomoi* further creates the impression of an empire that was neatly divided into twenty jurisdictions. Still awareness has set in that satrapies did not "exhaustively [fill] the imperial area";[141] that there were considerable variations in the administrative hierarchy from one province to the other; and while it has long been accepted (at least as a working hypothesis) that satrapies constituted the large-scale administrative structure of the empire, the precise relationship between satrapies and *nomoi* remains open to discussion.

Textual references to the regional affiliations of imperial officials throughout the Persian period allow us to compile a list of larger administrative regions that roughly corroborates the total number of Herodotus' *nomoi*.[142] The number and exact geographical configuration

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among others, Cook 1983, 79-90, Tuplin 1987a, 113-114, Briant 1996, 956-957, Debord 1999, 69-82.

140. Even discounting as anachronistic (cf. Debord 1999, 80) Xenophon's references to the appointment of satraps by Cyrus the Great (*Cyrop.* 8.6.8, and 8.6.3 [detailing those satraps' duties]), the term *xšaçapāva* (literally, 'protector of the kingdom', see Lehmann-Haupt 1921, 82) is attested in the Behistun inscription that was composed in the very beginning of Darius I's reign; it is used on two separate occasions with reference to high standing officers that helped to quell the rebellions that broke out at the time of Darius' accession in Bactria and Arachosia, respectively, see Kent 1953, DB III 14, 56.

141. Tuplin 1987a, 114-126.

142. Tuplin 1987a, 113-114 and n. 22.

of those regions in any given period is impossible to fix. More disconcertingly, it is difficult to reconcile Herodotus' list of *nomoi* with the Achaemenid rulers' own surviving accounts of the composition of their empire. Beginning in Darius' reign, enumerations of the empire's subjects are featured in a number of monumental royal inscriptions.[143] The technical term *satrapy* is not attested, however, in the Persian record, and in the royal subject lists the constituent parts of the empire (regularly designated by their respective ethnic- or land-names) are consistently referred to as *dahyāva* (Old Persian *dahyu* interpreted as 'land'/ 'people').[144] The Achaemenid rulers' depiction of their realm as a mosaic of major ethnic groupings is reasonably consistent with Herodotus' satrapies since the geographical configuration of the individual *archai*/satrapies, as described by Herodotus, was also largely determined on grounds of ethnicity.[145] The *dahyāva* featured on the lists, however, do not fully coincide with Herodotus' *nomoi*,[146] and the divergences are further underlined by the numbers of *dahyavā* included in the royal lists which, however different they may be from list to list,

143. See, e.g., Kent 1953, DB I 14-17, DPe 10-18, DNa 22-30, DSe 21-30, Xph 19-28. For a comprehensive presentation of the relevant texts, see Vogelsang 1992, 100-106, with bibliography.

144. That *dahyu* stood for peoples/lands, and not satrapies, was first pointed out by Cameron 1973, 47-50. For subsequent discussions of the term, see Herrenschmidt 1976, 63, Lecoq 1990.

145. The principle is alluded to in Hdt. 3.89.1: καταστήσας δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς...κατὰ ἔθνεά τε καὶ πρὸς τοῖσι ἔθνεσι τοὺς πλησιοχώρους προστάσσων... (emphasis mine). There is at least one instance, where it would seem that the concept of *dahyu* was rendered in Greek by *ethne*. That is the reference to the two stelai erected by Darius on the Bosporus, which reportedly recorded (as in the practice attested by surviving royal Achaemenid inscriptions) the *ethne* over which Darius ruled (Hdt. 4.87.1: Θεησάμενος δὲ καὶ τὸν Βόσπορον στήλας ἔστησε δύο ἐπ' αὐτῷ λίθου λευκοῦ, ἐνταμὼν γράμματα ἐς μὲν τὴν Ἀσσύρια, ἐς δὲ τὴν Ἑλληνικά, ἔθνεα πάντα ὅσα περ ἦγε). For *ethne* as the constituent units of royal armies in Greek sources, see the references cited in Tuplin 1987, 113 n. 21.

146. See, e.g., Hdt. 3.93.3, wherein the 16th *nomos* comprises four peoples (Parthians, Chorasmians, Sogdians, and Aryans) that are featured as separate entries in the Achaemenid subject lists, e.g., Kent 1953, DB I 16, XPh 20-22.

even in documents dating from the reign of Darius, never match the 20 Herodotean *nomoi*.[147]

This discrepancy can be explained in different ways. One could assume (as is frequently done) that the Achaemenid subject lists were not meant to detail administrative structure and that they were, thus, never intended as accurate itemizations of satrapies.[148] Alternatively one could assume that the lack of synchronization was due to changes in the political or administrative map of the empire over time and, consequently, that Herodotus' list of *nomoi*—though ostensibly dating from Darius' reign—reflected the state of affairs in Herodotus' own time.[149] Finally, the possibility remains that Herodotus' list, in which the term *satrapy* (which is used earlier in his account in direct reference to political subdivisions of the empire) is replaced for reasons that are not explained by the term *nomos*, might at this point be describing something other than the political organization of the empire. A possible interpretation, given the systematic quotation of a specific figure of tribute for each *nomos*, would be that the *nomoi* represent merely fiscal circumscriptions rather than the political or administrative units generally thought of as satrapies.[150] These vexing questions applying to Herodotus' report as a whole are also directly relevant to discussions of the fifth *nomos* and of the status of Cyprus.

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147. Cf. Tuplin 1987, 113 and n. 20.

148. This now quite popular view that these rosters were not meant to offer an "orderly enumeration of the various satrapies, but only a list of some groups of peoples whom the Great King or his bureaucrats deemed worthy of mention" was initially put by Cameron, 1975: 87. For a recent statement of the contrary view, see Jacobs 1994.

149. See, e.g., Cook, 1983, 81-82, Debord 1999, 79-81.

150. The notion that Herodotus' *nomoi* were 'taxation districts' is encountered as early as the work of Toynbee 1955, 582-583. Considerations that might warrant this perception are more recently discussed in Cook 1983, 83-84, Debord 1999, 81-82. It is worth noting, however, that in its only other occurrence in the work of Herodotus, σατραπηίη is also used interchangeably with the terms νομός and ἀρχή; see Hdt. 1.192 (referring to Babylon): Καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς χώρης ταύτης [i.e., Babylon], τὴν οἱ Πέρσαι σατραπηίην καλέουσι, ἐστὶ ἀπασέων τῶν ἀρχέων πολλόν τι κρατίστη, ὅκου Τριτανταίχμη τῷ Ἀρταβάζου ἐκ βασιλέως ἔχοντι τὸν νομὸν τοῦτον ἀργυρίου μὲν προσήιε... (emphasis mine).

It has long been recognized that the geographical boundaries of the fifth *nomos*, as described by Herodotus, roughly coincide with those of *Ebir Nari* ('Across-the-River', i.e., 'Across-the-Euphrates'). The term, used in Akkadian as the "geographical proper name for part or all of Syria and Palestine at least as early as the eighth century B.C.",[151] also served in Neo-Assyrian contexts as a designation of parts of Cilicia and Cyprus.[152] The designation also occurs in Achaemenid period Babylonian documents that clearly allude to its affinity with provincial organization,[153] and once, in the Babylonian version of the 'foundation charter' of Darius I's palace at Susa, it is used as equivalent of the Old Persian term *Athura*, meaning "Assyria [and Syria]".[154] Assyrian inscriptions in which the Cypriot kings are included among the 22 kings of *Ebir Nari* subject to Assyrian monarchs[155] support a Cypriot administrative affiliation with *Ebir Nari* in the Persian period as well.[156] Achaemenid sources about the affiliation of Cyprus with *Ebir Nari* are extremely tenuous, however, and evidence related to the administrative history of the latter region in the Achaemenid period returns us to the problems of the significance of Herodotus' *nomoi* and the date of his list.

The possibility that Cyprus, never explicitly mentioned as such in the royal subject lists,[157] was perceived by the Achaemenids as a part of

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151. Stolper 1989, 288-289.

152. E.g., *ANET*² 291; *ARAB* 2.690.

153. Stolper 1989.

154. Kent 1953, 166, s.v. *Athurā-*. The use of *Ebir Nari* as equivalent of *Athura* is noted in, e.g., Leqoc 1997, DSf par. 9.

155. See n. 152 above.

156. Cf. Hill 1940, 112.

157. Achaemenid control of Cyprus could be implied by one of the lists' other designations of the Great Kings' western maritime holdings. Some scholars (e.g., Herrenschmidt 1976, 53, Wallinga 1991, 278 [cf. 281], Lecoq 1997, 141) maintain that Cyprus is (or is included in) the *tyaiy drayahyā* ('[those] who [are/dwell] in/ by the sea'), who occur as early as the Behistun inscription of Darius I (Kent 1953, DB I 15). Featured in the DB list between Egypt and Persia's Asia Minor holdings, that designation would seem a priori suitable for Cyprus' insular domain. Lack of consistency, however, in the order of the entries attested in the Behistun and later lists and the shifting and confusing terminology employed for Persia's western maritime holdings in those documents have led to alternative interpretations of *tyaiy drayahyā*, especially in later contexts, as denoting Aegean islanders (e.g., Herrenschmidt 1976, 57,

Ebir Nari emerges from certain references to *kurtaš* ('workmen'), who are referred to as *kupirriyaš*, in a number of Persepolitan chancery texts.[158] In one of these documents, an unpublished Persepolis Fortification text (L1-2409) of 498/7 BC, the *kupirriyaš* are described as *kurtaš* "from (As)syria" (i.e. from *Athura*).[159] Another text (Q-1888 of 495/4 BC) refers to the *kupirriyaš* "as travelers to Persepolis under authorization from Dattana".[160] In one interpretation the term *kupirriyaš* could mean 'Cypriots',[161] and, although none of the latter texts mention *Ebir Nari*, the official affiliation of the *kupirriyaš* in question with the latter entity could be alluded to by the associated references to *Athura* and Dattana. Old Persian *Athura* (in L1-2409) is regularly rendered in the Babylonian and Elamite versions of the royal inscriptions as *áš-šur* and *áš-šú-ra*, respectively.[162] An association with *Ebir Nari* is still present in the Babylonian version of the 'foundation charter' of the palace of Darius I at Susa, wherein *Ebir Nari* appears as the equivalent of the Old Persian ethnic *Athuriya-* (designating both Assyrians and Syrians) for the peoples who brought the cedar used in the palace construction from Mt Lebanon to Babylonia.[163] Dattana (in Q-1888), on the other hand, has been suggested by Matthew Stolper to be Tattenai, the governor of 'Across-the-River' in Babylonian documents and the book of Ezra (5.3 and 6, 6.6 and 13).[164] If correctly interpreted, these texts would support Herodotus by indicating that Cypriots were already a part of *Ebir Nari* by the third decade of Darius' reign.

Lecoq 1997, 143) or even Hellespontine Phrygia/Dascylium (e.g., Prašek 1910, 53, Olmstead 1939, 307, and 1948, 44, Schmitt 1972, 524-525, Weiskopf 2002, 85, Debord 1999, 70, 91). As an alternative, Cyprus, inhabited by both Greek and Phoenician elements, could be classified under one of the different types of *Yaunā* featured in the lists or it could be perceived as an integral part of the predominantly Semitic speaking group of *Athura/Ebir Nari* (cf., e.g., Tuplin 1996, 42 and n. 88).

158. See Briant 1996, 976-977, and Tuplin 1996, 42-43.

159. Other references to *kupirriyaš* as *kurtaš* occur in PT 49.5, 54.5, 55.5 (all dated to 466/5 BC) and L1-1612:5 (dated to 498/7 BC) (after Tuplin 1996, 43).

160. Tuplin 1996, 43.

161. Lewis unpublished, cited by Tuplin 43 n. 89, and Koch 1993, 39.

162. Kent 1953, 166, s.v. *Athurā-*.

163. Kent 1953, DSf 32. Lecoq 1997, par. 9.

164. Tuplin 1996, 43 n. 89, citing Lewis' notes. On Tattenai, see Stolper 1989, 290 Table 1: 4a, 289 and n. 7, with references to earlier discussions.

Agreement, however, on the significance of *kupirriyaš* is lacking. The term, tentatively suggested as representing Cypriots, was formerly interpreted by George Cameron[165] as 'copperers' while Walter Hinz and Heidemarie Koch variously took the gloss *kuppirriyaip* in PT 49, L1-1012, L1-2409 as a derivative from the toponym of *Kaupirriš* (a place north-west of Persepolis) and in PT 54 and PT 55 as the Elamite version of *kufriya* (translated as 'pitch-workers').[166] Moreover, as Tuplin notes, assuming that *kupirriyaš* means Cypriots and that Dattana is Tattenai, the person authorizing those Cypriots' travel to Persepolis is not necessarily their governor. His authorization would have been required in any case since they had to traverse his satrapy. Clearly the testimony of the Achaemenid texts about the connection of Cyprus with *Athura/Ebir Nari* is not decisive.

Straightforward conclusions are equally difficult to draw about the status of Herodotus' fifth *nomos* from the limited extant references to officials of *Ebir Nari*. Babylonian documents refer to two individuals, Tattannu and Bēlšunu, son of Bēl-uṣuršu. Both bore the title of 'governor of Across-the-River' in 502 BC and 407-401 BC, respectively.[167] Their jurisdiction in the same region in the Achaemenid period is attested, moreover, by biblical and Greek evidence.[168] Generally speaking, our evidence would corroborate the reality of a Persian provincial *arche*, which encompassed the Syro-Palestinian region, and which would thus correspond to Herodotus' fifth *nomos*.

However, whereas Herodotus would have us believe that an independent Syro-Palestinian satrapy existed since at least the reign of Darius I, Babylonian legal texts, dated between the fourth Babylonian regnal year (535 BC) of Cyrus II and less than two months before the end of Darius I's reign and Xerxes' accession,[169] make reference to three individuals with Iranian names who bore the title 'governor of Babylon and Across-the-River'.[170] These references to governors of 'Babylon and

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165. Cameron 1948, 42, 161, 206.

166. Tuplin 1996, 43 and n. 89, citing Hinz and Koch 1987.

167. See Stolper 1989, 289 and 292, and 290 Table 1: 4 a and b.

168. About Tattanu, see Stolper 1989, 289 and no. 7. About Bēlšunu, see *ibid*. 292 and n. 8, 291 n. r, and Stolper 1987.

169. On the date of the end of Darius I's reign, see Stolper 1989, 303-305, with the correction of Stolper 1992.

170. Stolper 1989, 290 Table 1:1 a-c.

Across-the-River' indicate that a great administrative unit approximating the territory of the Neo-Babylonian kingdom (i.e., including both Babylonia and Syria-Palestine) was created by Cyrus the Great shortly after his conquest of Babylon[171] and was still in existence until at least the end of Darius I's reign. An indication that that combined jurisdiction was eventually dissolved could be provided by a reference to a certain Gūbaru as 'governor of the Land of Akkad' (i.e., of Babylonia) in 420-419 BC.[172] 'Across-the-River', initially under the jurisdiction of the governor of Babylonia and Syria-Palestine, would have become a province in its own right presumably sometime between the accession of Xerxes and 420 BC.

Herodotus' list, in which Babylonia is associated with the ninth *nomos* and Syria-Palestine is associated with the fifth *nomos*, is difficult to accept as an accurate description of the larger administrative structure of the Persian Empire during the reign of Darius I. The apparent incongruity could be resolved by interpreting Herodotus' *nomoi* as merely fiscal districts, despite the apparent correspondence with the 20 satrapies/*archai*. Or, Herodotus' allocation of Babylonia and Syria-Palestine to two separate *nomoi* could indicate, as it is often assumed at present, that the Greek historian derived his information from a document or account of his own time.

In the current state of our evidence, Herodotus' testimony could no longer be said to offer secure guidelines about the date or duration of Cyprus' affiliation with Persia's Levantine holdings. The island, reportedly incorporated within the fifth *nomos* at the time of Darius' 'reforms', could have become a part of the Levantine sphere at any moment between the reign of Cyrus II and the time Herodotus was writing. Uncertainties about the status of Herodotus' *nomoi* and the lack of any clear picture of political relationships within the satrapies leave open the question of the nature of Cyprus' political affiliation with the empire.

Recent scholarship has focused on the absence of textual references to a satrap of Cyprus, on the lack of vestiges of Achaemenid bureaucracy on the island, and on evidence about the exceptionally wide margins of autonomy enjoyed at all times by Cypriot kings. In contrast to earlier

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171. Stolper 1989, 292-298.
172. Stolper 1989, 290 Table 1: 2 a.

unquestioned acceptance[173] of Cyprus' formal incorporation into the satrapal structure of the empire following Darius I's reforms, a number of recent scholars have reassessed the admittedly spotty and inconclusive evidence against "the Cypriot kings' having been the subordinates of the satrap of 'Abarnahara' at any time";[174] it is even confidently stated that "Cyprus never had a satrap under the Achaemenids".[175] Thus as Stylianou points out, in 399 B.C., when Evagoras was negotiating with Artaxerxes II on behalf of Conon (*FGrHist* 688 [Ktesias] F 30), no satrap is mentioned as an intermediary, and that the same circumstance also seemingly applied again in 392 or 391, when the kings of Amathus, Soli, and Citium appealed to the same Persian monarch for aid against Evagoras (Diod. 14.98.2). An impression of the normal absence of an intermediary of satrapal authority in Cyprus' dealings with the Great King might also emerge, as Stylianou considered, from Diodorus 16.42.4,[176] which could be understood to indicate that "each of the [Cypriot] kings was the separate subject of the Great King".[177]

Attention is further drawn to both the absence of Achaemenid documents and the lack of vestiges of Achaemenid royal protocol in the island. In particular, it is noted that, in stark contrast to official documents discovered in other territories of the Persian empire and dated according to the regnal years of Persian kings,[178] documents found in Cyprus are dated by the regnal years of local Cypriot rulers or, in the case of the Idalium tablet (*ICS*² 217 ll. 1-2), by the local eponymous official.[179]

Finally, while it has long been recognized that the Great Kings generally left Cypriot rulers to their own devices as long as Cypriot

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173. See n. 17 above.

174. Stylianou 1989, 416.

175. Tuplin 1996, 40.

176. Diod. 16.42.4 (set to 351/0 BC) describes Cyprus as an island containing "nine populous cities...each one of which was governed by a king, who was subject to the King of the Persians".

177. Stylianou 1989, 416 n. 240.

178. See references cited in ns. 200 and 205 below.

179. Stylianou 1989, 416 and n. 240, citing, among others, inscriptions dated by regnal years of the fourth-century kings of Citium Milkiathon (*ICS*² 215-216, 220) and Pumiathon (Guzzo Amadasi and Karageorghis 1977, A1, A2).

activities did not pose a threat to Persian interests,[180] the case of
Evagoras, in particular, appeared to lend itself to the notion of a still
more relaxed relationship between the Persians and Cypriots. According
to Diodorus (15.8.1-9.2), at the end the Cypriot war, Evagoras, then in
control of a large part of the island and besieged in Salamis by Persian
troops, was offered terms of surrender. The Persian general Tiribazus,
reportedly conveying the word of his King, demanded that Evagoras
evacuate all Cypriot cities and confine himself to ruling Salamis, pay a
fixed annual tribute to the Great King, and obey the King's orders "as a
slave his master" (Diod. 15.8.2: ποιῇ τὸ προσταττόμενον ὡς δοῦλος
δεσπότῃ). Negotiations broke down because Evagoras did not agree to
the last term: he would only obey, we are told, the Great King "as one
king another" (Diod. 15.8.3: αὐτὸν ὡς βασιλέα βασιλεῖ δεῖν ὑποτε-
τάχθαι; cf. 9.2: ὑπακούειν ὡς βασιλεὺς βασιλεῖ προστάττοντι). When
subsequent Persian attempts to overcome the Salaminian's resistance
brought no results, Orontes, Tiribazus' successor, was compelled to
grant Evagoras his demand and the settlement with the Great King was
ratified.

The significance of Evagoras' demand and the eventual Persian
agreement has been a matter of dispute. Earlier commentators had
variously professed agnosticism about its meaning[181] or suggested that
the disagreement was merely a matter of verbal dispute[182] or point of
honor[183] or asserted that the point was all important for the future of
Evagoras.[184] Chaumont argued that the point would indeed have been
all-important to Evagoras. He noted that the term 'slave' appears to
correspond to the Persian term *badaka* used in Old Persian inscriptions
to designate "satraps and other high functionaries". Accordingly, it
would have had a juridical significance. It would mean that, if Evagoras
was readmitted in the empire as δοῦλος, he would have had the status of
a royally appointed official, and Salamis would have become a Persian
royal domain. On Evagoras' death, his kingdom would have been the
Great King's to use as he pleased and he might or might not have elected

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180. See, e.g., Spyridakis 1941[1945], 104-107 (cf. 1963, 62-65), Hill 1940,
112.
181. Hill 1940, 138-139.
182. Martin 1963, 231, Osborne 1973, 530.
183. Grote 1852, 31-32.
184. Spyridakis 1941[1945], 71 (cf. 1963, 54-55), Meloni 1950, 332.

to allow Evagoras' sons to succeed their father. For Evagoras the implication was being subject to the Persian monarch, rather than being sovereign.[185]

Viewed in this light, the incident was held to offer most revealing insights about the status of Cypriot kings and a basis of interpreting in general Achaemenid attitudes to Cypriot rulers. Evagoras' accomplishment in being recognized formally as a king and not as a pro forma slave (or subject), viewed as a reinstatement of the *status quo ante*, implied that the 'autonomy' that was presumably granted to Evagoras by the terms of the peace characterized the status of Cypriot kings throughout the Persian period.

The incident was also instrumental in the formulation of more recent, general conclusions about Persian responses to Cypriot revolts. Cypriot kings were prone to rebel occasionally, and Persia was evidently inclined to quickly quell the revolts. Evagoras' rebellion and reinstatement, however, implied that the Cypriot rebellions had no serious impact on the status of local kings (and by extension the island as a whole). As Tuplin states, "[a]ll things considered, the history of Cypriot revolts seems to disclose a rather laid-back attitude by all parties. Cypriot cities seem prone to jump on band-wagons and then

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185. Chaumont 1972, 187-188: "Il nous semble que le term δοῦλος tel qu'il est employé ici par Diodore de Sicile correspond tout simplement au mot vieux perse *bandaka* qui et attesté dans les inscriptions achéménides pour designer des satrapes et des hauts fonctionnaires. Nous serions disposés à considerer la différence de terminologie qui se reflète dans le récit de Diodore comme correspondant à la nuance juridique suivante: Evagoras n'a pas voulu être δοῦλος, c'est-à-dire mandataire royal nommé par le monarque, obéissant aux ordres de celui-ci, commandant une région qui n'est plus la sienne propre mais une parcelle de l'empire achéménide, enfin révocable. Au contraire, en se voyant reconnaître comme Βασιλεύς, Evagoras, en plus du prestige personnel attaché au titre, se voyait maître de son pays. Celui-ci restait autonome, obéissant aux lois et réglements d'Evagoras. En plus du Salamine conservait donc entière liberté intérieure, peut-être même extérieure, dans la mésure où sa diplomatie n'allait pas à l'encontre de celle du Grand Roi. Evagoras pouvait enfin songer à transmettre son état à ses descendants, futurs vassaux du Perse. En bref, Evagoras n'acceptait qu'une forme de vassalisation lui garantissant l'autonomie....Il est difficile de dire si ce traité entraînait de grands changements dans la position du roi de Salamine par rapport au satrape d'Abarnahara." Cf. Costa 1974, 41, 43, Stylianou 1989, 478.

jump off them again and the Persians, though concerned to suppress disorder, seem to regard this behaviour tolerantly."[186] This was also seen to explain the continuation of the kingdoms after the Cypriot revolt. As Stylianou stated, in this light, the Persian answer to the Cypriot revolt could be said to have been that Persia merely saw to it "that the conservative and/or pro-Persian elements in the island's ruling class maintained the upper hand".[187]

In short, realization of the thorny problems that center on Herodotus' testimony about Cyprus' affiliation with the fifth *nomos*, the lack of any positive evidence for Cyprus' subjection to direct satrapal authority, and evidence that could be taken to indicate the wide freedom enjoyed by the Cypriot kings as well as the Persian monarchs' tolerance to rebellion on the island all led to a considerably reformed perspective of Cyprus' place in the empire.

The island's well-attested obligations to make tributary payments and to support with troops the Persian rulers' military expeditions remain the only certain parameters in discussions of Cyprus' relations with the Persian regime. The rest of the evidence seemed to lead to a number of equally plausible alternative definitions of the island's political connections with the empire. Despite the controversy that surrounds the meaning and accuracy of Herodotus' list, the apparent diversity of imperial administrative mechanisms in the provinces would still allow, according to some scholars, the supposition of the island's formal incorporation in the imperial structure. Thus, according to J. M. Cook's description of the satrapy of *Ebir Nari*:

> So far as we can judge, there was a variety of local governors, whose chanceries would maintain contact with both the satrapal court and such lesser centres as there were within their jurisdiction. These local governors were city princes in Phoenicia and Cyprus, elsewhere perhaps priestly rulers, native despots, and tribal sheikhs.[188]

Cyprus' dependence on the fifth *nomos* was also accepted by Thierry Petit, who specifically takes, however, Herodotus' 'satrapies' to be fiscal districts and further asserts that, while Sidon is always likely to have

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186. Tuplin 1996, 47.
187. Stylianou 1989, 428; cf. 398-412, 434.
188. Cook 1983, 174-175.

been the chief administrative center of the fifth 'satrapy', the administration of the Cypriot polities was in the hands of local dynasties, and the presence on the island of a satrapal court and administration, or even of an officer subordinate to the satrap, should be excluded.[189] Michael Weiskopf,[190] in contrast, considers local rulers as able to function as satraps; satrapal authority would be represented by local Cypriot kings.

This trend towards finding alternative interpretations of what it might have meant for Cyprus to be included in the empire has produced a number of interpretations that cannot be entirely reconciled. Others believe Cyprus to have been outside the satrapal structure altogether. For Stylianou, "[t]he incorporation of Cyprus within the satrapy of 'Abarnahara'", which, as he states, "is based on no other evidence than Herodotus' perplexing list of satrapies" ought to be dismissed on the grounds of absence of concrete traces that the island was subject to the authority of a satrap.[191] Thus, altogether discounting the trustworthiness of Herodotus' testimony in this respect, he posits that the indications "are rather of client kingdoms, independent in every respect, with their own administrative systems and laws..."[192]—a status that was presumably initially determined under Cyrus and remained unchanged throughout the Persian era. Similarly, for Tuplin, although one could

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189. Petit 1991, 161. As he states (p. 169), in the case of Cyprus, the terms of Hauben's proposal (1987, 214; cf. Gjerstad 1948, 479), namely, that "[f]or every power aspiring to a measure of thalassocracy in the Eastern Mediterranean control of Cyprus was a *conditio sine qua non*", "pourraient être inversés. Contrôlez les côtes qui font face à Chypre, toutes les côtes, et l'île vous sera donnée en sus. Après les expéditions de Pausanias (478) et de Cimon (ca. 466 et ca. 450), cette evidence s'imposa aux Perses comme aux Grecs et fut entérinée par les dispositions mêmes du traité qui s'ensuivit".

190. Weiskoph 1982, 22 (see also *idem* 2000, 758, and Debord 1999, 27-28). Key examples cited are the Hecatomnids of Caria (see Tod 1985, no. 138) and the *Syennesis* of Cilicia (called a satrap in Xen. *Anab.* 7.8.25); contrast, however, Petit 1988, 307-322, who considers that, properly speaking, only Iranians could assume the office of 'satrap'.

191. Stylianou 1989, 414-417, 486, 411. According to this same scholar (416 n. 239) the reported subordination of the island to 'Abarnahara' was perhaps no more than "an arrangement which ... helped to precipitate the Cypriot revolt in 498, and which did not last."

192. Stylianou 1989, 416.

naturally suppose that "in general geo-political terms" Cyprus would be regarded by the Achaemenids as being in *Ebir Nari*,[193] the island "never had a satrap under the Achaemenids…neither one imposed from outside (i.e., an Iranian) nor a native king elevated to that role", and that "in this respect it differs from some other dynastic areas of the empire, for example Cilicia, Lycia, Caria, which were eventually embraced within the satrapal system…The safest comparison is with the Phoenician cities, since nobody is ever said to have been satrap of Phoenicia or the like either".[194] This would reflect "the realization that the two areas with their long established city-states had a satisfactorily defined internal organization and one, which, being monarchic, was not conceptually alien".[195] In Tuplin's assessment, "the situation is one which, given other considerations, such as the insularity of Cyprus, is consistent with a certain attitude of detachment".[196] Finally Costa and Collombier[197] do not discuss the status of Cyprus as a part of a satrapy at all. According to Costa, considering the King's demand that Evagoras relinquish his holdings outside Salamis, "[t]he autonomy of the individual Cypriot cities was the method by which Persia assured the loyalty of Cyprus", meaning that "a united Cyprus, even if ostensibly friendly, was too great a threat to the western seaboard of the Empire to be tolerated".[198]

193. Tuplin 1996, 42.

194. Tuplin 1996, 40. See, however, Elayi 1987, for a view of the Phoenician cities as autonomous tributary states within the satrapy of 'Across-the-River'.

195. Tuplin 1996, 40.

196. Tuplin 1996, 40.

197. Collombier 1991a, followed by Bekker-Nielsen 2004, 49: "While the Persians were swift to punish the Cypriots for their participation in the Ionian Revolt and again after an insurrection in the mid-fourth [!] century, here as elsewhere in their vast empire they exerted their hegemony indirectly rather than by direct day-to-day control. The Cypriot states retained their separate identity, their monarchical institutions and their own coinage".

198. Costa 1974, 55 (cf. Spyridakis 1941[1945], 70).

QUESTIONS AND PROSPECTS

S ome 70 years since Spyridakis', Hill's and Gjerstad's initial surveys, the stereotype of oppressive Persian rule in Cyprus has lost its luster. Growing awareness of the political and ideological bias of Greek accounts has helped to set the study of Cypriot phenomena free from the narrow framework of ethnic and ideological tensions between Greeks, Persians, and Phoenicians that was implied by our sources and colored earlier interpretations of the island's political and cultural history in the Persian era. Parallel inquiries into the relations of the island with the Persian state have exposed, furthermore, the difficulties in adducing either written or archaeological evidence of a formal Persian presence or tight imperial administrative control of Cyprus.

The claim that the Persians were detached from the island's affairs derives from lack of evidence for the existence of a satrap or other permanent Persian administrative or military presence on the island, rather than affirmative evidence either way, making the claim difficult to disprove but perhaps also of limited usefulness. The more important question for our purposes is whether our sources' silence in this instance allows us to posit the Cypriot kingdoms' special autonomy throughout the Persian period. The overall lack of evidence that plagues investigations of the subject provinces makes it difficult to address this question.

Parallel studies of other areas of the empire demonstrate that the problems of detecting a Persian presence and assessing modes of Persian control are not exclusive to Cyprus but surface repeatedly in investigations of other, demonstrably tightly controlled, territories of the Great Kings' realm. For instance, no satrap is ever recorded in our texts for Sogdiana, although it is included by Herodotus (3.93.3) in the sixteenth Persian *nomos* and as a separate entry in the royal subject lists.[199] Furthermore, although it is indisputable that the Persians kept meticulous records, such records have only been recovered in any volume in the Persian homeland and in Babylonia, where cuneiform documents on clay tablets have survived. Elsewhere the workings of the Achaemenid administration were usually recorded in Aramaic on

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199. E.g., Kent 1953, DB I 16, DPe 16, DNa 23, XPh 21. Cf. Tuplin 1987a, 114.

perishable materials; surviving documents are usually rare[200] and unevenly distributed, and sometimes represented in greater quantities in minor sites but rare or absent in major centers.[201]

Defining markers of Persian presence in the material culture of the subject provinces is by and large an ineffectual exercise.[202] Thus, although Iranian settlement in Asia Minor is well attested, at the major satrapal capital of Sardis, which has been under intensive archaeological exploration, signs of Persian impact upon the local material culture are most visibly present in the prolific and standardized local production of Achaemenid bowls in ceramic.[203] No traces of what must have been a bustling Sardian bureaucracy in the form of archives or Achaemenid-

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200. In some instances such administrative activity is merely betrayed by *caches* of Achaemenid bullae, see, e.g., Dascylium (Balkan 1959, Kaptan 2002), Memphis (Petrie 1910, xxxv, xxxvi, Bresciani 1958, 182). For contemporary administrative/economic documents dated by Achaemenid rulers' regnal years found outside Iran and Babylonia, see notably the ostraka from the Wadi Daliyeh in Palestine (Stern 1982, 237, dated between c. 375 and 335 BC and mentioning officials of the local Persian government by their titles, such as, governor, prefect, treasurer, scribe); the papyri in Aramaic from Elephantine (Cowley 1923) and the ostraka of Ayn Manâwir (Chauveau 2001, some 400 ostraka written in demotic and dating almost entirely from the middle of the reign of Artaxerxes I to that of Akoris) in Egypt; the three decrees of the city of Mylasa in Caria (Tod 1985, no. 138, the decrees are dated, respectively, to the 39th and 45th year of Artaxerxes II and the fifth year of his successor, Artaxerxes Ochus]); and a more recent find of documents in 'Imperial Aramaic' dating from the reign of Darius III to that of Alexander the Great from Bactria that are due to be published by J. Naveh and S. Shaked (announced in Briant 2003, 34). See also Tuplin's (1987a) apt overview of Achaemenid administration and the material evidence for its presence in the subject provinces.

201. As Briant 2003, 38, observes, "there is no mechanical relationship between the number of documents found in a province and the intensity of the control exercised by central authorities" (cf. Briant 1986, 782-788).

202. Concerning the pronounced *general* difficulty of determining (archaeological) markers of Persian presence and impact in the lands of the empire, see, e.g., Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1990, Briant 1987, 2003; cf. also, however, the reservations of Stolper 1999 about the false impression that such a general scarcity of evidence may be projecting about the overall 'presence' of the Achaemenid state in the provinces.

203. Dusinberre 2003, 172-195.

type administrative buildings have been discovered.[204] What little documentation exists is largely Lydian in character. Persian rule in that cardinal Achaemenid center in the West is echoed by rare funerary inscriptions dated by Achaemenid regnal years,[205] by a Roman period re-carving of an Achaemenid period dedication by a certain Droaphernes, son of Barakes, 'hyparch of Lydia', that provides evidence, among other things, to the interactions of local Lydian and Iranian cults,[206] and by the so-called Mnesimachus Inscription which offers insights into Achaemenid land-tenure systems at Sardis.[207] Even more instructive for the present purposes is the example of Bactria in the eastern reaches of the empire. Though classical and Achaemenid texts attest that satraps and imperial garrisons were posted to Bactria, traces of Achaemenid presence in its archaeological landscape (e.g., pottery, military architecture, irrigation techniques) have long been difficult to identify.[208] Only a recent chance discovery of documents in "Imperial Aramaic" dated from the reign of Artaxerxes III to Darius III and Alexander the

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204. The seals of Sardis (Boardman 1970; see now Dusinberre 2003, 158-171 and 264-283 [Appendix 4]) might be taken as an index of the role of Achaemenid administration (Tuplin 1987a, 110 n. 3). See also the suggestion of Mierse (1983) that the local satraps would have resided in the palace of the former Lydian rulers. The dialogue, however, between Lydian and Persian architecture, which is evident from the Graeco-Lydian elements that are featured in the architecture of Cyrus the Great at Pasargadae (see Nylander 1970), is also attested in the cases of two Persian period funerary monuments at Sardis (Mierse 1983, 102-103).

205. Thus, the Aramaic version of a bilingual, Lydian-Aramaic funerary inscription indicates that the text was composed "[o]n the 5th of Marheswan [of the] 10th year of King Artaxerxes" (see Kahle and Sommer 1927, trans. in Dusinberre 2003, 229 no. 9]); the Lydian version of another bilingual text is dated to "year sixteen of Artaxerxes/ the king in/ the month Kanlala on the ...st day/ [trolλ] on the feast of Artemis..." (Gusmani 1964, no. 41, trans. in Dusinberre 2003, 230 no. 12]); a third, Lydian, inscription is dated "[i]n the year fifteen in the month of Cuves of Artaxexes/ the king" (Gusmani 1964, no. 2, trans. in Dusiberre 2003, 229 no. 10).

206. See conveniently Dusinberre 2003, 118 and 233, with references to earlier publications.

207. Descat 1985, Dusinberre 2003, 123-125, 237-238 no. 55, with bibliography.

208. Cf. Briant 1987, 7. An earlier summary of the evidence may be consulted in Briant 1984; see now also Lyonnet 1997, 118-119.

Great[209] allow us to reconcile the literary and archaeological testimony from this satrapy.

The identification of imperial garrisons, which were presumably a regular feature of Persian rule in the provinces,[210] is especially difficult. We do not possess an official catalogue of imperial garrisons posted in the subject territories. In most cases their existence is revealed incidentally in the textual record through references to specific military incidents, and as a rule they are difficult to detect on the ground. Tuplin notes that although some 120 Achaemenid garrison sites are securely attested in the Greek and Near Eastern written record,[211] and although an abundance of fortified sites that *could* have served as imperial military control points have been identified in different provinces of the empire, "[t]o deduce the presence…of Persian garrisons is…rarely possible"[212] from these sites' material remains, and "it is only in the real heartland of the empire that one might be safe in assuming a connection [of such sites] with the Achaemenid garrison system".[213] Thus far, outside the Iranian homeland, the only securely attested Iranian military presence (based on the existence of distinct Iranian cultural traits) in a non-fortified site is the Deve Hüyük II cemetery.[214] The identification of such sites is further complicated by the fact that in most instances, the only Iranian individual present might be the garrison commander, with the post otherwise manned by non-Iranian troops. In particular, if imperial

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209. See n. 200 above.

210. See Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.6 and *Oecon.* 4.5-11, and the systematic collection of the literary and archaeological evidence for imperial garrisons by Tuplin 1987b (cf. Debord 1999, 38-41).

211. See Tuplin 1987b, 235-241, for a complete list of such sites and the relevant literary evidence. See also his discussion of the relevant archaeological evidence and the numerous problems that are involved in the identification of such sites (pp. 198-208), and his conclusion (p. 208) that "…the archaeological record has for our present purposes a decidedly limited utility. It does not suggest an empire characterized by highprofile and oppressive military supervision; but the chances are that this says as much about the failings of the evidence as about the actual nature of Ahaemenid rule".

212. Tuplin 1987b, 204.

213. Tuplin 1987b, 203.

214. Moorey 1980 (cf. Tuplin 1987b, 204). The evidence consists of built cist-tombs of western Iranian type, Caspian pottery, and "weapons and equipment of the sort to be expected among Persian troops".

troops stationed on Cyprus were drawn from the Levant, their presence on the island would be especially difficult to detect in the archaeological record given the island's millennial close cultural ties with the latter area.

Such general grounds for caution might be overridden, at least in the case of Cyprus, on the basis of Xenophon's report that the Founder Cyrus "sent no satraps to Cyprus but was satisfied with the local kings", as well as evidence arguing for local institutions of kingship through the end of the Persian era, and the stress placed by Diodorus on the granting of Evagoras' demand to submit to Artaxerxes II as a "king to a king" in the treaty that ended the Cypriot war. The latter event—in all probability correctly interpreted as a reinstatement of the *status quo ante* and coming after Evagoras' ten-year conflict with Persia—has been held to make the point most forcefully that the privileged status that was presumably awarded to the Cypriots by Cyrus the Great remained in place throughout the Persian period, however prone the Cypriots were to rebel and despite the Persian rulers' concern to contain Cypriot recalcitrance as rapidly as possible.

Recent researches on the history of the Persian empire illustrate the possible dangers of going too far in minimizing the impact and efficiency of Achaemenid power in the subject provinces in the face of diverse local political institutions (*koina*, city- and temple-states, *ethne*).[215] The Achaemenids' tolerance for the political (and social) institutions of their subjects may differ from modern state practices, but one cannot doubt the expediency and overall success of this strategy. The preservation of local structures not only facilitated the collection of revenues and the recruitment of troops but also allowed the co-opting of local elites into the imperial system[216]—a system whose success ought to be measured primarily against the longevity of the empire. The need to preserve the traditional political systems of the empire's subjects was

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215. See, for, instance, Tod 1985, no. 138, wherein the Carian city of Mylasa, though subject to the rule of Mausollus (who is designated as satrap, ll. 2, 18, 33: Μαυσσώλλου ἐξαιθραπεύοντος) and ultimately of the Persian king, passes decrees in a regular civic assembly (ll. 2 f., 19, 43) which further require the formal ratification of the three tribes into which the original citizen body had been divided (ll. 3 f., 20, 43 f.). See also, in general, Frei 1990, Tuplin 1987a, 111, Briant 1987, esp. 2-3, Debord 1999, 176-188, with further references.

216. See, among others, Austin 1990, Knauf 1990, Frei 1996.

perhaps especially pronounced in the case of royal institutions that were intimately associated with divinity. These could not be eliminated without profoundly upsetting the fabric of local society and local political stability. The Persian rulers' need to impress upon their subjects the notion of the continuity of local institutions of kingship—even when they saw a need to displace native kings—is evidenced, for example, by Cyrus' adoption of Babylonian royal protocol when addressing the Babylonian people,[217] and by Darius' adoption of Egyptian royal titulature in the hieroglyphic inscription of his Egyptian-made statue discovered at Susa.[218] Information about the Great Kings' treatment of vassal kings is very limited outside Cyprus; this is what makes Cyprus, from the point of view of inquiries into the organization of the Persian state, a particularly important case study. The preservation of the Cypriot kingdoms might not deviate, however, from the standard scheme of political tolerance adopted by Persia elsewhere.

Setting δοῦλος as an equivalent of *badaka*[219]—the Persian term interpreted by Chaumont as designating "satraps and other high functionaries"—Evagoras' submission as a 'king' and not as a 'slave' implies extraordinary autonomy (interpreted by Stylianou as 'client' status), and as such it could be understood as excluding Evagoras and Salamis from the Great King's domain. While ostensibly anchored in Persian realities (δοῦλος = *badaka*), such an interpretation would seem to be incongruous with Persian royal practice. However face-saving it might have been in comparison to other types of imperial rule, a vassal's royal status was not exempt from the standard definition of *badaka* by which the Great King defined his normative relationship with his subjects.

In the first column of his Behistun inscription, Darius' self-presentation as "the Great King, King of Kings, King in Persia, King of countries"[220] presupposes a supreme monarch ruling over subject kingdoms. The subsequent collective characterization of the ruled as

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217. See, e.g., Kuhrt 1983.
218. See Yoyotte 1972.
219. Properly defined, however, the Old Persian term *badaka* means 'vassal'/'follower' rather than 'slave', see Widengren 1969, cf. Schmitt 2001, 419, Briant 1996, 335-7.
220. Kent 1953, DB I 1-2.

Darius' *badakā*[221] could be taken to indicate that such kingdoms as existed in the empire were, at least conceptually, not excluded from the King's domain.[222] While thus there would appear to exist no intrinsic conflict between the concept of a subject king and that of *badaka*, the latter concept, being indiscriminately applied in both the Greek and Persian records to Persian satraps as well as conquered peoples,[223] would have actually encompassed different types of dependence and degrees of self-determination, depending in each instance on the respective position of the individual in the imperial hierarchy.

Accordingly, the distinction between 'slave' and 'king' might have been intended to flatter a proud Greek audience that their vassal king was of higher status than other subjects of the empire. Or, perhaps more probably, the distinction is no more than a rationalization by Diodorus (or his source) of the unconventional settlement of Evagoras' conflict with the empire. Isocrates notes that the Persian kings "were not accustomed to make peace with their rebellious subjects until they had become masters of their persons" and that they had abandoned that custom (νόμον) in the case of Evagoras, "leaving entirely undisturbed

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221. Kent 1953, DB I 18-20: *imā:dahyāva:tyā:manā:patiyāiša:vašnā:Aura-mazdāha:manā:badakā:āhatā:manā:bājim:abaratā:tyašām:hacāma:aθahya: xšapavā:raucapativā:ava:akunavayatā*, "These are the peoples/lands which came unto me; by the favor of Ahuramazda they were my *badakā*; they bore tribute to me; what was said to them by me either by night or by day, that was done" (trans. Kent).

222. See in the same sense Hdt. 7.96.2, wherein the respective native leaders (including native kings) who were in charge of the different ethnic contingents of Xerxes' army and fleet in 480/79 are stated to have followed not as commanders but ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι στρατευόμενοι δοῦλοι.

223. Much discussed are the Greek uses of the term 'slave' for high standing Persian officials. In Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.36 (τοὺς νῦν ὁμοδούλους σοι καταστρεφόμε-νον, ὥστε σοὺς ὑπηκόους εἶναι) the Spartan king, Agesilaus uses it of the satrap of Dascylium, Pharnabazus. Philip would later scorn Alexander for wanting to become the son-in-law of the satrap of Caria, Pixodarus, "a man who was a Carian and a slave to a barbarian king (i.e., the Great King)" (Plut. *Alex.* 10.3: εἰ Καρὸς ἀνθρώπου καὶ βαρβάρῳ βασιλεῖ δουλεύοντος ἀγαπᾷ γαμβρὸς γενέσθαι). See also the address of Darius to the hyparch of Sardis, Gadata, in the famous "Letter" of Darius (Meiggs and Lewis 1988, no. 12 ll. 1-4: βασιλεὺς [βα]σιλέων Δαρεῖος ὁ Ὑστάσπεω Γαδάται δούλωι...). The point is, however, that the Greek use of the term with respect to *all* of the King's subjects is also well attested.

[his] authority" (9.63, Loeb trans.). Persian rulers are indeed said in a number of occasions to have dealt harshly with rebellion, and the principle is enunciated in the Achaemenids' own official proclamations.[224] Artaxerxes' final acquiescence to Evagoras' demand to be readmitted to the empire as a 'king' has been taken by some scholars as an indication of Persian complaisance to Cypriot rebellion. In the lack of any direct evidence to the contrary, the thesis of Persian tolerance towards the Cypriot rebels has also seemed applicable to the revolt of the 490's, whose effects on the Cypriot kingdoms have been the subject of heated discussion.[225] Yet Artaxerxes' deviation from the general pattern of Persian harshness towards insubordination in his treatment of Evagoras can also be explained more pragmatically: despite the Persians' persistent efforts to capture Salamis in the 380's, the city was not actually conquered.[226] All that Diodorus may mean in this instance is that Evagoras, negotiating from a position of relative strength, was able to extricate himself from the afflictions that were normally visited upon rebels by the Persian kings. Be that as it may, Diodorus still leaves unanswered the crucial question of the relationship between central power and Evagoras.

Once Diodorus' supposedly clear testimony about the status of Evagoras is dismissed, the rest of the testimony available about the status of Cypriot kings equally fails to provide a convincing picture of Cypriot 'autonomy'. Although the equivalent Persian term remains unknown, αὐτονομία was certainly not alien to Persian political vocabulary. It is worth keeping in mind, however, that Iranian rulers (including Cyrus the Great himself) are never stated to have applied the concept to Cyprus. In 387/6 the Aegean Greek states were largely declared 'autonomous' by

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224. See, e.g., Kent 1953, DB I-V describing Darius' quelling of the rebellions that broke out in the empire during the first three years of his reign, and Darius' exhortation to future Persian rulers in DB IV 37-40: "Thou who shalt be king hereafter, protect thyself vigorously from the Lie; the man who shall be a Lie-follower [i.e., a rebel], him do thou punish well, if thus thou shalt think, 'May my country be secure!'" Cf. DNa 56-60: "O man, that which is the command of Ahuramazda, let this not seem repugnant to thee; do not leave the right path; do not rise in rebellion!"

225. This tendency is especially pronounced in Tuplin 1996, 43-47.

226. An understanding of this important 'technical' point would appear to be implicit in the comments of Hill 1940, 140.

the terms of the King's Peace (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31, Isoc. 4.115, Diod. 14.110). However one interprets Persia's definition of the Aegean Greek parties' 'autonomous' status,[227] Artaxerxes II's simultaneous demand that "the cities in Asia…as well as Clazomenae and Cyprus among the islands" shall belong to the King leaves no doubt that, strictly speaking, αὐτονομία was not what the Persian ruler had in mind for Cyprus.[228] Furthermore, whatever the status awarded to the Cypriots by Cyrus, it is in any case difficult to assume that it would have remained immutable throughout the Persian period. Considering that it was generally not in character for Persian authorities to show mercy to recalcitrant subjects, Cypriot cities and dynasts that were subdued by siege in the revolt of the island in 498/7 would more likely have been treated less tolerantly than Evagoras. It is worth remembering that dynastic continuity remains impossible to prove after the Cypriot revolt at least in the cases of Paphos and Soli (the only two cities so far attested to have been taken by the Persians by siege),[229] and that the continuing existence of Soli as an independent kingdom after the revolt remains a moot question.[230]

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227. For a detailed discussion of the numerous questions raised by the recorded details of the treaty, see especially Badian 1991, 35-48, with references to earlier commentaries.

228. The distinction is astutely made in the Greek edition of Karageorghis 2002, 214-215, who takes, however, the differences between the Cypriots' status and that of the Greeks' 'autonomy' to have been confined to the Cypriots' tributary and military obligations of the Cypriots to the Persian regime: "…οι Κύπριοι ενδεχομένως γνώριζαν πως τα άλλα ελληνικά κράτη ρύθμιζαν αυτόνομα τις υποθέσεις τους, ενώ εκείνοι έπρεπε να πληρώνουν φόρο υποτέλειας στους Πέρσες και να υποστηρίζουν, όποτε καλούνταν, τους περσικούς πολέμους με πλοία και άντρες."

229. Destruction layers datable to c. 500 and, thus, possible to associate with Persian operations against the Cypriot cities at the time of the Cypriot revolt have also been discovered at Tamassus (Buchholz 1977, 303) and in the Peristeries sanctuary at Marium (Childs 1997, 40). A Persian connection is nonetheless not explicit.

230. The limited information at our disposal about the fifth-century rulers of Paphos is stressed by Maier in Maier and Karageorghis 1984, 204. The view that the repercussions of the Cypriot revolt of 498/7 for the Cypriot kingdoms may not have been negligible was put anew by Kagan 1994, who suggested that a disruption of local dynastic/political continuity might be surmised from the apparent discontinuation of a number of mints and the emergence of new ones at about the time of the revolt. See also Debord 1996, 23: "Les nécessités de la

In the current state of our evidence, the endless argument over whether Cyprus was formally included within a Persian satrapy may be unproductive. There are insufficient surviving Achaemenid administrative records to answer the question at present, and the terms satrap/satrapy may not have been always used consistently.[231] Given the Achaemenid rulers' well-attested tolerance towards the political, religious and social institutions of their various subjects, Herodotus' implication that Cyprus was incorporated in a Persian 'satrapy', need not imply that Cyprus enjoyed less *local* autonomy than kingdoms that were 'clients'.[232] The Cypriots' relationship with the empire would inevitably have been subject to the aims and fluctuations of Persian power— vicissitudes that, if studied closely, may reflect the circumstances of Persian rule on the island. In this respect at least, there is plenty of room for contemplating both the existence of a Persian policy that was friendlier to Phoenicians and restrictive of Cypriot sovereign authority under different historical circumstances.

Progress in disentangling Cypro-Persian relations has been hindered in part by a literary tradition of analyzing Cypriot history and culture of the Achaemenid era from the narrow perspective of Cyprus' historical relations with Greece and of viewing the presence of Persians and

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guerre (Chypre, Égypte) amènent à reconsidérer la situation en imposant un contrôle plus direct...sur la province."

231. Cf. Weiskopf 1982, 5-13, and 2000, 758: "Subordinate to him [i.e., the satrap] were lesser officers: local nobles (usually estate owners), city commanders, semi-obedient tribal chieftains, native dynasts. The categories overlap: The Greek city commanders Zenis and Mania were styled 'satraps' of Pharnabazus (Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.10-12); the Carian Hecatomnid family, initially city commanders in Mylasa and local dynasts, provided Caria (and Lycia) with satraps. The service and status orientations of the empire left much for promotion—and demotion." Evidence indicating that satraps were not always the highest level officers in provincial contexts has been collected by Tuplin 1987a, 114 and n. 23. A more recent account of the relevant testimony is offered by Debord 1999, 23-29, with references to earlier discussions.

232. This distinction may not have been conceptually significant from the Great Kings' viewpoint. See, e.g. Kent 1953, DB IV 65-66 ("The man who cooperated with my house, him, I rewarded well"; cf. "whoso did injury, him I punished well") and DN 16-17, where the principle of reciprocity that is elemental in patron-client relationships appears to apply to *all* of the King's relationships.

Phoenicians primarily as intrusions on that relationship. Costa's argument that Evagoras' policies were dictated by material interests rather than by ideological motives and Maier's similar conclusion that, despite the Idalium tablet's testimony for tension between Cypriot Greek and Phoenician centers, the Classical period is characterized by "elements of traditional dynastic conflicts"[233] rather than ethnic antagonism have helped to bring balance to our understanding of local Cypriot power politics. Despite difficulties, however, in confirming the antagonisms attested by Isocrates between Cypriot Greeks and Phoenicians, the factual basis of the Athenian orator's statements cannot be entirely dismissed.

As Stylianou[234] has argued, the historical record supplies sufficient grounds for assuming a Mediterranean-wide Graeco-Phoenician antagonism, the roots of which, based ultimately on commercial competition, are possible to trace as early as the Neo-Assyrian period. In as much as the Phoenicians are repeatedly implied by our sources to have constituted the backbone of Persia's Mediterranean fleets (indeed, on occasion the expression 'Phoenician ships' occurs as synonymous with Persia's imperial navy, e.g., in Thuc. 8.88, 109.1) and Greek military encounters with Persia were largely sea-based, there is every reason to assume that Graeco-Phoenician antagonism would have acquired additional momentum in the Persian era. The Graeco-Phoenician rivalry playing out elsewhere in the Mediterranean world undoubtedly played out in Cyprus as well.

Although the Greek and Phoenician populations of Cyprus had coexisted for centuries, a real ethnic mélange and identity had not arisen by the Persian period. There are far more numerous indications that "Greek and Phoenician communities in Persian period Cyprus were still essentially separate".[235] The course of these communities' relations with Greece and Phoenicia, respectively, is usually impossible to chart. But as the island existed in the broader context of eastern Mediterranean commercial and political interests there can be little doubt that external

233. Maier 1985, 39.
234. Stylianou 1989, 421-425.
235. Tuplin 1996, 67, who bases his comments on the conclusions reached initially by Stylianou 1989, 432-433 and Collombier 1991b.

Greek, Phoenician and Persian interests, and the clashes between these interests, impacted Cyprus in complex ways.[236]

Put side by side, Persian collaboration with Phoenician Citium against Idalium, on the one hand, and the Great Kings' apparent maintenance of amicable relations with Evagoras until 391, despite his deposing his Phoenician predecessor, on the other, illustrate the Persian tendency to align with Cypriot cities and rulers on the basis of factors other than ethnicity or cultural identity. However, Persia's well attested amicable relations with Evagoras—who is in fact the only Cypriot-Greek ruler known to have attained extraordinary prominence in Persian affairs—until 391 have a considerable potential to lead us astray when viewed outside the framework of Persia's larger strategic concerns at the time. Evagoras' rise to prominence in Persian affairs in the 390's was linked, as initially argued by Costa,[237] with a consistent Persian policy to destroy Spartan sea power and to regain control of Asia Minor with Athenian help. His usefulness to the Persians may have derived from his friendly relations with Athens that allowed him to function as a liaison between Persia and Conon and Athens.

Yet a temporary Persian alliance with Conon and Athens would seem unlikely to point to a more pervasive and enduring pro-Greek attitude given the more numerous occasions, such as the Cypriot revolt and Cimon's expeditions, when Aegean Greeks are known to have been actively threatening the dissolution of Persian sea power in the eastern Mediterranean, and when the Cypriots' Greek cultural ties and sentiment,[238] if left unchecked, threatened to weaken Persia's position. In such moments, the Phoenicians, traditional competitors of the Greeks and unerringly loyal to Persia until the mid-fourth century, would have been a valuable asset for Persia, possibly in exchange for political influence and commercial privileges in the Levant and Cyprus.[239]

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236. On mainland Phoenician hegemonic claims over Cyprus during the Neo-Assyrian period, see esp. Na'aman 1998 and 2001.

237. Costa 1974, 48-49; cf. Lewis 1977, 146-158, Lewis and Stroud 1979, 190-191, Zournatzi 1991, 101-119.

238. Cf. Lewis 1977, 153.

239. See, e.g., the grant of Dor and Jaffa by the Great King to King Eshmunazor of Sidon, explained by Elayi 1989, 241-242, as a reward for military accomplishments in Persian service; cf. also Elayi and Sayegh 2000, 341-343. As argued by Yon 1992, 244-249, Citium's well attested collaboration

Needless to say, the foregoing observations do not cover the full spectrum of issues that arise in connection with Persia's two-century-long rule of Cyprus. It is hoped that they at least help, first, to highlight the limitations of our direct sources and the need to appeal to the larger corpus of Achaemenid evidence and Persian imperial practice throughout the empire in order to elucidate conditions on Cyprus. Second, it is hoped that they illustrate the need to take into account the complex interplay of interests that would have affected the history of the island in the Persian period—and which have never ceased to affect Cypriot history through the ages. Crucial though they may be in general for understanding Cypriot history in the Persian era, the framework of local Cypriot state conflict and the likely presence of an undercurrent of antagonism between Cypriot Greek and Phoenician communities may only acquire specific significance when approached from a perspective that considers the mix of internal and external interests at work in both Cyprus and the eastern Mediterranean at large.

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with Persia and the latter city's political prominence throughout the classical period, despite its possible collusion with the Greek-Cypriot cities against the Persian regime in the 490's, should be understood within a framework of mutual benefits.

ABBREVIATIONS

AC	*Archaeologia Cypria*
AfO	*Archiv für Orientforschung*
AHB	*Ancient History Bulletin*
AJA	*American Journal of Archaeology*
AMI	*Archäologische Mitteilungen aus Iran*
AncSoc	*Ancient Society*
ANET[2]	Pritchard 1955
Annales HSS	*Annales Histoire, Sciences Sociales*
ARAB	Luckenbill 1975
BASOR	*Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research*
BMB	*Bulletin du Musée de Beyrouth*
BMC, Cyprus...	Hill 1904
CCEC	*Cahier du Centre d'Études Chypriotes*
CIS	*Corpus inscriptionum semiticarum* (1881-)
CP	*Classical Philology*
CQ	*Classical Quarterly*
CRAI	*Comptes rendus des séances de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles lettres*
FGrHist	Jacoby 1923-1958
ICS[2]	Masson 1983
IG	*Inscriptiones graecae*
JA	*Journal asiatique*
JHS	*Journal of Hellenic Studies*
JNES	*Journal of Near Eastern Studies*
JNG	*Jahrbuch für Numismatik und Geldgeschichte*
JSOT	*Journal of the Society for Old Testament*
KF	*Kleinasiatische Forschungen*
KS	*Kypriakai Spoudai*
MusHelv	*Museum Helveticum*
NC	*Numismatic Chronicle*
NNA	*Nordisk Numismatisk Årsskrift*
OpArch	*Opuscula Archaeologica*
OpAth	*Opuscula Atheniensia*
RDAC	*Report of the Department of Antiquities, Cyprus*
RE	Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft* (1893-)
REA	*Revue des études anciennes*
RN	*Revue numismatique*
SCO	*Studi Classici e Orientali*
StudIr	*Studia Iranica*

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